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Report to the Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2008:
FAA Airspace Redesign:
An Analysis of the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia Project:
GAO-08-786:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-786, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In September 2007, after 9 years of evaluation and a cost of over $53
million, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced it would
begin implementing a new airspace structure for the New York/New
Jersey/Philadelphia metropolitan area. According to FAA, this redesign
of routes leading to and from commercial airports will fully integrate
the airspace in the region, produce $300 million annual savings, and
reduce delay by 20 percent once fully implemented. Critics disagree and
cite potential increases in aircraft noise and other adverse
environmental impacts. GAO was asked to examine: (1) the extent to
which FAA followed legal requirements for its environmental review, (2)
the extent to which FAA’s methodology in assessing operational and
noise impacts was reasonable, and (3) the likelihood FAA will meet its
projected time frames and costs of implementation. GAO’s legal analysis
covered applicable federal laws, regulations, court decisions, and FAA
orders. GAO’s analysis of FAA’s methodology was based on criteria
established through review of federal policy, FAA’s guidance, prior GAO
reports, and standards from the aviation and analytical community. With
the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences, GAO identified
experts in the fields of environmental policies and procedures,
airspace operations, and aircraft noise measurement and obtained their
views on relevant aspects of FAA’s methodology.
What GAO Found:
GAO evaluated FAA’s compliance with the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) and environmental justice directives in conducting the New
York/New Jersey/Philadelphia Airspace Redesign project. In assessing
compliance, GAO used established court precedent applying these
requirements, as well as the standard of review for agency actions
established by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which is
deferential to agency decision making. Courts interpret the APA
standard—whether an agency’s actions were “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”—as
mandating that an agency act reasonably in carrying out NEPA’s
requirements and that the agency’s ultimate decisions be reasonable and
not arbitrary and capricious. GAO reviewed FAA’s compliance with
respect to five key issues: the statement of the project’s purpose and
need, the evaluation of alternatives, consideration of the project’s
environmental effects, public participation, and environmental justice
matters. GAO selected these issues based on public concerns raised
during and after the NEPA process, congressional interest, the views of
experts we interviewed, and GAO’s evaluation of the range of concerns
presented.
Applying these legal requirements and the APA’s reasonableness
standard, GAO concluded that FAA complied with applicable NEPA
requirements and related environmental justice directives. First, the
statement of the project’s purpose and need—which defines the objective
of the project and which, in this case, was to increase the efficiency
and reliability of the airspace while enhancing safety and reducing
delays—was reasonable. The statement was reasonable in scope, as it was
not defined too narrowly or too broadly, and it reasonably excluded
noise reduction. Second, FAA developed a reasonable range of
alternatives to the redesign and appropriately evaluated these
alternatives. As required, FAA included a no-action alternative to
serve as a baseline, as well as alternatives that would achieve the
project’s purpose and need. FAA also discussed options eliminated from
detailed analysis, and explored and objectively evaluated the remaining
alternatives. Third, FAA acted reasonably in not analyzing the indirect
environmental effects of potential growth resulting from the redesign.
Because FAA found the redesign in itself would not increase traffic
demand and flight operations, it did not consider the potential
environmental impacts of these system improvements. In the aviation
context, courts have uniformly upheld similar decisions by FAA where,
as in this case, the purpose of the project was not to induce growth
and the project did not include capacity-enhancing construction, such
as the addition of a runway. Fourth, FAA reasonably involved the public
throughout the environmental review process. It took actions required
to ensure public outreach including conducting an early and open
process, providing notice of and holding public meetings, and
soliciting and responding to public comments. Fifth, FAA satisfied
environmental justice directives in Executive Order 12898 and related
guidance and Orders. FAA prepared an analysis that identified minority
and low-income populations significantly impacted by the proposed
redesign, and determined whether the impact on these populations was
disproportionate. FAA also involved these individuals throughout the
environmental review process. In addition, FAA mitigated these
significant impacts by altering arrival procedures and departure
headings, raising arrival altitudes, and other related measures.
FAA’s methodology to assess operational and noise impacts was
reasonable, based on FAA’s guidance for conducting airspace redesigns,
standards from the aviation and analytical community, and the opinion
of independent aviation operational and noise experts. FAA’s guidance
suggests activities for conducting a redesign’s operational analysis
and establishes specific guidelines for conducting a noise analysis.
FAA generally adhered to this guidance in conducting the redesign, in
that FAA generally followed its process for conducting operational
analyses and used the noise modeling tool and metric specified in its
guidance. In addition, according to experts, FAA used experienced
contractors, the best available modeling tools, and appropriate data.
For example, according to FAA and experts we interviewed, the data
sources, such as FAA radar flight track data, U.S. Geological Survey
terrain data, and U.S. Census Bureau data, are industry standard and
generally recognized as providing reliable information. However, GAO
and experts also identified some ways in which the methodology could be
improved for future redesign projects. For example, when evaluating the
alternatives, FAA did not analyze various economic impacts, such as
implementation costs. GAO identified two types of analyses—an
uncertainty analysis and a benefit-cost analysis—that could have
benefited decision makers and the public in future redesign efforts. An
uncertainty analysis would provide more information about the level of
uncertainty associated with conducting the operational analysis, while
a benefit-cost analysis would provide more information about the
impacts of various alternatives.
FAA has not developed a detailed implementation plan for the New
York/New Jersey/Philadelphia Airspace Redesign with a schedule, and
therefore GAO was unable to determine whether FAA would meet its
projected timetable. In addition, the final project configuration and
costs are unknown since FAA has not determined the type of equipment
and software that will be needed and FAA is currently reviewing whether
to house operations for the redesigned airspace in existing FAA
facilities, a new facility, or a consolidated facility. Given that the
redesign represents a complex and comprehensive change to the region’s
airspace, GAO believes it is important to conduct evaluations of the
redesign after each implementation step to ensure proper
implementation. A potential strategy that could be used by FAA is an
adaptive management strategy, which is a process that promotes flexible
decision making as outcomes from management actions become understood.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that FAA develop and follow a detailed implementation
plan for the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia Airspace Redesign that
includes a time and cost schedule and follow a post implementation
evaluation plan that includes an adaptive management strategy. In
addition, GAO recommends that for future airspace redesign projects,
FAA conduct an uncertainty analysis of key assumptions and inputs to
provide information on the level of confidence of the estimated impacts
and conduct a benefit-cost analysis for the purpose of evaluating
redesign alternatives.
A draft was provided to DOT and FAA. While DOT said it does not agree
with everything in the draft, due to pending litigation, DOT declined
to specify its areas of agreement or disagreement. DOT provided
technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-786]. For more
information, contact Susan Fleming, 202-512-2834, flemings@gao.gov or
Susan Sawtelle, 202-512-6417, sawtelles@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
FAA Complied with Key Legal Requirements in Conducting Its
Environmental Review for the Regional Airspace Redesign:
Methodology Used to Assess Key Impacts Was Reasonable, However
Additional Analyses Could Have Benefited Decision Making and the
Public's Understanding:
Lack of Detailed Implementation Plan Raises Questions about Time Frames
and Costs:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: FAA's Legal Compliance with Key NEPA Requirements and
Environmental Justice Directives:
Appendix III: Operational Comparison of Alternatives:
Appendix IV: Summary of the Integrated Airspace Alternative with ICC:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Transportation:
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Summary of Public Participation Opportunities during the EIS
Process:
Table 2: List Of Experts Providing Input During Our Review:
Figures:
Figure 1: Map of Regions with Major Airports and Satellite Airports
Included in FAA's Analysis:
Figure 2: General Representation of a Cross Section of the Different
Air Traffic Control Facilities and Procedures:
Figure 3: Timeline of FAA's New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia Airspace
Redesign Project:
Figure 4: Alternatives Considered under the FAA New York/New Jersey/
Philadelphia Airspace Redesign EIS:
Figure 5: Example of Departures without and with Dispersal Headings:
Figure 6: Simplified Representation of the Methodology Used by FAA to
Assess Operational and Noise Impacts:
Figure 7: Description of FAA's Estimated 20 Percent Reduction in
Airport Delay:
Figure 8: Description of the 12 Million Minutes Saving in Delay
Savings:
Abbreviations:
APA: Administrative Procedure Act:
ATC: Air Traffic Control:
ATO: Air Traffic Organization:
CAASD: Center for Advanced Aviation System Development:
CEQ: Council on Environmental Quality:
DNL: Day-Night Average Sound Level:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
EIS: environmental impact statement:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
FFRDC: Federally Funded Research and Development Center:
FHWA: Federal Highway Administration:
FICON: Federal Interagency Committee on Noise:
Handbook: FAA Airspace Management Handbook:
ICC: Integrated Control Complex:
JFK: John F. Kennedy International Airport:
LaGuardia: LaGuardia Airport:
NATCA: National Air Traffic Controllers Association:
NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act:
Newark: Newark Liberty International Airport:
NextGen: Next Generation Air Transportation System:
NIRS: Noise Integrated Routing System:
NJCAAN: New Jersey Coalition Against Aircraft Noise:
Philadelphia: Philadelphia International Airport:
RNAV: Area Navigation (technology):
SEL: Sound Exposure Level:
TAAM: Total Airspace and Airport Modeler:
Teterboro: Teterboro Airport:
TRACON: Terminal Radar Approach Control:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 31, 2008:
The Honorable James Oberstar:
Chairman:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Jerry Costello:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Aviation:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Robert Andrews:
The Honorable Joseph Sestak:
House of Representatives:
In September 2007, after 9 years of evaluation and a cost of over $53
million, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced that it
would implement a new airspace structure for the five major airports
[Footnote 1] and several regional airports serving the New York/New
Jersey/Philadelphia metropolitan area.[Footnote 2] According to FAA,
the expected growth in the region's air travel contributed to the need
for the airspace redesign, the goal of which is to increase the
efficiency and reliability of the region's airspace, while maintaining
safety. The efficient operation of the airspace is important, since the
region's airports are critical to the nation's aviation system. For
example, because the New York metropolitan area airports provide
service to one of the most populated urban areas in the United States,
as well as to substantial commercial air traffic,[Footnote 3] any
delays in this region tend to ripple throughout the National Airspace
System. The region's airspace, therefore, has become a critical
chokepoint, and any resulting problems have substantial national
impacts. FAA believes that the redesigned airspace will have several
important benefits, including reducing airport delays, increasing the
balance of air traffic controller workloads and operational
flexibility, and maintaining the throughput of airports. FAA estimates
that when compared to the current airspace structure, the redesigned
airspace will produce $300 million annual savings in direct costs and
will reduce delay by 20 percent once fully implemented.[Footnote 4]
However, many in the region's local communities disagree that the
redesign will yield these benefits and worry that the redesign will
substantially increase aircraft noise and produce other environmental
impacts, both in communities already affected and in areas where
aircraft traditionally have not flown. A number of critics maintain
that FAA's decision to implement the new airspace structure is based on
a flawed process and a predetermined outcome. For example, some critics
question the methodology FAA used to develop the different alternatives
evaluated in the airspace redesign and maintain that FAA did not fully
assess nonairspace alternatives, such as requiring airlines to pay
additional fees for airport use during peak demand times. Based on
these and other objections, state and local governments and citizen
groups have filed 13 separate lawsuits challenging the redesign, based
primarily on FAA's alleged failure to comply with the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).[Footnote 5] While this litigation is
pending, FAA has begun implementation of the redesign, with initial
steps starting on December 19, 2007.[Footnote 6] Full implementation is
estimated to be completed by 2012.
You asked us to review FAA's airspace redesign project for the New
York/New Jersey/Philadelphia region. Accordingly, this report focuses
on the following questions:
1. To what extent did FAA follow key legal procedures and requirements
in conducting its environmental review?
2. To what extent was the methodology used by FAA to assess the
operational and noise impacts reasonable?
3. What is the likelihood that FAA will meet its project time frames
and costs of implementing its airspace redesign project?
To address our three research questions, we reviewed documents
associated with the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia Airspace Redesign,
including the draft and final environmental impact statements (EIS) and
selected appendices, underlying technical reports and analyses, and the
administrative record filed by FAA with the court in the pending
litigation. We also obtained and analyzed information from a variety of
other sources, including previous FAA airspace redesigns similar to
this project and other aviation evaluations and studies.[Footnote 7] We
interviewed officials from the Department of Transportation (DOT) and
from FAA's headquarters and eastern regional office, including
representatives of FAA's airspace redesign team. We also contacted
other stakeholders, including FAA's principal contractors[Footnote 8]
for the operational and noise analyses, the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey, City of Philadelphia Department of Aviation, other
participants in the EIS process, trade organizations for the aviation
industry, the national air traffic controller's union, and community
groups in the region.
To assess the extent to which FAA followed key legal procedures and
requirements in conducting its environmental review, we reviewed
applicable federal laws, regulations, executive directives, and court
decisions, as well as FAA and DOT Orders and FAA and Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) guidance. We then conducted a legal
analysis to determine FAA's compliance with respect to five key issues:
the statement of the project's purpose and need, evaluation of
alternatives, consideration of the project's environmental effects,
public involvement, and environmental justice matters. We selected
these five issues based on public concerns raised during and after the
EIS process,[Footnote 9] congressional interest, the views of experts
we interviewed, and GAO's evaluation of the range of concerns
presented. To examine the extent to which the methodology used by FAA
to assess the operational and noise impacts was reasonable, we compared
FAA's methodology to criteria we established through review of federal
policy, FAA guidance, prior GAO reports, and standards from the
aviation and analytical community. In addition, with the assistance of
the National Academy of Sciences, we identified experts in the fields
of EIS policies and procedures, airspace operations and system
modeling, and aircraft noise measurement and mitigation. These experts
reviewed selected portions of the EIS related to FAA's operational and
noise analysis. We then interviewed these experts within their area of
expertise to obtain their views on the extent to which FAA followed
applicable procedures and requirements, and on the methodology used by
FAA to assess the operational and noise impacts. See appendix I for a
list of the experts we interviewed.
As agreed with you, we did not prepare a new EIS or develop and analyze
new alternatives to the airspace redesign. We conducted this
performance audit from July 2007 to July 2008 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
Our evaluation of FAA's compliance with NEPA in conducting the New
York/New Jersey/Philadelphia Airspace Redesign was based on established
court precedent applying NEPA and its implementing regulations, and the
standard of review for agency actions established by the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), which is deferential to agency decision making.
Courts interpret this APA standard--whether an agency's actions were
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law"--as requiring that an agency act reasonably in
carrying out NEPA's requirements and that the agency's ultimate
decisions be reasonable and not arbitrary and capricious. We reviewed
FAA's compliance with respect to five key issues: the statement of the
project's purpose and need, evaluation of alternatives, consideration
of the project's environmental effects, public involvement, and
environmental justice matters. We selected these five issues based on
public concerns raised during and after the EIS process, congressional
interest, the views of experts we interviewed, and GAO's evaluation of
the range of concerns presented.
Applying these NEPA requirements and the APA's reasonableness standard
to these five key issues, we concluded that FAA complied with
applicable NEPA and related requirements and environmental justice
directives. First, the statement of the project's purpose and need--
which defines the objectives of the project and which, in this case,
was to increase the efficiency and reliability of the airspace while
maintaining safety and reducing delays--was reasonable. The statement
was reasonable in scope because it was not defined too narrowly or too
broadly, and it reasonably excluded noise reduction. Second, FAA
developed a reasonable range of alternatives to the redesign and
appropriately evaluated these alternatives. As required, FAA included a
no action alternative, which served as the baseline, as well as
alternatives that would achieve the project's purpose and need. FAA
also discussed options it eliminated from detailed analysis, and
explored and objectively evaluated the remaining alternatives. Third,
FAA acted reasonably in not analyzing the indirect environmental
effects of potential growth resulting from the redesign. Because FAA
found that the redesign in itself would not increase traffic demand and
flight operations, it did not consider the potential environmental
impacts of these system improvements. In the aviation context, the
courts have uniformly upheld similar decisions by FAA where, as in this
case, the purpose of the project was not to induce growth and the
project did not include capacity-enhancing construction, such as the
addition of a runway. Fourth, FAA reasonably involved the public
throughout the environmental review process. It took the actions
required to ensure appropriate public outreach, including conducting an
early and open process, providing notice of and holding public
meetings, and soliciting and responding to public comments. Fifth, FAA
satisfied environmental justice directives in Executive Order 12898 and
implementing CEQ guidance and DOT Orders. FAA prepared an analysis that
identified minority and low-income populations significantly impacted
by the proposed redesign and determined whether the impact on these
populations was disproportionate. FAA also involved these individuals
throughout the environmental review process. In addition, FAA mitigated
these significant impacts by altering arrival procedures and departure
headings, raising arrival altitudes, and other related measures.
FAA's methodology to assess the operational and noise impacts was
reasonable, based on FAA's guidance for conducting airspace redesigns,
standards from the aviation and analytical community, and the opinions
of experts we interviewed. FAA's guidance suggests activities for
conducting a redesign's operational analysis and establishes specific
guidelines for conducting a noise analysis. We found that FAA generally
adhered to this guidance, generally following its process for
conducting operational analyses and using the noise modeling tool and
metric specified in its guidance. In addition, independent experts we
interviewed generally agreed that FAA used experienced contractors and
used the best available tools to model the operational and noise
impacts of the airspace redesign. Furthermore, we found no evidence
that the data used are unreliable, and experts interviewed generally
agreed that FAA used data that were appropriate and standard to the
industry and chose metrics to measure the operational impacts that were
reasonable and aligned with the objectives of the airspace redesign.
For example, according to FAA and experts we interviewed, such data
sources as FAA radar flight track data, U.S. Geological Survey terrain
data, and U.S. Census Bureau data are industry standard and generally
recognized as providing reliable information. On the basis of generally
accepted economic principles and practices, expert opinions, past FAA-
sponsored airspace redesigns, and prior GAO reports, we also identified
some limitations in FAA's methodology that, if addressed, would provide
more information for decision makers and the public. We and the experts
we interviewed do not believe these limitations are substantial enough
to warrant redoing the analyses, but rather, would help identify ways
in which FAA's methodology could be improved in future airspace
redesigns. These limitations are not matters that FAA is required by
law to address. One limitation is that because FAA assumed that traffic
demand and flight operations would not increase in response to airspace
system improvements--specifically, delay reductions and operating cost
savings--FAA did not account for the potential effect of the system
improvements in its operational analysis. FAA also did not fully assess
the uncertainty associated with each alternative's estimated impacts:
FAA did not consider a range of values for key assumptions and inputs,
even though some key inputs, such as the aviation demand forecast, are
inherently uncertain. In addition, when evaluating the alternatives,
FAA did not analyze economic impacts, such as implementation costs, the
effect of the alternatives on the airlines, passengers' time value, or
the effect of noise on the quality of life of residents living near the
airports. FAA did not estimate the economic impacts of noise in part
because the agency is not required under CEQ regulations to do so. We
identified two analyses that, while FAA is not required by law or
guidance to conduct, could benefit decision makers and the public.
First, an uncertainty analysis that examines a range of key assumptions
and inputs, such as the aviation demand forecast, would provide
additional information on the potential range of the redesign's impact
to decision makers and the public. Second, a benefit-cost analysis,
which assesses the benefits and costs of each alternative compared to
the status quo, would have provided decision makers and the public with
more information on whether the estimated benefits of the redesigned
airspace justify its costs.
Based on the information available to date, we are unable to fully
assess the likelihood that FAA will meet its projected five-year
implementation time frame or determine the costs of the airspace
redesign project. Although FAA internal guidance recommends that an
implementation plan--including specific implementation activities, such
as establishing a project schedule or planning for potential
challenges--be developed immediately after approval of the airspace
redesign, FAA has not developed a detailed implementation plan that
outlines these specific activities. However, even though FAA does not
have a detailed implementation plan available, FAA began limited
implementation at Philadelphia and Newark on December 19, 2007. Without
a more detailed implementation plan, we cannot determine whether FAA is
likely to meet its projected schedule or how it will deal with
potential challenges. In addition, for two principal reasons, the final
project configuration and costs are unknown. First, although FAA will
use currently available equipment and software, FAA has not determined
the type or amount that will be needed to support the common automation
platform for air traffic controllers. Second, FAA is currently
reviewing whether the common automation platform, which will allow
different air traffic controllers to communicate with each other, will
be housed in existing FAA facilities, a new facility, or in a
consolidated facility. If FAA decides to house this platform in a new
facility, FAA officials stated that a final cost estimate for the new
facility will not be available until late 2008, and is not projected to
be completed until 2015, 3 years after FAA has estimated full
implementation of the airspace project. Given that the redesign
represents a complex and comprehensive change to the region's airspace,
the agency also should consider how it plans to conduct evaluations of
the redesign. One potential strategy for FAA to employ is adaptive
management, which is a process that promotes flexible decision making
as outcomes from management actions become understood, and is a
strategy that GAO has recommended for other federal agencies.
Furthermore, adaptive management is recognized by the CEQ and other
federal agencies as a useful strategy.
To improve FAA's implementation of the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia
Airspace Redesign, we are recommending that the Secretary of the
Department of Transportation direct the Acting Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration to develop and follow a detailed
implementation plan and postimplementation evaluation plan using an
adaptive management strategy for this airspace redesign. To improve
FAA's effectiveness and accountability in conducting future airspace
redesigns we are recommending that the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation direct the Acting Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration conduct uncertainty analyses and benefit-cost analyses
when evaluating the potential effect of future airspace redesigns.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOT stated that it was pleased
that the GAO review concluded the actions taken by FAA with regard to
NEPA were reasonable. However, DOT also noted that while it did not
necessarily agree with everything in the draft report, it is
constrained from offering a detailed analysis of the draft report at
this time, as the matters the report covers are the subject of pending
litigation (see app. V for DOT comments). DOT provided technical
comments that we incorporated as appropriate.
Background:
For several reasons, the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia airspace is
unique and highly complex. First, numerous airports are located within
a small geographic area, including some of the nation's most important
major airports. In the New York City metropolitan area alone, there are
four major airports, including New York's John F. Kennedy International
Airport (JFK) and LaGuardia Airport (LaGuardia) and New Jersey's Newark
Liberty International Airport (Newark) and Teterboro Airport
(Teterboro). Philadelphia International Airport (Philadelphia) is
located less than 100 miles southwest of New York City. The region also
has numerous satellite airports,[Footnote 10] which provide substantial
aviation service to Connecticut, New Jersey, southeastern New York, and
eastern Pennsylvania (see fig. 1). Second, the region's airports
provide service to a very large air travel market. Since the New York
metropolitan area has one of the largest urban populations in the
United States, there is a substantial market for air travel, which is
serviced by many domestic and international airlines. Third, three of
these airports--JFK, Newark, and Philadelphia--serve as hubs for major
U.S. airlines[Footnote 11] to connect passengers to other flights.
Finally, both LaGuardia and JFK have been slot controlled[Footnote 12]
in the past. In January 2007, the authority to issue slot restrictions
at LaGuardia and JFK airports expired;[Footnote 13] however, due to the
increased congestion and flight delays at LaGuardia, JFK, and Newark,
FAA has imposed temporary slot controls at these airports with the goal
of preventing an increase of scheduled flights during peak demand
times.
Figure 1: Map of Regions with Major Airports and Satellite Airports
Included in FAA's Analysis:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of regions with major airports and satellite
airports included in FAA's analysis, as follows:
JFK: John F. Kennedy Intl.
LGA: La Guardia:
EWR: Newark Liberty Intl.
PHL: Philadelphia Intl.
TEB: Teterboro:
ABE: Allentown/Lehigh Valley Intl.
ACY: Atlantic City Intl:
BDR: Bridgeport/Igor I. Sikorsky Memorial:
CDW: Caldwell/Essex County:
ISP: Islip/Long Island:
LDJ: Linden Airport:
WRI: McGuire AFB:
MMU: Morristown Municipal:
HVN: New Haven/Tweed-New Haven:
SWF: Newburgh/Stewart Intl.
PNE: Northeast Philadelphia:
FRG: Republic Airport;
TTN: Trenton/Mercer County:
FOK: Westhampton Beach/The Francis S. Gabreski:
HPN: White Plains/Westchester County:
ILG: Wilmington/New Castle County:
Source: FAA.
