This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-03-483 
entitled 'Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Action Needed to Ensure 
Continued Recovery of Unwanted Sealed Radioactive Sources' which was 
released on May 13, 2003.

This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office 
(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a 
longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately.

Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Financial 
Management, the Budget, and International Security, Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:

United States General Accounting Office:

GAO:

April 2003:

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION:

DOE Action Needed to Ensure Continued Recovery of Unwanted Sealed 
Radioactive Sources:

GAO-03-483:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-03-483, a report to the Ranking Minority Member, 
Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International 
Security, Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate 

Why GAO Did This Study:

Potentially dangerous sealed sources containing greater-than-Class-C 
radioactive material pose a threat to national security because 
terrorists could use them to make “dirty bombs.”  Public Law 99-240 
requires the Department of Energy (DOE) provide a facility for 
disposing of unwanted sources. Because DOE has no disposal facility 
for these sources, its Off-Site Source Recovery Project is recovering 
and temporarily storing them at Los Alamos, New Mexico.  GAO was asked 
to determine (1) the number of unwanted sealed sources that DOE plans 
to recover through 2010 and the estimated cost, (2) the status of 
recovery efforts and any problems that DOE may face, and (3) the 
status of DOE’s efforts to provide a disposal facility for these 
sealed sources.

What GAO Recommends:

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Energy (1) determine whether the 
priority given to the project is commensurate with the threat these 
sources pose; (2) ensure adequate resources are devoted to the 
project; (3) take immediate action to provide space to store sealed 
sources containing plutonium-239, strontium-90, and cesium-137; (4) 
initiate the process to develop a permanent disposal facility for 
greater-than-Class-C radioactive waste; and (5) develop a plan to 
ensure the continued recovery of greater-than-Class-C waste until a 
disposal facility is available.  DOE did not comment on our 
recommendations.

what GAO Found:

The exact number of unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources in 
the United States is unknown, but DOE estimates it will recover about 
14,300 such sources by the end of fiscal year 2010, at a total cost of 
about $69 million.  DOE’s estimate of the number of sealed sources it 
will recover was based on three assumptions—that a permanent disposal 
facility would be available by fiscal year 2007; that the Off-Site 
Source Recovery Project’s recovery operations would be phased out from 
fiscal years 2007 through 2010; and that, after fiscal year 2010, all 
sealed sources would be sent directly to a disposal facility and the 
project would cease operations.  

Through February 2003, DOE’s Off-Site Source Recovery Project had 
recovered more than 5,000 greater-than-Class-C sealed sources from 
about 160 sites across the United States; however, the project faces 
three problems that could hinder future recovery efforts.  First, the 
project is not a priority with DOE’s Office of Environmental 
Management, because, according to office officials, the project does 
not conform with the mission of the office.  The project did not 
receive full funding, even after September 11, 2001, because of the 
Office of Environmental Management’s other higher priority projects, 
and the office’s current budget specifies future annual funding levels 
that, according to project officials, would be insufficient to enable 
the project to recover additional sealed sources.  Second, DOE cannot 
recover any additional sealed sources containing plutonium-239 because 
the project has already run out of space at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory that meets DOE’s higher security standards for storing 
these sources.  Third, DOE has not approved a means for storing sealed 
sources containing strontium-90 and cesium-137 until a permanent 
disposal facility is available.

As of February 2003, more than 17 years after the enactment of Public 
Law 99-240, DOE had not made progress toward providing for the 
permanent disposal of greater-than-Class-C radioactive sealed sources, 
as required by the act.  Specifically, DOE had not assigned 
responsibility to an office within DOE to begin developing such a 
facility.  Also, according to DOE officials, DOE lacks a plan for 
ensuring the continued recovery of sealed sources in the likely event 
that the disposal facility is delayed beyond fiscal year 2007.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-483.

To view the full report, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Gene Aloise, 202-512-3841, 
aloisee@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

The Exact Number of Unwanted Greater-Than-Class-C Sealed Sources Is 
Unknown, but DOE Plans to Recover About 14,000 Sealed Sources by the 
End of Fiscal Year 2010 at an Estimated Cost of About $69 Million:

DOE Has Recovered a Large Number of Sources, but Unresolved Problems 
Could Hinder Future Recovery Efforts:

DOE Has Not Made Progress toward Providing a Permanent Disposal 
Facility:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments:

Scope and Methodology:

Appendix I: Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Public Law 
99-240:

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy:

Tables:

Table 1: Estimated Number of Greater-Than-Class-C Sealed Sources DOE 
Plans to Recover Annually, Fiscal Years 1999 through 2010:

Table 2: Number of Each Type of Greater-Than-Class-C Sealed Source that 
DOE Plans to Recover by the End of Fiscal Year 2010:

Table 3: Estimated Annual Cost to Complete the Recovery of 14,309 
Greater-Than-Class-C Sealed Sources, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2011:

Table 4: Estimated Total Cost to Complete Remaining Recovery and 
Closeout Activities, as of Fiscal Year 2002:

Table 5: Number of Each Type of Greater-Than-Class-C Sealed Source 
Recovered and Associated Grams and Curies of Radioactive Material, as 
of February 2003:

Table 6: Number of Each Type of Greater-Than-Class-C Sealed Source 
Awaiting Recovery and Associated Number of Holders and Grams and Curies 
of Radioactive Material, as of February 2003:

Figures:

Figure 1: The Off-Site Source Recovery Project's Process for Recovering 
Greater-Than-Class-C Sealed Sources:

Figure 2: Photograph of a Structure at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory in Which Greater-Than-Class-C Sealed Sources Recovered by 
the Off-Site Source Recovery Project Are Stored as Waste:

Figure 3: Greater-Than-Class-C Sealed Sources Recovered by State, as of 
February 2003:

Figure 4: Greater-Than-Class-C Sealed Sources in Need of Recovery by 
State, as of February 2003:

This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain 
copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce 
copyrighted materials separately from GAO's product.

Abbreviations:

DOE: Department of Energy
NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission:

United States General Accounting Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

:

April 15, 2003:

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Financial Management,
 the Budget, and International Security
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate:

Dear Senator Akaka:

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been a 
great deal of concern about the control of sealed sources containing 
radioactive material used in medicine, agriculture, research, and 
industry throughout the United States. The radioactive material in 
these sealed sources is encapsulated, or sealed, in metal--such as 
stainless steel, titanium, or platinum--to prevent its dispersal. The 
small size and portability of the sealed sources make them susceptible 
to misuse, improper disposal, and theft. If these sealed sources fell 
into the hands of terrorists, they could be used as simple and crude 
but potentially dangerous radiological weapons, commonly called dirty 
bombs. In general, a dirty bomb is produced by packaging explosives, 
such as dynamite, with radioactive material, which would be dispersed 
when the bomb went off. The radioactive material dispersed--depending 
on the type, form (e.g., solid or powder), amount, and concentration--
could cause radiation sickness for people nearby as well as the serious 
economic costs and social disruption associated with the evacuation and 
subsequent cleanup of the contaminated area.

Certain sealed sources are considered particularly attractive for 
potential use in producing dirty bombs because, among other things, 
they contain more concentrated amounts of nuclear material known as 
"greater-than-Class-C material"--typically americium-241, cesium-137, 
plutonium-238, plutonium-239, and strontium-90.[Footnote 1] 
Applications of greater-than-Class-C sealed sources include portable 
and fixed gauges used in commercial manufacturing processes, gauges 
used by the construction industry for testing the moisture content of 
soil, medical pacemakers, medical diagnostics and treatments, gauges 
used for petroleum exploration, and government and private research and 
development.

The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Public 
Law 99-240, requires the Department of Energy (DOE) to provide a 
facility for disposing of all greater-than-Class-C radioactive waste, 
including greater-than-Class-C sealed sources that are no longer wanted 
by their owners, but DOE has not yet developed a disposal facility (see 
app. I). Until a disposal facility is available, DOE created the Off-
Site Source Recovery Project, which, since fiscal year 1999, has been 
recovering unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources from their 
owners and temporarily storing them at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico. Currently, owners of unwanted 
greater-than-Class-C sealed sources must continue to store and secure 
their sources on their premises until either DOE recovers and 
temporarily stores them or a disposal facility becomes available. Once 
a permanent disposal facility becomes available, source holders will be 
able to send their sources directly to the facility, and the sources 
that DOE is storing at Los Alamos will be transferred to the facility 
for permanent disposal.

To assess DOE's progress toward improving its control of greater-than-
Class-C sealed sources, you asked us to determine (1) the number of 
greater-than-Class-C sealed sources that are unwanted, the number that 
DOE plans to recover and dispose of through 2010, and the estimated 
cost and schedule to recover and temporarily store these sources until 
a permanent disposal facility is available; (2) the status of recovery 
efforts to date and any problems that DOE may face in recovering and 
temporarily storing greater-than-Class-C sealed sources; and (3) the 
status of DOE's efforts to meet the requirements of Public Law 99-240 
to provide long-term disposal for greater-than-Class-C radioactive 
waste. To address these objectives, we, among other things, visited the 
Off-Site Source Recovery Project office at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory to observe the storage facilities and interview project 
officials, reviewed studies estimating the number of greater-than-
Class-C sealed sources and DOE's budget documents, and analyzed data on 
the progress of recovery efforts. This report is the first of three we 
are preparing at your request to examine efforts to control sealed 
radiological sources. Forthcoming reports will review domestic and 
international efforts to control these sources beyond those of the Off-
Site Source Recovery Project.

