Forty Years of USAID in Mali (1961-2000)
by chris Strickland and Boubacar Daou
The Earliest Years (1961-1968)
Anxious to rejuvenate and develop its economy
along socialist lines, the Government of the Republic of Mali
(GRM) set out on an ambitious program following independence in
1960. The size of the government was expanding, with a good number
of state enterprises, mostly in trade, manufacturing and transport,
being established. Furthermore, most of the country's banking
activities, foreign trade, and large industrial concerns where
taken control of by the state as well. Price controls were introduced,
with private merchants being severely limited and grain prices
fixed at low levels. The urban areas were to be fed by the rural
economy at low prices in order to keep down industrial wages and
produce crops that would originate the foreign exchange needed
for capital imports.
In an effort to gain economic independence, Mali seceded from
the Franc Zone and the West Amcan Monetary Union in 1962, and
formed its own central bank. After a gradually worsening external
financial position, Mali was readmitted into the Franc Zone with
France's strong suggestion that the GRM rearrange state companies,
liberalize trade, and curb state expenditure. By the end of the
decade, Mali found itself in a condition of economic disarray.
Public enterprises were inadequately managed and the wished for
surpluses never developed. All in all, the agricultural cooperatives
were not successful mostly because the traditional community and
family continued to function as a social and economic system.
Furthermore, overall production grew insignificantly as price
incentives were small. Modibo Keita and his civilian government
were dethroned in 1968 and replaced by a military committee.
Economic assistance from the US to the GRM originated in 1961,
and was controlled by a bilateral Mission until 1968. Due to political
uncertainties in Mali and the already considerable aid from other
sources, USAID's assistance program was small and limited in scope.
USAID's simple strategy was aimed at moderating the socialist
leanings of the GRM through bilateral and regional programs, and
encouraging cooperative efforts between adjacent states and other
Western donors. Three areas of focus were used: food production,
education and training, and rural infrastructure.
After a 1966 reassessment of the US economic assistance policy
in Amca, results indicated the need for an increased emphasis
on the long-term nature of assistance; in other words, a change
to a regional and multinational project execution plan. This would
involve more coordination among other aid sources; support and
encouragement from countries with conceivable development prospects;
and country development support programs concentrating in certain
economic sectors.
A Time of Transition (1968-1974)
With a new government established, the socialism ofthe 1960's
was abandoned and in turn replaced in 1970 by an economic and
financial rehabilitation program that brought the balance of payments
into equilibrium and extracted the budget deficit of the government.
In order to increase government revenues, the moderation of trade
controls, along with the reducing of customs duties on imports
and exports and the resulting expansion of foreign trade all helped.
Furthermore, built to replace a private trade network, the cooperative
system was de-emphasized, and the GRM made significant efforts
to broaden food and export crops through area-specific projects
called "operations." The intent of these operations was that they
were to eventually turn into full-scale rural development projects
including cooperatives, credit, and extension services for market
supply and incentive support. However, constant trouble with payment
difficulties from high transportation costs, extreme dependence
on imports, and reliance on primary products for most export earnings
eclipsed the economic outlook and made it obvious that the GRM
was far from its proposed recovery objectives. International inflation,
the precipitous rise of energy and other import prices, and a
lengthened and severe drought further exasperated the weaknesses
of the economy.
In establishing the Organization of Senegal River States (OERS),
Mali joined Guinea, Mauritania, and Senegal in April of 1968.
This regional assortment intended to facilitate the exploitation
of each member/country's resources: refine economic relations
between members, develop linked development projects, and coordinate
river and land transport. Due to the collapse of the OERS (conflict
between Guinea and Senegal), Mali then joined the Senegal River
Development Organization (OMVS), which was founded in 1972 to
supersede its predecessor. The OMVS was handed the responsibility
for the conceptualization, coordination, and implementation of
projects to develop and use the resources ofthe Senegal River
Basin within the limits of the three member states (Senegal, Mauritania,
and Mali).
Economic assistance to Mali was managed by the AID Regional Office
in Dakar from 1968 to 1974. This included administering activities
that were started during the previous period and classifying projects
of a regional nature in which Mali could partake. The US contributed
large quantities of Emergency food assistance to Mali, as well
as undertaking Relief and Rehabilitation activities during the
Sahel drought years of 1973-75. Due to problems from trying to
control the USAID program from outside the country, in 1974 a
Country Development Office (CDO) was created in Bam.?lco. The
CDO was simply created to terminate projects initiated in the
first period, develop on-going activities, and to begin a transitional
program aimed towards long-range development goals.