[End of figure]
According to FAA, the current airspace structure--which basically has
remained the same since the 1960s[Footnote 14]--is inefficient and
cannot meet future travel demands without increasing delays. The
airspace was designed for lower air traffic volumes and different types
of aircraft, and is characterized by complex, highly interrelated
departure and arrival routes. FAA maintains that there is a need to
redesign the region's airspace because the current structure cannot
efficiently address the increased air traffic levels, the use of new
aircraft types, and emerging technologies to control air traffic. In
addition, because specific routes used by aircraft taking off from one
airport overlap routes from other airports, safety-related
inefficiencies ensue. Severe weather conditions also may hinder
aircraft's access to departure routes at certain airports. According to
FAA, the complexity of the airspace also has contributed to
inefficiencies in the air traffic management for the region. To provide
air traffic management for the region's airspace, FAA uses a variety of
air traffic control facilities and predetermined and coordinated
procedures and routes. Each ATC facility has a specific--and different-
-area of responsibility for the overall management of the regional
system. Figure 2 depicts a cross section of the different air traffic
control facilities and procedures.
Figure 2: General Representation of a Cross Section of the Different
Air Traffic Control Facilities and Procedures:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a general representation of a cross section of the
different air traffic control facilities and procedures, as follows:
1. Routes: FAA uses predetermined and coordinated procedures and routes
during the entire flight of the aircraft starting with its departure
from the origin airport, through its en-route flight, and ending with
landing at its destination airport.
2. En-route: The phase that occurs between terminal areas, including
the climb, cruise, and descent phases of the flight. Air traffic
controllers at Centers control the aircraft during this phase of the
flight.
3. Arrival posts: At the arrival posts, Center air traffic controllers
hand off the aircraft to TRACON air traffic controllers.[A]
4. Terminal airspace: TRACON facilities are responsible for directing
aircraft movement in the airspace approximately 50 miles from the
airport. TRACON facilities direct aircraft to the assigned route and
specific altitude.
5. Airport traffic control towers (ATCT): ATCTs manage aircraft on the
ground, and the arrival and departure of aircraft into airports. ATCTs
control aircraft during the initial moments after takeoff and prior to
landing, when the aircraft is within approximately 5 nautical miles of
the airport and up to approximately 3,000 feet above the airport.
Handover of flights are coordinated between ATCT and TRACON
controllers.
6. Departure headings: ATCT controllers will direct aircraft to use
specific departure headings, routes, and altitudes during its takeoff
and then shortly after takeoff.
7. Separation rules: Separation rules are the required spacing between
aircraft. This spacing may be vertical, lateral, longitudinal, and
visual. Different separation rules apply to different aircraft.
8. Departure gates: Transition areas within the TRACON boundaries where
aircraft are directed and transferred to another controller.
9. Departure fixes: At the departure fixes, TRACON controllers hand
over the aircraft to Center controllers.
10. Overflights: Aircraft whose flights originate or terminate outside
the controlling facility’s area.
Source: GAO (data); Art Explosion (images).
[A] Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON)--An FAA air traffic
control facility that uses radar and two-way radio communication to
provide separation of air traffic within a specific geographic area in
the vicinity of one or more large airports.
[End of figure]
In April 1998, FAA launched the nation's first-ever coordinated,
comprehensive National Airspace Redesign program with goals of moving
aircraft more efficiently and more safely through the airspace system.
The goals of this program are identified in the National Airspace
Redesign Strategic Management Plan,[Footnote 15] and include
maintaining system safety, decreasing system delay, increasing system
flexibility, increasing system predictability, and increasing user
access. The Airspace Management Program Office is responsible for
airspace redesign project planning and ensuring that planning goes
beyond the design phase and includes an execution and implementation
focus. Other organizations also are involved in the national airspace
redesign efforts, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, which
reviews and publicly comments on the adequacy of FAA's analysis of
environmental impacts.
In 1998, as part of its National Airspace Redesign program, FAA
initiated the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia Airspace Redesign. To
redesign the airspace, FAA uses its Airspace Management Handbook
(Handbook)--which describes step-by-step procedures for airspace design
management--to guide the overall management of the redesign project and
must follow applicable environmental laws and regulations. The Handbook
provides FAA guidance on all phases of the redesign project from
characterizing the initial problem to conducting the operational
analysis for the airspace redesign to postimplementation
evaluation.[Footnote 16] FAA also is required to comply with
NEPA.[Footnote 17] NEPA requires that a detailed EIS be prepared for
all major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment.[Footnote 18] To implement NEPA, CEQ has promulgated
regulations that set forth specific requirements that all federal
agencies must adhere to in the EIS process. Among other things, CEQ
regulations require an EIS to (1) specify the purpose of and need for
the federal action, (2) describe the environment that will be affected,
(3) identify alternatives to the proposed action and identify the
agency's preferred alternative(s), (4) present the environmental
impacts of the proposed action (including the direct and indirect
effects and cumulative impacts), (5) identify any adverse environmental
impacts that cannot be avoided should the proposed action be
implemented, and (6) identify any irreversible and irretrievable
commitment of resources that would occur should the proposed action be
implemented. Agencies also must make diligent efforts to involve the
public throughout the EIS process.[Footnote 19] For additional
direction on implementing NEPA and CEQ regulations, FAA developed
Orders[Footnote 20] that govern, among other things, its EIS process.
In addition, Executive Order 12898,[Footnote 21] accompanying CEQ
guidance, and DOT Order 5610.2[Footnote 22] set forth environmental
justice directives, which FAA must adhere to in conducting its
environmental review. The executive order directs agencies to address
"disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental
effects of [an agency's] programs, policies, and activities on minority
populations and low-income populations…."[Footnote 23]
Figure 3 shows some of the key dates in the preparation of FAA's
airspace redesign and the EIS for the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia
project.
Figure 3: Timeline of FAA's New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia Airspace
Redesign Project:
[See PDF for image]
The timeline is depicted as follows:
1999-2000:
September 22, 1999–February 3, 2000 - FAA held prescoping workshops for
the public.
2000:
July - FAA issued prescoping report.
2001:
January 22 - Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS for NY/NJ/PHL Airspace
Redesign published in the Federal Register.
February 7–May 24 - FAA conducted formal scoping public meetings.
2002:
March - FAA issued scoping report.
2002-2005:
FAA conducted operational and environmental analysis for redesign.
2005:
December 30 - EPA published Notice of Availability of draft
environmental impact statement (DEIS) in Federal Register; DEIS public
comment period closed.
2006:
February 7 – May 2 - FAA conducted public meetings for DEIS.
May 30 - FAA extended DEIS public comment period by 30 days.
July 1 - DEIS public comment period closed.
2007:
March 23 - FAA selected the preferred alternative.
April 6 - FAA issued Noise Mitigation Report.
April 6 – May 11 - Public comment period for Noise Mitigation Report.
April 23 – June 28 - FAA conducted public meetings on the Noise
Mitigation Report.
August 3 - EPA published Notice of Availability of final environmental
impact statement (FEIS) in Federal Register.
September 5 - FAA issued Record of Decision (ROD).
September 28 - FAA issued corrected ROD.
Source: GAO and FAA.
[End of figure]
After determining that it would prepare an EIS, and following 5 years
of scoping and options development, in December 2005, FAA issued a
draft EIS for public comment that identified four basic alternatives.
The first alternative, mandated by NEPA as a baseline, was the Future
No Action Alternative, which represents what the airspace structure
would be if the airspace redesign did not occur. The second
alternative, the Modifications to Existing Airspace Alternative, would
have made only slight adjustments within the existing airspace. That
is, this alternative would have maintained the current boundaries of
the control tower, the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON)
facility, and the Center facility. The third alternative, the Ocean
Routing Airspace Alternative, would have sent all departing flights
from Newark over the Raritan Bay to the Atlantic Ocean before turning
them back over land to head to their departure gates. The main purpose
of this alternative was to reduce the noise impacts on the citizens of
New Jersey. The final alternative was evaluated using two versions. The
Integrated Airspace Alternative Variation without Integrated Control
Complex (ICC) would have changed the current boundaries of the
airspace, to the extent possible, but would have done so with the
existing ATC facilities and equipment. The second version, the
Integrated Airspace Alternative Variation with ICC, would have fully
integrated the airspace using a common automation platform for ATC
equipment. It also may have involved consolidating air traffic
controllers into a consolidated facility.[Footnote 24] Figure 4
provides a summary of the different alternatives, the eight evaluation
criteria applied to each alternative, and the measures or "metrics"
used to compare each alternative.
Figure 4: Alternatives Considered under the FAA New York/New Jersey/
Philadelphia Airspace Redesign EIS:
[See PDF for image]
The following information is presented in the figure:
Future No Action Airspace Alternative:
Maintains the current airspace structure.
Modification to Existing Airspace Alternative:
Modifies existing airspace but maintains the current boundaries of the
ATC facilities.
Ocean Routing Airspace Alternative:
Sends all Newark departing flights over the Raritan Bay to the Atlantic
Ocean before routing flights back over land to head to their departure
gates.
Integrated Airspace Alternative:
Combines the New York TRACON airspace with portions of surrounding
Centers’ airspace to permit more seamless operations without a common
automation platform or a consolidated facility.
Integrated Airspace Alternative Variation without Integrated Control:
Combines the New York TRACON airspace with portions of surrounding
Centers’ airspace to permit more seamless operations with a common
automation platform and the possibility of a consolidated facility.
Evaluation Criteria: Reduce complexity;
How Measured:
* Jet route delays plus time below 18,000 feet: Measures over a 24-hour
period average flight delay and average flight time for a departing
aircraft to reach 18,000 feet altitude.
* Arrival distance below 18,000 feet: Measures average distance
traveled by an arriving aircraft from 18,000 feet altitude to landing.
Evaluation Criteria: Reduce voice communication;
How Measured:
* Maximum interfacility handoffs per hour: Measures number of
controller-to-controller communications an hour to transfer aircraft
responsibility from one ATC facility to another.
Evaluation Criteria: Reduce delay;
How Measured:
* Traffic weighted arrival delay 2011 and traffic weighted departure
delay: Measures the difference in estimated time required for an
aircraft to arrive or depart absent any delays and to arrive or depart
under a specific alternative.
Evaluation Criteria: Balance controller workload;
How Measured:
* Equity of west gate fix traffic counts: Measures the balance of
aircraft traffic among departure fixes—where aircraft responsibility is
handed over between ATC towers—in a particular departure gate—the
transition area within TRACON boundaries.
Evaluation Criteria: Meet system demands and improve user access to
system;
How Measured:
* End of day’s last arrival push: Measures time when the final bank of
scheduled flights from all study area airports enters the TRACON
system.
Evaluation Criteria: Expedite arrivals and departures;
How Measured:
* Time below 18,000 feet: Measures average flight time spent descending
or climbing per flight in a 24-hour period.
* Change in route length per flight: Measures the difference in
distance flown between Future No Action Airspace Alternative and each
alternative.
* Change in block time: Measures average departure gate to arrival gate
flight time in a 24-hour period.
Evaluation Criteria: Flexibility in routing;
How Measured:
* Minutes of delay saved per flight per day: Measures modeled delay
caused by waiting out or flying around a 4-hour weather disruption
divided by the total number of flights.
Evaluation Criteria: Maintain airport throughput;
How Measured:
* Arrival maximum sustainable throughputs: Measures number of landings
per hour.
* Departure maximum sustainable throughputs: Measures number of
takeoffs per hour.
Source: GAO and FAA.
[End of figure]
FAA recommended the Integrated Airspace Alternative Variation with ICC
as its preferred alternative, as it scored highest on 10 of the 13
metrics FAA used to compare the alternatives. Appendix III provides the
full operational comparison of the alternatives. Because the preferred
alternative involves integrating the New York TRACON and portions of
the surrounding Centers' airspace, air traffic controllers will be able
to reduce aircraft separation rules from 5 miles to 3 miles over a
larger geographical area than the current airspace structure allows. In
addition, the preferred alternative will modify other key airspace
components. Appendix IV provides a more detailed summary of the
Integrated Airspace Alternative Variation with ICC. Under this
alternative, for example, FAA will be able to increase the number of
departure headings air traffic controllers can assign to aircraft
during take-offs, and adjust the routes air traffic controllers can
assign aircraft during their final approach to an airport. Figure 5
shows an example of departures without and with dispersal headings
(increasing the number of departure headings).
Figure 5: Example of Departures without and with Dispersal Headings:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of departures without and with dispersal
headings. Without dispersal headings, the separation distance is 3
miles. Separation distance is just over 1 mile with dispersal departure
headings.
Source: GAO (data); Art Explosion (images).
Note: These separation distances are based on normal conditions with
similar types of aircraft. Separation distances can be increased
depending on certain weather conditions or if smaller aircraft are
taking off after a large-body aircraft.
[End of figure]
After the preferred alternative was announced, FAA initiated a noise
mitigation study to develop measures to alleviate, to the extent
possible, the noise impacts associated with the preferred alternative.
The study identified several mitigation measures for analysis--some of
which were later incorporated into the preferred alternative based on
the results of this analysis. The mitigation measures changed some
aspects of the preferred alternative, including reducing the number of
departure dispersal headings, shifting certain departure routes, and
changing certain arrival altitudes. According to FAA, the mitigation
measures incorporated into the preferred alternative would not
substantially reduce the operational gains that FAA believes would
occur once the mitigated preferred alternative is fully implemented.
For example, at Philadelphia, FAA originally planned to increase the
number of new departure dispersal headings on one of its runways from
one to six, which would have allowed air traffic controllers to
decrease the time between aircrafts on take-offs and increase the
number of departures in a given amount of time. However, FAA's analysis
of the mitigation measures recommended that the number of headings
could be reduced from six to three headings, while minimizing the loss
of operational efficiency. The preferred alternative with mitigation
measures was identified as the selected project in FAA's Record of
Decision, which was issued on September 5, 2007.[Footnote 25]
FAA officials have projected a 5-year time frame for full
implementation of the redesigned airspace, which will be implemented in
four stages. According to FAA, each stage will take 12 to 18 months to
implement; elements that do not require large-scale changes to the
current airspace structure will be implemented first, while more
complex changes will be implemented later. For example, during the
first stage, implementation focuses on procedural changes, such as
adjusting the departure dispersal headings at three of the major
airports. FAA implemented the use of additional departure dispersal
headings at Philadelphia and Newark as of December 19, 2007.
FAA Complied with Key Legal Requirements in Conducting Its
Environmental Review for the Regional Airspace Redesign:
Our evaluation of FAA's compliance with NEPA and related requirements,
in conducting the airspace redesign, was based on established court
precedent applying NEPA and its implementing regulations. In deciding
whether an agency adequately carried out these requirements, a court
uses a standard of review articulated in the APA, which is deferential
to agency decision making--whether an agency's actions were "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law."[Footnote 26] Courts interpret this APA standard as requiring that
an agency act reasonably in carrying out NEPA's requirements and that
the agency's ultimate decisions be reasonable and not arbitrary and
capricious. We reviewed FAA's compliance with respect to five key
issues: the statement of the project's purpose and need, evaluation of
alternatives, consideration of the project's environmental effects,
public involvement, and environmental justice matters. We selected
these five issues based on public concerns raised during and after the
EIS process, congressional interest, the views of experts we
interviewed, and GAO's evaluation of the range of concerns presented.
Applying these NEPA requirements and the APA's reasonableness standard,
we concluded that FAA complied with respect to these five key issues.
Our detailed legal analysis is contained in appendix II and is
summarized below.
FAA's Statement of Purpose and Need Complied with Requirements:
FAA's statement of purpose and need, which defined the objectives and
parameters of the project, complied with NEPA requirements. FAA
developed the following purpose and need statement:
"The purpose of the airspace redesign is to increase the efficiency and
reliability of the airspace structure and ATC system. The need is to
accommodate growth in aircraft operations while maintaining safety,
mitigating delays, and accommodating changes in the types of aircraft
using the system."[Footnote 27]
CEQ regulations require that FAA "…briefly specify the underlying
purpose and need to which the agency is responding in proposing the
alternatives including the proposed action."[Footnote 28] Additionally,
FAA Order 1050.1E requires that the purpose and need statement
"…present the problem being addressed … and essentially provide the
parameters for defining a reasonable range of alternatives to be
considered."[Footnote 29] FAA specified the purpose and need and
defined the parameters of the project such that a reasonable number of
alternatives could be developed--the statement was not too narrowly or
too broadly defined. During the EIS process, members of the public and
certain advocacy groups supported the inclusion of noise minimization
in the redesign's stated purpose. According to FAA officials, although
the agency was aware that noise was an important issue to the public
from the onset of the EIS process, it is not FAA's policy to minimize
noise impacts for one community at the expense of another. FAA noted in
the final EIS that its highest priority must be to maintain a safe and
secure airspace. Based on our legal review, we find FAA's decision to
exclude noise from the purpose and need to be reasonable, in part,
because NEPA does not require agencies to elevate environmental
concerns--in this case noise--over other appropriate considerations.
Rather, NEPA requires only that agencies consider the environmental
impacts of their actions as part of their decision making. FAA's
decision also is consistent with court precedent, including a court
decision upholding an FAA purpose and need statement excluding noise
from a major airport expansion, even though the project would have
caused significant noise impacts.[Footnote 30]
FAA's Range and Evaluation of Alternatives Complied with Requirements:
FAA complied with the various NEPA requirements for evaluating the four
alternatives, including the selected project, during the EIS process.
In the EIS, the agency included a no action alternative and discussed
alternatives eliminated from detailed analysis. In addition, the
evaluated alternatives were responsive to the agency's purpose and need
and were reasonably developed, rigorously explored, and objectively
compared to each other throughout the EIS.
* Representation of a baseline of current airspace conditions in an
alternative. By including a Future No Action Alternative, FAA complied
with the requirement[Footnote 31] to provide a no action alternative
that provided a baseline of current conditions to which the other
alternatives were compared.
* Discussion of alternatives eliminated. FAA "briefly discussed the
reasons…"[Footnote 32] for alternatives that were evaluated but
subsequently eliminated from detailed consideration in the EIS.
[Footnote 33] For example, during the formal scoping period, there was
public support for the development of alternatives that included either
alternate modes of transport or improvements to airport infrastructure
(such as additional runways at Philadelphia) as means to reduce delays
or improve operational efficiency. In addition, during subsequent
public comment periods stakeholders suggested other alternatives, such
as peak hour demand controls. Within the EIS, FAA explained that while
it had considered these alternatives, it ultimately eliminated them
because they did not meet the purpose of reducing the inefficiencies of
the airspace.
* Assessment and evaluation of reasonable alternatives. In order to be
"reasonable," the range of alternatives must first be responsive to the
purpose and need.[Footnote 34] Our review showed that to develop the
alternatives, FAA worked with modelers and air traffic controllers in
an iterative and collaborative process specifically to design
alternatives that were feasible within the parameters of the redesign's
purpose and need. Furthermore, FAA used the project's purpose and need
to evaluate the alternatives, both quantitatively and qualitatively, as
each evaluative criterion informed an aspect of the stated purpose and
need. Some community stakeholders and government officials criticized
the range of alternatives considered, pointing out that FAA did not
include an alternative that focused on noise reduction. However, FAA
officials explained that as noise reduction was not among the defined
purposes of the redesign, it did not have to be considered when
developing the alternatives. Furthermore, with the inclusion of the
noise mitigation for the preferred alternative, FAA believes it
minimized environmental impacts, such as noise, to the extent possible
while continuing to address the purpose and need. Despite stakeholder
concerns, as noted above, we find FAA was responsive to the project's
purpose and need, which did not include noise reduction; additionally,
the selected project, which did include noise mitigation measures,
minimized noise impacts to the extent possible while still addressing
the project's purpose and need.[Footnote 35]
* Alternatives' comparative merits. To comply with the CEQ regulation,
alternatives also must be discussed in reasonable detail;[Footnote 36]
there must be a rigorous exploration of each alternative.[Footnote 37]
As demonstrated by the thorough discussion throughout the EIS, FAA
substantially evaluated each of the four primary alternatives,
including both operationally--discussing routing procedures, reduction
of complexity, delay, voice communication, and balancing controller
workload--and in terms of the alternative's environmental consequences.
FAA also compared the alternatives using specified criteria and
presented the alternatives in summary comparison tables, thereby
enabling "reviewers [to] evaluate [the alternatives'] comparative
merits."[Footnote 38]
FAA's Decision Not to Consider Environmental Effects of the Potential
Growth Inducement Resulting from Airspace Redesign Complied with
Requirements:
FAA complied with NEPA in its decision not to analyze the environmental
effects of a potential increase in capacity resulting from the regional
airspace redesign. CEQ regulations require that within the EIS process,
an agency must consider the direct and indirect effects and cumulative
impacts of a proposed action when evaluating the environmental
consequences.[Footnote 39] Indirect effects,[Footnote 40] which are
reasonably foreseeable future effects caused by the current project,
may include growth-inducing effects, among others. FAA did not analyze
the indirect effects of potential growth resulting from the redesign
because it found that the redesign would not in itself create a growth-
inducing effect or increase capacity. Therefore, FAA concluded that
such an analysis was not required. Members of the public and government
agencies criticized FAA's decision, stating that the efficiencies
gained from a redesigned airspace would lead to an increase in capacity
and consequently would increase air traffic and emissions. In other
words, an indirect effect would occur as a result of the redesigned
airspace.
We found that FAA's decision not to consider these potential indirect
environmental effects was reasonable under court decisions applying
these NEPA requirements. In the aviation context, courts have uniformly
upheld similar decisions by FAA not to analyze the effects of induced
growth where the purpose of the project was not growth inducing and did
not add runway capacity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, for example, ruled that FAA complied with NEPA even though it
did not consider the possible growth-inducing effects of altering
arrival procedures at Los Angeles International Airport, where there
would be no changes to the airport's infrastructure. The court
explained that although growth might certainly be foreseeable, "the
project was implemented in order to deal with existing problems; the
fact that it might also facilitate further growth is insufficient to
constitute a growth-inducing impact…" under CEQ regulations.[Footnote
41] Likewise in this case, the purpose of the regional airspace
redesign was to increase the efficiency and reliability of the existing
airspace structure and ATC system--not growth inducement--and the
project does not add runway capacity. Therefore, we found that FAA was
not required to analyze potential environmental effects of increased
growth that might result from the airspace redesign.
FAA Complied with Public Participation Requirements:
FAA complied with NEPA requirements to make "…diligent efforts to
involve the public…"[Footnote 42] during the EIS process by (1)
conducting an early and open process to determine the scope of issues,
[Footnote 43] (2) providing notice of and holding public meetings,
[Footnote 44] and (3) soliciting and responding to public comments.
[Footnote 45] We determined that FAA used an "early and open" process,
as demonstrated by an extensive prescoping campaign: 31 "prescoping"
workshops were conducted prior to the formal scoping period[Footnote
46] which drew 1,174 attendees and prompted 712 written comments. As
with the scoping meetings, according to FAA, the purpose of these
meetings included improving public understanding of the project and
increasing FAA's understanding of public issues that would need to be
addressed as part of the redesign process. For these meetings, as well
all other public meetings conducted for the redesign, FAA advertised in
local media outlets for upcoming meetings and developed a mailing list
to send notifications about public meetings and periodic updates on the
redesign.[Footnote 47] FAA continued to conduct public meetings and to
solicit public comments for the scoping and draft EIS periods by
holding 58 public meetings that drew over 2,000 attendees. In addition,
FAA held seven public meetings during the Noise Mitigation Report
comment period, drawing the largest number of participants--2,200.
According to FAA officials, meeting locations for the different phases
of the EIS process were selected based on multiple criteria including
site suggestions from government officials and their staffs, proximity
to areas that would be by the proposed action, and FAA's goal to hold
at least one meeting in each affected state.[Footnote 48]
During the EIS process, public comments included criticism that the
meeting locations were not widely dispersed around the affected states.
There also was criticism that the comment period for the Noise
Mitigation Report was too short and that there were too few public
meetings regarding this report, which addressed one of the most
controversial and technically complex issues of the redesign. As
demonstrated in table 1, although FAA held the fewest number of public
meetings for this phase of the EIS process, the meetings had the
highest number of attendees. FAA officials stated that they recognized
that noise mitigation issues would attract a lot of public attention.
Despite stakeholder concerns, we concluded that FAA complied with their
requirements.[Footnote 49]
FAA also solicited public comments and considered and responded to
comments, as required by CEQ regulations, in an adequate manner.