Results in Brief:

The exact number of unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources is 
unknown but DOE's Off-Site Source Recovery Project officials estimate 
they will recover about 14,300 unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed 
sources by the end of fiscal year 2010, at an estimated total cost of 
about $69 million. These officials told us that the number of unwanted 
greater-than-Class-C sealed sources that would be recovered is a rough 
estimate, which was derived by reviewing, among other information, 
studies completed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and DOE's Idaho 
National Engineering Laboratory and information provided by sealed 
source manufacturers. Although the Idaho National Engineering 
Laboratory study estimated that there currently could be about 250,000 
to 500,000 greater-than-Class-C sealed sources in the United States, 
the actual number of greater-than-Class-C sealed sources that are no 
longer wanted is not known because no one kept track of this 
information. The estimate of the number of greater-than-Class-C sealed 
sources that DOE's project will recover is based on three assumptions-
-that a permanent disposal facility for greater-than-Class-C sealed 
sources will be available by fiscal year 2007; that the Off-Site Source 
Recovery Project will continue to recover sources from certain holders 
of sources during a transition period from fiscal year 2007 through 
fiscal year 2010; and that, after fiscal year 2010, all greater-than-
Class-C sealed sources will be sent directly to the disposal facility 
and the Off-Site Source Recovery Project will cease operations.

As of February 2003, DOE's Off-Site Source Recovery Project had 
recovered more than 5,000 greater-than-Class-C sealed sources from 
about 160 sites across the United States; however, the project faces 
three problems that could hinder future recovery efforts. These 
problems include the questionable long-term commitment of DOE's Office 
of Environmental Management to the project, inadequate storage capacity 
that meets the higher security needs of sealed sources containing 
plutonium-239, and the lack of a means for temporarily storing sealed 
sources containing strontium-90 and cesium-137. With regard to the 
first problem, officials from DOE's Office of Environmental Management, 
which is responsible for the Off-Site Source Recovery Project, told us 
that they would like the responsibility for the project to be placed in 
another DOE office because the mission of the project is inconsistent 
with the mission of the Office of Environmental Management. They also 
told us that the project did not receive full funding, even after 
September 11, 2001, because of other higher priority projects, and 
current Office of Environmental Management budget documents specify 
future annual funding levels that, according to project officials, 
would limit the project's ability to recover additional greater-than-
Class-C sealed sources. Without funding available to the Off-Site 
Source Recovery Project to recover additional sources, owners of 
unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources will be forced to store 
and secure their sources on their premises until a disposal facility is 
available.

Further, the Off-Site Source Recovery Project cannot recover any 
additional greater-than-Class-C sealed sources containing plutonium-
239 because there is no more space at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory that meets DOE's security standards for storing these 
sources. As a result, about 150 holders of unwanted sources containing 
plutonium-239, most of which are universities, must retain them and 
keep them properly secured until space becomes available. Although this 
nuclear material requires special security measures because of its 
potential for use in a crude nuclear bomb, two holders of these sources 
have told us of instances in which doors to the rooms containing 
unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources were left unlocked and 
open, and most holders expressed their desire to dispose of the sources 
as quickly as possible. In addition, DOE has not approved a means for 
temporarily storing strontium-90 and cesium-137 at a DOE facility until 
a permanent disposal facility is developed as DOE has done for the 
other types of radioactive materials contained in the sealed sources it 
needs to recover. According to DOE, it recognizes these problems and is 
developing options to resolve them. Our report recommends that DOE 
determine whether the priority that it is giving the project is 
commensurate with the risks these sealed sources pose, ensure adequate 
resources are devoted to the project, and provide, as soon as possible, 
storage space for sealed sources containing plutonium-239, strontium-
90, and cesium-137 with the appropriate level of security.

As of February 2003, DOE's Office of Environmental Management had not 
made progress toward providing for the permanent disposal of greater-
than-Class-C radioactive waste, and it is unlikely to provide such a 
facility by fiscal year 2007, as previously assumed, because it is not 
a priority with the office. Specifically, the office had not begun the 
first step in developing a disposal facility--completing an appropriate 
analysis as required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
and implementing regulations, which would likely be an Environmental 
Impact Statement. Officials from DOE's Office of Environmental 
Management told us that the office had provided funding for fiscal 
years 2002 and 2003 to develop such an analysis, but that after the 
office reviewed the budget in February 2002, it reallocated these funds 
to other priorities. These officials also told us that DOE is 
considering moving the responsibility for developing the analysis to 
another office within DOE, and they anticipate that this decision will 
be made some time in fiscal year 2003. In an Environmental Impact 
Statement, which Office of Environmental Management officials say could 
take 2 years to develop, DOE could propose that either a new disposal 
facility be built or an existing facility be used. If a new facility 
were decided upon, developing it could take at least 7 years, according 
to DOE's estimates. If an existing facility were selected, disposal 
services could be provided sooner, depending upon the availability of 
the facility. For example, DOE has been exploring the possibility of 
sending greater-than-Class-C sealed sources containing plutonium-239 
to an existing facility, its Waste Isolation Pilot Plant located in 
Carlsbad, New Mexico, but it remains uncertain when or if this will be 
possible. Finally, according to Office of Environmental Management 
officials, DOE does not have a plan for recovering greater-than-Class-
C sealed sources in the event that the disposal facility is delayed. 
Our report recommends that DOE initiate the process to provide a 
permanent disposal facility for greater-than-Class-C waste, develop a 
plan to help manage this process, and develop a plan to ensure the 
continued recovery and storage of greater-than-Class-C sealed sources 
in the likely event that availability of the disposal facility is 
delayed beyond fiscal year 2007.

Background:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulates medical, industrial, 
and research uses of radioactive materials through a combination of 
activities, including regulatory requirements; licensing; and safety 
oversight, including inspection and enforcement. NRC issues licenses 
for the ownership of radioactive material and for the possession and 
use of this material in certain items, such as sealed sources. NRC 
licensees include medical, industrial, and academic organizations. In 
addition, NRC has delegated its licensing authority to 32 states, 
called "agreement states." These agreement states administer 76 percent 
of the licensees while NRC administers the remainder of the licensees.

In the 1970s, DOE began to recover unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed 
sources containing plutonium-239. Through 1998, DOE recovered more than 
1,300 such sealed sources, mainly from universities, and destroyed them 
by chemical processing. During this time, the Congress also enacted the 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Public 
Law 99-240, which requires the Department of Energy (DOE) to provide a 
facility for disposing of all greater-than-Class-C radioactive waste, 
including all greater-than-Class-C sealed sources that are no longer 
wanted by their owners. However, DOE has not yet developed such a 
facility. Although DOE had no formal program to accept unwanted 
greater-than-Class-C sealed sources from their owners, in 1992, the 
agency established a working agreement with NRC to address greater-
than-Class-C sealed sources that might cause potential health and 
safety problems. Between 1993 and 1999, DOE recovered over 40 greater-
than-Class-C sealed sources at the request of NRC. By 1999, however, 
DOE determined that chemically processing greater-than-Class-C sealed 
sources was expensive, exposed laboratory workers involved in the 
chemical processing to unacceptable doses of radioactivity, and created 
problematic waste that needed disposal. In addition, DOE lacked 
sufficient capacity to process the growing numbers of greater-than-
Class-C sealed sources that were being reported as unwanted. As a 
result, DOE determined in 1999 that chemical processing should be 
discontinued. That same year, DOE's Office of Environmental Management, 
whose main mission is to clean up DOE's contaminated weapons 
development facilities that DOE plans to close, created the Off-Site 
Source Recovery Project to recover and temporarily store unwanted 
greater-than-Class-C sealed sources until a disposal facility was 
available. The Office of Environmental Management funds and provides 
oversight and direction to the project; DOE's National Nuclear Security 
Administration Service Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico, provides 
project oversight and direction for the Los Alamos National Laboratory; 
and the University of California conducts planning and recovery 
operations for DOE at Los Alamos.

The greater-than-Class-C sealed source recovery process begins when a 
holder of a source notifies the project that it has no further use for 
its source or when NRC or state regulators notify the project that a 
source needs to be recovered because it might cause a potential health 
or safety problem (see fig. 1).

Figure 1: The Off-Site Source Recovery Project's Process for Recovering 
Greater-Than-Class-C Sealed Sources:

[See PDF for image]

Source: DOE.

[End of figure]

Project officials obtain extensive descriptive information about the 
source, maintain the information in a database, and work with NRC to 
use the information to prioritize recoveries. Once a decision has been 
made to recover a greater-than-Class-C sealed source, the recovery 
effort can occur in one of three ways: (1) the source holder packages 
and ships the source to the Los Alamos National Laboratory; (2) project 
staff travel to the source's location to characterize, package, and 
ship the source to Los Alamos; or (3) project subcontractors accomplish 
the required work for the project. In any of these cases, the sources 
may be shipped directly to the Los Alamos National Laboratory for 
receipt and storage, or they may first be shipped to a subcontractor 
facility where they are consolidated and stored until a larger shipment 
to Los Alamos is prepared. Greater-than-Class-C sealed sources sent to 
the Los Alamos National Laboratory are either stored as nuclear 
material under appropriate security or, if security requirements are 
waived, may be stored as waste in some of the same structures as other 
radioactive waste stored by the laboratory (see fig. 2).

