

# Federal Railroad Administration Office of Safety Headquarters Assigned Accident Investigation Report HQ-2006-64 

## Burlington Northern Santa Fe McKenzie, ND <br> July 16, 2006

Note that 49 U.S.C. §20903 provides that no part of an accident or incident report made by the Secretary of Transportation/Federal Railroad Administration under 49 U.S.C. §20902 may be used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report.


108. DRAW A SKETCH OF ACCIDENT AREA INCLUDING ALL TRACKS, SIGNALS, SWITCHES, STRUCTURES, OBJECTS, ETC., INVOLVED.
HQ-64-
2006

Sketch.jpg


## 109. SYNOPSIS OF THE ACCIDENT

On July 16, 2006, at 3:15 p.m., Central Daylight Time (CDT) a westbound BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) freight train (G-BREINB-9-16) derailed. The accident occurred at McKenzie, North Dakota, on a single main track at about milepost 176.5, on the Twin Cities Division, Jamestown Subdivision.

The train consisted of three locomotives, 110 loaded cars, 15,600 trailing tons and was 6,598 feet in length. A total of 20 cars, 21 st and 26th, and 28th through the 45th, derailed. There were no injuries reported and no release of hazardous materials. The estimated damage for the derailment was $\$ 992,601$ ( $\$ 275,200$ track and \$717,401 equipment).

At the time of the derailment it was daylight and clear. The temperature was $105^{\circ} \mathrm{F}$.
The probable cause of the accident was track alignment irregular (Buckled/Sunkink) (T109).

## 110. NARRATIVE

## Circumstances Prior to the Accident

On July 16, 2006 after completing more than the statutory off duty time, a crew consisting of a engineer and a conductor reported for duty at Dilworth, Minnesota at 8:20 a.m. CDT, their home terminal. The crew was assigned to operate a westbound BNSF freight train (G-BREINB-9-16) between Dilworth and Mandan, North Dakota, a distance of 200 miles.

The train consisted of three locomotives (two in the lead and one in the rear of the train), 110 loaded grain cars, 15,600 trailing tons, and was 6,598 feet in length. The daily locomotive inspections were done on July, 15, 2006 at Grand Forks, North Dakota and an initial terminal air brake test was done on July 16, 2006. The crew boarded the train and departed Dilworth at about 9:35 a.m.

The train approached the derailment area traveling geographically and timetable west. Timetable directions will be used throughout this report. The locomotive engineer was seated at the controls on the right (north) side of the leading locomotive. The conductor was seated on the left (south) side of the cab of the leading locomotive.

Approaching the accident site from east to west starting at about mile 174.7, there is a tangent for 7,392 feet, and then a left hand 1-degree 4 -minute curve for 2,112 feet to the point of derailment and 1,848 feet beyond. The grade approaching the derailment is a 0.40 percent descending grade from mile 174.7 to 176.0 , and a 0.22 percent descending grade from mile 176.0 to 176.1 , and a 0.0 percent grade from mile 176.1 to the point of derailment and 8,448 feet beyond.

According to the train crew, as the train approached the accident area, the trip had been uneventful.
The Accident
As the train approached the accident site and at the time the accident occurred, the train was being operated at a recorded speed of 21 miles per hour (mph). The speed was recorded by the event recorder of the controlling locomotive.

In the accident area, trains operate on a single main track under the authority of a Track Warrant Control System (TWC), controlled by a dispatcher in Fort Worth, Texas and supplemented by signal indications of an Automatic Block System (ABS). The maximum authorized speed for freight trains is 50 mph as designated in the current BNSF Timetable No. 2.

According to the train crew, the train made a train line induced emergency air brake application of the train air brakes and came to a stop. After coming to a stop, the engineer notified the train dispatcher of the train line induced emergency air brake application. The conductor walked back to inspect the train and determined that several freight cars had derailed.

Analysis and Conclusions
The accident did not meet the requirement for FRA Post Accident Toxicology Testing, as required under Title 49 CFR, Part 219, Subpart C.
The trackside failed equipment detector located at mile 172.8 recorded no defects on the train when it traversed over the detector about four miles in advance of the accident area.

A thorough inspection of the derailed equipment revealed no evidence of mechanical defects that would contribute to the cause of the accident.
An inspection of the data print out from the lead locomotive event recorder indicated that the train was being operated at 21 mph at the location of the POD. The
event recorder also indicated no unusual events related to train handling.
The investigation revealed the train derailed due to a thermal track buckle at mile 176.5.
On July 14 and 15, 2006, a BNSF track inspector conducted a track inspection by traversing the track with a hi-rail vehicle between milepost 93.0 and milepost 192.0. No defective conditions were noted in the accident area.

A total of 20 loaded freight cars derailed ( 21 st and 26th freight cars, and the 28th through the 45th freight cars from the head end of the train).
There were no injuries reported and no release of hazardous materials.
The estimated damage for the derailment was $\$ 992,601$ ( $\$ 275,200$ track and $\$ 717,401$ equipment).
Probable Cause
An investigation conducted by the Federal Railroad Administration found that the probable cause of the derailment was track alignment irregular (Buckled/Sunkink) (T109).