[Footnote 50] The public comment period for the Scoping and Noise
Mitigation periods lasted at least 30 days. For the draft EIS comment
period, FAA extended the initial 5-month comment period by 30 days to
allow the public more time to submit its comments. FAA also solicited
public comments at the public meetings and accepted them during the
public comment periods via U.S. mail and e-mail. Receiving numerous
public comments, FAA categorized and responded to all substantive
comments for the draft EIS comment period in the final EIS. Based on
FAA's solicitation and response to public comments received throughout
the EIS process, we concluded FAA's actions complied with requirements.
See table 1 for a summary of public participation opportunities during
the EIS process.
Table 1: Summary of Public Participation Opportunities during the EIS
Process:
Phase: Prescoping;
Total number of public meetings: 31;
Time period for public meetings (days): 135;
Total number of public attendees: 1,174;
Length of comment period (days): [Empty].
Phase: Scoping;
Total number of public meetings: 28;
Time period for public meetings (days): 107;
Total number of public attendees: 1,031;
Length of comment period (days): 159.
Phase: Draft EIS;
Total number of public meetings: 30;
Time period for public meetings (days): 85;
Total number of public attendees: 1,166;
Length of comment period (days): 184.
Phase: Noise Mitigation;
Total number of public meetings: 7;
Time period for public meetings (days): 67;
Total number of public attendees: 2,200[A];
Length of comment period (days): 36.
Sources: GAO and FAA.
[A] The source documentation cites that "over 2,200 people" attended
the noise mitigation meetings. As a specific number was not included by
FAA in its documentation, GAO used the number that was listed--2,200.
[End of table]
FAA Complied with Environmental Justice Directives:
FAA complied with environmental justice directives set forth in
Executive Order 12898,[Footnote 51] accompanying guidance,[Footnote 52]
and DOT Order 5610.2,[Footnote 53] including (1) identifying and
addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse
environmental impacts of the proposed action on minority and low-income
populations and (2) eliciting public involvement from minority and low-
income populations during the EIS process. Understanding that potential
significant noise impacts could result from the alternatives, FAA
identified and addressed any disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental impacts on minority and low-income populations
in the study area. First, FAA used U.S. Census Bureau block data to
identify the areas that could be significantly impacted by noise. Then,
FAA determined whether the impact on minority and low-income
populations was disproportionate.[Footnote 54] While certain areas were
identified as locations with significant environmental impacts to
minority and low-income populations, the mitigation measures outlined
in the selected project reduced the expected impacts by 2011 to below
significant levels, as defined by FAA's standard of noise exposure.
Therefore, FAA concluded that no additional measures were needed to
minimize noise impacts for the identified minority and low-income
populations. By conducting this assessment, FAA met the directive to
identify and address disproportionate significant impacts on low-income
and minority populations. [Footnote 55]
To comply with DOT Order 5610.2 and guidance accompanying Executive
Order 12898, FAA elicited opportunities for public involvement of
minority and low-income populations for the public meeting periods of
the EIS. As the final EIS described, prior to the start of the public
meeting periods, the agency worked with congressional offices to
determine appropriate locations that would accommodate the specific
needs of minority and low-income populations. According to FAA
officials, a number of meetings during each public meeting period of
the EIS process were held in locations accessible by public transit.
Additionally, public meetings throughout the EIS process period were
held in low-income and minority communities. Foreign language
translators were also provided at certain meetings and information was
presented in a variety of formats. Lastly, FAA published advertisements
for the draft EIS public meetings in specialized local foreign language
media throughout the redesign's affected states. Thus, FAA complied
with requirements outlined in Executive Order 12898 and related
guidance and Orders.
Methodology Used to Assess Key Impacts Was Reasonable, However
Additional Analyses Could Have Benefited Decision Making and the
Public's Understanding:
FAA's methodology to assess the operational and noise impacts was
reasonable, based on FAA's guidance for conducting airspace redesigns,
standards from the aviation and analytical community, and opinions of
experts we interviewed. We used FAA's guidance--specifically the
Handbook and FAA Order 1050.1E--to establish criteria to examine FAA's
methodology. The Handbook suggests activities for conducting a
redesign's operational analysis. In addition, FAA Order 1050.1E
establishes specific guidelines for conducting its noise analysis. We
found that FAA generally adhered to its guidance in conducting the
redesign. Specifically, FAA generally followed the process outlined in
its Handbook and used the noise modeling tool and metrics specified in
FAA Order 1050.1E. In addition, experts we interviewed generally agreed
that FAA used experienced contractors, used best available tools to
model the operational and noise impacts of the airspace redesign, used
data that were appropriate and standard to the industry, and chose
metrics to measure the operational impacts that were reasonable and
aligned with the objectives of the airspace redesign. However, based on
generally accepted economic principles and practices, expert opinions,
past FAA-sponsored airspace redesigns, and prior GAO reports[Footnote
56] we identified four limitations in FAA's operational and noise
analyses and an additional limitation in not analyzing economic impacts
when evaluating the alternatives. Based on our analysis and the
opinions of experts we interviewed, we do not believe that these
limitations are substantial enough to warrant redoing the analyses, but
help identify ways in which FAA's methodology could be improved in
future airspace redesigns. Consequently, we identified two types of
analyses--uncertainty analyses and benefit-cost analyses--that,
although not required by law, would provide more comprehensive
information for decision makers and may increase public understanding
of FAA's process and decision making in future airspace redesigns.
Methodology Used to Assess Operational and Noise Impacts Was
Reasonable:
FAA's methodology to assess the operational and noise impacts was
reasonable, based on FAA's guidance for conducting airspace redesigns,
standards from the aviation and analytical community, and opinions of
experts we interviewed. To examine FAA's methodology, we focused on
five components--process, contractors, modeling tools, data, and
metrics--which we identified from FAA's guidance, interviews with FAA
officials and experts, and prior GAO reports.[Footnote 57]
Specifically, we found that FAA generally followed the process outlined
in its Handbook and used the noise modeling tool and metric specified
in FAA Order 1050.1E. In addition, FAA used experienced contractors
and, according to experts we interviewed, the best available modeling
tools in its operational and noise analyses. Furthermore, we found no
evidence that the data used are unreliable, and experts interviewed
generally agreed that FAA used data that were appropriate and standard
to the industry and chose metrics to measure the operational impacts
that were reasonable and aligned with the objectives of the airspace
redesign.
Process: FAA generally followed the process outlined in its Handbook.
Airspace studies are generally iterative and involve substantial
professional judgment. FAA formulated alternatives for redesigning the
airspace through an iterative process with FAA's airspace redesign
team[Footnote 58] and MITRE (the organization responsible for the
operational analysis). Initially, as outlined in FAA's Handbook,
conceptual ideas were developed based on the project's objectives. Then
using an operational modeling tool, the conceptual ideas were simulated
to check that they were technically feasible. If there were parts of
the conceptual design that did not work as evidenced through the
modeling, the design was adjusted, and the new design was simulated.
This iterative process was used in designing the Modifications to
Existing Airspace Alternative and the two variations of the Integrated
Airspace Alternative.[Footnote 59]
Once the conceptual alternatives were designed, FAA collaborated with
MITRE to develop simulation models for each alternative to measure the
operational impacts. Performance metrics,[Footnote 60] which are
selected based on the project's objectives, were used to measure the
operational impacts, or system improvements, of each alternative. As
discussed in the Handbook, the purpose of the metrics is to allow FAA
to evaluate and compare the alternatives, which contributed directly to
FAA's decision. The Total Airspace and Airport Modeler (TAAM) was the
primary tool used to model the alternatives' operations and quantify
the operational impacts in terms of the performance metrics. Additional
modeling tools were used to supplement the operational analysis. FAA,
MITRE, and air traffic controllers validated each operational design
through an iterative process, as outlined in the Handbook, to ensure
that the models would provide reliable results by reviewing the model
output, making adjustments, and continuing that process until there was
agreement that the design was valid.
After the operational designs were validated, the four alternatives
were evaluated for environmental impacts, and the results were included
in the draft EIS. In conducting the noise analysis, FAA collaborated
with its environmental contractors and MITRE to develop scenarios for
each alternative to measure the noise impacts in terms of a cumulative
noise metric. The Noise Integrated Routing System (NIRS) model was the
primary tool used to measure the noise impacts. While developing the
input for the noise model, quality assurance checks were conducted by
the modelers to help assure accuracy in the model output. Using an
iterative process, FAA's airspace redesign team, the environmental
contractors, and MITRE reviewed portions of the input for the noise
model and output from the operational simulations and validated them
against one another to help ensure consistency between the operational
and noise analyses.
FAA selected the Integrated Airspace Alternative Variation with ICC as
its preferred alternative because, according to FAA, it best met the
project's objectives. However, after selecting the preferred
alternative, FAA began the process of identifying measures to mitigate
the noise impacts associated with the preferred alternative. This
process again was iterative and involved identifying potential noise
mitigation strategies and using operational and noise modeling tools to
measure the operational and noise impacts. The potential noise
mitigation measures were continually adjusted and evaluated until
measures were identified that would reduce noise impacts without
substantial adverse impact on operational efficiency. Several noise
mitigation measures were incorporated into the preferred alternative,
resulting in the mitigated preferred alternative--the Integrated
Airspace Alternative Variation with ICC and mitigation measures. In the
Record of Decision, FAA identified this alternative as its selected
project.
The operational and noise models required substantial amounts of data.
As highlighted in the Handbook, some data were used as direct inputs to
the models, such as the airport and runway configurations for the
airports, while other data were used as supporting data when developing
the model inputs. For example, in the noise analysis, a sample of radar
data was analyzed to develop the locations of the terminal and en route
flight tracks. In addition, numerous assumptions were required for the
operational and noise analyses. FAA and its contractors made
assumptions not only when developing the simulations (including the
simulations' scope and detail), but also when developing the data
inputs, including the aviation demand forecast. For example, the
operational models included details down to the airport level based on
the judgment that the redesign has the possibility of improving
flexibility of runway use. In addition, while developing the aviation
demand forecast, which is a key input to the models, numerous
assumptions were made, including assumptions about future traffic
demand and the introduction of new aircraft. Figure 6 represents a
simplified representation of FAA's methodology used to assess
operational and noise impacts.
Figure 6: Simplified Representation of the Methodology Used by FAA to
Assess Operational and Noise Impacts:
[See PDF for image]
Developed alternatives:
FAA developed alternatives through an iterative process with FAA’s
airspace redesign and contractors.
Chose performance metrics:
FAA chose quantifiable performance metrics based on the evaluation
criteria, which were based on the project’s purpose and need.
Collected data:
Numerous data were collected to support development of operational and
noise models, including airport runway configurations, forecasted
operations levels, and flight tracks.
Analyzed alternatives for operational impacts:
Each alternative was analyzed using a simulation model, which
quantified the operational impacts in terms of the selected performance
metrics.
Analyzed mitigation measures for noise impacts:
Each alternative was analyzed for noise impacts using a set of noise
modeling tools, which quantified noise in terms of a cumulative noise
metric.
Selected preferred alternative:
FAA selected the preferred alternative by comparing the operational
impacts of each alternative to assess which alternative best met the
project’s purpose and need.
Identified potential noise mitigation measures:
FAA identified potential noise mitigation measures for the preferred
alternative to avoid, minimize, rectify, reduce, eliminate, or
compensate for significant and reportable noise impacts.
Analyzed mitigation measures for operational impacts:
Potential noise mitigation measures were analyzed for operational
impacts.
Analyzed alternatives for noise impacts:
Noise mitigation measures that did not result in significant adverse
operational impacts were analyzed for noise impacts.
Developed mitigated preferred alternative (selected project):
The preferred alternative was modified by incorporating noise
mitigation measures that reduced noise without significant adverse
operational impacts.
Source: GAO and FAA.
[End of figure]
Contractors: Key to our finding that FAA's contractors were reasonable
is the contractors' substantial experience conducting FAA-sponsored
aviation studies. Experience is important because both operational and
noise analyses inherently involve substantial professional judgment,
including determining the detail included in the model to validating
the model and interpreting the results. For example, the Handbook
states that some of the key consequences of airspace changes may not be
captured well by models and that a model's quantitative metrics often
need to be supplemented with a qualitative review by knowledgeable
experts. For this reason, one expert we interviewed stated that the
results of a study depend on the contractor's expertise. MITRE, the
organization that conducted the operational analysis, is well-respected
in the industry, according to experts we interviewed. MITRE's aviation
program has a long-standing relationship with FAA, as evidenced by its
designation as a Federally Funded Research and Development Center, and
according to MITRE representatives, has generally conducted FAA's more
complex airspace redesigns. One expert highlighted that over the years,
MITRE has improved the main modeling tool used in the operations
analysis to create more valid simulations. Metron Aviation, Inc., a
contractor responsible for about half of the noise modeling, developed
the NIRS model for FAA and has worked on several airspace studies,
including the Potomac Consolidated TRACON Facility Airspace Redesign
and the Chicago Terminal Airspace Project. Landrum & Brown and Northrop
Grumman, the contractors responsible for the other half of the noise
modeling, also have experience with airspace projects.
Modeling tools: The experts we interviewed agreed that FAA used
generally accepted tools to model the operational and noise impacts of
the airspace redesign. TAAM, the primary operations modeling tool, is
used to model airspace, airports, and traffic flows. Some experts said
that TAAM was generally the best tool to use for this airspace
redesign. It allows for fast-time simulation and analysis of changes to
route or sector structure, procedures, and traffic levels. For that
reason, FAA and aviation stakeholders, such as airport owners, also
have used TAAM to model airport and airspace operations.
Noise analysis experts that we interviewed uniformly agreed that the
NIRS modeling tool was the best available tool for this multiairport
airspace redesign. NIRS is capable of evaluating complex air traffic
designs involving high-altitude routing, broad-area airspace changes
affecting multiple airports, and other airspace modifications in the
terminal and en route environments. While this airspace redesign
presented noise exposure in terms of 1 metric, NIRS is capable of
computing 13 predefined noise metrics. NIRS was first released as a
prototype model in 1998 and has been used in two previous FAA airspace
studies (the Potomac Consolidated TRACON Facility Airspace Redesign and
the Chicago Terminal Airspace Project). In addition, FAA Order 1050.1E
states that the NIRS model must be used for noise analysis of regional
airspace studies.
Data: Based on our examination of the data sources and steps taken by
FAA and its contractors to ensure the completeness and accuracy of the
data, we found that data used in this airspace redesign (such as the
airport runway configurations and flight tracks) were appropriate and
standard to the industry. While we did not conduct our own reliability
assessments for any data used by FAA, our review disclosed no evidence
that these data are unreliable. According to FAA and experts we
interviewed, the data sources are industry-standard and generally
recognized as providing reliable information. For example, most of the
data were obtained from governmental sources, such as the radar flight
track data, U.S. Geological Survey terrain data, and U.S. Census Bureau
data. Data obtained from nongovernmental sources (such as the Official
Airline Guide, Airframe Manufacturers Forecast, and other aviation and
population forecasting studies) were primarily used to support aviation
demand forecasting, rather than as direct inputs for modeling. While
FAA did not employ specific procedures to test these data's
reliability, according to FAA and its contractors, basic professional
care was undertaken. After data were obtained, generally in electronic
format to avoid data entry errors, FAA and its contractors took
additional steps to ensure that the data were complete and accurate.
For example, FAA and its contractors conducted consistency checks
throughout the analyses. According to FAA, consistency checks were used
to identify discrepancies between data sets that, if identified, were
then reviewed and rectified. In addition, consistency checks were
conducted on model inputs that were developed. For example, in the
noise analysis, a sample of radar flight track data was analyzed to
develop the locations of the terminal and en route flight tracks and
the flight track dispersions,[Footnote 61] which were used as direct
inputs to the noise model. Furthermore, two experts we interviewed
noted that the use of actual radar data in the noise analysis was a
good practice.
Metrics: FAA generally used appropriate metrics to measure the
operational noise impacts. According to the Handbook, the selection of
performance metrics should be linked to development of the
alternatives, as well as the project's objectives. For this airspace
redesign, FAA used several performance metrics from the Handbook's list
of standard performance metrics. For example, the Change in Route
Length per Flight metric is correlated to the Handbook's Average
Arrival Flight Distance metric. The Handbook states, however, that the
standard performance metrics do not preclude the use of additional
metrics. For this airspace redesign, FAA also selected and customized
additional performance metrics based on the airspace redesign's
specific goals of improving user access and increasing flexibility.
Experts that we interviewed generally agreed that the performance
metrics used to measure the operational impacts were reasonable and
aligned with the project's objectives. One expert also said that
customizing performance metrics was a good practice because the effects
of the changes made in the airspace redesign could then be isolated.
To measure noise exposure, FAA used the Day-Night Average Sound Level
(DNL) metric that, under FAA Order 1050.1E, must be used as the primary
noise metric.[Footnote 62] DNL averages the magnitude of sound levels
generated by all individual events occurring during a 24-hour period,
with a 10-decibel penalty for noise events occurring during typical
sleeping hours (between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.) To assess the
significance of the noise impacts, FAA used the generally accepted
method, which sets a significant noise impact threshold criteria based
on a dose-response relationship--the correlation of DNL to the
percentage of population highly annoyed by recurring noise sound
events. The correlation shows that the percentage of people highly
annoyed by noise exposure increases significantly above DNL of 65
decibels. Some aviation noise consultants, however, have noted
disadvantages of DNL as a metric to measure noise, and suggest the use
of supplemental metrics that measure the frequency and intensity of
individual noise events, which may provide a more adequate measure of
aviation noise as experienced by people. In 1992, after a comprehensive
review of measurement approaches, the Federal Interagency Committee on
Noise (FICON) concluded there were no other metrics of sufficient
scientific standing to replace DNL, and consequently DNL is used by all
federal agencies when analyzing airport-related noise in environmental
assessments and impact statements.[Footnote 63] This conclusion was
still valid as of 2000, according to the chairman of the Federal
Interagency Committee on Aviation Noise,[Footnote 64] which focuses on
aviation research related to noise. Although FICON recommended in 1992
continuing the use of the DNL noise metric as the principal means of
describing airport noise exposure, the Federal Interagency Committee on
Aviation Noise recognized in 2002 that supplementing this description
with noise analyses based on alternative metrics would provide valuable
information that is not easily captured by DNL, and that the use of
some supplemental noise metrics can provide a more meaningful estimate
of impacts than a single DNL estimate.
Our Review Identified Limitations, Which Had They Been Addressed, Would
Have Provided More Comprehensive Information for Decision Makers and
the Public:
Based on generally accepted economic principles and practices, expert
opinions, past FAA-sponsored airspace redesigns, and prior GAO reports,
[Footnote 65] we identified four limitations in FAA's operational and
noise analyses and an additional limitation in not analyzing the
economic impacts when evaluating the alternatives. We and the experts
we interviewed do not believe that the limitations identified are
substantial enough to warrant redoing the analyses. Addressing these
limitations would have provided more comprehensive information for
decision makers and may have increased public understanding of the
process and decision. For example, although not required, FAA did not
fully assess the uncertainty associated with its estimated impacts--
that is, it did not consider a range of values for key assumptions and
inputs--even though some key inputs, such as the aviation demand
forecast, are inherently uncertain. In addition, although FAA was not
required to analyze the economic impacts (such as implementation costs
or the effect of noise on the quality of life of residents living near
the airports) when evaluating the alternatives, GAO has previously
highlighted the importance of analyzing economic impacts for agency
decision making.
FAA Did Not Account for the Potential Effect of Delay Reductions and
Operating Costs Savings on Passengers and Airline Traffic:
Because FAA assumed that traffic demand and flight operations would not
increase in response to airspace system improvements--specifically,
delay reductions and operating cost savings--FAA did not account for
the potential effect of system improvements in its operational
analysis. While our legal review found that FAA's decision to not
analyze the potential increase in capacity in its EIS is reasonable
from a legal standpoint, we believe that FAA's assumption that traffic
demand and flight operations would not change as a result of system
improvements poses a methodological limitation. FAA estimated that the
airspace redesign will reduce airport delay by about 20 percent and
annual operating costs by about $285 million once implemented (see fig.
7 for the calculation and context of the 20 percent delay reduction).
Despite these estimated reductions, however, FAA assumed that traffic
demand and flight operations would not change as result of system
improvements.[Footnote 66]
Figure 7: Description of FAA's Estimated 20 Percent Reduction in
Airport Delay:
[See PDF for image]
FAA projected that the selected project will reduce airport delays by
20 percent once fully implemented. While the scope of our study did not
include a validation of FAA’s estimates, we describe below additional
information about FAA’s projected delay reduction and how FAA
calculated the 20 percent airport delay reduction for the selected
project because the detailed calculations were not included in
documentation that FAA provided to the public.
* The 20 percent delay reduction is the difference in airport delay in
2011 between the selected project and the Future No Action Alternative,
not a reduction from today’s airport delay.
* This airspace redesign addresses delays within FAA’s control—that is,
delays in the National Airspace System, as well as flexibility in
severe weather. Thus, some causes of delay, such as air carrier and
security delay, will not be reduced as a result of this project.
* The 20 percent airport delay reduction was calculated by combining
the minutes of delay in clear weather (arrival delay, departure delay,
and jet route delay) and severe weather (route flexibility). The
difference in minutes of delay in 2011 between the selected project and
the Future No Action Alternative was then translated into a percentage.
* Estimated delay reduction for the redesign is not equal for all
airports—that is, delay reductions at some airports will be
significantly greater than at others. In addition, some airports (most
notably LaGuardia) will continue to experience significant airport
delays. (See the table below for estimated airport arrival and
departure delays.)
Table: Airport Arrival and Departure Delays in 2011:
Airport: JFK, Arrivals;
Future No Action Alternative (minutes per flight): 3;
Integrated Airspace with ICC (minutes per flight): 1.7;
Difference (minutes per flight): -1.3;
Percentage difference: -43%.
Airport: JFK, Departures;
Future No Action Alternative (minutes per flight): 11.7;
Integrated Airspace with ICC (minutes per flight): 9.4;
Difference (minutes per flight): -2.3;
Percentage difference: -20%.
Airport: LaGuardia, Arrivals,
Future No Action Alternative (minutes per flight): 53.7;
Integrated Airspace with ICC (minutes per flight): 49.4;
Difference (minutes per flight): -4.3;
Percentage difference: -8%.
Airport: LaGuardia, Departures;
Future No Action Alternative (minutes per flight): 74.7;
Integrated Airspace with ICC (minutes per flight): 65;
Difference (minutes per flight): -9.7;
Percentage difference: -13%.
Airport: Teterboro, Arrivals;
Future No Action Alternative (minutes per flight): 6.4;
Integrated Airspace with ICC (minutes per flight): 5.3;
Difference (minutes per flight): -1.1;
Percentage difference: -17%.
Airport: Teterboro, Departures;
Future No Action Alternative (minutes per flight): 2.2;
Integrated Airspace with ICC (minutes per flight): 2.2;
Difference (minutes per flight): 0;
Percentage difference: 0%.
Airport: Philadelphia, Arrivals;
Future No Action Alternative (minutes per flight): 14.6;
Integrated Airspace with ICC (minutes per flight): 14.3;
Difference (minutes per flight): -0.3;
Percentage difference: -2%.
Airport: Philadelphia, Departures;
Future No Action Alternative (minutes per flight): 8.2;
Integrated Airspace with ICC (minutes per flight): 7.4;
Difference (minutes per flight): -0.8;
Percentage difference: -10%.
Airport: Newark, Arrivals;
Future No Action Alternative (minutes per flight): 34;
Integrated Airspace with ICC (minutes per flight): 26.7;
Difference (minutes per flight): -7.3;
Percentage difference: -21%.
Airport: Newark, Departures;
Future No Action Alternative (minutes per flight): 20.1;
Integrated Airspace with ICC (minutes per flight): 13;
Difference (minutes per flight): -7.1;
Percentage difference: -35%.
[End of table]
Source: HAO; GAO analysis of FAA data (table)
Note: The table in fig. 7 does not include jet route delay or route
flexibility used in FAA's calculation of the 20 percent airport delay
reduction.