Figure 2: Photograph of a Structure at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory in Which Greater-Than-Class-C Sealed Sources Recovered by 
the Off-Site Source Recovery Project Are Stored as Waste:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]


At the request of the Secretary of Energy and NRC Chairman in June 
2002, the DOE/NRC Interagency Working Group on Radiological Dispersal 
Devices was convened to identify any concerns with the nation's ability 
to adequately protect nuclear materials, including radiological 
sources, that can be used in a radiological dispersal device, or dirty 
bomb. The working group was tasked to provide a report to the Secretary 
of Energy and NRC Chairman detailing recommendations for protecting 
radioactive materials of concern. The objectives of the working group 
were to identify those radioactive materials of concern for use as a 
radiological dispersal device, examine the options for tracking these 
materials in a national database system, assess potential technologies 
for tagging these materials for tracking purposes, and identify actions 
needed to ensure that sources are secure and that storage and disposal 
is available for unsecured, excess, and unwanted sources. The report 
provides recommendations that DOE and NRC can pursue to enhance control 
of materials that could be used in radiological dispersal devices. 
These include coordination with the Department of Homeland Security and 
other federal agencies to establish national policies for defining 
threats and radiological dispersal device protection levels, 
implementing a national source tracking system, and developing national 
strategies for recovering and disposing of unsecured sources. As of 
February 2003, the report was still in draft.

The Exact Number of Unwanted Greater-Than-Class-C Sealed Sources Is 
Unknown, but DOE Plans to Recover About 14,000 Sealed Sources by the 
End of Fiscal Year 2010 at an Estimated Cost of About 
$69 Million:

Neither DOE nor any other government agency has kept track of the 
number of greater-than-Class-C sealed sources that are no longer 
wanted; therefore, this number is not known with certainty. Also, DOE 
created the Off-Site Source Recovery Project to enable DOE to comply 
with Public Law 99-240 until a disposal facility became available; 
hence, the project was never envisioned as a permanent solution. As a 
result, before DOE could estimate the number of greater-than-Class-C 
sealed sources that the project would recover, it had to estimate how 
long the project would be in operation. In fiscal year 2002, DOE 
estimated that the Off-Site Source Recovery Project would operate from 
fiscal years 1999 through 2010 and, during that time frame, the project 
would recover and temporarily store 14,309 unwanted greater-than-Class-
C sealed sources.[Footnote 2] DOE also estimated the total cost to 
complete the planned recovery effort at $69.3 million.

DOE's Estimate of How Long the Off-Site Source Recovery Project Will 
Operate and How Many Sealed Sources DOE Plans to Recover:

To develop its estimate of the number of unwanted greater-than-Class-C 
sealed sources it planned to recover, DOE first determined how long the 
Off-Site Source Recovery Project would operate. Prior to 1999, DOE's 
activity was limited to recovering and destroying unwanted greater-
than-Class-C sealed sources. At the time, DOE was processing and 
destroying up to 100 sealed sources per year. According to a project 
official, the rate at which DOE estimated it could process and destroy 
sealed sources played a key role in determining the time frame for Off-
Site Source Recovery Project operations. According to this official, 
prior to 1999, DOE planned to increase its processing capability to 
about 400 sealed sources annually, and in 1999, DOE estimated that a 
backlog of about 4,000 to 5,000 unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed 
sources existed. As a result, DOE set the time frame for the Off-Site 
Source Recovery Project at 
12 years (fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2010), which was 
approximately the amount of time DOE estimated it would take to manage 
the existing backlog. Although DOE plans to store the sources it 
recovers instead of destroying them, the time frame for the project has 
remained the same.

DOE then estimated the number of greater-than-Class-C sealed sources 
that would become unwanted from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 
2010. To do this, DOE officials reviewed, among other information, its 
preliminary database of about 3,000 unwanted greater-than-Class-C 
sealed sources, discussions with representatives from the sealed source 
industry, and past studies by NRC and DOE's Idaho National Engineering 
Laboratory, which included surveys of source holders and manufacturers 
conducted by NRC and state regulatory agencies.[Footnote 3] The study 
by the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, completed in 1994 at the 
request of DOE, estimated that there could be about 250,000 to 500,000 
greater-than-Class-C sealed sources currently in the United States and 
as many as 24,000 new greater-than-Class-C sealed sources are being 
produced each year. According to a project official, the estimate of 
how many of these sealed sources will become unwanted during the time 
period that the Off-Site Source Recovery Project is in operation 
represents a best guess based on all of the information available.

As such, DOE officials estimated that about 18,000 greater-than-Class-
C sealed sources would become unwanted from fiscal years 1999 through 
2010. DOE initially developed a plan detailing how many of the 18,000 
unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources it planned to recover each 
fiscal year. However, DOE later modified the plan to recover 14,309 
unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources on the basis of three key 
assumptions: (1) that a permanent disposal facility for the sources 
would be available by fiscal year 2007; (2) that the Off-Site Source 
Recovery Project would continue to recover sources from certain holders 
of sources during a transition period from fiscal year 2007 through 
fiscal year 2010;[Footnote 4] and (3) that after fiscal year 2010, all 
greater-than-Class-C sealed sources would be shipped by their owners to 
the disposal facility and the Off-Site Source Recovery Project would 
cease operations.[Footnote 5] Table 1 shows DOE's plan for recovering 
14,309 unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources through the end of 
fiscal year 2010.

Table 1: Estimated Number of Greater-Than-Class-C Sealed Sources DOE 
Plans to Recover Annually, Fiscal Years 1999 through 2010:

Fiscal year 1999: 53; Fiscal year 2000: 39; Fiscal year 2001: 2,915; 
Fiscal year 2002: 1,325; Fiscal year 2003: 2,130; Fiscal year 2004: 
2,470; Fiscal year 2005: 2,332; Fiscal year 2006: 1,680; Fiscal year 
2007: 675; Fiscal year 2008: 412; Fiscal year 2009: 203; Fiscal year 
2010: 75; Total number of sources: 14,309.

Source: DOE.

Note: GAO's presentation of DOE's data.

[End of table]

According to DOE's estimates, about 85 percent of the 14,309 greater-
than-Class-C sealed sources that the project plans to recover would 
contain americium-241, with the remainder containing plutonium-238, 
plutonium-239, and various other radioactive materials (see table 2). 
DOE did not specify the number of sealed sources containing cesium-137 
or strontium-90 that it planned to recover.

Table 2: Number of Each Type of Greater-Than-Class-C Sealed Source that 
DOE Plans to Recover by the End of Fiscal Year 2010:

Type of greater-than-
Class-C sealed source: Americium-241; Number of sources 
DOE plans to recover: 12,176.

Type of greater-than-
Class-C sealed source: Plutonium-238; Number of sources 
DOE plans to recover: 1,722.

Type of greater-than-
Class-C sealed source: Plutonium-239; Number of sources 
DOE plans to recover: 364.

Type of greater-than-
Class-C sealed source: Other; Number of sources 
DOE plans to recover: 47.

Type of greater-than-
Class-C sealed source: Total; Number of sources 
DOE plans to recover: 14,309.

Source: DOE.

Note: GAO's analysis of DOE's data.

[End of table]

DOE Estimates the Total Cost to Recover 14,309 Sealed Sources at 
$69.3 Million:

In fiscal year 2002, DOE estimated that it would cost about $56.5 
million to complete the recovery of 14,309 greater-than-Class-C sealed 
sources from fiscal years 2002 through 2011 (see table 3).[Footnote 6] 
In addition, since DOE had already spent about $12.7 million on 
recovery activities from fiscal years 1999 through 2001, DOE estimated 
the total cost to recover the 14,309 sealed sources at about $69.3 
million.[Footnote 7]

Table 3: Estimated Annual Cost to Complete the Recovery of 14,309 
Greater-Than-Class-C Sealed Sources, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2011:

(Dollars in millions).

Fiscal year 2002: $5.1; Fiscal year 2003: $7.1; 
Fiscal year 2004: $6.7; Fiscal year 
2005: $8.7; Fiscal year 2006: $8.0; 
Fiscal year 2007: $6.7; Fiscal year 
2008: $4.9; Fiscal year 2009: $4.4; 
Fiscal year 2010: $4.5; Fiscal year 
2011[A]: $0.4; Total cost to complete 
activities: $56.5.

Source: DOE.

Note: GAO's presentation of DOE's data.

[A] The $400,000 cost estimated for fiscal year 2011 is for project 
closeout activities.

[End of table]

Table 4 shows how DOE plans to spend the $56.5 million the agency 
estimates it will need to complete remaining project activities.

Table 4: Estimated Total Cost to Complete Remaining Recovery and 
Closeout Activities, as of Fiscal Year 2002:

(Dollars in millions).

Activity: Recovering, inspecting, and storing 
greater-than-Class-C sealed sources, including planning recoveries, 
maintaining contracts with subcontractors, and preparing waste for 
future permanent disposal; Estimated cost: 
$24.2.

Activity: Upgrading equipment at Los Alamos and 
designing, testing, and acquiring tools and containers for packaging, 
transporting, and storing greater-than-Class-C sealed sources; 
Estimated cost: 9.0.