A fundamental change in US foreign aid policy was legislated by
Congress in 1973. According to the New Directions Mandate, AlD
was to concentrate on helping the rural poor rather than on providing
general assistance directed at augmenting overall economic development.
Responding to the human suffering and hardship of the protracted
drought of 1968-74, the Sahelian relief effort led donors and
Sahel states into considering planning a comprehensive long-term
Afiican Sahel Development Program in order to promote regional
economic viability. This covenant thus gave way to two institutions:
the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control (formed
in March 1973) and The Club des Amis du Sahel (formed in March
1976). Both institutions were formed for different purposes, however;
the CILSS was established to coordinate relief and recovery efforts,
whereas The Club des Amis du Sahel was created as a consultative
group of donors preoccupied with long-term regional development.
They felt that no single donor could provide all the assistance
needed, and that the only way to meet basic needs for food and
development was to update food production, save rangelands, and
develop brand new farming systems (food with cash crops, as well
as mixed farming with livestock).
Without a doubt, regional cooperation was a somewhat new concept
and experiences in designing and executing programs that demanded
well-orchestrated coordination was clearly limited. Attempts by
USAlD to complete New Directions and CILSS/Club goals become clear
in the wide variety of new projects begun during the next stage,
Period Three.
The Great Drought (1974-1978)
Considering the economic and financial refonn program of 1970-1973
as fairly successful, the GRM applied it to its 1974-1978 development
plan. The main strategy accepted agricultural production and reconstitution
of cattle herds to maintain food selfsufficiency, to produce
adequate supplies of raw materials for processing industries,
and to guarantee increasing export of primary products (groundnuts,
cotton). Large investments were advocated by the GRM, as well
as water/energy resources in order to provide the groundwork for
the extension of primary and secondary sectors of the economy.
Food engendering was viewed as the basis on which to construct
an economic development program and infrastructure investments
were remarked as crucial for an economic discovery. However, institutional
refonn strategies to accommodate internal price policies to foodcrops
and state manufacturing enterprises were lacking, and as a result
the GRM's ability to execute projects that could meet the stated
long-tenn development objectives remained strictly limited.
The new policy direction initiated by AID was persuaded by unsteady
political situations within Africa, a changing international economy,
a New Directions Mandate to approach the poor majority, and the
drought. There was a strong accentuation placed on an integrated
approach to handling with fundamental, multifarious problems.
Regional experiments would be balanced by bilateral programs,
especially where local national programs could furnish resources,
training sites, and delivery systems. The equality between multidonor,
regional, and bilateral area-specific programs was to provide
longrange development that would support self-sustaining growth.
Working together, GRM and AID fonned a cooperative Development
Assistance Plan that stressed livestock, agriculture, health and
human resources, with an emphasis on sector level policy, area
development progra'TIS, and maximum application of Malian skills.
Integrated rural impact programs, training, and research and extension
were all part of an extensive humanitarian/development packet
directed at improving the standard of living of the poor majority.
The Beginning of Reform and USAID Expansion (1978-1982)
During this period, economic growth in Mali was inconsistent and
insufficient, according to the continued reoccurrence of drought
conditions, extreme financial debts induced by state organizations,
and unmanageable rural development organizations. All of these
contributed to steadily increasing budgetary deficits, procrastination
in paying public employees, and regressing government services.
Similar to the 1974-78 Plan, the GRM Five Year Plan (1981-85)
emphasized improvement in rural conditions based on food self-sufficiency,
development of transportation channels, and industrialization.
Expanding agriculture production was to be the main focus of accelerated
economic growth, which required expansive reforms in the GRM policies
relevant to production incentives, state enterprises and public
funds.
The importance of production incentives and the need for greater
farmer involvement in rural development implementation was further
stressed by a 1982 Food Sector Strategy document, which set forth
a synthesized and operational approach.
GRM efforts to lessen state control over the economy and to promote
greater private sector participation were supported by USAID and
other foreign donors. Mali began discussions with France in 1981
on rejoining the West Afucan Monetfu)' Union, and the next year
the GRM acquired a one-year standby loan from the IMF, which further
specified reform of public finances.