[End of figure]
FAA's assumption that travel demand will not increase, however, is
contrary to economic theory and FAA internal guidance.[Footnote 67]
Based on economic theory, because delays impose costs on airlines (by
requiring them to operate their aircraft for longer periods and use
more fuel) and on passengers (by requiring them to spend more time in
delayed aircraft), a reduction in delays and an airline's operating
costs would reduce the total price (or cost) of air travel.[Footnote
68] The reduced total price of air travel would generally provide
airlines with an incentive to lower fares (that is, they would be able
to provide the same volume of service at a lower price) and because
travelers will generally fly more at lower prices, the reduction in
price could induce an increase in the amount of travel demanded by
passengers, all else the same. FAA also failed to provide economic
evidence to support its underlying rationale that traffic demand and
flight operations will not change as a result of system improvements
because the demand for air travel in the New York area is "price
inelastic" (that is, relatively unresponsive to price changes).
[Footnote 69] FAA guidance, experts we interviewed, and our own
previous work indicate that the responsiveness of travelers to changes
in travel price depends on factors such as distance traveled, nature of
the trip (nonbusiness versus business), and the availability of
substitute travel modes (for example, rail). Specifically, FAA's
benefit-cost guidance for capacity-related airport projects (for
example, building a new runway) indicates that the demand for travel
over shorter distances and travel by nonbusiness travelers is price
elastic (that is, relatively responsive to changes in price).[Footnote
70] In addition, an economist in the aviation industry whom we
interviewed noted that air travelers who use the New York and
Philadelphia airports have multiple travel options, especially options
that compete with short-distance flights, and as a result, demand for
air travel on these routes is relatively elastic. Our prior work also
indicates that passenger rail competes with short-distance flights,
such as the New York to Washington, D.C., market.[Footnote 71]
We also question FAA's underlying rationale that flight operations
would not increase as a result of the airspace redesign because the
redesigned airspace does not increase overall system capacity.
Specifically, FAA explained that the capacity of the entire airspace
system--which includes the airspace, runways, and airport terminals--is
determined by the element in the system with the least capacity, which,
for the New York metropolitan area, is the capacity of the airport
runways. Because this redesign does not increase runway capacity, FAA
concluded that operations would not increase. However, FAA's National
Airspace Capital Investment Plan states that an objective of this
airspace redesign project is to increase capacity to meet projected
demand and reduce congestion.[Footnote 72] In addition, officials from
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey--which operates JFK,
LaGuardia, and Newark--said that this redesign could increase capacity
and that additional operations at these airports could be achieved.
Finally, most of the experts that we interviewed believe that the
capacity in the airspace would increase, which could allow for
additional operations. Most of these experts, however, also stated that
any increase in system capacity resulting from the redesign would
likely be relatively small, such that any increase in new operations
would also be small. One expert that we interviewed stated that there
needs to be a major increase in the capacity, such as a new runway,
before airlines would substantially increase their operations. Also,
airlines could use a larger aircraft, with more available seats,
instead of increasing the number of operations. While we believe this
was a methodological limitation, it is uncertain what the net effect of
the airspace redesign will be since the final results will depend upon
the actions of the airlines and passengers in responding to the
estimated delay reduction and operating cost savings.
FAA Did Not Fully Account for Future Use of New Technology in the Noise
Analysis:
FAA's assumptions in the noise analysis did not fully account for the
future use of Area Navigation (RNAV) technology.[Footnote 73]
Specifically, FAA modeled RNAV procedures in the noise analysis of the
mitigation measures for the preferred alternative, but did not model
RNAV in the noise analysis used to compare the alternatives, which is
inconsistent with the operational analysis. RNAV is designed to allow
aircraft to fly a more precise track, thus examining the effect of RNAV
on noise impacts could have provided more precise information for
decision makers and the public. FAA said that it modeled RNAV for some
mitigation measures of the preferred alternative because mitigation of
noise impacts could be improved by using RNAV procedures. In the noise
analysis used to compare the alternatives, however, FAA did not model
RNAV because FAA said it did not know whether all aircraft using a
particular route would be equipped with RNAV technology; FAA also did
not predict which flight tracks airlines would choose. Thus, FAA
officials said that they did not want to model anything that was not
guaranteed to be implemented. Our review, however, showed that FAA had
some indication as to which routes would be used with RNAV because some
tracks in the operational models were designed to be RNAV compatible.
An expert whom we interviewed further explained that because FAA had
designed flight tracks to be more efficient for the purposes of this
airspace redesign, it could be expected that airlines would use RNAV on
those tracks that are most efficient. Furthermore, it would be
reasonable to assume that RNAV will be used within the time frame of
this airspace redesign because as one expert explained, RNAV reduces
fuel burn and reduces flight time. FAA's own estimate reflects that
about 80 percent of operations at the top 35 busiest airports in the
National Airspace System are estimated to be RNAV capable.[Footnote 74]
FAA officials also said that RNAV was not modeled in the noise analysis
because the amount of dispersion depends on a route's designated
accuracy value,[Footnote 75] which is decided during development of the
route procedure. According to FAA and its contractors, however, the
effect of using RNAV in the noise analysis would have created a more
concise concentration of flight tracks over specific geographic areas
and would have concentrated noise under these tracks. Therefore, in
most cases, RNAV may have resulted in fewer people impacted by noise
but to a greater degree, depending on the location of the RNAV route.
FAA included some RNAV procedures as noise mitigation measures,
however. For example, when RNAV is used in the river approach to
Philadelphia, the flight tracks are concentrated over the river, in
effect reducing the number of people impacted by noise, as well as
concentrating the higher noise levels over nonpopulated areas. Experts
with whom we discussed FAA's use of RNAV said that examining the effect
of RNAV procedures on the noise impacts could have provided more
accurate information on the noise impacts. One expert, however,
considered the FAA's assumption to not fully model RNAV in the noise
analysis conservative given the uncertainty of the extent to which RNAV
would become a key part of the airspace system.
FAA Did Not Assess the Effect of Noise Using Supplemental Noise
Metrics:
FAA only assessed noise impacts using a single cumulative noise metric
that is required under FAA guidance, where additional metrics, not
required by law or guidance, that measure noise in other ways--called
supplemental noise metrics--would have provided information that may be
more readily understood by decision makers and the public than the DNL
metric.[Footnote 76] As mentioned previously in this report, the
Federal Interagency Committee on Aviation Noise recognized in 2002 that
supplementing the DNL cumulative noise metric with alternative noise
metrics would provide valuable information that is not easily captured
by DNL, and the use of some supplemental noise metrics can provide a
more meaningful estimate of physical impacts than a single DNL
estimate. For example, Sound Exposure Level (SEL)[Footnote 77] and Time-
Above[Footnote 78] are recognized as appropriate metrics for evaluating
physical impacts associated with noise, such as sleep disturbance and
speech interference.[Footnote 79] According to FAA representatives,
supplemental noise metrics were not calculated because the size and
complexity of this regional airspace redesign would have made their
inclusion in the EIS more confusing to the public. FAA has, however,
calculated supplemental metrics, including SEL and Time-Above, in
previous airspace redesigns.[Footnote 80] While experts we interviewed
recognized that presenting supplemental metrics in this EIS would have
been challenging, they said that it was possible, and one expert
explained that in some cases, it may have helped FAA more easily
respond to public concerns. One expert said that limiting the
information to discrete areas may have made presenting supplemental
metrics in the EIS more manageable. For example, FAA could have
reported single-event noise levels only for schools or the most common
or loudest aircraft. In previous airspace redesigns where FAA
calculated supplemental metrics, they reported the supplemental metrics
only for areas that experienced noise impacts above a selected DNL
value.
FAA Did Not Fully Assess Uncertainty Associated with Estimated Impacts
of the Alternatives:
FAA did not fully assess the uncertainty associated with the estimated
impacts--that is, it did not consider a range of values for the key
assumptions and inputs--even though some inputs are inherently
uncertain.[Footnote 81] Rather, when assessing the estimated impacts of
the four alternatives, FAA generally used point estimates to represent
traffic demand in 2006 and 2011, such as a point estimate for the
future fleet mix and traffic levels. As a result, FAA's analysis
implies greater precision about the redesign's impacts than is
warranted. Assessing the uncertainty associated with the key
assumptions and inputs would have provided a range of estimated
impacts.
As FAA's own Handbook recognizes, questions are likely to be raised
about analyses based on uncertain assumptions, and "one way to protect
a study's integrity … is to develop a few scenarios that reflect
alternative assumptions for key uncertain elements,"[Footnote 82] that
is, perform a sensitivity analysis. We heard a range of opinions from
experts we interviewed about assumptions made in the airspace
redesign's demand forecast. Two experts said that the demand forecast
did not fully account for new classes of aircraft, such as the change
in use of air taxis or regional jets, while one expert noted that the
forecast did not account for changes in the airlines' hub-and-spoke
operations. Other experts disagreed with assumptions about airline
yields or the effects of fuel costs. What most experts that we
interviewed shared, however, was the belief that FAA should have
assessed uncertainty by evaluating how changes in key assumptions made
in the demand forecast would affect the estimated impacts of the
alternatives.
FAA did, however, conduct a very limited sensitivity analysis to assess
the uncertainty associated with one element of the forecasted fleet mix
and one comparative analysis. According to FAA, based on the results of
the limited sensitivity analysis, the relative ranking for the
alternatives did not change. In 2006, FAA--in recognizing that the
aviation industry had changed since the forecast was conducted--
conducted a comparative analysis of some elements of its 2006 forecast
with the observed levels in 2005 and some elements of the 2011 forecast
of Philadelphia traffic to the 2012 forecast used for the Capacity
Enhancement Plan.[Footnote 83] This comparative analysis did not assess
the uncertainty associated with estimated impacts, but, rather,
assessed the accuracy of parts of the 2006 and 2011 forecasts developed
for the airspace redesign. Through the comparative analysis, FAA
determined that some of the forecasted elements were essentially
correct (for example, the traffic counts for the 2006 forecast were 6
percent to 8 percent higher than the 2005 observed levels for the major
airports in the region)[Footnote 84] while some were inaccurate (for
example, the estimated fleet mix).[Footnote 85] Based on the results of
this comparative analysis, FAA determined that the number of regional
jets at Newark needed further analysis and as a result, conducted a
very limited sensitivity analysis by increasing the estimated
proportion of regional jets at Newark in 2006 and recalculating the
operational impacts for each alternative in 2006. According to FAA, the
results of the limited sensitivity analysis showed that the relative
ranking of the alternatives was not affected by the change.
FAA Did Not Analyze Economic Impacts when Evaluating the Alternatives:
The criteria used to evaluate the alternatives did not include economic
impacts, such as implementation costs, the effect of the alternatives
on the airlines, passengers' time value, or the effect of noise on the
quality of life of residents living near the airports. According to
experts interviewed, considering these impacts could have been helpful
for decision makers because it would have provided more information for
FAA to better assess whether the estimated benefits of the alternatives
(relative to the Future No Action Alternative) justified the estimated
costs. Experts we interviewed also said that a fuller discussion of the
airspace redesign's potential costs may have increased stakeholders'
understanding of FAA's decision and, in turn, made FAA's decision more
palatable to the public. FAA, however, is neither required to, nor
precluded from, considering these impacts in its decision under CEQ
regulations.
Implementation costs: Some experts we interviewed noted that FAA did
not assess implementation costs when comparing the alternatives with
the Future No Action Alternative. According to FAA, because
implementation costs, such as facility or training costs, would be the
same for all alternatives, their inclusion in the operational analysis
would not have affected FAA's decision. For example, FAA said that the
cost for training air traffic controllers is an ongoing agency cost;
that is, training will occur independently of the airspace redesign.
However, because the selected project, unlike the other alternatives,
will require a common automation platform,[Footnote 86] its
implementation costs[Footnote 87] will be different from the other
alternatives' implementation costs. Furthermore, although
implementation costs were not explicitly analyzed when comparing the
alternatives, FAA suggested in the airspace redesign's operational
technical report that costs and benefits were assessed. Specifically,
the operational technical report states that the Integrated Airspace
with ICC is the only alternative "worth the effort and expense of
implementing an airspace redesign of this magnitude."[Footnote 88]
Other economic impacts: We also found that FAA did not assess other
economic impacts, such as the effect of the alternatives on the
airlines, passengers' time value, or the effect of noise on the quality
of life of residents living near the airports. FAA representatives said
they did not measure the economic impact on airlines or passenger time
value because they were trying to keep the analysis "clean," and did
not believe that those impacts were part of the NEPA process. In
addition, FAA did not estimate the economic impacts of noise, in part
because they are not required under CEQ regulations to conduct a
benefit-cost analysis, and noise reduction was not part of the airspace
redesign's purpose and need.[Footnote 89] While methods to determine
the economic costs associated with noise impacts are not firmly
established, economists have used methods for assessing the economic
impact of changes in noise.[Footnote 90] For example, according to one
expert we interviewed, FAA could have estimated property devaluation
associated with noise using the DNL cumulative noise metric calculated
in the noise analysis. Although not required under CEQ regulations, FAA
would have had a more comprehensive picture of the trade-offs for each
alternative had it assessed these economic impacts.
Uncertainty Analyses and Benefit-Cost Analyses Could Benefit Decision
Makers and the Public:
We identified two analyses that would have provided decision makers and
the public with more comprehensive information. For example, an
uncertainty analysis using a range of values for key assumptions and
inputs, such as future demand and operations levels, would have
provided decision makers and the public with a range of projected
impacts. In addition, a benefit-cost analysis, which could have been
used to assess the economic trade-offs between each airspace redesign
alternative and the status quo, could provide more comprehensive
information for decision makers to determine whether the estimated
benefits associated with redesigning airspace justify the costs, and
provide more transparency in the decision-making process to increase
the public's understanding.
Uncertainty Analysis Would Provide Information on the Range of the
Redesign's Impacts:
An uncertainty analysis that examined a range of key assumptions and
inputs, such as the aviation demand forecast and the future use of
RNAV, would have been useful. For example, a sensitivity analysis (a
way to assess uncertainty) is used to change the values for key
assumptions and to assess the effect on the estimated impacts, thereby
providing decision makers and the public with information to understand
the sensitivity of the results to changes in the assumptions. The
analysis can be used to assess the uncertainty associated with the
estimated impacts--that is, provide a range of projected impacts. The
basic approach is to vary key assumptions, estimates, and forecasts
systematically over appropriate ranges and to measure the impact on the
results. In some cases, the relative impact of competing alternatives
may be altered as a result of the sensitivity analysis, while in others
it will not. As we stated in a prior section, FAA did not conduct a
full sensitivity analysis on the demand forecast's key assumptions but
only a limited analysis to assess uncertainty in the number of regional
jets at Newark. FAA reported that the results of this limited
sensitivity analysis showed that the relative ranking of the
alternatives was not affected by the change.[Footnote 91]
An uncertainty analysis is common for evaluations of projects that will
have future impacts. For example, a 2007 report on the region's travel
demand used a sensitivity analysis to assess the effect of low,
baseline, and high scenarios for its 2025 forecast.[Footnote 92] In
addition, FAA's Handbook recommends a sensitivity analysis when
conducting airspace studies and evaluating airspace alternatives.
Specifically, the Handbook recommends a sensitivity analysis be
performed "even if assumptions have a strong basis in precedence and
factual information. Other assumptions are known to be inherently
uncertain from the beginning because they are based on imperfect or
incomplete information. This is clearly the case for all future events,
such as the level and characteristics of the future traffic demand
since the future cannot be predicted precisely."[Footnote 93] Experts
interviewed said that given the inherent uncertainty associated with
projecting future events, when feasible, uncertainty should be
assessed. Several experts told us that a sensitivity analysis could
have been used for key factors in the operational analyses.[Footnote
94] For example, a sensitivity analysis could have been performed on
aircraft fleet operations at the region's smaller airports to account
for the growing segment of business jet operations.
Benefit-Cost Analysis Would Provide Information on Whether Estimated
Benefits Outweigh Estimated Costs:
A benefit-cost analysis, which can be used to assess the benefits and
costs associated with each alternative compared to the status quo,
would have provided decision makers and the public with more
comprehensive information on whether the estimated benefits of the
selected project justified its costs. Benefit-cost analyses are used to
identify the alternative, if any, that maximizes the net benefits
(benefits minus costs) relative to the status quo. The alternative that
maximizes net benefits is economically justified. The analysis also can
be used to identify how the benefits and costs associated with each
alternative are distributed across different subpopulations or income
groups.
FAA stated that it did not conduct a benefit-cost analysis for the
airspace redesign because the agency was not required to do so.
[Footnote 95] GAO believes, based on prior work, that benefit-cost
analyses can provide valuable information for decision makers and
should be considered in analyzing transportation investments.[Footnote
96] While conducting benefit-cost analyses requires an investment in
time and resources, FAA uses benefit-cost analyses in making other
investment decisions, such as the Next Generation Air Transportation
System (NextGen) projects. Moreover, FAA has guidance for conducting
benefit-cost analyses for airport projects and investment analyses for
air traffic control procurements.[Footnote 97] FAA requires benefit-
cost analyses in granting discretionary airport improvement program
funds and for investment analysis for air traffic control procurements.
In addition, the Office of Management and Budget requires benefit-cost
analyses for new regulations. The Air Traffic Organization (ATO), which
includes the division that develops airspace redesigns, also includes a
division that is charged with assessing investments for the air traffic
control system. FAA's Office of Aviation Policy and Plans conducts
benefit-cost analyses on investment and regulatory decisions and
discretionary Airport Improvement Program grants.[Footnote 98]
Furthermore, only after FAA selected the final alternative did it
assess the economic benefits associated with the selected project.
Specifically, in describing the benefits of the airspace redesign to
the public, FAA stated that the selected project would result in 12
million minute delay savings (see fig. 8 for further discussion) and a
reduction of up to $285 million[Footnote 99] in annual operating costs,
when compared to the Future No Action Alternative. These benefits were
calculated using FAA's economic values for investment decisions, which
are used in FAA's benefit-cost analyses for investment and regulatory
decisions.[Footnote 100] However, the dollar amounts for delay savings
were done only for airline operating costs and not for others such as
delay savings to passengers. Moreover, because FAA did not estimate
costs, the information on benefits cannot be used to assess whether the
selected project is economically justified.
Figure 8: Description of the 12 Million Minutes Saving in Delay
Savings:
[See PDF for image]
FAA stated in press releases that there will be a projected annual 12
million minutes in delay savings. We present this description because
FAA did not include an explanation of the calculation in the documents
it released to the public.
* This measure was developed as a means to communicate the delay
benefits of the redesigned airspace to the public. FAA officials said
that because this measure only reflects delay, it is not a useful
measure in evaluating the different alternatives. Furthermore, it was
developed after FAA made its decision.
* The 12 million minutes is not a straight multiplier of the average
minutes delay savings—which FAA estimates to be 3 minutes of arrival
delay per flight—by the number of operations at the airports. Rather,
the 12 million minutes was calculated from 4 performance
metrics—traffic-weighted arrival delay, traffic-weighted departure
delay, departure airspace delay, and delay savings from flexibility-of
the 13 metrics used in the operational analysis to compare the
alternatives. FAA multiplied the daily per flight savings by the number
of affected flights and then annualized the savings for each of the
four metrics. The total savings calculated for all four metrics was
approximately 12 million minutes (see table below).
* In one press release, FAA stated that the 12 million minutes savings
were for the four major metropolitan airports—JFK, LaGuardia, Newark,
and Philadelphia. However, the operational analysis included other
satellite airports.
Table: Calculation of 12 Million Minutes Savings:
Metric: Minutes saved per flight for arrival;
Minutes saved: 2,948;
Number of operations: 3,558;
Annualizing factor: 368;
Annual savings (minutes/year): 3,860,145.
Metric: Minutes saved per flight for departures;
Minutes saved: 4,113;
Number of operations: 3,566;
Annualizing factor: 368;
Annual savings (minutes/year): 5,398,744.
Metric: Minutes saved per flight for departure airspace delay;
Minutes saved: 0.49;
Number of operations: 3,566;
Annualizing factor: 368;
Annual savings (minutes/year): 643,021.
Metric: Minutes saved per flight for routing flexibility;
Minutes saved: 12.60;
Number of operations: 3,566;
Annualizing factor: 36;
Annual savings (minutes/year): 1,617,538.
Total minutes saved: 11,519,448.
[End of table]
Source: GAO; FAA (table).
[End of figure]
FAA's limited economic analysis focused only on select benefits of only
one alternative--the selected project--and does not account for costs.
A comprehensive benefit-cost analysis would have increased transparency
about the range of potential economic impacts of the airspace redesign.
For example, a benefit-cost analysis that estimated the economic impact
on passengers, airlines, and residents living near the airports, would
have allowed a decision maker to assess which alternative, if any,
would maximize net benefits, and to identify how the benefits and costs
are distributed among population or income groups. As one expert
explained, it is difficult to identify from the operational analysis
the beneficiaries of the system improvements. For example, system
improvements, such as reducing delay, benefit passengers and airlines,
but other improvements, such as reduce voice communications and balance
controller workload, benefit the ATC system.
Experts we spoke with indicated that a benefit-cost analysis for the
airspace redesign would have been useful. For example, one expert noted
that the list of system improvements and metrics in the alternatives
analysis focused on impacts related to efficiency, while the
implementation costs were not included. In addition, if the economic
impacts of noise had been included, costs could have varied by
alternative. For example, FAA estimated that the Ocean Routing Airspace
Alternative would result in fewer people impacted by noise compared to
other alternatives. If the economic effect of noise, approximated by a
change in home values due to aviation noise, had been taken into
account, then an alternative like the Ocean Routing Airspace
Alternative might have performed better than the other alternatives on
this metric. In addition, the potential economic effect on passengers
and airlines also would have been assessed in a comprehensive benefit-
cost analysis. For example, the effect of delay on passengers could
have been assessed using the value of passenger time lost or gained as
a result of the airspace redesign.
Lack of Detailed Implementation Plan Raises Questions about Time Frames
and Costs:
Based on the information available to date, we are unable to determine
whether FAA will meet its projected 5-year implementation time frame,
what the final project configuration and implementation costs will be,
and any details regarding FAA's postimplementation evaluation plan. For
example, FAA has not yet developed a detailed implementation plan that
includes a schedule of when the new redesigned airspace will be in
place. Additionally, FAA has not yet determined the type or amount of
equipment or software that will be needed to implement the project.
Lack of Detailed Implementation Plan Raises Questions on FAA Meeting
Its 5-Year Completion Goal:
FAA is in the process of preparing an implementation plan, and
therefore, we are unable to determine whether FAA can meet its
projected 5-year implementation time frame, overcome potential
obstacles to implementation, and transition from the current airspace
structure to the redesigned structure. FAA is responsible for ensuring
that the selected project is implemented in a manner that avoids any
interruption in air traffic services and minimizes disruptions to air
traffic. To ensure that new airspace redesign projects are successfully
implemented, FAA's Handbook lays out specific activities for
transitioning between the current airspace structure and the redesigned
airspace. Based on our prior work[Footnote 101] and the experts we
interviewed, we have identified three specific activities recommended
in FAA's Handbook and one additional activity emphasized by our experts
that we believe are important to include in an implementation plan to
successfully implement the redesigned airspace.
* Scheduling. FAA's Handbook recommends preparing a schedule that
identifies the exact time that the new redesigned airspace will be in
place so that all affected FAA regions and facilities, airports,
airlines, air traffic controllers, and general aviation pilots can
prepare for the change. For example, a major component of the
redesigned airspace is the integration of the airspace, which will
allow air traffic controllers to use the terminal separation rules over
a larger geographical area. Although FAA acknowledges that integrating
the airspace will require new procedures and potentially reallocation
of staff, there is no detailed information on when these procedures
will be implemented, how ATC staff may be reallocated, and what type of
air traffic controller training will be required. Without this
information, it is difficult for the agency to clearly track and report
progress, as well as to ensure timely implementation. In our prior
work,[Footnote 102] we have highlighted the importance of developing an
implementation timeline to build momentum and show progress from day
one. For example, to help federal agencies implement successful
transformation of their cultures in a transparent and accountable
manner, a key implementation step is to make implementation goals and
timelines public.
* Risk mitigation. According to the Handbook, as part of its
implementation plan, FAA should identify potential risks and develop a
risk mitigation plan to minimize the impact if the risk does occur.
FAA, however, has not developed risk mitigation strategies to deal with
potential challenges that may arise during the redesign's
implementation. Without details on proposed risk mitigation, it is
unclear whether FAA has taken steps to identify possible risk factors.