Activity: Conducting other activities supporting 
project operations, including overseeing and controlling the quality of 
project performance, complying with applicable regulations and 
requirements, maintaining project data, training staff, disseminating 
information, and paying the project's share of the costs associated 
with the Los Alamos National Laboratory's management and support staff; 
Estimated cost: 11.2.

Activity: Conducting activities related to 
planning a disposal facility and transitioning project operations to 
this facility, including facilitating the recovery of nuclear material 
leased to federal agencies and universities, characterizing and 
certifying greater-than-Class-C waste stored at Los Alamos, 
transferring the waste to a disposal facility, and closing out project 
operations; Estimated cost: 12.1.

Activity: Total estimated cost to complete 
remaining recovery and closeout activities; 
Estimated cost: $56.5.

Source: DOE.

Note: GAO's analysis of DOE's data.

[End of table]

DOE Has Recovered a Large Number of Sources, but Unresolved Problems 
Could Hinder Future Recovery Efforts:

As of February 2003, DOE's Off-Site Source Recovery Project had 
recovered 5,294 unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources, but the 
project faces three problems that could hinder future recovery efforts. 
These problems include the questionable long-term commitment of DOE's 
Office of Environmental Management to the project, the lack of storage 
capacity needed to allow the recovery of sealed sources containing 
plutonium-239, and the lack of an approved means for temporarily 
storing sealed sources containing strontium-90 and cesium-137.

The Off-Site Source Recovery Project Has Recovered a Large Number of 
Unwanted Greater-Than-Class-C Sealed Sources:

As of February 2003, the Off-Site Source Recovery Project had 
identified and recovered 5,294 unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed 
sources, and owners of an additional 4,380 greater-than-Class-C sealed 
sources had reported to DOE that they no longer wanted their sources, 
but DOE had not yet recovered them. According to DOE's estimates, these 
4,380 sealed sources and another 4,635 greater-than-Class-C sealed 
sources that DOE estimates are either currently in use or not yet 
reported as unwanted will need to be recovered by the end of fiscal 
year 2010.

About 65 percent of the 5,294 unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed 
sources that DOE had recovered contained the radioactive material 
americium-241, either alone or in combination with cesium-137, and 
about 35 percent of the sources recovered contained plutonium-238 (see 
table 5). As table 5 shows, DOE had recovered 15 of the 364 sealed 
sources containing plutonium-239 it planned to recover before running 
out of storage capacity and had recovered no sealed sources containing 
strontium-90. All together, the project has secured almost 2 kilograms 
of unwanted radioactive material.

Table 5: Number of Each Type of Greater-Than-Class-C Sealed Source 
Recovered and Associated Grams and Curies of Radioactive Material, as 
of February 2003:

Type of greater-than-Class-C sealed source: Americium-241; Number of 
sources recovered: 3,004; Number of grams of radioactive material 
recovered: 730; Number of curies of radioactive material recovered: 
2,513.

Type of greater-than-Class-C sealed source: Americium-241 and Cesium-
137; Number of sources recovered: 411; Number of grams of radioactive 
material recovered: 5; Number of curies of radioactive material 
recovered: 24.

Type of greater-than-Class-C sealed source: Curium-244; Number of 
sources recovered: 2; Number of grams of radioactive material 
recovered: Less than 1; Number of curies of radioactive material 
recovered: Less than 1.

Type of greater-than-Class-C sealed source: Plutonium-238; Number of 
sources recovered: 1,862; Number of grams of radioactive material 
recovered: 489; Number of curies of radioactive material recovered: 
7,235.

Type of greater-than-Class-C sealed source: Plutonium-239; Number of 
sources recovered: 15; Number of grams of radioactive material 
recovered: 696; Number of curies of radioactive material recovered: 44.

Type of greater-than-Class-C sealed source: Total; Number of sources 
recovered: 5,294[A]; Number of grams of radioactive material recovered: 
1,920; Number of curies of radioactive material recovered: 9,816.

Source: DOE.

Note: GAO's analysis of DOE's data.

[A] Total includes 16 greater-than-Class-C sealed sources that DOE 
recovered before Off-Site Source Recovery Project operations began.

[End of table]

These greater-than-Class-C sealed sources were recovered from 157 sites 
nationwide. Figure 3 shows the number of unwanted greater-than-Class-C 
sealed sources that DOE recovered from each state. These recoveries 
include sealed sources contained in:

* 1,632 gauges that had been used by the construction industry for 
testing the moisture content of soil from a manufacturer in North 
Carolina who is consolidating these sources for shipment to Los Alamos 
and another 231 gauges from a manufacturer in California;

* 1,500 gauges used for petroleum exploration from a DOE subcontractor 
that is consolidating sources for shipment to Los Alamos and various 
companies in Texas; and:

* 588 medical pacemakers from a manufacturer in Minnesota, 483 from a 
manufacturer in Pennsylvania, 233 from a manufacturer in Florida, and 
219 from DOE's Oak Ridge research facility in Tennessee.

Figure 3: Greater-Than-Class-C Sealed Sources Recovered by State, as of 
February 2003:

[See PDF for image]

Note: GAO's presentation of DOE's data. In addition, the project 
recovered one source from a site in Puerto Rico.

[End of figure]

The 4,380 unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources that awaited 
recovery as of February 2003, were estimated to contain about 
80.3 kilograms of radioactive material (see table 6). About 80 percent 
of these unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources (3,495 out of 
4,380) contained the radioactive material americium-241, either alone 
or in combination with cesium-137. Table 6 also shows that the Off-Site 
Source Recovery Project has identified 85 more sealed sources 
containing plutonium-239 that need to be recovered than it initially 
estimated (currently totaling 449 as compared to the 364 initially 
estimated). In addition, the project has identified 46 unwanted 
strontium-90 sealed sources that need to be recovered, which contain 
about 78 percent (about 62.8 kilograms) of the total amount of 
radioactive material that needs to be recovered.

Table 6: Number of Each Type of Greater-Than-Class-C Sealed Source 
Awaiting Recovery and Associated Number of Holders and Grams and Curies 
of Radioactive Material, as of February 2003:

Type of source: Americium-241; Number of holders: 193; Number of 
sources: 3,343; Curies: 11,904; Grams: 3,542.

Type of source: Americium-241 and Cesium-137; Number of holders: 19; 
Number of sources: 152; Curies: 23; Grams: 3.

Type of source: Californium-252[A]; Number of holders: 3; Number of 
sources: 15; Curies: 22; Grams: Less than 1.

Type of source: Cesium-137[B]; Number of holders: 9; Number of sources: 
21; Curies: 3,435; Grams: 57.

Type of source: Cobalt-60[B]; Number of holders: 1; Number of sources: 
8; Curies: 363; Grams: 2.

Type of source: Curium-244; Number of holders: 6; Number of sources: 
59; Curies: Less than 1; Grams: Less than 1.

Type of source: Plutonium-238; Number of holders: 47; Number of 
sources: 282; Curies: 11,925; Grams: 881.

Type of source: Plutonium-239; Number of holders: 149; Number of 
sources: 449; Curies: 812; Grams: 13,034.

Type of source: Radium-226[C]; Number of holders: 5; Number of sources: 
5; Curies: 2; Grams: 2.

Type of source: Strontium-90; Number of holders: 8; Number of sources: 
46; Curies: 3,971,315; Grams: 62,786.

Type of source: Total; Number of holders: 440[D]; Number of sources: 
4,380; Curies: 3,999,801; Grams: 80,308[E].

Source: DOE.

Note: GAO's analysis of DOE's data.

[A] According to an Off-Site Source Recovery Project official, because 
californium-252 is expensive to make, all greater-than-Class-C sealed 
sources containing californium-252 are recycled.

[B] According to an Off-Site Source Recovery Project official, owners 
of 29 sealed sources containing cesium-137 or cobalt-60 have reported 
to the project that their sources are no longer wanted. Although most 
of these sources are not greater than Class C and could be sent to an 
existing commercial disposal facility, the owners for various reasons 
have been unable to dispose of them.

[C] According to an Off-Site Source Recovery Project official, because 
radium-226 is a naturally occurring radioactive material, the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 places naturally occurring radioactive material 
outside of federal jurisdiction. However, this official told us that 
although such sources are the responsibility of the states, few states 
currently have the ability to recover these sources.

[D] Some holders of sources have more than one type of source.

[E] Total does not add to 80,308 because of rounding.

[End of table]

The 4,380 unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources that awaited 
recovery were held by 328 different owners located across the United 
States.[Footnote 8] As figure 4 shows, about 59 percent of these 
unwanted sealed sources are located in the state of Texas in gauges 
that had been used for petroleum exploration.

Figure 4: Greater-Than-Class-C Sealed Sources in Need of Recovery by 
State, as of February 2003:

[See PDF for image]

Note: GAO's presentation of DOE's data.

[End of figure]

The Off-Site Source Recovery Project Is Not a Priority of DOE's Office 
of Environmental Management:

The Office of Environmental Management's most recent budget plan, which 
was completed in fiscal year 2001, showed DOE providing about 
$3 million annually to the Off-Site Source Recovery Project from fiscal 
year 2002 through fiscal year 2030.[Footnote 9] Consequently, the 
amount of funding that the Office of Environmental Management 
authorized for the Off-Site Source Recovery Project in fiscal year 2002 
was about $2.2 million less than the $5.1 million that the project 
estimated it needed.

