The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: Challenges and Opportunities
Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office in Vienna
and the International Atomic Energy Agency
Hanns Seidel Foundation Conference
Munich, Germany
May 4, 2007
This is a pivotal time for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The treaty confronts serious challenges. Left unchecked, these challenges could put at risk global efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and reduce existing stockpiles. But there are also important opportunities to address these challenges and strengthen the NPT.
I’d like to review three challenges and three opportunities, then talk about the importance of our collaboration.
Three Challenges
There are three main challenges to the NPT:
-- the noncompliance of a small number of states,
-- the spread of sensitive technologies,
-- the interest of terrorists in mass destruction.
North Korea is a leading case of noncompliance. The IAEA Board found North Korea in noncompliance with its safeguards obligations in 1993 and again in 2003. North Korea left the NPT in 2003 and tested a nuclear weapon last October.
Under significant international pressure, North Korea has agreed to dismantle its nuclear capabilities and return to the NPT. But it has been slow to implement initial actions to shut down and seal the facility where it produced plutonium for its nuclear weapons.
Iran is the other blatant case of noncompliance. Since its covert nuclear facilities were uncovered in 2002, the IAEA’s intensive investigations have raised troubling questions about Iran’s nuclear activities. In February 2006, the IAEA Board reported Iran to the UN Security Council on two grounds: Iran’s noncompliance with its safeguards obligations, and the absence of confidence in the peaceful nature of its activities.
The UN Security Council has since adopted three resolutions on Iran’s nuclear activities, two imposing sanctions targeted against sensitive nuclear activities and individuals and organizations involved in them. Unfortunately, the leaders in Iran have shown no inclination to comply with the Security Council resolutions, and they have been steadily reducing Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA. Just last month, President Ahmadinejad -- well-known for calling to wipe Israel off the map -- defiantly announced the start of industrial-scale uranium enrichment.
Mohammed ElBaradei, the Director General of the IAEA, predicts that Iran will be operating 3,000 centrifuges for uranium enrichment by June. Three thousands centrifuges -- once reliably running -- are sufficient to produce enough highly-enriched uranium for one nuclear bomb in less than a year.
I’m not saying that Iran will have a nuclear weapon in a year -- we think it will take longer. But there is no doubt that Iran’s leadership is actively and defiantly pursuing the technology, material, and know-how to produce nuclear weapons in the near term.
Iran’s leaders claim their pursuits are peaceful. But following President Ahmadinejad’s defiant announcement, the editor of a conservative daily newspaper, closely connected to the supreme leader wrote: “a country that has uranium enrichment is only one step from producing nuclear weapons.” And an editorial in another government-controlled newspaper warned: “if the international community fails to resolve the current crisis as soon as possible by accepting Iran’s model the world will again witness the proliferation of nuclear weapons.”
A second challenge to the NPT is the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies. The main hurdle between a leadership determined to produce a nuclear weapon is not the design and assembly of the weapon itself. Rather the main hurdle is acquiring the necessary fissile material in the form of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Countries like Iran have pursued sensitive technologies to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium while claiming that their intentions are purely peaceful.
Mohammed ElBaradei and others have warned that this ability to build bomb-making capabilities in the guise of peaceful nuclear pursuits is a major loophole in the NPT. This loophole can become more of a challenge as more and more countries look to nuclear power to provide energy diversity and reduce carbon emissions. This loophole will also become more of a challenge if governments decide to acquire their own bomb-making capabilities in response to noncompliance by others. This is a real possibility in the Middle East, where Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon could easily cause others to do the same. And the Middle East is the last place in the world where we need a new nuclear arms race.
A third challenge to the NPT is terrorist pursuit of nuclear weapons or radioactive materials suitable for a “dirty bomb.”
Like many other international treaties, the NPT was conceived to deal with states. Increasingly, however, the problems we face are not states – but transnational networks that operate across states. Today, criminal networks are trafficking cocaine, opium, and even people, transporting them across our borders by plane, ship, and truck. These same networks could also smuggle nuclear materials that are not properly secured or controlled.
A renegade state might brandish nuclear weapons to blackmail or intimidate, without actually exploding them. However, today’s terrorist groups may have little compunction to detonate a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb in one of our cities. The results would be devastating -- and global.
Three Opportunities
The challenges are apparent. We felt them in North Korea’s nuclear test. We hear them in the defiant words of President Ahmadinejad. We see them as we continue to unravel A.Q. Kahn’s worldwide network for trafficking sensitive technologies.
But there are also opportunities -- opportunities to address these challenges, strengthen the NPT, and benefit from the peaceful side of nuclear technology. Let me mention three.
The first opportunity is the potential for strong, sustained, international diplomacy to reverse noncompliance.
The challenges posed by North Korea and Iran have sparked worldwide concern and condemnation. Both countries are now subject to Chapter VII resolutions. And, supported by those resolutions, both countries are subject to intense diplomatic endeavors to convince their leaders to change from a course of confrontation and noncompliance to one of cooperation and peaceful pursuits.
Each case is different but the central problem is similar: To convince the leadership that they would be better off without nuclear weapons than with them. This is not easy when the leaders have made nuclear pursuits a matter of nationalist pride -- or even see nuclear weapons as crucial to their hold on power.
For diplomacy to succeed, it must be serious and sustained, and it must be backed by the right balance of sanctions and incentives. Countries across the world must work together and use a full range of non-military instruments, from global diplomacy to progressively stronger international sanctions.
In the case of Iran, Dennis Ross, an American expert on the Middle East, recently wrote: “a deal may be possible, but it won’t come from chasing after Iranians. They must know that they will pay a high price for pursuing nuclear weapons.”
The U.S. is working closely with partners in Europe and Asia to seek diplomatic solutions that would bring North Korea and Iran back into full compliance with the NPT.
A second opportunity to strengthen the NPT is represented by the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. GNEP was announced last year by President Bush. It has been warmly welcomed by a variety of countries who see nuclear power in their future energy mix.
GNEP is designed to meet the increasing demand for nuclear power that is safe and secure, while reducing the risk of proliferating weapons. A first step toward GNEP is being developed at the IAEA today. It entails a multilateral system, administered by the IAEA, that would back up the commercial market in fuel for nuclear power reactors with assurances of reliable supply. The goal is to assist countries gain access to nuclear power without feeling compelled to acquire the sensitive technologies that can be misused to build nuclear weapons.
A third opportunity to strengthen the NPT is represented by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. This initiative was announced last year by President Bush and President Putin and launched at last year’s G-8 Summit. Germany and other countries from Europe and across the globe are joining the initiative.
It is intended to strengthen state controls over nuclear and radioactive materials and to increase international cooperation in countering their acquisition by terrorist groups. This initiative is building on ongoing efforts by the US, G-8, and IAEA, including programs to remove weapons-grade uranium from lightly-secured research reactors.
Conclusion
The challenges we face are global and require global responses. Close cooperation between the United States and Europe is essential.
I am pleased to report that the United States and Europe, including Germany, share a common view of the challenges and solutions. At the IAEA, I work closely with the German ambassador, who now not only represents Germany, but also the EU and G8.
While the challenges are difficult, the close cooperation between the US and EU gives me some confidence that we can grasp the opportunities and together succeed.