FAA officials noted that there are a number of separate FAA projects
and initiatives that, while not directly linked to the airspace
redesign project, will influence how FAA implements the airspace
redesign. For example, FAA has not decided whether it will house the
new common automation platform in existing facilities, a new facility,
or a consolidated facility. In some of our prior work,[Footnote 103] we
have recommended that agencies should develop a risk analysis to show
the potential impacts if task and milestones are not achieved, develop
methods to accurately evaluate and measure the progress of
implementation, and develop contingency plans should task and
milestones not be met. FAA does not have such plans in place for
implementing the redesign. Furthermore, if there is no consideration of
risk mitigation, FAA may be unable to minimize potential risks.
* Transition planning. The Handbook also recommends that FAA identify
the steps that need to be taken to transition between the current
airspace to the redesigned airspace in a transition plan that includes
key decision points along the way. Transitional plans provide details
on the activities and time schedules for the transition from the
current airspace to the redesigned airspace. The purpose of these plans
includes ensuring that services associated with the airspace and
airports continue throughout implementation and that the multiple users
of the airspace--such as pilots, FAA personnel, and air traffic
controllers--are aware of the ongoing changes. Given this redesign's
high level of complexity and multiple implementation stages,
transitional planning could be beneficial to FAA's implementation.
However, FAA has not developed a transitional plan for the redesign's
implementation. We have highlighted in a prior GAO report[Footnote 104]
that FAA should include proper transition planning when implementing
highly technical and complex projects that involve numerous
stakeholders, such as NextGen. For example, in February 2008, we
testified that FAA faces a number of management challenges--such as
better aligning costs with revenue--in its transition to NextGen.
[Footnote 105]
* Monitoring. It is important for FAA to monitor the implementation
throughout the transition process to ensure that FAA is actually
implementing the changes in the airspace that were identified in the
selected project. We have reported in prior GAO work[Footnote 106] that
monitoring efforts can help agencies transition to new systems. For
example, as FAA transitions to NextGen, we believe it will be critical
for FAA to monitor and address equipment outages to ensure the safety
and efficiency of the current ATC system. In addition, experts we spoke
with also believe that monitoring is an important step for implementing
the airspace. For example, one expert interviewed by GAO stated that
FAA should get a current baseline of information on the airspace, and
continue to monitor and evaluate throughout implementation. Another
expert interviewed by GAO also stated that both operational and noise
impacts should be assessed (as part of monitoring and evaluation) to
further enhance management of the implementation. Although FAA has
already begun implementing the redesign, it is unclear how the agency
will monitor and evaluate the process since there is no monitoring plan
in place. Periodic monitoring and evaluation will both ensure that FAA
is complying with the operational and environmental objectives outlined
in the selected project, as well as increase the project's
accountability and transparency.
Final Project Configuration and Costs Are Unknown:
FAA has not determined the final project configuration and costs. Based
on our prior work,[Footnote 107] it is critical for an agency to have a
full understanding of project costs to ensure that implementation is
successful. For example, by understanding project costs, agencies can
ensure they have the required resources. However, FAA has not yet
determined the costs due, in part, to two reasons. First, although FAA
officials have stated that they will be using currently available
technology and software, FAA has not determined the type or amount of
equipment and software that will be needed to implement the common
automation platform for the ICC. Second, it is still unclear whether
the ICC will be housed in existing FAA facilities, a new facility, or
in a consolidated facility. Under FAA's Facility Replacement Program,
FAA is reviewing whether to build a new TRACON facility for the New
York region. However, FAA officials estimated that the final decision
as to whether to approve the design and construction of a new TRACON
will be made sometime in September 2008, but it will not include costs
estimates. Cost estimates will require FAA to make specific decisions
on the location of the TRACON, the size of the facility, and any
supporting infrastructure requirements. If FAA approves the
construction of a new TRACON, the final cost estimate for this new
facility will not be available until September 2011 when the contract
is to be awarded, and the new facility is not projected to be completed
until September 2015--3 years after FAA has estimated full
implementation of the selected project.
An Adaptive Management Strategy May Help FAA Successfully Evaluate the
Implementation of the Redesign:
Although the redesign's implementation is planned to take multiple
years, FAA's Handbook offers few actions and steps for the agency to
use for a postimplementation evaluation of the redesign. Given that the
redesign represents a complex and comprehensive change to the region's
airspace, it is important for FAA to determine how it plans to conduct
evaluations of the redesign. One potential strategy is adaptive
management. As defined by the National Research Council, adaptive
management is a process that promotes flexible decision making in the
face of uncertainties, as outcomes from management actions and other
events become understood. Adaptive management is recognized by CEQ and
other federal agencies as a valuable strategy.[Footnote 108] For
example, in 2007, CEQ issued a guide[Footnote 109] that recognizes the
value of adaptive management when there are uncertainties in the
prediction of the impacts or outcome of project implementation. GAO
also has recommended adaptive management, and practices like it, as a
strategy for other federal agencies. For example, we recommended that
the U.S. Department of Agriculture adopt a systematic application of
adaptive management principles and develop a monitoring program for
Yellowstone's bison[Footnote 110] to improve its overall management of
the program. Adaptive management elements that FAA could use include
implementing a monitoring program to systematically obtain information
about the management objectives identified in the selected project and
communicating and engaging the results with key stakeholders. This
approach also would emphasize FAA's accountability and transparency to
its stakeholders. In addition, a 2004 FAA paper describes elements for
using adaptive management.[Footnote 111] One expert interviewed by GAO
stated that a benefit of using an adaptive management strategy as a
review tool, both to assess operational and environmental impacts, is
the effect it could have on the design and development of future
airspace redesigns.
Conclusions:
When conducting its airspace redesign, FAA complied with legal
requirements under NEPA and environmental justice directives for the
identified five key issues. In addition, FAA's methodology to assess
operational and noise impacts was reasonable. Nonetheless, we found
that FAA's methodology contained some limitations that if addressed in
future efforts, could improve FAA's decision making and the public's
understanding of FAA's decision and process. In particular, FAA could
undertake two types of analyses--uncertainty analyses and benefit-cost
analyses--in future airspace redesigns to help avoid limitations
similar to those identified during our evaluation. An uncertainty
analyses would provide decision makers and the public information on
the extent to which estimated impacts may vary under alternative
assumptions. As highlighted in our study, the realization of the
redesign's operational benefits are dependent on the accuracy of key
assumptions--particularly the aviation demand forecast. FAA has already
established through a comparative analysis that the traffic counts for
the 2006 forecast are higher than the 2005 observed levels; thus, while
an uncertainty analysis might not have resulted in a change in the
relative ranking of the alternatives, our confidence that the level of
estimated benefits will be realized is reduced. A benefit-cost
analysis, although not required, could provide more comprehensive
information for FAA to assess whether the estimated benefits associated
with redesigning airspace justify the costs. More information on the
trade-offs would also increase transparency in FAA's decision for the
public, thus, in turn, likely making the decision more understandable.
Although a benefit-cost analysis would require an investment in time
and resources, FAA conducts these types of analyses for other
investment decisions, such as ATC procurements and new regulations, and
has specific guidance for them. In addition, economists have used
methods to estimate the economic impact of changes in noise, and
supplemental noise metrics, which provide different information about
noise impacts not captured by DNL, are recognized as appropriate
methods for analyzing physical impacts.
Our study also raises concerns about FAA's future actions for this
airspace redesign. Despite implementing the initial steps of the
redesigned airspace last December, FAA has not published a detailed
implementation plan. The lack of such a plan raises concerns that FAA
may not meet its estimated implementation time frame, be able to deal
with potential obstacles, or be able to transition from the current
airspace structure to the redesigned structure. Furthermore, it is
important for FAA to determine how it plans to evaluate the
implementation, which would help FAA ensure that the operational and
environmental objectives are met and increase the project's
transparency and accountability. One strategy used by other federal
agencies for evaluating a project's implementation is the adaptive
management strategy. Adaptive management is a strategy that recognizes
the need for flexibility and would allow for modification of the
redesigned airspace if the results of future research indicate a need
for change, as long as these changes do not significantly affect the
quality of the human environment. This strategy would include
implementing a monitoring program to collect information and
communicating and engaging with key stakeholders.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve FAA's effectiveness and accountability in implementing the
New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia Airspace Redesign, we recommend that
the Secretary of the Department of Transportation direct the Acting
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to take the
following two actions for the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia Airspace
Redesign:
* Develop and follow a detailed implementation plan that includes a
time and cost schedule, risk mitigation plan, transition planning, and
monitoring and evaluation plan.
* Follow a postimplementation evaluation plan that includes an adaptive
management strategy for monitoring implementation of the redesign and
communicating the results to key stakeholders.
To improve FAA's effectiveness in conducting future airspace redesigns,
we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Transportation
direct the Acting Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
to take the following actions in developing and implementing future
airspace redesigns:
* Conduct an uncertainty analysis of key assumptions and inputs--
particularly on elements within aviation demand forecasts. The analysis
should be used to assess the extent to which the estimated impacts for
the airspace redesign alternatives would change using different values
for key assumptions and inputs and to provide information on the level
of confidence in the project's estimated impacts and the relative
ranking of the alternatives.
* Conduct a benefit-cost analysis for the purpose of assessing the
economic effect of alternatives for airspace redesigns (including the
status quo). Such an analysis should include an assessment of the key
impacts associated with redesigning the airspace, including
implementation costs and, as appropriate, the economic effect
associated with noise.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation
for its review and comment. In commenting on a draft of this report,
DOT stated that it was pleased to see that the GAO review concluded the
actions taken by FAA with regard to NEPA were reasonable. DOT also
noted that while it did not necessarily agree with everything in the
draft report, it is constrained from offering a detailed analysis of
the draft report at this time, as the matters the report covers are the
subject of pending litigation. DOT also provided technical comments
that we incorporated as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no distribution until 30 days from the
report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to
interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Transportation,
and other interested parties. We also will make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact Susan Fleming at (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov or Susan
Sawtelle at (202) 512-6417 or sawtelles@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Individuals making key contributions to
this report are listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
Susan A. Fleming:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
Signed by:
Susan D. Sawtelle:
Managing Associate General Counsel:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
In assessing the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) airspace
redesign of the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia region, the report
addresses the following questions: (1) To what extent did FAA follow
applicable key legal procedures and requirements in conducting its
environmental review? (2) To what extent was the methodology used by
FAA to assess the operational and noise impacts reasonable? (3) What is
the likelihood that FAA will meet its project time frames and costs of
implementing its airspace redesign project?
To address our three research questions, we reviewed documents
associated with the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia Airspace Redesign,
including the draft and final environmental impact statements (EIS) and
selected appendices, underlying technical reports and analyses, and the
Administrative Record filed by FAA with the court in the pending
litigation. We also obtained and analyzed information from a variety of
other sources, including federal laws, regulations, executive
directives, and court decisions; FAA and the Department of
Transportation (DOT) Orders and FAA and Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) guidance; the final EISs for three previous FAA-sponsored
airspace redesigns determined to be similar to this project;[Footnote
112] prior GAO work; and other aviation evaluations and studies. We
interviewed officials from DOT, the Environmental Protection Agency,
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, City of Philadelphia
Department of Aviation, and FAA's headquarters and eastern regional
offices, including representatives of FAA's airspace redesign team and
its principal contractors for the operational and environmental
analyses. We also contacted other stakeholders, including a trade
organization for the aviation industry, the national air traffic
controller's union, and local governments and community groups in the
region.
To assess the extent to which FAA followed key legal procedures and
requirements, we reviewed applicable federal laws, regulations,
executive directives, and court decisions, as well as FAA and DOT
Orders and FAA and CEQ guidance, to establish criteria by which to
compare FAA's actions. We then conducted a legal analysis to determine
whether FAA complied with five key issues for the airspace redesign to
include the statement of the project's purpose and need, evaluation of
alternatives, consideration of the project's environmental effects,
public involvement, and environmental justice matters. We selected
these five issues based on public concerns raised during and after the
EIS process, congressional interest, the views of experts we
interviewed, and GAO's evaluation of the range of concerns presented.
To examine the extent to which the methodology used by FAA to assess
the operational and noise impacts was reasonable, we reviewed FAA's
methodology for conducting the operational and noise analyses. We
compared FAA's methodology to criteria we established through our
review of federal policy, FAA guidance, prior GAO reports, and
standards from the aviation and analytical community, including
generally accepted economic principles and practices, and statistical
principles.
In addition, with the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences,
we identified 11 experts in the fields of EIS policies and procedures,
airspace operations and system modeling, and aircraft noise measurement
and mitigation. These experts reviewed selected portions of the EIS
related to FAA's operational and noise analysis. We interviewed these
experts within their area of expertise to obtain their views on the
extent to which the FAA followed applicable procedures and
requirements, and on the methodology used by FAA to assess the
operational and noise impacts. (Table 2 identifies the list of
participating experts.)
Table 2: List Of Experts Providing Input During Our Review:
Expert: Hamsa Balakrishnan, Assistant Professor of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology;
Area(s) of expertise: Airspace operations and system modeling.
Expert: Mike Ball, Orkand Corporation Professor of Management Science,
Decision and Information Technologies Department, University of
Maryland;
Area(s) of expertise: Airspace operations and system modeling.
Expert: William Dunlay, Director, Jacobs Consultancy;
Area(s) of expertise: EIS policies and procedures.
Expert: Charles Etter, Staff Scientist, Gulfstream Aerospace Company;
Area(s) of expertise: Aircraft noise measurement and mitigation.
Expert: Bill Jeffers, Senior Director, ARINC, Inc. (retired);
Area(s) of expertise: Airspace operations and system modeling.
Expert: Margaret Jenny, Chief Executive Officer, MJF Strategies, LLC;
Area(s) of expertise: Airspace operations and system modeling.
Expert: Vincent Mestre, Principal, Mestre Greve Associates, Inc.;
Area(s) of expertise: Aircraft noise measurement and mitigation.
Expert: Clint Oster, Professor, School of Public and Environmental
Affairs, Indiana University;
Area(s) of expertise: Airspace operations and system modeling.
Expert: Neil Planzer, Vice President of Air Traffic Management
Strategy, The Boeing Company;
Area(s) of expertise: Airspace operations and system modeling.
Expert: John Putnam, Partner, Kaplan Kirsch & Rockwell;
Area(s) of expertise: EIS policies and procedures.
Expert: Ian Waitz, Jerome C. Hunsaker Professor of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology;
Area(s) of expertise: Aircraft noise measurement and mitigation.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
To determine the likelihood that FAA will meet its project time frames
and costs of FAA's airspace redesign, we reviewed documents associated
with the redesign's impacts, time frames, and direct costs, and met
with FAA to discuss plans for project implementation. We also reviewed
prior GAO work related to environmental reviews and project
implementation.
As agreed with you, we did not conduct a new EIS, or develop and
analyze new alternatives to the airspace redesign. We conducted this
performance audit from July 2007 to July 2008 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: FAA's Legal Compliance with Key NEPA Requirements and
Environmental Justice Directives:
Introduction and Summary of Conclusions:
As part of GAO's review of the FAA's airspace redesign for the New
York/New Jersey/Philadelphia region, we examined FAA's legal compliance
with certain requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq., and with the environmental justice
directives of Executive Order 12898, "Federal Actions to Address
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income
Populations," 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994). Specifically, based on
public concerns raised during and after the EIS process,[Footnote 113]
congressional interest, the views of experts we interviewed, and GAO's
evaluation of the range of concerns presented, we reviewed FAA's
compliance with respect to five issues:
* whether FAA's purpose and need statement in its EIS for the airspace
redesign was reasonable;
* whether FAA developed a reasonable range of alternatives to the
redesign and rigorously explored those alternatives in the EIS;
* whether FAA reasonably decided not to analyze environmental effects
of a potential increase in growth resulting from the redesign;
* whether FAA reasonably involved the public in its environmental
review process; and:
* whether FAA appropriately considered environmental justice issues in
its environmental review process.
Based on the information available to us and for the reasons discussed
below, we conclude that FAA met NEPA and Executive Order 12898
requirements in conducting the airspace redesign with respect to these
issues.[Footnote 114]
Background:
As discussed in greater detail in this report, in 1998, FAA launched a
comprehensive national airspace redesign effort to more efficiently and
safely move aircraft through the nation's airspace system. As a part of
this program, FAA initiated the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia
airspace redesign in 1999. For a federal project of this magnitude, FAA
must comply with NEPA and implementing regulations issued by CEQ, as
well as FAA's own NEPA Orders and guidance.[Footnote 115] FAA also must
follow environmental justice directives set forth in Executive Order
12898. After determining that NEPA required an EIS for the project, FAA
issued a draft EIS in December 2005. Following public hearings and a
public comment period, FAA issued a final EIS in July 2007 and, based
on the final EIS, issued a Record of Decision in September 2007,
designating one of its redesign alternatives as the selected project.
FAA has begun implementing this project and anticipates that it will
take 5 years to complete implementation. Among other things, an EIS
must: (1) address the purpose of and need for the proposed action;
[Footnote 116] (2) identify alternatives to the proposed action;
[Footnote 117] and (3) present the reasonably foreseeable environmental
impacts of the proposed action, including the direct and indirect
effects and cumulative impacts.[Footnote 118] Furthermore, throughout
the environmental review process, an agency must make diligent efforts
to involve the public[Footnote 119] and, to the greatest extent
practicable and as appropriate, must identify and address any
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental
effects of its activities on minority and low-income
populations.[Footnote 120] We address FAA's compliance with each of
these requirements in turn.
Issues and Analysis:
1. Was FAA's purpose and need statement reasonable?
As discussed below, FAA's statement of the purpose and need for the
airspace redesign was reasonable and therefore complied with NEPA
requirements. It satisfied the statutory and regulatory requirements as
they have been applied by the courts--the statement was not too
narrowly or broadly defined--and it reasonably excluded noise reduction
as a purpose.
NEPA Requirements:
CEQ regulations implementing NEPA require an agency to include in the
EIS a statement specifying the purpose of and need for the project--
commonly referred to as a "purpose and need statement." In particular,
40 C.F.R. § 1502.13 requires that the agency include a statement to
"briefly specify the underlying purpose and need to which the agency is
responding in proposing the alternatives including the proposed
action." Further, FAA Order 1050.1E, section 506(d) requires the
purpose and need statement to "present the problem being addressed ...
and essentially provide the parameters for defining a reasonable range
of alternatives to be considered." As the courts have explained, an
agency "bears the responsibility for defining at the outset the
objectives of an action." Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey,
938 F.2d 190, 195-96 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994
(1991). The scope of the project, as articulated by the agency, informs
the alternatives it considers and guides its decision-making process.
In determining whether an agency has complied with NEPA, courts grant
substantial deference to an agency's actions as required by the
Administrative Procedure Act.[Footnote 121] With respect to the purpose
and need statement in particular, courts generally apply a "rule of
reason" and uphold the statement as long as it is reasonable. City of
Alexandria v. Slater, 198 F.3d 862, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 820 (2000). The agency can neither define a project's purpose
and need so narrowly that there is only one logical alternative to
accomplish it, nor so broadly that an infinite number of alternatives
would accomplish its goals. Citizens Against Burlington, 938 F.2d at
196 (upholding FAA approval of airport expansion). An agency complies
with NEPA if it meets these procedural requirements.
FAA Actions:
FAA initiated a redesign of the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia
region's airspace as a first step in its national airspace redesign
effort to accommodate air traffic growth while maintaining safety and
mitigating delays, and to accommodate changes in the types of aircraft
using the airspace system. FAA's basic objective was to create a system
to better manage traffic and capacity in the region, and to replace the
air traffic system designed in the 1960s. FAA noted that while the
volume of traffic and the type of aircraft used have changed
considerably since that time, the basic structure of the airspace has
stayed the same, and emerging technologies have not been taken into
account.
To increase the efficiency and reliability of the airspace structure
and air traffic control (ATC) system in the New York/New Jersey/
Philadelphia region, FAA began by identifying a formal purpose and need
for the airspace redesign. To do this, MITRE's Center for Advanced
Aviation System Development (CAASD)--a Federally Funded Research and
Development Center sponsored by FAA--identified problems and
performance shortfalls. In a parallel effort, FAA developed focused
leadership teams, composed of experts from throughout the United
States, who began a systematic effort to identify airspace
inefficiencies and solutions to ensure national integration of local
efforts.[Footnote 122] Based on these efforts, FAA developed the
following purpose and need statement:
"The purpose of the airspace redesign is to increase the efficiency and
reliability of the airspace structure and ATC system. The need is to
accommodate growth in aircraft operations while maintaining safety,
mitigating delays, and accommodating changes in the types of aircraft
using the System."[Footnote 123]
FAA has identified these same objectives--increased efficiency and
safety--for several of its previous airspace redesign projects, such as
the Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON)
[Footnote 124] in the Washington/Baltimore area and the Chicago
Terminal Airspace Project. FAA's purpose and need statement for the New
York/New Jersey/Philadelphia airspace redesign established the overall
criteria against which different alternatives were examined (see
section 2 below). Notably, FAA did not include noise reduction as part
of the project's formal purpose and need. As FAA explained in the final
EIS: "Noise reduction is not a component of the purpose and need for
the proposed action. Reduction of noise is not appropriately identified
as a purpose because it is not FAA policy to reroute aircraft to reduce
noise levels in one community at the expense of another."[Footnote 125]
Rather, according to FAA, the "first consideration and highest priority
in defining the Purpose and Need for any proposed action is to serve
the public interest by exercising its authority to assign, maintain,
and enhance safety and security of the national airspace (per 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101(d))."[Footnote 126] This is consistent with FAA's statement of
its mission: to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in
the world.[Footnote 127]
Nonetheless, there was considerable public controversy regarding the
potential noise effects of FAA's redesign and, as the project
progressed, congressional committees urged FAA to consider noise
impacts and mitigation where appropriate.[Footnote 128] FAA took
several such actions, beginning with a commitment in its early scoping
meetings to reduce noise where possible--for instance, by increasing
altitudes, dispersing or concentrating routes where appropriate,
reducing fly time, and routing aircraft over less noise-sensitive
areas.[Footnote 129] Additionally, FAA included a detailed analysis of
noise impacts for each alternative considered in detail[Footnote 130]
and included one alternative--the Ocean Routing Alternative--that would
have reduced noise overall. Finally, FAA included proposed mitigation
measures along with its preferred alternative, and issued a separate 62-
page noise mitigation report.[Footnote 131] As FAA noted in the final
EIS, however, the airspace redesign was not a cure-all for aircraft-
related noise problems in the region.[Footnote 132]
Analysis:
FAA's purpose and need statement for the airspace redesign complied
with NEPA requirements. FAA's statement defined the parameters of the
project, as required by 40 C.F.R. §1502.13. It also satisfied the
requirements courts have developed in evaluating agency statements of
purpose and need. FAA did not define the project's purpose so broadly
that it generated an infinite number of alternatives, as demonstrated
by its exclusion of such options as airport infrastructure
modification, congestion management measures, and alternate modes of
transportation[Footnote 133] (see section 2 below). Nor did FAA define
the purpose so narrowly that only one alternative would be
satisfactory, as evidenced by the fact that it could be met by multiple
alternatives (see section 2). While FAA ultimately selected a single
alternative that best met the project's purpose and need, more than one
alternative would have done so.
FAA also acted reasonably in excluding noise reduction as part of the
project's formal purpose and need statement. As noted, in analyzing the
environmental impacts of the proposed redesign, FAA gave substantial
consideration to possible noise effects. It was nevertheless reasonable
to exclude noise reduction as a formal objective of the redesign,
because NEPA "does not require agencies to elevate environmental
concerns over other appropriate considerations." Baltimore Gas &
Electric Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983); see also Strycker's Bay,
above, 444 U.S. at 227. Rather, through NEPA's requirement that
agencies prepare an EIS for all major federal actions significantly
affecting the environment, the statute requires only that agencies
consider the environmental impacts of their actions as part of their
decision making, not that they use environmental impacts as the
deciding factor. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, above, 427 U.S. at 409.
Courts have approved other purpose and need statements that excluded
environmental concerns. In City of Alexandria v. Slater, above, for
example, the D.C. Circuit evaluated the purpose and need statement
prepared by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) for the planned
replacement of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge in the Washington, D.C., area.
