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USAID/OTI Nigeria Field Report
July 2001
Program Description
The Office of Transition Initiatives' (OTI) principal mission in Nigeria is to sustain the current transition toward national reconciliation and democracy. The FY2001 budget is $6 million. The majority of OTI's grants are to civil society groups, local governments, and community and media organizations focusing on conflict management, public awareness of key reform issues, and civil society development. The bulk of program activities on civilian-military relations and police reform are funded out of OTI headquarters in Washington, DC.
OTI's Nigeria program has offices in Lagos, Abuja, Port Harcourt and Kano and works with Louis Berger International to implement the program. OTI is scheduled to complete its program in Nigeria in September 2001, handing off activities to other USAID offices, USG agencies, Nigerian and U.S.-based non-governmental organizations, and other donors.
Country Situation
With growing national attention focused on local elections in April 2002 and state and federal elections following a year later, disputes are becoming increasingly politicized, and politics more frequently emphasizes differences. For example, in the northern states where Sharia law has already been introduced, there is a widening gulf between state governments and more fundamentalist groups over the law's scope. Islamic fundamentalists are insisting on a full and rapid implementation of the laws enshrined in the Koran. In several states, vigilante groups have organized to ensure compliance, with or without the sanction of local authorities. As elections approach there is mounting concern that some politicians will tap into this extremism for political gain. If such extremism goes unchecked either by national political leaders or at the polls, the conditions will be ripe for another round of the communal violence that rippled through the country in late 1999. The comment this month by former military head of state Muhammed Buhari that Muslims should not vote for non-Muslims only fuels suspicions and exacerbates tensions.
In Nasarawa, calm returned after communal conflict engulfed the state for two weeks in June. The fighting left hundreds dead, numerous destroyed villages, and over 35,000 displaced persons. Despite the seriousness of the conflict, Governor Abdulahi was able to withstand pressures to respond with military intervention. Instead he devised a strategy, with OTI support, aimed at finding negotiated settlements to the numerous disputes that took on violent dimensions as law and order broke down. The federal government did not use force to suppress the disturbance, but made a gesture of deploying mobile police and armored units to deter any reoccurrence of violence.
In nearby Kwara State, tensions increased as a dispute between Yoruba and Fulani deepened. The Fulani control traditional leadership positions despite being outnumbered by Yoruba. Past efforts by the Yoruba to install a chief of their own have been thwarted by the Fulani minority. This month, the radical Yoruba nationalist group, the Oodua Peoples' Congress, threatened to invade the state and install a Yoruba chief. The Arewa Consultative Form, a northern regional group, responded by warning that they will not stand by and allow a change of the traditional status of the state. This interchange demonstrates how localized conflicts can be quickly politicized and turned into national issues.
Incidents of armed robbery continue across the country. Police report that gangs seem to be increasingly well-equipped and well-organized. In the South East, a gang launched a commando-style raid on the town of Akwuzu. The attack, apparently directed against a vigilante group working with the police, left 22 dead. Similarly well-coordinated raids occurred in Lagos throughout the month, despite the government's midnight-to-dawn prohibition on public transportation, meant to limit the robbers' mobility.
A recently released report from Royal Dutch Shell has put some numbers to the cost of conflict in the Niger Delta. The report states that a combination of lost production and the increased cost of operating in a volatile environment lowered royalty payments to Delta State alone by close to $18 million a year. Contributing to lower profitability were such expenses as increased security, repairs to vandalized pipelines and other facilities, and ransom payments for kidnapped workers.
OTI Highlights
A. Narrative Summary
With elections set, there is growing concern about election-related violence. To begin developing responses, OTI and the United Nations Election Assistance Division co-sponsored a weeklong workshop on Combating Election-Related Violence: The Role of Civil Society. The workshop, organized by the Transition Monitoring Group, brought together representatives of over fifty leading Nigerian NGOs, academics, and conflict management experts to share skills and insights and begin mapping ways that civil society can mobilize to counter electioneering violence. The workshop participants concluded that civil society had an important role to play in combating election-related violence through civic education, media campaigns, and election monitoring. At the same time, the participants stressed the importance of transparent processes for the registration of parties and voters, efficient and apolitical election administration, and adoption of codes of conduct by registered parties. The proceedings of this workshop will be widely distributed as a way of promoting a national dialogue.