Furthermore, as a special feature of the US Foreign Assistance
Act in 1978, the Sahel Development Program (SDP) was formed. Its
purpose was to provide funding for the seven countries bordering
the Sahara Desert: Senegal, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad,
The Gambia, and Mali, along with the Cape Verde Islands. Based
on regional cooperation among the Sahel States (CILSS) as well
as outside cooperation with the donor community (Club du Sahel),
the SDP was intended to supply sectoral inputs, which would counterpart
those of other donors.
This period was viewed by USAID as a time of transition from stressing
program development to one of project execution and assessment.
It was quickly observed, however, that expansion efforts were
not transferring appropriate technologies to farmers. Furthermore,
executive limits in accounting, financial and personnel guidance,
smothering food grain pricing and marketing systems, insufficient
physical infrastructure, and ineffective economic and institutiona:
Sj E;cems slowed down progress greatly. With a move to limit new
project starts, arrange projects sectorally and geographically,
expand management of similar technical assistance and training,
and correct Malian and USAID
Assessment, Revision, then Accomplishment (1982-1987)
AID completed an evaluation of the long-tenn development plan
in the Sahel in 1984. Indicated by the examination was that a
more concentrated program would augment benefits from development
resources. As a result, AID started to break down the range of
activities under the Sahel Development Program, and seceded from
sectors where qualification or direction ability had been restricted
Furthennore, AID's modified strategy was directed to increase
the efficiency of the SDP, clarify and reorganize country programs,
and diminish financial and administrative pressures on the Sahel
countries. With all these changes, a better atmosphere for development
programs through economic stabilization and refonn, enhanced agricultural
output, and human resource development would thus evolve. Also,
policy refonn strategies were associated with project compensation
by USAID in an effort to answer AID/W's extensive policy objectives,
to preserve consistency with the GRM plans, and to counter other
donor efforts.
All in all, the Mission has molded plans escalating policy refonns
influencing rural producers, the private sector, and the effectiveness
of public organizations; increasing food safety through strengthening
establishments for agricultural expansion, studies, and education
and family planning programs; and enhancing project administration
and development planning through expansive training programs.
The overall basis for a comprehending development program is granted
by cultivating strategies, eliminating obstacles blocking strategies
from becoming viable programs and projects, and connecting sector
activities with the goal of increased food generation.
The Turbulent Years around the Revolution of
1991 (1987-1994)
In the meantime, most ofthe first generation projects were terminated
due to a project assistance completion date or for reasons of
mismanagement (Operation Mils-Mopti, Action Ble Dire). However,
the survivor projects like CVL (Central Veterinary Laboratory)
and the DHV (Developpement de la Haute Vallee) were strengthened
and redirected towards private sector needs.
Between 1980 and 1994, the Government of Mali had demonstrated
its capacity to undertake policy reforms in the economic and financial
sectors to revive and improve the impact of development efforts.
The monopoly of the public sector on cereals marketing was eliminated,
govemment parastatals were privatized, more responsibilities were
handed to farmers and the private sector had regained confidence
and momentum.
The revised USAID programs had been redirected to match renewed
govemment strategies and policies and to complement other donors'
development efforts.
A More Strategic Perspective (1994-Present)
As an experimental lab, USAID/Mali launched its reengineering
effort in December of 1994. After several retreats and numerous
brainstorming sessions with partners and shareholders, a strategic
plan was finalized in August 1995.
A deep restructuring process was then undertaken in establishing
terms to replace Divisions and to rebaptize positions and establish
new personnel classifications. The Vision statement agreed upon
was More Mali, Less Aid. The goal statement was Mali achieves
a level of sustainable economic, political and social development
that eliminates the need for concessional foreign assistance.
The four Core values are:
- Customer focus
- Results orientation
- Participation and teamwork
- Empowerment and accountability
Initially, four Teams were created to carry out the four Strategic
Objectives and those teams are:
- The Youth Team - The Sustainable Economic Growth Team - The
Democratic Governance Team - The Infonnation and Communication
Team (also called Special)
The Bottom Line
Since Mali became a multiparty democracy in 1992, USAID has seeked
to refine economic growth by increasing private sector investment,
particularly in agriculturalbased activities; and the condition
and delivery of health care, family planning, and educational
programs.