In February 2002, the Office of Environmental Management conducted a 
review of its priorities with the goal of improving program 
performance. The review recommended that the office realign its 
priorities in a manner more consistent with its main mission to 
accelerate the cleanup and closure of contaminated DOE weapons 
development facilities. Office of Environmental Management officials 
told us that they questioned whether it is appropriate that the Off-
Site Source Recovery Project be assigned to their office and they are 
looking into the possibility of moving responsibility for managing the 
project to another office in DOE. These officials told us that the 
Office of Environmental Management planned to allocate more funding to 
cleaning up and closing contaminated DOE nuclear weapons production 
facilities, which the office considered a higher priority, and only 
provide the project funding to store sealed sources that already had 
been recovered. Consequently, DOE's Office of Environmental Management 
reduced its request for funding for the project for fiscal years 2003 
and 2004 to $2.2 million and $2 million, respectively. However, a DOE 
official told us that the office plans to reduce future requests 
further to $1 million annually beginning in fiscal year 2005, a funding 
level that, according to this official, would be insufficient to keep 
current project staff assigned to the project.

In August 2002, the Congress appropriated an additional $10 million for 
DOE's Off-Site Source Recovery Project, as part of the 2002 
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response 
to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Public Law 107-206. 
According to a DOE official, the Congress may have appropriated these 
funds, in part, as a result of a January 2002 letter from the NRC 
Chairman to the Secretary of Energy requesting an acceleration of 
efforts to recover greater-than-
Class-C sealed sources. In the letter, the NRC Chairman noted that NRC 
had completed an evaluation that concluded that--in light of the events 
of September 11, 2001--the possession or storage of unwanted 
radioactive sealed sources with no disposal outlet presents a potential 
vulnerability to terrorist threats. The letter urged DOE to recover, 
within 18 months, all greater-than-Class-C sealed sources currently 
known to be unwanted.

Rather than accelerating DOE's recovery efforts, however, these funds 
will be needed to keep DOE's recovery efforts on track through fiscal 
year 2004. The Off-Site Source Recovery Project had planned recovery 
activities for fiscal years 2003 and 2004 with a total cost of $13.8 
million, but DOE's Office of Environmental Management had requested 
from the Congress a total of $4.2 million for these years, leaving a 
funding shortfall of $9.6 million. Prior to fiscal year 2003, the Off-
Site Source Recovery Project was able to make up for funding shortfalls 
by carrying over unspent funds from prior fiscal years. However, by the 
end of fiscal year 2002, the size of the shortfall far exceeded the 
amount of funding available to carry forward. Therefore, almost all of 
the supplemental funding appropriated by the Congress will go toward 
helping the Off-Site Source Recovery Project make up the funding 
shortfall and continue recovering greater-than-Class-C sealed sources 
as planned through the end of fiscal year 2004. Beyond fiscal year 
2004, however, it remains unclear whether the Off-Site Source Recovery 
Project will receive the funding it needs to continue its planned 
recovery activities. The Secretary of Energy publicly stated in 
November 2002 that securing and reducing radiological materials that 
could be fabricated into dirty bombs is DOE's highest priority and an 
urgent problem. However, without funding available to the Off-Site 
Source Recovery Project to recover additional sources, owners of 
unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources will be forced to store 
and secure their sources on their premises until a disposal facility is 
available.

DOE Lacks Storage Capacity Meeting the Security Requirements for 
Storing Additional Sealed Sources Containing Plutonium-239:

The Off-Site Source Recovery Project has not been able to recover 
additional greater-than-Class-C sealed sources containing plutonium-
239 since mid-2002 because DOE lacks storage capacity at the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory that meets the security requirements for this 
material. Because plutonium-239 can be used to make a crude nuclear 
bomb, as well as a dirty bomb, DOE regulations require that any DOE 
facility storing 
6 kilograms or more of this material must meet DOE's most stringent 
security requirements. Meeting these requirements means that, among 
other things, the sources containing plutonium-239 must be stored in a 
vault-like room in a facility protected by two layers of physical 
barriers (e.g., an outer and an inner fence) providing access controls 
and intrusion detection; armed guards who are capable of responding to 
an intrusion; inspections of personnel, vehicles, and hand-carried 
items entering and exiting the facility; and exits that are alarmed or 
controlled at all times. As of February 2003, the greater-than-Class-C 
sealed sources in storage at the Los Alamos National Laboratory contain 
a total of less than 1 kilogram of plutonium-239. DOE's security 
requirements for this smaller amount of material are less stringent and 
have already been met in the locations at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory where it is being stored. However, according to a DOE 
official, these storage locations have also been used to store 
radioactive material associated with other programs operating at Los 
Alamos. As a result, by mid-2002, the Off-Site Source Recovery Project 
had reached the limits of its capacity to store additional plutonium-
239 at Los Alamos without needing to meet DOE's most stringent security 
requirements. As of February 2003, the project had identified an 
additional 449 unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources containing 
about 
13 kilograms of plutonium-239 that it will not be able to recover until 
storage space meeting DOE's most stringent security requirements is 
made available.[Footnote 10]

DOE is currently pursuing two parallel efforts to allow the Off-Site 
Source Recovery Project to recover and store additional greater-than-
Class-C sealed sources containing plutonium-239. First, DOE is 
evaluating two options for physically increasing the amount of storage 
space available that meets the stringent security requirements for the 
additional plutonium-239 that the project plans to recover. These 
options include packaging and placing the sources in a secure trailer 
at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in such a way that they are 
stored at least as securely as if they were in a vault and creating 
secured storage space at the Nevada Test Site in Nye County, Nevada. 
DOE is developing these options but is not yet able to provide us with 
a time frame for how long it will take to select and implement an 
alternative. An official from the Off-Site Source Recovery Project told 
us that the project budgeted $1.5 million to cover the initial cost of 
creating additional secure storage space for 
plutonium-239 but was unable to provide a plan for ensuring that the 
project received the additional funding that would be needed to 
continue to maintain this storage space for as long as it was needed.

Concurrent with efforts to increase physical storage capacity, DOE is 
also exploring whether all of the sealed sources containing plutonium-
239 that the Off-Site Source Recovery Project plans to recover meet the 
legal and regulatory requirements for disposal at the Waste Isolation 
Pilot Plant. Currently, by law, only radioactive waste resulting from 
the development of nuclear weapons, referred to as defense waste, can 
be disposed of at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. Any greater-than-
Class-C sealed sources containing plutonium-239 that were used in this 
manner can be disposed of at this facility; however, most of the 
plutonium-239 sources that the Off-Site Recovery Project plans to 
recover were not directly used for defense purposes. DOE is exploring 
whether a case can be made that, although these sources were used for 
research and other purposes, the 
plutonium-239 that they contain was originally manufactured for use in 
weapons development and thus can be disposed of at the Waste Isolation 
Pilot Plant. In this way, DOE could potentially bypass the plutonium-
239 storage problem entirely by establishing a permanent disposal 
facility. However, DOE regulations specify that no amount of plutonium-
239 requiring secured storage can be discarded, whether or not the 
material is defense-related, without special approval to terminate the 
security requirements. In March 2003, DOE approved the termination of 
the security requirements for less than 2 kilograms of plutonium-239 so 
that the Off-Site Source Recovery Project can dispose of the defense-
related plutonium-239 it is storing at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, but it has not yet approved such a termination for non-
defense-related plutonium-239 in storage at Los Alamos.

Until DOE is able to increase its capacity to store greater-than-Class-
C sealed sources containing plutonium-239, 149 holders of unwanted 
sources containing this radioactive material must continue to store and 
secure their sources on their premises. About 77 percent of the holders 
of unwanted plutonium-239 sources are universities. Six of the 
universities we contacted told us that they received the sources during 
the 1950s and 1960s as part of a national effort to promote research 
related to nuclear physics and they have not used these sources for 
many years. As a result, these universities each told us that they are 
storing and securing from 1 to 10 sealed sources of plutonium-239 that 
they no longer want. In general, the sources are stored in rooms or 
closets, typically without windows, and access to the rooms can only be 
gained by passing through one or more locked doors. Access to the keys 
to the doors is controlled, and doors are checked periodically by 
campus safety personnel to ensure that they are locked. In addition, 
NRC or state regulatory agencies review how the universities are 
securing their sealed sources as part of the agencies' reviews of the 
universities' nuclear safety programs. However, representatives from 
two universities told us of instances in which the doors to the sources 
had been found unlocked or open, and representatives from six of the 
universities told us that they wanted the Off-Site Source Recovery 
Project to recover their sources immediately.[Footnote 11] We also 
talked to officials from a Department of Defense facility, a DOE 
facility, and a decommissioned nuclear power plant about their 
plutonium-239 sources, one of which had as many as 60 plutonium-239 
sealed sources on-site. Officials at these facilities told us that 
their sources were secure, and no instances of concern were mentioned. 
The official at the nuclear power plant told us that the facility would 
like the Off-Site Source Recovery Project to recover its sources as 
soon as possible because it was in the process of shutting down 
operations.