The agency's statement focused primarily on traffic and safety
concerns, rather than on environmental concerns such as noise. In
finding the agency's purpose and need statement to be reasonable, the
court stated that "[t]he proper question to ask at the outset of a NEPA
inquiry is not whether the [FHWA] focused on environmental goals but
rather ...whether its stated objectives were reasonable. It seems
rather obvious to us that it is not unreasonable in articulating its
objectives for an agency to 'focus primarily on transportation and
safety issues' when replacing a massively congested and structurally
unsound bridge." 198 F.3d at 867-68. Similarly, in Citizens Against
Burlington, above, the D.C. Circuit approved FAA's EIS for a major
airport expansion that would cause significant noise impacts, even
though FAA's stated purpose and need focused only on creating a new
cargo hub, and did not mention noise mitigation.
By contrast, in California v. DOT, 260 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Cal.
2003), the court rejected FAA's purpose and need statement in its
environmental assessment of a major airport expansion, because it was
so narrow that it effectively eliminated consideration of any
significant environmental effects. While FAA stated that the purpose of
the expansion was simply to "provide the necessary runway length to
safely allow [larger aircraft] ...to operate at the Airport," and the
court agreed that such a narrow purpose might result in no significant
environmental impacts, in fact, the record showed the project's very
purpose was to induce growth by attracting thousands of additional
tourists to a local ski resort. The court therefore rejected FAA's
"myopic view of the airport project" and, based on this and other
reasons, required a full EIS to be prepared. Id. at 974.
As in City of Alexandria and Citizens Against Burlington, the issue
with respect to the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia Airspace Redesign
is not whether FAA included environmental concerns in its purpose and
need statement, but whether the agency's purpose and need statement was
reasonable. As discussed above, we conclude it was, because it
identified the problem being addressed and thus essentially provided
the parameters for defining a reasonable range of alternatives to be
considered, as the regulations and FAA's Orders require.[Footnote 134]
This is not a case like California v. DOT, where the facts belie the
agency's stated purpose.
Finally, the congressional committee reports directing FAA to consider
or mitigate the project's noise impacts[Footnote 135] did not create a
legal requirement to include noise reduction or mitigation as part of
the project's formal purpose and need. The D.C. Circuit noted in
Citizens Against Burlington, above, that in formulating a statement of
purpose and need, agencies "should always consider the views of
Congress, expressed, to the extent that the agency can determine them,
in the agency's statutory authorization to act, as well as in other
congressional directives." 938 F.2d at 196. FAA did consider the "views
of Congress" in developing the project's purpose and need--it complied
with the mandate in 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d) to give the highest priority
to enhancing the safety and efficiency of the national airspace. FAA
also considered the congressional report statement directing FAA to
address noise issues it its New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia Airspace
Redesign, by conducting detailed technical noise analyses and including
noise mitigation measures for the selected project. These report
directives did not, however, legally bind FAA to include noise
mitigation as a purpose of the redesign because they were not
contained, or incorporated by reference, in enacted legislation. See
generally Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 646
(2005); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993); GAO, Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008--Incorporation by Reference, B-316010 (Feb.
25, 2008).
4. Did FAA develop a reasonable range of alternatives to the proposed
redesign and rigorously explore those alternatives in the EIS?
As discussed below, FAA developed a reasonable range of alternatives
and rigorously explored those alternatives, as required by NEPA. The
agency included a no action alternative and reasonable alternatives
outside the agency's current legal jurisdiction, and discussed
categories of alternatives it ultimately eliminated from more detailed
analysis. In addition, the alternatives were responsive to the agency's
purpose and need and were reasonably developed, rigorously explored,
and objectively evaluated, supporting a fully informed and well-
considered decision.
NEPA Requirements:
NEPA section 102(2)(C)(iii) requires an EIS to include alternatives to
the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii). In implementing this
requirement, CEQ regulations mandate, among other things, that agencies
shall: "(a) Rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable
alternatives ...; (b) Devote substantial treatment to each alternative
considered in detail including the proposed action ...; (c) Include
reasonable alternatives not within the jurisdiction of the lead agency;
and (d) Include the no action alternative." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. In
addition, FAA's NEPA Orders recognize that analysis of alternatives:
"...is the heart of the EIS. It presents a comparative analysis of the
no action alternative, the proposed action, and other reasonable
alternatives to fulfill the purpose and need of the action....
Reasonable alternatives not within the jurisdiction of the lead agency
should be considered. The FAA may include alternatives proposed by the
public or other agencies. However, they must meet the basic criteria
for any alternative: it must be reasonable, feasible, and achieve the
project's purpose...."
FAA Order 1050.1E, Section 506e. Again, courts grant substantial
deference to agency actions and apply a "rule of reason" when
evaluating an agency's range of alternatives. Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827
(D.C. Cir. 1972). NEPA requires only that the agency weigh all
reasonable alternatives and come to a "fully informed" and "well-
considered" decision. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 599
(D.C. Cir. 1980). See also Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558; NRDC v.
Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1988). "This 'rule of reason
governs both "which alternatives the agency must discuss, and the
extent to which it must discuss them."'" City of Grapevine, 17 F.3d at
1506 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
A project's purpose and need statement guides the appropriate range of
alternatives to be considered by an agency. In turn, the chosen range
of alternatives must achieve the proposed action's purpose and need,
and the preferred alternative must be the one that best satisfies those
parameters. See Citizens Against Burlington, above. It is the agency
itself that must determine the alternatives to be considered and how
extensive the treatment of those alternatives should be. Vermont
Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558. Although the choice of alternatives is a
matter of agency discretion, the alternatives must be "bounded by some
notion of feasibility." Id. at 551. A court must uphold an agency's
decision so long as "the alternatives are reasonable and the agency
discusses them in reasonable detail." Citizens Against Burlington, 938
F.2d at 196.
FAA Actions:
FAA began its identification of alternatives by considering five
categories of potential alternatives: (1) alternate modes of
transportation and communication; (2) changes in airport use, including
additional infrastructure; (3) congestion management measures; (4)
improved air traffic control technology; and (5) airspace redesign.
[Footnote 136] Of these five categories, only the airspace redesign
category met FAA's purpose and need, and the agency therefore
eliminated the other categories from further consideration.[Footnote
137] FAA then formed the Airspace Redesign Team working group, charged
with designing and evaluating conceptual airspace redesign
alternatives. The Airspace Redesign Team was composed of
representatives from each of the affected FAA ATC facilities (New York
TRACON, Philadelphia TRACON, New York Center, Washington Center and
Boston Center), as well as representatives from ATC facilities outside
the study area. In addition to internal coordination among working
group representatives, FAA solicited and considered input from
airlines, airport operators, and other air transportation stakeholders.
[Footnote 138] Recommendations also were received from RTCA, Inc., a
nonprofit corporation that functions as a Federal Advisory Committee
and develops industry consensus regarding air traffic management
issues.[Footnote 139] The Airspace Redesign Team explored four broad
airspace redesign concepts--Four Corner-Post, Modifications to Existing
Routing, Ocean Routing, and Clean Sheet--that met a series of nine
objectives.[Footnote 140] Four basic airspace redesign alternatives
were then developed for detailed consideration, ranging from the Future
No Action Airspace Alternative (maintaining the status quo) to the
Integrated Airspace Alternative Variation with Integrated Control
Complex (creating a more fully integrated airspace). These alternatives
met the purpose and need, reflected public concern about the airspace
redesign, or were required by NEPA.[Footnote 141] In the final EIS, FAA
recommended the Integrated Airspace Alternative Variation with
Integrated Control Complex (ICC) as the preferred alternative, and in
its September 2007 Record of Decision, named this alternative, together
with noise mitigation measures, as the selected project.[Footnote 142]
FAA conducted detailed analyses of each of the four basic alternatives.
The primary evaluative tool used was the Total Airspace and Airport
Modeler (TAAM), a fast-time simulation tool that can model ground,
terminal, and en-route airspace environments. Under FAA's instruction,
MITRE's CAASD used TAAM to simulate all of the alternatives and measure
their operational impacts. The area's eight airports likely to be most
affected by the airspace redesign were included in the model in detail.
In addition, for each alternative, FAA conducted an analysis of the
noise impacts resulting from redesign-related changes in air
operations.
FAA used a specific set of criteria to evaluate and compare each
alternative, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Alternatives were
evaluated based on two types of criteria--operational viability and
operational efficiency--to determine how well each alternative met the
purpose and need.[Footnote 143] In its evaluation of each alternative,
FAA summarized the changes that would occur at specific airports under
each alternative, and then evaluated and compared each alternative
using the criteria. An analysis of the noise impacts also was conducted
for each alternative.[Footnote 144]
Analysis:
FAA's range of alternatives complied with NEPA because: (a) FAA
included a no action alternative and reasonable alternatives outside
the agency's jurisdiction and discussed the categories of potential
alternatives eliminated from detailed analysis; (b) the alternatives
were responsive to the agency's purpose and need; and (c) the
alternatives were reasonably developed, rigorously explored, and
objectively evaluated, which supported a fully informed and well-
considered decision.
As noted, FAA considered four basic alternatives in detail, including a
"no action" alternative as required by CEQ regulations.[Footnote 145]
Additionally, FAA considered, although eventually eliminated from
detailed analysis, categories of alternatives outside the agency's
jurisdiction, for instance, use of satellite airports and improvements
to airport infrastructure, also as required by CEQ regulations.
[Footnote 146]
Further, these alternatives were responsive to the purpose and need
statement, and FAA engaged in a detailed and collaborative process to
ensure this result. This process included development of the Airspace
Redesign Team, solicitation of input from facilities outside the study
area as well as various stakeholders, and exploration of broad concepts
using specific objectives. In addition, FAA used the project's purpose
and need to evaluate the four alternatives both quantitatively and
qualitatively. Each evaluative criterion flowed from an aspect of the
stated purpose and need.
Finally, the iterative process used by FAA and the detail and
consideration given to the development and exploration of the
alternatives suggest that FAA's range and scope of alternatives was
"well-informed" and developed and that the agency came to a "well-
considered" decision. FAA engaged in a detailed process to develop and
explore a range of alternatives. In creating the Airspace Redesign
Team, which then collaborated with outside and industry stakeholders
and RTCA, the agency sought to gather all potential input and
objectively develop feasible alternatives with both a regional and
national focus. Additionally, once the alternatives were winnowed down,
FAA engaged in another detailed process which modeled these
alternatives. FAA's last step was to evaluate the alternatives based on
criteria developed to meet the project's purpose and need. This
process, which took several years to complete, contributed to an
objective, well-developed, and well-considered range and scope of
alternatives. The exploration of the alternatives based on the criteria
also was rigorous. FAA conducted quantitative and qualitative
evaluations, which are discussed at length in the EIS. FAA summarized
the changes that would occur at specific airports under each
alternative and then evaluated the alternative using the criteria. FAA
also conducted an analysis of the noise impacts for each alternative.
Under the governing "rule of reason" standard, these actions produced a
reasonable range of alternatives, which were rigorously explored.
[Footnote 147]
3. Did FAA reasonably decide not to analyze environmental effects of
the potential growth resulting from its airspace redesign?
As discussed below, FAA complied with NEPA in deciding not to analyze
environmental effects of the potential growth resulting from its
airspace redesign. In the aviation context, courts have uniformly
upheld FAA's decision not to analyze the effects of induced growth or
induced capacity where the project's purpose was not to induce growth
and the project did not entail construction of additional runway
capacity.
NEPA Requirements:
One of NEPA's overarching requirements is that the agency consider and
discuss the environmental effects of its proposed action. 40 C.F.R. §§
1502.16, 1508.7. This includes considering all direct and indirect
effects and cumulative impacts of an action. Id. CEQ regulations define
"indirect effects" as reasonably foreseeable effects caused by the
action which appear later in time or farther in distance. 40 C.F.R. §
1508.8(b). This includes growth-inducing effects and other effects
related to induced changes in the pattern of land use, population
density or growth rate, and related effects on air and water and other
natural systems, including ecosystems. Id.
FAA Actions:
A number of external stakeholders involved in the New York/New Jersey/
Philadelphia Airspace Redesign argued that the greater efficiencies
resulting from a redesign of the airspace would necessarily and
foreseeably lead to an increase in air traffic volume, and that FAA
therefore was required to analyze the environmental effects of this
induced traffic. FAA disagreed, stating that the airspace redesign
itself--which does not include infrastructure improvements such as
additional runways--would not induce growth, and thus the agency was
not required to (and did not) analyze the environmental impacts of such
growth. As FAA explained in its response to comments, the airspace
redesign "does not increase capacity. It increases the efficiency with
which existing capacity is used ...."[Footnote 148] Similar statements
were part of the Administrative Record.[Footnote 149]
Analysis:
FAA complied with NEPA in deciding not to analyze the potential growth-
inducing effects of the airspace redesign, because the purpose of the
redesign is neither to induce growth, nor create additional runway
capacity.[Footnote 150] In cases where the project's purpose did not
include growth inducement and where the project did not create
additional runway capacity, courts have routinely upheld FAA's decision
not to analyze the effects of induced growth.
In Seattle Community Council Federation v. FAA, 961 F.2d 829, 836 (9th
Cir. 1992), for example, the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that because planned rerouting procedures at Seattle-Tacoma
International Airport were designed to enhance the safety and
efficiency of existing traffic rather than to induce growth, and
involved no physical infrastructure changes, NEPA did not require FAA
to address the environmental effects of an increased number of flights
that might indirectly result from such efficiency improvements. In
upholding FAA, the court emphasized the project's stated purpose of
improving safety and efficiency, the same as FAA's purpose and need
here. Although the challenges in Seattle Community Council related to
FAA's failure to prepare an EIS, rather than the adequacy of an EIS as
in the airspace redesign situation, the underlying issue is the same.
Similarly, in Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. FAA, 161 F.3d 569 (9th
Cir. 1998), FAA proposed to alter arrival procedures at Los Angeles
International Airport without making changes to the airport's physical
infrastructure. Relying in part on Seattle Community Council, the Ninth
Circuit ruled that FAA complied with NEPA even though its pre-EIS
environmental assessment did not consider possible growth-inducing
effects of its action. The court explained that while "growth certainly
may be a foreseeable indirect effect of the [project]..., the project
was implemented in order to deal with existing problems; the fact that
it might also facilitate further growth is insufficient to constitute a
growth-inducing impact under 40 C.F.R. §1508.8(b)." Id. at 580
(emphasis added). And in City of Los Angeles v. FAA, 138 F.3d 806 (9th
Cir. 1998), the court found that FAA had given the requisite "hard
look" at the environmental effects of a terminal expansion project at
Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport that did not include additional
runways, even though FAA did not consider expansion's growth-inducing
effects. The court relied in part on the fact that FAA's technical
forecasts of air transportation demand and airfield capacity should be
accorded significant deference. Id. at 807, n.2.
Finally, in City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261 (D.C. Cir.
2002), the U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a challenge to
FAA's plan to move an existing runway at Cleveland Hopkins
International Airport as part of an airport redevelopment project. The
city argued that FAA had improperly failed to consider increased air
emissions that would result from increased airport capacity. The court
found FAA's actions were reasonable, however, even though FAA did not
consider increased capacity, because as FAA determined, air travel
demand and increased capacity were independent of rerouting the runway.
(As the court phrased FAA's argument, "In other words, 'if you don't
build it, they will come anyway.'" Id. at 272.) As in City of Los
Angeles, the court relied in part on the fact that "FAA's expertise in
forecasting air transportation demand and airfield capacity are areas
where courts accord significant deference." Id. at 272 (citations
omitted).
These cases are unlike California v. DOT, 260 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D.
Cal. 2003), discussed in section 1 above. There, the court found that
FAA's decision not to analyze the environmental effects of a
substantial growth-inducing expansion of a small town airport violated
NEPA. In contrast to the present case, the expansion project in
California would have extended and strengthened the airport's runway,
created an air carrier apron, added access roads and parking, and
constructed a passenger terminal complex. As noted above, the
California court found that the very purpose of the expansion was to
induce growth, by attracting thousands of additional tourists to a
local ski resort. Distinguishing the projects in Seattle Community
Council and City of Los Angeles because they each occurred in "a large
city with substantial established commercial air service," the court in
California emphasized that the project there involved "expansion of an
airport to accommodate regular commercial air service, where none
currently exists, in a scenic, mountain region with unique, largely
undeveloped natural resources." 260 F. Supp.2d at 977. As the court
concluded, "suffice it to say that [FAA's] argument that the airport
project is growth-accommodating rather than growth-inducing ...is
belied by the record." Id. at 976-77. Because FAA had failed to take a
hard look at the project's environmental consequences, the court found
that the agency's decision not to conduct an EIS was unreasonable, and
ordered a halt to the project until an EIS was completed.
We believe FAA's decision not to analyze potential growth-inducing
effects of the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia Airspace Redesign is
akin to Seattle Community Council, City of Los Angeles, and City of
Olmsted Falls and distinguishable from California v. DOT. As discussed
in section 1 above, the purpose of the airspace redesign is to increase
the efficiency and reliability of the airspace system while maintaining
safety. The purpose is not, as in California v. DOT, to induce growth
or enhance runway capacity, and the redesign does not, as in
California, involve any additional physical infrastructure. In
addition, in the current case, FAA specifically found that growth would
not result from the project itself, a technical judgment similar to
those accorded deference by City of Los Angeles and City of Olmsted
Falls. Further, the project will, as in Seattle Community Council and
City of Los Angeles, affect a region already saturated with air
traffic. Under existing law, therefore, FAA was not required to analyze
the potential indirect effects of increased growth that may result from
the redesign.
4. Did FAA reasonably involve the public in the environmental review
process?
As discussed below, FAA complied with NEPA in reasonably involving the
public in its environmental review process. FAA conducted an early and
open process and made substantial efforts to involve the public
throughout the environmental review process. It also sponsored a
reasonable number of public meetings and provided the public with
adequate advance notice. Finally, FAA considered and responded to
comments in an adequate manner.
NEPA Requirements:
CEQ regulations and FAA Order 1050.1E implement NEPA requirements for
public participation. The regulations require that agencies involve the
public in a number of different ways. An agency should begin by
conducting an "…early and open process for determining the scope of
issues related to a proposed action"[Footnote 151] and make "diligent
efforts to involve the public…"[Footnote 152] throughout the
environmental review process. To this end, the regulations require that
an agency "provide public notice of NEPA-related ... public meetings
... and the availability of environmental documents..."[Footnote 153]
and hold or sponsor public meetings whenever appropriate or in
accordance with statutory requirements...[Footnote 154] so as to
solicit appropriate information from the public.[Footnote 155] Finally,
in receiving information from the public, the regulations require an
agency to "assess and consider comments both individually and
collectively, and ...respond ...stating its response in the final
statement ...." [Footnote 156]
FAA Order 1050.1E provides further guidance on how FAA should comply
with the foregoing regulations. As relevant here, the order provides
that "at the earliest appropriate stage of the action and early in the
process of preparing NEPA documentation, the responsible ... official
... must provide pertinent information to the affected community and
agencies and consider the affected communities' opinions…"[Footnote
157] To accomplish this, the order specifies that FAA must provide the
public with an opportunity to review and comment on the draft EIS and
must formally respond to those substantive public comments in the final
EIS.[Footnote 158] Additionally, the order emphasizes the discretion
granted to FAA in this area by stating that there is "...no standard
approach to public scoping…"[Footnote 159] and "...no requirements for
a scoping meeting or for a specific number of meetings";[Footnote 160]
nonetheless, "…it is important that FAA facilitate public participation
in [the scoping process]..."[Footnote 161]
FAA Actions:
FAA involved the public in an extensive prescoping process for the
airspace redesign. This included holding 31 prescoping public meetings,
referred to as "Airspace Redesign Workshops," as a strategy to begin
public education on airspace redesign, concepts, and expected benefits
of the project.[Footnote 162] A total of 1,174 people attended the
workshops and 712 comments were submitted. Further, during the formal
scoping period, FAA held 28 meetings throughout the study area with the
purpose of educating the public on the purpose and need of the project.
A total of 1,031 people attended the scoping meetings and 901 comments
were submitted and presented in a Scoping Report. This was followed by
a formal public comment period, which was extended to solicit further
public participation. During the public comment period, FAA conducted
30 public meetings in the five states affected by the redesign's
proposed alternatives. Subsequently, FAA issued a Noise Mitigation
Report on the preferred alternative and solicited public input on the
report by holding seven additional meetings, with at least one meeting
in each state affected by the preferred alternative.
FAA also advertised the meetings in local media through newspaper
advertisements, press releases, and public service announcements.
Additionally, FAA compiled a running list of all participants at each
meeting and sent any subsequent announcements to those individuals by
postcard, e-mail, or other means. FAA held its initial meetings in
potentially affected communities and held its draft EIS and noise-
mitigation meetings in areas where the most significant impacts of the
airspace redesign would be felt. These meeting locations were
accessible by public transit and were located to generate the most
participation. (As discussed in section 5 below, the meeting locations
also satisfied environmental justice directives.) At each meeting, FAA
provided handouts and visual maps and displayed videos to assist the
public in understanding the process. Representatives from FAA,
including air traffic controllers and contractors, were on hand at
scoping, draft EIS and noise-mitigation meetings to explain the project
and answer questions. Throughout the EIS process, FAA solicited public
comments and responded to each substantial comment, as required by CEQ
regulations.[Footnote 163] Comments could be made at public meetings as
well as by U.S. mail and e-mail. The public comment periods lasted at
least 30 days and in some cases were extended to accommodate additional
public participation.[Footnote 164]
Analysis:
Making a determination whether the public has been adequately involved
in the EIS process is "a fact-intensive inquiry made on a case-by-case
basis." Biodiversity Conservation Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 404
F. Supp. 2d 212, 220 (D.D.C. 2005). In this case, FAA conducted an
early and open process and made considerable efforts thereafter to
involve the public in the environmental review process. The prescoping
campaign designed by the agency garnered extensive public participation
and comments. The large number of meetings held in accessible areas in
the study area (chosen to elicit the largest number of attendees)
reflects FAA's efforts to educate the public about the redesign and
address concerns, gather information, and solicit comments early in the
process. FAA drew large crowds at the 31 meetings and received numerous
formal public comments. Further, FAA made substantial efforts to
involve the public in the formal scoping period, post-draft EIS period,
and post-noise mitigation period, by similarly conducting another round
of public meetings (65 in total), which educated the public on
additional elements of the project. Meetings were accessible, they drew
a substantial audience, and yielded a substantial number of public
comments. Additionally, in each of these stages, FAA engaged in an open
campaign to invite the public's attendance and comments by advertising
through various media and keeping a running list of attendees. FAA also
carefully chose locations which would contribute to this open process-
-accessibility for all and locations which would generate the most
participation. Finally, FAA structured its meetings so that the public
could learn about the process in various formats and ask questions of
FAA and its contractors. These factors all contributed to the conduct
of an "early and open process" and the use of "diligent efforts" to
involve the public, as the CEQ regulations require, including
sponsoring a reasonable number of public meetings (96 in all) and
providing adequate notice of those meetings in various forms.
FAA solicited public comments in various forms and responded to
comments consistent with its responsibilities outlined in its Order.
FAA solicited comments at public meetings and accepted them via U.S.
mail and e-mail, as well. Public comment periods lasted 30 days or
longer, and some were extended to garner additional public
participation. FAA advised that it responded to all substantive
comments received in the final EIS,[Footnote 165] directly addressing
the question presented and showing consideration of concerns. Based on
FAA's solicitation efforts and responses to substantive comments in the
final EIS, FAA efforts met CEQ procedural regulations and FAA Order
1050.1E. While there is no set process for addressing public
participation requirements, in our view, FAA adequately addressed the
issue consistent with NEPA regulatory requirements.
5. Did FAA reasonably consider environmental justice issues in its
environmental review process?
As discussed below, in its EIS review process for the New York/New
Jersey/Philadelphia Airspace Redesign, FAA satisfied the key
environmental justice directives contained in Executive Order 12898,
CEQ guidance documents, and DOT Orders. FAA prepared an analysis that
identified minority and low-income populations significantly impacted
by the proposed redesign and determined whether the impact on these
populations was disproportionate. FAA also involved these individuals
throughout the environmental review process. In addition, FAA mitigated
these impacts through alteration of the preferred alternative, which
included reducing the number of departure dispersal headings, shifting
certain departure routes, and changing certain arrival altitudes.