For the last several months, the major thrust of OTI's programming in the South West zone has been conducting conflict management skills development workshops for a broad cross-section of political and opinion leaders within Lagos State. Previous training has targeted the state legislature, leaders of ethic and religious communities, and leaders of youth and women's groups. In July, the last of these workshops were conducted, this time focused on senior members of the executive branch. Over three consecutive weekends, close to 100 departmental heads, special assistants, and ranking civil servants received training in conflict analysis, effective communication, and joint problem-solving techniques. The state's governor, Bola Tinubu, made an unexpected visit to the final training session. Intending only a brief visit, the governor found the instruction so interesting that he stayed for the duration of the training. In the closing ceremony, the governor charged his administration to make full use of the newly acquired skills to bring peace to the state. The next phase of OTI's strategy in Lagos is to bring together representatives of all the trained stakeholder groups to organize a permanent statewide peace forum.
During the month, the Lagos office also organized a series of workshops to improve the tone and effectiveness of police-community relations within the state. Two-day workshops were held in each of the eight police commands across the state. In all, 240 representatives of the police and other security services, community and human rights groups and the media attended. These workshops grew out of a request from the Lagos State government to the U.S. Consulate for assistance in dealing with the upsurge in violent crime. Initially envisaged as basic training for newly created civilian community watch groups, OTI and its NGO partner worked with the state government and the federal police to broaden the focus of the workshops to address the full range of impediments to close cooperation between the police and the citizenry. The reasoning was that the most effective deterrent to crime are citizens that reject lawlessness and instead support and work with the police. While one workshop cannot erase years of mutual suspicion and animosity, the positive response from police and community alike provides an indication of what can be accomplished through a police modernization program (currently proposed by OTI).
B. Grants Activity Summary
With the 23 grants disbursed in July, OTI's programming in Nigeria has virtually come to a close. While there may be a limited number of grants disbursed in the months to come, the heavy disbursements of the last five months will not be repeated.
|
|
Obligated funds (US$) 1 |
Number of grants / contracts |
| Abuja |
44,683 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44,683 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Kano |
254,728 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
254,728 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
| Lagos |
300,069 |
45,788 |
73,464 |
0 |
419,321 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
9 |
| Port Harcourt |
8,295 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8,295 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Total July 2001 |
607,775 |
45,788 |
73,464 |
0 |
727,027 |
21 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
23 |
| Total since April 1999 |
4,733,057 |
1,595,497 |
537,794 |
3,949,203 |
10,815,550 |
162 |
13 |
31 |
100 |
306 |
Notes:
1 Grants are attributed to the office that obligated the funds, and not to the location(s) of grant-funded activities.
2 The "Other" category includes grants for energy sector, media and anti-corruption programs among others.
C. Indicators of
Success
- OTI effectively leveraged its reputation, relations, and resources in helping the governor of Nasarawa State develop a strategy for dealing with the outbreak of violence in his state that relied on seeking negotiated settlements rather than forceful suppression. As the conflict escalated, OTI and its NGO partner put forward several ideas of how the state government could best respond, including a targeted media campaign, establishment of an independent judicial inquiry, and conflict management skills workshops for security services, local government officials, and opinion leaders in the most affected areas. All of these suggestions were adopted because OTI had a firm working relationship with state government and the resources to intervene rapidly. The initiatives ultimately played a key role in restoring calm in Nasarawa.
- OTI demonstrated its speed and flexibility in responding to a query from the U.S. Consulate about the feasibility of organizing workshops for the police and community watch groups in Lagos State. Within three weeks, OTI and its NGO partner had negotiated, designed, and implemented a series of eight two-day workshops for 240 participants from all over the state. Both Lagos government and the U.S. Consulate staff were impressed with OTI's ability to pull together such a high-quality program at such short notice. In a reporting cable, the Regional Narcotics and Law Enforcement Officer stated that "thanks to this OTI effort, the stage has been set for continued dialogue among the various Lagos police units and community organizations that in time will lead to greater community trust in the police and, consequently, more effective policing."
D. Program Appraisal
Progress continued during July on closeout and hand-over. During the month both the Kano and Abuja offices were closed, leaving only the Lagos operation. USAID/Nigeria gave approval in principle to OTI's plans for the disposition of non-expendable property. Programmatically, OTI continues to work with the Mission's DG office to assure smooth hand-over of programming in conflict management and police modernization. As it became apparent that USAID/Nigeria will not have an implementing partner in place to support conflict management in Nigeria until March 2002, OTI/Nigeria submitted a proposal for a no-cost extension of its activities through January 2002. Under the proposal two Nigerian staff, housed within USAID/Nigeria, would oversee the implementation of a modest grant program designed to sustain several initiatives until USAID/Nigeria support comes online.
OTI's grant to the Voice of America (VOA) will be handed off to the USAID Mission, which will commit $200,000 to VOA in FY2002.
NEXT STEPS/IMMEDIATE PRIORITIES
Closeout and hand-off continue to be the priorities, especially implementation of the property disposition plan. In addition, work will begin in August on the preparation of a combination FY2001 Results Report and Final Evaluation.
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