DOE Lacks an Approved Means for Temporarily Storing Sealed Sources 
Containing Strontium-90 and Cesium-137:

The Off-Site Source Recovery Project cannot recover unwanted greater-
than-Class-C sealed sources containing strontium-90 and cesium-137, 
because DOE has not approved a means for temporarily storing these 
types of sealed sources at a DOE facility until a permanent disposal 
facility is developed as it has done for the other types of sealed 
sources it needs to recover.[Footnote 12] In deciding how and where 
sealed sources containing strontium-90 and cesium-137 will be stored, 
DOE must do an appropriate analysis as required by the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) and implementing regulations. 
Once DOE completes and approves the NEPA analysis process for each type 
of source, it could begin to implement a storage alternative. DOE 
prepared its NEPA analysis for strontium-90 in December 2001, which 
offered nine alternatives for storing sealed sources containing this 
radioactive material until a disposal facility is available. As of 
February 2003, the Office of Environmental Management had not approved 
its analysis for strontium-90 and had not begun its analysis for 
cesium-137, and DOE was unable to provide us with an estimate of how 
long it might take. According to Off-Site Source Recovery Project data, 
almost all of the greater-than-Class-C sealed sources containing 
strontium-90 that need to be recovered are currently being stored at 
facilities operated by the Department of Defense and DOE. Also, while, 
according to a project official, most unwanted sealed sources 
containing cesium-137 that have been reported to the project do not 
contain a greater-than-
Class-C amount of radioactive material, this official told us that 
there are about 100 medical devices currently in use for treating blood 
that contain cesium-137 sealed sources and that some of these sources 
may contain a greater-than-Class-C amount of the radioactive material. 
The owners of these medical devices have told project officials that 
they would like to replace the devices with new technology.

DOE Has Not Made Progress toward Providing a Permanent Disposal 
Facility:

As of February 2003, DOE had not made progress toward providing a 
permanent disposal facility for greater-than-Class-C radioactive 
waste, as required by Public Law 99-240. Specifically, DOE had not 
decided which office within the agency would begin the first step in 
developing such a facility, completing the appropriate NEPA analysis, 
which would likely be an Environmental Impact Statement. According to 
DOE officials, it is unlikely that DOE will be able to provide a 
permanent disposal facility by fiscal year 2007 unless the agency makes 
it a priority. Furthermore, the agency lacks a plan for recovering and 
storing unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources in the event that 
the disposal facility is delayed.

DOE Is Unlikely to Provide a Disposal Facility by Fiscal Year 2007:

According to officials from the Off-Site Source Recovery Project, DOE 
is unlikely to be able to provide a disposal facility by fiscal year 
2007, as it had assumed, unless the agency makes it a priority. As of 
February 2003, DOE had not decided which DOE office would be assigned 
the responsibility for beginning the first step in providing a disposal 
facility for greater-than-Class-C radioactive waste--completing the 
appropriate NEPA analysis. Public Law 99-240 gave DOE responsibility 
for providing for the disposal of greater-than-Class-C radioactive 
waste. In developing a disposal facility, DOE must determine, as 
required by NEPA and implementing regulations, whether an Environmental 
Impact Statement is necessary. If an Environmental Impact Statement is 
necessary, DOE would have to propose a number of disposal alternatives, 
and the public would have an opportunity to comment. Following 
completion of the Environmental Impact Statement and a mandatory 30-day 
waiting period, DOE would initiate a Record of Decision, in which the 
agency would select the alternative to be implemented. After the Record 
of Decision is completed, approved, and made public, DOE may begin to 
implement the decision. Whether the alternative selected is to 
construct a new facility or modify an existing facility, funding would 
need to be identified, and after the facility was built, it would need 
to be licensed by NRC. All together, developing a new disposal facility 
could take at least 7 years, not including the time to physically build 
the facility.

Also, DOE had neither provided funding nor produced a timeline for 
completing the NEPA analysis. Officials in DOE's Office of 
Environmental Management told us that the office had identified funding 
for completing the Environmental Impact Statement for fiscal years 2002 
and 2003; however, after office management reviewed the budget in 
February 2002, the office redirected the funding to other higher 
priority projects. They also told us that they anticipated that DOE 
would decide which DOE office would be responsible for the NEPA 
analysis some time in fiscal year 2003, and the Office of Environmental 
Management's most recent budget plan for the Off-Site Source Recovery 
Project mentioned the office's intention to defer the development of 
the facility.

DOE officials told us that it typically takes about 2 years to complete 
an Environmental Impact Statement and as long as 3 years or more to 
complete a Record of Decision. If the Record of Decision indicates that 
a new facility is needed, funding would need to be secured, and 
construction activities completed. The officials told us that there was 
not enough information available at this time to estimate how long 
construction activities would take. However, they told us that the NRC 
licensing process that would follow could take at least 2 years. In a 
1987 report to the Congress, DOE estimated that providing a new 
facility, including construction, could require at least 7 to 9 years 
to complete.[Footnote 13]

In the 1987 report, DOE also stated that if an existing facility could 
be used for disposal of greater-than-Class-C sealed sources, disposal 
services could be provided sooner, depending upon the availability of 
the facility. However, it remains uncertain when or if this will be 
possible. DOE has been exploring whether the acceptance criteria for 
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico, can be 
broadened to include more of the sealed sources that the project is 
recovering. Currently, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant can only accept 
certain types of radioactive waste resulting from DOE's defense-related 
activities, which would preclude it from taking the majority of the 
sources recovered by the project. Furthermore, although the 
Environmental Protection Agency has certified the Waste Isolation Pilot 
Plant, the facility did not require an NRC license because the waste 
sent there did not result from NRC-licensed activities. However, Public 
Law 99-240 requires DOE to dispose of any greater-than-Class-C 
radioactive waste that resulted from NRC-licensed activities, which 
includes most of the sealed sources that the Off-Site Source Recovery 
Project is recovering, at a facility licensed by NRC. These legal 
matters would need to be resolved before the Waste Isolation Pilot 
Plant could be considered a viable option.

Another possibility being explored is the potential for disposing of 
greater-than-Class-C sealed sources at DOE's planned repository for 
waste resulting from the nuclear power industry. For example, the 
Environmental Impact Statement for building a disposal facility at 
Yucca Mountain discussed the potential for disposing of greater-than-
Class-C radioactive waste at this facility. The purpose of such a 
repository is to enable DOE to meet the requirements of the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act, which establishes DOE's responsibility for providing 
for the permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste. However, 
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act limits the amount of high-level waste that 
can be disposed of at a facility built to satisfy the requirements of 
the Act and does not explicitly state whether greater-than-Class-C 
waste could also be disposed of at the same facility. As with the Waste 
Isolation Pilot Plant, these legal matters would need to be resolved 
before sending unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources to DOE's 
planned repository could be considered a viable option.

DOE Lacks a Plan for Recovering Sealed Sources if the Disposal Facility 
Is Delayed:

As of February 2003, DOE's Office of Environmental Management did not 
have a plan for continuing the recovery of greater-than-Class-C sealed 
sources in the event that the disposal facility is delayed. The Off-
Site Source Recovery Project was originally envisioned as providing DOE 
with the means of recovering and temporarily storing unwanted greater-
than-Class-C sealed sources until a permanent disposal facility was 
available. However, DOE still plans to begin phasing out the Off-Site 
Source Recovery Project's operations in fiscal year 2007 and cease 
operations altogether in fiscal year 2010 as originally assumed. As a 
result, under the current plan, any delays in providing a disposal 
facility could begin to hinder DOE's efforts to ensure unwanted 
greater-than-Class-C sealed sources are properly secured as early as 
fiscal year 2007.

Conclusions:

Since September 11, 2001, recovering and disposing of greater-than-
Class-C radioactive sealed sources has taken on added significance 
because doing so would secure nuclear materials that have the potential 
for being misused and that pose a threat to national security. The 
Secretary of Energy publicly stated in November 2002 that securing and 
reducing radiological materials that could be fabricated into dirty 
bombs is DOE's highest priority and an urgent problem. We believe that 
continuing the recovery efforts of the Off-Site Source Recovery Project 
and providing a permanent disposal facility for greater-than-Class-C 
radioactive sealed sources should be key elements in any DOE strategy 
to address this problem. However, responsibility for these efforts is 
currently located in an office within DOE where they are not a 
priority. As a result, the Off-Site Source Recovery Project has not 
received adequate funding; key decisions about how and where to 
temporarily store and ultimately dispose of greater-than-Class-C sealed 
sources have not been made; and future progress toward permanently 
securing unwanted sealed sources is likely to be limited.

The Off-Site Source Recovery Project has made progress recovering 
greater-than-Class-C sealed sources, but future progress will depend on 
whether DOE gives the project the priority that is commensurate with 
the risks that these sealed sources pose to the public; ensures 
adequate resources are devoted to the project; and provides, as soon as 
possible, sufficient space to store, at an appropriate level of 
security, any sealed sources that it needs to recover. Ultimately, 
however, all unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources will need to 
be placed in a permanent disposal facility. Since already more than 17 
years have passed since the enactment of Public Law 99-240, we believe 
it is time that DOE initiate the process to provide such a facility. 
DOE will have difficulty ensuring the success of this effort, however, 
without a plan that would, at a minimum, assign responsibility for 
developing the facility; establish milestones by which progress could 
be measured; evaluate potential disposal options; estimate costs and 
schedules; and address legislative, regulatory, and licensing 
considerations. Also, because it is unlikely that such a facility will 
be operational by fiscal year 2007 when the Off-Site Source Recovery 
Project is scheduled to begin phasing out operations, a plan to ensure 
the continued recovery and storage of greater-than-Class-C sealed 
sources until a disposal facility is available would help DOE prevent 
any gaps in its ability to secure unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed 
sources.