Executive Order 12898 and Other Requirements:
Executive Order 12898, "Federal Actions to Address Environmental
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations," provides
that "...each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice
part of its mission by identifying and addressing ...disproportionately
high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs,
policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income
populations…." Id. Sec. 1-101. The Presidential memorandum accompanying
issuance of the Executive Order emphasized the importance of
considering these effects when an environmental analysis is required
under NEPA. See "Memorandum For the Heads of All Departments and
Agencies, Re: Executive Order on Federal Actions to Address
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income
Populations," Comprehensive Presidential Documents No. 279 (Feb. 11,
1994). CEQ, which oversees federal agency compliance with Executive
Order 12898, has developed guidance to assist agencies in meeting their
responsibilities under the order. See Environmental Justice: Guidance
Under the National Environmental Policy Act (Dec. 10, 1997) (hereafter,
CEQ Guidance). DOT also has issued an order to guide implementation of
the Executive Order, which sets broad environmental goals.[Footnote
166]
By their terms, the Executive Order and implementing documents provide
agencies with considerable flexibility in seeking to achieve these
environmental justice goals. The Executive Order, for example, states
that agencies shall make environmental justice part of their missions
"to the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law…[and]…as
appropriate ...." The CEQ Guidance describes its terms as flexible and
serving as "...a point of departure, rather than a conclusive direction
in applying the terms of the executive order,[Footnote 167] and
recognizes "there is no standard formula for how environmental justice
issues should be identified or addressed."[Footnote 168] There also is
not a particular formula by which to address these in an EIS; agencies
simply must present such concerns in a manner that is "...clear,
concise, and comprehensible..."[Footnote 169]
Against this backdrop of flexibility, Executive Order 12898 and these
related documents direct agencies to make efforts to ensure the
involvement of low-income and minority populations as part of the
agency's consideration of the environmental impacts of its actions. The
CEQ Guidance, for example, states that "...agencies should assure
meaningful community representation ...and endeavor to have complete
representation of the community as a whole ...as early as possible if
it is to be meaningful."[Footnote 170] To this end, an agency should
"...provide opportunities for effective community participation in the
NEPA process, including ...improving the accessibility of public
meetings, crucial documents, and notices"[Footnote 171] and "develop
effective public participation strategies, ...acknowledge and seek to
overcome linguistic, cultural, institutional, geographic, and other
barriers to meaningful participation, and should incorporate active
outreach to affected groups."[Footnote 172]
The CEQ Guidance recommends consideration of these impacts at various
stages of the environmental review process. In the scoping process, the
CEQ Guidance suggests an agency "seek input from low income populations
and minority populations ...as early in the process as information
becomes available"[Footnote 173] by use of "...local resources,
community and other non-governmental organizations, and locally
targeted media."[Footnote 174] The following are cited as examples of
ways to help inform the public during the scoping process: providing "a
description of the proposed action," "maps, drawings, and other
appropriate material or references," "an agency point of contact," and
"timely notice of locations where comments will be received or public
meetings held."[Footnote 175]
Further, to solicit public participation, the CEQ Guidance recommends
"...adaptive or innovative approaches to overcome linguistic,
institutional, cultural, economic, historical, or other potential
barriers to effective participation ...."[Footnote 176] Suggestions for
developing a public participation strategy include: "translation of
major documents...";[Footnote 177] "...opportunities for limited-
English speaking members of the affected public to provide comments
throughout the NEPA process;"[Footnote 178] use of different media
(e.g., size, formats);[Footnote 179] and "use of locations and
facilities that are local, convenient, and accessible to ...low-income
and minority communities ..."[Footnote 180] Finally, when analyzing
alternatives, the CEQ Guidance suggests an agency consider "...the
views it has received from the affected communities, ...the magnitude
of environmental impacts associated with alternatives that have a less
disproportionate and adverse effect on low-income populations and
minority populations" and "...community views in developing and
implementing mitigation strategies."[Footnote 181]
FAA Actions:
Throughout its environmental review process for the New York/New
Jersey/Philadelphia Airspace Redesign, FAA sought to ensure the
involvement of low-income and minority populations who would be
significantly affected by the redesign. FAA conducted an environmental
justice assessment to identify where those populations were located,
[Footnote 182] and determined that minority populations near LaGuardia,
Newark, and Philadelphia would experience significant noise impacts
under what ultimately became the preferred alternative. Beginning in
the prescoping phase, therefore, and continuing through the noise-
mitigation report phase, FAA held public meetings about the redesign in
areas accessible by public transit and in low-income and minority
communities, such as Newark, N.J., with disproportionately high and
adverse noise impacts. FAA provided translators at these meetings to
facilitate communication about the project and used different forms of
media--maps, printouts, and video presentations, in addition to live
speakers--to convey the elements and effects of the project. The
meetings were publicized by advertisements in multiple publications,
including local foreign language media, and by outreach to church
leaders and community organizations. The public could submit comments
to FAA at these targeted meetings. All of these measures were in
addition to FAA's general public information and public comment
opportunities for the redesign, as discussed in section 4 above.
FAA concluded that there would be a disproportionate impact on minority
populations near LaGuardia and Newark; however, with mitigation
measures, these impacts would be eliminated. In addition, FAA concluded
that there would be significant (though not disproportionate) impacts
on minority populations near Philadelphia, but these would be
eliminated once the redesign was fully implemented by 2012.[Footnote
183] FAA also considered another alternative--the Ocean Routing
Alternative--that would have eliminated noise impacts on these
populations altogether but, as noted, that alternative was not selected
because it did not meet the redesign's purpose and need.
Analysis:
FAA satisfied the environmental justice requirements of Executive Order
12898 and the related CEQ and FAA regulations and guidance. As
described in the final EIS, FAA conducted an assessment to identify
minority and low-income populations that would be significantly
affected by the redesign, determined whether the impact on these
populations was disproportionate, and involved those populations
throughout the environmental review process with sensitivity to issues
that could affect their level of participation. As Executive Order
12898 and CEQ guidance require, FAA engaged in reasonable initiatives
to ensure these populations had the chance to participate in the review
process, for example, by holding meetings in areas accessible by public
transit and in those communities most significantly affected by the
project. FAA also adhered to directives to overcome cultural and
linguistic barriers and involve community and nongovernmental
organizations in the notification process, by publicizing public
meetings in various publications in both English and foreign language
formats. When conducting these meetings, FAA heeded the directive to
convey project information in various formats, by using maps,
printouts, video, and speakers, as well as the Internet. These efforts
generated a large number of comments from the affected populations, and
FAA adequately responded to each substantive comment in the final EIS.
Finally, FAA considered these populations in developing its
alternatives, as the CEQ Guidance requires, by considering potential
noise impacts on these communities and considering the Ocean Routing
Alternative that would have eliminated disproportionately high and
adverse noise impacts. FAA also mitigated the preferred alternative,
thereby eliminating significant noise impacts no later than full
implementation, in compliance with the CEQ Guidance requiring
consideration of community views in developing and implementing
mitigation strategies. These efforts and activities met the
requirements of Executive Order 12898, CEQ Guidance, and the other
directives "to the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law..."
and "as appropriate..."
[End of section]
Appendix III: Operational Comparison of Alternatives:
Purpose and Need Evaluation Criteria: Reduce complexity;
How Measured: Jet route delays + time below 18,000 feet (minutes);
Alternative: Future No Action: 12;
Alternative: Modifications to Existing Airspace: 12;
Alternative: Ocean Routing Airspace: 12;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace without ICC: 11;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace with ICC: 10.
Purpose and Need Evaluation Criteria: Reduce complexity;
How Measured: Arrival distance below 18,000 ft (nautical miles);
Alternative: Future No Action: 96;
Alternative: Modifications to Existing Airspace: 95;
Alternative: Ocean Routing Airspace: 99;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace without ICC: 96;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace with ICC: 102.
Purpose and Need Evaluation Criteria: Reduce voice communications;
How Measured: Max interfacility hand-offs per hour;
Alternative: Future No Action: 525;
Alternative: Modifications to Existing Airspace: 525;
Alternative: Ocean Routing Airspace: 521;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace without ICC: 529;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace with ICC: 382.
Purpose and Need Evaluation Criteria: Reduce delay;
How Measured: Traffic weighted arrival delay 2011 (minutes);
Alternative: Future No Action: 22.9;
Alternative: Modifications to Existing Airspace: 22.6;
Alternative: Ocean Routing Airspace: 23.6;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace without ICC: 22.8;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace with ICC: 19.9.
Purpose and Need Evaluation Criteria: Reduce delay;
How Measured: Traffic weighted departure delay 2011 (minutes);
Alternative: Future No Action: 23.3;
Alternative: Modifications to Existing Airspace: 20.9;
Alternative: Ocean Routing Airspace: 29.5;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace without ICC: 20.8;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace with ICC: 19.2.
Purpose and Need Evaluation Criteria: Balance controller workload;
How Measured: Equity of west gate fix traffic counts;
Alternative: Future No Action: 0.37;
Alternative: Modifications to Existing Airspace: 0.37;
Alternative: Ocean Routing Airspace: 0.37;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace without ICC: 0.34;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace with ICC: 0.30.
Purpose and Need Evaluation Criteria: Meet system demands and improve
user access to system;
How Measured: End of day's last arrival push (time);
Alternative: Future No Action: 23:54;
Alternative: Modifications to Existing Airspace: 23:54;
Alternative: Ocean Routing Airspace: 23:54;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace without ICC: 23:54;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace with ICC: 23:00.
Purpose and Need Evaluation Criteria: Expedite arrival and departures;
How Measured: Time below 18,000 ft (minutes);
Alternative: Future No Action: 18.5;
Alternative: Modifications to Existing Airspace: 18.2;
Alternative: Ocean Routing Airspace: 18.8;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace without ICC: 18.2;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace with ICC: 18.6.
Purpose and Need Evaluation Criteria: Expedite arrival and departures;
How Measured: Change in route length per flight (nautical miles)[A];
Alternative: Future No Action: 0.0;
Alternative: Modifications to Existing Airspace: 0.0;
Alternative: Ocean Routing Airspace: 4.5;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace without ICC: - 1.2;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace with ICC: 3.7.
Purpose and Need Evaluation Criteria: Expedite arrival and departures;
How Measured: Change in block time (minutes per flight)[A];
Alternative: Future No Action: 0.0;
Alternative: Modifications to Existing Airspace: -0.9;
Alternative: Ocean Routing Airspace: 3.9;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace without ICC: - 1.0;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace with ICC: -1.4.
Purpose and Need Evaluation Criteria: Flexibility in routing;
How Measured: Delay saved per flight per day;
Alternative: Future No Action: 0.0;
Alternative: Modifications to Existing Airspace: 0.0;
Alternative: Ocean Routing Airspace: 0.0;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace without ICC: 0.0;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace with ICC: 12.6.
Purpose and Need Evaluation Criteria: Maintain airport throughput;
How Measured: Arrival max sustainable throughputs;
Alternative: Future No Action: 223;
Alternative: Modifications to Existing Airspace: 223;
Alternative: Ocean Routing Airspace: 223;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace without ICC: 223;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace with ICC: 238.
Purpose and Need Evaluation Criteria: Maintain airport throughput;
How Measured: Departure max sustainable throughputs;
Alternative: Future No Action: 238;
Alternative: Modifications to Existing Airspace: 239;
Alternative: Ocean Routing Airspace: 221;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace without ICC: 240;
Alternative: Integrated Airspace with ICC: 245.
Source: FAA.
[A] A negative value indicates a new decrease in the category.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Summary of the Integrated Airspace Alternative with ICC:
Airport: JFK;
Changes from the Future No Action Alternative:
* North departure gate shifted 15 miles northeast;
* New distant procedures for aircraft heading to the North departure
gate;
* West departure gate extended to the north and to the south;
* New procedures for aircraft heading to the West departure gate;
* Future No Action Ocean departure gate split into Ocean and South
departure gates;
* New distant procedures for aircraft heading to the Ocean departure
gate;
* New procedures for aircraft heading to the South departure gate;
* North arrival post shifted 5 miles southeast;
* New distant procedures for aircraft arriving from the North arrival
post;
* East arrival post shifted northwest;
* New procedures for aircraft arriving from the East arrival post;
* South arrival post shifted to the northeast;
* New procedures for aircraft arriving from the South arrival post.
Airport: LaGuardia;
Changes from the Future No Action Alternative:
* East departure gate shifted east;
* North departure gate shifted 15 miles northeast;
* New procedures for aircraft heading to the North departure gate;
* West departure gate extended to the north and to the south;
* New procedures for aircraft heading to the West departure gate;
* South departure gate shifted to the northwest;
* New procedures for aircraft heading to the South departure gate;
* North arrival post shifted 30 miles east;
* New procedures for aircraft arriving from the North arrival post;
* West arrival posts shifts to coincide with Future No Action South
arrival post;
* New procedures for aircraft arriving from the west to coincide with
the South arrival post;
* West arrival flow split into two arrival flows, one to the north and
one to the south;
* New departure headings for aircraft departing Runway 4 to the North
departure gate;
* New departure headings for aircraft departing Runway 4 to the East
departure gate.
Airport: Newark;
Changes from the Future No Action Alternative:
* New departure headings for all runways and all gates;
* East departure gate shifted to the east;
* New procedures for aircraft heading to East departure gate;
* North departure gate shifted to the northeast;
* New procedures for aircraft heading to the North departure gate;
* West departure gate expanded to the north and south;
* New procedures for aircraft heading to the West departure gate;
* South departure gate shifted to the southwest;
* New procedures for aircraft heading to the South departure gate;
* New Ocean departure gate;
* New procedures for aircraft heading to the Ocean departure gate;
* North arrival post moved to 50 miles north of Newark airport;
* New procedures for aircraft arriving from the North arrival post;
* West arrival post shifted to be near Greenville, New York;
* West arrival flow split into two arrival flows, one to the north and
one to the south;
* New procedures for aircraft arriving from the South arrival post;
* Use of both parallel runways for arrivals.
Airport: Teterboro;
Changes from the Future No Action Alternative:
* Departure gates match those of Newark Integrated Airspace with ICC;
* New distant procedures for aircraft heading to the North departure
gate;
* New distant procedures for aircraft heading to the West departure
gate;
* New distant procedures for aircraft heading to the South departure
gate;
* West arrival post shifted 15 miles south;
* New procedures for aircraft arriving from the West arrival post;
* New procedures for aircraft arriving from the West arrival post from
the vicinity of Yardley, Pennsylvania.
Airport: Westchester County Airport;
Changes from the Future No Action Alternative:
* North departure gate shifted 15 miles northeast;
* New distant procedures for aircraft heading to the North departure
gate;
* West departure gates extended to the north and to the south;
* New procedures for aircraft heading to the West departure gate;
* South departure gate shifted to the west;
* New departure procedures for aircraft departing to the South gate;
* North arrival post shifted to the east;
* New distant procedures for aircraft arriving from the North gate;
* New distant procedures for aircraft arriving from the south.
Airport: Philadelphia;
Changes from the Future No Action Alternative:
* West departure gate expanded to the northwest;
* New procedures for aircraft heading to the West departure gate;
* East departure gate is shifted to the east;
* New procedures for aircraft heading to the East departure gate;
* West arrival post shifts to the northeast;
* New distant procedures for aircraft arriving from the West arrival
post;
* New departure headings for aircraft heading to the North, East, West,
Southwest, and South departure gates;
* Additional route added to North arrival post.
[End of table]
Source: FAA.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Transportation:
U.S. Department of Transportation:
Office of the Secretary of Transportation:
Assistant Secretary for Administration:
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE:
Washington, DC 20590:
June 19, 2008:
Ms. Susan Fleming:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20458:
Dear Ms. Fleming:
Representatives from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the
Office of the Secretary have reviewed the GAO draft report, "FAA
Airspace Redesign: An Analysis of the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia
Project." While we are pleased to see that the GAO review concluded the
actions taken by FAA with regard to the National Environmental Policy
Act were reasonable, the Department does not necessarily agree with
everything in the draft report. However, we are constrained from
offering a detailed analysis of the draft report at this time, as the
matters it covers are the subject of pending litigation. Specifically,
there are currently 12 consolidated lawsuits before the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that challenge one or more
aspects of the airspace redesign project.
Neither the 73 Petitioners, nor the Federal Respondents, have yet
submitted briefs on the merits. Therefore substantive comments with
regard to the GAO draft report could potentially prejudice our ability
to defend this project in litigation.
We appreciate the opportunity to review the draft report. Please
contact Mr. Martin Gertel, Director of Audit Relations, on (202) 366-
5145 with any questions.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Linda J. Washington:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Susan A. Fleming, (202) 512-2834, flemings@gao.gov:
Susan D. Sawtelle, (202) 512-6417, sawtelles@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individuals named above, Paul Aussendorf, Assistant
Director; Lauren Calhoun; Heather Dowey; Tim Guinane; David Hooper;
Delwen Jones; Maureen Luna-Long; Sara Ann Moessbauer; Tim Schindler;
and Gretchen Snoey made key contributions to this report. Also
contributing to the report were Richard Johnson and Josh Ormond.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The five major airports include New York's John F. Kennedy
International Airport (JFK) and LaGuardia Airport (LaGuardia), New
Jersey's Newark Liberty International Airport (Newark) and Teterboro
Airport (Teterboro), and Pennsylvania's Philadelphia International
Airport (Philadelphia).
[2] Airspace for this project is the navigable area used by aircraft
for purposes of flight. In addition, FAA maintains infrastructure for
the National Airspace System to include FAA air traffic control (ATC)
system, which relies on an extensive array of information technology
systems, including radars, automated data processing, navigation, and
communication equipment; and ATC facilities.
[3] In 2006, over 100 million passengers used JFK, LaGuardia, and
Newark, alone.
[4] The estimated benefits are based on FAA's operational analysis for
2011; however, full implementation is not estimated to be completed
until 2012.
[5] Twelve of the 13 lawsuits are based primarily on NEPA grounds and
have been consolidated in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit under the lead case, County of Rockland v. FAA, No. 07-1363.
The other lawsuit, County of Delaware v. USDOT, No. 07-1385 (D.C.
Cir.), challenges the redesign based on FAA's allegedly improper
implementation of the Clean Air Act.
[6] The court in the NEPA litigation has denied requests that FAA
temporarily stop implementation while the lawsuits are being resolved.
[7] The three similar FAA-sponsored redesigns included the Expanded
East Coast Plan (1995), Chicago Terminal Airspace Project (2001), and
Potomac Consolidated TRACON Facility Airspace Redesign (2002). These
were determined to be most similar to the New York/New Jersey/
Philadelphia Airspace Redesign project because they all included an
EIS, changes to air traffic routes involving multiple airports, and an
analysis of noise impacts.
[8] In this report, the term "contractors" refers to organizations used
to conduct the operational and environmental analyses. This includes
MITRE, the organization that was responsible for conducting the
operational analysis. MITRE is a not-for-profit corporation, which
operates a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC)
sponsored by FAA--the Center for Advanced Aviation System Development.
An FFRDC is a unique organization that assists the U.S. government with
scientific research and analysis, development and acquisition, and
systems engineering and integration. FFRDCs are charged with addressing
long-term problems of considerable complexity, analyzing technical
questions with a high degree of objectivity, and providing creative and
cost-effective solutions to government problems.
[9] Although we took stakeholder concerns expressed after the NEPA
process into account when developing our five key issues, a court may
consider a petitioner to have waived their right to challenge issues
that were not raised during the process.
[10] For this airspace redesign project, FAA included in its study area
16 satellite airports, including (1) Allentown/Lehigh Valley
International, (2) Atlantic City International, (3) Bridgeport/Igor I.
Sikorsky Memorial, (4) Caldwell/Essex County, (5) Westhampton Beach/The
Francis S. Gabreski, (6) Islip Long Island MacArthur, (7) Linden, (8)
Morristown Municipal, (9) Newburgh/Stewart International, (10) New
Haven/Tweed-New Haven, (11) Northeast Philadelphia, (12) Republic, (13)
Trenton/Mercer County, (14) White Plains/Westchester County, (15)
Wilmington/New Castle County, and (16) McGuire Air Force Base. There
are other airports physically located within the region, but they were
not included in FAA's operational analysis because they do not have a
significant amount of Instrument Flight Rule traffic, thus there would
be little or no change to their operations as a result of the proposed
action. Instrument Flight Rule traffic from these other airports was
included in the environmental analysis as overflights.
[11] For example, JetBlue Airlines uses JFK as its hub airport, U.S.
Airways uses Philadelphia as its hub airport, and Continental Airlines
uses Newark as one of its hub airports.
[12] To minimize congestion and reduce flight delays, FAA promulgated
the High Density Rule in 1968, 14 C.F.R. § 93, Subpart K, which set
limits on the number of take-offs or landings--referred to as "slots"-
-that can occur during certain periods of the day at four congested
airports--Chicago's O'Hare, Ronald Reagan Washington National, and New
York's JFK and LaGuardia.
[13] Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st
Century, also referred to as AIR-21, Pub. L. No. 106-181, 114 Stat.
108, Section 231, April 5, 2000.
[14] In the mid-1980s, a plan to improve airspace efficiency in and
around the New York metropolitan area was implemented. The Expanded
East Coast Plan focused on developing common departure routes out of
the New York metropolitan area. The plan, which included changes to
routes and procedures above 3,000 feet, was implemented in phases in
1987 and 1988. Based on the public reaction to the Expanded East Coast
Plan, FAA recognized that the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia Airspace
Redesign had the potential to be controversial based on potential
environmental impacts.
[15] The National Airspace Redesign Strategic Management Plan was
developed collaboratively by local facility and regional air traffic
specialists, Air Transport Association representatives, and the
National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA). The plan works in
conjunction with the March 16, 2001, FAA/NATCA Memorandum of
Understanding regarding the National Airspace Redesign. In 2005, when
the National Airspace Redesign transitioned to the Airspace Management
Program, FAA terminated the assignments for NATCA representatives to
the National Airspace Redesign.
[16] There are two versions of the Handbook. The Airspace Management
Handbook Version 1 was first published in 1999 and consists of three
parts--the Airspace Management Handbook: Checklist; the Airspace
Management Handbook: Guidelines; and the Airspace Management Handbook:
Metrics. In December 2005, FAA published Version 2.2, which combines
all of the content of the previous documents and includes supporting
information for safety risk management considerations. The steps
established in these handbooks include (1) characterizing the extent of
the airspace problem, (2) performing an initial evaluation (scoping),
(3) initiating an airspace study, (4) conducting an airspace study, (5)
summarizing and presenting the results of the airspace study, (6)
implementing the recommended changes, and (7) evaluating the final
implementation of the airspace redesign to ensure changes made to the
airspace accomplished the redesign's intended goal. Because the FAA
airspace redesign project was initiated in 1998, we are basing our
review on Version 1.
[17] 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq.
[18] NEPA section 102(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). An EIS is not required
for all federal actions. Actions that do not individually or
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment may be
categorically excluded. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4. Additionally, an EIS is not
required for projects for which a project-specific Environmental
Assessment discloses no significant impact. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9.
[19] 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6.
[20] At the start of the airspace redesign in 1998, FAA Order 1050.1D,
Environmental Impacts: Policies and Procedures, was the current
guidance. The Order was updated to FAA Order 1050.1E, Environmental
Impacts: Policies and Procedures, on June 8, 2004, and again on March
20, 2006, to FAA Order 1050.1E, Chg 1.
[21] Executive Order 12898, Federal Actions to Address Environmental
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, 59 Fed.
Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
[22] DOT Order 5610.2, Environmental Justice in Minority and Low-Income
Populations.
[23] Executive Order 12898, Sec. 1-101.
[24] In this airspace redesign, ICC refers to the existence of a common
automation platform in existing facilities, a new facility, or a
consolidated facility. A common automation platform refers to a single
radar data processing system and the information it provides to
controllers. It includes shared displays on screens, radar, data
processing and presentation, and communications.
[25] FAA issued a corrected version of the Record of Decision on Sept.
28, 2007 after FAA identified several items in the original document
that were omitted or incorrect due to editing mistakes.
[26] 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
[27] Draft EIS, p. 2-2; final EIS, p. 2-2.
[28] 40 C.F.R. § 1502.13.
[29] FAA Order 1050.1E, section 506(d).
[30] Experts we interviewed also agreed that the scope of the purpose
and need was reasonable.
[31] 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(d).
[32] 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a).
[33] An agency's discussion of alternatives will be upheld as long as
the alternatives are reasonable and are discussed in reasonable detail.
Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 196 (D.C.
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991).
[34] See Citizens Against Burlington, Inc., 938 F.2d at 196.
[35] In addition, experts interviewed by GAO agreed that the
alternatives were feasible and met the purpose and need of the project.
[36] See Citizens Against Burlington, Inc., 938 F.2d at 196.
[37] 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a).
[38] 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(b).
[39] 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.16, 1508.7.
[40] 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b).
[41] Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. FAA, 161 F.3d 569, 580 (9th
Cir. 1998); see also Seattle Community Council Federation v. FAA, 961
F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1992) (re-routing of flights at Seattle-Tacoma
International Airport involving no infrastructure changes did not
require FAA analysis of environmental effects of increased flights that
may indirectly result from efficiency improvements).
[42] 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(a).
[43] 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7.
[44] 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(b) and (c).
[45] 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(d), 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(4) and 40 C.F.R. §
1503.4.
[46] FAA stated that its decision to hold prescoping meetings was due
to prior experiences with airspace redesign and a desire to better
educate the public on airspace redesigns.
[47] FAA's contractors stated the mailing list kept the same names
throughout the various EIS periods and added new names and addresses to
the master list during the process.
[48] FAA stated that the mailing list developed during the Expanded
East Coast Project was used to contact members of the public about the
airspace redesign.
[49] Experts we interviewed also stated that FAA's involvement of the
public throughout the EIS process was sufficient given the scope and
complexity of the redesign.
[50] 40 C.F.R. §§ 1503.1(4), 1503.4, 1506.6(d).
[51] Executive Order 12898, Federal Actions to Address Environmental
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, Feb. 11,
1994.
[52] CEQ, Environmental Justice: Guidance under the National
Environmental Policy Act, Dec. 10, 1997.
[53] DOT 5610.2, Environmental Justice in Minority and Low-Income
Populations.
[54] Congressional members and citizens raised concerns about FAA's
environmental justice assessment around Newark Liberty Airport during
the public comment period for the draft EIS.
[55] In the final EIS, FAA stated that the definitions of "minority"
and "low-income" populations in Order DOT 5610.2 were broad. Therefore
the agency also used definitions from the CEQ to more narrowly define
the two populations.
[56] GAO, Surface Transportation: Many Factors Affect Investment
Decisions, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-744]
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004); GAO, Highway and Transit
Investments: Options for Improving Information on Projects' Benefits
and Costs and Increasing Accountability for Results, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-172] (Washington, D.C.: Jan.
24, 2005); and GAO, Intercity Passenger Rail: National Policy and
Strategies Needed to Maximize Public Benefits from Federal
Expenditures, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-15]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006).
[57] GAO, Bureau of Reclamation: An Assessment of the Environmental
Impact Statement on the Operations of the Glen Canyon Dam, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-97-12] (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 2, 1996); GAO, Army Corps of Engineers: An Assessment of the Draft
Environmental Impact Statement of the Lower Snake River Dams,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-00-186]
(Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2000); GAO, Oregon Inlet Jetty Project:
Environmental and Economic Concerns Still Need to Be Resolved,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-803] (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 30, 2002); GAO, Assigning Air Traffic Control Costs to
Users: Elements of FAA's Methodology Are Generally Consistent with
Standards but Certain Assumptions and Methods Need Additional Support,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-76] (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 19, 2007).
[58] FAA's airspace redesign team initially included air traffic
controllers in the study area and neighboring areas.
[59] The Future No Action Alternative was included in the evaluation as
required by NEPA and CEQ regulations. The Ocean Routing Airspace
Alternative was developed by the New Jersey Citizens for Environmental
Research, Inc., at the request of the New Jersey Coalition Against
Aircraft Noise (NJCAAN) and was evaluated as a potential alternative
due to long-standing concerns of the NJCAAN.
[60] As defined in FAA's Handbook, metrics are parameters, algorithms,
or formulas used to quantify system performance, and they are measured
either directly in the National Airspace System or in models of the
National Airspace System.
[61] Flight track dispersion occurs because flights do not all follow
the same exact path. There is natural variation of flight tracks based
on operational factors, such as pilot variation and weather conditions.
[62] Use of this metric also has been upheld by courts. See City of
Grapevine v. DOT, 17 F.3d 1502, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Sierra Club v.
DOT, 753 F.2d 120, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
[63] FICON, Federal Interagency Review of Selected Airport Noise
Analysis Issues, August 1992.
[64] FICON was the predecessor of the Federal Interagency Committee on
Aviation Noise.
[65] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-744],
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-172], and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-15].
[66] The flight operations forecast is based on the traffic demand
forecast.
[67] See "FAA Airport Benefit-Cost Analysis Guidance," Office of
Aviation Policy and Plans, FAA, Dec. 15, 1999. FAA officials told GAO
that this guidance does not apply to airspace redesign projects.
Nonetheless, the officials agreed that the economic principles embodied
in the guidance are generally applicable.
[68] Total price includes air fare and travel time.
[69] More specifically, inelastic demand means that a 1 percent change
in price results in a less-than-proportionate change in demand, and
elastic demand means that a 1 percent change in price results in a
greater-than-proportionate change in demand. By holding traffic demand
constant across alternatives, FAA essentially assumed that demand is
perfectly inelastic or completely unresponsive to price changes.
[70] FAA's guidance also states that investments that lower average
delay at an airport will generally induce some customers who formerly
avoided the airport to use it, thereby placing new demands on the
facility and eroding some delay savings. The guidance also states that
if the project reduces delay in excess of an average of 1 minute per
operation, then travel demand forecasts should be adjusted. The
guidance states that as a rule of thumb, one 2 percent increment should
be simulated for each 3-minute savings. In addition, the guidance
states that it is DOT policy that passengers recognize small time
savings and can use them effectively. Therefore, a relatively small
time savings should be valued at the same rate as longer time savings.
[71] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-15].
[72] National Airspace System Capital Investment Plan FY 2008-2012.
[73] RNAV enables aircraft to fly on any desired flight path within the
coverage of ground-or-space-based navigation aids, within the limits of
the capability of the self-contained systems, or a combination of both
capabilities. As such, RNAV aircraft have better access and flexibility
for point-to-point operations.
[74] FAA's 2006 Roadmap for Performance-Based Navigation.
[75] For example, typically route procedures that are designated with
an accuracy value of 2 (designated RNAV-2), require aircraft to be
within 2 nautical miles of their assigned flight path 95 percent of the
flight time.
[76] These metrics also can be calculated using the same noise modeling
tools used to calculate DNL. The noise model is capable of calculating
up to 13 noise metrics, some of which include the supplemental metrics
mentioned by the experts.
[77] Sound Exposure Level, or SEL, metric is used to measure noise
exposure for a single aircraft flyover. It identifies the cumulative
sound that a person is exposed to during the event if the sound were
compressed into 1 second of time.
[78] The Time-Above metric can identify how much time during a
designated time period--such as a day--the noise exposure levels will
exceed a specified decibel level. The sound level must be specified--
for example, 60 decibels. This method can then determine the length of
time during a 24-hour period that noise levels will exceed 60 decibels.
[79] According to FICON.
[80] FAA calculated supplemental metrics in the Potomac Consolidated
TRACON Facility Airspace Redesign and the Chicago Terminal Airspace
Project.
[81] For example, a key input into the operational analysis was the
travel demand forecast--an inherently uncertain input because future
conditions cannot be precisely predicted.
[82] Airspace Management Handbook, Version 1, p. 21.
[83] DOT, FAA, Office of System Capacity, 2001 Aviation Capacity
Enhancement Plan, December 2001.
[84] An expert interviewed said that this level of difference appeared
reasonable.
[85] Specifically, the forecast underestimated airlines' use of
regional jets and the level of air traffic at many regional airports.
[86] A common automation platform refers to a single radar data
processing system and the information it provides to controllers. It
includes shared displays on screens, radar, data processing and
presentation, and communications.
[87] FAA officials do not currently know what the costs will be to
develop the common automation platform.
[88] App. C of the final EIS, p. 10-4.
[89] Even though reduction of noise was not part of the purpose and
need for the airspace redesign, thus not a criterion in the decision-
making process, FAA emphasized that noise impacts were considered.
Specifically, FAA explained that it considered noise after selecting
the preferred alternative by identifying measures to mitigate the noise
impacts associated with the preferred alternative. Several noise
mitigation measures were incorporated into the preferred alternative,
which according to FAA, would result in the mitigation of all
significant noise impacts by 2011. As determined by FAA, "significant"
noise impacts occur if a proposed action would result in a minimum 1.5
DNL increase where noise exposure already exceeds 65 DNL or would
exceed 65 DNL after the increase. FAA also explained that it did not
use noise metrics when comparing alternatives because there are no
established standards for significance of noise reduction. For
instance, there is no standard to answer the question, "Which is
better: reducing the noise impacts for 1,000 people by 3 decibels, or
reducing the noise impacts for 500 people by 5 decibels?"
[90] These methods include hedonic price techniques, which can be used
to measure the effect of economic attributes like noise on housing
values.
[91] FAA also did some comparative analyses that involved comparing
some elements of the 2006 forecast with the observed levels in 2005 and
some elements of the 2011 forecast for Philadelphia traffic with the
2012 forecast used in the Capacity Enhancement Plan.
[92] FAA Regional Air Service Demand Study, Summary Report. Sponsored
by FAA, The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, New York State
Department of Transportation, and Delaware Valley Regional Planning
Commission, May 2007.
[93] Handbook, p. 21. FAA's Benefit-Cost Analysis Guidance also
recommends the use of sensitivity analysis.
[94] Experts noted that a sensitivity analysis would have less of an
effect on a noise analysis than on an operational analysis. As one
expert noted, this is because traffic on one day will not significantly
impact the noise model, which reflects annual average conditions. In
addition, according to this expert, there would need to be a 35 percent
to 40 percent error in the traffic forecast to affect DNL.
[95] Although not required, a benefit-cost analysis is permitted under
CEQ regulations. Under 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23,. "if a cost-benefit
analysis relevant to the choice among environmentally different
alternatives is being considered for the proposed action, it shall be
incorporated by reference or appended to the [EIS] as an aid in
evaluating the environmental consequences." The regulation further
states that when a cost-benefit analysis is prepared, the EIS should
discuss the relationship between that analysis and any analyses of
unquantified environmental impacts, values, and amenities. The
regulation states that the merits and drawbacks of the alternatives
need not be displayed in a monetary cost-benefit analysis and should
not be when there are important qualitative considerations.
[96] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-744] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-172].
[97] FAA Airport Benefit-Cost Analysis Guidance, Office of Aviation
Policy and Plans, FAA, Dec. 15, 1999 and FAA Web page entitled "The FAA
Acquisition System Toolset, AMS Policy vs. Guidance," [hyperlink,
http://fast.faa.gov] (accessed March 15, 2008). FAA, along with the
U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Transport Canada,
also is sponsoring research to develop analytical tools to assess the
benefits and costs of different environmental policies and research and
development investment strategies. One area of research is focusing on
how to monetize the health and welfare impacts of aviation noise, local
air quality, and climate effects to enable a robust cost-benefit
analysis of policy alternatives.
[98] We recognize that the guidance does not apply to the Air Traffic
Organization, which includes the FAA division responsible for airspace
redesigns.
[99] FAA reported in the Record of Decision that the airspace redesign
would reduce annual operating costs by $248 million and severe weather
delay costs by another $37 million, totaling $285 million. However, in
a letter to Senator Robert Menendez in February 2008, FAA estimated
that there would be $300 million annual savings in direct operating
costs. FAA stated that the higher reduction in annual operating costs
was due to an increase in jet fuel prices.
[100] Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory Decisions, A
Guide. Prepared by GRA Incorporated for the FAA Office of Aviation
Policy and Plans (Washington, D.C., Dec. 31, 2004).
[101] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-669] (Washington, D.C.: July
2, 2003); GAO, Intercity Passenger Rail: Issues Associated with the
Recent Settlement between Amtrak and the Consortium of Bombardier and
Alstom, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-152]
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 1, 2004); GAO, United States Coast Guard:
Improvements Needed in Management and Oversight of Rescue System
Acquisition, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-623]
(Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006); GAO, Telecommunications: Full
Adoption of Sound Transition Planning Practices by GSA and Selected
Agencies Could Improve Planning Efforts, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-476] (Washington, D.C.: June
6, 2006); GAO, 2010 Census: Costs and Risks Must be Closely Monitored
and Evaluated with Mitigation Plans in Place, GAO-06-822T (Washington,
D.C.: June 6, 2006).
[102] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-669].
[103] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-152].
[104] GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and
Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace
System, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-25]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006).
[105] GAO, Federal Aviation Administration: Challenges Facing the
Agency in Fiscal Year 2009 and Beyond, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-460T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
7, 2008).
[106] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-152],
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-76], and GAO, Next
Generation Air Transportation System: Status of the Transition to the
Future Air Traffic Control System, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-784T] (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2007).
[107] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-460T]
and GAO, National Airspace System: Transformation Will Require Cultural
Change, Balanced Funding Priorities, and Use of All Available
Management Tools, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-
154] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 14, 2005).
[108] The strategy is already used by some federal, state, and local
agencies, such as the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force.
[109] The guide does not establish new requirements and does not
constitute formal CEQ guidance.
[110] GAO, Yellowstone Bison: Interagency Plan and Agencies' Management
Need Improvement to Better Address Bison-Cattle Brucellosis
Controversy, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-291]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 7, 2008).
[111] See "Environmental Management Systems and NEPA Adaptive
Management" available at [hyperlink,
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/policy_guidance/envir_policy]
(accessed on May 29, 2008).
[112] The three similar FAA-sponsored redesigns included the Expanded
East Coast Plan (1995), Chicago Terminal Airspace Project (2001), and
Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) Facility
Airspace Redesign (2002). These were determined to be most similar to
the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia Airspace Redesign project because
they all included an EIS analysis, changes to air traffic routes
involving multiple airports, and analysis of noise impacts.
[113] Although we took stakeholder concerns expressed after the NEPA
process into account when developing our five key issues, a court may
consider a petitioner to have waived their right to challenge issues
that were not raised during the process.
[114] In conducting our analysis, we relied on FAA's draft and final
Environmental Impact Statements and its Record of Decision, and the
Administrative Record filed by FAA with the D.C. Circuit in December
2007 in the County of Rockland litigation (hereafter, Administrative
Record).
[115] Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA requires all federal agencies to
prepare an EIS for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment ...." 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(C). CEQ's
NEPA regulations are set forth at 40 C.F.R. Part 1500 et seq.; FAA's
NEPA requirements and guidance are set forth in FAA Order 1050.1E and
in the FAA Airspace Redesign Handbook.
[116] 40 C.F.R. § 1502.13.
[117] 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14.
[118] 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(ii); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.16, 1508.7, 1508.8.
[119] 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6.
[120] Executive Order 12898, Sec. 1-101.
[121] Agency compliance with NEPA is evaluated according to § 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706, which provides that
a court may "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion
or otherwise not in accordance with the law." This standard grants
deference to agency decisions, with courts presuming that an agency's
action is valid. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435
U.S. 519 (1978); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402 (1971); City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261 (D.C. Cir.
2002); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980). To
determine whether an agency's action was "arbitrary or capricious,"
courts assess whether the agency came to grips with the obvious
ramifications of its approach and addressed them in a reasoned fashion.
See NRDC v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1988). This requires an
examination of the relevant data and an articulation of a satisfactory
explanation for its action--including "a rational connection between
the facts found and the decision made." Id. at 209 (citations omitted).
In the NEPA context, this "arbitrary and capricious" standard has been
interpreted as requiring an agency act reasonably in carrying out
NEPA's requirements (applying a "rule of reason") or that an agency
take a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of its proposed
actions. See, e.g., Citizens Against Burlington, 938 F.2d at 196
(upholding FAA approval of airport expansion); City of Grapevine v.
DOT, 17 F.3d 1502, 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1043
(1994) (same). As long as an agency meets this standard, a court should
not substitute its own judgment, and the agency's action should be
affirmed. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)
(upholding the Department of the Interior's decision not to conduct
comprehensive EIS on speculative proposals). In addition to its basis
in the APA, this deference stems from NEPA's imposition of procedural
rather than substantive requirements--NEPA's purpose is to ensure that
government agencies consider environmental consequences and act on full
information, and that interested groups have access to such
information, but NEPA does not mandate a particular environmental
result. Sierra Club v. United States Forest Service, 46 F.3d 835, 837
n.2 (8th Cir. 1995). "Once an agency has made a decision subject to
NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to insure
that the agency has considered the environmental consequences ..."
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-
28 (1980).
[122] See Administrative Record, Document No. 9358, MITRE Report,
"Eastern U.S. Problem Assessment and Multi-Cen." Among other things,
MITRE modeled and simulated all alternatives for the airspace redesign
project.
[123] Draft EIS, p. 2-2; final EIS, p. 2-2.
[124] A TRACON is an air traffic control facility that uses radar and
two-way radio communication to separate air traffic within a specific
geographic area in the vicinity of one or more large airports.
[125] Final EIS pp. 1-25.
[126] Final EIS pp. 1-21. In 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d), Congress declared
national policy to be that FAA shall: "(1) assign, maintain, and
enhance safety and security [as] the highest priorities in air
commerce; ...and (4) control the use of the navigable airspace and
regulate civil and military operations in that airspace in the interest
of the safety and efficiency of both of those operations ...."
(Emphasis added.)
[127] See [hyperlink, http://www.faa.gov/about/mission/] (accessed on
May 5, 2008). FAA has certain general noise reduction authority, see 14
C.F.R. Part 150, but noise reduction is not part of FAA's statutory
mission.
[128] See S. Rep. No. 108-146, at 22 (2003), accompanying S. 1589 ("As
FAA moves forward with its redesign program in the New York/New Jersey
and Philadelphia area, the Committee encourages FAA, where appropriate,
to consider air noise impacts as part of the redesign effort."). See
also S. Rep. No. 107-224, at 43 (2002), accompanying S. 2808.
Additionally, certain appropriations committee reports stated that FAA
may not use funds for its New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia redesign
NEPA review "as long as the FAA fails to consider noise mitigation,"
see H.R. Rep. No. 108-792, at 1366 (2004), accompanying H.R. 4818. See
also H.R. Rep. No. 109-307, at 136 (2005), accompanying H.R. 3058; H.R.
Rep. No. 109-307, at 136 (2005), accompanying H.R. 3058. Cf. H.R. Rep.
No. 108-671, at 16 (2004), accompanying H.R. 5025 (stating FAA may not
use funds for NEPA review of New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia redesign
"unless the FAA formally declares noise mitigation to be a primary
objective of the redesign project.") (statement not included in
conference report).
[129] Final EIS, pp. 1-25, 1-26.
[130] Final EIS, p. ES-2.
[131] Noise Mitigation Report, FAA, Apr. 6, 2007.
[132] Final EIS, pp. 1-26.
[133] Final EIS, pp. 2-8.
[134] The experts we interviewed also found that FAA's purpose and need
statement was reasonable and that the agency did not need to include
noise or environmental concerns in its objectives.
[135] See footnote 16 above.
[136] Final EIS, p. ES-2.
[137] Final EIS, p. 2-8.
[138] Final EIS, p. 2-9.
[139] Final EIS, p. 2-9.
[140] These objectives included reducing airspace congestion, reducing
environmental impacts, where possible, and accommodating projected
growth. Final EIS, pp. 2-9 - 2-11.
[141] The alternatives considered in detail were the Future No Action
Airspace Alternative (required by NEPA), the Modifications to Existing
Airspace Alternative, the Ocean Routing Airspace Alternative, and the
Integrated Airspace Alternative Variation with, and without, Integrated
Control Complex (ICC) (ICC refers to a common automation platform).
Final EIS, p. ES-4. FAA considered the Ocean Routing Alternative, even
though it did not meet the purpose of increasing the efficiency and
reliability of the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia airspace, because
of long-standing concerns of New Jersey Citizens Against Aircraft
Noise, a citizens group. Final EIS, pp. 2-10, 2-11.
[142] App. IV to this report describes the selected project in more
detail.
[143] Operational viability refers to whether a particular airspace
redesign is workable and thus safe; criteria include reduced airspace
complexity and reduced voice communications. Operational efficiency
refers to how well a particular design works; criteria include reducing
delay, balancing controller workload, meeting system demand, improving
user access to the system, expediting arrivals and departures,
increasing flexibility in routing, and maintaining airport throughput
(throughput is explained in note 36 below).
[144] Final EIS, Chapter 4.
[145] 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(d).
[146] 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(c).
[147] Although we conclude FAA's selection and analysis of alternatives
met the legal requirements of NEPA, we nevertheless have identified
deficiencies in FAA's analysis. See pp. 36-45 of this report.
[148] Final EIS, Appendix N, p. 1164. FAA further explained:
"Throughput is not the same as capacity. Throughput is the actually
achieved number of aircraft using a resource in a given time. It is
measured by counting aircraft, whether in a real system or a simulated
one. Capacity is the theoretical maximum number of aircraft that could
use a resource in a given time. It is measured by surveying, queuing
simulations, or mathematical models. A decrease in throughput does not
mean a reduction in the number of flights; it means that delays
increase. Likewise, an increase in throughput does not mean an increase
in flights, it means a decrease in delays. When throughput is below
capacity, the system is inefficient. Reducing the difference between
the throughput and the capacity is the purpose of this airspace
redesign ...." Id.
[149] See Administrative Record Document No. 8239, Meeting minutes with
NY DOT, Dec. 17, 2003 ("airspace redesign is not related to increasing
capacity because the capacity of the system is currently limited by the
pavement (runways) at the airports. Airspace redesign produces a more
efficient system and reduces delay.").
[150] While we believe FAA's decision not to assess environmental
impacts from possible growth from the redesign would likely survive
challenge as a legal matter, particularly given the deferential
standard of review, we nevertheless find FAA's induced-growth analysis
contained several limitations, as discussed at pp. 36-40 of this
report.
[151] 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7.
[152] 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(a).
[153] 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(b).
[154] 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(c).
[155] 40 C.F.R. §§ 1503.1(4), 1506.6(d).
[156] 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4(a).
[157] FAA Order 1050.1E, § 208b.
[158] FAA Order 1050.1E, §§ 208d, 508(g).
[159] FAA Order 1050.1E, § 208c.
[160] FAA Order 1050.1E, § 505a.
[161] FAA Order 1050.1E, § 208c.
[162] Final EIS Table 6.1; Record of Decision, pp. 28, 48.
[163] A summary of the public comments and FAA's responses to these
comments are contained in appendices N and Q of the final EIS.
[164] Additional detail on the public comment periods is contained in
table 1, p. 26.
[165] See final EIS, appendices N and Q.
[166] DOT Order 5610.2; 62 Fed. Reg. 18377 (Apr. 15, 1997).
[167] CEQ Guidance, p. 5.
[168] CEQ Guidance, p. 8.
[169] CEQ Guidance, p. 10.
[170] CEQ Guidance, p. 9.
[171] Presidential Memorandum, p. 1.
[172] CEQ Guidance, p. 9.
[173] CEQ Guidance, pp. 10-11.
[174] CEQ Guidance, p. 11. Examples of how agencies should enhance
their outreach include the use of religious organizations, newspapers,
radio, and other media, civic associations, community and social
service organizations, labor organizations, and the internet and other
electronic media.
[175] CEQ Guidance p. 12.
[176] CEQ Guidance, p. 13.
[177] CEQ Guidance, p. 13.
[178] CEQ Guidance, p. 13.
[179] CEQ Guidance, p. 13.
[180] CEQ Guidance, p. 13.
[181] CEQ Guidance, pp. 15-16.
[182] FAA first identified the census blocks significantly impacted by
aircraft-related noise and determined the minority composition and
median income of those census blocks based on prospective census data
for 2011. See final EIS, tables 3.8, 3.9, showing minority populations
in the study area and poverty population statistics. To determine
whether there would be a high and adverse impact to a low-income
community, the median income of the significantly impacted census
blocks was compared to the poverty-level income. Additionally, FAA used
CEQ's definition of a minority population. FAA then determined whether
a low-income or minority community subjected to a high and adverse
human health or environmental impact was disproportionately affected,
deemed to occur when an environmental impact is either predominantly
borne by a low-income or minority population or is more severe in
magnitude than the impact on the non-low-income or nonminority
populations. See final EIS, pp. 4-43, 4-44.
[183] See final EIS, Chapter 4 and Appendix I.
[End of section]
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