As sealed sources currently in use wear out or become obsolete, the 
proliferation of unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources of all 
types across the United States will continue to increase. Unless action 
is taken, DOE's efforts to recover, temporarily store, and ultimately 
dispose of unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources will be 
severely impeded, ultimately forcing owners of these dangerous 
materials to continue storing and securing them on their premises where 
they will remain susceptible to misuse, improper disposal, and theft.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Because of the risk that unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources 
could be used as weapons of terror, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Energy determine whether the priority given to the Off-Site Source 
Recovery Project is commensurate with the threat posed by these sealed 
sources. Once this determination has been made, the Secretary should 
ensure that adequate resources are devoted to the project to cover the 
costs of recovering and storing these sealed sources as quickly as 
possible. To ensure that unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources 
containing plutonium-239, strontium-90, and cesium-137 are properly 
secured to prevent their use in dirty bombs or, in the case of sources 
containing plutonium-239, nuclear weapons, we further recommend that 
the Secretary of Energy take immediate action to provide storage space 
for these sources at a secure DOE facility and establish milestones by 
which progress can be measured to ensure that the storage space is 
provided as soon as possible.

In addition, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy initiate the 
process to develop a permanent disposal facility for greater-than-
Class-C radioactive waste to carry out the requirements of Public Law 
99-240. To help manage the process, the Secretary should develop a plan 
that would, at a minimum, assign responsibility for developing the 
facility; establish milestones by which progress can be measured; 
evaluate potential disposal options; estimate costs and schedules; and 
address legislative, regulatory, and licensing considerations. Because 
it is unlikely that a permanent disposal facility for such waste will 
be operational by fiscal year 2007 when the Off-Site Source Recovery 
Project is scheduled to begin phasing out operations, we recommend that 
the Secretary of Energy develop a plan to ensure the continued recovery 
and storage of greater-than-Class-C sealed sources until a disposal 
facility is available.

Agency Comments:

During a discussion of our report with DOE officials, including the 
Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Integration and Disposition, 
agency officials expressed general agreement with our findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations. In a subsequent March 31, 2003, 
letter, which is reproduced in appendix II, DOE provided written 
comments on our report and raised three issues. Specifically, DOE 
asserted that (1) our report did not mention a joint DOE and NRC 
working group that was chartered to address the issue of unwanted 
sealed sources and their potential use in radiological dispersal 
devices; (2) the project baseline we reviewed had not been revised to 
incorporate the results of the working group's draft report and the 
need to change the recovery effort from a general health-and-safety-
driven program to a national-security-and-nuclear-nonproliferation-
driven program; and (3) we did not interview any policy executives 
within DOE in preparing our report.

Regarding the first issue, we have added to the report a discussion of 
the purpose and objectives of this working group and its preliminary 
recommendations to DOE and NRC. Although the efforts of this working 
group are broader than the scope of the Off-Site Source Recovery 
Project, in our view, the working group's preliminary findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations generally support the conclusions and 
recommendations in our report. Regarding the second issue, our report 
states that the greater-than-Class-C sealed sources that are being 
recovered by the project are a national security concern because they 
are particularly attractive for potential use in producing dirty bombs. 
In addition, DOE has been required to provide a facility for disposing 
of these sources for more than 17 years. Finally, regarding the third 
issue, it is unclear to us why this point is being raised. During the 
course of our review, we met with the Director and then the Acting 
Director for Technical Program Integration, and on February 20, 2003, 
we met with the Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Integration 
and Disposition to obtain her comments on our written findings and 
discuss our preliminary conclusions and potential recommendations. 
Furthermore, on March 26, 2003, at her request, we met with the 
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management. During the meeting, 
we offered to accept any additional information she wanted to provide 
and make appropriate changes to the draft as needed. During this 
meeting, no changes were suggested to our findings, conclusions, or 
recommendations.

Scope and Methodology:

We performed our review at the Off-Site Source Recovery Project office 
at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico; DOE's 
Albuquerque Operations Office in Albuquerque, New Mexico; and DOE's and 
NRC's headquarters in Washington, D.C. We reviewed statutes, 
regulations, and appropriate guidance as well as interviewed agency 
officials to determine the relevant statutory framework. We reviewed 
cost and schedule estimates from DOE and interviewed appropriate 
officials to determine how much DOE had spent to date recovering and 
storing unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources and how DOE 
estimated the number of sealed sources it planned to recover from 
fiscal years 1999 through 2010 and the cost to complete the remaining 
project activities. We also obtained and reviewed the studies and other 
information on which DOE based its estimates. We reviewed data from the 
Off-Site Source Recovery Project on the number of greater-than-Class-C 
sealed sources recovered to date and the number still awaiting 
recovery. In addition, we visited the Los Alamos National Laboratory to 
see how sealed sources that the project had recovered were being 
stored. We reviewed budget data and interviewed headquarters officials 
from DOE's Office of Environmental Management to assess the level of 
the office's commitment to the Off-Site Source Recovery Project. We 
also interviewed appropriate officials to determine what efforts DOE 
was undertaking to provide safe and secure storage capacity for 
greater-than-Class-C sealed sources containing plutonium-239, 
strontium-90, and cesium-137. To understand how owners of unwanted 
sources containing plutonium-239 were managing their sources until they 
were recovered, we spoke with representatives from eight universities, 
a Department of Defense facility, a DOE facility, and a decommissioned 
nuclear power plant, which were located throughout the United States 
and listed on the project's database as having unwanted sources 
awaiting recovery. Finally, we interviewed headquarters officials from 
DOE's Office of Environmental Management to determine the progress DOE 
had made toward providing a permanent disposal facility.

We conducted our work from June 2002 through April 2003 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 
days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to the 
Secretary of Energy, the Acting Administrator, National Nuclear 
Security Administration, the Director, Office of Management and Budget, 
and interested congressional committees and other interested parties. 
We will also make copies available to others who request them. In 
addition, the report will be available at no charge at GAO's web site 
at http:www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, I can be 
reached at (202) 512-3841. Major contributors to this report include 
Gene Aloise, Stephen Cleary, and Ilene Pollack.

Sincerely yours,

Robert A. Robinson

Managing Director, Natural Resources and Environment:

Signed by Robert A. Robinson:

[End of section]

Appendix I: Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Public Law 99-240:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

[End of section]

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy:

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix.

Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585:

March 31, 2003:

Mr. Robert A. Robinson:

Managing Director, Natural Resources and Environment:

United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548:

Dear Mr. Robinson:

We have reviewed your draft report entitled Nuclear Nonproliferation: 
Department of Energy (DOE) Action Needed to Ensure Continued Recovery 
of Unwanted Sealed Radioactive Sources (GAO-03-483). The Office of 
Environmental Management (EM) believes your draft report does not 
adequately consider a number of issues that the DOE is addressing 
concerning nonproliferation of sealed sources.

The DOE takes seriously the new national security aspects of this 
source recovery program. In June 2002 the Secretary of Energy and the 
Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) chartered a 
working group to address the issue of unwanted sealed sources and their 
potential use in radiological dispersal devices (a copy of that group's 
charter is enclosed). The working group has drafted a report, currently 
undergoing internal agency review, that makes a number of 
recommendations which, when implemented, will make considerable 
improvements in how the DOE and NRC are addressing the issue of 
unwanted sealed sources. One major focus of this effort is to ensure 
DOE's resources are spent wisely, to focus recovery efforts on those 
sealed sources which pose the greatest concern.

The project baseline that your team reviewed was approved in April 
2002. That baseline was prepared to reflect the work necessary to 
address unwanted sources from a general health and safety perspective. 
The baseline has not been revised to incorporate the results of the 
working group report and the need to change the recovery effort from a 
general health and safety driven program to a national security and 
nuclear nonproliferation driven program. The baseline proposes a budget 
for fiscal year (FY) 2005 that will be considered, along with the 
working group report, during DOE's FY 2005 budget request preparation, 
which is ongoing. EM further believes the results of this effort 
provide the DOE with a technical context within which to conduct proper 
analysis under the National Environmental Policy Act for disposal of 
the necessary range of sources.

I appreciate the opportunity to comment on this report. However, the 
report should focus on DOE's policy approach to addressing this 
initiative. Furthermore, the General Accounting Office (GAO) failed to 
interview any policy executives within DOE in preparing this report, 
and the draft report reflects this fact.

if you have any questions, please call me at (202) 586-7709 or Ms. 
Patrice M. Bubar, Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of 
Integration and Disposition, at (202) 586-5151.

Sincerely,

Jessie Hill Roberson Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management:

Signed by Jessie Hill Roberson:

Enclosure:

See comment 2.

See comment 1.

See comment 1.

See comment 3.

The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Energy's (DOE) 
letter dated March 31, 2003.

GAO Comments:

DOE commented that our draft report does not adequately consider a 
number of issues that DOE is addressing concerning nonproliferation of 
sealed sources. Specifically, DOE mentions a joint DOE and Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) working group that was chartered to address 
the issue of unwanted sealed sources and their potential use in 
radiological dispersal devices. A discussion of the working group and 
its draft report will be addressed in our forthcoming report on the 
control of domestic radiological sources. However, we have added, in 
the background section of this report, a discussion of the purpose of 
the working group, the objectives it was addressing, and its 
preliminary recommendations to DOE and NRC regarding the disposal of 
radiological sources. The efforts of this working group are broader 
than the scope of the Off-Site Source Recovery Project in that they 
include a discussion of all radiological materials not just greater-
than-Class-C sealed sources. In our view, the working group's 
preliminary findings, conclusions, and recommendations generally 
support our conclusions and recommendations regarding the need for DOE 
to (1) provide sufficient resources to ensure the continued operations 
of the Off-Site Source Recovery Project; (2) provide secure storage 
space for greater-than-Class-C sealed sources that DOE needs to 
recover; (3) initiate the process to provide a permanent disposal 
facility for greater-than-
Class-C waste; and (4) develop a plan to ensure continued recovery of 
these sources in the likely event that a permanent facility is delayed.

DOE also makes the point that one major focus of this DOE and NRC 
working group's effort is to ensure DOE's resources are spent wisely 
and to focus recovery efforts on those sealed sources that pose the 
greatest concern. However, greater-than-Class-C sealed sources have 
already been identified as particularly attractive for potential use in 
producing dirty bombs. Among other things, they contain concentrated 
amounts of high-risk nuclear materials, such as americium-241, cesium-
137, plutonium-238, plutonium-239, and strontium-90. Furthermore, 
Public Law 99-240 specifically requires that DOE provide for the 
permanent disposal of greater-than-Class-C sealed sources, a task even 
more important now, following the events of September 11, 2001, than 
when the law was enacted.

DOE commented that the project's baseline that we reviewed had not yet 
been revised to incorporate the results of the working group's draft 
report and the need to change the recovery effort from a general 
health-and-safety-driven program to a national-security-and-nuclear-
nonproliferation-driven program. In addition, the project's baseline 
proposes a budget for fiscal year 2005 that will be considered, along 
with the working group's report, during DOE's fiscal year 2005 request 
preparation, which is ongoing. Regarding DOE's comment that the 
project's baseline will be revised to focus on national security and 
nonproliferation, greater-than-Class-C sealed sources are a concern 
because they are particularly attractive for potential use in producing 
dirty bombs. Furthermore, for more than 17 years, DOE has been required 
by Public Law 99-240 to provide a facility for disposing of all 
greater-than-Class-C waste, including greater-than-Class-C sealed 
sources that are no longer wanted by their owners. To date, however, 
DOE has not developed such a facility. Regarding DOE's point about the 
budget, DOE's comments indicate that the project's future estimated 
budget needs will be considered along with the recommendations of the 
working group. However, there is still no indication that the Off-Site 
Source Recovery Project will get the funding it needs to recover 
greater-than-Class-C sealed sources beyond fiscal year 2004. As stated 
in our report, DOE's Office of Environmental Management reduced its 
request for funding for the Off-Site Source Recovery Project for fiscal 
years 2003 and 2004 to 
$2.2 million and $2 million, respectively, to provide the funds 
necessary to store sealed sources that had already been recovered. In 
addition, a DOE official told us that the office plans to reduce future 
requests further to $1 million annually beginning in fiscal year 2005, 
a funding level that, according to this official, would be insufficient 
to keep current project staff assigned to the project.

DOE commented that we failed to interview any policy executives within 
DOE in preparing this report and that the draft report reflects this 
fact. It is unclear to us why this point is being raised. During the 
course of our review, in addition to meeting with a variety of project 
managers, we met with the Director and then the Acting Director for 
Technical Program Integration. These officials are directly responsible 
for the management of the Off-Site Source Recovery Project. On February 
19, 2003, we provided DOE with our written findings, prior to sending 
the draft to DOE for agency comment, to confirm that the critical facts 
and key information used to formulate our analyses and findings were 
current, correct, and complete. On February 20, 2003, we met with a 
variety of program officials, including the Associate Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Integration and Disposition to discuss our findings, 
preliminary conclusions, and potential recommendations that flowed from 
the factual information we collected. These officials agreed with our 
findings and preliminary conclusions and recommendations. They did 
provide us technical changes, which we made to the draft report as 
appropriate. In addition, on March 26, 2003, at her request, we met 
with the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management. At this 
meeting, we said that we were willing to accept any information 
regarding the findings, conclusions, and recommendations in our draft 
report that the Assistant Secretary may have. In addition, we said that 
we were willing to make appropriate changes to the draft. The Assistant 
Secretary did not dispute the findings, conclusions, or recommendations 
in our draft report but said that our draft did not mention the working 
group and its resulting draft report dated February 2003. As stated 
above, we included a discussion of the working group's efforts in the 
background section of this report.

FOOTNOTES

[1] The Nuclear Regulatory Commission classifies low-level radioactive 
waste (i.e., waste not specifically classified as high-level waste, 
such as used fuel rods from nuclear power plants) as A, B, or C for the 
purpose of disposal. Radioactive waste is classified by type of 
radionuclide (e.g., americium-241) and concentration of radioactivity 
(often measured in curies per gram). Class A, B, and C radioactive 
wastes must meet progressively more stringent requirements for 
disposal. Class A, B, and C wastes (e.g., exit signs containing tritium 
and contaminated soil or lab equipment) generally can be disposed of at 
existing commercial disposal facilities. Wastes that exceed the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission's criteria for Class C, known as greater-than-
Class-C wastes, generally cannot be disposed of at existing facilities.

[2] As of February 2003, DOE had not modified these estimates.

[3] Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Above Class C Source/Device 
Inventory Survey (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1989) and Idaho National 
Engineering Laboratory, Characterization of Greater-Than-Class-C 
Sealed Sources, Volumes 1, 2, and 3, DOE/LLW-163 (Idaho Falls, Idaho: 
Sept. 1994).

[4] According to a project official, DOE assumed that, based on past 
experience, owners of small numbers of unwanted greater-than-Class-C 
sealed sources initially might have difficulty shipping their sources 
directly to a disposal facility without the assistance of the Off-
Source Recovery Project. DOE assumed that by the end of the transition 
period these difficulties would be resolved.

[5] At 14,309, the number of greater-than-Class-C sealed sources that 
DOE plans to recover appears more precise than it is because DOE 
reduced the number of sealed sources it initially planned to recover 
during the transition years, fiscal years 2007 through 2010, by a 
certain percentage each year.

[6] Although DOE planned to cease project operations by the end of 
fiscal year 2010, DOE planned project closeout activities for fiscal 
year 2011. As of February 2003, DOE had not changed its estimate of the 
cost to complete the planned recovery activities.

[7] DOE's $56.5 million estimate of the cost to complete the recovery 
of 14,309 greater-than-Class-C sealed sources and the $12.7 million 
that DOE had spent from fiscal years 1999 through 2001 do not add to 
$69.3 million because of rounding.

[8] The number of different holders of unwanted greater-than-Class-C 
sealed sources that awaited recovery is lower than the number in table 
6 because some holders of sources have more than one type of source.

[9] The Office of Environmental Management's budget plan was completed 
before DOE finalized the time frame for the Off-Site Source Recovery 
Project, which, as currently planned, will cease operations by the end 
of fiscal year 2010.

[10] The Off-Site Source Recovery Project also identified greater-than-
Class-C sealed sources containing another 15 kilograms of plutonium-239 
that are currently in use. According to an official from the Off-Site 
Source Recovery Project, DOE will eventually need to recover these 
sources as well. Consequently, DOE could need to provide the capacity 
to securely store a total of an additional 28 kilograms of this 
material, if a disposal facility were not made available beforehand.

[11] Representatives from two universities told us that they wanted to 
keep their sealed sources even though these sources were listed as 
unwanted on the project's database.

[12] Strontium-90 and cesium-137 are nuclear materials that remain 
radioactive for a long period of time, can contaminate property, and 
require an extensive clean-up. These nuclear materials can also be 
absorbed in the food chain and are potential cancer causing risks. 
According to an Off-Site Recovery Project official, the project is able 
to store the unwanted greater-than-Class-C sealed sources that contain 
both americium-241 and cesium-137 because the americium-241 in the 
sources determines how the sources must be stored.

[13] Public Law 99-240 also requires DOE to submit a report to the 
Congress setting forth the agency's recommendations for ensuring the 
safe disposal of greater-than-Class-C radioactive waste, which the 
agency completed in February 1987. See U.S. Department of Energy, 
Recommendations for Management of Greater-Than-Class-C Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste, Report to Congress in Response to Public Law 99-240 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1987).

GAO's Mission:

The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, 
exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability 
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use 
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides 
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make 
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to 
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, 
integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains 
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an 
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search 
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You 
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other 
graphics.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its 
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document 
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to 
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to daily E-mail alert for newly 
released products" under the GAO Reports heading.

Order by Mail or Phone:

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to:

U.S. General Accounting Office

441 G Street NW,

Room LM Washington,

D.C. 20548:

To order by Phone: 	

	Voice: (202) 512-6000:

	TDD: (202) 512-2537:

	Fax: (202) 512-6061:

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:

Contact:

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:

Public Affairs:

Jeff Nelligan, managing director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 U.S.

General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, D.C.

20548: