China
and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications
for the United States
Conference Report
5 November 1999
This
conference was sponsored by the National Intelligence
Council (NIC) with Armed Forces Journal International
and the National Security Studies Program at the
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown
University. The views expressed in this
conference summary are those of individuals and
do not represent official US intelligence or policy
positions. The NIC routinely sponsors such unclassified
conferences with outside experts to gain knowledge
and insight to sharpen the level of debate on
critical issues.
Introduction
This
conference document includes papers produced by
distinguished experts on China's weapons-of-mass-destruction
(WMD) programs. The seven papers were complemented
by commentaries and general discussions among
the 40 specialists at the proceedings.
The
main topics of discussion included:
-
The
development of China's nuclear forces.
-
China's
development of chemical and biological weapons.
-
China's
involvement in the proliferation of WMD.
-
China's
development of missile delivery systems.
-
The
implications of these developments for the
United States.
Interest
in China's WMD stems in part from its international
agreements and obligations. China is a party to
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), the Zangger Committee, and the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and has signed
but not ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT). China is not a member of the
Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, or the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR), although it has agreed
to abide by the latter (which is not an international
agreement and lacks legal authority).
The
papers below reflect important trends in thinking
outside the Intelligence Community on the issue
of China and WMD. As noted on the title page,
the views stated in the papers are those of the
authors and are not necessarily those of the Intelligence
Community or any particular US Government agency.
Schedule
|
Welcome
|
(9:00-9:05
AM): Robert L. Worden, Chief, Federal Research
Division |
Opening
Comments
|
(9:05-9:15
AM): Robert G. Sutter, Moderator, National
Intelligence Officer for East Asia |
Panel
One
|
(9:15-10:45
AM): WMD Capabilities |
|
Bates
Gill and James Mulvenon - The Chinese Strategic
Rocket Forces: Transition to Credible Deterrence
|
|
Eric
Croddy - Chinese Chemical Warfare Capabilities |
|
Commentators:
Torrey Froscher and Catherine E. Johnston |
Panel
Two
|
(11:00-12:30
AM): Scope of WMD Proliferation |
|
Evan
Medeiros - The Changing Character of China's
WMD Proliferation Activities |
|
Shirley
Kan - Chinese Proliferation of Missiles
and WMD: Issues for US Policy |
|
Commentators:
Harlan Jencks, Peter Brookes, Janice Hinton
|
Panel
Three
|
(2:00-3:45
PM): China's Views on WMD |
|
Michael
Swaine - The Chinese View of Weapons of
Mass Destruction |
|
Mark
Stokes - Weapons of Mass Destruction: PLA
Space and Theater Missile Development |
|
Ken
Allen - Key Indicators of Changes in Chinese
Development and Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction |
|
Commentators:
Lonnie Henley and Vincent Bonner |
Panel
Four
|
(4:00-5:15
PM): Wrap-Up: Implications for US Interests
and Policies |
|
Peter
Almquist, Michael McDevitt, and Thomas Fingar |
|
|
|
Contributors
|
|
Ken
Allen is with the Stimson Center. |
|
Peter
Almquist is with the Department of State. |
|
Peter
Brookes is a member of the staff of the
International Relations Committee, House of
Representatives. |
|
Eric
Croddy is a senior research associate
at the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation
Project, Center for Nonproliferation Studies
(CNS), Monterey Institute. |
|
Bates
Gill is Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy
Studies at the Brookings Institution, and
Director of the Brookings Center for Northeast
Asian Policy Studies. |
|
Thomas
Fingar is with the Department of State. |
|
Torrey
Froscher is with the Central Intelligence
Agency. |
|
Janice
Hinton is a specialist on Chinese affairs. |
|
Lonnie
Henley is with the Defense Intelligence
Agency. |
|
Harlan
Jencks is with the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory. |
|
Catherine
E. Johnston is with the Defense Intelligence
Agency. |
|
Shirley
Kan is with the Library of Congress. |
|
Michael
McDevitt is with the Center for Naval
Analysis. |
|
Evan
Medeiros is a senior research associate
on the East Asia Nonproliferation Project
at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies
in Monterey, CA. |
|
James
Mulvenon is Associate Political Scientist
at the RAND Corporation, and Deputy Director
of the RAND Center for Asia-Pacific Policy. |
|
Mark
Stokes is with the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs. |
|
Robert
G. Sutter is National Intelligence Officer
for East Asia, National Intelligence Council. |
|
Michael
Swaine is with the RAND Corporation. |
|
Robert
L. Worden is Chief, Federal Research Division,
Library of Congress. |
Bates
Gill and James Mulvenon1
Introduction
The
doctrine and force structure of China's Strategic
Rocket Forces (also known as the Second Artillery
from the Chinese di er pao) remain some
of the most heavily shrouded and poorly understood
aspects of the Chinese military. Yet, as China
undergoes a continued modernization of its nuclear
forces, to include improved mobility, reliability,
accuracy, and firepower, concerned analysts are
compelled to understand and analyze the Second
Artillery more precisely, including its evolving
doctrine, organization, and hardware, and their
implications for international security.2
To
date, the most prominent work on China's nuclear
posture has either dwelled primarily on hardware
and R&D,3
focused on doctrinal debates,4
or described the technological development of
Chinese nuclear weapons in the form of political-military
histories.5
Some past work, now more than 10 years old, attempts
to weave several of these strands together in
the context of a "cultural" explanation.6
More recent work by Johnston and Xue goes furthest
in providing more unifying analyses that carefully
draw together aspects of doctrine and force structure,
yet this work requires some reexamination.7
In
light of China's continuing nuclear weapons modernization
program, an updated and more comprehensive framework
is needed that fully pulls together theoretical
analysis, China's declared nuclear principles,
and an empirical assessment of its nuclear force
structure. Taking such an approach, we reach four
key findings on Chinese nuclear posture:
-
First,
from a theoretical perspective, traditional
approaches such as neo-Realist and organization
theory do not adequately predict and explain
key aspects of Chinese nuclear doctrine and
force structure. Rather, an understanding
of such variables as domestic political, technological,
historical, and cultural factors provide far
greater insight and predictive capacity about
the drivers that shape China's doctrinal and
force structure decisions.
-
Second,
from a technical perspective, although we
agree with analysts who highlight the role
of technology in shaping Chinese doctrine,
we go beyond the somewhat simplistic understanding
that technology drives doctrine. Rather, we
see patterns of rational strategic choice
made for China's nuclear posture, though technology
limited the realm of the possible for Chinese
leaders. Perhaps it could be said that the
Chinese made a virtue out of necessity
in the construction of their nuclear deterrent,
accepting the technological constraints of
the system and making rational choices under
those constraints.
-
Third,
we find that the evolution over time of China's
doctrine and force structure is the story
of trying to close the gap between real capability,
on the one hand, and what one might call "aspirational
doctrine" on the other. In the United States,
the appropriate analog would be a comparison
of current operational doctrine, as outlined
in the Joint Doctrine publications series,
with an aspirational doctrine, such as Joint
Vision 2010. In the Chinese case, the discontinuity
between reality and aspiration is of times
referred to as the "capabilities-doctrine
gap." At the present stage in the Second Artillery's
modernization, China is nearing an historic
convergence between doctrine and capability,
allowing it to increasingly achieve a degree
of credible minimal deterrence vis-à-vis
the continental United States--a convergence
of its doctrine and capability it has not
confidently possessed since the weaponization
of China's nuclear program in the mid-1960s.
-
Finally,
for the future, the doctrine and force structure
of China's Second Artillery should be analyzed
at three distinct levels, reflecting a multifaceted
force with very different missions: a posture
of credible minimal deterrence with
regard to the continental United States and
Russia; a more offensive-oriented posture
of "limited deterrence" with regard
to China's theater nuclear forces; and an
offensively configured, preemptive, counterforce
warfighting posture of "active defense"
or "offensive defense" for the Second Artillery's
conventional missile forces.
Theoretical
Examination of China's Nuclear Posture
In
reaching these findings, the work proceeds in
five sections. First, we begin with a theoretical
analysis of Chinese nuclear posture. Second,
in the absence of an open and official declaration
of Chinese nuclear doctrine, we examine China's
declared nuclear principles to inferentially
deduce certain aspects of China's nuclear doctrine.
In a third and fourth section, we test these findings
by closely examining empirical data on China's
current and likely future nuclear force structure.
A final section draws these findings together
to reach conclusions about China's past, present,
and likely future nuclear force posture.
One
observer of China's nuclear program states that
"for about 30 years after China exploded its first
nuclear weapon there was no coherent, publicly
articulated nuclear doctrine."8
In a similar vein, others have noted that China's
nuclear weapons program "proceeded without such
strategic guidance" and that "until the early
1980s, there were no scenarios, no detailed linkage
of the weapons to foreign policy objectives, and
no serious strategic research."9
In the absence of definitive official, authoritative
open-source documentation to describe China's
nuclear doctrine, how can analysts begin to understand
Chinese nuclear posture? To start, one can briefly
consider several theories, or "analytical lenses,"
to deduce likely Chinese doctrinal choices. The
literature offers three principal "models," or
explanatory frameworks.
The
first framework to consider is neo-Realism. Neo-Realism
stresses the state as the primary actor on the
international scene, and focuses on the propensity
of states to engage in "self-help" in order to
preserve their interests in a hostile, anarchic
world system. According to neo-Realist predictions
about nuclear posture, China, as "revisionist
power," would likely prefer offensive weapons
and doctrines. Furthermore, neo-Realism would
predict that as a country that faced a number
of powerful adversaries in the formative years
of its nuclear weapons program (first the United
States and then the United States and the Soviet
Union), China would wish to pursue offensive weapons
and doctrines. Neo-Realism would also predict
that, as a revisionist power with limited means
to detect imminent attack, Chinese doctrine would
favor offensive, preventive war strategies.10
Another
theoretical approach, known as organization theory,
looks to the presumed preferences of military
organizations as a determinant of doctrinal outcomes.11
An organization theory framework would suggest
that under the highly militarized domestic conditions
during the initial development of China's nuclear
arsenal (from the mid-1950s to the early-1970s)
China would have likely pursued an offensive nuclear
posture. According to this framework, the strong
presence of Chinese military interests in doctrinal
and weapons development in the first decades of
the People's Republic would likely result in the
rejection of no-first-use posture, and would favor
first-use options and counterforce targeting.
According to the organization theory framework,
this would be predicted by the fact that China's
leadership during this period was made up of active
and former military leaders, and the fact that
the nuclear weapons program itself was conducted
largely under the auspices of the military. In
addition, because China went through a series
of external security crises during the formative
years of its nuclear arsenal, organization theory
would warn of an even stronger likelihood that
the military would actively pursue offensive deployments
and doctrines.
A
third predictive approach gives greater weight
to domestic political, historical, and cultural
factors as determinants for shaping doctrinal
decisions. This approach, known as neo-culturalism
in the academic literature, can be applied to
the Chinese case by examining domestic political
interests, civil-military relations, resource
restraints, and historical experience. In the
Chinese case, one can point more specifically
to domestic political factors (especially the
unusual dynamic of Party-Army relations), technical
factors (particularly availability of resources),
and other historical and cultural factors as critical
variables compelling doctrinal decisions.12
In examining these factors, neo-cultural explanations--unlike
neo-Realist or organizational frameworks--would
not necessarily predict a Chinese preference for
offensive nuclear doctrines.
Certain
aspects of the empirical record would lend support
to the predictions of either the neo-Realist or
the organizational theorist, or both. For example,
the initial Chinese decision to go nuclear in
January in 1955 is predicted by the neo-Realist
approach that places great emphasis on threats
and prestige as useful indicators. In another
example, we see that midlevel Chinese military
officers have been the most open in recent years
to promote more offensively oriented deployments
and doctrines, as shown in Iain Johnston's work.13
However,
in taking the 45-year record of Chinese nuclear
weapons development as a whole, neo-Realist and
organizational frameworks would not predict the
basic declared principles and empirical record
of Chinese nuclear weapons posture overall. As
explained in fuller detail in subsequent sections,
China's nuclear posture overall has adopted such
principles as no-first-use, has circumscribed
use in the form of both positive and negative
security assurances and the declared adherence
to nuclear-weapon-free zones, provides no extended
deterrence guarantees beyond its borders, and
maintains qualitatively and quantitatively limited
forces, resulting in likely "countervalue" (as
opposed to "counterforce") targeting, and a delayed
second-strike (as opposed to launch on warning
or launch on attack) state of readiness.
Hence,
in the Chinese case, considering the neo-cultural
approach to help predict and understand Chinese
doctrinal choices would be more helpful to us.
What specific aspects of domestic politics, historical
experience, and cultural tradition stand out in
this regard?
From
the perspective of domestic politics, we must
recognize first and foremost that in the critical
decades that Chinese nuclear weapons were first
developed, Chinese nuclear weapons decisions were
firmly dominated by the views and statements of
Mao Zedong and a small number of other leaders
under the powerful political sway of Maoist political
ideology and rhetoric. Mao's own publicly expressed
opinions about nuclear weapons served as the guiding
principles for the development of the Chinese
arsenal. Lewis and Xue have derived seven major
principles from official Maoist statements in
the 1960s and 1970s that helped define the future
parameters of Chinese nuclear deployments and
doctrine: (1) no first use; (2) no tactical nuclear
weapons; (3) "small but better"; (4) "small but
inclusive,"; (5) minimum retaliation; (6) quick
recovery; (7) soft-target kill capability.14
A recent study by a Chinese missile scientist
argues that many of these principles continue
to carry great weight in determining the fundamental
quantitative and qualitative parameters of China's
nuclear weapons arsenal even today.15
A
good part of this thinking with regard to nuclear
weapons was derived from the wartime experience
of the Chinese communist leadership,
especially during the Chinese civil war (1927-49),
and in the war or the communists
against the Japanese (1937-45). According to Mao,
Chinese communist military successes
of "People's War" emphasized guerrilla tactics
within a protracted war strategy, the importance
of manpower over technology, the moral and physical
attrition of the enemy over time, and the importance
of controlling the strategic "hinterland" to surround
the enemy's base in the developed urban centers.
For nuclear doctrine, this translated into (1)
opposition to quick or preemptive military actions
from a position of weakness; (2) an appreciation
for "strategic retreat" and the primacy of defense
in the interest of eventual victory; (3) a subordination
of a strictly military viewpoint to the political-military
goals of the revolution; and (4) the ultimate
superiority of man over weapons and technology.16
Mao's
opinions also were influenced by his careful reading
of Chinese history and its classic texts, especially
the work of Sun Zi (Sun Tzu), who wrote the classic
Art of War in the 6th century BC.17
Contemporary Chinese interpretations of this work
emphasize the largely defensive and nonviolent
nature of Chinese strategic thought, most often
citing Sun Zi's well-known maxim: "To win one
hundred victories in one hundred battles is not
the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without
fighting is the acme of skill." Other aspects
of Sun Zi's thought that favor "nonviolent" means
to vanquish one's opponents--deception, wily strategy,
and what is known today as "psychological warfare"--also
are often cited as representative of traditional
Chinese strategic thinking.18
Moreover, this interpretation of strategic thinking
finds resonance in the larger context of Confucianism--the
single-most-dominant philosophy of statecraft
in Chinese history--and its overarching concern
with abjuring violence and assuring order through
moral--rather than strictly military--strength.
Interestingly,
the term in China for "deterrence" itself may
help explain Chinese nuclear posture. For example,
a "Confucian" approach to nuclear doctrine may
be reflected in China's frequently stated "opposition"
to the policy of nuclear deterrence. This apparent
contradiction only leads to suspicions about true
Chinese intentions, especially from Western analysts
who view deterrence as an essentially defensive
and stabilizing condition. However, discussions
with Chinese strategists suggest that this confusion
may derive in part from Chinese perceptions of
the word "deter," which in Chinese (weishe)
connotes strongly the notion of "menacing" or
"terrorizing with military force," and implies
threatening rather than defensive intent. Alternative
terms in Chinese for "deterrence" also imply threats:
hezu,to frighten into inaction, and weixie,
to awe and threaten. Not wishing to portray its
nuclear weapons as threatening, China traditionally
stated its opposition to deterrence.
Since
late 1995, China's official position has adjusted
slightly its stance to criticize the "obviously
anachronistic . . . policy of nuclear deterrence
based on the first use of nuclear weapons."
Track-two discussions between US and Chinese officials
were able to glean a further Chinese distinction
to the effect that China exercises a "defensive
deterrent," while the United States wields an
"offensive deterrent."19
A
second domestic political factor in the Chinese
case that neo-Realist and organizational theory
cannot fully capture is the unique dynamic of
China's "Party-Army" relations. Both the neo-Realists
and the organizational theorists assume a discernible
distinction of preferences between "civil" and
"military" leaders in a given state. The revolutionary
history of the Chinese political-military leadership
often belies that assumption, especially in the
formative years of the People's Republic and the
development of the Chinese nuclear arsenal. Chinese
"civilian" or "Party" leaders--such as Mao Zedong,
Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai--had
considerable experience as revolutionary military
leaders, while members of the uniformed military
carried significant political power as Party leaders
and, by dint of their status, as revolutionary
heroes. Powerful "military" interests and predispositions
intertwined with "civilian" (or "Party") concerns
to reach decisions of a broader "political-military"
nature, which is reflected in the apparent doctrine
of China's nuclear arsenal.
The
notion of different "Party-Army" factions is a
better approach to understanding how the Party
and the Army interact for decisions in China.
The differences between these factions are resolved
at the highest levels of Chinese politics where
both ostensibly "civil" and "military" leaders
represent interests as individuals of the Chinese
Party-Army state, rather than the corporate interests
of bodies of which they are members. Three good
examples of how this factionalism and resolution
played out were the intervention of the military
to quell the excesses of the Cultural Revolution,
the overthrow of the Maoist "Gang of Four" in
1976, and the deployment of troops to crush the
Tiananmen Square demonstrations of 1989. In these
cases, different "Party-Army" factions formed
across institutional boundaries to advocate different,
often diametrically opposed, courses of action.
We
should note how key decisions under the conditions
of a symbiotic "Party-Army" relationship have
traditionally been taken by China's topmost leaders,
who by necessity must credibly bridge the gap
between civil and military constructs. The result
for strategy in the formative years of the Chinese
nuclear arsenal was a more comprehensive and political-military
doctrine, not a strictly "military" or "civilian"
approach.20
Third,
an understanding as to how the Chinese define
"doctrine" also helps explain what appear to be
discrepancies between doctrine and capability.
Briefly put, what Western observers might call
"doctrine" is different from the Chinese definition.
What the West often defines as doctrine in the
Chinese context is better understood to be "basic
doctrine, as distinct from operational doctrine."
Doctrine for China is "less operational and practical,
and is more of a systemic description of the theory
or overall construct guiding the PLA's defense
posture."21
In practice, we would differentiate between "aspirational
doctrine" as opposed to "actual doctrine." In
the United States, the appropriate analog would
be a comparison of current operational doctrine,
as outlined in the Joint Doctrine publications
series, with an aspirational doctrine, such as
Joint Vision 2010. Thus, just as "minimal deterrence"
at the beginning of China's nuclear weapons program
reflected hopeful thinking as much as on-the-ground
reality, so too today discussions of a warfighting
or "limited deterrent" are likely indicative of
future goals rather than current capabilities.
To state, for example, that "the PRC's announced
strategic doctrine is based on the concept of
'limited deterrence'"22
not only misinterprets Johnston's research and
wrongly implies that the Chinese have ever "announced"
a formal doctrine, but also wrongly attributes
a Western sense of "doctrine" to what amounts
to a Chinese "aspirational" doctrine.
Finally--and
again a point not well explained by either neo-Realist
or organizational theory frameworks--the empirical
record suggests that Chinese nuclear weapons options
and doctrine were shaped by resource constraints,
especially considerations of technological development.23
As noted above, we find that Chinese doctrinal
preferences were not the principal drivers behind
technological deployments (as neo-Realists and
organizational theorists would likely predict),
but rather the other way around: doctrine was
shaped by what was technologically desirable or
feasible. As a developing world state, technical
obstacles and resource deficiencies almost immediately
limited Chinese deployments to a defensive, countervalue,
minimal deterrence stance, the principal features
of China's traditional nuclear weapons doctrine.
For example, China's reliance on countervalue
targeting derives from the questionable accuracy
of its ballistic missile forces and large-yield
warheads that made precise, limited counterforce
attacks unfeasible.24
Chinese
technological restraints were further exacerbated
by certain domestic political and arguably "cultural"
or historical factors. In turn, these developments
limited Chinese doctrinal options resulting in
a reliance on largely defensive and minimalist
approaches. First, China's historical perception
of itself as a "victim" at the hands of aggressive,
more powerful states limited political choices--especially
in the early years of China's nuclear weapons
development--which may have favored more offensive
and threatening nuclear postures. Second, the
period of China's early development and eventual
deployment of its rudimentary nuclear arsenal
coincided closely with a turbulent period of domestic
political upheaval. As Lewis and Xue have written
in reference to China's pursuit of a nuclear submarine
armed with solid-fuel missiles, it is "a story
of politics and technology in collision."25
While
China eventually--after a 30-year effort--deployed
a nuclear-powered submarine armed with nuclear
weapons, it did so only tortuously and at great
technological cost; the single submarine currently
serving as the third leg of China's strategic
triad rarely leaves port and has constant operational
difficulties.
Third,
China's historical ambivalence and self-reliant
stance toward political and technological dependency
also had implications for its nuclear weapons
development. This position, already well entrenched
in Chinese thinking dating back to the Opium Wars
of the mid-1800s, was considerably strengthened
during China's "century of shame" and following
China's "betrayal" at the hands of Krushchev in
the late 1950s and early 1960s. These lessons
of historical experience slowed the acceptance
and integration of foreign assistance and technologies
in the development of the Chinese nuclear force.
This situation constrained doctrinal choice and
contributed to the development of the Chinese
minimal deterrent.26
Taken
together, the available evidence suggests that,
in analyzing the underlying causes of Chinese
strategic choices, we need to give far greater
attention to an approach that carefully considers
domestic political forces, resource restraints,
and historical experience.
China's
Nuclear Weapons Principles
Moving
beyond an explanation of the causal factors behind
Chinese nuclear posture, what specific nuclear
principles have resulted, and what can we deductively
infer from them as a way to describe Chinese doctrine?
On the whole, these declared nuclear principles
tell us more about when China claims it would
not use nuclear weapons than when it would.
Nevertheless, we can infer from these principles
certain aspects of an otherwise undeclared nuclear
doctrine. Overall, these declared principles support
what the Chinese claim to be the generally defensive
nature of its nuclear arsenal. As we will see,
there is room to question this assertion, though
we find that the principles generally conform
to current force structures (see next section).
We can consider these declared principles in three
parts: China's no-first-use principle, its negative
and positive security assurances, and its declared
adherence to nuclear weapon free zone agreements.27
No
First Use
First, public Chinese statements consistently
reiterate the "defensive" purpose of Chinese nuclear
weapons to counterbalance foreign threats. China's
long-held "no-first-use" (NFU) policy serves as
the foundation of this aspect of China's declared
defensive nuclear posture. Chinese leaders decided
to pursue nuclear weapons in January 1955 due
to US nuclear threats during the Korean war and
Taiwan Straits crisis of the early 1950s.28
In a statement issued on the day of its first
nuclear explosion in October 1964, China cited
this achievement in its "struggle to strengthen
[its] national defense and oppose the US imperialist
policy of nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats":
China
cannot remain idle in the face of the ever-increasing
nuclear threats from the United States. China
is conducting nuclear tests and developing nuclear
weapons under compulsion...China is developing
nuclear weapons for defense and for protecting
the Chinese people from US threats to launch a
nuclear war.29
This
declaratory policy has changed little in the subsequent
35-plus years that China has been a nuclear weapon
state. In a July 1997 speech to the US Army War
College, Lt. Gen. Li Jijun, Vice President of
the PLA's Academy of Military Science, reiterated
China's public position regarding its nuclear
posture:
China's
nuclear strategy is purely defensive in nature.
The decision to develop nuclear weapons was a
choice China had to make in the face of real nuclear
threats. A small arsenal is retained only for
the purpose of self-defense. China has unilaterally
committed itself to responsibilities not yet taken
by other nuclear nations, including the declaration
of a no-first-use policy, the commitment not to
use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear states and in nuclear-free zones...In
short, China's strategy is completely defensive,
focused only on deterring the possibility of nuclear
blackmail being used against China by other nuclear
powers.30
The
cornerstone of this publicly declared defensive
position is China's NFU policy. Since first detonating
a nuclear device in October 1964, China has consistently
declared an unconditional NFU policy,31
combined with a policy of no threat or use of
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states
(negative security assurances) (see below).32
Since that time, China has persistently proposed
that nuclear-weapon states conclude a no-first-use
agreement. The achievement of such an agreement
was one of China's initial bargaining points in
its CTBT negotiations. Later, China sought to
gain such an agreement with the United States
in return for a Sino-US detargeting pledge. Neither
of these efforts succeeded, though the CTBT was
completed and a Sino-US detargeting deal was reached.
China and Russia, however, signed a bilateral
NFU accord in September 1994.
Several
questions, nevertheless, attend China's no-first-use
pledge. First, such a pledge is highly symbolic--it
is not verifiable and any violation would not
be detected until too late. Second, as a practical
matter, the NFU pledge may be less an altruistic
principle, and more a simple reflection of the
operational constraints imposed on Chinese doctrine
by the country's qualitatively and quantitatively
limited nuclear arsenal: China maintains an NFU
pledge because it fits with the realities of nuclear
weapons inventory. Finally, over the years there
have been some indications that China's pledge
may not be relevant to the first use of nuclear
weapons on Chinese soil. Faced with the threat
of a conventional Soviet invasion in the 1980s,
Beijing's military strategists argued that the
first-use of nuclear weapons on Chinese territory
would not have violated its NFU pledge. Similarly,
Johnston unearths evidence in Chinese military
writings that loosely interprets the NFU pledge
to possibly advocate launch-on-warning or launch-under-early-attack
policies.33
Negative
and Positive Security Assurances
Another set of nuclear-weapon-related principles
issued by the Chinese involves both negative and
positive security assurances (NSAs and PSAs).
As for NSAs, China's declaratory stance is clear:
China
undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free
zones at any time or under any circumstances.
This commitment naturally applies to non-nuclear-weapon
States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons [NPT] or non-nuclear-weapon
States that have undertaken any comparable internationally
binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire
nuclear explosive devices.34
DF-21
IRBM TELs at National Day Parade in Beijing, 1
October 1999
Of
note here is China's pledge not to use nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states under
any circumstances; the US NSA, for example, is
conditional in that the country retains the possibility
of nuclear weapons use against non-nuclear-weapon
states that take part in an attack on US territory,
armed forces, or allies.35
As
for PSAs, China has agreed with the other four
major nuclear weapon states (France, Great Britain,
Russia, and the United States) to work within
the Security Council to take "appropriate measures
to provide . . . necessary assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon
State that comes under attack with nuclear weapons."36
The precise nature of the assistance is not elaborated,
and the Chinese statement makes clear that this
position does not in any way compromise its desire
for a universal NFU pledge and unconditional NSAs,
nor does it endorse the use of nuclear weapons.
Of
related note, Chinese declaratory policy is particularly
critical of the policy of extended nuclear deterrence,
or so-called "nuclear umbrellas," provided by
other nuclear-weapon states to their allies. In
operational terms, this means China officially
opposes the deployment of nuclear weapons outside
national territories, and states that it has never
deployed nuclear weapons on the territory of another
country, a point that is not contradicted by any
open-source evidence. When Japan sanctioned China
for continued nuclear testing in 1995 and 1996
during the course of the CTBT negotiations, Beijing
derisively dismissed Japanese censure as hypocritical,
citing the fact that Japan enjoyed the protection
of extended deterrence. China also opposes the
threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon
states, and has repeatedly called on nuclear-weapon
states to agree to a legally binding, unconditional
NSA accord.
In
practice, if China adheres to its NSAs and PSAs,
its deployments and targeting would presumably
be focused only on nuclear-weapon states and possibly
other states not party to the NPT or similar arrangements.
Several questions, however, arise about China's
commitments, particularly with regard to NSAs.
First, like the NFU pledge, China's NSAs are not
verifiable or enforceable. Second, the pledge
apparently would not apply to such states as India,
Israel, and Pakistan, which are not members of
the NPT. Even if they joined, we question whether
China's NSA would still apply to a country such
as India, which, although not formally recognized
by China as a nuclear-weapon state, certainly
has attained such de facto status.
Finally,
some observers question the need for certain Chinese
deployments--such as the DF-21 series--insofar
as its range and basing mean its possible targets
largely comprise non-nuclear-weapon states. For
example, as discussed in the text accompanying
table 2, the DF-21s' basing and ranges suggest
targets in such places as Japan, South Korea,
Okinawa, the Philippines, or Vietnam, in addition
to targets in the Russian Far East and India.
If true, as asserted by Lewis and Xue, that China's
target sets for the DF-3 included US bases in
the Philippines and Japan, this targeting also
runs contrary to Chinese NSAs. That the DF-3 and
-4 series missiles are already capable of reaching
Russian and Indian targets raises further questions
as to the purpose of the DF-21 series in the context
of Chinese NSAs.
Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zones
China has become a signatory to several nuclear-weapon-free-zone
(NWFZ) treaties: the Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa
NWFZ), the Treaty of Raratonga (South Pacific
NWFZ), and the Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin American
NWFZ). During the ASEAN Regional Forum minister's
meeting in July 1999 China stated it also would
sign the Southeast Asian NWFZ Treaty. In its 1995
white paper on arms control and disarmament, the
Chinese government stated its support for "the
establishment of nuclear-free zones in the Korean
Peninsula, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the
Middle East."37
At
a conference focusing on a Central Asian NWFZ
convened in Tashkent in September 1997, a Chinese
Foreign Ministry official heading the Chinese
delegation listed seven principles related to
the establishment of NWFZs. Among them, China
insisted that "any other security mechanism" should
not interfere with the nonnuclear status of a
nuclear-weapon-free zone, including military alliance
relationships. In addition, perhaps with reference
to the South China Sea, the Chinese official declared
that NWFZs should not include "areas where there
exist disputes over sovereignty of territory or
maritime rights." He also called on nuclear-weapon
states to commit to an unconditional pledge not
to use, nor threaten to use, nuclear weapons against
NWFZs.
In
practice, China's adherence to NWFZ pledges does
not greatly affect its nuclear weapon deployments,
especially given that it deploys no nuclear weapons
abroad. China's signing and ratifying the Southeast
Asian NWFZ Treaty presumably would place an added
political onus on its ability to threaten or use
nuclear weapons against such targets as Vietnam
or the Philippines. Depending on caveats, if any,
at the time of its signing, the treaty also could
affect use by China in the South China Sea. However,
the pledges of nuclear-weapon states to adhere
to NWFZs are not verifiable, and some include
escape clauses. For example, in signing the Treaty
of Raratonga (South Pacific NWFZ), China stated
that it could reconsider obligations in the event
that other nuclear-weapon states or treaty parties
violated the treaty.
Taken
together, several points can be gleaned from these
principles on NFU, PSAs and NSAs, and NWFZs. First,
these long-held principles are consistent with
a "defensive" posture and a qualitatively and
quantitatively limited nuclear arsenal. Given
the reality of Chinese nuclear forces, therefore,
these pledges come at little to no real "cost"
in terms of reductions, disarmament, or dramatic
alterations to Chinese nuclear posture overall.
Second, with the possible exception of some deployments,
such as the DF-21-series ballistic missile, the
nuclear principles noted here are consistent with
a posture largely concerned with the other major
nuclear-weapon states (especially the United States
and the Soviet Union/Russia), as well as India.
Third, nothing in these principles necessarily
precludes China's nuclear weapons modernization
program, but might place political limits on targeting
and use options. Finally, although these principles
may give us an overall understanding about China's
formally stated views about when it would not
use nuclear weapons, they provide no details
about when they would.
Second
Artillery Force Structure
Inferences
drawn from theory and from declared nuclear principles
may be incorrect. Theoretical inferences have
not been tested under actual warfighting conditions,
and China may purposely misrepresent its principles
for the purpose of deception. To unravel these
potential analytic stumblingblocks, in the next
two sections we take a careful look at China's
nuclear force structure and hardware, draw inferences
from this empirical data to clarify questions
about China's doctrine and capabilities, and reach
understandings about China's overall posture from
the vantage point that means most for strategic
policy: how does the posture of the Second Artillery
actually affect the security balance in strategic,
theater, and conventional terms?
History
According to Chinese sources, the Chinese Missile
Research Academy (also known as the Fifth Research
Academy) was established in October 1956 under
the direction of Qian Xuesen.38
Ten research institutions were set up under the
Fifth Academy to focus on the development of China's
ballistic missiles. China began "copy production"
of its first ballistic missile--a Chinese copy
of a Soviet R-2 missile--in October 1958, and
the missile was first tested three times in November
and December 1960. Since that time the exact number
of missile tests is difficult to discern through
open sources, but, by the end of the 1960s, China
had conducted at least 30 MRBM (the DF-2 and -2A
missiles) tests at ranges of up to 1,500 km. Major
milestones in China's nuclear force modernization
are noted over the following pages.
DF-2
and -2A. After a failed flight test on
21 March 1962--in which shortly after takeoff,
the missile erratically flew with its engine on
fire before crashing near the launch pad--the
Chinese successfully tested the DF-2 numerous
times in June and July 1964 following the first
success on 29 June 1964. Following a February
1965 decision to increase the range of the DF-2,
an increase of 20 percent in the range was achieved
for the DF-2A, beginning with its first successful
tests in November 1965. On 27 October 1966, the
Chinese launched a DF-2 with an armed, live nuclear
warhead from the Shuangchengzi to an impact area
in the Lop Nur testing area.39
The DF-2 series, with ranges of 1,000 and 1,250
km, respectively, and a yield of 20Kt, was "sited
in Northeast China and targeted on cities and
US military bases in Japan."40
China was believed to have produced a total of
100 missiles between 1965 and 1971,41
deploying approximately 50 missiles at one time.42
Retirement of the system reportedly began in 1979
and was completed by 1990.43
DF-3/3A.
The DF-3 was China's first indigenously developed
ballistic missile.44
Official calls for an intermediate-range missile
began in the summer of 1964, with formal approval
to commence the R&D process granted in May
1965. After the difficulties with the DF-2's "volatile
liquid oxygen fuel," the DF-3 was reportedly the
first of a series of Chinese missiles designed
to utilize storable liquid fuels.45
The more stable fuels were also meant to improve
readiness because the Cuban Missile Crisis had
illustrated that missiles with nonstorable fuels
(such as the SS-3s and SS-4s on Cuba) were ineffective
in international crises, since they took long
to prepare for launch and could not be maintained
at high alert levels for extended periods of time.46
The missile was first successfully flight-tested
on 26 December 196647
although it was not until a third flight test
in May 1967 that the Chinese were fully satisfied.
Several years were required for the missile to
be deployed, though the exact deployment date
is in dispute. The IISS Military Balance lists
a 1970 deployment, although the Nuclear Weapons
Databook asserts a May 1971 deployment.48
The DF-3 was designed to carry a 2,150-kg warhead
to a distance of 2,650 km (intended, when first
conceived in the early 1960s, to hit US military
bases in the Philippines). Perhaps as many as
36 of these missiles were sold to Saudi Arabia
in the late 1980s, as the slightly longer range
(2,850 km) DF-3A was tested in December 1985 and
January 1986, and commissioned in that year to
replace the DF-3.
DF-4.
The Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missile
(IRBM) DF-4 was a more difficult undertaking.
With a required range of up to 4,000 km ("to strike
the B-52 base on the US island of Guam"49),
the Chinese formally authorized development of
the missile in May 1965. This was to be China's
first two-stage rocket (using the DF-3 as the
first stage), and required technical breakthroughs
in such areas as engine reliability in the near
vacuum of the upper atmosphere, developing high-altitude
test simulator beds, developing more heat-resistant
materials, and improved guidance systems for the
longer range missile. The first flight test of
the missile failed in November 1969--the second
stage was not ignited/separated and the missile
self-destructed--but the missile was successfully
tested in January 1970. According to Lewis and
Hua, because of the Sino-Soviet Ussuri River clashes
in late 1969, the range of the missile was subsequently
raised to 4,500 km (and eventually attained a
4,750-km range) in order to reach Moscow.50
According to Norris, et al., it "was initially
planned to be deployed in silos but recognition
of its vulnerability lead to reconsideration of
rail-mobile basing."51
From 18 September to 2 October 1975, the Chinese
conducted DF-4 rail-mobile tests over 8,000 km
in 10 provinces.52
In 1977, the Chinese finally chose a deployment
plan based on cave storage, whereby the missiles
would be brought out of the cave for erecting,
fueling, and firing.53
A full-range test flight occurred on 2 August
1980.54
DF-5
and DF-5A. China formally began development
of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
DF-5 in March 1965; its progress also was delayed
by the exigencies of the Cultural Revolution.
A first flight test was conducted on 10 September
1971, although this test--entirely within Chinese
territory--had to be conducted across a shorter
range and different trajectory than the missile
was designed for. Not until 18 May 1980--a full
15 years after the missile began development--could
the Chinese conduct a full-range flight test from
the mainland into the Western Pacific. This test
was followed by a second full-range test on 21
May 1980.
Solid-fuel
Missiles. According to Chinese sources, work
on solid-fuel missiles in China date back as far
as October 1956, when Qian Xuesen first began
to set up the Fifth Research Academy.55
First strides were made by the late 1950s and
early 1960s in developing and testing prototype
solid propellant. Static tests were made with
300-mm-diameter engines in 1965 and on 1,400-mm-diameter
engines in December 1966.
Initially,
work was conducted with the intention of using
solid fuels for a single-stage rocket. But, deeming
such missiles' ranges as too short, in March 1967
Chinese military-technical authorities decided
to go forward in the development of two-stage,
"medium-range" solid-fuel surface-to-surface strategic
missiles, to be mated with the ongoing nuclear
submarine under development (the submarine-based
missile was later to evolve into the DF-21 land-based
system). Again, owing to the exigencies of the
Cultural Revolution, Chinese sources note that
serious work on the solid-fuel missile program
did not begin until August 1978.56
After launch equipment tests in April and May
1984, followed by launch tests in May 1985 (DF-21)
and May 1987 (DF-21A), these systems finally became
fully operational in the early 1990s. This accomplishment
culminated a nearly 30-year development effort.
Another
version of the DF-21, the submarine-launched JL-1,
was first tested from a submerged conventionally
powered Golf-class submarine on 7 October 1982,
but this launch failed as the missile lost control
soon after ignition and self-destructed. On 12
October 1982 the missile was successfully launched
from the submerged Golf submarine. As for launching
from China's nuclear-powered submarine, the missile
failed its first test on 28 September 1985, again
turning over and self-destructing. Not until three
years later, on 15 September 1988, did a fully
successful JL-1 launch take place from the submerged
Xia-class nuclear submarine; a second successful
test was conducted on 27 September 1988, culminating
a difficult 30-year development process for Chinese
SLBMs dating back to the late 1950s. According
to open sources, China, since 1988, has not test
launched its JL-1 from the Xia-class nuclear submarine.
DF-15
SRBM Launch From TEL
By
the early 1990s, China also had tested and begun
deployment of two short-range, nuclear-capable
ballistic missiles, the DF-15 (CSS-6/M-9) and
300-km-range DF-11 (CSS-X-7/M-11).57
Both missiles were originally developed for export;
only after China pledged not to export these missiles
were they incorporated into the Second Artillery.58
The DF-15 has been operational since 199459
and was tested approximately 10 times as part
of the missile exercises China conducted around
the Taiwan Strait in July-August 1995 and March
1996.60
The CSS-X-7/M-11 probably was not deployed with
Chinese forces by October 1998,61
though some foreign sources familiar with the
PLA believe that the 300-km DF-11 already has
been fielded by at least two PLA group armies.62
The 1999 DoD Report to Congress on the Security
Situation in the Taiwan Strait reported thatan
improved, longer range version of the DF-11 might
be under development,63
which later was verified by the 1 October 1999
military parade in Beijing.64
Testing.
China's 32-year testing program is the smallest
of the five major nuclear powers, with 45 tests
between 1964 and 1996. By comparison, the United
States tested more than 20 times as much, with
over a thousand blasts over a more than 50-year
program. This static examination of the total
number of tests gives us evidence of comparative
scale, but changes in annual averages can also
signal intent. The amount of Chinese testing increased
marginally after 1979 from 1.3 to 1.7 tests per
year, but American testing between 1979 and 1992
averaged 13.6 detonations per year.
By
previous standards, Chinese testing accelerated
significantly in the mid-1990s, though this intensified
program was probably linked to China's stated
intention from early 1994, at the outset of CTBT
negotiations, to conclude a test ban by the end
of 1996. This timeline suggests that a political
decision to sign the treaty in principle had been
made by 1993 or earlier and may have intensified
in the face of increasing international condemnation
of China's test program, which continued throughout
the CTBT negotiation process.65
The pace of Chinese testing certainly intensified
over the period 1994-96. China's six tests over
a 25-month period (June 1994-July 1996, which
overlapped with the negotiations of the CTBT)
more than doubled China's average testing pace.
For the only time in Chinese history, nuclear
weapons were tested twice in three successive
years.66
Also, this period marked the only time in Chinese
testing history that blasts occurred in either
July or August--outside the typical Chinese testing
"season"--which also indicates a sense of urgency
within the military and nuclear scientific communities.67
Finally, the initial bargaining positions put
forth by China--such as on verification and inspection
procedures and leaving the door open to peaceful
nuclear explosions--offered the military the possibility
of further testing and may have succeeded in stalling
the negotiation process, thereby granting China's
testing program more time. Almost immediately
after China announced in early June 1996 that
it would have one more test, it stepped away from
its objections to the treaty and allowed the negotiations
to conclude.
The
Cox Report strongly suggests that the combination
of nuclear espionage and the intense series of
underground tests described above has accelerated
the PRC's attainment of advanced, MIRVable small
warheads, but some important caveats must be offered.
First and foremost, the warheads employed by US
nuclear forces are highly complicated devices
that are extremely difficult to build. They are
the product of decades of dedicated research and
development, using some of the most advanced techniques
available. As such, there are limits on the amount
of benefit that can be wrought from simply obtaining
the designs for these weapons.68
As one sober observer writes,
China's
theft of the W-88 design used for the US Navy's
Trident missile warhead, for example, does not
allow its engineers to reconstruct the thousands
of parts and electronic components that form the
completed weapon. Even the computer codes China
may have obtained are mathematical models of the
physical characteristics of a nuclear explosion.
They cannot be used to design and manufacture
a warhead. Chinese engineers may well have obtained
some useful information, but they lack the data
and experience required to design and build replicas
of sophisticated US warheads from the stolen information.69
This
line of reasoning is supported by the damage assessment
by the intelligence community,
which concluded that China had not deployed any
operational system using the stolen designs, despite
a lapse of more than 10 years since the alleged
espionage.70
Passage of the CTBT could have locked this situation
in place for the foreseeable future, although
its defeat in the Senate should prepare us for
the likelihood of a resumption of Chinese testing,
and, thus, the possible conquering of important
developmental hurdles in the area of smaller warheads.
Current
Force Structure
As a result of this historical progression, one
of the most intriguing aspects of China's nuclear
weapons program has been its quantitatively and
qualitatively limited nature over time. These
limitations are characterized in practice by a
relatively small number of warheads; technically
and numerically limited delivery vehicles; an
overwhelming reliance on land-based systems; persistent
concerns over the arsenal's survivability, reliability,
and penetrability; and a limited program of research,
development, and testing.
Table
1
Range of Estimates of Chinese Nuclear Weapon Delivery
Vehicles
China's
current nuclear weapons arsenal totals about 400
devices, 300 of which consist of warheads and
gravity bombs for use on its strategic "triad"
of land-based ballistic missiles, bomber and attack
aircraft, and one nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN) (see table 1).71
According to the US Defense Department, over 100
warheads are deployed for use on China's ballistic
missiles, with additional warheads in storage.72
The Chinese SSBN is thought to deploy 12 single-warhead
missiles. The remaining warheads reportedly consist
of about 100 tactical nuclear weapons, including
bombs for tactical bombardment, artillery shells,
atomic demolition munitions, and possibly short-range
missiles.73
China has the capability to increase the size
of its nuclear arsenal using its existing stockpile
of fissile material. One source indicates that
China has an inventory of between 2 and 6 tons
of plutonium and 15 to 25 tons of highly enriched
uranium.74
Iain Johnston estimates that China has enough
fissile material to double or triple its arsenal.75
According to the US Defense Department, however,
"China is not currently believed to be producing
fissile material for nuclear weapons, but it has
a stockpile of fissile material sufficient to
increase or improve its weapon inventory."76
In
addition to ballistic and cruise missiles, according
to the US Defense Department, "China also has
a variety of fighters, bombers, helicopters, artillery,
rockets, mortars, and sprayers available as potential
means of delivery for NBC [nuclear, biological,
and chemical] weapons."77
China is working to modernize its capabilities
in terms of ballistic and cruise missiles, bombers,
and multirole aircraft, but relies upon deterrent
systems and technologies that are at least 20
years behind the capabilities of the four major
declared nuclear powers. According to Chinese
sources, the overall capabilities of the strategic
rocket forces have advanced in recent years owing
to better, more modern training, the development
of strategic missile simulator training, improvements
in technical reconnaissance, weather forecasting,
geographical surveying, antichemical warfare and
logistics support, and the introduction of some
"1,000 technological research results."78
Estimates of Chinese nuclear-capable ballistic
missile forces are shown in table 1. Estimates
vary as to the exact number of these missiles,
but China benefits from a large, well-developed
infrastructure for the development and production
of ballistic missiles.
From
table 1, the Chinese nuclear force structure clearly
is primarily land-based, relying on a range of
missile systems. On the short-range end of the
land-based missile spectrum, China reportedly
possesses several hundred DF-11s and DF-15s, which
have ranges of 300 km and 600 km, respectively.
The DF-15 can deliver a 500-kg payload to a maximum
range of 600 km, with a CEP (circular error probable)
of 600 meters.79
The DF-11 reportedly has an 800-kg warhead and
a 150-meter CEP.80
In
the medium- to intermediate-range inventory, the
PRC fields three types of missiles (DF-3A, DF-4,
and DF-21A). Deployed in caves and valleys to
increase its survivability, China's liquid-fueled
DF-3As have a range of 2,800 km and reportedly
carry a single warhead with an estimated yield
of 1-3 megatons.81
The liquid-fueled DF-4s, with a range of 4,850-5,500
km, are deployed in silos and tunnels and have
a single warhead with an estimated yield of 1-3
megatons.82
The solid-fueled, mobile DF-21As have a range
of 1,800 km and a 600-kg warhead with a yield
of 200-300 Kt.83
In
the ICBM category, China's DF-5 ICBMs can reach
targets in all of the United States.84
Each silo-based missile carries a single warhead,
with an estimated yield of 3-5 megatons.85
In
its weaker second leg of the triad, China has
deployed 12 single-warhead JL-1s, a submarine-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM) with a range of 1,700
km aboard its one Xia-class nuclear submarine.86
These missiles have faced operational difficulties,
and not until 1988 were they first test-launched
successfully from the Xia-class submarine. According
to Paul Godwin, "this troubled ship has spent
most of its time docked or in local waters and
is not considered operational."87
The limited range of the missile, the problems
it has had in deployment and operation, and the
limited experience of the Chinese in long-range
submarine operations limits the value of this
system as a strategic weapon. Beijing also may
have learned some valuable negative lessons from
the experience of the Soviet Union, whose SSBN
force was forced to retreat to bastions by a superior
US attack submarine fleet.
China's
bomber and ground-attack fleet is made up of two
aircraft, both of which are based on 1950s Soviet
designs: the Hong-6 (H-6) bomber (Soviet Tu-16
design) and the Qian-5 (Q-5) ground attack aircraft
(a redesign of Soviet MiG-19). Given the nascent
state of China's in-flight refueling capability,
the maximum ranges of these aircraft are approximately
3,000 and 800 km, respectively. China reportedly
halted production of the H-6 in 1982, and now
deploys between 100 and 120 H-6s (some in a nuclear
role). China deploys over 400 Q-5 aircraft (perhaps
30 currently in nuclear role).88
Toward
an Organic View of Chinese Nuclear Force Structure
Viewed as an organic whole, the Chinese nuclear
force structure seems to defy simple categorization
as either limited or minimal deterrence. Instead,
the multifaceted force is made up of strategic,
theater, and tactical systems of varying range,
accuracy, and yield. The small ICBM force, anchored
by the DF-5 family of missiles, appear to be second-strike
minimal deterrence forces. The theater systems
are unlikely to be used in a second-strike, minimal
deterrent role following a preemptive strike.
Instead, theater systems look like offensive systems
meant to strike US forces and bases in Asia to
degrade conventional capability. The short-range,
ballistic missile forces, which are also nuclear
capable, further confuse the situation by serving
a variety of conventional warfighting and nuclear
warfighting roles. Perhaps the best way to understand
the nature of this multifunction force structure
is to deductively infer the purpose of each element
in the force by examining range and deployments,
payloads and CEP, readiness, and C4I structure.
Table
2
Suspected
Chinese Strategic Missile Bases
(Derived From Open Sources)
Ranges,
Deployments, and Targets. The Chinese
nuclear force inventory encompasses a wide variety
of ranges, and the deployment of these forces
offer a wide variety of potential targets. The
range and basing of China's missiles are summarized
in table 2.
From
the locations of these bases and the ranges of
their deployed missiles, several inferences can
be drawn about the likely target for these missiles.
The DF-3As and DF-21s of Base 80301 probably are
targeted on Japan, South Korea, Okinawa, or the
Russian Far East. The DF-15s of Base 80302 are
almost certainly aimed at Taiwan. The DF-3As and
DF-21s of Base 80303 probably are targeted against
countries south and southwest of China, including
the Philippines, Vietnam, and India. The DF-5s
of Base 80304 are the major CONUS-oriented systems,
while the DF-4s of both Base 80304 and Base 80305
might be aimed at Hawaii. Finally, the DF-3As
and DF-4s of Base 80306 likely are targeted at
sites in the former Soviet Union, including Moscow,
or possibly India.
How
Did the Structure Evolve to This Arrangement?
Lewis and Hua maintain that China's nuclear weapons
program "proceeded without such strategic guidance"
and that "until the early 1980s, there were no
scenarios, no detailed linkage of the weapons
to foreign policy objectives, and no serious strategic
research."89
They even go so far as to say that neither the
"Chinese leader nor his senior colleagues on the
Central Military Commission considered, communicated,
or authorized the investigation of the broader
strategic purposes of the program."90
As Lewis and Hua predicted, we have difficulty
believing this to be true. From an examination
of the sources of their collected works, no one
can doubt the authors' access to critical personnel
or documents from China's nuclear programs or
missile programs, though the level of citation
from central leadership documents is considerably
lower. Although we doubt that the first generation
of leaders, especially Mao, understood the scientific
or technical aspects of nuclear combat, they at
least were able to articulate the strategic targets
for these weapons and task the weapons complex
accordingly. Indeed, the authors seem to contradict
themselves when they relate stories wherein researchers
are told the specifications for specific missiles
(i.e., range, payload, etc.) by central authorities,
who then later change the range and payload requirements
for individual missiles to reflect new strategic
goals. For example, they assert that the military
commission in 1970 commanded that the range of
the DF-4 be increased from 4,000 km to 4,500 km,
"bringing Moscow within range of bases in Da Qaidam,
Qinghai Province."91
This story, along with others in the narrative
about the sequential development of missiles capable
of hitting the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii, and
the United States, suggest that someone, somewhere,
at a central level was making decisions about
the strategic purpose and direction of various
missile systems, which was then reflected in the
seemingly logical pattern (defined as matching
geographic location with range to target) of base
and missile deployments.
One
important dilemma that confronts any analyst trying
to understand the overall nature of the Chinese
nuclear force posture is reconciling the mixture
of strategic and theater systems with claims of
either minimal or limited deterrence. Comparative
cases of nuclear force structure evolution, however,
offer clues about China's intentions. In the Soviet
case, we note that Moscow did not draw a sharp
distinction between its strategic and theater
nuclear weapons systems. The best example of this
was the road-mobile SS-20, which was developed
to decouple the United States from its allies
in Europe and Asia by holding theater targets
at risk and preventing Washington from defending
allies. The Soviets referred to this combination
of strategic and theater nuclear weapons as the
"seamless web of deterrence." Is the same thing
happening in China? Clearly, China and the former
Soviet Union share some commonalties in their
strategic environment and goals. Like Russia,
China seeks to decouple the United States from
its allies in the region, especially Japan and
South Korea, by using the threat of theater nuclear
weapons. In recent years, this threat has become
particularly important in a Sino-US conflict over
Taiwan, which could escalate to the point that
it threatens to split the US-Japan defense alliance.
The United States, however, withdrew its theater
nuclear forces in 1991. How has this situation
changed the rationale for the DF-21A and other
Chinese theater nuclear forces, because they no
longer have a second-strike role?92
To explicate this situation, a deconstruction
of the Chinese force is required.
Payloads,
CEP, and Targeting. Until the DF-31 comes
online, the Chinese strategic nuclear force is
dominated by missiles with high yield warheads
and large CEPs. For example, the DF-4 ICBM has
an estimated yield of 1-3 megatons and a CEP of
almost a mile.93
The mainstay of the Chinese ICBM force, the DF-5,
is more accurate but still has a yield of 3-5
megatons and a CEP of more than a quarter of a
mile. This combination of high yield with low
accuracy suggests that the force is designed for
countervalue, or "city-busting" attacks against
"soft" targets such as concentrated population
centers, and other locations of political and
economic value.94
Counterforce warfighting, by contrast, requires
far more accuracy than offered by these systems.
Readiness
and Survivability. In the past, the limited
numbers, low level of readiness, and slow response
times of China's land-based missiles and bombers
left China vulnerable to an overwhelming and incapacitating
first strike. China does not currently have space-based
or land-based early warning assets. A senior US
intelligence official has confirmed that Chinese
missiles are usually unfueled and unmated to their
warheads.95
Furthermore, the process of loading the liquid
fuel tanks and installing the warheads can take
two to four hours.96
Because of the lengthy prelaunch exposure times
of more than 2 hours for the DF-3A, decisions
were taken that led eventually to operating the
DF-4 from caves and the DF-5 from silos.97
Although cave and silo basing reduces prelaunch
exposure, the basing mode could not significantly
reduce the overall preparation time for launch,
including fueling, arming, positioning (in case
of non-silo-basing), targeting and range-setting,
and other preparatory checks.98
Given these time constraints, the Chinese DF-3A,
DF-4, and DF-5A in today's arsenal may still require
from 1 to 2 hours to launch. From this incomplete
data, we tentatively infer that the Chinese nuclear
force is incapable of launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack.
This readiness and survivability level is consistent
with a minimal deterrent posture.
DF-31
ICBM TELs. The DF-32 Is Still in the Test Launch
Stage
China
has also sought to improve survivability by establishing
a credible triad. As early as the mid-1950s, China
began developing a sea-based deterrent, though
this small program continues to face a number
of serious technological obstacles.99
China has held only one known SLBM test from the
Xia-class submarine, and the existence of only
a single boat obviates the possibility of regular
patrolling.100
Efforts to further integrate Chinese bombers into
the triad have been impeded by the vulnerability
of PRC airfields and the high cost of modern aircraft
capable of penetrating advanced air defenses.101
In addition, Chinese nuclear-capable bombers are
limited in range and are highly vulnerable to
sophisticated air defenses, making it unlikely
that the bomber force would be effective in a
nuclear delivery role against either Russia or
US forces in the Western Pacific region.102
Despite strenuous efforts, therefore, the sea-based
and bomber-based legs of China's triad are still
relatively unreliable, especially in the context
of intercontinental nuclear combat with the United
States. As a result, China has been forced to
focus on ensuring the survivability of its land
forces by deploying road-mobile, solid-fuel systems.
C4I
Structure. The Second Artillery (SAC)
is tasked with implementing the reliable and secure
command and control of China's nuclear and conventional
missile forces.103
The SAC was formally established in 1966, based
upon a "special" artillery corps formed in 1958
following the Chinese decision to develop nuclear
weapons. The SAC is a separate service arm, distinct
from the army, navy, and air force. The central
command and control center for all Chinese forces,
including SAC, is located is Xishan, in the hills
west of Beijing, where strategic operational orders
originate. Direct communication with China's six
launch bases would be passed through the SAC headquarters
and its communications regiment. We must note
that this system bypasses China's military region
commands, and connects directly to base commands.
Base commands, in turn, communicate with their
respective launch brigades. The SAC reportedly
operates about six launch bases, each led by a
major general. Each base has two to three missile
brigades each commanded by a colonel, with each
brigade operating one type of missile. These brigades
consist of up to four launch battalions (see table
2).
At
a political level, ultimate authority to use nuclear
weapons is "subject to the unified command of
the Central Military Commission. Only the commission's
chairman (currently Jiang Zemin, who is also head
of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese
President) has the power to issue an order to
use such weapons after top leaders reach a consensus
on the issue."104
However, it is likely that such a decision would
require a consensus decision within the Central
Military Commission and other senior military
elders.105
As
for the technical aspects of Chinese nuclear C4I,
little open source information is available as
to the precise systems employed to ensure safe
and reliable communication between the central
leadership and the launch bases. In recent years,
however, reports increasingly have surfaced in
the open literature describing various new technologies
and systems that help strengthen China's command
and control system. In some cases the "breakthroughs"
reported suggest that the past level of command
and control structures was not particularly advanced.
For example, the official People's Liberation
Army Daily in early 1998 noted that the SAC "after
three years of arduous work" developed a new digital
microwave communications system which now allows
for a secure "all-weather" communications for
missile launch. "With the new system," the article
notes, "the Second Artillery will no longer be
affected by natural conditions such as weather."106
At
the same time, however, the Pentagon reports that
"China has made significant efforts to modernize
and improve its command, control, communications,
computers, and intelligence infrastructure."107
Given the importance of nuclear weapons to Chinese
security, we assume that similar advances in C4I
modernization have occurred in the strategic rocket
forces. Some evidence indicates, for instance,
that the Second Artillery seeks to connect much
of its infrastructure with secure, landline fiber-optic
cable.108
Moreover, open-source reports detail the deployment
of an "automated command and control system."109
From these changes, we can infer desire for greater
survivability and positive control of nuclear
weapons. They probably also reflect a greater
desire for operational security, as well as enhanced
denial and deception against increasingly advanced
national technical means of other countries. By
itself, however, the modernization of Chinese
nuclear C4I does not automatically imply that
the force is transitioning to a flexible response,
counterforce footing. The changes might signal
desire for eventual launch under attack (LUA)
capability, but the current inventory of missiles
and the next generation of replacements are not
capable of the reaction times necessary for such
a capability. More likely, the C4I modernization
program is meant to improve the credibility of
China's minimal deterrent posture in the short
to medium term.
Future
Nuclear Force Posture
Doctrine
Over the past decade, certain indicators suggest
that these long-held aspects of Chinese nuclear
weapons doctrine may be undergoing some reconsideration.110
As Paul Godwin argues,
Minimum
deterrence, which uses a single countervalue punitive
strike on cities to deter, is seen by many Chinese
strategists as passive and incompatible with what
they see as a future requirement for more flexible
nuclear responses.111
One
observer argues that, consequently, some Chinese
military planners are considering a shift to a
"limited" deterrent posture, which could include
the introduction of limited warfighting capabilities;
improved command and control and early warning
systems; smaller, survivable, mobile, more accurate,
and diverse cruise and ballistic missile nuclear
delivery systems; possible abandonment of the
NFU policy; missile defenses; and the addition
of counterforce targets.112
This view has gained backing in other detailed
research that notes that "China's strategic modernization
R&D [research and development] supports this
shift toward a limited warfighting approach to
nuclear warfare."113
Such a capability would enable China to respond
to "any level of nuclear attack, from tactical
to strategic."114
As
the previous pages suggest, however, from a strictly
doctrinal perspective, such a shift probably will
await shifts in the domestic political hierarchy
and its view of the outside world, factors that
have consistently driven Chinese doctrinal choices.
Moreover, as noted in the previous section on
force structure, technological constraints will
remain one of the foremost drivers determining
the direction of doctrine in the near term.
Rather
than force a stark analytic choice between either
a doctrine of "minimal deterrence" or one
of "limited deterrence," drawing out two important
nuances to better understand this debate is more
logical. First is to recognize the differences
between "operational doctrine" and what we might
call "aspirational doctrine" in the Chinese context.
Second is to recognize that the Second Artillery--which
oversees strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and
conventional missiles--more likely operates on
three levels of doctrine: credible minimal
deterrence with regard to the continental
United States and Russia; "limited deterrence"
with regard to China's theater nuclear forces;
and an offensively configured, preemptive,
counterforce warfighting posture of "active
defense" or "offensive defense" for the Second
Artillery's conventional missile forces.
Force
Structure
Various governmental reports suggest that Chinese
nuclear force structure will increase in numbers
and quality. In 1995, then Secretary of Defense
William Perry stated that China "has the potential
to increase the size and capability of its strategic
nuclear arsenal significantly over the next decade."115
According to the US Department of Defense in 1997,
"China probably will have the industrial capacity,
although not necessarily the intent, to produce
a large number, perhaps as many as a thousand,
new missiles within the next decade."116
General Hughes, then Director of the DIA, testified
in 1999 that "the number of Chinese strategic
missiles capable of hitting the United States
will increase significantly during the next two
decades."117
Publicly released estimates of the number of ICBMs
capable of reaching the United States range from
"tens"118
to the Cox Committee's ambitious estimates of
"up to 100" ICBMs with 1,000 MIRVed warheads by
2015.119
According to the Pentagon, "China plans to begin
production and deployment of at least one solid-propellant
ICBM that will provide China's strategic nuclear
forces [with] improved mobility, survivability,
accuracy, and reliability."120
Two
principal impetuses are behind the modernization
of the Chinese nuclear force structure. The first
is the predictable process of replacing aging
weapons systems with more modern counterparts.
Most of China's operational missile forces, especially
the CONUS-capable ICBMs, are 1950s-vintage liquid-fueled
systems. As General Hughes has testified, "China's
strategic nuclear force is small and dated, and
because of this, Beijing's top military priority
is to strengthen and modernize its strategic nuclear
deterrent."121
This effort has been assisted and accelerated
in part by the ready access to technologies now
available from Russia. The second driving factor
behind Chinese modernization is a rising concern
about the survivability of its nuclear deterrent,
particularly given the prospect of the Strategic
Defense Initiative in the 1980s and now the deployment
of theater and national missiles defenses by the
United States. Chinese perceptions about the survivability
of its force were also undermined by Desert Storm,
which highlighted the ability of US conventional
forces to destroy fixed targets with precision-guided
munitions and the concomitant inability of those
same forces to destroy mobile targets. This realization
no doubt reinforced the perceived desirability
of modern, road-mobile nuclear forces.
The
two principal programs in this modernization effort
will be the DF-31 and the DF-41.122
The mobile, solid-fuel DF-31 will have a range
of 8,000 km, and carry a payload of 700 km. The
origins of this missile are controversial. Lewis
and Xue argue that the First Academy drew up plans
beginning in 1974 to develop not only the JL-1
SLBM, but three other solid-propellant missiles
as well over the subsequent decade, namely the
DF-21, DF-21A, and the JL-2 SLBM.123
Another source claims that the DF-31 missile was
an outgrowth of the DF-23 road-mobile, solid-fueled
program, which began development in 1978 as a
land-based missile, and was then modified to also
serve as the basis for a submarine-launched SLBM,
known as the JL-2. To confuse matters even further,
a different Lewis article asserts that the R&D
for the DF-23 began in August 1970, during "a
particularly tense moment in Sino-Soviet confrontation."124
Regardless of its development path, the DF-23
was renamed the DF-31 in January 1985, although
the designation JL-2 was not changed. In August
1999, China publicly declared the first full flight
test of the DF-31.125
We expect that the DF-31 will be deployed perhaps
by the early 2000s.
The
planned follow-on to the DF-31, the DF-41, was
officially initiated in July 1986.126
The three-stage, solid-propellant ICBM will have
a range of 12,000 km, thus making it capable of
striking all targets in the CONUS. It is therefore
the logical replacement to China's aging DF-5
force, which Beijing will begin replacing around
2010. According to Lewis and Hua, the final basing
mode for the DF-41 is still unclear, although
it will be stored in caves and is likely to be
deployed on a road-mobile TEL.
Some
reports indicate that China will launch a major
effort to develop and construct a follow-on to
the Xia-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines
to be deployed after 2000. The next-generation
submarine, the 09-4, probably would deploy 16
of the new JL-2 SLBMs, with a range of about 8,000
km.127
However, political and technological constraints
may delay or even suspend the deployment of this
boat.128
Implications
Mobility.
Despite yeoman effort, the Chinese largely have
failed to field a credible triad. Instead, the
force remains highly unbalanced, with land-based
missiles predominant over bombers and SLBMs, especially
in the intercontinental category. As a result,
Beijing has been forced to improve the survivability
of its land-based missiles. Apart from the addition
of solid fuels and improved C4I infrastructure,
the Chinese began to move from silos and caves
to a road-mobile force with missiles loaded on
transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) as early
as the 1970s.129
With the planned deployments of the DF-31 and
DF-41 ICBMs over the next 10 to 20 years, the
Chinese nuclear inventory will thus become increasingly
mobile over time. This move will have the effect
of enhancing the credibility of China's minimal
deterrent posture, as long as such a large force
size asymmetry exists between China and the larger
nuclear powers. Moreover, the deployment of the
DF-31 and DF-41 theoretically increases deterrence
stability with other nuclear powers by making
China's force more survivable.
Solid
Fuel. One impediment to greater flexibility
and survivability in the Chinese force were the
hazards associated with volatile liquid propellants.130
The move to solid fuel increases the credibility
of the Chinese force by improving reaction times,
thus raising its overall readiness level. As Godwin
points out, however, solid fuels also "contain
less thrust than liquid fuel, requiring China
to develop smaller, lighter warheads with much
better yield-to-weight ratios than its older weapons."131
C4I
Modernization. Speaking in 1999, DIA Director
Hughes testified to Congress that China was actively
engaged in "upgrade programs" for its nuclear
C4I.132
Overall, the modernization of Chinese nuclear
C4I increases the credibility of the Chinese force
by strengthening command and control. Specifically,
it enhances the leadership's positive control
over the force, increasing the probability that
the National Command Authority could survive an
attack and respond. In the paradox of nuclear
strategy, this development actually increases
deterrence stability between China and other nuclear
powers.
Accuracy.
There is reason to believe that the Chinese SAC
is attempting to improve the accuracy of its strategic
rocket forces. Presurveyed launch sites increase
the potential accuracy of the new mobile systems.
Chinese research institutes are reportedly attempting
to increase precision by developing better gyros
and inertial measurement units.133
According to the Pentagon, China is using the
Global Positioning System (GPS) to make "significant
improvements" in its missile capabilities. As
an example, the DoD cites the use of GPS for midcourse
guidance correction to improve missile accuracy,
and also asserts that such satellite updates will
"increase the operational flexibility of China's
newer mobile missiles."134
A RAND study on this subject concluded that GPS-aiding
of ballistic missile guidance could improve accuracy
by 20-25 percent.135
Greater accuracy might signal a desire for eventual
counterforce capabilities, although force size
will be an important constraint on successful
transition to a more offensive posture.
Greater
Numbers. The Cox Report and other analyses
predict that the Chinese nuclear force structure
is likely to increase in size, and therefore pose
a greater threat to the United States.136
Why would the Chinese force increase in size?
Increasing numbers of Chinese missiles would cause
an opposing force to have greater difficulty in
"decapitating" the Chinese force, which has been
a prevailing fear since the beginnings of the
program. The fear only has become more frantic
in an age of growing American predominance in
space-based reconnaissance. More Chinese missiles
might signal a possible shift from a retaliatory
countervalue posture to an offensive counterforce
posture, particularly if accompanied by necessary
improvements in accuracy. According to Godwin,
a sufficient number of weapons could permit China
for the first time to attempt intrawar escalation
control because Beijing would retain enough forces
to respond at a higher level if the aggressor
chooses to escalate a nuclear exchange.137
An
increase in missiles is also the logical response
to the deployment of theater (TMD) and national
missile defenses (NMD) among the United States
and its allies, which the Chinese view as an organic
whole rather than separate programs (as one Chinese
arms controller put it, "two sides of the same
coin"). Proponents of TMD/NMD point out that the
Chinese already are modernizing their missile
forces, so defenses are not to blame for increases
in the quality and quantity of the Chinese force.
This claim probably is true but must also be accompanied
by an honest recognition that TMD/NMD deployment
is likely to accelerate this effort and push the
Chinese to spend more money on such relatively
cheap antimissile defense accessories as countermeasures
and decoys. Perhaps the only good news is that
limited increases in Chinese missiles would paradoxically
increase deterrence stability between China and
other nuclear powers and enable China to maintain
a no-first-use principle by reducing the likelihood
that the PRC's force could be destroyed in an
all-out preemptive attack.
At
the same time, we must also entertain the possibility
that the new generation of missiles are meant
only to replace the aging veterans of the fleet,
particularly the DF-4 and DF-5. If the Chinese
eventually exchange the road-mobile, solid-fueled
DF-31s and DF-41s for these liquid-fueled, silo-
and cave-based missiles on a one-to-one basis,
or even two-to-one basis, then the net result
is ceteris paribus an increase in the credibility
of China's previously suspect minimal deterrent,
not necessarily a fundamental shift to an offensive
posture. Moreover, as the significant delays in
the IOCs of past systems and the inaccurate estimates
of DF-31/DF-41/DF-25 deployments in Lewis and
Hua's 1992 article attest, we should not be overly
optimistic about the production timelines or output
estimates offered by the Chinese for the rollout
of the next generation of missiles. Rather, we
should maintain a sober view of the impressive
but sometimes erratic production cycles in the
Chinese missile system.
MIRVing?
Since the late 1980s, China has conducted a series
of smaller yield tests, apparently intended to
develop smaller, lighter warheads with an improved
yield-to-weight ratio,138
although this trend could be traced as far back
as 1970.139
Most analysts agree that the purpose was to develop
new warheads for single placement on China's next-generation
solid-fuel ICBMs (DF-31 and DF-41) as well as
ensure the safety and reliability of new warhead
designs.140
The antecedents of the DF-31 and DF-41 programs,
which were initiated in the early 1970s, were
the beginning of a move to develop mobile forces,
which required the development of smaller missiles,
which in turn required smaller warheads.
Other
observers have added an additional, controversial
motivation for the testing of smaller warheads--the
development of a multiple warhead capability,
possibly MRV or even MIRV.141
The Cox Committee, for example, concluded that
"the PRC has demonstrated all of the techniques
that are required for developing a MIRV bus, and
that the PRC could develop a MIRV-dispensing platform
within a short period of time after making a decision
to proceed."142
Often, this desire is linked to a perceived future
Chinese intent to develop flexible response, counterforce-oriented
nuclear forces, though the smaller warheads could
also be used as MIRVs on the existing DF-4s and
DF-5As. Significant evidence suggests that the
Chinese have been actively interested in developing
multiple warhead technology for more than 20 years.143
The current small size of the Chinese force and
the mainstream projections of the size of the
future force, however, make unlikely China's seeking
multiple warheads for counterforce purposes. Instead,
an examination of the timelines for MIRV research
in China suggest that the focus of the multiple
warhead effort is anti-ballistic-missile defense.
Lewis and Hua assert that the Chinese began to
study MRVs and MIRVs in 1970 as a response to
US deployment of multiple warhead systems, but
lowered the priority of the effort in March 1980
after more than a decade of problems.144
Work on multiple warheads was resumed on 10 November
1983, however, when the First Academy included
them in the DF-5A modification program.145
Some reports suggest that missile tests undertaken
between fall 1986 and late 1987 were for the development
of multiple-warhead missiles, including at least
one such test for the DF-5A ICBM.146
Why
the renewed interest after years of difficulty?
Lewis and Hua give us no clues, but the US announcement
of the Strategic Defense Initiative in March 1983
seems too great a coincidence to ignore. If we
assume that US SDI and now NMD research is driving
the current round of Chinese efforts to develop
multiple warheads, then a number of potential
implications can be offered. The first critical
variable is the status of Chinese nuclear testing.
Despite allegations of nuclear espionage, Chinese
accession to the CTBT would significantly impair
China's ability to make progress in this area,
particularly given the conclusion of the Jeremiah
Commission that China has not deployed a MIRV
on its ICBMs.147
Even if we assume that the Chinese have already
achieved a level of miniaturization necessary
for MIRVing or will do so in the near future,
a second critical variable will be the size of
the future Chinese nuclear force posture, particularly
the CONUS-capable forces. If China maintains a
relatively small ICBM force, eventually replacing
its several dozen DF-4s and DF-5As with a comparable
number of DF-31s and DF-41s, respectively, then
Chinese MIRVing along with robust decoys and countermeasures
is likely meant to try and overwhelm the proposed
100- or 200-interceptor NMD system, not necessarily
perform offensive counterforce attacks. A larger
force of ICBMs makes this distinction murkier,
but the overwhelming, triadic force asymmetry
of the United States vis-à-vis China for
the foreseeable future severely reduces the possibility
that China could hope to achieve its goals with
a preemptive strike.
Conclusions
Based
on theoretical analysis, a review of Chinese nuclear
principles and doctrine, and a study of China's
nuclear force structure, we reach a number of
important findings. We conclude that the operational
survivability of China's nuclear retaliatory capability
vis-à-vis major nuclear powers was and
probably still is open to question, particularly
in the context of an all-out preemptive strike.
At best, then, China's minimal deterrent was primarily
psychological, although the potency of this aspect
of the deterrent should not be underestimated.
The PRC's missile modernization program, therefore,
has been a quest to increase the credibility of
this deterrence posture by improving the readiness
and survivability of the force. Measures being
implemented are a transition from volatile liquid
fuels to more stable solid fuels, a transition
from fixed basing to mobile basing, and the construction
of a robust C4I infrastructure. The Chinese have
not operationally deployed any of their planned
solid-fueled, road-mobile ICBMs, though the shorter
range DF-31 seems to be nearing IOC after more
than 30 years of work. When these systems come
online, the Chinese finally will have succeeded
in fielding a much more credible minimal deterrent
force, whose mobility and readiness theoretically
increase the chances that some percentage of the
force could survive a first strike and thus effectively
deter potential attackers.
At
the same time, however, the Chinese force has
grown to encompass more than simply minimal deterrent
forces, including theater and tactical systems.
Viewed in its totality, the Chinese nuclear force
structure seems to defy simple categorization
as either minimal or "limited" deterrence. The
multifaceted force is made up of strategic, theater,
and tactical systems of varying range, accuracy,
and yield, reflecting the very different missions
it is required to perform. The small ICBM force,
anchored by the DF-5 family of missiles, appear
to be second-strike minimal deterrence forces.
The theater systems, by contrast, are unlikely
to be used in a second-strike, minimal deterrent
role following a preemptive strike. Instead, theater
systems look like offensive systems meant to strike
US forces and bases in Asia to degrade conventional
capability. The short-range, ballistic missile
forces, which are also nuclear capable, further
confuse the situation by serving a variety of
conventional warfighting and nuclear warfighting
roles. For the future, the doctrine and force
structure of China's Second Artillery must be
analyzed at three distinct levels: a posture of
credible minimal deterrence with regard
to the continental United States and Russia; a
more offensive-oriented posture of "limited
deterrence" with regard to China's theater
nuclear forces; and an offensively configured,
preemptive, counterforce warfighting posture of
"active defense" or "offensive defense" for the
Second Artillery's conventional missile forces.
How
did the Chinese force evolve into this arrangement?
First, our analysis tends to confirm the arguments
of Lewis, et al., of the importance
of technology as a determinant of Chinese doctrine.
The progression of missile systems, with their
gradually expanding ranges and capabilities, defined
the limits of the possible for the Chinese leadership.
We disagree, however, that technology alone determined
the nature of the Chinese nuclear force posture.
Central guidance on ranges and payloads, although
admittedly vague, appears to conform with strategic-level
perceptions of threats and goals in the external
security environment, especially when matched
with the corresponding logical deployment pattern
outlined in section three. Perhaps we can say
that the Chinese made a virtue out of necessity
in the construction of their nuclear deterrent,
accepting the technological constraints of the
system and making rational choices under those
constraints.
In
the end, however, we question whether China ever
actually achieved a fully credible minimal deterrent.
Thus, our attention has focused on the discontinuity
between reality and aspiration, which is oftimes
referred to as the "capabilities-doctrine gap."
At the present stage in the Second Artillery's
modernization, China is nearing an historic convergence
between doctrine and capability, allowing it to
increasingly achieve a degree of credible minimal
deterrence vis-à-vis the continental
United States--a convergence of its doctrine and
capability it has not confidently possessed since
the weaponization of China's nuclear program in
the mid-1960s.
But
what about "limited deterrence"? Recent studies
find that since at least the late 1980s, Chinese
military writings have promoted the need for China
to develop a "limited deterrence"--as opposed
to a "minimal deterrence"--doctrine. Although
these writings are not considered official declarations
of doctrine, because they are written by military
analysts and appear in officially sanctioned military
publications they have a special salience that
deserves further scrutiny. In analyzing these
writings, Johnston observes the emergence of "more
comprehensive and consistent doctrinal arguments
in favor of developing a limited flexible response
capability" and that "Chinese strategists have
developed a concept of limited deterrence . .
. to describe the kind of deterrent China ought
to have."148
In
general and specific terms, these Chinese writings
call for limited, counterforce, war-fighting capabilities
"to deter conventional, theater, and strategic
nuclear war, and to control and suppress escalation
during a nuclear war."149
According to Chinese analysts, such a posture
requires:
a
greater number of smaller, more accurate, survivable,
and penetrable ICBMs; SLBMs as countervalue retaliatory
forces; tactical and theater nuclear weapons to
hit battlefield and theater military targets and
to suppress escalation; ballistic missile defense
to improve the survivability of the limited deterrent;
space-based early warningand command and control
systems; and anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) to
hit enemy military satellites.150
Because
such a posture would require a significant increase
in Chinese capabilities, Johnston correctly highlights
the gap between this proposed doctrine on the
one hand, and actual capabilities on the other.
As Godwin points out, the lack of any space-based
reconnaissance or early warning systems means
that Beijing's command and control system does
not have the ability in real time to determine
the size and origin of the attack, making it difficult
to determine what kind of response is required--an
essential component of the more sophisticated
versions of limited deterrence found in Chinese
military journals.151
Johnston also notes that actually achieving such
a deterrent posture is not an inevitable outcome,
owing to a number of possible constraints.
We
have little basis for questioning the findings
of Johnston about internal military writings on
nuclear deterrence, especially the striking lack
of discussion of the term "minimal deterrence."
There are a number of possible explanations. Paul
Godwin suggests that Mao Zedong's death in 1976
and the implementation of Deng Xiaoping's military
reforms in the late 1970s permitted China's military
analysts to explore issues of doctrine and strategy
"free from the stultifying requirement to verify
everything they wrote with a literal interpretation
of Mao's writings and statements."152
Second, Godwin points to the increased battlefield
nuclear weapons threat on the Sino-Soviet border,
which "raised the salience of strategic deterrence
and nuclear warfighting to a level it had never
before achieved," encouraging Chinese military
analysts to read extensively in Western theories
and journals.153
Johnston himself offers some additional explanations
in the last few pages of his International
Security article.154
Many of the PLA authors explicitly contrast limited
and minimal deterrence, obviating the possibility
that they have simply renamed the previous doctrine
for bureaucratic purposes. The authors appear
to be well placed to affect the operational doctrine
of the Second Artillery, removing the possibility
of a disjuncture between academic and military
writings, as occurred between the writings of
RAND strategists and the war-winning strategy
of General LeMay at the Strategic Air Command.
If limited deterrence is defined as flexible response,
counterforce warfighting, then perhaps limited
deterrence is the aspirational doctrine
for a future Second Artillery, although the past
production timelines of the missile industry should
sober our expectations of its appearance anytime
soon.
We
would add three more caveats to interpret the
emergence and meaning of an ostensible limited
deterrence posture in China. First, assuming a
continued adherence by China to its testing moratorium,
and the possibility that it will ratify the CTBT
in the future, we question the ability of China
to confidently develop smaller, lighter, and more
accurate nuclear warheads (including potential
MRV and MIRV capability) consistent with the limited
deterrent aspirations described by Chinese analysts
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Second,
the tripartite system we describe possibly is
a confirmation of Johnston's conclusions about
limited deterrence, and we have simply come to
the same place from a different direction. Perhaps
the Chinese, when they looked at the multifunctional
force structure they created, felt that minimal
deterrence no longer could encompass all of the
various defensive and offensive, long-range and
short-range systems in their arsenal. Borrowing
from Confucius, they may have concluded that harmony
could only be restored when the name of the thing
matched the nature of thing, and the product of
this zhengming was "limited deterrence."
Third,
even if we accept limited deterrence as an overarching
aspirational goal of this multifaceted
system, however, we still reject the misinterpretation
of Johnston's writings by some, such as the Cox
Committee and others, to mean that the Chinese
are unquestionably engaged in an aggressive modernization
of their missile forces meant to enable counterforce
warfighting. Indeed, as we have outlined in this
paper, there are legitimate, alternative explanations
for many of the hardware trends in China. Reforms
in mobility, readiness, and C4I infrastructure
are readily and more comprehensively explained
as an attempt to increase survivability from foreign
attack--simply the long-sought confidence of a
credible deterrent, notwithstanding Chinese analytic
differentiation between "limited" and "minimal"
deterrence--and not necessarily to achieve a warfighting,
war-winning strategy. Moreover, as long as the
numbers of the force stay beneath a certain level,
increases in accuracy and multiple warheads do
not pose a threat to American and Russian overwhelming
nuclear superiority. American strategic nuclear
forces, we must remember, still number around
8,000 deployed on 575 ICBMs, 102 strategic bombers,
and 17 SSBNs. Indeed, a single Trident SSBN, carries
more missiles (24) than the entire Chinese ICBM
inventory.
The
troubling countertrend involves the introduction
of theater and national missile defenses into
the equation, dramatically complicating China's
strategic environment. Whereas China previously
faced a world marked by the threat of offense
racing, the post-BMD world will be marked by the
unpredictable interactions of offense racing,
defense racing, and countermeasure/decoy racing.
In this environment, China would be acting rationally
if it accelerated the desultory pace of its missile
modernization, spending more money on relatively
cheap countermeasures and decoys. To develop smaller
warheads for penetrating missile defenses, Beijing
would be acting in its self-interest by opting
out of CTBT and resuming testing. Finally, China
might even seek to foil missile defenses by proliferating
its countermeasures technology to other emerging
nuclear states. All of these trends would reduce
the security of the United States. We hope that
a sober understanding of the nature and purpose
of Chinese nuclear force modernization and doctrinal
evolution could forestall such an outcome.
Chinese
Chemical and Biological Warfare
(CBW) Capabilities
Eric
Croddy
Summary
This
paper divides the two disciplines of chemical
and biological (CB) weaponry. First, it discusses
the PRC view of chemical weapons from a historical
perspective. Next, the immediate question of Chinese
CB weapons is examined, presenting the likely
capabilities of a former or existent offensive
capability in either area, followed by a look
at Chinese CW defensive preparations. The next
section sketches the development of China's chemical
industry, and how its uneven progress could have
affected offensive CW capabilities. Looking at
the state of chemical technology in the PRC can
help to establish a framework to consider the
production of CW agents.
The
BW side of the ledger follows, noting its historical
context, facilities in the PRC that are related
to the science of biological weaponry, and whether
recent allegations of specific BW activity on
the part of China have merit.
The
main points of this study are as follows.
History
- Statements
by PLA officers on CW and its historical development
are often derivative of Western and Russian-language
sources.
-
The
same sources charge that the US military used
chemical weapons against Sino-Korean forces,
including mustard, cyanide, and chloropicrin.
-
The
PRC also alleges the extensive use of BZ (an
incapacitating agent) by the United States
in the Vietnam war.
Chemical
Warfare: China's Offensive Capabilit
-
In
Chinese literature, three CW agents receive
the most attention, and probably for good
reason: blister, blood, and nerve agents.
-
China
possessed a significant quantity of chemical
weapons at least until the late 1980s, although
the amount of CW agent or number of munitions
did not approach anywhere near that of the
former Soviet Union or the United States.
-
The
only chemical delivery systems in China that
could threaten Taiwan directly include ballistic
missiles and possibly aerial munitions.
Chinese
Views on Chemical Weapons and Arms Control
- Two
PLA officers who are also CBW experts are
skeptical that arms inspections can stop the
proliferation of chemical weapons technology
in toto.
-
The
PRC is under the impression that coalition
forces moved some 2,700 tons of weaponized
CW agent near the Persian Gulf during the
Gulf war (1991).
-
With
regard to the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), the PRC probably believes that for
a country to clandestinely produce large amounts
of chemical weapons and not be discovered
is impossible.
The
PLA's Chemical Defense Corps (Fanghuabing)
-
The
PLA's Chemical Defense Corps (CDC) to our
knowledge first undertook offensive operations
during the campaign in the Yijiangshan islands
in January 1955, probably involving obscurant
smoke and perhaps flame throwers.
-
China
was able to indigenously mass produce CW defense
equipment only by the mid-1970s.
-
A
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense
reconnaissance vehicle recently was modified
by the PLA using a chassis from the Beijing-Jeep
line of SUVs.
-
After
1979, a new series of CW defense materiel
was designed, and, by 1987, a total of 50
different standardized models were used by
the PLA.
Medical
Defense Research and Organization
-
During
the 1960s and 1970s, China provided instruction
in chemical defense medicine to students from
Vietnam, North Korea, and Albania.
-
The
official history of military medicine in the
PRC indicates China finally deduced the chemical
formula and composition of VX only by the
1970s.
-
The
two carbamates mentioned in Chinese literature
for nerve agent prophylaxis, Cuixingning
and Cuixingan, offer the PLA effective
nerve agent prophylaxis, possibly superior
to that used in the West.
-
One
of the more important areas for medical defenses
are efforts to protect PLA personnel from
the toxic propellants and off-gases of rockets
and other self-propelled weapons systems.
Development
of China's Chemical Industry: 1978 to Present
-
China's
large oil reserves and petrochemical industry
probably were adequate to manufacture blister
(Lewisite, sulfur, and nitrogen mustards)
in large quantities, perhaps by the mid-1950s.
-
Since
the founding of the PRC, production of elemental
phosphorus for fine chemicals probably was
a very difficult procedure for Chinese chemists
to accomplish.
-
If
China has in fact given up an offensive CW
capability, the PRC does so now when it is
most able to produce a wide range of toxic
nerve agents, and in large quantities.
-
A
pessimistic view is that, in the event of
a major crisis, the PRC would have little
trouble reconstituting a large chemical weapons
arsenal within a relatively short period of
time.
Chinese
Perspectives on BW
- Allegations
that the United States routinely used BW agents
during the Korean war--including smallpox,
plague, typhus, and anthrax--seem to be accepted
as fact within the PLA.
-
The
PRC repeatedly makes assurances that China
has no biological weapons, and categorically
states that "China has never manufactured
nor possessed biological weapons."155
-
Some
specialized equipment has also been fielded
in some unspecified numbers to counter the
threat of BW to PLA troops, including mobile
laboratory units and bioaerosol sampling.
-
By
1984, M.S. degrees were being awarded in the
related specialization of BW defense by the
Military Medical Science University.
-
Nonetheless,
Chinese writings on BW reflect a rather outdated
mode of thinking, with emphasis on destroying
insects and vermin for defense against biological
weapons.
Chemical
weapons: The Chinese Historical View
In
language remarkably similar to that of an East
German source on the subject,156
modern Chinese CW experts refer to the use of
noxious chemicals by prehistoric man, who may
have employed them either to scare off fierce
beasts, or perhaps to smoke out prey ensconced
in caves. Drawing upon the fecund, literary sources
of their own history, the Chinese are also wont
to proffer specific examples:
During
China's ancient period, it is said that the rebel
Chi You created a fog to confuse his southern
enemies. This smoke caused such havoc that were
it not for Emperor Huang Di's "directional chariot"--a
legendary vehicle that could navigate in darkness--the
Northern barbarians might very well have won that
day. In 559 BC, the Qin kingdom is purported to
have poisoned the Jing river, a source that supplied
water for the Jin, Lu, and other warring states,
with the result that many men and horses were
poisoned, forcing their retreat.157
In
1000 AD, a grenade invented in China is mentioned,
consisting of arsenic and crotonaldehyde (badou),
158
capable of poisoning the enemy by means of its
issuing vapors.159
Even the deified Gen. Guang Gong160
who, while attacking the city of Fan, was hit
by a poisoned arrow in the right shoulder, the
toxin going straight to his marrow. Fortuitously,
he was cured by a well-known physician who happened
to be in the area.161
The
Modern Period
Chinese
writings on the subject of CW--admittedly a sparse
selection--closely mirror western
sources, but little time is actually spent on
presenting other historical precedents in use
of chemicals in battle, at least not until World
War I.162
From the latter conflict, according to a PRC book
on military history, major lessons can be drawn,
particularly from the first major chemical attack
at Ypres. One contributing author explains that
the inattention of the British concerning intelligence
that pointed to Germany's plans to attack with
chlorine was a crucial misstep. After all, he
points out, Germany had already tried a similar
assault on Czarist troops earlier, and this should
have been known to the British War Ministry.163
Although
mentioning that White Russian armies used British
CW ordnance against Lenin's troops during the
civil war in 1919,164
Chinese sources do not discuss CW activity that
existed during 'feudal' Republican China by the
various warlords. Why not is difficult to ascertain.
During
the 1920s, Zhao Hengti, Cao Kun, Feng Yuxiang,
and Zhang Zuolin all expressed interest in purchasing
or enlisting foreign firms to help manufacture
chemical weapons. The latter warlord apparently
contracted a facility to be built in Shenyang
by Witte (Germany), contracting Russian and German
chemical engineers to oversee the manufacture
of mustard, phosgene, and chlorine, while Zhao
took delivery of a relatively small shipment of
"gas-producing shells" in August 1921. The warlord
Wu Peifu considered such forms of warfare "inhumane,"165
but by all accounts no widespread use of CW occurred
during this period.
This
(deliberate?) omission in China's semi-official
history of CW might shed light on later, post-1949
activities in chemical agent manufacture. Reliable
sources indicate that, among the former Japanese
chemical weapons being unearthed in modern China
are found some munitions that are not Japanese,
but could have been a legacy of local CW activity
two decades before the war.166
Also, they could have been more modern munitions
produced in the PRC, and dumped out of expediency.
Lessons
From World War II
As
one might expect, the Chinese are bitterly indignant
over Japan's use of CW in World War II. One source
notes that, despite Roosevelt's warning to Japan
in 1942 over their use of such weapons against
the Chinese, the United States never did take
measures to retaliate in kind.167
Although Japan certainly did employ a significant
amount of CW agents during their invasion of China--including
Lewisite, mustard, cyanide, phosgene, and probably
a range of irritating gases--the same Chinese
source probably exaggerates the overall importance
of such warfare in Japan's success against KMT
armies during this period. Quoting an "authoritative
Soviet source," the self-same book claims:
During
its war in China, the Japanese army had prepared
25% of their artillery shells to be chemical munitions,
while 30% of its aerial ordnance were chemical
bombs.168
The
authors, waxing in a nationalistic tone usually
reserved for such historical judgments, also write,
"The Chinese people finally gained victory on
the battlefield, proving that the Chinese race
are exceptional (youxiu), courageous, and
cannot be broken down or subjugated." "Fascist"
Japan used CW over 2,000 times, causing the death
of 90,000, the authors continue, but "it is not
a couple of new weapons here or there, but rather
a just people (zhengyi de renmin) that
will win a war, despite the great menace posed
by chemical weapons."169
The
PLA's more objective view of the European theater
in the Second World War may be somewhat revealing,
although it is clearly derivative of at least
two Western sources, the SIPRI volume and Brown's
Chemical Warfare: A Study in Restraints.170
Observing
that CW did not figure into Heinz Guderian's doctrine
of Blitzkrieg, Chinese authors recount that Hitler
was persuaded not to use chemical weapons against
the Allies in World War II, despite having a "monopoly
on tabun (GA, nerve agent)." Hitler's advisors,
using the open scientific literature as a means
of intelligence gathering, were certain that the
Allies, particularly Russia which had developed
organophosphate chemistry for many years already,
must have superior CW capabilities and no doubt
maintained nerve agent stocks. (In fact, the G-series
nerve agents were unknown to the Allies until
at least 1945.) Figuring this into the potential
costs of an Allied retaliatory attack, Germany's
impressive array of offensive chemical weapons--including
the exceptional power of tabun--became little
more useful than "room decoration."171
The
Korean War
In
an otherwise objective source on chemical weapons,
the Chinese charge that the US military used chemical
weapons against Sino-Korean forces on more than
200 occasions, and lists the following CW agents
by name: mustard, cyanide, chloropicrin, and chloroacetophenone
(CN).
The
authors, Wang Qiang, a captain and now research
professor specializing in chemical defense, and
Yang Qingzhen, a senior colonel and assistant
professor at the National Defense College, write
extensively concerning the United States and the
Korean war, claiming that chemical weapons were
used often by the US Army. Because one of the
purported incidents is recounted in a nationalist
film (available on VCD, incidentally), and is
one of the more popular films at least among the
patriotic mainland Chinese,172
it may be worth quoting at length:
In
line with the summer and autumn offensives, the
US Army made incessant use of poison gas against
the Sino-Korean armies. From June to December
1951, poison was used seven times against our
PVA 19 Corps alone. On the fourth of October,
while defending a 331.8 meter elevation line and
under unremitting attack from the US Army the
141 division of the PVA 47 Army was attacked over
20 times with yellow, purple, and brown-colored
poison agents fired from rocket artillery shells.
Following the explosions there issued forth heavy
sulfur-smelling pall of smoke; those being poisoned
had difficulty in breathing, tearing from the
eyes, and went into an irreversible coma. According
to this it can probably be determined that it
was a mixture of two chemical agents, chloroacetophenone
(ben lu yi tong, benzyl chloro ethyl ketone,
CN) and chloropicrin (lu hua ku). On the
13th of October, during an attack by the 8th Army
of South Korea there were also fired "chemical
agent artillery shells" against the 199th division
of 67 corps of the PVA.
The
US Army's use of chemical weapons was an often
used technique that was particularly effective
against our army's tunnel defense system. Chemical
munitions were usually combined with the use of
explosives, brought in by artillery and military
aircraft. First by destroying with explosives
those fortifications and chemical warfare defenses,
chemical munitions would then be fired, raising
the effectiveness in causing casualties. Sometimes
chemical bombs and smoke munitions would be used
in tandem, disorienting our troops and widening
further the killing zone.
At
the point of a particular offensive in the war,
after capturing one area and coordinated with
a surrounding siege, the American Army hurled
chemical hand grenades in a tunnel with our defending
PVA army inside. At about the middle of June in
1952, the United States puppet army was in Kaesong
[jin cheng] attacking the 100th regiment of the
12th PVA to the east, defending [Guan dai li xi
shan] and the 39th PVA group at a 190.8 meter
elevation southeast of [cheng shan]. As our defenders
were retreating to the tunnels, the US Army hurled
several times hand grenades that utilized sneezing
powder [pentixing duji]. In October, the US Army
during its so-dubbed "Operation Showdown" attack
on Kumhwa against the 45th division of the 15th
PVA [ganling] at 597.9 elevation, tunnel no. 2,
and 537.7 elevation at the Paeksan summit tunnel,
there also were thrown chemical weapon hand grenades
many times. The motion picture "On [ganling] Ridge"
in one vivid scene accurately recreates the use
of chemical weapons by the enemy against the PVA,
reminding us that the victory in Korea was not
going to be easy.
(Curiously,
a mainland book series on the history of major
battles since the PRC's founding makes little
mention of this, at least not in the section devoted
to the Korean conflict.173)
The
PRC generally has taught its citizens, among other
things, that the United States and its "puppet"
ally in the South instigated the Korean war by
invading the north. (This idea is given serious
thought among some Western revisionist historians
as well.) Allegations of CW use by the United
States also could be accepted matter-of-factly
in mainland China, despite no foundation for such
charges.
The
Vietnam War
The
PRC also alleges the extensive use of BZ (an incapacitating
agent) by the United States in the Vietnam war,
to have been delivered using M44 and M43 CW agent
munitions.174
In one of these supposed attacks, a whole platoon
of NVA apparently became anesthetized and were
subsequently wiped out by bayonets. One NVA soldier,
however, was undiscovered and after waking up
after three days reported back to his barracks.175
Of interest here is the fact that the PRC clearly
takes credit for having, along with other unnamed
countries, given the North Vietnamese training
in CW defense, as well as supplying protective
gear and equipment during the conflict against
US forces.176
CW
Offense
China
possessed a significant quantity of CW agents,
and this would include chemical weapon delivery
systems, at least until the late 1980s. The amount
of CW agent or number of munitions, however, probably
did not approach anywhere near that of the former
Soviet Union (40,000 tons, according to the general
consensus).
Former
Soviet chemical munitions could have constituted
an early Chinese inventory, perhaps before 1960.177
If so, these were probably first- and second-generation
CW agents only, such as phosgene, mustard, and
Lewisite. Although certainly potent by themselves,
this chemical ordnance probably was not augmented
by the modern nerve agents, at least not for some
time. The weaponization en masse of the G-series
nerve compounds did not proceed quickly in the
Soviet Union, despite the Soviets having discovered
German tabun and sarin manufacturing facilities
in 1945. Krause and Mallory write that in the
former Soviet Union,
It
is safe to assume that during the 1950s there
was small-scale production of nerve agents such
as soman and sarin and that testing and development
activities took place in order to familiarize
Soviet military officers with the effects of these
new agents. . . . Once again, the Soviet military's
greatest problem was its technological backwardness
in the field of military chemistry. There is evidence
pointing to some "development aid" rendered to
the Soviet Armed Forces by East German military
chemists. However, it seems that these activities
did not start before 1965 or 1966.178
With
Chinese-Soviet relations ever worsening in the
1960s, the same could probably be said of chemical
weapons work in the PRC.
Current
Status of Chemical Weapons in the PRC
The
PRC in submitting its data declaration to the
CWC reported that it destroyed three production
facilities, capable of producing militarily significant
amounts of CW agent (from low hundreds to thousands
of tons). This claim is consistent with PRC statements
that deny any previous production of biological
weapons, but make no categorical claim regarding
past work in CW agents or weapons. The aforementioned
declarations, according to some who were in close
proximity to the offices that handled such documents,
recorded Chinese CW agent-related activities in
voluminous detail. Possible Chinese chemical munitions
could have followed in the Soviet model:
Literature
on Chinese CW in its offensive context is practically
nonexistent. One of the only credible hints surfaced
in 1989, when a marketing manager of Duphar medical
devices was told by mainland Chinese that, in
addition to having nerve agent antidotes, the
PRC possessed much more than they were letting
on: "But we don't know what, and we can't verify
the claim at all," the manager was reported as
saying.179
Another source indicates that a Chinese-manufactured
mustard shell of unknown caliber was recently
found among Albanian munitions, and although containing
live agent it appeared to be intended primarily
for training purposes.180
Finally, a report in March 1997 alleged that Ukraine
sold China 500 tons of sarin left from former
Soviet stocks, in addition to chemical protection
equipment.181
(The original report apparently began with a comment
from a Taiwanese "intelligence officer."182)
This story was vigorously denied by the Ukranian
Ministry of Defense.
The
training and research in handling the effects
of chemical weapons is routine in the PRC, but
to date no defector or other report in the open
literature has elucidated any detail on actual
Chinese chemical munitions or offensive doctrine
in CW. Later in this report, the role of Chinese
medical sciences in CW defense will be treated
in some detail, but for now it is sufficient to
point out that the PRC is cognizant of all known
CW agents, except perhaps novel agents such as
the Russian novichok,183
has developed a nominal defensive infrastructure
to deal with these threats, and is quite knowledgeable
from both indigenous research and second-hand
(foreign) information.
Chinese
literature regarding chemical and biological warfare,
often draws directly from Western sources, and
one can even pinpoint certain passages that were
translated practically word for word, such as
the SIPRI volumes on CBW by Robinson, Leitenberg,
et al. Therefore, when an officer of the PLA suggests
that multiple launched rocket systems (MLRS) offer
the most efficient means of delivering CW agent,
he is not necessarily speaking from experience
or drawing from any doctrinal axiom. He is just
as likely quoting directly from the aforementioned
SIPRI volume on chemical weapons.184
However, he does point out that "at present, the
United States and Russia both have this type of
weapon system to fire CW agent rockets."185
From the Chinese point of view, and considering
their intimate knowledge of Soviet MLRS capabilities,
the CW threat from the ersatz Soviet Union must
have been an especially unsettling one.
And
once the Soviet Union shrank back to pre-Revolution
borders, and even now is cooperating militarily
with the PRC, the Chinese apparently have little
incentive to maintain an offensive CW capability.
The remaining land-based opponent, India, could
pose a threat to China, but would this justify
holding on to a form of warfare that does not
coincide with the new revolution in Chinese military
affairs? We cannot say for certain, but it does
not seem likely.
As
for Taiwan, the only delivery systems remaining
would be ballistic missiles and possibly aerial
munitions--a Chinese concept for a binary nerve
bomb that could be dropped over Taiwan will be
addressed shortly. With China already armed with
nuclear warheads, however, offensive chemical
weaponry utilized against Taiwan seems redundant,
possibly anathema, particularly when considering
their shared past and kinship ties. At least two
PLA officers regarded the use of chemical weapons
to be equivalent to employing nuclear war:
Chemical
weapons could be the fuse to ignite a nuclear
war, for as soon as mass casualty weapons such
as CW are used, there is no reason why nuclear
weapons won't be as well. Once CW begins, it will
be just like releasing the evil spirits from Pandora's
box, eventually slipping towards the abyss of
nuclear war.186
When
it comes to the actual chemical weapons themselves,
we can identify some of the impressions of the
PLA, however. In some respects these are surprising
to an American observer
-
Three
main agents receive the most attention, and
probably for good reason: blister, blood,
and nerve agents. Blister agents, or vesicants,
include mustard and Lewisite and are standard
for CW arsenals. Sulfur mustard in particular
requires a low level of technology investment
compared to nerve agents, is well suited for
a country well endowed with petroleum, and
has a proven track record of effectiveness
in battle. Nerve agents, as explained in the
chemical industry section below, would have
presented a challenge to early PRC technological
capabilities, but this situation has changed
dramatically in the past two decades.
A
1985 CBW defense encyclopedia reported that
"the Russian military has been equipped with
thickened mustard gas for many years now, and
recently it has also come to possess thickened
soman."187
As a means to counter such threats, viscous
preparations of nerve agents--the Chinese cite
methacrylate polymers and tributyl phosphate188
as possible thickeners for CW agents such as
soman as well as mustard--would have given China
the full range of persistent application of
chemicals needed to slow down a Soviet armored
advance. Although it may very well be that China
was not able to mass produce VX until the 1970s
(see medical research below), the utilizing
tributyl phosphate--a compound that is easily
produced189--as
a thickener would have afforded sufficient viscous
character to other Chinese nerve agent preparations.
The
PRC, however, was certain to be aware of Soviet
preparations for operating in contaminated environments,
and could not hope to wreak the kind of havoc
on the Red Army with CW agents alone. However,
in line with the Maoist "lure the tiger into
the cave" stratagem, ground contamination with
viscous agents would force the enemy to suit
up, constantly reconnoiter with detection equipment,
and then intermittently halt to decontaminate
equipment and possibly the troops themselves.
This situation could have given PLA forces breathing
room and time to regroup. One Chinese source
chose VX and mustard as illustrative examples
for slowing an enemy's advance, canalizing opposing
forces, and for area denial, especially against
mechanized forces.190
(Such tactics go back to the early Soviet 1936
Provisional Field Service Regulations.191)
In
the latter vein, the PLA, and by extension its
CW defensive training regimens, emphasize the
decipherment of changes in the color of surrounding
fauna to determine what CW agent may have been
used by the enemy and has taken the trouble
to photograph such training. (For example, VX
on certain plants such as floating lilies or
eggplant flowers will turn the original pink
or purple colors to blue-green hues, sarin turns
purple/red petals to pink, Lewisite purple/red
flowers to a fuller red color, etc.192)
The
more surprising part of PRC writings on the
subject is the matter of cyanide, specifically
hydrocyanic acid. This emphasis surely stems
from the influence of former Soviet attitudes
toward its practicality as a deliverable weapon.
This weapon was long eschewed in the West. But
World War II tests conducted by the Red Army
showed that--provided the user is willing to
fly slow and low enough in the face of enemy
flak--HCN can be laid down in a dense enough
concentration by aerial release.193
HCN production, also, would not have necessitated
advanced technology nor great cost, again, relative
to nerve agent production, and would have found
significant dual use in the civilian sectors
(in its potassium or sodium salt form for gold
mining, electroplating, etc.). Although HCN
is an excellent "knock down" gas, it is nearly
entirely dose dependent in terms of toxicity,
and either kills very quickly or has little
effect. It is best used against unprotected,
front line troop concentrations, for it has
little staying power once applied.
We
do not know where the PRC got the idea, but
apparently China understands that the Soviet
Union was producing binary chemical weapons
as early as 1978. This conclusion could have
been reached from the open literature on the
subject, figuring that the technology was hardly
a secret by that time.194
Drawing from other Western sources, the Chinese
also make some hay concerning the theoretical
binary construction of a KB-16 (nitrogen mustard
analogue) munition, utilizing a relatively nontoxic,
tertiary amine compound and a separate container
of nitric acid.195
In
1990 Rosita Dellios pointed out that, as far
as China was concerned, binary munitions possess
five distinctive features that are compatible
to a "people's war under modern conditions,"
namely, safety in storage, delivery, suited
to nuclear-capable systems, extended shelf life,
and "suited to the people's war requirements
of surprise and deception."196
The PLA also points out the much safer production,
easier logistics, handling, and storage of binary
components. At least the latter points are valid.
The drawbacks, as far as the PRC is concerned,
is that the components do not yield full product
(the US 155 mm had a 70-percent yield) and the
reaction between difluor and the alcohol components
usually take about 8-10 seconds to complete.197
This delay puts a damper on fielding direct
fire weapons such as the MLRS, although certainly
most large caliber howitzers and gliding bombs
(see below) largely would be unaffected by this
constraint. Furthermore, unspecified side-reactant
by products of binary mixing make detection
by the enemy much easier.198
Although not a true binary, Iraq made use of
a similar, "quick mix" method using difluor,
and combined cyclohexonal (to form GF) and isopropyl
(sarin) in bombs just before being delivered.
Unlike
the West, which sees binary chemical weapons,
particularly the VX "Bigeye" munition, as a
rather expensive boondoggle, the PRC takes a
different view of this delivery system. One
Chinese source reports that the costs associated
with the US 155 mm, binary sarin chemical projectile
to be 25 times less expensive than the unitary
munition.
The
diagram
shows a conceptual diagram of a binary bomb,
possibly with the Haiqing cruise missile body
in mind. However, like much of PRC writings
on the subject this, too, is probably derivative
of a Western illustration showing a VX binary
system.199
The
main difference between the latter and the Chinese
rendering is that the PRC depicts two liquid
systems rather than QL and solid, elemental
sulfur (plus catalyst, etc.). Also, the PRC
diagram indicates a device at the aft that would
issue forth the aerosol, probably sarin. An
Haiqing missile as the delivery system would
afford more than 500 kg--possibly much more
if the bomb glides and no longer requires propellant--of
difluor/alcohol fill. With 70-percent yield,
we would expect that (approximately) 175 kg
of actual nerve agent would be delivered over
a target. Because sarin is so volatile (as is
soman, a theoretical alternative), however,
the bomb must fly low and slow to make an effective
line source pattern.
China
and the Chemical Weapons Convention
Since
ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention (the
treaty coming into force in 1997), and having
submitted its declarations to the executive body
responsible for verification, the PRC ostensibly
has no chemical weapons. Also an official from
the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeated
this claim to me.200
China
is displeased because it perceives lack of benefit
from joining the CWC. An Iranian official stated
that "China sees a lot of liability with little
benefit in being a State Party." Although this
was said in the context of inspections, the PRC
clearly is disappointed that it is not obtaining
the technology, assistance, and bonuses it anticipated
gaining from joining the Convention. Perhaps China
expected more after having destroyed its remaining
chemical arsenal, although Beijing's stockpile
probably was quite small.
Chinese
Views on Chemical Weapons and Arms Control
Chemical
weapons could be the fuse to ignite a nuclear
war, for as soon as mass casualty weapons such
as CW are used, there is no reason why nuclear
weapons won't be as well. Once CW begins, it
will be just like releasing the evil spirits
from Pandora's box, eventually slipping towards
the abyss of nuclear war.
--Capt.
Wang Qiang and Col. Yang Qingzhen201
The
handbook on chemical weaponry written by two PLA
officers is skeptical that arms inspections can
stop the proliferation of chemical weapons technology.
These authors state that a fundamental concern
is that the basic components involved in manufacturing
binary chemical munitions are not far removed
from technology used in industry. No matter how
many intrusive inspections are carried out, they
cannot stop the basic research conducted by civilians,
thus making the spread of such CW technology easy.202
As chemical weapons proliferate, the possibility
of their being used increases when a nation, equipped
with a CW apparatus, is pitted against another
country that has none.
China's
View of the Gulf War (1990-91)
The PRC seems to be under the impression that,
in addition to 1,000 tactical nuclear warheads
deployed by the United States,203
coalition forces also moved some 2,700 tons of
weaponized CW agent near the Persian Gulf, posing
a "name-brand recognition" type of threat to Saddam
Hussein. The latter claim, of course, cannot be
supported by the available evidence,204
but the PRC believes this deployment of chemical
weapons played an important role in the course
of the war, demonstrating that CW is "by no means
inferior" to high-tech weaponry.205
Referring
to the export control efforts of CW precursors
and equipment by Australia Group, the authors
above suggest that:
Although
many countries have adopted these measures, it
is doubtful that they will be effective. Because
companies want to earn high profit margins, they
are not going to concern themselves with governmental
prohibitions, and will secretly export these kinds
of materials. The reality is that nations are
helped by foreign business, supplying them with
the materials, equipment, and technology to acquire
a chemical weapons capability.
A
solution, they suggest, is to establish chemical-weapons-free
zones.206
Reiterating
the futility of stopping the proliferation of
CW-related technical know-how, the authors nonetheless
concede that, if international agreements like
the CWC use intrusive inspections (yange de
hecha cuoshi), a country will have great difficulty--perhaps
near impossibility--clandestinely producing large
amounts of chemical weapons without being discovered.207
The
PLA's Chemical Defense Corps (Fanghuabing)
History
and Defensive Materiel
The 8th Route Army in 1939 established
a Chemical Group (huaxuedui) at the Chinese
People's anti-Japanese Military College. The group
received rudimentary instruction, probably from
Soviet instructors, on measures to defend against
Japanese chemical warfare.208
According
to Maj. Gen. Jiang Zhizeng--chief of the Chemical
Defense Department of the PLA in 1989 and a significant
contributor209
to an encyclopedic treatment of NBC defense--during
the period following the war for "liberation"
separate chemical groups were established in the
7th, 9th and 13th columns of the PLA's East China
field army. "According to the recollections of
comrade Liu Baicheng," writes General Jiang, "the
2nd Field Army established a large Chemical Group."
On 11 December 1950, following the personal approval
of Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai,210
the first Chemical Defense Corps school was founded,
leading to the formation of the Chemical Defense
Corps (CDC). Its earliest instructors at this
point were former Nationalist officers who had
prior training in CW defense, and who had apparently
"revolted from the KMT."211
In 1951 an Oxford-educated chemist, Dr. Huang
Xinmin, left England to direct the chemistry department
in the PRC, along with several Soviet advisers,
in "protection" against CW agents.212
With
regard to the allegations that chemical weapons
were used during the Korean war (see also below),
the aforementioned preparation in CW defense prior
to China's involvement could have made the PLA
overly amenable to suggestion. When aggressive
use of artillery, napalm, and aerial bombing hit
the Chinese People's Volunteer Army during the
war, the resultant off gases and suffocating smokes
no doubt had the semblance of real chemical weaponry.
These factors, together with posturing and outright
fabrication for propaganda purposes (which are
similar to charges that the United States used
BW), are the best explanation of why the PLA continues
to assert that the United States used CW (for
more on the Korean war, see "History" below).
The
wholesale import of Soviet-made CW defensive gear,
including detectors, clothing, decontamination
equipment, smoke generators, and flame throwers
began in 1953.213
The latter two types of equipment would be deployed
as early as 1955, according to General Jiang.
In
December 1954, Zhang Aiping was ordered by Mao
Zedong to prepare an assault on Yijiangshan island.214
Full-scale military operations were conducted
during 18-20 January 1955, to seize control of
the Yijiangshan island off of the coast of Zhejiang
Province. General Zhang noted that "this was the
first organized operation in which sea, air, and
land forces worked in concert," and quickly finished
off remnants of KMT soldiers (Jiang's Bandits)
in this rather lopsided affair.215
These are the first known operations for the nascent
PLA's Chemical Defense Corps.
A
grainy photograph published in PLA Pictorial
shows troops boarding landing craft, wearing protective
suits of some kind, and many carrying portable
tanks on their backs, consistent with portable
smoke generators or flame throwers.216
Upon the quick victory by the PLA, a congratulatory
telegram to the front lines was sent by the commander
in chief of the East China army (presumably from
Zhang Aiping).217
Bingqi
Zhishi has it that on 19 April 1955, the Central
Military Commission named Zhang Xigeng as the
first minister of the Ministry of Chemical Defense.
General Jiang, however, uses the date January
1956 for its founding.218
In any event, General Jiang states the mission
of the CDC in this way:
[The
Chemical Defense Corps] is to guarantee the protection
of our army while under battle conditions that
include nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
It is composed of troops in the CD (surveying,
reconnaissance, decontamination), those responsible
for flame throwers, smoke generation, etc. Among
the major responsibilities are: Directing the
use of collective protection against chemical
weapons, carrying out of survey and reconnaissance
for nuclear radiation and chemical analysis, testing
for agents and infection, the neutralization of
poisons and infection, providing an organized
and assured obscurant smoke, as well as directing
the coordinated use of flame throwers with advancing
troops in combat.219
A
Chinese NBC defense manual dating from 1957 grouped
CW agents in four categories, the systemic poisons,
asphyxiating gases, blister agents, and irritants.
Probably in the interest of simplicity for its
intended--chiefly juvenile--audience, nerve agents
were not mentioned by name. They were listed along
with cyanide under the heading of systemic or
blood agents, referring to them as being "odorless
and colorless liquids, very poisonous, not very
easy to detect, demanding that special caution
be taken." It also gave simple instructions on
how to build shelters, don protective CW suits,
and decontaminate one's skin.220
By
1959, of the 20-odd different types of CW defense
materiel formerly imported from the Soviet Union,
the PRC became 90 percent self-sufficient in their
development and manufacture. For example, in the
mid-1960s, the Model 64 respirator mask was an
indigenous product.221
In
1971 the Chinese developed a detector (type 65)
alarm for organophosphorus (OP) compounds (i.e.,
nerve agents). Although the type 65 OP detector
is praised for its easy use and sensitivity to
detect nerve agents at a considerable distance,
like Western counterparts it is prone to interference222
(and probably susceptible to false alarms). Nonetheless,
the 65 and type 75 testing kit (analogous to the
M256A1) are the current CW agent detection accouterments
used by the PLA.223
But
the ability to indigenously mass produce CW defense
equipment, at least enough to outfit significant
numbers of personnel, was achieved only by the
mid-1970s, when the imported and copied Soviet-style
equipment finally began fading out of service.
In 1975, mechanized chemical and radiological
surveying became more specialized, and CW defensive
gear became standardized for the battlefield.
A CW defense reconnaissance vehicle was modified
using a chassis from the Beijing-Jeep line of
SUVs, the same outfitter for the Gonganbu (Public
Security Bureau), among others. This vehicle represented
the first generation of laboratory testing on
wheels. Although personnel must get in and out
of the vehicle to perform field recon, the PLA
could see many improvements in automation.224
Combining
appropriate gas masks, individual chemical testing
kits, and CW agent alarms, the Chinese Navy, Air
force, and Second Artillery were already equipped
at this time with CW defense equipment. After
1979, a new series of CW defense materiel was
designed, and by 1987 a total of some 50 different
standardized models were used by the PLA.225
Food
and Water Testing
Various testing methods were supplied in kit form
to examine provisions for CW agent contamination,
beginning with the types 59 and 62 testing kits
that were put together in the 1950s. Later, when
the toxins VX and BZ came to light, improvements
were made in the new type 67 kit supplied to the
PLA. Later in the 1980s, a more comprehensive
list of CW agents could be tested for in food
and water by the type 85, and a kit especially
designed for water quality testing was developed
in the Shenyang type 81, which is well-suited
for use by mobile armed forces.226
Gas
Masks: Measure Twice, Cut Once
The Chinese military depended upon used and foreign-made
gas masks going into the Korean war. The PLA notes
that in the beginning it encountered an immediate
problem, namely, the gas masks did not appear
to fit the Chinese face very well. The PLA worked
hard to find a solution:
It
was necessary to make it suitable for the shape
of the head that typifies our nation's race. In
1958, data was culled from the measuring of some
40,000 PLA soldiers heads, resulting in a lightweight
and very protective model 64 mask.227
Later,
types 65 and 69 masks were made for more flexible
use on the battlefield, the latter model having
activated charcoal in its filter. An additional
model 87 was introduced, along with one specifically
crafted for rocket propellants, the model 75.228
No. 75 is considered a "special-purpose mask,"
having a filter/canister construction best suited
for personnel who are stationed near rocket propellants
and fumes. It is also designed for tank crews
and use in aircraft by connecting directly with
the oxygen system.229
Chemical
Suits
The first-generation protective garments in the
PLA were and still are the venerable, 1966-vintage
butylene polymer rubber suit. Having strong resistance
to acids, mustard, VX, etc., and weighing some
2.5 km,230
this suit must be terribly uncomfortable, especially
in the many hot days of the year in southern China.
The CDC seems to be using this suit for most of
its specialized training and operations. For battle
front troops, mercifully, a gas-permeable suit
layered with activated charcoal has been made
available since its introduction in 1982.
Decontamination
Equipment/Vehicles
Having noticed the former Soviet TMC-65 turbine
engine platform--basically a jet engine that uses
the force of water to decontaminate vehicles--the
Chinese seem to have adapted their own. Whereas
the Soviet system did not necessarily require
special decontamination fluid231
or hypochlorite solutions--heat and kinetics of
the spray are probably violent enough for the
purpose of sustaining combat operations--the PLA
includes a tank of decon fluid in its diagram.
This "Jet Exhaust Decontamination Vehicle" vents
with a flow rate of 400 meters/second, with vapor
immediately out of the nozzle reaching temperatures
of over 500¼C, and reducing to 200¼C upon reaching
the intended surface. Onboard computerized control
can adjust the rate of fuel (diesel) burn, heating,
etc.
One
of the more interesting aspects of this arrangement,
which includes a wireless automated control and
a secondary driver's booth, is that the same engine
can be used for laying down smoke screens. Apparently,
the secondary operator changes the intake to allow
supply of smoke-generating fuel into the turbine.232
We
do not know if this endeavor represents a serious
effort to deploy such vehicles in large numbers
in the PLA forces, or even within the smaller
organization of the CDC. Nonetheless, Chinese
authors on this topic are apologetic concerning
this particular need:
Although
today the world is gradually moving towards a
peaceful trend, the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) has been signed, and despite the reduction
in risk from chemical attack, there is still an
unending research and improvement in decontamination
equipment.233
Decontamination
fluids used in the CDC are made up of the usual
types found in other armies, the PLA often utilizes
a 3:2 ratio of calcium hypochlorite and calcium
hydroxide, in addition to bleach, and chlorides
of ammonia are especially recommended for dealing
with V-agent contamination.234
Individual
Decontamination and First Aid Kit
In 1958 the PRC copied the Soviet-type "IPP-51"
decontamination kit, and later developed types
58, 63, 71, and model 1-0 for cleaning skin exposed
to CW agents. Other models, No. 14 and 25 in particular,
were specifically formulated to handle V-agent
threats.235
The
modern kit contains pharmaceutical preparations
for countering the effects of nerve agents, and
a moistened, chemically impregnated cloth for
decontaminating skin. A cylinder holds tablets,
presumably for a carbamate, and beneath it is
a spring-loaded atropine injector. Although the
main purpose of this kit is, again, for nerve
agent first aid, it is also recommended for decontaminating
other agents, such as mustard and Lewisite.236
Chemical
Warfare Defense and the Chinese Antichemical Corps
Medical
Defense Research and Organization
The following are highlights from the official
history of Chinese military medicine.
China's
development of a professional cadre to treat CW
casualties took form in 1951, when the first Military
Medical Sciences Learning Hospital was founded.
Expertise in medical defense against CW was initially
brought to China from the Soviet Union, and the
first semester of high-level training in this
area began with 45 students in 1954. Early emphasis
on mustard agent (the king of CW agents) soon
gave way to even more serious attention on the
nerve toxins, and Chinese staff of the General
Hygiene Department (Zonghou Weshengbu)
visited the Soviet Union for advanced studies.
In 1958, the disciplines of military toxicology,
pharmacology, and biochemistry were combined into
a Pharmacological and Toxicology Research Institute
headed by Yang Tenghan, also referred to as the
Chemical Defense Medical Science Research Institute,
(and later changed in 1987 to the Toxicology and
Pharmacology research Institute). Nationwide conferences
that dealt with military chemical defense were
held in 1961, 1974, and 1979.
In
the beginning of the 1960s, owing to "strategic
demands," a Chemical Defense Testing Unit (Fanghua
Jianyan Fendui) was formed, shortened to "Fangyandui,"
and later called the Chemical Defense Medical
Science Specialized Unit (Fanghua Yixue Zhuanye
Fendui). Its duties were to assist in evaluating
conditions on the borders or within the country,
to quickly ascertain threats and provide medical,
testing, and other support for chemical defense
medicine. Depending upon their anticipated requirements,
each military region formed its own version of
this type of organization.237
With
gradual improvements in technology, and the accumulated
scientific knowledge, chemical defense medicine
became even more important in the 1960s and 1970s.
Qualitative improvements were made in the general
treatment of mustard casualties, ways to counteract
incapacitating agents, treatment for poisoning
from cyanide compounds, as well as prophylactic
defense and antidotes for nerve agents. In addition
to packets made for skin decontamination, a testing
kit was also designed for alerting one to the
presence of contaminated food and water provisions.
By 1963, the realization that the irreversibility
of enzyme by nerve agents due to aging also led
to renewed efforts at finding better acetylcholinesterase
reactivators. During the 1960s and 1970s, instruction
in chemical defense medicine was provided to students
from Vietnam, North Korea, and Albania, with specialists
sent to help these and other countries establish
their own testing laboratories.238
Along
with investigation of therapeutic herbs to counteract
the toxic effects of CW agents, in the 1980s enzyme
immobilization indicator technology was developed,
along with more advanced spectrographic, immunoassay,
and ionization-based (fangshe) detection
systems. During this time the PLA also sent abroad
specialists to study the problem of treating the
toxic effects of nerve agents, communicating with
the experts in the field in the United States,
Great Britain, France, Japan, Switzerland, Australia,
among others. From 1971 to 1989, the General Logistics
and Sanitation Departments cultivated 81 specialists
in the area of chemical defense medicine. In 1989,
19 Masters degrees were awarded in hygiene and
chemical defense medicine.
Chinese
Research in Defense Against Nerve Agents
For protection against nerve agent exposure, three
main types of compounds are commonly used, both
before and after the fact.
Carbamates
are reversible inhibitors of acetylcholinesterase
(AChE), and protect the enzyme from irreversible
(aging) or long-term impairment by the G-series
and VX. Because soman, for example, can age enzymes
in a matter of minutes, carbamate prophylaxis
is especially important. Pyridostigmine bromide
(PB) is used in the United States and most other
countries, but physostigmine, a naturally occurring
carbamate found in the calabar bean, also is effective,
although it probably is of higher toxicity. (In
my view, current speculation that PB has a role
in Gulf War Syndrome is completely unfounded.)
Oximes
are administered after nerve agent intoxication
to remove the nerve agent from the enzyme, hopefully
revitalizing enough AChE to put the victim on
the road to recovery. Pralidoxime HCL (Protopam
Chloride, 2-PAM-Cl) is used in the autoinjector
supplied to the United States and NATO, but may
be replaced in the future with more effective
oximes.
Anticholinergic
compounds are those that block acetylcholine,
restoring some normalcy following nerve agent
poisoning. Atropine is the drug of choice
for military chemical defense, although other
similar compounds could be used, depending on
the level of perceived risk.
Chinese
development of antidotes for nerve agents may
be broken down into three stages: 1) the initial
treatment regimen typed No. 11, consisting of
atropine and an oxime, etc., 2) efforts to find
treatment for soman poisoning, and 3) general
efforts to raise the capabilities of treatment,
made more pressing by reports of the V-series
of agent revealed from foreign reports in the
1970s.
With
regard to the V-series of nerve agents, open literature
referring to the basic structure of VX goes back
to at least 1958.239
Between the actual date of discovery (1952), and
its open publication revealed in 1975,240
Soviet military intelligence (GRU) probably had
filched the basic formula in 1955.241
But regardless of how it actually obtained the
information on V-agents, the Soviet Union then
proceeded to replace much of its G agents with
its own structural isomer, VR-55 by 1960.242
Are we to believe that, at least according to
the official history of the Chinese military medical
sciences, the PLA pharmacology and toxicology
department only became aware of the details of
VX by the 1970s?
The
chemical formula and composition of VX was finally
deduced in China after considerable laboratory
investigation. Finally, China subsequently introduced
the type 85 emergency antidote for treating nerve
agent intoxication, "bringing the PRC to international
standards." This effort, along with work in carbamates
for protecting acetylcholinesterase from the effects
of nerve agents, led to the exhaustive research
of more than 15,000 compounds, 2,000 of which
were novel formulations. Of these, more than 10
were shown to be effective, some of them typed
as No. 11, No. 60, No. 68, No. 51, No. 73, No.
85, and others for emergency treatment of nerve
agent poisoning, No. 85 simultaneously winning
a second-level national prize as well as an award
for advancing military technology.
In
terms of enzyme protection with carbamates, traditional
medicine yielded Cuixingning and Cuixingan.
As work on natural sources of carbamates began
in 1968, in the realm of enzyme reactivation,
Song Hungqiang, et al., synthesized two new types
of oxime compounds in cooperation with the Beijing
Medical Pharmacological Industry Research Institute.
These two compounds showed effectiveness against
soman poisoning, surpassing international standards.
For blocking acetylcholine, Zhang Qijie and others
finally was able to synthesize new compounds,
among them one that is found in traditional medicine.243
The
two carbamates referenced above, Cuixingning
and Cuixingan, are worth mentioning for
they offer the PLA effective nerve agent prophylaxis,
possibly superior to that of pyridostigmine bromide
used in Israel, the United States, and many other
Western countries. Lieske, et al., credit Ahmed
and Robinson with having first prepared the following
compound, referred to in the Chinese literature
most commonly as Cuixingning, but also "youselin,"
and "Jiebiling" in the 1997 Junshi Yixue
Cidian.244
The
Chinese claim, however, that the latter compound
was first synthesized in China during the early
1960s.245
A study performed at the US Army Research Institute
of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD) found that Cuixingning
showed promise as an effective prophylactic for
nerve agents, while also having an acceptable
index of toxicity.
Another
compound, Cuixingan, is also mentioned
in Chinese writings on CW defense.
Jiebling
Cuixingan
Regarding
this compound, the Chinese claim that:
The
pharmaco-toxicological action of cui-xing-an is
the same as that of physostigmine and cui-xing-ning,
but its toxicity is only one-tenth that of cui-xing-ning.
The nicotinic action of cui-xing-an and its effects
on the cardiovascular system are milder that those
of cui-xing-ning.246
Little
information exists in Western literature, however,
to support such claims.
In
the field of anticholinergics, Chinese investigators
undertook substantial research on herbs and other
traditional forms of medicine. As early as 1959,
the PRC copied from abroad an atropine autoinjector,
developing later a partially automated, ampoule-style
injector mechanism, built with an extruded plastic
injector. A fully automated injector has been
supplied since the early 1980s, and the PLA Veterinary
College successfully developed an OP antidote
syringe (jielinzhen) for animals. Additional
work through the 1980s included the elucidation
of the mechanism of nerve agents, including soman
and VX, as well as work in the area of using hydrolyzing
enzymes to protect against lethal doses of soman.
Many clinical trials involving this knowledge
were performed on the personnel, reflecting a
"a spirit of selflessness" on the part of the
researchers. Such tests in chemical defense medicine
alone were performed in individuals on some 3,000
occasions.247
Blister
Agents (Vesicants)
Recognizing the "Great Old Difficulty" in treating
mustard agent casualties, Chinese chemical defense
medicine is resigned--much like everyone else--to
the fact that supportive care is at present the
only realistic course of action. A complete report
elucidating mustard's effects on the human body,
including its comprehensive toxicity, was produced
in the 1980s. The official history does, however,
refer to a typed No. 14 ointment designed to absorb
and decontaminate exposed skin to vesicants, and
the Kunming Military District's 60th Hospital
and Medical Research Institute treated five serious
mustard casualties, four of them "successful"
(presumably, the fifth did not survive.) These
casualties may very well have been caused by Chinese
mustard, as the history refers to "other regional
hospital departments having treated victims of
mustard from leftover Japanese munitions, gaining
much experience in the process."
The
PRC seems to have adopted its own mercaptan type
of treatment for Lewisite exposure, a certain
dithiosodium butyrate, different from British
Anti Lewisite (BAL) and the Soviet variety. As
a CW agent, however, Lewisite does not receive
as much attention as does mustard. 248
Incapacitating
Agents
When it was learned that the United States had
developed BZ weapons in the early 1960s, the PRC
undertook efforts to characterize the compound
and to develop treatments for BZ intoxication.
BZ (3-quinuclidynil benzilate) was prepared in
China by 1965, the official history noting that
the compound was finally revealed in the open
literature in 1972. In the 1970s, the Military
Medical Science University, the Jinan Military
Region's 88th Hospital, as well as the PLA General
Medical Institute successfully used "Jiebiling"
[the aforementioned carbamate, Cuixingning] to
counter the effects of BZ poisoning. (Treatment
in the United States for anticholinergic poisoning,
such as Jimson's weed, calls for the judicious
administration of a carbamate (physostigmine),
if only for diagnostic purposes.)
Reports
also surfaced that work overseas was being done
on what were termed "body incapacitants" (Qutixing
shinengji) in the mid-1960s, substances that
would cause personnel to become numb and paralyzed
(mabi tanhuan). These might be references
to fentanyl and its derivatives. The Chemical
Defense Medicine Research Institute then speedily
researched effective antidotes in the event such
agents were to be encountered.
Blood
Agents (Systemic Poisons)
In 1961 the Seventh Military Medical University
Medical College Protection Teaching Research Institute,
together with the Chemical Defense Medicine Research
Institute of the Medical University College of
Sciences, carried out investigations into treating
cyanide casualties, both HCN and cyanogen chloride
(CK). Novel treatments were researched between
1970 and 1980, including the use of 4-dimethyl
amino-aniline [4-erjiajianjifen] and p-amino benzylacetone.
In the 1980s an antidote kit was developed, typed
the No. 85 anticyanide injector. The No. 85 is
also used in industrial and shipboard settings
where accidents involving cyanide might occur.249
Asphyxiants
Phosgene and diphosgene present similar problems
to mustard in that very little exists in therapy
other than supportive care. In the 1960s, the
Fourth Military Medical University's Protection
Teaching Institute laboratory emphasized research
in the choking gases, discovering, among other
things, that vitamin C lessened the severity of
pulmonary edema. Some 70 clinical trials were
carried out in investigative drug therapies, many
showing promise. Treatment for phosgene and diphosgene
gas, including rapid diagnosis, also was investigated
thoroughly by the Fourth Military Medical University
and the Lanzhou Military Region Medical University
Research Institute.250
Protection
Against Rocket Propellants and Off-Gases
One of the more important areas for medical defenses
was undertaken simultaneously with China's push
for strategic aerospace weapons, primarily to
protect personnel from the toxic propellants and
off-gases, and especially to provide expertise
in protection from "harmful gases produced from
underground nuclear explosions."251
In
the latter part of the 1950s, the upper echelons
directed scientists to fully elucidate the dangers
of unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH), and
in 1960 the Military Medical Science Institute
established a Rocket Propellant Toxicological
Research Laboratory, with a staff of about 20.
The institute focused attention on protecting
eyes and skin from possible exposures, decontaminating
tissue safely, and treating casualties.252
Determining that UDMH could be used safely in
aerospace vehicles was considered a major achievement,
winning the institute a 1965 National Discovery
award. Additional toxicological research institutes
conducted studies on decaborane, another propellant,
and in 1966 Zhu Kun, et al., found that Vitamin
B-6 was helpful in treating UDMH exposures.
As
the strategic missile program grew even larger
in the 1970s, solid fuel propellants also demanded
toxicological study, including those compounds
used in missiles and torpedoes. Both the National
Defense Science Council and the SAC each established
medical defense groups (fangjiandui) and
laboratories (fangjiansuo) dedicated to
addressing the problems of toxic propellants.253
Development
of China's Chemical Industry: 1978 to Present
The
PRC's Chemical Industry Base
For a nation to manufacture chemical weapons,
a sound chemical industry base is obviously advantageous,
particularly for the unfettered supply of important
precursors and intermediates. It becomes even
more important when the production of militarily
significant quantities (in the hundreds of tons)
of CW agent fill are required. During World War
I, first-generation CW agents (chlorine and phosgene)
were originally seconded from German dye industry
stocks: The gas attacks at Ypres in April 1915,
for example, required roughly 500 tons of chemical
agent,254
and represented half of Germany's supply of chlorine
for that year.
At
the same time, some countries can do much more
with a lot less. Iraq, for example, is not among
the most highly developed nations in terms of
a comprehensive chemical industry. However, its
large phosphate reserves and imported technology
(e.g., a French phosphorus trichloride manufacturing
plant) enabled it to produce, with the possible
exception of Soman (GD),255
every known CW nerve agent and in large quantities
(including an obscure chemical, cyclosarin or
GF). In terms of its own chemical industry base,
a similar picture could be drawn for China, with
one major difference, namely, the lack of foreign
technology and the withdrawal of Soviet assistance,
especially during the years 1959-78.
Although
today the PRC could be ranked seventh in the world
in terms of total GDP, its level of technological
competitiveness is still rated much lower; by
one account China ranks 28th.256
No Chinese conglomerate appears in the top 50
chemical producers in 1998, for example. Taiwan's
Formosa Plastics comes in at 46 (with Chevron
following at 47).257
More recently, the nurturing of China's chemical
industry has brought some rather spectacular results.
To
understand better the environment in which the
PRC stands in terms of CW weaponry, assessing
its past and present levels of chemical technology
is useful, particularly since the Sino-Soviet
schism in 1959. This section sizes up the development
of China's chemical industry, with emphasis on
its course since the founding of the PRC.
Background
on Chinese Chemistry: History
In 1928, an Institute of Chemistry was originally
founded in Shanghai as part of Academica Sinica,
was subsequently transferred to Kunming during
the war, and eventually returned to Shanghai following
hostilities. The Peking Academy also contained
under its auspices an Institute of Chemistry that
was formed a year after its Shanghai counterpart.
In the late 1930s the Chinese Chemical Society
had a membership of about 2,000, and by 1950 there
were 218 Chinese research institutes devoted to
chemistry.258
Not
surprisingly, the Soviet Union played a very important
role in the formation of scientific societies
in Communist China, and in early 1956 a 12-year
plan was instituted that prioritized technological
research in the following order by the CCP leadership:
-
Peaceful
utilization of nuclear energy.
-
Radio
and associated electronics.
-
Jet/turbine
propulsion technology.
-
Remote
control and automation.
-
Exploitation
and exploration of minerals/petroleum.
-
Metallurgic
applications.
-
Fuels
and fuel technology.
-
Heavy
machinery and power equipment.
-
Control
of the Yellow and Yangtze rivers.
-
Chemical
fertilizers and agricultural mechanization.
-
Disease
prevention and eradication.
-
Basic
theory in natural science.259
On
8 October 1956, the CCP announced the beginnings
of the Chinese space program, establishing the
first Rocket Research Institute under the Fifth
Research Academy, led by Marshall Nie Rongzhen.260
With the concurrent programs in both atomic bomb
assembly and missile development under way in
the PRC, the demands for the production of chemicals
must have been especially acute, and even more
so when the Sino-Soviet agreements fell apart
in 1959 and the ironically titled "Great Leap
Forward" (GLF) began in earnest.
To
address the needs of advancing technology and
the building of a chemical industry in particular,
in 1957 the Chinese Society for Chemical Engineering
was established. Although this move certainly
was a step in the right direction, the shortage
of technical expertise in chemistry was such that
in 1959 China was unable to find the necessary
materials for building a launching pad for a sounding
rocket, nor could it acquire liquid oxygen.261
(This is despite the fact that the eminent scientist
Qian Xuesen, who himself had carried out post-war
intelligence work on Werner Von Braun's V-rockets
for the United States, had been the primary project
leader for the PRC's Fifth Research Academy since
1956.)
The
1950s were not devoid of any progress in the field
of applied chemistry. In 1958 the PRC developed
special methods to produce both superphosphate
and calcium-magnesium phosphate for the production
of fertilizer.262
Despite such efforts, however, chemical fertilizers
were more cost effective to import than would
be procuring grain from abroad,263
and even in 1993 fertilizers were still being
imported for reasons of cost.264
Unfortunately--not
just for the 30 million victims but with regard
to China's scientific progress as well--the late
1950s also heralded a period during which Mao's
mass movements were just gaining speed. Making
a virtue of necessity, these exhortations to pull
the wisdom from the grassroots can only be described
as antiintellectual pogroms. Reminiscent of Lysenkoism
(Lysenkovshina) in the Soviet Union--where
the experimental musings of peasants drove Russian
biological sciences back to the stone age--elitism
in scientific research was decried by all media
outlets in China, while workers and farmers were
praised for their practical applications of "science,"
however loosely defined.265
Work in basic research (i.e., that which may not
have immediate or obvious practical use) was listed
last on the CCP's to do list for the above-mentioned
12-year plan. (This aversion to theoretical work
in the sciences and preference for applied chemistry
persists even to this day in the PRC.266)
Although mass movements may have assisted in prospecting
for uranium,267
and the near elimination of schistosomiasis (recall
the "People's War against the Snail" in 1950),268
scientific and other higher institutions were
being led by party hacks and slogan-mouthed rubes,
and as a result "red" nearly always trumped "expert,"
severely retarding technological advances. Until
Marshall Nie Rongzhen intervened, more than two-thirds
of Chinese rocket scientists suffered from edema
stemming from malnutrition, much like everyone
else (save for the party leadership.)269
A
condition approaching normalcy returned in 1962,
but the GLF clearly had taken its toll on the
sciences, especially in the field of chemical
engineering. By 1965, a substantial effort made
progress bringing back science and technology
in China. Between 1950 and the mid-1960s the number
of institutes in the Chinese Academy of Sciences
(CAS) had grown from 20 to more than 120.
But
such progress was stymied by the Cultural Revolution,
which brought back the antielitist themes of the
GLF, displacing real academics with soldiers,
workers, and other political cadres who then were
put in charge of the universities. While the inmates
were running the asylum, both the Chinese Chemical
Society and the Chinese Society for Chemical Engineering
were shut down,270
and, according to a CAS academician Tang Youqi,
organic, inorganic, and physical chemistry were
no longer taught at colleges. Fei Changpei told
Chemical & Engineering News that "during
the 10 years of the Cultural Revolution, no new
scientists and teachers were trained."271
Unless Chinese chemists were working directly
for the strategic rocket and hydrogen bomb projects,
which enjoyed special status, they were not protected
from the political onslaught by the Red Guards;
many scientists left the PRC during this chaotic
period.272
By
at least one account, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai
tried to reintroduce the need for advanced and
professional training in the sciences in the early
1970s. In January 1975, Zhou urged that agriculture,
industry, national defense, and science in general
be modernized, looking toward the year 2000 as
a goal. An "Outline Report" delineating areas
where attention was most needed was produced thanks
to Zhou's urging; with its emphasis on cultivating
professional technicians and professors, however,
the document offended the retrograde tendencies
of the "Gang of Four." Only after Mao's death
in 1977 was a serious discussion of scientific
progress possible, and, finally, a National Science
Conference was held in March 1978.273
As
Deng Xiaoping's reforms were starting to be implemented
in the late 1970s, scientists involved in research
or teaching in China could be grouped into the
following two cohorts: 1) those 55 and older who
had obtained Ph.Ds in the United States, 2) scientists
aged between 45 and 55 who had obtained graduate-level
training in the USSR, and others at Chinese universities
before the 1949 revolution. Chemical engineering
departments in the PRC during the late 1970s,
for example, primarily consisted of those who
had studied in the United States, returned to
China during and after the revolution, and were
still fondly nostalgic of their previous time
spent abroad. Those potential scientists between
30 and 45 years old, however, who would have ushered
in the next 20 years of scientific development
in the PRC, were effectively lost because of the
tumult of the Cultural Revolution.274
The effects still are felt today: official PRC
sources indicate that by the year 2000, the generation
of leading scientists and academics--and quite
a few of these holding influential government
positions--will begin retiring, producing an "academic
vacuum."275
The
late 1970s witnessed a move toward the importation
of foreign technology in chemical engineering,
as well as investment from overseas. At this stage
of development, as far as it pertains to CW agent
production, the technical and infrastructure base
for chemicals in China probably would have been
self-sufficient to produce the first generation
of weapon fills, namely, mustard (sulfur and nitrogen),
Lewisite, chlorine, phosgene, and hydrocyanic
acid. Because changes or rapid improvements in
the Chinese chemical industry were unlikely to
have occurred during the Cultural Revolution,
data from 1977 could be extrapolated modestly
downward to the early 1970s, and still have an
approximate picture of what China could produce
in the way of intermediates and final products:
If
China did maintain a stockpile of, at the very
least, blister (mustard) and nerve agents (e.g.,
sarin), stocks of such vital precursors as thiodiglycol
(mustard) and phosphorus trichloride (nerve agents)
would be needed. Chinese chemical technology developments
suggest the rudimentary necessities of three separate
CW categories. Example agents demonstrated how
production and weaponization could have been affected:
The
demands for these starting materials and their
CW agent products would include the following.
Mustard
(Sulfur)
Mustard had, at least until the end of World War
II, been considered the "king of CW agents," and
this was nowhere more true than in the Soviet
Union, where both Lewinstein and thiodiglycol
processes were successively used in its production.
Initially, the Lewinstein process used in the
Soviet Union was probably the combination of ethylene
and sulfur chloride:
2C2H4
+ S2Cl2 ®(CH2-CH2Cl)2S
+ S
or
alternatively with sulfur dichloride,
2
C2H4 + SCl2
(CH2CH2Cl)2S276
This
method had many drawbacks, not the least of which
was the rapid degradation of mustard as well as
explosive (hydrogen) off-gasses that required
constant maintenance.277
Even more distressingly, within a span of five
years the Soviet Union gauged that 25 percent
or more of its mustard decomposed while in storage.278
China almost certainly would have been aware of,
and much more in favor of, the thiodiglycol method
(Victor Meyer-Clarke process) invented by Germany
in World War I. If the experience in the later
Soviet Union and Iraq279
is any guide, China would have followed in analogous
fashion:
Oxidation
of Ethylene
C2H4
+ HOCl
CH2-OH-CH2Cl
A
sulfonification step, most likely using hydrogen
sulfide
2CH2-OH-CH2Cl
+ Na2S
[or H2S]
(CH2CH2OH)2S
+ NaCl
Utilizing
hydrogen disulfide to obtain thiodiglycol, according
to Hirsch, led to a 70-75-percent yield. The remaining
step is a straightforward chlorination reaction:
(CH2CH2OH)2S
+ 2HCl (CH2CH2Cl)2S+
H2O280
The
precursors and intermediary steps of either process
would have presented no difficulty for the PRC,
and likewise for the nitrogen mustards. Hirsch
reports that nitrogen mustard was probably made
in the Soviet Union in World War II "in the usual
way by chlorinating the chlorhydrate of triethylamine
with thionyl chloride or phosphorus trichloride.
A method of chlorination by HCl is also known,
but this has many technical difficulties."281
If the PRC did follow in similar fashion, again,
the materials and processes--with the possible
exception of phosphorus trichloride--should not
have been problematic, since at least the mid-1960s.
Lewisite
Lewisite production was carried out in the former
Soviet Union by reacting arsenic and a chlorinated
ethane-mercuric chloride compound. Although as
a blister agent it does not receive as much attention
as does mustard in PRC publications, it could
also have been produced in large amounts with
little (relative) difficulty.
Nerve
Agents
The major challenge for the production of G-series
(V-agents would not appear until at least the
mid-1960s282),
would have been finding precursors for nerve agents,
primarily phosphorus trichloride (PCl3),
perhaps phosphorus oxychloride (POCl3),
and perhaps later phosphorus pentasulfide (P2S5/P4S10)
for VX.
During
the 1950s and 1960s, supplies of technical-grade
phosphorus in China would have been sparingly
small. Although dedicated facilities to thermal
phosphoric acid production could have been built
to feed the military use of chemicals, similar
to the Muscle Shoals plant in the United States
during the 1950s, no open-source data exists on
China's approach. Moreover, competing needs for
basic chemicals among different industries and
even strategic weapons programs may have limited
developments in this area.
With
regard to civilian use, phosphates are extremely
important in providing fertilizer and feed supplements
to farm animals, food preservation, metal finishing,
oil additives, flame retardants, and pesticides,
among other uses. Fluorine and phosphorus (in
the form of tributyl phosphate), for example,
are used both in nuclear fuel processing as well
as the manufacture of sarin and soman nerve agents.
But, whereas the latter chemicals are utilized
within closed systems and some recycling could
take place, CW agent production in the hundreds
of tons would have presented rather daunting challenges,
at least in the years before 1978:
In
1972, technology for the production of elemental
phosphorus via thermal methods was held by the
United States, United Kingdom, and West Germany,
the latter (Uhde of Farbwerke Hoechst) having
built the Chimkent plant in the Soviet Union.283
Relations between the PRC and these countries
were at their nadir during the early 1970s. Without
similar turnkey plants China would have experienced
great difficulty becoming sufficiently self-sufficient
to build large stockpiles of nerve agents, although
modest amounts could be produced by diverting
elemental phosphorus from other uses, or via the
time-consuming purification of phosphorus via
the wet (acid) process.
Further,
China claims to have developed an organophosphorus
agent detector in 1971,284
apparently to fulfill a need to detect the use
of contact insecticides, and perhaps in part stemming
from concerns regarding Soviet CW capabilities
on the border. Insecticides of concern probably
would have included ethyl parathion and methyl
parathion, both in use by the late 1960s, and
resulting in many accidental poisonings in China.285
By 1971, the price of either insecticide dropped
rather dramatically compared to 1966 levels, from
US $0.75 per pound to US $0.40,286
leading to their wide-scale use. Perhaps an example
of "off the shelf" technology used for military
purposes, this detector may not have changed substantively
since its inception.
Brain
Power
Economic reforms in the late 1970s resulted in
a concomitant increase in institutions devoted
to applied chemistry and research. By 1991, 240
R&D agencies had been established for chemical
industry, consisting of 20,000 scientists and
engineers, plus an additional 12,000 technical
staff.287
This progress is remarkable, particularly when
considering that in 1984 the PRC only produced
15 graduates in science at the Ph.D. level, and
these were primarily in theoretical research.288
Using data from a year earlier, these numbers
reflect a large proportion of effort toward the
chemical sciences, comprising 40 percent of all
scientific research institutes, and another 40
percent of those personnel classified as "scientists
or engineers."289
Today, China produces thousands of Ph.D.s in the
sciences, although the significant problem of
brain drain to more lucrative jobs in foreign
countries continues.290
Infrastructure
In a barter arrangement that included mostly petroleum,
Japan and China stuck a deal in 1978 for $20 billion
in which Japan was to sell manufacturing facilities
to produce ethylene, fertilizer, and synthetic
leather.291
From 1982 onward, foreigners invested in some
940 ventures over the next 10 years.292
By 1994, 5,540 chemical enterprises with overseas
funding were started in the PRC,293
and in 1997 there were 6,800.294
Foreign chemical conglomerates have since participated
in the building of large chemical facilities,
particularly ethylene plants to satisfy large
demands for plastics and other polymers:
Production
of Phosphorus and Organophosphorus (OP) Compounds
in the PRC
In 1999, chemical outputs in China surpass levels
originally targeted in Beijing's respective five-year
plans, particularly in the area of pesticides.
For example, the production plan in 1995 for pesticides
(i.e., herbicides and insecticides) was 230,000
tons, with an actual output of 349,000 tons.295
This year the capacity is estimated at 750,000
tons for all pesticides, and outputs have averaged
nearly 400,000 tons per year. In chemical fertilizers,
the PRC has nearly always been self-sufficient
in terms of nitrogen but continues to import potash
and phosphate fertilizers.296
As
demonstrated previously, production of elemental
phosphorus for food-grade phosphates and chemical
intermediates in OP chemistry has typically been
via thermal processes, although recently the world
market has been changing toward wet-process phosphates.
The significant point about phosphate production
in the PRC is the ability to produce large amounts
of pure phosphorus trichloride (PCl3)
and phosphorus pentasulfide (P2S5),
precursors for G-series nerve agents and V-agents,
respectively. With large phosphate reserves, even
if the phosphate content in rock is of low quality,297
China has increased dramatically its production
of several phosphate-related chemicals. Yunnan
Province, for example, utilizes hydroelectric
power to provide a source for thermal phosphoric
acid. In 1990 plans were made to develop a 60,000
metric ton/year phosphoric acid plant in Yunnan.298
Bottlenecks and other production problems remain.
In 1997, a manager based at a foreign-invested
chemical company in China that is heavily involved
in pesticide production, remarked:
China
lacks the essential intermediates to carry out
contract synthesis. They often have to do more
steps due to this deficiency. We often have to
ship raw materials from the West to ensure production
schedules.299
In
1998, however, apparently there was enough phosphorus
pentasulfide to allow the clandestine shipment
of 500 tons to Iran via a Norinco front company
in Hong Kong.300
Although it violates the Australia Group chemical
precursor restrictions, which brought about sanctions
from Great Britain and the United States, P2S5
technically is not a controlled substance under
the CWC. Though not a member, and a vociferous
opponent, of the Australia Group, China has voluntarily
added P2S5 to its
list of controlled chemical exports.301
Phosphorus
oxychloride, which is produced in China by more
than 20 facilities, may also be considered within
the context of nerve agent precursors, but primarily
for tabun (GA) production. Interestingly in this
regard, Lianshiu Chemical Works has introduced
a process that combines sulfur, chlorine, and
phosphorus trichloride over a catalyst to produce
both phosphorus oxychloride (POCl3)
and thionyl chloride, 1 ton of POCl3
producing about 0.8 ton of thionyl chloride during
the process.302
(Thionyl chloride is considered a chemical that
has proliferative use in nerve agent synthesis.)
The
PRC has made a concerted effort to move away from
chlorinated hydrocarbons to organophosphorus (OP)
pesticides.303
Two major pesticide research institutes were recently
established in China, one in Shenyang (National
Pesticide Engineering Research Center), and the
other in Shanghai (National Southern Pesticide
Formulation Center). In 1995, for the first time
since the Communist revolution, representatives
from the China Pesticide Industry Association
visited their counterparts on Taiwan. Then, more
than 10 joint-venture projects were financed by
Taiwan firms in the PRC and were devoted to the
export of pesticides, amounting to "tens of million[s]
US dollars."304
In 1998, China produced 382,000 tons305
of pesticides and of this total exported 100,000
tons, earning a reported US $320 million.306
One
of the more significant developments has been
this ability on the part of the PRC to produce
large amounts of OP pesticides, including an indigenous
supply of precursors that could be used in nerve
agent synthesis, particularly phosphorus trichloride
and phosphorus pentasulfide. Although the production
of OP pesticides is quite different from that
of the extremely toxic nerve agents, the basic
expertise and the basic starting materials are
not that far removed. Significantly, the PRC produces
the following OP pesticides, on the order of 5,000
tons/year (or more, 1994-1995):307
Pesticide
Table
If
local production and consumption of pesticides
in the PRC (estimated by Monsanto to be approximately
US $ 600,000308)
remains at current levels, starting materials
will also be in strong demand, especially for
phosphorus trichloride. Of the pesticides listed
above, two in particular often use the phosphorus
pentasulfide route in synthesis. Many others probably
are produced in smaller quantities in China:
Dimethoate
(Dongguo)
example,
4CH3OH + P2S5
Þ
2(CH3O)2PSSH + 2H2S
(+ additional organochlorine steps)309
Parathion
(Duiliulin)
example,
4C2H3OH + P2S5
(or PCl3) Þ(Chlorinating
step in the case of synthesis with P2S5)310
These
two formulations alone would require enormous
quantities of phosphorus if 5,000 tons of agent
were to be produced. Thus, the phosphorus industry
in China is capable of producing large quantities.
Conclusion
In
terms of chemical technology and knowledge base,
some crossover from erstwhile Soviet assistance
would have occurred in the late 1950s, particularly
in the areas of fluorine chemistry and organophosphorus
compounds. (The latter two are critical for the
enrichment of uranium, and form the basis for
the German series of toxic nerve agents, respectively).
Nonetheless, at the time of the Sino-Soviet feud,
as far as military chemistry is concerned, China
was even more backward than the Soviet Union.
(Substantial East German assistance to the Soviet
Union probably did not occur until 1965--long
after the Sino-Soviet split.311)
We
do not know what degree of technological competence
and production levels in chemical manufacture
existed in China before 1978, especially during
the times when economic data was considered "secret."
By the 1990s, however, China clearly has mastered
many commercial methods of producing fine chemicals,
including key precursors and intermediates that
could be diverted to CW-agent manufacture.
If
China has in fact destroyed its chemical weapons--and
by its reported documentation to the Organisation
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
in The Hague, it has--the PRC did so at a time
when it could produce nearly any of the known
CW agents in mass quantities. From an economic
point of view, joining the CWC was for China a
strategic decision to ensure that it's "pillar
industry," namely chemical, would not be impeded
by international export controls. An optimistic
assessment would be that Deng Xiaoping's policy
to subordinate the military to a strong economy
applies to the Chinese chemical industry as well.
The pessimist would note that, in the event of
a major crisis, the PRC would have little trouble
reconstituting a large chemical weapons arsenal
within a relatively short time.
Chinese
Perspectives on BW
Official
PRC histories of BW, justifiably, recount at length
the experience of Japan's invasion of China, and
the gruesome experiments conducted by Gen. Ishii
Shiro and his Unit 731. Also mentioned is a report
about "Operation Golden Triangle," allegedly from
a Russian defector who fled to Germany, claiming
that near the end of the Second World War the
Soviet Union conducted experiments with plague,
anthrax, and cholera in Soviet-occupied Mongolia.312
Allegations
that the United States routinely conducted BW
during the Korean war, however mendacious and
insupportable, also seem to be accepted as fact
by the PLA. The book on BW printed by the PRC's
National Defense Press, for example, extensively
covers the issue. Defense Minister Chi Haotian,
who served during the Korean conflict and wrote
the preface to the series on weapons and war,
including CBW,may have influenced the book to
publish a lengthy laundry list of "biological
crimes" committed by US forces. Nonetheless, despite
no reliable evidence of US complicity (and even
recent proof that the Chinese themselves have
colluded with North Korea to fabricate biological
weapons), the charges are ingrained among senior
Chinese leaders. The recent publication by Endicott
and Hagerman,313
as well as the unreconstructed claims of Maoist
fellow traveler Joseph Needham, may have sealed
the idea even further, for now there is "Western"
concurrence to the allegations.
At
the very least, this legend provides a historical
starting point for the PLA's development of anti-BW
defense measures and training. But with regard
to future arms control agreements and intelligence
assessments, the belief of the PRC that the United
States employed biological weapons during the
Korean war is significant. The Chinese, who see
even the Opium War of the 1840s as having happened
only yesterday, will be influenced by their interpretation
of such historical events, no matter whether true
or false.
China
alleges the following US BW attacks in North Korea:
-
While
the United States was retreating south under
attack by the united Sino-Korean Army, in
December of 1950 the United States military
disseminated smallpox against the Korean capital
of Pyongyang, Hwanghae do, and other areas.
-
On
the 28th of January, US forces used aircraft
on areas such as [Lung Zhao dong],
southeast of Inchon, [Long shui dong],
etc., to disseminate large quantities of three
insect types never before seen in Korea: The
first type was a kind of black fly, the second
was in the form of something similar to fleas,
and the third was a kind of tick.
-
Laboratory
test evidence showed that the insects disseminated
by the United States carried plague, choloera,
and other infections disease-causing pathogens.
-
Accounts
have revealed that the US Chemical Corps operations
department produced 16 different types of
deadly BW agents in large quantities. In March
1951, [Brigadier General Crawford] Sams314
who was in charge of the Public Health and
Welfare department of the "United Nations
Army" command, led the No. 1091 microbiology
lab on a landing boat to Wonsan harbour, and
onward to Koje island. They used POWs as targets
for biological weapons experiments. As the
US military progressed in their manufacture
of biological weapons, they utilized the work
of the Japanese war criminal Ishii Shiro,
Wakamatsu Yujiro, Kitano Masaji, etc., and
even sent them to South Korea.
-
[E]xamples
of various technologies used ranged from fountain
pens filled with infectious disease-causing
black ink to feathers contaminated with anthrax
bacilli, as well as fleas, lice, and mosquitoes
infected with plague and yellow fever. Various
kinds of flies, fleas, spiders, beetles, bedbugs,
crickets and other insects were found, many
of which had never been seen before in Korea.
-
The
types of bacteria found were Vibrio cholerae,
Salmonella typhi (typhoid), Yersinia
pestis, paratyphoid (A and B types), the
causative agent of typhus, and Shigella
dysenteria. Laboratory results showed that
the insects tossed down carried plague, cholera,
and other infectious diseases. . . . Not long
after discovering these containers, many people
came down with plague or cholera. Of 53 total
plague victims, 39 died.
-
According
to relevant information, from the 28th of
January, 1952, to the 31st of March, the US
military disseminated bacteria as many as
804 times in North Korea.
-
Several
years later, the American government acknowledged
that they had used biological weapons during
the Korean War.315
Similar
conspiracy type of allegations seem to continue
into the 1990s. For example, the PLA may actually
believe that unusual outbreaks of hemorrhagic
fever that occurred in Kenya in 1995, were in
fact the results of US BW experiments,316
and makes similar insinuations concerning
the Ebola virus outbreaks in Zaire.317
BW
Offense
Writings are scanty on Chinese CW capabilities
and even more so on BW. A PRC official from the
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs assured me
that China has no biological weapons.318
A book on the subject, with the imprimatur of
Chi Haotian, states categorically that "China
has never manufactured nor possessed biological
weapons."319
According
to its submitted Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BWC) declarations, the PRC has declared
the following facilities as having a "national
defensive biological warfare R&D program,"
and listed the following facilities:320
Dual
Use/BW Defense Research Facilities (1993)
Vaccine
Production Facilities
-
National
Vaccine and Serum Institute.
-
Shanghai
Institute of Biological Products.
-
Lanzhou
Institute of Biological Products.
-
Changchun
Institute of Biological Products.
-
Wuhan
Institute of Biological Products.
-
Chengdu
Institute of Biological Products.
-
Institute
of Medical Biology, Chinese Academy of Medical
Sciences.
The
PRC claims that no BL-4 (highest containment for
extremely contagious and virulent organisms) laboratories
exist, at least as far as BW-related research
is concerned. Most biological weapons, however,
can be produced and studied in BL-1-3 conditions,
and a BL-4 facility is less relevant from a weaponization
capability standpoint.321
Little
of the scientific literature that the PRC reports
in its BWC declarations is worth noting except
for public-health-related research on bioaerosols
and reviews on staphylococcal toxins. The remaining
citations consist of the typical infectious disease
reporting and epidemiological studies on hepatitis
(of just about every type), hemorrhagic fever
with renal syndrome (HFRS), and insect abatement
programs.
Allegations
of BW Activity in Xinjiang Province
Ken Alibek, formerly with the Soviet/Russian Biopreparat
BW complex, suggests that an outbreak
of hemorrhagic fever in Xinjiang Province near
Lop Nor was the result of Chinese activity in
BW research:
Intelligence
sources found evidence of two epidemics of hemorrhagic
fever in this area in the late 1980s, where these
diseases were previously unknown. Our analysts
concluded that they were caused by an accident
in a lab where Chinese scientists were weaponizing
viral diseases.322
Another
source in Taiwan told me that he felt certain
a BW facility of some sort did exist in Xinjiang
Province, not far from the nuclear testing facilities.323
As
for the allegations of the source of outbreaks
in Xinjiang, we should be cautious because of
the natural occurrence of Xinjiang hemorrhagic
fever (HF) endemic to the area, a variant of Crimean-Congo
HF of the bunyaviridae-type virus that occasionally
strikes in northeastern China, and where a significant
outbreak occurred in 1968.324
But even if we discount the 1980 outbreaks as
having military-related origin, we cannot rule
out the actual existence of the BW-related facility.
The list of declared research and production sites
above shows nothing further northeast than Gansu
Province. The Soviet Union, in open violation
of the BWC, built the largest BW capability thus
far known. Given the poor track record of the
BWC as it is currently implemented (or more accurately,
is not being implemented), China probably is withholding
much information about its BW research, although
such research primarily may be defensive in nature.
Agricultural
BW
A newspaper in the United States intimated that
the foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in Taiwan
could have been due to mainland Chinese sabotage.325
The largest known FMD outbreak, it has caused
more than $5 billion damage to the Taiwanese pig
farming industry.326
After hearing a presentation by Dr. Terrance Wilson
on the subject,327
and following discussions with some knowledgeable
Taiwanese, I am fairly certain that the FMD outbreak
was purely accidental. A similar conclusion was
also reached in the Taiwan agricultural community.
For example, Stock-Farming of Tendays [sic]
(Nongmu Xunkan), 25 September 1999, writes:
The
outbreak of FMD in Taiwan was caused by the introduction
of virus through either the smuggling of goods
or related agricultural products. As a consequence,
the defense against such smuggling is of great
importance. . . It was finally determined by means
of analysis in foreign research institute(s) that
the FMD outbreak was absolutely the same as that
in the mainland, thus proving that infection was
brought into Taiwan from the PRC. It was completely
because of smuggling meat products across the
boundary by smuggling that caused great economic
losses to Taiwan amounting to one percent of (1997)'s
[GNP].328
The
few Chinese writings on the subject of BW preponderantly
discuss the allegations of US use of BW during
the Korean war. Thus, even today, there is emphasis
on training and equipment to rid the immediate
environs of insects and vermin, as if modern armies
would deploy such crude methods of delivery. For
example, to foil the enemy's germ-laden, flying
insects or plague-infested rats, the PLA handbook
on BW even suggests how to use simple brooms and
nets, and procedures for burying the offensive
detritus.329
BW
Defense in the PLA
In
keeping with the definition of BW as "public health
in reverse," PRC writings on the subject treat
the matter more in terms of infectious disease
control, an approach that is standard everywhere.
As one would expect, considerable amount of research
has been conducted in China on potential BW agents
including tularemia, Q fever, plague, anthrax,
West and Eastern Equine Encephalitis, psittacosis,
among others.330
Some specialized equipment has also been fielded
in some unspecified numbers to counter the threat
of BW to PLA troops.
Type
76 Microbe Sampling Kit331
First introduced in 1975, and includes the 76-1
variant,332
this portable laboratory can test surface, waterborne,
and airborne particles to determine the presence
of BW agent threats, and also has five different
types of insect and small animal reference specimens.
Resembling a low-tech, gravitation/settle plate,333
a small, rotating mechanism is placed windward,
and aerosol particles will adhere to the sampling
or petri dish. Disinfectant is supplied along
with culturing supplies.
Large-Volume
Electrostatic Air Sampler334
This equipment has no classification number, and
little information is provided concerning its
attributes. It probably is similar to the corona
discharge-based large volume air sampler (LVAS)
used in the West. This technology in general offers
excellent results, and is capable of isolating
viral particles from the air, including rabies
and human respiratory disease viruses.335
JWL-I
Model Bioaerosol Sampler336
Like the LVAS mentioned above, the reference to
this equipment offers little in the way of details.
This automated air sampler resembles most closely
a single stage impactor, drawing in air and depositing
aerosolized particles onto agar for further testing.
An example of this type of instrumentation is
the Casella slit-to-agar, single-stage impactor
used in civilian environmental monitoring.337
In
1974 an improved version of the WJ-85 microbiological
laboratory vehicles was introduced,338
and could have resulted in this motorized laboratory
platform, described as somewhere between "a railway
car and a sedan," is separated into three sections,
with airtight sealed gaskets on the doorways.
The forward section houses the driver and carriage
for occupants, the midsection contains the laboratory
room (See
Mobile BW Assessment Laboratory), and the
rear section contains decontamination apparatus
plus extra clothing. Laboratory equipment includes
a glass glove box for handling infectious material,
a bacteriostatic device, a refrigerator, an incubator
(hengwenxiang), a fluorescent microscope,
an inverted microscope, culture media, diagnostic
reagents, cell culture instruments, etc. A separate
station allows testing for bacteria and viruses,
accommodating up to four people. Some 200 bacteria
and 50 virus samples for reference and identification
are supplied with the laboratory vehicle.
PLA
Military Medicine and BW Defense
The earliest semblance of routinized BW defense
in the PLA were the 1952 sanitation/anti-plague
units, formed during the involvement of the Chinese
People's Volunteer Army in Korea. At the same
time, educational campaigns to rid disease-carrying
pests were conducted, and, when combined with
experience of the supposed BW casualties treated
during the Korean war, "a great victory was achieved
in anti-bacterial warfare."339
Building
a more formal curriculum in BW defense, the PLA
continued work in anti-plague research, and in
1954 delegations and students visited the Soviet
Union for expertise in microbiology and infectious
disease.340
Perhaps in tandem with the fanatical anti-pest
campaigns carried out during the Great Leap Forward,
a full-fledged, national investigative research
project was carried out during 1958-61, led by
the Military Medical Science University and sanitation
units, from every military region, on down to
individual cadres. By 1984, M.S. degrees were
being awarded in the related specialization of
BW defense by the Military Medical Science University.341
The
Changing Character of China’s WMD Proliferation
Activities
Evan
S. Medeiros
Beginning
in the early 1980s, China's weapons proliferation
activities emerged as an issue of growing concern
for US policymakers. This trend has persisted
for close to 20 years. Chinese companies in the
last two decades have exported to several countries
a variety of goods useful in building nuclear
weapons, chemical weapons, and ballistic and cruise
missiles. In some cases, China has provided critical
materials, equipment, and technical assistance
to nations who could not otherwise acquire these
items for their weapons programs. Most notably,
China provided Pakistan with a basic nuclear weapon
design and substantial assistance in fabricating
weapons-grade nuclear material. Moreover, China
has provided some countries with production technologies,
allowing these nations to indigenously build certain
missile systems with little external assistance.
Although China's proliferation behavior over the
last two decades has been highly egregious, it
has also improved dramatically in recent years,
especially since the mid-1990s. The Chinese government
has gradually signed onto a number of key nonproliferation
treaties, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) and has developed internal bureaucratic
and regulatory structures to carry out these commitments.
This is not to say that China no longer engages
in exports of proliferation concern to the United
States. Rather, the nature of the China-proliferation
problem is fundamentally different, and US nonproliferation
policies on China should be changed accordingly.
This
paper addresses one central question: What is
the current scope of China's proliferation activities
related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD),342
and how has it changed over the last 20 years?
Answering this question will help to establish
the factual and conceptual basis for understanding
the nature of the problem and determining viable
options for US policy-makers in an effort to change
Chinese behavior. To evaluate the scope of Chinese
proliferation activities, this paper considers
three indicators: the geographic scope of China's
WMD exports, the types of exports (e.g., weapon-specific
or dual-use technologies) and their contribution
to WMD programs, and the frequency of such transfers.
These three indicators are applied to three case
studies around which this paper is structured;
the three case studies cover China nuclear exports,
missile (ballistic and cruise) exports, and chemical
exports. The paper examines each of these case
studies over a 20-year period to provide a historical
perspective on the shifts and changes in the scope
of China's WMD proliferation activities.
Drawing
on this analytical framework, this paper argues
that in the last two decades the overall scope
of Chinese proliferation activities has declined
across the board. The geographic distribution
of Chinese proliferation-relevant exports has
narrowed from almost a dozen countries to three:
Iran, Pakistan, and to a lesser extent North Korea.
The character of China's exports similarly narrowed
from a broad range of nuclear materials
and equipment (much of it unsafeguarded) and complete
missile systems to exports of dual-use
nuclear, missile, and chemical technologies today.
In addition, during much of the 1980s and 1990s,
China's nuclear and missile assistance directly
contributed to the nuclear and missile programs
in other countries; today such assistance is indirect,
at best. The frequency of such exports also appears
to have declined to a dribble of dual-use items,
albeit declining less than the scope or technical
character of China's exports. Despite this overall
narrowing of China's WMD-related exports, further
progress will be slow. Significant policy differences
between Washington and Beijing exist about controlling
dual-use nuclear, chemical, and missile goods
to Iran and Pakistan. These contrasting policies
are based on profound differences between the
respective foreign policy approaches of the United
States and China to Iran and Pakistan, the utility
of supply-side technology control regimes, China's
ability to implement and enforce its export control
laws, and linkages to such bilateral issues as
US arms sales to Taiwan.
This
analysis of the scope of China's WMD exports requires
a major caveat, however. Tracking China's nuclear,
chemical and missile exports based on nonclassified,
open-source information is an inherently difficult
task. Reliable and comprehensive information is
scarce. Much of the information--especially detailed
technical data--is based on press accounts of
leaked intelligence information. This classified
data is often leaked for specific political purposes,
is often incomplete, and thus is of questionable
reliability. To offset these informational weaknesses,
this paper relies on multiple sourcing combined
with extensive conversations with US and Chinese
officials from a variety of government agencies
in both Washington and Beijing.
China
and Nuclear Proliferation343
Chinese
nuclear exports have changed dramatically over
the course of the last twenty years. The geographic
distribution of Chinese nuclear exports has narrowed,
the character of nuclear items sold and their
relative contribution to nuclear proliferation
has positively changed and the frequency of nuclear
exports (including technical assistance) has decreased
significantly. As of 1999, US concerns about Chinese
actions that contribute to nuclear proliferation
are fundamentally different as compared to 20
years ago. To detail these trends, this section
compares China's nuclear exports in the 1980s
and 1990s.
Chinese
Nuclear Exports in the 1980s344
Beginning
in the early 1980s (only a few years after Sino-US
normalization), Chinese state owned companies
began providing a variety of nuclear assistance
to an eclectic mix of countries all over the world.
Chinese nuclear companies used nuclear exports
as a means to generate hard currency as China
opened up to the outside world and sought to better
integrate its economy with Western ones. Central
authorities in Beijing encouraged nuclear exports
as a way for China's large military-nuclear complex
to diversify into producing civilian goods. The
profits from these activities were then funneled
into improving China's dilapidated nuclear infrastructure,
both military and civilian.345
Given these pressures, Chinese companies began
providing nuclear equipment, materials, and technical
assistance to such countries as Argentina, Algeria,
Brazil, Chile, India, Iran, possibly Iraq, Pakistan,
and South Africa. Initially, Chinese companies
sought to create long-term relationships with
many of them. Throughout the 1980s, China signed
nuclear cooperation agreements (NCAs) with Argentina,
Algeria, Brazil, Iran, Pakistan, and a variety
of other countries of lesser proliferation concern
in an effort to create sustained export relationships.346
Many of these NCAs are currently active, although
trade between China and many of these countries
has been scaled down in recent years.
China's
nuclear sales covered a variety of nuclear items
and technical assistance that directly contributed
to the military nuclear activities in several
countries. In the early 1980s, Chinese nuclear
exports were not placed under International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, which facilitated
their use in military nuclear activities. Chinese
firms exported different types of reactor fuel,
complete reactors, reactor technologies, technical
assistance for indigenous nuclear projects, and
nuclear facility training. In the case of Pakistan,
China also provided substantial direct assistance
in designing and building nuclear weapons. Beginning
around 1983, China sold Argentina a wide variety
of nuclear materials such as uranium concentrate
(yellow cake), uranium hexafloride, 20-percent
low-enriched uranium (LEU), and heavy water. None
of these exports was under IAEA safeguards, and
all probably were used in Argentina's dual-use
nuclear program. China's exports to Brazil were
less extensive but also probably were diverted
to Brazil's military nuclear activities. China
sold some 200 kg of LEU (3-20-percent enriched)
to Brazil in the early 1980s, none of which was
subject to international safeguards. Of greater
proliferation significance were China's nuclear
exports to South Africa, which operated a dedicated
nuclear weapon program--as opposed to the "military
options" programs in Brazil and Argentina. South
Africa purchased unsafeguarded LEU and uranium
hexafloride that probably were used to fuel its
pilot enrichment plant at Pelindaba East. In addition,
China sold South Africa 60 metric tons (MT) of
unsafeguarded heavy water for other nuclear projects.
China's strong financial motives for exporting
nuclear items were especially evident in its willingness
to provide nuclear fuel to its strategic competitors.
Between 1982 and 1987, China provided India with
130-250 MT of unsafeguarded heavy water; this
item was probably used in India's CANDU reactors
that for many years served as the main plutonium
producers for India's nuclear weapons program.
Chinese
nuclear exports in the 1980s went beyond nuclear
fuel. In 1983, China and Algeria signed an agreement
for the construction of a small 15 MW heavy-water
research reactor.347
The reactor initially was not subject to any international
inspection, and several indicators suggested the
reactor could have been part of a nascent nuclear
weapons program in Algeria.348
Chinese officials originally argued that the reactor
deal was exempt from inspection because the contract
was signed in 1983, a year before China joined
the IAEA. Only after significant US and international
pressure was applied beginning in 1988 (when US
satellites noticed the reactor's construction)
did China and Algeria agreed to open the reactor
to IAEA inspection when it was completed.349
Ironically,
China's nuclear assistance to Iran was of lesser
concern in the 1980s. China's nuclear relationship
with Iran was just taking shape in the 1980s and
did not flourish until the 1990s. This assistance
involved limited amounts of training and nuclear
equipment exports; none of it was directly applicable
to nuclear weapon development, and all of China's
assistance was placed under safeguards. Reports
say that China and Iran signed a secret nuclear
cooperation as early as 1985. The first manifestation
of this accord was the training of Iranian technicians
in China; by 1991 some 15 nuclear engineers from
Iran's Isfahan facility had been trained in nuclear
reactor design and research in China.350
In 1989, China's initial nuclear exports to Iran
were minimal and involved transfers of two or
three electromagnetic isotope separators (EMIS
or calutrons) and a 27-kilowatt (kW) subcritical
reactor. Although EMIS is used to enrich uranium,
it is highly inefficient, and hundreds are needed
to produce significant quantities of enriched
uranium.351
The Chinese-supplied calutrons were placed under
IAEA safeguards and stationed at two facilities
in Iran. The Chinese used the subcritical reactor
to began training the Iranians in basic nuclear
physics, isotope production, and reactor operation.
Such training--both in Iran and in China--provided
the Iranians with a technical baseline from which
greater expertise and presumably nuclear weapon
knowledge could eventually be developed. Yet all
of China's aid was consistent with and, in fact,
encouraged under the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT).
During
the 1980s, China's nuclear relationship with Pakistan
was Beijing's most extensive in terms of the technologies/assistance
provided, the contribution to proliferation, and
the frequency of transfers. China directly assisted
Pakistan's nuclear weapon program. In the early
part of the decade, China reportedly provided
Pakistan with a nuclear weapon design of a crude
but highly reliable Hiroshima-sized weapon; reports
say China also transferred enough HEU for one
or two cores for this weapon; and in 1989 China
may have allowed Pakistani scientists to observe
nuclear tests at Lop Nor.352
In addition, Chinese technicians provided equipment
and assistance to several of Pakistan's unsafeguarded
fuel-cycle facilities that supported the nuclear
weapons program. In 1986, China concluded a comprehensive
nuclear cooperation agreement with Pakistan. Under
this accord, Chinese companies supplied Pakistan
with a variety of nuclear products and services,
ranging from uranium enrichment technology to
research and power reactors. Specifically, Chinese
scientists may have assisted Pakistan with construction
of the PARR-2 research reactor and operating uranium
enrichment centrifuges at the Kahuta facility.
China also reportedly transferred enough tritium
gas to Pakistan for a few nuclear weapons.353
China's
extensive nuclear exports to Pakistan, Argentina,
Brazil, and South Africa during the 1980s largely
are explained by the weakness of China's formal
nonproliferation commitments combined with the
relative lack of bureaucratic infrastructure in
China to support nuclear nonproliferation. For
years, Chinese officials had rejected the NPT
as a biased and inherently discriminatory treaty
and viewed nonproliferation as a means for the
superpowers to entrench their nuclear superiority
by denying other nations equivalent capabilities.354
This view began to change slowly in the 1980s
as China re-engaged with the international community.
Beginning
in 1984, China made two initial nonproliferation
commitments, neither of which was verifiable or
enforceable. First, China joined the IAEA and
pledged to require safeguards on all of its nuclear
exports to non-nuclear-weapon states; this promise
also included third-party retransfer prohibitions.
Second, China's then Premier Zhao Ziyang provided
a verbal commitment in a White House toast that
China does not "advocate or encourage nuclear
proliferation" and that China "does not engage
in nuclear proliferation ourselves, nor do we
help other countries develop nuclear weapons."
Both of these commitments probably were motivated
by the Chinese desire to conclude negotiations
on a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement so
that China could gain access to US reactor technologies.
The ability and/or willingness of the government
to implement them was limited. Neither of these
commitments was part of China's export law and
probably were not communicated to the Chinese
nuclear companies involved in exporting goods.
At that time, China had no functioning export
control system, set of export control laws, or
technology lists that governed China's nonproliferation
commitments. China's arms control and nonproliferation
community similarly was underdeveloped. China's
nascent community of arms control and nonproliferation
experts were based mainly at the UN in New York
or at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva
and focused on broad arms control issues like
nuclear disarmament and nuclear testing. Nonproliferation
was not an independent discipline in China. Also,
there was little bureaucratic support in the Foreign
or Trade ministries to understand
or implement the 1984 pledges. China's continued
nuclear relationship with Pakistan throughout
the 1980s provides the best evidence of the limited
scope and weaknesses of China's initial nonproliferation
pledges.355
Chinese
Nuclear Exports in the 1990s
By
the early 1990s, the character of China's nuclear
exports had begun to change. Chinese companies
stopped providing nuclear-specific materials,
equipment, and technologies to unsafeguarded facilities
in countries with suspected nuclear weapons programs
like Argentina, Brazil, India, and South Africa.
The geographic scope of China's nuclear exports
declined to cover mainly Iran and Pakistan; the
character of China's remaining nuclear exports
gradually shifted to dual-use nuclear goods; and
the relative contribution of these exports to
nuclear proliferation accordingly declined. These
developments were further enhanced by the gradual
expansion throughout the 1990s of China's formal
nuclear nonproliferation commitments (China signed
the NPT in 1992), its nuclear export control laws,
and bureaucratic support within China for nuclear
nonproliferation. These trends are detailed below.
China's
nuclear cooperation with Iran expanded in the
early part of the 1990s, but by the end of the
decade it had almost entirely stopped. This contraction
was a direct result of US pressure on China to
cease all nuclear cooperation with Iran. Beginning
in the early 1990s, China signed several reactor
deals and contracts for other fuel-cycle-related
facilities with Iran. China sold Iran a small
zero-power research reactor and a zirconium tube
production facility. Both of these were placed
under IAEA safeguards and have been visited several
times by inspectors. During this same period,
China and Iran concluded a deal for a small 20
MW research reactor. Yet, by 1992 China canceled
the deal under US pressure. Chinese officials
were concerned that the deal would have complicated
China's bid to secure renewal of Most-Favored-Nation
(MFN) trading status with the United States.356
Around
1992, China and Iran signed another, larger contract
for the export of two 300 megawatts electric (MWe)
Qinshan-type reactors and a uranium hexafloride
(UF6) production facility. As before,
the United States opposed these transactions,
fearing they would contribute to Iran's nascent
nuclear weapons program. US officials argued that
two reactors and the UF6 facility--although
legal under the NPT--would move Iran further up
the "nuclear-weapon ladder." Chinese officials
countered that Iran was a member of the NPT, previous
inspections had found no evidence of noncompliance
with the treaty, and all these facilities were
subject to IAEA safeguards.357
Sino-US debates about these facilities came to
a head in 1997 as Beijing and Washington began
to discuss implementation of the dormant 1985
US-China nuclear cooperation agreement. Both sides
finally reached an agreement during the Clinton-Jiang
summit in October 1997. In exchange for China's
cancellation of these two projects and its agreement
to halt all future nuclear cooperation with Iran,
the United States would allow the NCA to enter
into force. As part of this deal, China was allowed
to continue two nuclear projects: the zero-yield
reactor and the zirconium production facility.358
The CIA has verified in several reports to Congress
that since 1997 China continues to adhere to this
pledge to end all nuclear cooperation with Iran.359
Thus, as of 1999, almost all of China's nuclear
exports to Iran have stopped. This virtual halt
to Sino-Iranian nuclear cooperation stands in
stark contrast to the ambitious plans for bilateral
nuclear cooperation that Tehran and Beijing reached
at the beginning of the decade.
During
the 1990s, direct assistance to Pakistan's nuclear
weapons program appears to have ended, while the
scope of China's other assistance has narrowed
significantly. Chinese firms provided Pakistan
with a variety of nuclear goods and technical
assistance that indirectly contributed
to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Much of
the assistance over the last 10 years involved
exports of dual-use nuclear goods and nonnuclear
technologies to unsafeguarded facilities involved
in fabricating nuclear materials for weapons.
China's assistance to Pakistan on three projects
will help to elucidate the scope of the relationship.
First,
China reportedly provided Pakistan with construction
assistance for a 50-70-MW plutonium production
reactor at Khushab; this facility is not under
IAEA safeguards and, if operational, would provide
Pakistan with an unsafeguarded source of plutonium-laden
spent fuel. In 1995, for example, a Chinese company
exported a special industrial furnace and high-tech
diagnostic equipment to the Khushab facility.360
Although these technologies have clear civilian
functions, their destination suggested a more
pernicious end use. China has since promised to
halt all assistance to this and other unsafeguarded
facilities.
Second,
Chinese firms reportedly were assisting Pakistan
with the construction of a partially completed,
unsafeguarded reprocessing center located at Chasma;
if Pakistan completes this facility, then operating
it in conjunction with the Khushab facility would
provide Pakistan with an unsafeguarded source
of plutonium. Also at the Chasma site, China is
building a 300 MWe power reactor for electrical
generation purposes. The reactor has little proliferation
relevance and will be under IAEA safeguards.361
Yet, Chinese work on the reactor could function
as a "cover" for assistance to the Chasma reprocessing
facility or other projects in Pakistan. Some sources
indicate that Chinese and Pakistani experts already
have considered this possibility.362
Third,
in 1995 a Chinese firm supplied Pakistan's Kahuta
Research Laboratory with 5,000 custom-made ring
magnets for use in high-speed gas centrifuges.
This plant, which is not under international safeguards,
serves as Pakistan's main source of HEU for the
nuclear weapons program. The proliferation relevance
of these specialized magnets is not readily evident,
however. They are a dual-use item that are not
listed on any international nuclear trigger list
but rather are part of a key technology, magnetic
suspension bearing, which is a controlled as a
dual-use item. Yet, the sale of these magnets
raised concern on the part of the US due to their
custom-made design for enrichment centrifuges
and, more important, their destination at the
Kahuta facility. The ring magnet incident was
particularly significant because it raised questions
about the ability of Chinese officials to control
the actions of Chinese firms. Chinese officials
claimed not to know about the magnet deal, and
thus argued they should not be held accountable
for it.363
The
ring-magnet incident was especially important
because it both highlighted the emerging problem
in the 1990s of the government's difficulty in
controlling exports, and catalyzed China to institutionalize
many of its nonproliferation commitments. Following
the episode, Chinese officials began to clarify
its nuclear nonproliferation commitments and to
codify them in domestic law. In 1996, following
the incident, China publicly pledged not to "provide
assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities."
This promise built on China's 1992 NPT obligations
by expanding them to cover dual-use nuclear items
or any nonnuclear goods to unsafeguarded
facilities in Pakistan or other countries. These
pledges were followed by the promulgation of nuclear
export control laws that incorporate the Nuclear
Supplier Group (NSG) trigger lists.364
China's first nuclear export control law was issued
and published in 1997 and a second one, specifically
covering dual-use nuclear goods, was released
in June 1998. The latter law importantly includes
a "catchall" clause to stop any and all dual-use
nuclear exports not specifically mentioned in
the regulations; this step even goes beyond the
NSG restrictions on dual-use exports. (See Appendix
III.) Since the early 1990s, China has also developed
the bureaucratic infrastructure to help implement
these commitments. The China Atomic Energy Agency
or CAEA (Zhongguo Guojia Yuanzineng Jigou)
in conjunction with MOFTEC and the Foreign Ministry
have assumed responsibility for overseeing the
nuclear export control process. Recent organizational
changes in China have further bolstered this process.
First, the CAEA was separated from the China National
Nuclear Corporation which is China's main exporter
of nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies;
thus the CAEA is no longer subject to the direct
pressure of the CNNC when making export control
decisions. Second, the Foreign Ministry within
the last two years established a Department of
Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (junkong
si) under the directorship of one of China's
most experienced arms control experts, Sha Zukang.
This department has an entire division of some
10 experts devoted to Chinese nuclear affairs
including nuclear exports and export control issues.
Although
these bureaucratic changes represent a step in
the right direction, concerns about Sino-Pakistani
nuclear cooperation persist. First, the Chinese
Government continues to have difficulty implementing
and enforcing its nonproliferation commitments
and nuclear export control laws. There are Chinese
companies, usually small ones, that either do
not know the government's laws or that disregard
them in an effort to earn hard currency. China's
commercial nuclear ties to Pakistan are deep,
which may facilitate continued nuclear-relevant
exports. The ring-magnet incident in 1996 represented
the first public instance of the continuing problem
of how to promote respect in China for the government's
international commitments and domestic laws. Until
the central government is able to control the
activities of these small, "rogue" firms, Chinese
nuclear exports will remain an issue of concern
for US policymakers.
Second,
aside from illicit exports of dual-use equipment
and materials, Chinese scientists and technicians
may still be providing secret technical assistance
to their Pakistani counterparts. Although China
has adopted controls on exports of nuclear materials,
equipment, and technologies, tracking and controlling
technical exchanges by personnel is inherently
difficult. Mutual visits by key scientists to
weapons-related facilities in both China and Pakistan
probably continue. In one instance, China's existing
nuclear cooperation with Pakistan on the Chasma
power reactor may provide a cover for exchanges
related to Pakistan's construction, operation,
and maintenance of unsafeguarded facilities.365
China
and Missile Proliferation366
In
the last 10 years, China's exports of ballistic
and cruise missiles and related technologies have
undergone an evolution similar to, but not as
dramatic as, the reduction in China's nuclear
exports. The geographic scope of China's missile
exports has narrowed to include Iran, Pakistan,
and, to a lesser extent, North Korea. The character
of China's missile exports has shifted from sales
of complete systems to exports of dual-use missile
technologies. China also has assumed a growing
number of missile nonproliferation commitments.
In contrast to the nuclear area, however, many
of them are vague, lacking legal basis, and poorly
implemented. Significant concerns also persist
about China's interpretations of its pledges.
As of 1999, the principal US concern about China's
missile proliferation revolves around the continued
export by Chinese firms of dual-use missile technologies
and production technologies to organizations in
Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea that are involved
in missile development.
Beginning
in the late 1980s and ending in the early 1990s,
China actively marketed and sold a variety of
complete ballistic and cruise missiles to several
countries. As early as 1986, China sold hundreds
of HY-2 Silkworm and C-801/YJ-8 cruise missiles
to Iran and Iraq; in Iran some of these systems
were fitted on land-based batteries for coastal
defense, and others were mounted on fast-attack
crafts and used to threaten Persian Gulf shipping.367
China also provided Iran with production technologies
to facilitate indigenous construction of these
systems. As China's missile cooperation with Iran
began to expand rapidly, China exported 30-35
DF-3 (CSS-2) intermediate range ballistic missiles
to Saudi Arabia in 1988. These missiles, drawn
from China's stock of aging missiles, possess
a range of approximately 2,800 km that allowed
Saudi Arabia--for the first time--to target most
Middle East capitals.368
Chinese
exports of complete missiles continued in the
late 1980s when Chinese firms began to market
and sell the newly developed M-9 and M-11 missiles.
The M-9 and M-11 were developed specifically for
export and were welcome additions to the international
missile market in the late 1980s. These missiles,
which are Chinese designed and solid fueled, were
far more reliable and accurate than the majority
of the Scud-derivatives available at that time.
China negotiated with Pakistan, Iran, and Syria
for the sale of both M-9s and M-11s. By late 1989,
China and Syria reportedly signed a $285 million
contract for approximately 30 M-9 missiles and
launchers; the Syrians even provided advance funds
for the missiles that the Chinese promptly spent
before deliveries began.369
China and Iran had also engaged in extensive discussions
about exports of M-9 missiles. One report indicated
that by January 1990 China and Iran agreed on
the export of M-9 missiles and production tooling,
suggesting the possible sale of production technologies
along with the full missiles.370
Other reports indicated Iran financially supported
the M-9's development as Tehran is known to have
done for North Korea's Nodong missiles.371
There is little evidence to suggest that Iran
was interested in the M-11 missile, however. China
also began selling Iran a short-range, battlefield
missile with a 150-km range; it was known as the
8610 or CSS-8. By 1989 China had sold some 150-200
of these systems to Iran and also had begun providing
technologies for the creation of a production
line to facilitate Iran's indigenous development
of the 8610 system.372
China's discussions with Pakistan focused on the
possible supply of the M-11 missile. Sino-Pakistani
negotiations proceeded quickly, and by 1990 China
had transferred a training M-11 missile and launcher.
A final shipment of 34 M-11s reportedly arrived
in November 1992.373
In
response to China's missile marketing, the United
States actively sought, and in many cases succeeded,
in curbing China's behavior. Reeling from the
shock of China's DF-3 sale to Saudi Arabia and
its perceived impact on Middle East stability,
the Bush Administration immediately launched a
vigorous effort to halt China's exports of M-9
and M-11 missiles. This campaign involved several
rounds of bilateral discussions combined with
the imposition in 1991 of limited economic sanctions
for violations of the 1990 Missile Control Act.
Finally in late 1991 and again in 1992, Chinese
officials pledged verbally (and later in writing)
that China would adhere to the guidelines and
parameters of the MTCR. By assuming this commitment,
China was forced to cancel the proposed sale of
M-9 missiles to both Iran and Syria; this was
especially difficult in the case of Syria because
a contract had been signed and advance funds had
been provided to Chinese firms. Neither the Iranian
nor the Syrian deal went forward. The 1991/1992
MTCR commitment is particularly important in evaluating
the changes in the scope, content, and frequency
of China's missile export activities. Beijing's
1991 MTCR commitment provided a tangible, upper-bound
limit on China's missile export activities. Since
late 1992, China has not sold any complete MTCR-class
missiles to any countries. Beijing even denied
Saudi Arabia's 1997 request for replacement versions
of the DF-3s purchased in 1988. Rather, China
has limited its missile exports to transfers of
dual-use missile technologies to Iran, Pakistan,
and, to a lesser extent, North Korea. These exports
continue today and define the scope and content
of China's missile proliferation activities.
Two
ambiguities in China's original MTCR pledge have
directly influenced the character of China's missile
exports in the 1990s. Detailing these areas of
confusion will help to explain the scope of China's
exports in the last decade. First, during the
1991 negotiations on the MTCR, both sides explicitly
agreed that the MTCR covered the M-9 missiles,
given its 600-km range. Yet, US and Chinese officials
failed to reach agreement on whether the MTCR
covered the M-11 given its published range of
290 km. The bilateral MTCR negotiations ended
with no resolution to this issue.374
This ambiguity helps to explain the subsequent
Sino-US controversy over China's late 1992 M-11
exports to Pakistan; from China's perspective,
M-11 exports to Pakistan were not covered by its
MTCR commitment. A second factor to consider is
that in China's original MTCR formulation, Beijing
never agreed to accept the MTCR annex, which specifies
all of the technologies controlled by this regime.
China's reluctance to accept the annex has resulted
in the continuation of missile technology exports
to Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea.
Chinese
Missile Exports in the 1990s and Beyond
Since
1991, Chinese firms have provided limited amounts
of dual-use technologies to help Iran build short-range
ballistic missiles; some of these technologies
also may have been used to improve Iran's medium-range
systems. Chinese assistance can be divided into
two general categories. On one level, China has
provided Iran with production technology for key
sub-components for Iran's short-range 8610 missiles;
these systems are below MTCR parameters and are
not prohibited by any international agreement.
China reportedly sold computerized machine tools,
specialized steel, gyroscopes, accelerometers,
and test equipment that Iran uses to build and
test missile airframes and guidance and control
systems.375
Based on this type of assistance, Iran has probably
developed a self-sufficient production infrastructure
for short-range missiles, possibly including the
construction of a facility to produce the Chinese
missiles. On a second level, Iran may be using
these production technologies to build subsystems
for medium- and long-range systems, which are
explicitly banned by the MTCR. The production
technologies used to build the 8610 missile may
also accelerate Iran's construction of indigenous
missiles like the Shahab-3 or to improve the Scud-type
missiles supplied by North Korea. Some reports
suggest that China also may have transferred telemetry
equipment for use when test launching medium-range
missiles banned by the MTCR.376
Chinese officials continue to defend these deals
by citing the dual-use nature of its technology
exports to Iran and the lack of agreement between
the United States and China on the MTCR technology
annex.
However,
the proliferation significance of China's missile
technology exports to Iran must also be evaluated
in the context of Iran's overall ballistic missile
program. Given the limited scope of China's assistance,
its technology exports are not likely to be crucial
to the long-term viability of Iran's missile development.
The Iranian missile program is dominated largely
by North Korea missiles improved with some Russian
assistance. Iran's preference in the last several
years appears to be for the purchase of complete
missile systems that readily are available from
Pyongyang. Iran has purchased numerous Scud B,
Scud-C and No Dong missiles from the North and
Iran's two newest missiles--the Shahab-3 and Zelzal--probably
are Scud-derivative missiles. Chinese technologies
do not contribute significantly to the development
of any of these systems.377
Until
1997 China's contributions to Iran's antiship-cruise-missile
arsenal were arguably more significant than its
ballistic missile assistance in the 1990s. China
provided Iran with a full array of antiship cruise
missiles and the ability to indigenously produce
these systems.378
Yet, by the end of the decade such assistance
had stopped. As mentioned above, in the mid-1980s
China sold Iran hundreds of HY-2 and C-801 cruise
missiles.379
This cooperation expanded in the early part of
the 1990s when China began providing Iran with
the equipment, materials, and technologies needed
to indigenously produce these missile systems.
As Iran's naval modernization program accelerated
in the early 1990s, China and Iran concluded a
deal for China's newest and most capable antiship
cruise missile known as the C-802. In the fall
of 1993, China delivered its first shipment of
C-802s to Iran, and these were quickly followed
by the means for Iran to indigenously produce
the missile.380
This
cooperation lasted until Fall 1997 when China
agreed--under US pressure--to cancel all C-801
and C-802 shipments. At that point, China had
delivered approximately 150 of the 400 missiles
Iran previously ordered. For months US officials
heavily lobbied their Chinese counterparts to
cancel these deals by arguing that they would
threaten the free flow of oil through the Persian
Gulf. In the context of the first Clinton-Jiang
summit in October 1997, Chinese Foreign Ministry
officials provided Secretary of State Madeline
Albright with a verbal pledge that China would
cease all C-801 and C-802 exports to Iran. This
pledge reportedly also covered exports of production
technologies.381
China's Defense Minister Chi Haotian reaffirmed
this ban in January 1998 during meetings with
Defense Secretary Cohen; US intelligence documents
indicate that during these meetings Chinese military
officials also agreed not to provide over-the-horizon
targeting for the C-801s and C-802s Iran already
possessed.382
Recent questions about China's adherence to its
1997 cruise missile export ban have proven unfounded.
In response to press reports that Chinese firms
were assisting Iran with air-launched cruise missiles,
both the US State Department and China's Foreign
Ministry issued statements confirming that the
1997 commitment banned exports of only C-801s
and C-802s and not other cruise missiles. Thus,
in the course of 10 years, China's antiship cruise
missile assistance had declined dramatically;
not only has China stopped selling additional
C-801s and C-802s to Iran but also all production
assistance for these missiles has stopped as well.
Similar
to China's missile cooperation with Iran, China's
assistance to Pakistan's missile programs narrowed
significantly in the 1990s. Following the M-11
deliveries in late 1992, China capped its M-11
exports to Pakistan and is not known to have supplied
Islamabad (or any other country) with MTCR-class
missiles. Rather, Chinese firms have supplied
Pakistan with a wide range of equipment, materials,
and technologies for its missile programs. According
to 1998 Senate testimony of Gordon Oehler, China
has focused on exports of "production technologies
and components" for Pakistani missiles.383
Much of this assistance has been for China's largest
missile project in Pakistan: the construction
of a missile production facility at Rawalpindi.
A 1997 Pentagon report on global proliferation
developments confirmed the existence of this facility
and China's central role in the plant's construction.384
China is reported to have provided Pakistan with
the blueprints and much of the equipment to build
and possibly to outfit the facility; the plant's
construction reportedly began in 1995 based on
a decade-old contract.385
Open sources are unclear whether this facility
will be used to build complete missiles or just
missile components and sub-systems; this determination
will affect China's compliance with the MTCR.
Thus, until this facility becomes operational,
questions will remain about the nature of China's
missile assistance to Pakistan and the degree
to which China's actions are consistent with its
MTCR pledges.
As
of 1999, China's missile cooperation with Pakistan
remains an active issue worthy of significant
US and international concern. China's past missile
assistance has been extensive (as detailed above),
and it is continuing despite the deterioration
of the security environment in South Asia. Chinese
firms continue to aid in the construction of the
missile facility at Rawalpindi that are likely
to produce M-11/DF-11 missiles under the Pakistani
designation Hatf-3. Also, Pakistan's recently
tested Shaheen has design characteristics
that are similar, but not identical, to China's
M-9/DF-15 missile. Although China's missile nonproliferation
commitments regarding South Asia have recently
expanded, Beijing's willingness and ability to
implement them remains ambiguous. Following the
June 1998 summit meetings in Beijing, the United
States and China issued a Joint Statement on South
Asia that said "our respective policies are to
prevent the export of equipment, materials, or
technology that could in any way assist programs
in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for
ballistic missiles capable of delivering such
weapons, and that to this end, we will strengthen
our national export control systems." This statement
appears to remove all remaining uncertainty about
the commitment of the Chinese Government to halt
further missile assistance to Pakistan (including
MTCR Category II technologies) and signals China's
commitment to begin developing legally based export
controls on MTCR-controlled technologies. Yet,
this agreement--which was reached by senior US
and Chinese leaders--is opposed by many parts
of the Chinese bureaucracy, and Chinese Government
officials have done the minimum to implement it.386
The ability of the government to enforce these
commitments is also not clear. Chinese firms have
deep relationships with their counterparts in
Pakistan. These Chinese entities often do not
share the government's commitment to nonproliferation,
and thus Beijing has difficulty controlling their
export activities. This situation is especially
true in the missile realm because China lacks
regulations covering these items; thus, the government
has no legal basis to monitor or punish firms.
China's
Uncontrolled Missile Technology Exports in the
1990s
The
ability and willingness of Chinese firms to sell
dual-use missile technologies to potential proliferants
is particularly evident in the patterns of exports
to countries other than Iran or Pakistan.
Throughout the 1990s, Chinese firms have concluded
a number of deals with potential proliferants.
These deals raise questions about the Chinese
Government's ability to control various Chinese
companies and, ultimately, to implement China's
nonproliferation commitments. In 1992, a Chinese
company exported 300 tons of ammonium perchlorate
to Syria, possibly for use in making solid rocket
fuel; that same year Libya received a shipment
of lithium hydride, which has direct application
to missile fuel production, and in 1994 another
Chinese firm also exported ammonium perchlorate
to Iraq in direct violation of the UN embargo.387
One
of the most recent and most worrisome examples
of unapproved assistance involved exports by Chinese
firms to North Korea's ballistic missile program.
Reports in early 1999 indicated that scientists
from China's Academy of Launch Technology (CALT)
had provided some low-level assistance to engineers
in North Korea. Chinese firms also allegedly sold
a variety of dual-use technologies to the North
including accelerometers, gyroscopes, and specialized
machinery used to build missile airframes. Yet,
there is little evidence that the Chinese Government
approved any of these exports.388
A further confirmation of the links between firms
in China and North Korea came in a recent CIA
report on global proliferation developments. An
unclassified CIA report on proliferation developments
in the latter half of 1998 indicated that Chinese
"entities" had sold specialized steel to the North
and had provided some unspecified space technologies
to organizations involved in missile development.389
Understanding
China's Missile Nonproliferation Commitments
China's
interpretations of it missile nonproliferation
commitments lie at the heart of the problem of
Beijing's continued sales of missile technologies
to Iran and Pakistan. As argued above, China's
original MTCR pledges suffer from some basic weaknesses.
China has never accepted the MTCR annex as the
definitive list of items to be controlled under
the regime. China has also never accepted the
1993 revisions to the MTCR's guidelines and parameters.
Thus, the United States and China have little
basis for agreement on which items are banned
under the MTCR. In stark contrast to China's work
in the areas of nuclear and chemical goods, China
has not yet issued a series of export control
regulations covering MTCR-controlled equipment,
materials, and technologies. Without these regulations,
the Chinese Government has no legal authority
to monitor, control, or curb the exports of Chinese
firms. Chinese Foreign Ministry nonproliferation
specialists maintain that, at best, the Foreign
Ministry can request that a firm halt certain
export activities but their power and influence
is limited by the absence of regulations.
Barriers
to a resolution of this issue are real. First,
Chinese officials generally are reluctant to expand
their existing MTCR commitments. From its inception,
Chinese officials have criticized the MTCR as
a discriminatory regime that relies on double
standards and that focuses too heavily on the
supply side of the issue. In particular, the Chinese
are quick to point out that the MTCR does not
control exports of strike aircraft, which arguably
are better delivery vehicles for WMD than missiles
and which the United States sells all over the
world. Although China agreed during the June 1998
Clinton-Jiang summit to "actively study" MTCR
membership, Chinese officials have been reluctant
to carry out this commitment. Many Foreign Ministry
officials opposed this summit statement, which
they regarded as a political commitment made in
the context of bilateral talks. Thus, they have
been reluctant to implement it fully. As a result,
in the last year, the United States and China
have achieved very little movement on China's
membership in the MTCR. Aside from one bilateral
meeting in November 1998, there have been no further
discussions.
Second,
China's original and subsequent missile nonproliferation
commitments are bilateral, political promises
made in the context of US-China bargaining. Chinese
officials probably interpret them from that perspective.
According to a recent study on Chinese arms exports,
"Beijing's pledges may rest more on political
understandings about US-China relations rather
than apolitical contractual obligations" that
uphold international norms.390
As such, China has begun to link its missile technology
exports to changes in US policy, such as reductions
in US arms sales to Taiwan. Chinese officials
and scholars argue that continued US arms sales--particularly
missile defense exports to Taiwan--constitute
a form of missile proliferation.391
They maintain that China will become a member
of the MTCR when the United States curbs its military
sales to Taiwan. Chinese Foreign Ministry officials
argue that only when the United States respects
China's security concerns about US weapons exports
to Taiwan will China seriously consider US security
concerns about China's missile technology cooperation
with Iran and Pakistan.
China
and Chemical Weapons Proliferation
Unlike
Chinese exports in the nuclear and missile areas,
China's chemical-weapons (CW)-related exports
did not emerge as a serious problem until the
early 1990s. China's chemical industry in the
1980s (particularly the private chemical producers)
had just begun to grow and expand, and they assumed
a wide-scale export orientation only at the beginning
of the 1990s. Yet, the nature of China's CW-related
exports has not changed significantly throughout
the last decade. The geographic scope of this
problem has remained limited to Iran and, to a
lesser extent, Syria. The nature of the assistance
continues to be dual-use equipment, materials,
and technologies used to produce chemical weapons;
specific exports have included chemical precursors,
chemical production equipment, and production
technology. The central problem continues to be
illicit sales by Chinese firms operating outside
of government control in marketing and selling
dual-use items to Iranian and Syrian organizations
involved in chemical weapon production.
The
linkages between Chinese and Iranian firms have
been documented numerous times in official US
Government documents and policy statements. As
early as 1992, then CIA Director Robert Gates
noted in Congressional testimony that Syrian firms
were actively seeking CW production assistance
from China.392
In 1995, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Bruce Reidel added that "Chinese firms have provided
some assistance (to Iran), both in terms of infrastructure
for building chemical plants and some of the precursors
for developing agents."393
The Defense Department's 1997 report on global
proliferation developments bluntly affirmed these
connections:
China
is an important supplier of technologies and equipment
for Iran's chemical warfare program. Therefore,
Chinese supply policies will be key to whether
Tehran attains its long-term goal of independent
production for these weapons.394
US
concerns about these activities culminated in
May 1997 when the United States imposed economic
sanctions on three Chinese companies and five
Chinese citizens for assisting Iran's chemical
weapons program in the early 1990s. This case
involved the exports of nerve gas precursors (e.g.,
thionyl chloride, dimethylamine, and ethylene
chlorodydril) and chemical production equipment
and technology. The Chinese Government was not
implicated in this incident because the exports
were attributed to private chemical-producing
firms operating without government consent.
In
assessing China's CW-related exports to Iran and
Syria, one factor that may have declined throughout
the last decade has been the frequency of such
exports. In the early part of the 1990s, Chinese
exports of CW-related goods largely resulted from
the inability of China's export control infrastructure
to regulate adequately these types of sales. China
simply lacked the proper regulations, the legal
authority, and the bureaucratic structure to control
the activities of Chinese firms. This situation
began to change in the mid-1990s as China assumed
a number of international commitments and set
up domestic structures to limit CW-related exports.
These probably have helped the government to control
illicit exports to known CW aspirants like Iran
and Syria. Beginning with China's signature of
the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993, the Chinese
Government has taken numerous steps to erect an
extensive chemical export control architecture.
In 1995 China issued its first "Regulations on
Chemical Export Controls" (Jiankong Huaxuepin
Guanli Tiaoli); this law included a "schedule"
of controlled chemicals based on the CWC and regulations
that provide for strict control on the transfer
of items listed in the schedule.395
(See Appendix III.) In March 1997, the government
issued a supplement to the 1995 regulations in
preparation for China's CWC ratification.
An
August 1997 law further buttressed the existing
ones. The Ministry of Chemical Industry (MCI)
in conjunction with the Foreign Ministry, the
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
(MOFTEC), and the Customs Administration jointly
issued a circular to further strengthen China's
controls on chemical exports. This step was especially
important because it established a registration,
licensing, and approval process for all chemical
equipment, materials and technologies; the law
also importantly required authorized exporters
to seek special approval for export to non-CWC
signatories. Most recently, China expanded the
scope of these regulations in June 1998 when it
added some 10 dual-use chemicals not previously
covered in the 1995 law. In addition, powerful
bureaucratic interests in the Chinese Government
track this issue. China's CWC Implementation Office
has high-level political backing because its nominal
head is Wu Bangguo, a vice premier. Also, the
Foreign Ministry has a division of some 10 experts
within the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament
Affairs devoted to tracking China's compliance
with the CWC and China's export control laws.
Although
the Chinese Government has erected these legal
barriers and committed parts of the bureaucracy
to monitoring China's chemical exports, Beijing's
ability to implement and enforce its laws and
commitments remains a continuing challenge. Despite
the promulgation of the laws in 1995 and 1997,
CW-related exports by Chinese firms to entities
in Iran has continued. In November 1996, China
reportedly sold about 400 metric tons of chemicals
(including carbon sulfide) used in the production
of nerve agents and riot-control and tear gas
to an Iranian chemical center.396
Also in 1996, the US Central Intelligence Agency
reported that Iran "obtained considerable CW-related
assistance from China in the form of production
equipment and technology" and that "Iran obtained
the bulk of its CW equipment from China and India."397
One such instance involved a 1996 delivery of
two tons of calcium hypochlorate, a chemical used
for decontamination, and an additional 40,000
barrels in early 1997.398
More recently, in May 1998 the I>Sunday Telegraph
reported that a Chinese firm had supplied Iran
with 500 tons of phosphorus pentsulphide in 10
consignments of 50 tons each for an estimated
$924,000. The chemical can be used for pesticides,
but it is also a precursor for VX. The secret
deal reportedly was concluded in April 1998 by
Iran's Defense Industry Organization and a local
branch of the SinoChem Agency.399
Several
factors help to explain the difficulties the Chinese
Government faces in curbing the chemical export
activities of Chinese firms. First, China's chemical
industry is one of its largest and most widely
dispersed, and unlike the nuclear and aerospace
industries, most chemical exporters are private,
nonstate enterprises. China produces some 15,000
chemical products by 14,500 chemical producers
scattered throughout 22 provinces (not including
Taiwan), 5 autonomous regions and 4 municipalities.
Gansu Province, which is one of China's most underdeveloped
provinces, has 157 chemical production plants.400
Informing these companies about government regulations
and monitoring their behavior is an inherently
difficult task. Many of these small companies
probably do not know about the regulations; their
priorities are to make profits rather than strictly
adhere to government regulations.
Second,
the export control culture in China is not strong.
During the Maoist period, laws regulating exports
were not required because only a small number
of companies were allowed to trade on the international
market. Modern export control laws, which are
highly detailed and require strict adherence,
differ significantly from the day in which firms
were required to interpret broad-based policy
directives. Third, the deal-making activities
of certain Chinese individuals, like Chen Qingchang
(a.k.a. Q. C. Chen), who operate outside government
control, have been instrumental in promoting contracts
between Chinese companies and Iranian firms. The
activities of this individual, in particular,
have undermined the Chinese Government's ability
to meet its CWC obligations. The Chinese Government's
apparent inability or unwillingness to control
Chen's dealmaking contributes to China's continued
chemical exports to Iranian organizations involved
in chemical weapons development.401
Fourth,
US intelligence information on illicit chemical
exports that is provided to Chinese officials
is often inadequate for investigative purposes.
Based on discussions with Chinese Foreign Ministry
officials, US intelligence information is normally
too vague to help Chinese officials to identify
specific firms. Because the United States often
provides the names of individuals and firms engaging
in illegal activity using the pinyin rendering
and with little more information, Chinese officials
have had significant difficulty identifying the
actual firms or persons given, the size of China's
chemical industry.
Finally,
there is a political dimension to the problem
of China's CW-related exports. China rejects membership
in the Australia Group (AG) on the grounds that
it is not a multilateral treaty like the CWC,
that it interferes in the operation of the CWC,
and that it unfairly targets countries like Iran.402
Chinese companies continue to export dual-use
chemicals controlled by the Australia Group (AG),
but not the CWC. This stance has resulted in the
export of goods to Iran that the US opposes on
the grounds they are covered in the AG. As a result,
China's political opposition to the AG as a discriminatory
and redundant regime has been the source of several
bilateral disputes with the United States. These
five problems suggest that, although the frequency
of China's CW-related exports may be declining,
the Chinese Government continues to face the difficult
task of implementing and enforcing the laws its
has adopted. Until the Chinese Government is able
to establish an effective system for monitoring
and controlling the export behavior of its chemical
firms, then CW-related exports probably will continue.
Conclusions
and Implications for US Policy
China's
WMD proliferation activities have undergone a
significant transition in the last twenty years.
The geographic scope: the types of technologies;
and the frequency of Beijing's nuclear, chemical,
and missile exports have all declined over the
last two decades. In the 1980s, Chinese firms
were directly assisting military nuclear activities
in a variety of countries all over the world,
Chinese entities were marketing and selling complete
ballistic and cruise missiles to several nations
in the Middle East and South Asia, and in some
cases these nuclear and missile exports involved
transfers of critical technologies for indigenous
production. Today, the nature of China's WMD-related
exports has declined significantly as compared
to the activity in the 1980s. Exports are limited
to three countries (Iran, Pakistan, and, to a
lesser degree, North Korea), these deals involve
mostly dual-use nuclear, chemical, and missile
technologies that at best indirectly assist WMD
development, and the frequency of such exports
appears to have slowed to a dribble. An additional
element of the current situation is that some
of these exports, particularly from the chemical
industry, are the result of Chinese firms operating
beyond government controls, not deliberate government
policy decisions. China's current WMD proliferation
activities are fundamentally different from those
of a decade ago.
None
of this is meant to suggest that China's current
WMD-related exports are not a serious problem
for US policymakers. Exports of WMD-related technologies
to nations like Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea
are particularly threatening to US national security
interests. Any assistance to the WMD programs
in these countries has the potential to threaten
US forces stationed abroad and US friends and
allies in East Asia and the Middle East. Exports
to South Asia should be viewed as particularly
dangerous, given their potential to accelerate
ongoing nuclear and missile races, which could
easily escalate into conflict.
Given
these threats to US security, the challenge for
US policymakers is to develop policies that address
the current scope of the China proliferation activities,
not the past problem. The current US burden is
no longer to convince China to fully embrace the
nonproliferation regime with all its treaties,
agreements, control lists, and legal obligations.
China has largely done this on a broad scale in
the areas of nuclear exports, chemical exports,
and, to a lesser extent, ballistic missiles. (See
Appendix IV.) This objective was accomplished
through a tactful mix of US diplomacy, unilateral
pressures, and imposition of economic sanctions.
As this paper has documented, in multiple instances
in the 1980s and 1990s US intervention was instrumental
in bringing about the cancellation or limitation
of Chinese nuclear, chemical, and missile assistance
to Algeria, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria.
Yet,
these successes of US nonproliferation policy
largely have gone unappreciated by Congress and
the US media. Some seize on any Chinese military
export as a nonproliferation violation without
considering the type of transfer or the precise
nature of China's commitments and bilateral differences
about those pledges. Few acknowledge the narrowing
of China's WMD proliferation activities, the expansion
of its formal commitments, and the growth in government
resources used to implement these pledges. During
Congressional debates about China in 1997, three
prominent Congressmen called China "the Wal-Mart
of international nuclear commerce,"403
and the 1999 Cox Committee Report characterized
China as "one of the leading proliferators of
complete ballistic missiles systems" based on
its exports of missiles in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. China's past proliferation transgressions
are being used to evaluate Beijing's current and
future behavior without regard for the US successes
in limiting Beijing's WMD proliferation activities.
The
current policy challenges presented by China's
remaining WMD proliferation activities are subtler.
On one level, the United States must encourage
the Chinese Government to fully comply with and
implement its nonproliferation commitments by
cracking down on Chinese entities engaged in exports
that violate the government's obligations and
domestic Chinese law. This task is indeed daunting,
given the number of enterprises and the dual-use
nature of many of the exports.404
Effectively resolving this problem probably will
require deeper bilateral cooperation than has
existed in the past.
On
a second level, US policymakers must seek to curb
China's authorized assistance (regardless of how
limited) to Iran and Pakistan. Resolving this
issue will not be easy and will require overcoming
relatively significant, possibly irreconcilable,
differences. Chinese and US policymakers share
few foreign policy interests and national security
concerns in their respective relationships with
Iran and Pakistan. These differences are compounded
by differing views on dual-use technology controls
and the obligations imposed by such supply-side
nonproliferation agreements as the MTCR, the AG,
and the NSG. Developing common security perceptions
of global proliferation developments may help
both sides set appropriate expectations and address
the domestic challenges Beijing faces in controlling
exports of WMD-related technologies. This approach
is particularly important in light of Beijing's
linkage of proliferation issues, such as missile
exports to Iran, to Sino-US bilateral relations.
These
two challenges, combined with the narrowing of
China's proliferation activities, raise questions
about whether past policies can work effectively
on this narrower range of problems. The effectiveness
of such classic US diplomatic tools as sanctions
and bilateral pressure to address the immediate
issues of dual-use exports and unauthorized transfers
is questionable. The legal basis for sanctions
in the dual-use realm is highly ambiguous. There
is little international consensus about many dual-use
goods, legal determinations are often politically
controversial, and the practical impact of sanctions
on Chinese behavior is potentially negative. Furthermore,
intensifying diplomatic pressure on China carries
its own inherent risks. US policymakers must be
careful not to damage China's current nonproliferation
commitments in pursuing an absolute end to all
of Beijing's WMD proliferation activities. Such
an outcome is possible given the current climate
in which Beijing closely links its positions on
arms control and nonproliferation to the overall
state of US-China relations, US arms sales to
Taiwan, and, recently, US missile defense proposals.
An understanding of these linkages is dangerously
absent from US debates on China's proliferation
activities.
To
address the two policy challenges mentioned above,
policy initiatives can be found in several areas.
Stopping China's unauthorized WMD-related exports
will require greater cooperation than has existed
to date. Both nations must take steps to improve
China's capacity to recognize and address this
issue. For example, the United States and China
could improve the quality of intelligence sharing
on both sides and could expand the scope of bilateral
dialogues on export control training. Resolving
the second challenge is far more onerous because
it is based on profound bilateral differences
about national security interests and the limits
of nonproliferation. Some initial steps could
involve expanding the depth of bilateral dialogues
to isolate the key policy differences between
Beijing and Washington. Nongovernment institutions
could be particularly effective in this area.
Nongovernment exchanges open up channels of communication
on sensitive issues and, in a broad sense, promote
the growth of epistemic communities in China involved
in arms control and nonproliferation research.
The expansion of these communities is particularly
important in improving China's institutional capacity
to address the increasingly complex global arms
control and nonproliferation agenda.
As
US policymakers consider the range of options
to address China's WMD proliferation activities,
past successes and recent progress in narrowing
the scope of this problem should not be forgotten.
Future progress will require, on the one hand,
good bilateral relations to develop deeper cooperation
and, on the other, a willingness in both countries
to manage the more complex proliferation questions
resulting from fundamental differences between
Washington and Beijing about foreign policy and
nonproliferation. The proximate US goal should
be to remain vigilant about monitoring China's
behavior and to expand cooperation in order to
address the new nonproliferation challenges described
above while preserving existing cooperation.
Chinese
Proliferation of Missiles and Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Issues for US Policy
Shirley
Kan
We
are here to examine the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles by the
People's Republic of China (PRC) because of the
threat it continues to pose to US national security
interests. This paper does not review in detail
the PRC's proliferation activities over the years,
which have included transfers to Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea.405
The discussion here addresses the salient issues
for US policy to counter threats to US national
security interests posed by the PRC's proliferation
of WMD and missiles that could deliver them. First,
a policy that maximizes gains for US interests
would be grounded in a correct assessment of the
nature of this PRC threat. Second, US policy would
require leadership both domestically and internationally
to execute an effective mix of policy options.
This paper will discuss the possibilities and
limits of a number of unilateral, bilateral, and
multilateral policy options.
This
paper contends that, despite the efforts of successive
administrations (since at least the Reagan administration),
an important gap remains between US and PRC perceptions
about weapon proliferation. The United States
has viewed WMD proliferation as a critical problem
that threatens its national security interests
and historically has led international efforts
to curb proliferation. However, the PRC sees WMD
nonproliferation less as its national interest
and more as useful leverage in its top foreign
policy priority--relations with the United States.
As leverage in a realpolitik and hostile world,
weapon proliferation is an issue that the PRC
employs in affirmative and negative dimensions.
At the same time, US leverage in securing PRC
commitments to WMD nonproliferation has dissipated,
even as the divide widens in Washington over the
strategy for dealing with Beijing.
Competing
US and PRC National Interests
Some
in the administration (particularly the State
Department) and others argue that the PRC has
increasingly recognized the value of WMD and missile
nonproliferation for its national interests. They
point to the steps that the PRC has taken to support
the international nonproliferation regimes.
Since
1992, Beijing--facing significant US, Japanese,
and other pressures--has taken several steps to
advance its nonproliferation commitments. China
unilaterally promised to abide by the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in February 1992
and reaffirmed that commitment in its October
4, 1994 statement. However, the PRC is not considered
a "member" or "partner" of the MTCR. The MTCR
is not an international agreement and has no legal
authority. It is a set of voluntary guidelines
that seeks to control the transfer of missiles
that are inherently capable of delivering at least
a 500-kg (1,100-lb) payload to at least 300 km
(186 mi).
China
acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) on March 9, 1992. The NPT does not ban peaceful
nuclear projects. China signed the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) in January 1993. In November
1995, China issued its first public defense white
paper, which focused on arms control and disarmament.
On May 11, 1996, the Chinese issued a statement
promising to make only safeguarded nuclear transfers.
China, on July 30, 1996, began a moratorium on
nuclear testing and signed the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996. The CTBT
has not entered into force. On April 25, 1997,
China deposited its instrument of ratification
of the CWC. The CWC entered into force on April
29, 1997.
Premier
Li Peng issued new nuclear export control regulations
on September 10, 1997. On October 16, 1997, China
joined the Zangger Committee. The Chinese issued
new export control regulations on dual-use nuclear
items on June 17, 1998.
Nevertheless,
others in and outside the administration, especially
in Congress, contend that the PRC's troubling
transfers continue to threaten US national security
interests. The Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI), in June 1997, submitted a required report
to Congress stating that, during July-December
1996, China was "the most significant supplier"
of WMD-related goods and technology to foreign
countries.406
The DCI's latest report (issued in July 1999)
on the last half of 1998 named China (along with
Russia and North Korea) as a "key supplier" of
such technology, having transferred supplies to
Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea.407
India
conducted nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998,
citing China's nuclear ties to Pakistan, and Pakistan
followed with nuclear tests on May 28 and 30,
1998. The PRC, Pakistan's military and nuclear
supplier, failed to avert the tests and did not
cut off nuclear aid or impose other sanctions.
The DCI reported in February 1999 that China provided
"extensive support" in the past to Pakistan's
WMD program, and "some assistance continues."408
In
a public speech on September 17, 1998, Robert
Walpole, the National Intelligence Officer for
Strategic and Nuclear Programs, assured us that
China or Russia currently are unlikely to sell
an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or
a space launch vehicle to convert to an ICBM,
but warned that this situation may change over
the long term. On February 2, 1999, DCI George
Tenet testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee
that "both the Chinese Government and Chinese
firms have longstanding and deep relationships
with proliferant countries, and we are not convinced
that China's companies fully share the commitments
undertaken by senior Chinese leaders."
In
early 1999, press reports revealed that the Clinton
administration has suspected since 1995 that China
acquired in the 1980s the design for the most
advanced miniature US nuclear warhead (W88) from
Los Alamos National Laboratory.409
If China acquired the W88 design, that would help
explain the series of Chinese nuclear tests leading
up to its moratorium on nuclear testing and willingness
to sign the CTBT in 1996.
On
April 21, 1999, the DCI took the unusual step
of publicly confirming that the Intelligence Community
concluded that "China obtained by espionage classified
US nuclear weapons information that probably accelerated
its program to develop future nuclear weapons."
The damage assessment ominously cautioned that
the proliferation threat has increased, saying
that the PRC could now pass US nuclear weapon
secrets to other countries, although whether China
has done so is unknown. The assessment warned
that, since the Chinese have more modern US nuclear
weapon information, they "might be less concerned
about sharing their older technology." The House
Select Committee on US National Security/Commercial
Concerns with the People's Republic of China (PRC),
also known as the Cox Committee, released its
unclassified report on May 25, 1999, replete with
concerns about technology transfers to China,
including nuclear weapon information.410
There
are other indications of division with the US
Government over policy toward China and assessments
of the problem of PRC weapons proliferation. The
White House agreed to hold twin summits with the
PRC in October 1997 and June 1998, advancing the
notion of Presidents Clinton and Jiang Zemin of
building a "constructive strategic partnership,"
and the Administration promised to issue certifications
to implement the 1985 Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
as the centerpiece of the 1997 summit. The November
1998 East Asia Strategy Report of Secretary of
Defense William Cohen declined to include that
characterization of US-PRC relations and criticized
continuing Chinese missile and chemical proliferation
activities. On January 28, 1998--just two weeks
after Presidential certifications were issued
on China's nonproliferation credentials--DCI George
Tenet testified that "China's relations with some
proliferant countries are long-standing and deep"
and that "the jury is still out on whether the
recent changes are broad enough in scope and whether
they will hold over the longer term."
Some
have questioned whether China has assisted North
Korea's missile program, which included the surprising
test-firing of a three-stage, medium-range Taepo
Dong 1 ballistic missile on August 31, 1998. One
could argue that Chinese national interest is
not to promote advances in North Korea's missile
program, since that increased threat has galvanized
US and Japanese support for development of theater
ballistic missile (TMD) systems, which China opposes.
Nonetheless, the National Security Agency (NSA)
is said to have reported on March 8, 1999, that
China sold specialty steel for use in North Korea's
missile program.411
In June 1999, US intelligence found that Chinese
entities transferred accelerometers, gyroscopes,
and precision grinding machinery to North Korea.412
The DCI confirmed publicly for the first time
in July 1999 that "North Korea obtained raw materials
for its ballistic missile programs, especially
from firms in China" in the second half of 1998.
After
the mistaken bombing of the PRC Embassy in Belgrade
in May 1999, one of Beijing's first reactions
was to suspend discussions on international security
and arms control with Washington, even as Acting
Under Secretary of State John Holum was preparing
to visit China.
On
April 8, 1999, after a meeting with visiting Chinese
Premier Zhu Rongji, President Clinton acknowledged
that they discussed issues of disagreement, including
"limiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction,"
and Premier Zhu reportedly promised that China
will soon ratify the CTBT. However, the PRC still
has not ratified the CTBT, and President Jiang
Zemin's reported assurances in Paris in October
1999 did not include the timetable of ratification
"soon." After the US Senate's rejection of the
CTBT, the PRC is even less likely to ratify the
treaty.
In
short, the PRC has both issued certain nonproliferation
assurances as well as continued to spread dangerous
technology and condone even nuclear weapon proliferation.
Beijing's deficient commitment to weapons nonproliferation
has given rise to competing assessments and increasingly
public divisions within the US Government. The
United States and the PRC have competing visions
of the world order, and to reserve premature assumptions
that Beijing has adopted weapon nonproliferation
as one of its national interests or that, over
time, Beijing will learn nonproliferation principles
and practices would be prudent. The PRC will continue
to calculate the gains of cooperation (concession)
or noncooperation (retribution) on weapon nonproliferation
as a function of the state of relations with the
United States. Weapon proliferation accords Beijing
with important leverage against Washington that
it will not likely surrender. US policy will continue
to face this challenge into future administrations
and the 21st century.
US
Policy Options
Chinese
proliferation as a policy issue concerns the priority
of this issue relative to other US national interests
(i.e., other security issues, human rights, and
trade), the Administration's response, including
the enforcement of nonproliferation laws, and
possible legislation to reduce the danger. Congress
has been concerned about the appropriate US response
to Chinese transfers that may have violated international
agreements and/or contradicted US laws. The benefits
and limitations of a number of US policy options
are discussed below.
Trade
Satellite
Exports. Allowed by export licenses and
presidential waivers of post-Tiananmen crackdown
sanctions (in PL 101-246), the United States,
since 1988, has exported satellites to be launched
by China Great Wall Industry Corp. (the same company
sanctioned for missile proliferation). The National
Security Council, in a Secret memo on bilateral
talks leading up to the summit in June (dated
March 12, 1998 and printed in the Washington
Times), proposed to expand space cooperation
with Beijing, increase the number of satellites
that China can launch, issue a blanket presidential
waiver of sanctions, and support China's membership
in the MTCR--in return for effective Chinese export
controls on missiles. However, Congress investigated
in 1998 whether exports of satellites to China
has indirectly assisted China's ballistic missile
and space programs, and satellite exports have
become a controversial issue.413
Nuclear
Cooperation. As agreed during the US-China
summit in October 1997, President Clinton, on
January 12, 1998, signed certifications (as required
by PL 99-183) about China's nuclear nonproliferation
policy and practices to implement the 1985 Nuclear
Cooperation Agreement. According to President
Clinton, the agreement serves US national security,
and environmental and economic interests, and
"the United States and China share a strong interest
in stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction
and other sophisticated weaponry in unstable regions
and rogue states--notably, Iran." The President
also waived a sanction imposed after the Tiananmen
crackdown (in PL 101-246).
Congressional
review ended on March 18, 1998, and the agreement
is now implemented. US firms may apply for Export-Import
Bank financing and licenses from the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and DOE to export nuclear technology
to China, and foreign firms may apply to re-export
US technology. Members pursued several options
to affect the implementation of the agreement.
On November 5, 1997, the House passed a bill with
an amendment sponsored by Rep. Gilman that would
extend Congressional review for implementation
of the agreement from 30 to 120 days and provide
for expedited review procedures. As amended by
Rep. Gilman, the National Defense Authorization
Act for FY 1999 requires the President to notify
Congress "upon" granting licenses for nuclear
exports to a non-NATO country that has detonated
a nuclear explosive device.
Also,
at the summit in Beijing in June 1998, the Department
of Energy (DOE) and the Chinese State Planning
Commission signed an agreement on peaceful nuclear
cooperation, including bringing Chinese engineers
and scientists to US national laboratories, universities,
nuclear reactor facilities, and other institutions.
Some are concerned, however, about security at
US labs and universities. On October 6, 1998,
the House National Security Subcommittee on Military
Procurement held a hearing on foreign visitors
to the labs. Sec. 3131 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY 1999 makes permanent
a ban on activities with China in cooperative
stockpile stewardship. The Cox Committee and the
Intelligence Community have expressed strong concerns
about PRC acquisition of US nuclear weapon secrets.
Some
in Congress, the nonproliferation community, and
elsewhere have been skeptical that Chinese policies
changed sufficiently to warrant the certifications
and that they are in US interests. First, past
Chinese assurances have proven unreliable, and
concerns have persisted about China's nuclear,
missile, and chemical-weapon-related transfers
(especially to Pakistan and Iran). The closed
hearings also reportedly uncovered concerns about
continuing sales even after the certifications.
China did not promise to stop nuclear cooperation
with Pakistan and did not make a public pledge
to stop nuclear assistance for Iran. Also, China
has not shown a satisfactory track record on nuclear
export controls nor adopted all international
nonproliferation standards (by joining the Nuclear
Suppliers Group). Second, there were concerns
that any potential sanctions would hurt US businesses
involved with the China National Nuclear Corporation.
Third, some were concerned that China could retransfer
US technology to countries seeking nuclear weapons
technology and indirectly use the technology in
China's nuclear weapons program. Last, some are
skeptical of any huge potential for US exports,
saying that China aims to expand foreign competitors
for its business and adopt US technology in its
own designs to reduce imports. Indeed, Nucleonics
Week reported on March 4, 1999, that US firms
no longer expected China to order new foreign
reactors soon.
Supporters
in the administration, particularly the Departments
of State and Energy, US nuclear industry, and
others have argued that nuclear technology offers
a source of leverage to advance US goals and the
agreements with China so far should be "pocketed."
China indicated ambitious plans to expand its
nuclear power generation and needed Western technology.
US nuclear cooperation presented a positive incentive
for the Chinese nuclear industry to stop sales
that contribute to nuclear proliferation. Referring
to China's May 11, 1996 commitment, President
Clinton stated in a speech on China on October
24, 1997, that "China has lived up to its pledge
not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities
in third countries." Some added that conditions
for US-China nuclear cooperation should not be
changed in the middle of negotiations. Also, supporters
argued that French, Canadian, and Russian companies
were already selling nuclear technology to China.
Washington would have control over US technology
exports. US companies said that they were losing
out on more than $1.6 billion in annual US nuclear
exports to China and that China was a potentially
large market for reactors, equipment, and technology.
DOE said that China will account for one-third
of the increase in the world's nuclear power in
the next 20 years. US companies, such as Westinghouse
Electric Corp. and Bechtel Power Corp., were seeking
approvals for exports as well as Export-Import
Bank loans. In 1998, China had 2,100 megawatts
of nuclear-power-generating capacity and contracts
to increase that capacity by 2005 to 10,100 megawatts.
China planned to have 20,000 megawatts of nuclear
power by 2010, or 4 percent of electric generation
(from less than 1 percent today).
The
administration urged China to adopt "comprehensive,
nationwide regulations on nuclear export control."
China responded by implementing a set of regulations
(not a law) on nuclear export controls signed
by Premier Li Peng on September 10, 1997. The
regulations permit nuclear exports to only facilities
under IAEA safeguards. There were concerns, however,
that the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA)--in
charge of nuclear export controls, was headed
by the president of the China National Nuclear
Corporation, with competing interests in nuclear
exports. Also, whether China's nuclear weapons
labs (and their contacts with Pakistan) were covered
was unclear. The Foreign Ministry lacked a routine
role in reviewing exports, and the regulations
lacked an enforcement record. China also joined
the Zangger Committee on October 16, 1997. China
issued new export control regulations on dual-use
nuclear items on June 17, 1998.
China,
however, has refused to require full-scope safeguards
(intended to prevent diversions to nuclear weapon
programs) and to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Moreover, Nucleonics Week reported on July
1, 1999 that the State Department has still failed
to acquire Chinese agreement to prevent diversions
of US technology exports to Pakistan. Critics
say that an important source of US leverage was
lost with the presidential certifications.
Sanctions.
Policy debates concerning Chinese technology transfers
have often centered on the question of whether
to impose unilateral sanctions as required by
various US laws. Although certain Chinese transfers
may not violate any international treaties, US
sanctions may be required under US laws. Congress
has passed numerous laws to set US nonproliferation
policy and enforce nonproliferation treaties and
guidelines with unilateral sanctions in response
to violations. Underlying the question of whether
sanctions should be used are disagreements about
the most effective approach for curbing dangerous
Chinese sales and promoting US interests. While
the Soviet threat dominated assessments of foreign
and defense policy, the elimination of that threat
fostered sharp debates about the primacy of security
interests over business or other foreign policy
interests. The President issued a July 29, 1998
executive order (E.O.) that strengthened some
authority in E.O. 12938, but also gives the Secretary
of State more flexibility and discretion in not
imposing sanctions.
Those
who argue for the imposition of US sanctions cite
the legal obligation of the executive branch to
implement and enforce US laws passed by Congress.
They also place a greater priority on nonproliferation
as a national interest and view the strict enforcement
of laws as vital to stemming proliferation. They
refer to reports that China continues to transfer
dangerous technology in defiance of the nonproliferation
regimes and note the lack of Chinese participation
in some significant international groups, such
as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This school of
thought believes that Chinese transfers may pose
a threat in the long term and that a necessary
military response to resulting threats against
Americans or our allies would be terribly costly--as
in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. They also argue
that the narrow interests of an individual firm
or industry should not determine national security
policy. Some who argue for a tough approach say
that China has made commitments to nonproliferation
after facing US pressures and is more likely to
restrain its proliferation activities if there
are concrete and costly consequences tailored
to penalize specific Chinese violators. Moreover,
they assert that, not only are national security
interests at stake, but US credibility is diminished
if the US policy of opposing proliferation is
not strictly carried out. They add that international
nonproliferation regimes have proven to be inadequate,
and until they are strengthened, US laws are vital
to enforcing compliance with the regimes. In this
way, the United States has played the critical
leadership role for a long time and should push
to capitalize on decades of effort. Some are concerned
that if US commitment to peace and stability in
Asia and the Middle East is perceived to have
weakened, arms races would result when states
seek to boost their defensive capabilities.
Those
who argue against the imposition of unilateral
sanctions tend to focus on the harm to US trade
or business interests. Advocates for certain industries
or companies lobby against policy actions deemed
harmful to US businesses. They argue that the
United States needs to stay "commercially engaged"
in China to influence Chinese policies, especially
over the longer term. US policy since the 1970s
has been one of "engagement," to bring China into
the world community with subsequent acceptance
of the international "rules of conduct." Those
arguing against the use of sanctions often say
that sanctions are too broad or are not warranted,
and refer to the progress China has made since
1992 in joining nonproliferation regimes. They
also argue that this improvement needs to be sustained
by a "strategic dialogue." They add that cultivating
relationships with China's military leaders is
important, because they have important influence
over arms sales. When sanctions were imposed,
the dialogue tends to focus on lifting sanctions,
rather than how to stop proliferation. This side
of the debate argues that bilateral and multilateral
options may be more effective and would not affect
American businesses in an unequal way.
The
Clinton administration has apparently tended to
side with opponents of using sanctions. It avoided
imposing sanctions on the PRC for nuclear weapon
proliferation. In early 1996, some in Congress
called for sanctions after reports said that China
sold unsafeguarded ring magnets to Pakistan in
1994-95, apparently in violation of the NPT and
US laws, including the Arms Export Control Act
and Export-Import Bank Act (as amended by the
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994).
On February 5, 1996, the Washington Times
first disclosed intelligence reports that the
China National Nuclear Corporation, a state-owned
corporation, transferred to the A.Q. Khan Research
Laboratory in Kahuta, Pakistan, 5,000 ring magnets,
which can be used in gas centrifuges to enrich
uranium.
On
May 10, 1996, the State Department announced its
decision to not impose sanctions against China
and Pakistan, citing a new agreement with China.
Administration officials said China promised to
provide future assistance only to safeguarded
nuclear facilities, reaffirmed its commitment
to nuclear nonproliferation, and agreed to consultations
on export control and proliferation issues. The
administration also said that Chinese leaders
insisted they were not aware of the magnet transfer
and that there is no evidence that the Chinese
Government had willfully aided or abetted Pakistan's
nuclear weapons program through the magnet transfer.
Thus, the State Department announced that sanctions
were not warranted, and Export-Import Bank considerations
of loans for US exporters to China were returned
to normal. (Later that year, Congress closed what
the State Department apparently found as a loophole
in the law by adding language on "persons" in
the Export-Import Bank Act.)
On
May 11, 1996, China's foreign ministry issued
a statement that "China will not provide assistance
to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities." In any case,
China since 1984 has declared a policy of nuclear
nonproliferation and requirement for recipients
of its transfers to accept IAEA safeguards. China
formalized this policy by acceding to the NPT
in 1992.
Moreover,
since the Clinton administration began, it has
been faced with intelligence reports that the
PRC transferred complete M-11 short-range ballistic
missiles to Pakistan. On August 24, 1993, however,
the administration imposed lesser category II
sanctions on the PRC for transferring M-11 equipment
(not whole missiles) to Pakistan and agreed in
October 1994 to waive those sanctions, after Beijing
promised not to export ground-to-ground missiles
"inherently capable" of delivering a 500-kg warhead
300 km. (Missile technology was not mentioned.)
The administration has not imposed missile proliferation
sanctions on the PRC since then.
Nonetheless,
Gordon Oehler, soon after stepping down as head
of the CIA's Nonproliferation Center, testified
on June 11, 1998, to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that in November 1992, "the Chinese
delivered 34 M-11s to Pakistan." On September
9, 1999, the CIA confirmed for the first time
in a public report that "Pakistan has M-11 SRBMs
from China" and they may have a nuclear role.414
The State Department responded on September 14,
1999, that it requires a "high standard of evidence"
and has not yet concluded that category I sanctions
are warranted, despite the intelligence judgment.
(Category I sanctions would deny licenses for
exports of Munitions List items, among other actions,
and Congress in 1998 transferred satellites back
to the Munitions List.) Reports say that sanctions
were not imposed for transfers of complete M-11s,
because the missiles remain inside crates at Sagodha
Air Base.415
Others say that the Administration has avoided
making any determinations in the first place.
In any case, China has not faced sanctions for
its reported transfers of complete M-11 missiles
to Pakistan, despite the State Department's study
of the issue for the last seven years.
Confirming
long-suspected Chinese transfers contributing
to chemical weapon proliferation, the Administration,
on May 21, 1997, imposed sanctions on two Chinese
companies, five Chinese citizens, and a Hong Kong
company for chemical-weapons-related transfers
to Iran. US sanctions, affecting US Government
procurement and imports, were imposed under the
Arms Export Control Act and Export Administration
Act (as amended by the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act).
Sanctions were not imposed on the Chinese or Hong
Kong governments, because the State Department
said that it had no evidence that those governments
were involved in the transfers.
However,
the administration did not impose sanctions under
the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, because
the transfers in question apparently occurred
before February 10, 1996, the date when provisions
on WMD proliferation took effect. Despite news
and intelligence reports that the PRC has proliferated
chemical weapons since February 1996, new sanctions
have not been imposed. In July 1998, the DCI reported
that, in 1997, Iran acquired CW-related material
"primarily" from Chinese firms. The DCI reported
in July 1999 that Chinese entities continued to
be "significant suppliers" of chemical-weapons-related
items to Iran in the second half of 1998.
Trade
Status. In the 1990s, Congress has annually
debated whether to link conditions to normal trade
relations (NTR) (formerly most-favored-nation
status) for China. Because China has an increasing
and significant trade surplus with the United
States and the Chinese economy depends on the
US market, some believe that trade is a powerful
policy tool to advance vital US goals. President
Clinton has separated renewal of normal trade
status from proliferation issues, arguing that
trade is too broad a policy tool that would hurt
US firms. Congress has not passed legislation
to deny normal trade status for China. It is also
doubtful that conditions would be attached to
the PRC's enjoying permanent NTR status or entry
into the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Import
Controls. To avoid broad sanctions or
steps that may affect US companies, some have
proposed controls on imports of products produced
by Chinese military or defense-industrial companies
suspected of contributing to WMD proliferation.
Import controls have been included as possible
sanctions in response to missile proliferation
(Section 73[a][2][C] of the Arms Export Control
Act). Many, however, are concerned about negative
impacts on trade.
Export
Controls. Export controls are an important
policy tool, because US technology provides one
source of leverage over Beijing. For example,
the Reagan administration, in 1987, froze export
control liberalization because China sold Silkworm
anti-ship missiles to Iran. After the Cold War,
US export restrictions have been reduced to focus
on items that contribute significantly to the
development and production of WMD. Some in Congress
are concerned about US technology reaching hostile
states with WMD programs through China. Congress
may strengthen controls over missile-related technology.
US military sales to China have not been allowed
since sanctions were imposed after the 1989 Tiananmen
crackdown, but there is increasing demand to export
dual-use technology that could enhance China's
military capabilities.
Nonproliferation
Efforts
Nonproliferation
Regimes
Another policy approach is to strengthen the international
nonproliferation regimes. Such efforts have two
prongs: encouraging Chinese support for strengthening
the regimes to enforce compliance and filling
gaps in China's participation. Some say that including
China would capitalize on its desire to be treated
as a "great power" and to be perceived as a responsible
world leader. In addition, China might be more
cooperative if it helped to draw up the "rules."
Others, however, argue that China's participation
would obstruct efforts for tighter export controls,
derail arms control efforts, link them to the
Taiwan issue (e.g., the Mideast arms control talks),
or weaken provisions (e.g., the CTBT).
For
nuclear nonproliferation, the UN Security Council
has recognized the limits to the effectiveness
of the NPT/IAEA safeguards system (as shown by
Iraq's and North Korea's advanced, clandestine
nuclear weapons programs) and has tried to strengthen
the IAEA's verification authority. To strengthen
the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), negotiators
are drafting a verification protocol for on-site
inspections to monitor compliance.
The
United States and others might encourage China
to join the MTCR (as a member after it establishes
a record of compliance and effective export controls),
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Australia Group
(on chemical and biological weapons), and Wassenaar
Arrangement (military and dual-use export controls).
Indeed, the National Security Council in a Secret
memo, dated March 12, 1998 (printed in the March
23, 1998 Washington Times), proposed in
a "China missile deal" to expand space cooperation
with Beijing, increase the number of satellites
that China can launch, issue a blanket presidential
waiver of post-Tiananmen sanctions on satellite
launches, and support China's membership in the
MTCR--in return for effective Chinese missile
export controls.
However,
membership in the MTCR would exempt China from
certain sanctions (unless the laws on missile
nonproliferation are amended), provide it with
intelligence, give it a potentially obstructionist
role in decisionmaking, and relax missile-related
export controls to China. At the summit in Beijing
in June 1998, China did not agree to join the
MTCR but said it is "actively studying" whether
to join. In Washington on January 12, 1999, China's
chief arms control official, Ambassador Sha Zukang,
signaled opposition to the MTCR by proposing that
it be replaced with a multilateral Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty. Indeed, in 1999, Congress passed
a law placing conditions on the PRC's membership
in the MTCR.
China
joined the Zangger Committee (on nuclear trade)
in October 1997. But China is the only major nuclear
supplier to shun the 35-nation NSG, which requires
"full-scope safeguards"(IAEA inspections of all
other declared nuclear materials and facilities
in addition to the facility importing supplies
to prevent diversions to weapon programs). Such
a requirement would have important implications
for the PRC's continuing nuclear cooperation with
Pakistan.
Regional
Security Talks
Chinese support may be sought for regional arms
control groups, such as multilateral talks for
South Asia. In 1991, President Bush initiated
the Arms Control in the Middle East (ACME), or
Permanent Five, talks to seek bans on nuclear
bomb materials and ballistic missiles in the Middle
East. After Bush's decision, announced on September
2, 1992, to sell Taiwan 150 F-16 fighters, China
suspended its participation in the talks. The
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has become an important
multilateral security group in Asia. Some say
that major nonnuclear powers, such as Japan, should
be included.
Foreign
and Defense Policies
Comprehensive
Engagement
The administration resumed high-level exchanges
and pursues "comprehensive engagement" with China
to advance US security goals, including nonproliferation.
President Clinton granted Jiang Zemin two summits
in eight months: in Washington, on October 29,
1997, and in Beijing, on June 29, 1998. The summit
in Beijing produced an agreement on nontargeting
nuclear weapons, and Joint Statements on South
Asia and on biological weapons. Also, China refused
to join the MTCR but said it is "actively studying"
whether to join. Critics say that little was achieved
and China should not be in the MTCR. The Clinton
administration participated in the first "track
2" arms control dialogue with China in Beijing
on September 24-25, 1998.
Missile
Defense
Missile defense is another possible response to
the problem of missile proliferation. Regional
theater missile defense (TMD) systems are said
to have a key role in the strategy to counter
the threat of missiles and WMD. China is opposed
strongly to US deployment of missile defense systems
or cooperation with Japan or Taiwan. China is
concerned that missile defense programs would
bring an arms race, weaken its deterrence capabilities,
and forge closer US-Taiwan military cooperation
akin to an alliance. As required by the FY 1999
National Defense Authorization Act, the Defense
Secretary submitted a report in May 1999 on TMD
systems that could be transferred to Japan, South
Korea, and/or Taiwan.
Taiwan
China has increasingly tried to link missile nonproliferation
to the Taiwan issue, particularly US arms sales
to Taiwan. On January 8, 1997, Secretary of State-designate
Madeleine Albright responded to Senator Craig
Thomas that she opposed any such linkage. Nevertheless,
during President Clinton's visit to China in June
1998, the administration considered, then disagreed
on, a Chinese request for a US pledge to deny
TMD technology with Taiwan, if China promised
to stop missile proliferation with Iran.416
International
Lending and Japan
Congress
may seek to link US support for loans made by
international financial institutions to China's
nonproliferation record. The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation
Act requires US opposition to multilateral loans
for sanctioned countries (Section 1605[b][2]).
However, US influence is limited, and the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank have resumed
and increased substantial lending to China. Moreover,
as part of the sanctions imposed after the 1989
Tiananmen crackdown, the United States has supported
only international loans for basic human needs
in China.
Coordination
with Japan is important, since it provides the
most significant bilateral aid to China and was
the only country to use aid to pressure China
to stop nuclear testing. In May 1995, Tokyo suspended
the small, grant portion of its aid program in
China to protest Chinese nuclear testing, and
Tokyo restored the aid (worth about $56 million)
only after Beijing began a moratorium on nuclear
testing. The US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security
Alliance for the 21st Century (signed on April
17, 1996) cited agreement on coordination to prevent
the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.
Some argue that Japan, as nonnuclear power, should
be rewarded with greater international status,
such as a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
Conclusion:
US Leadership
In
conclusion, a common strategy supported throughout
and executed at the highest levels of the US Government
is needed to counter the threat of weapon proliferation
posed by the PRC and other countries. Domestic
leadership is required to narrow the divide within
the administration and between the administration
and Congress. First, an example of mixed signals
is the Pentagon's November 1998 East Asia Strategy
Report, which criticized continuing Chinese missile
and chemical proliferation activities but nonetheless
listed weapon nonproliferation as eighth on a
list of nine elements of the strategy. Instead,
the Department of Defense, speaking the language
of national security, could be a useful voice
on nonproliferation as it pursues military relations
with the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Indeed,
during his visit to Beijing in January 1998, Defense
Secretary Cohen secured some assurances from the
PRC President on stopping transfers of anti-ship
cruise missiles to Iran. Second, the State Department's
avoidance of sanctions as required by law and
as called for by public intelligence reports continue
to raise questions about the Clinton administration's
credibility in safeguarding US national security
interests. Many are concerned that the administration
may negotiate away important benefits for Beijing,
with few lasting gains.
An
example of a proposal to strengthen leadership
in the US Government is the "Deutch report." On
July 14, 1999, the Commission to Assess the Organization
of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction, led by former
DCI Deutch, made recommendations for reorganizing
the government to counter the "grave threat" of
WMD proliferation. It cited Chinese proliferation
activities as contributing to that threat and
called for Presidential leadership, a new National
Director for Combating Proliferation, better policy
implementation, and creation of a new budget category.
In
addition, concerted US leadership in the world
is needed, especially since multilateral efforts
would be more effective against a PRC wary of
international isolation. US leadership must be
maintained in multilateral nonproliferation efforts.
Confusing messages were sent when the State Department
sought a way out of sanctions for transferring
ring magnets, when President Clinton certified
the PRC's nonproliferation practices so an export
agreement could be implemented and a summit could
claim a centerpiece, and similarly when the United
States signed the CTBT, but the Senate was able
to reject the treaty in October 1999.
US
policy options are limited by years of not using
certain highly publicized sources of leverage
(including proliferation sanctions and most-favored-nation
trade status), while expending the leverage provided
by the nuclear cooperation agreement. Even comprehensive
engagement and summitry have failed to produce
lasting gains for nonproliferation goals or stable
bilateral relations. As US-PRC relations will
continue to be rocky, especially over Taiwan and
missile defense, the outlook for PRC cooperation
in weapon nonproliferation will be unfavorable
for US national interests. While effective bilateral
relations are important for securing PRC cooperation
in weapon nonproliferation, US national interests
ought not be negotiated away for short-term gains.
Chinese
Views of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Michael
D. Swaine
This
chapter examines Chinese views regarding the possession,
use, and transfer of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), including nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons and their principal means of delivery.
These views are derived from an examination of
Chinese statements and practices concerning WMD
as well as assessments provided by knowledgeable
experts on China and WMD issues. This chapter
does not present a detailed analysis of China's
WMD force structure, deployments, or modernization
program. Such features are discussed only insofar
as they shed light on Chinese viewpoints and beliefs
toward WMD. The chapter begins with a summary
of four major factors influencing Chinese attitudes
toward WMD. It then presents an assessment of
China's basic view since 1949 regarding the use,
possession, and transfer of WMD. This section
is followed by a discussion of several modifications
in China's basic viewpoint as a result of several
major developments occurring largely since the
seventies. The chapter concludes with some speculations
on the possible future evolution of Chinese views
toward WMD possession, use, and transfer.
Major
Factors Influencing China's Attitude Toward WMD
China's
basic viewpoint toward weapons of mass destruction
has been influenced by four basic factors: (1)
geostrategic realities; (2) historical experience;
(3) leadership perceptions and beliefs; and (4)
technological, organizational, and economic capabilities
and limitations.
China's
approach to WMD is greatly conditioned by the
basic geostrategic environment confronting the
Chinese state. The most significant and enduring
features of this environment are: (a) the existence
of a very long and in many places geographically
porous border; (b) the presence along or near
this border of many nation states, some possessing
relatively sophisticated military forces; and
(c) in recent decades, the nearby presence of
two large nuclear weapons powers (Russia and the
United States) and a proto-nuclear power (India),
all of which have either threatened or fought
with China since 1949.417
These basic features have required the construction
by China of a military force sufficient to deter
large-scale conventional and WMD threats and attacks,
to defend Chinese territory against an actual
invasion should deterrence fail, and generally
to sustain Chinese political and military influence
along the periphery. Moreover, as discussed in
greater detail below, shifts in the specific disposition
and type of geostrategic threats posed to China
since 1949 by major WMD-armed powers (and in particular
Russia and the United States) have exerted an
important influence on the possession and potential
use by China of weapons of mass destruction, whereas
alterations in the larger international environment
relating to WMD issues (e.g., the emergence of
a robust set of WMD-oriented arms control regimes)
have affected China's approach to WMD possession
and transfer in particular.
China's
historical experience in the modern era (i.e.,
since the mid-19th century) has served to enhance
the sense of insecurity and resulting vulnerability
created by China's geostrategic environment as
well as China's desire for great power status.
Specifically, China has been the object of armed
intervention, subjugation, and humiliation by
foreign industrial powers at various times during
the past nearly one hundred and fifty years. These
experiences have created an acute and enduring
sensitivity to perceived foreign "bullying" and
intimidation and resulted in a strong need to
neutralize such threats. In addition, China's
longstanding position as the preeminent power
in East Asia has served to intensify Chinese sensitivity
to foreign threats and slights while strengthening
the desire for renewed international respect and
equal treatment for China as a major power in
the international community. WMD obviously can
play a role in both neutralizing perceived threats
and attaining great power status.
Chinese
leadership perceptions and beliefs have exerted
a significant influence over China's rhetorical
stance toward WMD possession, use, and transfer,
as well as more substantive elements of WMD doctrine
and force structure. Chinese leaders believe that
the threat of WMD use has been employed by larger,
more developed powers such as the former Soviet
Union and the United States to intimidate and
blackmail weaker, smaller powers and generally
to maintain the dominant influence of such larger
powers within the international system.418
Thus, weapons of mass destruction are viewed by
Chinese leaders as a major stimulus to great power
rivalry and global instability. Of even greater
importance, the Chinese leadership believes that
China has been a primary target of WMD threats
and deployments by the superpowers since the fifties
and sixties. In particular, the United States
leveled nuclear threats against China and, in
the view of some Chinese, employed chemical and
biological weapons against Chinese troops during
the Korean war,419
while the Soviets indirectly threatened the use
of nuclear weapons against China in the sixties.
In addition, both countries have targeted China
with strategic nuclear weapons and deployed tactical
nuclear (and possibly, in the case of the former
Soviet Union, chemical and biological) weapons
along China's periphery.420
Finally, China was subjected to biological weapons
use by Japan during WWII and large quantities
of chemical weapons abandoned by Japanese troops
remain in China.
Arguably
the greatest impact on China's viewpoint toward
WMD possession has been exerted by basic technological,
organizational, and economic factors. China's
low industrial and technological base, limited
finances, and early reliance on Soviet weapons
designs, organizational structures and systems
engineering have combined to restrict the size
and sophistication of China's WMD systems, especially
its nuclear inventory. At the same time, as will
be discussed in greater detail below, changes
in the nature of the superpower threat as well
as major increases in advanced technologies in
the areas of warhead yield, surveillance, detection,
targeting, and long-range precision delivery systems
have together increased China's vulnerability
to conventional and WMD attack and raised the
likelihood of the limited use of WMD on the battlefield.
Such developments, combined with China's economic
and technological limitations, have also led to
a distinctive approach to and reliance upon ballistic
and cruise missiles as non-WMD conventional weapons.
China's
Basic Approach to WMD Possession, Use, and Transfer
The
above factors have combined to produce China's
basic approach to WMD possession, use, and transfer.
This approach has remained fairly constant over
time, although developments in recent decades
(discussed in the following section) have produced
some modification of views on specific issues.
Three distinctive features of China's basic viewpoint
toward weapons of mass destruction have been evident
since the fifties: 1) rhetorical support for the
complete prohibition of nuclear, biological, and
chemical (NBC) weapons; 2) the possession of a
limited WMD capability in the nuclear arena (and
possibly in the chemical and biological arenas)
for self-defense purposes, combined with a supposed
no-first-use (NFU) doctrine governing nuclear
weapons; and 3) the selective proliferation of
nuclear (and possibly chemical) weapons technologies
for what are perceived as vital strategic objectives.
As
suggested above, monopoly control over weapons
of mass destruction by the superpowers is viewed
by the leadership of China as a clear threat to
Chinese security, a source of regional and global
instability, and a potential precipitant of war
within the international community. As a result
of such perceptions, China officially has stated
that it supports, as the ultimate goal of disarmament,
the complete prohibition and thorough destruction
of all nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction.421
Beijing also repeatedly declares that it opposes
arms races of whatever type and any use of WMD
or threats to use WMD against other states. In
recent years, China also has declared often that
it does not advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation
and does not help other countries develop nuclear
weapons (more on this point below).422
Moreover, China consistently has advocated the
complete prohibition and thorough destruction
of chemical, biological, and space weapons. It
claims that it does not develop, produce, stockpile,
or possess chemical or biological weapons and
opposes the production and deployment of such
weapons by any country and their proliferation
in any form by any country. China officially has
denied ever having acquired or retained chemical
or biological weapons or their delivery systems.
Although China has been accused of exporting chemical
weapons-related materials and technology to countries
of concern in the developing world, it repeatedly
has denied these charges. China claims that it
has formulated extremely stringent measures to
control its chemical exports.423
In
line with this overall position, China is a party
to most of the major international agreements
concerning the control and/or abolition of nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons, including the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty, the Geneva Protocol, the Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC).424
At
the same time, Chinese leaders believe that, given
the continued presence of WMD in the international
community as well as China's general historical
experience in the modern era, China must possess
WMD capabilities to deter superpower blackmail
and threats, to reduce the likelihood of instability
and war, and generally to heighten China's regional
and global status and political influence.425
Nuclear weapons are of particular importance in
this effort.426
Thus WMD capabilities essentially have been viewed
by Chinese leaders, from the strategic perspective,
as defensive political instruments necessary to
counter threats and deter attacks and to support
China's great power aspirations, and not as offensive,
first-strike or warfighting instruments of any
type.427
And, in the view of most Chinese, the possession
of WMD capabilities (especially nuclear capabilities)
also provide China with superior weight and influence
(some would say status and respect) as a great
power within the international community.428
This
set of views, when combined with the above-mentioned
technical and economic limitations confronting
China as a developing country, together explain
the acquisition by China of a small yet survivable,
retaliatory nuclear weapons capability in the
form of a low number of nuclear-armed intermediate-range
ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), an aging long-range
nuclear bomber force capable of delivering a hundred
or so nuclear bombs to distant targets, and a
single nuclear missile submarine (SSBN) armed
with a dozen nuclear-tipped missiles. These forces
are intended to hold at risk a small number of
key population centers and major forward-deployed
military assets of a more powerfully nuclear-armed
adversary, i.e., the United States or Russia,
and to caution other nuclear or proto-nuclear
powers such as India against contemplating the
threat or use of weapons of mass destruction against
China.429
This
capability constitutes a so-called credible "limited,
self-defense counterattack" force that can undertake
small-scale nuclear retaliation at a time and
against targets of Beijing's choosing. Such a
strategy often is described by the Chinese as
following the general principle of houfa zhiren
(to gain mastery by striking only after the enemy
has struck first).430
In more technical terms, this so-called minimum
deterrence doctrine generally assumes that China
would absorb an initial nuclear attack rather
than undertake a launch under attack (LUA) or
a launch on warning (LOW).431
Perhaps most important, its deterrent effectiveness
hinges on the inability of an adversary to destroy
all of China's WMD facilities in a first strike.
Given the small size of China's strategic nuclear
arsenal as compared to the arsenals of both the
United States and Russia, China has been unwilling
to participate in strategic arms limitation discussions
with either or both powers.
The
small, defensive nature of China's nuclear force
and China's general opposition to nuclear blackmail
and intimidation are reinforced by the public
enunciation of a supposed commitment never to
use nuclear weapons first in a conflict and never
to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
nonnuclear states or nuclear free zones.432
Hence, China formally opposes offensive-based
nuclear deterrence doctrines and extended nuclear
deterrence guarantees, and is against the deployment
of nuclear weapons outside national territories.433
The Chinese explicitly oppose doctrines based
on "war-winning" nuclear war strategies,434
in favor of the above summarized self-defense
stance purportedly designed to oppose and check
the outbreak of a nuclear war.
This
so-called NFU principle is valued for its political
effect, both on the superpowers and toward lesser
powers. Specifically, Beijing intends to show
its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons by
any power, in an attempt to politically coerce
or subjugate other nations. This stance reinforces,
in the public arena at least, the impression that
China does not pose a WMD threat to the superpowers.
The latter objective is particularly important,
given the absolute WMD superiority of the superpowers
over China. The NFU principle also is intended
to support the above-mentioned effort at the total
abandonment of nuclear weapons, by indicating
China's apparent refusal to develop the type of
large, offensive, warfighting WMD arsenal possessed
by Russia and the United States.
Despite
China's rhetorical stance regarding chemical and
biological weapons, Beijing probably sees the
value of possessing a small inventory of chemical
and biological weapons, or the essential components
of such weapons, as a deterrent against potential
chemical and biological threats or attacks. This
stance seems especially likely given the prevalent
Chinese belief that China has been the target
of chemical and biological threats or attacks
by the superpowers in the past, and that the superpowers
(and perhaps other lesser powers) continue to
maintain some chemical and/or biological weapons.435
In fact, available evidence suggests that China
indeed might maintain a small chemical and biological
weapons inventory as part of its overall "limited,
self-defense" approach to potential WMD threats.
In
the area of chemical weapons, China reportedly
has funded a chemical warfare program since the
1950s and has produced and weaponized a variety
of agents, apparently as part of a defensive chemical
warfare program designed to deter any potential
chemical attack against China. Chinese military
forces also conduct defensive chemical warfare
training and are prepared to operate in contaminated
environments.436
China has held both nuclear and chemical weapons
exercises since the 1960s. Contrary to Beijing's
claims, the United States Government believes
that China has a mature chemical warfare capability,
including R & D, production and weaponization
capabilities.437
Moreover, in September 1997, in compliance with
the declaration requirements of the CWC, China
submitted a confidential declaration reportedly
stating that it had formerly possessed chemical
weapons sites. China has not publicly declared
whether a chemical weapons stockpile formerly
existed.438
Regarding
biological weapons, the United States Government
believes that China possessed an offensive biological
weapons program prior to 1984 when it became a
party to the BWC and maintained an offensive biological
warfare program throughout most of the 1980s.
There are strong indications that China probably
continues to maintain its offensive program today.439
In 1993, reports indicated that US intelligence
believed that China was conducting biological
research at two civilian research centers run
by the Chinese military.440
These facilities were reportedly known to have
produced and stored biological weapons. In the
view of many outside experts, China probably has
not been in compliance with its BWC obligations.
China's
above-basic stance toward weapons of mass destruction
does not totally exclude the possibility that
Chinese leaders might be the first to use such
weapons in a crisis, especially within a limited
military theater; nor does it mean that China's
leaders would never transfer NBC weapons to other
powers. The concept of preemptive military action
within a limited theater (i.e., at a sub-strategic
level), to deter a major conventional attack or
to prevent a major escalation of a lesser attack
is usually applied by the Chinese to the conventional
arena. For some Chinese at least, however, this
notion apparently has a potential application
to the WMD arena as well. In particular, some
Chinese strategists apparently believe that Beijing
would contemplate the initial use of theater-oriented
NBC weapons in a crisis if the leadership perceived
that China was about to be attacked by such weapons.441
This possibility is made more likely because many
Chinese apparently do not accept automatically
that a limited nuclear conflict would escalate
to a general nuclear war.442
Despite
its present-day public commitment to the objectives
of the nonproliferation movement, China has at
times seen the utility of transferring nuclear
weapons to valued political allies as strategic
stabilizers. During the Maoist era, China sought
to obtain nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union
and generally advocated the proliferation of nuclear
weapons among socialist states, as part of the
general effort to oppose "imperialist aggression."443
Yet the only unambiguous example of actual, deliberate
Chinese involvement in the transfer of NBC weapons
of mass destruction for national policy ends began
in the post-Mao era and served much narrower regional
strategic interests, i.e., the creation of a strategic
counterweight to India in South Asia through the
transfer of nuclear-weapons-related designs, technology
and equipment to Pakistan.444
This effort was undertaken to establish a friendly
Islamic state along China's southwest flank and,
more important, to provide Islamabad with a small,
defensive nuclear capability that would divert
India's energies and attention to dealing with
its regional rival, hopefully without provoking
a nuclear confrontation in South Asia. Thus, China
has been willing to engage in limited levels of
nuclear proliferation to serve what it regards
as critical strategic objectives.
Modifications
in China's Basic Approach
The
above basic Chinese view toward weapons of mass
destruction has undergone some modifications in
recent decades as a result of four major events:
the end of the Maoist era; the emergence of a
more active and effective international arms control
environment; changes in the military threat posed
by the Soviet Union and the United States; and
the advent of new and more varied WMD capabilities
by potential adversaries. Taken together, these
factors have served to alter some important elements
of China's basic viewpoint toward WMD use in particular
and also have exerted some influence on views
toward WMD transfer. Specifically, they have led
to: 1) a more pragmatic and sophisticated assessment
of the role of WMD in protecting China's security
(along with improvements in the quality of China's
nuclear inventory); 2) an increased emphasis on
the development and deployment of multirole ballistic
missiles; 3) greater restraints on WMD transfers;
and possibly 4) a growing consideration of substrategic
WMD use under limited war conditions.
The
End of the Maoist Era
Maoists believed, as do Chinese leaders in general,
that such socialist states as China need to acquire
WMD capabilities (and especially nuclear weapons)
for defensive purposes, to break the superpowers'
"nuclear monopoly" and deter superpowers from
war or threats of war.445
Hence, although they stood publicly for the eventual
abolition of all WMD, Maoists certainly recognized
the need for a WMD-based defensive deterrence
capability, especially after China had received
nuclear threats from the United States in the
early fifties.446
Maoist theory, however, also tended to downplay
the power of weapons of mass destruction and the
significance of such weapons as a key factor influencing
a state's calculations regarding the initiation
and prosecution of armed conflict. In particular,
Maoists did not see weapons of mass destruction
as possessing a special power to prevent an attack
or to dominate a battlefield, although they were
viewed as tools of superpower dominance in the
larger international political arena.447
Instead, Maoist strategists stressed in their
writings the role of revolutionary political struggle,
human willpower and motivation, the use of stern
warnings and defiance of an adversary, and visible
military movements to deter and defeat an enemy.448
In short, Maoists did not want an unrealistic
fear of nuclear war to prevent support for national
liberation struggles.449
Maoists
thus believed that Western nuclear deterrence
theory and general efforts to reduce tensions
between the superpowers placed an excessive emphasis
on technology and weapons over the human factor
and were a form of appeasement to imperialist
aggression.450
In line with this approach, they also criticized
efforts by the superpowers to limit the spread
of nuclear weapons as an attempt by the superpowers
to establish a nuclear monopoly to dominate and
intimidate other states. And they believed that
such WMD-based intimidation by the superpowers,
combined with aggressive competition between the
superpowers, could lead to war.451
This
largely ideological viewpoint toward the role
of WMD in creating or ensuring inter-state peace,
stability, and conflict prevented the development
of more realistic and explicit doctrines governing
nuclear weapons possession and use.452
Hence, Mao's passing and the subsequent decline
of Maoist influence opened the door to more pragmatic
and technology-driven approaches to WMD threats
and countermeasures.453
Specifically, during the post-Mao era, a more
explicit and realistic recognition gradually emerged
of the capabilities and hence the range of threats
posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons,
including the potential vulnerability of China's
small WMD arsenal to a decapitating first strike.
This development permitted a more deliberate consideration
of a relatively diverse WMD inventory (including
a triad of land-based missiles, submarine-launched
missiles, and bombers, as well as theater and
tactical weapons) and the doctrines for their
use, although these changes did not alter the
basic Chinese emphasis on a defense-based notion
of WMD deterrence. (i.e., maintenance of a retaliatory
WMD force that is primarily countervalue in orientation).454
The
Rise of International Arms Control Regimes
International efforts to stop nuclear testing,
limit fissile materials production, end the proliferation
of WMD capabilities (including technologies, warheads,
and delivery systems), and ban chemical and biological
weapons increased significantly during the seventies,
eighties, and nineties, thus resulting in the
emergence of a wide range of arms control regimes
in these and other areas. Such international efforts,
combined with the passing of the Maoist view of
arms control as "sham disarmament" designed to
increase the dominant position of the superpowers,
led to China's active participation in most arms
control regimes, as indicated above.455
Although
much of China's involvement in these regimes has
amounted to defection and free riding,456
the significant increase in global attention to
and support for arms control efforts, along with
increases in the number of specific arms control
regimes, together have served to limit the size
and diversity of China's WMD capabilities. In
particular, these developments arguably have limited
China's ability to develop a wider range of warhead
designs and posed the possibility of limiting
or reducing China's existing nuclear and WMD stockpiles,
not just its WMD production. They also have arguably
lowered the ability and the willingness of China's
leaders and lower-level elites to transfer WMD
to other countries, either as a function of national
policy or as a result of unsanctioned business
activities.457
Changes
in the Superpower Threat
During the 1950s, the perceived threat of US theater
nuclear attack with tactical weapons was so acute
that some Chinese reportedly contemplated the
possibility of acquiring and employing tactical
and theater nuclear weapons.458
Though largely nascent at that time, this attitude
has gained strength since the late sixties and
seventies as a result of several developments.
In particular, the intensification of tensions
with the Soviet Union and the resulting deployment
of large numbers of relatively sophisticated Soviet
armored formations and tactical nuclear weapons
along China's periphery in the sixties, seventies,
and eighties raised the possibility of a massive
conventional and nuclear assault on Chinese territory
in a limited war scenario.459
China had little defense against such an assault
beyond either: a) a protracted war of attrition
that pitted large numbers of inferior armed Chinese
infantry against Soviet units possessing overwhelming
conventional firepower; or b) escalation of the
conflict to a strategic nuclear confrontation,
where China also was enormously inferior.
By
the 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union had
lowered greatly the threat of a Russian attack
on Chinese territory. Chinese fears of a limited,
yet potentially overwhelming, conventional and/or
WMD attack by a more powerful foreign adversary,
however, did not dissipate as a result. During
the decade, the United States gradually emerged,
in the view of many Chinese, as a new and, in
some ways, more lethal threat to China's security.
The end of Sino-American strategic collaboration,
the violent suppression of prodemocracy demonstrators
by the Chinese Government in June 1989, and growing
Sino-US friction over Taiwan had combined during
the nineties to increase significantly the level
of tension in China's relations with the United
States. Moreover, the performance of US military
forces during the Gulf war showed that Washington
had the technical ability to wreak enormous damage
on an opponent within a limited theater of operation
using conventional weapons (more on this point
below).460
Serious Chinese concerns over the possibility
of a limited yet overwhelming US attack on Chinese
territory, however, only arguably emerged as a
result of the recent Kosovo war. This conflict
indicated to many Chinese that the United States
was willing and able to intervene militarily in
the internal affairs of a sovereign state, without
the approval of the United Nations, and to devastating
effect.461
Hence, despite the collapse of the Soviet Union,
China's sense of vulnerability to a limited yet
overwhelming conventional attack did not diminish
as the decade progressed. One might also add that,
despite the Soviet collapse and the US removal
of tactical nuclear weapons from forward-deployed
forces, China's leaders also remain concerned
over the possible continued presence of tactical
nuclear weapons near China's borders.
Together,
these developments for the first time gave greater
salience to the potential utility for China of
possessing and deploying theater or tactical weapons
of mass destruction in an actual warfighting mode,
to deter overwhelming conventional attacks, and
to avoid escalation of a limited conflict to the
strategic level.462
Technical
Changes and Shortcomings
Many technical changes relevant to WMD possession
and use served to reinforce the general trends
cited in the previous section. Specifically, by
the sixties and seventies, the advent of lower
yield, tactical nuclear weapons, improvements
in battlefield chemical and biological weapons,
and the emergence of new doctrines of flexible
response and sub-strategic conflict with limited
escalation potential led to a growing Chinese
awareness of the possible use of WMD in a variety
of limited theater conflicts. In addition, enormous
technical advances in the areas of surveillance,
detection, targeting, and long-range precision
delivery systems (as seen during the Gulf war463
and even more markedly during the Kosovo war)
combined with more recent movement by the United
States toward a limited national ballistic missile
defense system and the possible deployment of
such systems in East Asia, together increased
China's vulnerability on both the strategic
and substrategic levels and further raised the
overall likelihood of the limited use of WMD on
the battlefield. Moreover, on the strategic level,
the end of the bipolar US-Soviet confrontation
arguably increased China's overall vulnerability
by making possible the ability of either Russia
or the United States to target more weapons on
China if necessary.
China's
continued (indeed, enhanced) sense of vulnerability
to conventional and WMD attacks at both the strategic
and substrategic levels, along with its continuing
inability to develop and deploy such long-range
conventional and WMD strike assets as fourth-generation
fighter-bombers464
and nuclear missile submarines, together have
led to a greater reliance upon one area of weapons
technology in which China has shown considerable
prowess: missiles. China's general attitude toward
the possession and use of ballistic missiles differs
significantly from that of the United States and
other Western countries.465
In particular, for the Chinese, ballistic missiles
are not viewed essentially as weapons of mass
destruction but rather as highly versatile delivery
systems for both WMD and conventional warheads.
In some scenarios, they are treated as relatively
cheap equivalents to such more advanced and versatile
delivery systems as attack aircraft, or even as
a type of very-long-range artillery. For many
Chinese, therefore, ballistic missiles can serve
as either conventional warfighting instruments,
or as delivery systems for both conventional and
WMD deterrence weapons, depending upon their range
and the size and type of warhead employed. As
a result of this broad, essentially non-WMD definition,
China has in the past been willing to transfer
to other countries various types of (especially
short or medium range) missiles, especially those
intended for conventional use. This willingness
also has resulted from increased emphasis on weapons
exports as a means of generating business profits
of the reform era. Yet in recent years, the Chinese
Government has shown a much greater willingness
to restrict the transfer of ballistic missiles,
especially those with intermediate- or long-range
capabilities. At the same time, since the mid-nineties,
the Chinese leadership also increasingly has emphasized
the development and deployment of short-range
ballistic missiles as conventional tactical and
theater-oriented delivery systems. This development
has occurred primarily in support of a larger
strategy of coercive diplomacy toward Taiwan.
For the Chinese leadership, none of these activities
fall within the realm of WMD. Indeed, China has
frequently stated that the focus of WMD nonproliferation
efforts should be on the restriction of WMD per
se, not on delivery systems.466
The
above technical developments, as well as the changes
that occurred in the nature of the threat posed
by the superpowers, together led, in the seventies
and eighties, to Chinese efforts to reduce the
vulnerability of its small, defensive force through
the deployment of solid-fueled, mobile delivery
IRBM and ICBM systems and, more recently, the
development of a nascent MIRV capability to penetrate
ballistic missile defense systems, if necessary.
Beijing also undertook efforts to acquire a more
effective (i.e., larger and more capable) SSBN
force.467
In addition, as suggested above, in the last few
years an increasing number of Chinese have come
to recognize the need to develop and deploy a
variety of more sophisticated theater and tactical
weapons, including small-yield battlefield and
theater nuclear warheads and short- and intermediate-range
ballistic and cruise missiles capable of delivering
both conventional and WMD warheads.
All
of these developments suggest a gradual movement
from China's previous "minimum deterrence" WMD
force structure to a more versatile WMD inventory
including sufficient counter-force and counter-value
tactical, theater, and strategic forces to deter
conventional, theater, and strategic nuclear conflict,
and to control escalation and compel the enemy
to back down if deterrence fails.468
Such a force structure, much less the more sophisticated
"limited deterrence" doctrine to support it, however,
require a wide variety of components, including
high levels of warhead accuracy, a more diverse
range of delivery systems in larger numbers, combat
troops trained to utilize such systems, and more
robust early warning, detection, surveillance,
and targeting capabilities, to identify the source
of attacks and to locate and destroy military
facilities and large conventional and WMD force
concentrations. A capacity for rapid response
and the ability to concentrate firepower quickly
and massively would be required to defeat enemy
forces early and decisively. Although China is
attempting to acquire at least some of these elements
(e.g., greater warhead accuracy and a more proficient
early warning and C3I capability),
others (e.g., combat troops trained to employ
theater and tactical nuclear weapons) are nowhere
in evidence. In short, the Chinese do not at present
possess the capacity to implement this vision,
owing to economic, technical, organizational,
and arms control restraints. Hence, stating that
China is at present actively engaged in developing
a warfighting-oriented, limited deterrence WMD
force structure and doctrine, even at the theater
level, probably is premature.469
China apparently remains, for the present, wedded
to a defensive-oriented, nonwarfighting notion
of WMD deterrence.
Summary
and Future Developments
To
summarize, China's view toward weapons of mass
destruction includes the following six elements
-
Rhetorical
support for the complete prohibition of
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
weapons, allegedly in support of the notion
that such weapons increase the risk of war
and are often employed by larger powers
to bully smaller powers and to generally
dominate the international system.
-
Recognition of the need for China to maintain
a small, retaliatory, counter-value-oriented
WMD capability in the nuclear (and possibly
in the chemical and biological) area, to
prevent efforts at WMD-based blackmail and
intimidation by other powers, and to deter
WMD attacks. For many Chinese, possession
of such capabilities also lends China the
respect and status of a major power.
-
Enunciation of a no-first-use (NFU) doctrine
governing nuclear weapons, presumably to
indicate Beijing's opposition to all attempts
to use nuclear weapons to politically coerce
or subjugate other powers, to reinforce,
in the public arena, the impression that
China does not pose a WMD threat to larger
WMD powers, and to support the objective
of total abandonment of weapons of mass
destruction.
-
Recognition of the necessity to selectively
transfer nuclear (and possibly chemical)
weapons technologies to other countries
(e.g., Pakistan) to serve vital strategic
interests, along with, in recent years,
a greatly reduced ability and willingness
to transfer WMD equipment and technologies
for other purposes.
-
Since
the end of the Maoist era, a more explicit
and realistic recognition of the capabilities
and hence the range of threats posed by
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons,
including the potential vulnerability of
China's small WMD arsenal to a decapitating
first strike, thus permitting a more deliberate
consideration of a relatively diverse WMD
inventory and the doctrines for their use.
In recent years, this approach has included
a growing consideration of substrategic
WMD use under limited war conditions.
-
The
treatment of ballistic missiles not as weapons
of mass destruction per se, but as relatively
cheap and versatile delivery systems for
both WMD and conventional purposes, combined
with both a greater willingness to restrict
the transfer of larger, longer range missiles
and an increasing emphasis on the development
and deployment of short-range ballistic
missiles as conventional tactical and theater-oriented
weapons.
What,
if any, changes might occur in China's viewpoint
toward the use, possession, and transfer of weapons
of mass destruction in the next decade or so?
The above examination suggests that Chinese views
could undergo significant changes in five basic
areas:
First,
and foremost, China's leadership might increasingly
be pressured to jettison, or at least significantly
downplay, its No First Use stance toward nuclear
weapons use. This change could occur largely as
a result of Beijing's continued sense of vulnerability
to a devastating theater (i.e., substrategic)
conventional attack by the United States using
a variety of long-range, precision assets against
which it has few if any effective existing countermeasures
other than nuclear weapons. In such a context,
Chinese leaders and strategists might conclude
that effective deterrence against such an attack
can be provided only if China possesses a genuine
capability and willingness to initiate a tactical
or theater WMD strike first, for either preemptive
purposes, or in response to an initial conventional
attack at that level. This approach, in turn,
would imply the emergence of a true limited deterrence-based
WMD force structure and doctrine.
Second,
and closely related to the previous point, continued
increases in the number and variety of Chinese
ballistic missiles capable of carrying conventional
warheads could lead the Chinese leadership to
adopt a "local war" strategy designed to threaten
or employ large numbers of conventionally armed
short- and intermediate-range missiles against
both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states in
a theater environment, coupled with a warning
of potential escalation to nuclear attack.470
This approach would constitute a conventional
variant of the aforementioned limited deterrence
approach to theater-level conflict.
Third,
over the long term, China's leaders might expand
significantly the size, versatility, and capability
of their strategic nuclear arsenal, primarily
in response to a growing sense of vulnerability
to a decapitating first strike by the United States
resulting from both technical improvements in
the detection, targeting, and warhead accuracy
of the US nuclear arsenal and the deployment by
the United States (and perhaps by Japan) of a
national ballistic missile defense system.471
This policy could result in China's emergence
as a more significant nuclear adversary of the
United States. Although China might approximate
elements of a limited deterrence force on the
strategic level, however, Beijing, for technical,
organizational, economic, and perhaps political
reasons, is unlikely to acquire an offensive,
first-strike capability.
Fourth,
China is likely to show increasing restraint toward
the transfer of WMD capabilities (including long-range
missile systems) to non-WMD states during the
coming decade, largely owing to the continuation
of existing positive trends that serve to limit
China's ability and willingness to undertake such
transfers. China's leaders, however, could become
more willing to transfer WMD capabilities over
the longer term if the United States and China
become genuine strategic adversaries. Under such
circumstances, Beijing's vital strategic interests
are likely to extend beyond their present limits
to include the acquisition of greater influence
over a larger number of areas and countries, in
competition with the United States. The Chinese
leadership might thus calculate that its interests
would be served by cultivating and maintaining
a range of strategic allies through the provision
of WMD-related military assistance. Fortunately,
however, such an outcome is by no means on the
horizon.
Fifth,
China's leadership might seek to acquire the ability
to employ WMD warheads in space, as part of an
effort to counter a space-based US national ballistic
missile defense system that, from the Chinese
viewpoint, poses the danger of neutralizing their
relatively small strategic nuclear arsenal.472
Such a course, however, will likely remain a remote
possibility for a long time to come, given: a)
the cheaper and relatively more feasible alternatives
that China probably would have at hand to counter
a US missile defense system (as indicated in point
three above); b) China's general public stance
against the miniaturization of space; and c) the
likely pressure on China that would emerge from
the international community if Beijing were to
undertake such a course of action.
Weapons
of Precise Destruction: PLA Space and Theater
Missile Development
Mark
A. Stokes
Introduction
The
People's Republic of China (PRC) is developing
one of the most daunting conventional theater
missile challenges in the world. Theater missiles
and supporting space assets are emerging as one
of the most important political and operational
tools of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). A
large arsenal of highly accurate and lethal theater
missiles serves as a "trump card" (shashoujian),
a revolutionary departure from the PLA of the
past. The PLA's theater missiles and a supporting
space-based surveillance network are emerging
not only as a tool of psychological warfare but
also as a potentially devastating weapon of military
utility.473
Theater
ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles, supported
by space-based reconnaissance, appear very likely
to emerge as a cornerstone of PLA warfighting
early in the 21st century. A growing
sector of the PLA believes strategic attack through
theater missile strikes are the best way to even
out the playing field when fighting against a
technologically superior force. The concept of
strategic attack involves pitting one's strengths
against an enemy's weakness, waging an asymmetrical
strategy using overwhelming offensive capabilities.
Theater missiles offer a lethal means of striking
targets that most directly relate to the ability
of the opponent to sustain operations. According
to PLA National Defense University officials,
"The guiding strategic principle of China's new
era military is active defense (jiji fangyu),
of which the required essence is offensive operations
against theater targets."474
Beijing's
drift toward a force dominated by offensive theater
missiles could have significant implications for
regional stability. In the most likely scenario
for their use, the PLA's growing arsenal of highly
accurate and lethal theater missiles, and a preemptive
doctrine could give Beijing a decisive edge in
any future conflict with Taiwan. An overwhelming
offensive advantage could intensify the existing
cross-Strait arms race, reduce Beijing's willingness
to compromise on cross-Strait issues, increase
the chances that force could be used short of
an outright Taiwan declaration of de jure
independence, and prompt Taiwan to shift toward
a tactically offensive doctrine. At the extreme,
an overwhelming PLA offensive advantage could
force Taiwan to pursue a punitive deterrent option.
Drivers
This
paper will first address drivers that are influencing
the PLA force planners who view space assets and
theater missiles as integral to 21st century operations.
The next section outlines Chinese efforts to field
a space-based reconnaissance architecture that
would support theater missile targeting. The paper
then outlines research and development aimed at
fielding a large arsenal of ballistic and land-attack
cruise missiles. The following section details
operational concepts associated with a PLA theater
missile campaign, to include organizational issues,
information denial, and the Second Artillery's
phased approach to theater warfighting. The paper
concludes with a discussion of the operational
and political implications of an offensive-dominated
force structure, as well as potential countermeasures.
A
number of drivers are propelling Beijing toward
reliance on theater missiles and supporting space
assets. These include: 1) lessons from the Gulf
war and subsequent US and Russian literature on
the revolution in military affairs (RMA); 2) a
doctrinal shift toward offensive preemption, surprise,
and deep strikes against strategic and operational
targets; 3) use of Taiwan as a preeminent force
planning scenario; and 4) prevention of foreign
intervention in a Taiwan scenario through an area
denial strategy.
Lessons
from the Gulf War
China's interest in deep attack was sparked in
large part by lessons from the Gulf war and subsequent
US and Russian literature on the RMA. The US performance
in the Gulf war demonstrated to the Central Military
Commission (CMC) the preeminence of the offensive,
especially airpower and long-range precision strike.
In a December 1995 meeting, the CMC concluded
that "ground fighting can only enhance the results
of battle." Lessons from the Gulf war have been
reinforced by calls to meet its challenges of
21st century warfare through selected exploitation
of the RMA.475
Chinese commentators note areas for exploitation
include precision strike, strategic maneuver,
and space combat.476
Emerging
Operational Concepts
The Gulf war and the RMA have sparked a fundamental
reassessment of the PLA's approach to warfare.
Operational concepts articulated in a wide range
of PLA publications serve as an important driver
propelling the PLA toward theater missiles and
supporting space assets. Key to future conflicts
around the PRC's periphery will be achieving a
rapid political resolution through rapid establishment
of information dominance (zhixinxiquan)
and air superiority (zhikongquan) in the
opening phases of a conflict.477
The concept of "rapid war, rapid resolution" (suzhan,
sujue) requires a series of crippling strikes
directed against vital points (dianxue)
of the enemy's defense infrastructure. These critical
nodes include civilian and military command and
control facilities; intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance nodes; and important airfields
and air defense sites. This concept does not require
annihilation of the enemy or occupation of his
territory, only a paralyzing "mortal blow" (zhiming
daji), "winning victory with one strike" (yizhan,
ersheng).478
From the Chinese perspective, "gaining the initiative
by striking first" (xianfa zhiren), is
one of most effective means of offsetting the
technological and logistic advantages that a more
advanced military power would bring to the fight.
The emerging doctrine requires a high degree of
secrecy, mobility, an accurate concentration of
firepower, and surprise.479
Use
of Taiwan as a Primary Force Planning Scenario
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Taiwan
appears to have become a primary testing grounds
for the PLA's emerging operational concepts. Military
force planners around the world generally rely
on illustrative planning scenarios to guide the
development of doctrine, research and development
(R&D), and acquisition. Until the early to
mid-1990's, China did not appear to be fostering
an ability to take Taiwan by force. Nor did the
PRC deploy more than a symbolic land, sea or air
force presence within 300 miles of Taiwan. Now,
however, PLA modernization--and theater missile
development in particular--is motivated in large
part by the desire to use decisive military force
as a means to deter Taiwan independence sentiment
and strengthen the PRC's hand in a re-established
cross-Strait dialogue. The focus on Taiwan may
reflect a view within the PLA that force may eventually
have to be used.
With
Taiwan as the primary driver, the PLA has three
general operational requirements. First is the
capacity to bring Taiwan to its knees quickly
through paralysis of Taipei's ability to conduct
military operations. Critical to this effort is
establishment of information dominance by neutralizing
Taiwan's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
assets and paralyzing its command and control
network. Information dominance enhances the conditions
necessary to control the airspace over Taiwan.
Theater ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles,
used in parallel with electronic warfare, special
operations, and offensive counterair operations,
can play a crucial role in the rapid establishment
of information and air superiority. Control of
the information environment and the skies above
the Taiwan Strait--if not enough to force a resolution
in itself--could create the conditions necessary
for dominance of seas and facilitate an amphibious
invasion, if necessary.480
The PLA must also hedge against strikes against
its own critical assets and facilities.
Prevention
of Foreign Intervention
At the same time, the PLA must deny foreign forces
the ability to intervene either through a quick
resolution of the conflict or through complicating
their ability to enter the area of operations.
Since the US deployment of two aircraft carrier
battle groups off the coast of Taiwan in March
1996, PLA planners probably assume the United
States would intervene in a future Taiwan scenario.
PLA writings indicate Beijing is pursuing the
kinds of capabilities intended to deter or prevent
intervention by outside powers, such as the United
States. The PLA has carefully studied US military
weaknesses and has identified vulnerabilities
in US force projection, including reliance on
space systems, weaknesses in aircraft carrier
battle groups, and air expeditionary forces.481
The
most fundamental requirement for denying the United
States the ability to intervene in a Taiwan conflict
would be an expanded capacity for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance. Monitoring US
deployments could enable PLA targeting of critical
nodes in the Western Pacific in order to complicate
or delay US intervention in a Taiwan scenario.
Successful use of overwhelming force through preemptive
strikes to quickly resolve the Taiwan issue could
preclude US intervention by presenting Washington
and the international community with a fait
accompli.
Space
Support for Theater Missile Operations
Under
CMC guidance, China's space and missile industry
is working toward the fielding a constellation
of reconnaissance systems that could support the
PLA with near-real-time intelligence early in
the next century. PLA observers view exploitation
of space assets as crucial for 21st century warfare.
Theater operations must be supported by a surveillance
architecture for strategic intelligence, targeting,
and battle damage assessment (BDA). Effective
theater missile operations need to see deep. Before
any targets can be struck, they must be identified
as targets, precisely located, and defenses accurately
assessed so that they can be hit without prohibitive
losses. This requires information from a variety
of space-based, airborne, and ground-based sensors.
Through its existing air- and ground-based reconnaissance
network, the PLA currently has the ability to
monitor activities within line of sight of its
borders--approximately 200 nautical miles.482
To expand its battlespace awareness, however,
the PLA must develop the means to monitor activities
in the Western Pacific, South China Sea, and Indian
Ocean. Space assets could enable the monitoring
of naval activities in the Pacific and Indian
Oceans and the South China Sea and could track
US Air Force air expeditionary force (AEF) deployments
into the region. Space-based reconnaissance systems
also provide the images necessary for mission
planning functions, such as navigation and terminal
guidance for land-attack cruise missiles.
China
Aerospace S&T Corporation (CASC) is developing
at least four space-based systems that would expand
PLA battlespace awareness and support strike operations
farther from Chinese shores.483
Space operations are the responsibility of the
PLA General Armaments Department (GAD) China Launch
and Tracking Control General (CLTC).484
Although only a small percentage of space-derived
ISR assets will be near-real time, the number
and diversity of sensors could provide frequent
revisit times and complementary data on significant
military targets on Taiwan and in the Western
Pacific.485
By
the 2005-2010 time frame, China's space-based
surveillance architecture could have at least
four components: 1) synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
satellites for all-weather, day/night monitoring
of military activities; 2) electronic reconnaissance
satellites to detect electronic emissions in the
Western Pacific; 3) mid-high-resolution electro-optical
satellites for early warning, targeting, and mission
planning; and 4) a new generation of high-resolution
recoverable satellites for intelligence and analysis.
According to Chinese sources, SAR and electronic
reconnaissance satellites would serve as important
components of an ocean monitoring (haiyang
jianshi) network for detecting and tracking
naval activities, to include carrier battle groups
and submarines. Development of a space-based surveillance
architecture has in large part been funded under
the special 863 program budget.486
Radar
Imaging Satellites
Work on an indigenous synthetic radar (SAR) satellite
(hecheng kongjing leida weixing) began
in the 1980s. Under the 863 Program, China's space
industry and oceanographic research organizations
began preliminary research on an SAR satellite
in 1987. The program moved into the applied R&D
phase in 1991. After successful fielding of an
airborne SAR system,487
China's State Science and Technology Commission
(SSTC) and the PLA's Commission of Science, Technology,
and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) approved
the finalized design and associated high-speed
data transmission system in May 1995.
Production
of the first-generation SAR satellite is included
in the 9th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000). China's
first radar imaging satellite, designated the
Haiyang-1 (HY-1), is slated for launch in the
year 2000. The HY-1 will be based on a small satellite
bus that will serve as a common bus for a range
of future satellite constellations, to include
an integrated SAR/EO small satellite constellation.
The HY-1 and major subsystems passed a design
finalization review recently and a test model
is supposed to be delivered by end of this year.
Preliminary research has already begun on a more
sophisticated second-generation SAR satellite
system.488
Although
SAR satellites have civilian applications, Chinese
journals note their principle purpose is to support
national defense. The PLA and other parts of the
state apparatus view radar satellite imagery as
a critical modernization program. Unlike electro-optical
systems, GSD Second Department advocates note
that space-based SAR systems can see through clouds,
rain, and fog in order to detect and track ships
and submarines in shallow waters.489
China
has arranged to receive down-linked radar satellite
imagery to help establish a foundation for radar
satellite imagery exploitation. The PRC has entered
contractual agreements to obtain commercial radar
satellite data from a number of foreign vendors.
China began receiving SAR data from ERS-1 and
JERS-1 satellites in 1994 and from Canada's RADARSAT
in 1997. Included in the arrangement was training
of imagery analysts.490
Electronic
Reconnaissance Satellites
Electronic reconnaissance satellites (dianzi
zhencha weixing) appear to be the second component
of an ocean monitoring network. Strong indications
exist that China has resurrected an electronic
reconnaissance satellite program that has been
dormant for over twenty years. The PLA experimented
with electronic reconnaissance satellites, euphemistically
called "technical experimental satellites" (jishu
shiyan weixing), in the mid-1970s under the
701 Program of the Shanghai Bureau of Astronautics.
Technical writings indicate the Shanghai Academy
of Spaceflight Technology (SAST), the successor
of the Shanghai Bureau of Astronautics, has resurrected
the program and intends to field a space-based
electronic reconnaissance system. At least one
SAST design under evaluation is a constellation
of small electronic reconnaissance satellites
that can ensure precise location data and survivability.491
Electro-Optical
Reconnaissance Systems
In addition to its ocean reconnaissance systems,
China's remote sensing community is working feverishly
to deploy space-based electro-optical (EO) remote
sensing platforms. CASC and China's electronics
industries have made notable progress in charged
couple devices (CCDs), a technology that is essential
to the development of real-time EO imaging systems.492
Fielding of EO satellites would enable Beijing
to beam images back to ground stations directly
from space.
The
Ziyuan-1 (ZY-1), a joint venture between the PRC
and Brazil, will serve as China's first EO reconnaissance
satellite. Launched in October 1999, the ZY-1
will have a two-year lifespan and will incorporate
a data transmission system to beam images back
to earth. The ZY-1, operating at an altitude of
778 km, is expected to have only a 20-meter resolution,
but will add to China's experience base in EO
imaging systems.493
Furthermore,
CASC spokesmen have announced their intention
to field a tactical small satellite imaging constellation
and associated mobile ground receiving stations.
The tactical imaging system, slated for launch
in the next two years, will consist of four EO
and two SAR satellites. The EO component is likely
to use the same bus as the HY-1 and is designed
to have a five-meter resolution when operating
in a 700-km orbit.494
Small
satellite constellations are an important aspect
of China's operational concept for space warfare.
Clearly recognizing their military implications,
Chinese defense officials advocate small satellite
development to reduce vulnerability of fixed launchsites.
Chinese engineers are examining the utility of
using mobile, solid-fueled launch vehicles, such
as a modified DF-21 or DF-31.495
Reduced size and complexity allows for faster
R&D and manufacturing time, and production
in significant numbers. In a contingency situation,
tactical imagery satellites can be launched on
demand, with mobile launch platforms increasing
survivability. Multiple small satellites can be
launched on a single-launch vehicle. Furthermore,
enemy attacks on small satellite constellations
will encounter greater targeting difficulties
and be costly. Destruction of one satellite will
have minimal effect on the overall functioning
of the architecture.496
The
FSW-3
China has launched more than a dozen film-based
recoverable satellites (fanhuishi weixing,
or FSW) since 1975. These systems stayed
in orbit for up to 16 days and were used to obtain
imagery of Taiwan and nations around China's periphery,
determine coordinates of facilities that were
potential targets of Chinese missiles, and to
map Chinese territory. China's most recent generation
of reconnaissance satellite, the Fanshihui-2 (FSW-2),
displayed ability to maneuver in orbit. Reconnaissance
satellites have generally been launched from Gansu's
Jiuquan Space Launch Center.497
China's next-generation recoverable satellite--the
FSW-3--is expected to have a resolution of 1 meter.
This satellite may have been could be launched
as early as late 1999.498
Ground
Processing
China's ground-processing capacity is rapidly
progressing. Chinese engineers are working to
improve ultra-high-speed data processing, storage,
and transmission systems, as well as computer,
data compression, and networking technology to
be able to handle real-time, high-resolution imagery
from multiple satellites. Essential for the efficient
transmission and processing of satellite-derived
imagery is data compression technology, which
CAST is attempting to master.499
The PLA has fielded a real-time image storage
system as well as an imagery dissemination system
that is linked to China's national integrated
telecommunications network. The system will allow
subscribers to search and rapidly download images.500
In 1996, the PLA installed a digitized high-resolution
imagery processing system, the BGC-161.501
China
is receiving foreign assistance. In 1992, Italy's
Telespazio signed an agreement worth $8 million
to provide Olivetti image-processing computers
and software. Telespazio assigned technicians
to train Chinese photo interpreters for up to
three years. China's procurement of foreign sources
of imagery also includes options for training.502
Despite
significant investment in reconnaissance systems,
China still may have a limited near-real-time
targeting capability. Reconnaissance satellites
must be within line of sight of a ground station
to download its imagery data. Targets on Taiwan
could be imaged and immediately beamed back to
a ground station on the mainland. Satellites imaging
targets farther out from China's borders in the
Western Pacific, however, probably would need
to store their images and wait until the satellite
returns to within line of sight of the Chinese
mainland.
Future
deployments of a sea-based imagery receiving station,
a data relay satellite (DRS), or establishment
of ground stations abroad would enhance China's
extended range near-real-time targeting capability.503
A Chinese DRS architecture under development is
expected to include at least two geostationary
satellites that could provide 85 percent coverage
of the earth and support five to
10 satellites at the same time.504
R&D,
production, and deployment of satellite systems
is expensive. However, much of the R&D budget
for China's space program comes from the State
Council science and technology budget, not from
PLA coffers.505
With a price tag of between 5 and 12 million US
dollars per satellite, the cost of satellite development
in China is significantly less than in the US
or Western Europe.506
In addition to funding from the 863 Program, R&D
of space systems is subsidized by revenues from
commercial space launches and the sale of satellite
systems abroad. International cooperative efforts
with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, France, Germany,
Italy, and Brazil cut costs even more.507
Theater
Missile Developments
A
space-based reconnaissance system will be a key
element of the PLA's emerging theater missile
strike force. In March 1996, the Central Military
Commission reportedly convened an enlarged meeting
and developed a plan to develop seven weapons
on a priority basis. Four of those weapons are
directly related to building a deep-strike capability.
At least one of the objectives was fielding of
China's first-generation land-attack cruise missile
by the year 2000.508
Dependence
on theater missiles reflects a failure of China's
aviation industry to provide the types of aircraft
that normally would carry out this mission.509
Although they can carry only one-sixth the payload
of an air-to-ground strike fighter, ballistic
missiles have a strong psychological deterrent
effect, and are increasingly accurate, mobile,
and stealthy. Advocates argue that ballistic and
land-attack cruise missiles are relatively cheap,
while aviation technology is increasingly sophisticated
and expensive. Air mobilization is time consuming
and relatively easy to detect. Strikes against
targets in denied areas require a measure of air
superiority. Theater ballistic missiles, however,
can be rapidly mobilized with a high degree of
secrecy. They are much harder to counter due to
their fast reentry speeds and short flight times.510
Second
Artillery Conventional Theater
Missile Organization Chart
Theater
Ballistic Missiles
Ballistic
missiles are emerging as the backbone of conventional
PLA theater operations. Drawing profound lessons
from the Gulf war, the PLA views conventional
ballistic missiles as a crucial aspect of China's
emerging deep attack (zongshen daji) strategy.511
CASC appears to be producing a substantial number
of conventional theater ballistic missiles with
ranges stretching from 300 to 2,000 km. In fact,
a 1998 Department of Defense report asserted that
China's space and missile industry probably will
have the capacity to produce as many as 1,000
ballistic missiles in the next decade.512
At an estimated cost of US $500,000 or less per
missile, CASC would be able to produce up to 1,000
ballistic missiles at a total cost of $500 million.513
CASC's key producers of ballistic missiles--China
Academy of Launch Technology and the 066 Base
in Hubei Province--are leveraging foreign technology
in order to achieve tremendous advances in accuracy.
At the same time, they are diversifying the payloads
of their ballistic missile to increase their lethality.
CASC and the PLA are also examining a wide range
of countermeasures to ensure their theater ballistic
missile force remains viable as active theater
missile defenses are introduced into the Asia-Pacific
region. The PRC is concentrating on three conventional
theater ballistic missile systems: 1) the DF-15
short-range ballistic missile (SRBM); 2) the DF-11
SRBM; and 3) the DF-21 medium-range ballistic
missile (MRBM).514
DF-15
Short-Range Ballistic Missile System. The
DF-15 (CSS-6) is a solid-fueled, 600 km SRBM manufactured
by the China Academy of Launch Technology (CALT).
The DF-15's payload reportedly has an attitude
control mechanism that permits steering corrections
from separation to impact.515
The detachable warhead offers a much smaller target
than a SCUD, and its potential maneuverability
would complicate missile defense radar tracking,
computations, and interception. With a unitary,
high-explosive warhead, the DF-15 could create
a crater has large as 30 to 50 meters in diameter.516
Assuming a nominal trajectory at a range of 500
km, the DF-15 would reach an altitude of about
120 km, achieve a re-entry speed of about 2 km
per second and have a flight time of only six
or seven minutes.517
Some reporting indicates the DF-15 currently has
a 100-meter circular error of probability (CEP).518
To diversify its theater ballistic missile inventory,
a 1,200-km-range version of the DF-15 is reportedly
under development.519
DF-11
Short-Range Ballistic Missile System.
The DF-11--better known by its export designator,
the M-11 (CSS-7)--also is a solid-propellant,
road-mobile SRBM with an estimated range of 300
km. This missile, however, has not yet entered
the PLA's inventory. An improved, longer range
version of the DF-11 may be under development.520
The main advantage of the DF-11 over the DF-15
is its ability to carry a larger payload. Some
sources credit the 300-km version with an 800-kg
warhead and a 150-meter CEP.521
The DF-11 is manufactured by the CASC's 066 Base,
also known as the Sanjiang Space Corporation,
based in Hubei Province. The DF-11's 300-km range
presents challenges for active missile defenses
due to its brief flight time of three minutes.
Because its flight would remain within the atmosphere,
upper tier systems would be unable to engage the
300-km DF-11.522
Details on the longer range version are unavailable.
DF-21
Medium-Range Ballistic Missile System.
One other missile system that could be brought
to bear against Taiwan is the solid-fueled 2,000-km
DF-21 (CSS-5), equipped with a 600-kg warhead.
Research and development on the DF-21 began in
1967, had its first successful test in 1985, and
deployed into an experimental regiment as early
as 1991. With a circular error probable (CEP)
of 700 meters, the DF-21 currently is equipped
for nuclear missions only. Indications are, however,
that a terminal guidance system is under development
for the DF-21 that could permit highly accurate
conventional strikes.523
The DF-21 reentry speed is fast enough to preclude
successful intercepts by lower-tier missile defense
systems. Because of its warhead size and the inability
of lower tier missile defense systems to engage
longer range MRBMs, incorporation of a terminal
guidance system could have significant military
implications.
Technical
Trends
Several efforts are under way to increase the
accuracy and lethality of China's theater ballistic
missiles. These include: 1) terminal guidance;
2) a diverse mix of conventional payloads; and
3) missile defense countermeasures.
Terminal
Guidance. The most significant development
in China's theater ballistic missile program is
the development of terminal guidance systems which,
according to Chinese writings, meet a CEP requirement
of 25 to 40 meters.524
CASC engineers point to three options in ballistic
missile terminal guidance. First, terrain matching
terminal guidance (dixing pipei mozhidao)
makes use of digitized stored images (electro-optical
or radar) and match them against the images acquired
in the seeker. CALT began preliminary research
on terrain-matching terminal guidance as early
as 1977.525
Radar matching was used on the US Pershing-II
and optical matching is currently used on a Russian
variant of the Scud-B. Chinese engineers note
that critical technologies for terrain matching
terminal guidance include large-scale and very-large-scale
integrated circuits (LSIC/VLSIC).526
A
second means for terminal guidance is a millimeter
wave seeker (maomibo xun). CALT engineers
have carried out a number of feasibility studies
on terminal guidance technologies, to include
millimeter wave and infrared.527
Millimeter wave seekers are compact, lightweight,
have high spatial resolution, a robust antijamming
capability, and are all-weather. Critical technologies
include LSICs, microcomputers, and digital information
management systems for target discrimination and
tracking. Chinese engineers, however, note that
MMW seekers are relatively expensive.528
A
final option for terminal guidance is exploitation
of the global positional system (GPS). GPS-assisted
guidance system usually includes a GPS receiver,
a ring laser gyro (huanxing jiguang tuoluo),
and microcomputer. There are indications China
has already mastered use of GPS for mid-course
corrections. At least two tests of an on-board
GPS trajectory reference system had been conducted
as of 1995.529
Use of GPS for terminal guidance requires frequent
and highly precise updates from navigation satellites.
Potentially in support of this effort, China is
installing a differential GPS network (chafen
quanqiu dingwei xitong) along its eastern
seaboard that could enhance the accuracy of the
PLA's SRBM force.530
Finally,
CASC institutes have close relations--some officially
sanctioned and some not--with counterparts in
the former Soviet Union. Chinese engineers have
approached Russian institutes for ballistic missile
guidance and control technology and have hired
a number of Russian scientists as technical advisors.531
Conventional
Payloads. Evidence suggests that China
intends to design up to six different payloads
for its theater ballistic missiles. Today, the
PLA's conventional theater ballistic missiles
are armed with only unitary blast fragmentation
warheads. To diversify its missile payloads, CASC
writings indicate prioritization of three categories
of specialized warheads for use against air defense
sites, radar, airfields, semi-hardened C4I
centers, and ports: 1) submunition (zimudan)
payloads; 2) electromagnetic pulse warheads (dianci
chongzhong dantou); 3) penetrating warheads
(zuandi dantou); and 4) fuel-air explosive
warheads (youqi or leibao dantou).532
Submunitions.
A submunition warhead contains a number of small
devices or "bomblets" designed for specialized
roles. These warheads usually detonate at a preset
altitude of several hundred meters so as to spread
the munitions out to an optimal pattern size.
Submunition warheads are far more efficient against
targets susceptible to blast and fragmentation
than unitary warheads of the same weight. As of
1996, CALT was testing a guided submunition (jiandan
zimudan) package for blast and fragmentation
effects; and penetrating submunitions (qinche
zimudan) for cratering runways. More advanced
packages under development include terminally
guided sensor fused submunition warheads.533
There are also indications of CBU-78 GATOR-like
minelaying submunition development.534
Electromagnetic
Pulse Warhead (EMP). PLA writings indicate
that fielding of an antiradiation EMP warhead
is a high priority. An antiradiation warhead,
specifically a high-powered microwave (HPM) device,
is viewed as a "natural enemy" (tiandi)
of more technologically advanced militaries and
an "electronic trump card" (dianzi shashou).535
Due to challenges related to weaponizing a device
with enough power, HPM warheads would initially
be effective only against radiating targets within
the immediate area of impact--radar and communications
centers would be the prime candidates. As the
technology progresses, HPM warheads could achieve
wider effects.536
The developers of the DF-1--known as the 066 Base--have
demonstrated the most interest in HPM warheads.537
Penetration
Warheads. Chinese engineers note that an increase
in CEP to better than 50 meters would permit the
use of penetration warheads (zuandi dantou)
that would dig deep into such semihardened facilities
as command and control centers, intelligence collection
facilities, and weapons storage facilities that
are housed in concrete bunkers. CALT warhead engineers
have tested a range of high-strength steels and
other material and structural technologies that
would dig into critical hardened facilities.538
Fuel-Air
Explosive Warhead. There are also indications
that the DF-15 may carry a fuel-air explosive
(FAE) warhead. FAE warheads offer greater explosive
power at a weight approximately 50 percent less
than conventional explosives. Pound for pound,
FAE weapons are three to five times as destructive
as high-explosive warheads. For example, a 500-kg
FAE warhead would destroy most aircraft and injure
all personnel within 250 meters of the impact
point. Chinese designers have studied the use
of FAE warheads since the 1970s and tested the
effectiveness of an FAE as early as 1976 by detonating
a US device that had been captured by the Vietnamese
and transferred to Beijing.539
Missile
Defense Countermeasures
The PLA places a premium on ensuring its ballistic
missile force would be able to penetrate future
active theater missile defenses. PLA and defense
industry analysts are examining a range of more
sophisticated TMD countermeasures that could reduce
the effectiveness of active missile defense systems.
Saturation.
The simplest means of overcoming a missile defense
architecture is by saturating it with a large
number of missiles. Given enough ballistic and
land attack cruise missiles, any system can be
saturated by overwhelming a missile defense systems'
area of coverage. Saturation generally requires
a large number of missiles, timed to arrive together
in order to bunch effectively for ground defense
saturation. PLA General Armament Department engineers
have evaluated Patriot saturation rates and are
confident that their theater ballistic missiles
can reach their targets.540
Maneuvering
Reentry Vehicles. More sophisticated countermeasures
could reduce the effectiveness of active missile
defenses short of the brute force saturation approach.
For example, the CASC is developing the capabilities
that would permit conventional ballistic missile
reentry vehicles to maneuver in their terminal
phase. Missile designers believe maneuvering is
not only essential for the terminal guidance packages
but are also a means to complicate ballistic missile
defenses. Through modeling and simulation, CASC
has determined that maneuvering is a viable means
to reduce land-based, lower-tier TBMD probability
of kill rates.541
In support of this research effort, China allegedly
acquired PATRIOT technology to calibrate an auxiliary
propulsion system on the DF-15 reentry vehicle
to enable the payload to outmaneuver a PATRIOT
system as it reenters the atmosphere.542
Missile designers have also demonstrated a special
interest in the speed control maneuver (sudu
kongzhi jidong) used in the 1,800-km Pershing-II.543
Shaping,
Stealth, Decoys, and On-Board Jammers.
CALT warhead designers already have lowered the
DF-15 and DF-11 signature through shaping of the
warhead. A warhead designer can lower the signature
of a reentry vehicle further by reducing the infrared
signal or by incorporating stealth design technologies
to reduce the radar cross section. Use of balloons
can also mask the shape of reentry vehicles, and
chaff (jinshu botiao) can be released with
the reentry vehicle in an attempt to hide the
target behind a cloud of radar-reflecting metal
strips. Chinese engineers have tested chaff packages.
Other measures under investigation include electronic
and infrared countermeasures on board reentry
vehicles, as well as carrying out hard kills against
enemy TMD radar through the use of antiradiation
missiles.544
CASC missile engineers have tested active jammers
that can broadcast a signal designed to interfere
with a radar's ability to detect the target object
or corrupt the signal in such a way as to cause
the radar to receive a false echo.545
National University of Defense Technology analysts
have examined electronic countermeasure packages
on board theater ballistic missiles as a means
to counter millimeter wave and infrared seekers
on missile defense interceptors.546
In 1995 and 1996, the Chinese allegedly tested
DF-21 endo-atmospheric decoys.547
Laser
Cladding. Looking ahead to the potential
deployment of boost phase intercept systems such
as the airborne laser (ABL), Chinese engineers
are developing a coating for ballistic missiles
that could complicate use of missile defense high-power
lasers. Using their own indigenously developed
high-powered lasers, Chinese institutes have tested
various coating materials to protect the outer
shell of ballistic missiles, a process known as
laser cladding (jiguang rongfu).548
Laser cladding, together with the spinning of
theater ballistic missiles, may not make ballistic
missiles immune to boost-phase missile defense
systems but could increase required lasing time,
thus reducing the number of laser shots available
per ABL mission.
Multi-Axis
Attacks. The Second Artillery and CASC
have conducted modeling exercises and simulations
to test China's ability to break though the wide
range of projected TMD deployments. Modeling has
focused on large raid sizes, using combinations
of surface-to-surface, air-to-surface, and sea-to-surface
theater missile systems. After computer simulations
and modeling exercises, CASC is confident that
its theater ballistic missiles can neutralize
opposing land-based, lower-tier systems.549
Depressed
Trajectories. Chinese missile analysts
view depressed trajectories (yadi guidao)
as another option to counter space-based and exo-atmospheric,
upper tier missile defense systems. A 1,200-km-range
ballistic missile on a nominal trajectory will
normally reach an altitude of 400 km rendering
the missile vulnerable to upper tier missile defenses
for a substantial portion of the flight. Launching
a missile at a depressed trajectory, however,
could allow the missile to achieve only a 100-km
altitude, which limits the ability of exo-atmospheric
upper systems to engage the missile. Testing and
modeling has been done on the DF-3 (CSS-2), which
normally has a range of 2,780 km, with a maximum
altitude of 550 km. With depressed trajectory,
the DF-3 travels 1,550 km at 100-km altitude.550
Land-Attack
Cruise Missiles
To augment its theater ballistic missile arsenal,
China is creating a new generation of cruise missiles
able to penetrate defenses and strike critical
targets with precision and increased firepower.
Fielding of land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs)
may prompt expansion of missions of the PLA's
Second Artillery and Navy. Increasing availability
of cheap navigation and guidance systems and digital
mapping technology have increased the incentives
and reduced the time required to field an LACM.
Cheaper
and more accurate than ballistic missiles, LACMs
appear to have a relatively high development priority.
The size and flight profile of ground-, air-,
and sea-launched cruise missiles can stress the
capabilities of even the most modern air defense
systems. Chinese research and development of LACMs
is being aided by an aggressive effort to acquire
foreign cruise missile technology and subsystems,
particularly from Russia. The first LACM to enter
production probably would be air-launched and
could be operational early in the next century.551
The
heart of China's LACM missile development lies
within CASC's Third Academy, headquartered just
southwest of Beijing. More than 14,500 technicians
and workers ply their trade in ten research institutes
and two major factories. The following discussion
of China LACM development focuses on: 1) the underlying
rationale for LACM development; 2) specific LACM
systems that may come on line within the next
five years; 3) the mission planning process; and
4) general technical trends influencing China
LACM development.
Why
Land-Attack Cruise Missiles?. LACMs have
a number of advantages over ballistic missiles
or manned aircraft. China's first-generation LACM
is likely to be up to twice as accurate as their
theater ballistic missiles. Successful exploitation
of GPS, indigenous and/or foreign-procured remote
sensing data, and digital mapping technology could
permit the fielding of an LACM with a CEP of 16
meters or better. LACMs are cheaper to produce,
generally thought to be one-third the cost of
ballistic missiles. For example, if one assumes
an SRBM unit cost of $500,000, then the unit cost
of an LACM could be as little as $175,000. Chinese
defense industrial observers note that developing
an arsenal of cruise missiles could have a 9:1
ratio over the cost of defending against them.
As the president of the Third Academy has pointed
out, the cost of producing cruise missiles is
20 to 30 percent less in China than it is in other
countries.552
Cruise
missiles offer other appealing features as well.
Use of GPS allows launchers to forgo presurveyed
launchsites, permitting the missile to disperse
to a greater range of launch sites. Ground-launched
LACMs can be quite survivable. With a low takeoff
weight, they tend to be more easily transportable
than theater ballistic missiles. The infrared
launch signature would be less than that of a
ballistic missile, decreasing warning time and
increasing survivability. Unlike ballistic missiles,
land-attack cruise missiles could be loaded onto
ships and fired at land targets that may not have
been anticipated.553
LACMs
pose serious challenges for air defenses. Due
to the earth's curvature, ground-based
radar can detect a low-flying cruise missile only
about 32 km away. In comparison, an aircraft flying
at 10,000 feet can be detected when it is about
240 km away. Newer missiles are incorporating
stealth features that would make them even less
visible to radar and infrared detectors.
PLA
LACM Programs. In accordance with standard
Third Academy R&D practices, China's future
family of land-attack cruise missiles probably
will be based on airframes that have already been
fielded.554
Chinese and Western sources indicate at least
three families of cruise missiles may be under
evaluation for a land-attack mission: 1) the Silkworm;
2) the multipurpose Yingji-8 missile; and 3) an
antiradiation missile that Western sources have
designated as the YJ-91.555
The
Land-Attack Silkworm. China's first LACM is
expected to be a Silkworm derivative. This system,
designated the XY-41 as early as 1989, will be
smaller, more mobile, and more accurate than ballistic
missiles such as the DF-15, but carry the same
size warhead (500 kg). The XY-41 is a variant
of the HY-4 antiship cruise missile.556
The Silkworm derivative could be air- or ground-launched
and reportedly will have a range of 300-400 km,
indicating an upgrade to the HY-4's turbojet engine.557
Some Western reporting asserts that CASC is getting
foreign assistance in development of an integrated
INS/GPS system and in warhead technology.558
Ground-launched
LACMs would be subordinated to the Second Artillery.
Based on existing organizational structures within
the Second Artillery and in coastal Silkworm units,
a ground-launched LACM brigade likely would be
divided into four battalions, with each battalion
having four company-sized fire units with one
launcher per fire unit. A first-generation LACM
brigade could adopt an organization structure
similar to today's typical HY-4 fire unit--four
towed launchers, a firing command vehicle, a truck-mounted
microwave relay, and auxiliary power truck. The
HY-4 is launched via a solid rocket booster before
a turbojet engine takes over for the duration
of the flight. The missile cruises at about Mach
0.8 and maintains an altitude of between 70 and
200 meters.559
The
YJ-8. A second system reported by Western
sources as being adapted for land-attack use is
the smaller Yingji-8 (YJ-8). The Exocet-like YJ-8
series adopts a solid propellant that decreases
the size and weight of the system to enable a
more diverse set of launching modes. With the
solid motor, however, the YJ-8's range is limited
to 42 km or less. A YJ-8 follow-on, designated
the YJ-82, utilizes the same basic airframe but
uses a small turbojet engine instead of a solid
motor that extends the airframe's range to 120
km. The alleged land-attack version of the YJ-8--reportedly
the turbojet variant--would incorporate integrated
GPS and TERCOM guidance. Western sources indicate
the Third Academy may be extending its range to
at least 300 km and claim that GPS-aided navigation--augmented
by terrain contour matching--could result in cruise
missiles like the YJ-8 to achieve an accuracy
of up to 10 meters. The YJ-8's smaller warhead
(165 kg), however, would limit the missile's utility.560
A
Chinese Antiradiation Missile. The PLA and
China's space and missile community has also devoted
a significant degree of attention to development
of cruise missiles with passive seekers to counter
enemy radar systems. Like ballistic and other
cruise missiles, antiradiation missiles are considered
as a shashoujian for priority development.
Western sources have designated China's new family
of antiradiation missiles as the Yingji-9 (YJ-9),
a system influenced by Russia's Kh-31P and/or
Israel's STAR-1 ARM systems. There are persistent
rumors of PLA procurement or joint production
arrangement on the Kh-31P, which Chinese engineers
note was specifically developed to counter the
US AWACS, PATRIOT MPQ-53 radar, and AEGIS SPY-1D
phased-array radar. China's defense industrial
complex, specifically the Third Academy with support
from the Harbin Institute of Technology, is aggressively
pursuing deployment of a long-range antiradiation
missile.561
Some Western sources allege an extended-range
version of the YJ-9 may have a range of 400 km.562
Chinese research indicates China's first-generation
antiradiation missile will be air launched.563
Mission
Planning. Mission planning exploits navigation
aids and flight management computers to permit
LACMs to fly along precise, preprogrammed routes.
This generally involves use of a land-attack navigation
system, including exploitation of US NAVSTAR GPS
and Russia's GLONASS, a radar altimeter, an inertial
measurement unit, and a sophisticated flight management
computer. Because mission planning requires a
knowledge of the shape of the terrain and obstructions
found along the cruise missile's intended flight
path, satellite imagery and geographic information
systems (GISs) play an important supporting role.564
Much
of this technology is available commercially off
the shelf.565
Commercial imagery is adequate to plan routes
with relative positional accuracy on the order
of tens of meters. China's indigenous remote sensing
program and future commercial sources will provide
even more precise data. A number of commercially
available mission planning software programs can
manipulate sources of imagery for robust mission
planning for military purposes.
There
are two major mission-planning processes: en route
and terminal. Both are heavily reliant on intelligence.
For the en route planning process, General Staff
Department (GSD) intelligence and cartography/mapping
offices probably would identify enemy air defenses
to avoid and generate en route terrain data. Routes
would be validated and waypoints en route to the
target loaded into the LACM computer.566
Because of the requirement for large databases
and computer operations, the mission-planning
process likely would be centralized in Beijing
and then transmitted to the theater operations
command center.
An
important en route mission-planning technology
under development in terrain contour matching
(TERCOM). A prerequisite for TERCOM (dixing
pipei zhidao) is the generation of electronic
maps from high-resolution satellite images. TERCOM
uses a radar altimeter to measure terrain features
along its flight path and correlate these measurements
with internally stored digital maps. The Third
Academy has been conducting preliminary research
into TERCOM since at least 1988.567
There is some indication China is examining integrating
combined GPS/GLONASS receivers on board their
missiles as well.568
For
terminal planning, the most advanced PLA system
under development is digital scene matching area
correlation (DSMAC) system. DSMAC updates the
position of the missile by matching a stored image
to a series of images sensed in flight. The planning
required is substantial and complex. A PLA targeteer
probably would obtain a photograph of the targeted
area and would generate DSMAC scenes for programming
into the cruise missile's flight computer. The
DSMAC images are prepared from satellite photographs
of the target. Higher resolution images allow
for more accurate updates and a better CEP. PLA
GSD intelligence analysts would identify targets
of interest and then either pull the image from
the library or task China's remote-sensing community
to procure the image. PLA GSD targeteers would
then select aimpoints to exploit the most vulnerable
aspect of a command and control facility or airfield.
The photograph would be transformed into a digital
image and loaded onto the LACM computer. Third
Academy engineers believe en route and terminal
mission planning systems can ensure a CEP of 16
meters or less.569
The
mission-planning process can take up to several
hours. The PLA's deep-attack strategy, however,
does not necessarily require a rapid mission-planning
process because most targets on Taiwan would be
strategic and static in nature. If an indigenous
near-real-time space remote-sensing systems were
available, GSD would task the satellite operators
for the imagery. The GSD could also order quick-turnaround
imagery from a foreign provider, such as Russia,
Israel, or France.
Deployment
of an LACM capability is likely to spark a shift
in organizational responsibilities. As previously
mentioned, the Second Artillery appears to be
a primary procurement agent for ground-launched
LACMs.570
An air-launched Silkworm LACM is likely to use
PLA Air Force subordinated B-6s. If the YJ-8 is
fielded as an LACM, tactical fighter-bombers such
as the FB-7 would serve as the primary platform.
There are indications the PLA Navy may be seeking
to expand its mission to include conventional
missile strikes against land-based targets from
the sea.571
Technical
Trends. China's Third Academy intends
to upgrade its cruise missile production capacity,
extend the range and speed of their cruise missiles,
diversifying its choices of terminal guidance
systems, and lower their radar-cross-section.
Production
Trends. The Third Academy is upgrading
its ability to design and manufacture highly complex
cruise missiles. They are integrating the use
of virtual reality (xuni xianshi) in cruise
missile development and are using increasingly
sophisticated supercomputers to design the missiles.
Third Academy manufacturing centers have imported
some of the world's most advanced engineering
workstations, and three-, four-, and five-axis
computer numerically controlled machine tools.572
CASC's world-class simulation facility in western
Beijing also aids cruise missile development by
theoretically reducing testing requirements by
40 to 60 percent and shortening overall development
time by 30 to 40 percent.573
Acquisition of advanced Western systems also could
reduce production time--Chinese engineers have
reportedly had access to an intact Tomahawk that
fell into Afghanistan territory in August 1998.574
Propulsion
Systems. Engineers also are working on
better propulsion systems that can increase the
lethal range and/or speed of the cruise missile.
Faster cruise missiles reduce an adversary's reaction
time. In one of China's most significant aerospace
programs, the PLA General Armament Department
(GAD) and the Third Academy are designing a supersonic
combustion ramjet engine (scramjet, or chaoran
chongya fadongji) that can propel a missile
at hypersonic speeds of between Mach 4 and 10.575
Engineers also are working toward more efficient
turbojet and turbofan engines and motors to significantly
extend the range of its cruise missiles. The anticipated
range of China's first generation of land-attack
cruise missiles would be limited to about 300
to 400 km. To be able to hit targets in Japan
using a ground-launched system, however, the Third
Academy would have to produce a missile with a
1,250 to 1,500-km range (750 km for Okinawa).576
Radar
Signature Reduction. With foreign assistance,
China's defense industrial complex also is striving
to reduce the radar-cross-section of their cruise
missiles.577
The aerospace industry has produced radar absorbing
material that targets the frequency range in which
most acquisition radar operates (2-18 GHz). Although
this material would not provide complete protection
from radar detection, it could reduce the detection
range of defensive radar. Engineers assert that
radar absorbing material, used in combination
with contour shaping, can reduce the effective
range of radar by 75 percent.578
Radar-absorbent materials and relatively high
speed reduces warning time available to defenders
and compresses their timeline for detecting, tracking,
identifying, and engaging the inbound missile.
Infrared
Signature Reduction. Third Academy officials
are also working to increase the survivability
of their land-attack cruise missiles by reducing
its infrared (IR) signature. This objective could
be achieved by the addition of an IR reduction
tail cone that is designed to mix cool air that
has traveled down the length of the airframe with
hot air emitted from the jet exhaust. This addition
would improve the survivability against IR sensors
and IR homing missiles. Engineers are attempting
to reduce the signature on cruise missile propellants,
and conceal location of mobile land-attack cruise
missiles.579
Other
Terminal Guidance Systems. Other terminal
sensor technologies under development include
passive imaging infrared, CO2 laser
radar, millimeter wave, and synthetic aperture
radar terminal sensors, as well as various composite
systems. R&D into passive imaging infrared
sensors is focused on matching a stored computerized
image with a real infrared image detected by the
missile.580
Third Academy engineers already have laid the
technical foundation for a CO2 laser
guidance system, to include the target recognition
components.581
Chinese aerospace engineers believe synthetic-aperture
radar, millimeter-wave radar, and infrared imaging,
and laser radar guidance could result in an accuracy
of one to three meters.582
The
Conventional Second Artillery
The
PLA entity most responsible for deep-strike missions
against vital strategic and operational targets
is the Second Artillery (dierpaobing).
Since its establishment in the 1960s, the Second
Artillery's mission has been limited to nuclear
counterstrikes. Following the conclusion of the
Gulf war, however, Chinese planners diversified
the Second Artillery's mission to include conventional
strikes against high-value strategic targets.
The Second Artillery's adoption of a conventional
strike role marks one of the most significant
developments in PLA modernization. This discussion
of the conventional Second Artillery outlines:
1) its organizational structure, 2) the vital
role of information denial in Second Artillery
operations, and 3) the conventional theater missile
campaign doctrine and operations.
Organization
The Second Artillery, with an estimated 90,000
personnel, consists of headquarters elements,
six launch bases (jidi), one engineering
design academy, four research institutes, two
command academies, and possibly an early-warning
unit.583
As key operational strike units, brigades are
likely assigned only one type of missile to facilitate
command and logistics. The Second Artillery headquarters
and subordinate bases oversee warhead and missile
storage facilities; maintenance units; and special
warhead/missile transportation services.584
The
80302 Unit, headquartered in the mountain resort
town of Huangshan, Jiangxi Province, is the Second
Artillery's most important base for conventional
long-range precision strikes against Taiwan.585
The Huangshan base includes both nuclear and conventionally
armed theater missiles. During a wartime situation,
multiple conventional brigades would be subsumed
into a conventional theater missile corps (juntuan)
consisting of a corps command post, a corps logistics
command post, and a number of subordinate theater
missile brigades each with different types of
theater missiles. The corps command post would
consist largely of command authorities from Beijing
and Huangshan.586
The
corps/base also oversees a set of "equipment assurance
units" (zhuangbei baozhang budui) which
includes a missile/warhead storage unit (zhuangbei
jishu qinwu budui), a transfer station (zhuanyunzhan),
and a repair depot (tezhuang xiulicang).
Other corps/base support elements include a reconnaissance
unit (jizhen dadui); a surveying/mapping
unit (cehui dadui); a computer center (jisuan
zhongxin); a weather center (qixiang zhongxin);
a communications regiment (tongxintuan);
an ECM regiment (dianzi duikangtuan); and
an engineering regiment (gongchengtuan).
Additional engineering, air defense, and antichemical
units can be assigned as needed.587
A
typical conventional theater missile brigade has
a staff consisting of a headquarters, political,
logistics, and equipment technology (jizhuangbu)
departments. Brigade elements include a mobile
brigade command post, a central depot (known as
a "technical position" or jishu zhendi),
a transfer point (zhuanzai changping),
and an assigned set of pre-surveyed launch sites
(fashe zhendi), as well as a set of reserve
(daiji) launchsites. A conventional missile
brigade also has a set of "equipment assurance
subunits" (zhuangbei baozhang fendui).588
Brigades have at least four firing battalions
(fasheying), with each battalion assigned
at least three or four companies.589
Companies subordinate to the launch battalion
likely would be assigned at least one launcher,
an electric power generation vehicle (fadianche),
a surveying vehicle (cekongche), a communications
command vehicle (tongxun zhihuiche), and
a missile transport vehicle (daodan yunshuche).
Battalions and companies would be assigned a zone
within which to operate.590
Information
Denial and the Theater Missile Campaign
Key to the success of a theater missile campaign
is concealing the forward deployment of brigade
elements. Surprise can be achieved only through
denial of foreign human and technical intelligence
assets. To ensure a high degree of concealment,
the Second Artillery has approached information
denial in three ways: 1) communications security;
2) passive and active counterspace measures, and
3) a supporting space tracking network.
Secure
Communications. Denying a potential adversary
the ability to monitor communications and other
electromagnetic emissions is a top priority. Beijing
is examining a wide range of technologies to reduce
vulnerabilities of its communications to interception
or jamming. Beijing has issued directives to strictly
implement communications security (COMSEC) measures.591
Introduction of fiber-optic communications significantly
increases its communications security. Engineers
are studying the application of spread spectrum
and frequency hopping technology for Beijing's
satellite tracking and control network, as well
as more secure satellite communications methodologies.592
China is also investing in more complex encryption
(mimaxue) algorithms.593
Passive
Counterspace Measures. The doctrinal requirement
for preemption and secrecy is also leading the
PRC toward development of passive and active counterspace
measures. The PLA is emphasizing passive counterspace
operations in an attempt to deny foreign reconnaissance
satellites with information on its disposition
of forces and R&D programs. Writings from
the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) indicate
the PLA has a concerted effort to defeat opto-electronic,
infrared, and radar reconnaissance systems. Specific
measures include the exploitation of natural camouflage,
and deception (qipian), to include distribution
of false indicators and intelligence.594
Chinese R&D into camouflage, concealment,
and deception is explicitly intended to counter
air- and space-based reconnaissance platforms.595
In 1992, COSTIND and CASC established camouflage
standards for missile development in order to
counter foreign optical, infrared, and radar satellite
systems.596
PLA engineers also have published technical papers
on methods to reduce infrared signature of underground
facilities.597
Another
approach to countering space systems is through
electronic countermeasures. The GAD and China's
electronics industry appear to be developing a
jammer to counter radar satellites.598
PLA affiliated publications assert that China
is capable of damaging optical reconnaissance
satellites through the use of high-powered lasers.599
Such measures would deny an adversary use of a
satellite, but not destroy the platform itself,
perhaps avoiding escalation of the conflict. As
a side note, GAD and CASC are also moving toward
fielding jammers intended to complicate use of
communications satellites and NAVSTAR GPS.600
Active
Counterspace Measures. The PRC also is
examining more lethal measures to negate foreign
satellites, if necessary. Open-source literature
strongly suggests that a Chinese direct-ascent,
anti-satellite (ASAT) program may be in the model
development stage in which the space industry
is identifying various design proposals for seekers
and propulsion systems. Chinese writings indicate
R&D of ASAT systems is intended to discourage
attacks on their own space systems. Technical
papers demonstrate some of the greatest obstacles
in developing an active counterspace capability
is with development of a homing kill vehicle and
associated terminal guidance. Specific systems
under evaluation, and simulation, include infrared,
radar, and impulse radar terminal guidance.601
Chinese engineers have also conducted studies
to counter satellite decoys as well.602
Space
Tracking Network. The key to passive and
active counterspace operations is a space-tracking
network that can monitor satellites passing overhead.
China currently can detect and track most satellites
with sufficient accuracy for targeting purposes.603
The PLA is modernizing and expanding its tracking
network, which is operated by the PLA General
Armament Department's China Launch and Tracking
Control General (CLTC). CLTC is adding overseas
links in Chile and the South Pacific island of
Kiribati, and has contracted with France for access
to data from its space-tracking network.604
China Academy of Sciences' astronomical observatories
in Nanjing and Kunming feed into the CLTC network,
providing orbital prediction data. CAS and CLTC
are upgrading their network of high-resolution
telescopes, augmented by laser tracking devices.
China's space community claims an ability to detect
objects in space down to 10 inches.605
The CLTC space tracking network likely supports
the Second Artillery through alert messages indicating
that foreign reconnaissance satellites are passing
overhead.606
The
Phased Campaign
A PLA theater missile campaign could take a number
of forms. An initial option would be to use theater
missiles as a show of force, similar to the missile
exercises of 1995-96. US reaction to the last
limited show of force, however, may have demonstrated
that this option is not viable. If the PLA indeed
desires to deny US intervention through a fait
accompli, a slow, gradual limited use option
would permit a buildup of US forces in the region.
PLA operational concepts call for large-scale,
preemptive operations. Preemptive theater missile
strikes, carried out in conjunction with airstrikes
and special operations, are intended to create
favorable conditions for dominance in all dimensions
of theater warfare.
A
theater missile campaign would support achievement
of the "three superiorities" (sanquan)--information
dominance (zhixinxiquan); air superiority
(zhikongquan); and sea superiority (zhihaiquan).607
Strikes supporting the quest for information dominance
would target the civilian and military leadership,
semihardened command and control centers, weak
links in Taiwan's defense information infrastructure,
key intelligence collection facilities, and electronic
warfare facilities. PLA conventional ballistic
and land-attack cruise missiles would attempt
to paralyze (tanhuan) Taiwan's command
and control system by to cutting off fielded military
forces from the civilian and military leadership
in Taipei. Antiradiation missiles would be employed
against key radar installations.608
To
achieve air superiority, the PLA would target
key air defense sites and airfields. The PLA would
seek to damage Taiwan Air Force runways, taxiways,
weapons storage facilities, airfield command posts,
and fuel depots to complicate generations of sorties.
Strikes against airbase runways and taxiways are
referred to as an "airbase blockade" (fengsuo
jichang). The objective would be to shock
and paralyze air-defense systems to allow a window
of opportunity for follow-on PLAAF strikes and
rapid achievement of air superiority. Air superiority
is key to establishing a no-fly zone; enabling
freedom of action on the ocean for a blockade;
or to permit greater freedom of action for physical
occupation of the island, if necessary.609
To
achieve sea superiority, PLA writings indicate
prioritization of strikes against naval ports.
The key objective will be to strike naval facilities
in the opening phases of conflict as a means to
prevent projection of naval power and resupply
of strategic resources by sea. "Strike opportunities"
exist when ships are concentrated in port or when
they are moving along known transit routes en
route to the theater of operations.610
Unsubstantiated
reports indicate that a phased campaign could
require at least 400 theater missiles distributed
in as many as seven conventional missile brigades.611
To maximize firepower for the most likely scenario,
most probably would be based in the Nanjing Military
Region or chopped to the Taiwan theater of operations
joint command during a crisis. PLA writings indicate
that approximately 50 percent of its total theater
missile inventory would be used in the initial
strike phase. Western sources believe the PLA
may deploy as many as 650 SRBMs opposite Taiwan
over the next several years.612
The
theater command center (zhanyi zuozhan zhongxin)
would direct the missile campaign as one component
of a joint strike force that also would include
air forces, ground-force artillery and tactical
missiles, electronic attack assets, and special
operations.613
Coordination will be carried out via a firepower
coordination cell (huoli xietiaozu) within
the theater command center.614
PLA officers envision a four-phase theater missile
campaign: 1) operational preparations phase (zuozhan
zhunbei jieduan); 2) campaign mobility phase
(zhanyi jidong jieduan); 3) missile strike
phase (daodan tuji jieduan); and 4) enemy
counterattack phase (kangdi fanji jieduan).615
Operational
Preparations Phase. After a CMC determination
on the appropriate course of action (juexin),
the operational preparation phase most likely
would include development or review of a mobility
plan, increased security, and closer monitoring
of foreign satellites and air/naval activity in
the Western Pacific. Working in conjunction with
the theater command, missile reconnaissance officers
and planners probably would review or develop
targeting folders. General Staff Department and
theater intelligence staff would exploit existing
intelligence and/or task space-based imaging assets
for updates to support targeting. The firepower
coordination cell within the theater command center
would prioritize detected targets in keeping with
the guidance of higher command for the conduct
of the theater campaign and determine the most
effective method of dealing with those targets.
The theater command would de-conflict strikes
so that firepower is not wasted, a complicated
and time-consuming process. Also, theater commanders
would modify preplanned targeting of targets that
have changed over time.616
Campaign
Mobility Phase. During the campaign mobility
phase, brigade elements would deploy to the area
of operations in a well-disguised fashion. Rail
is the normal way of moving launchers and missiles
from brigade garrison to a staging area or transfer
assembly point (zhuanzai changping).617
The individual launchers would then disperse to
pre-surveyed launch sites (zhendi) within
the battalion's assigned area of operations, not
far from rail lines or highways.618
A mobile command and control center would coordinate
launches. Rapid reaction (kuaisu fanying)
is essential, requiring a quick calculation of
position, orienting the missile, inputting targeting
data, and scattering in a very short period of
time. Chinese writings indicate that units intend
to launch within 40 minutes after arrival to the
pre-surveyed launch sites.619
To reduce reliance on pre-surveyed launch sites,
however, the PLA appears to be integrating GPS
onto their mobile launchers.620
Communication
between firing units and upper echelons probably
would be carried out through a mix of mobile SATCOM,
mobile digital microwave, and/or fiber optics.
Because of its high level of security and reliability,
the Second Artillery is trying to hardwire as
much of their operational infrastructure as possible
with fiber optics.621
For security reasons, any wireless transmissions
are to be limited to eight seconds or less. Operational
orders would be transmitted through an automated
command and control (C2) system due to the complexity
and timeliness requirements of conventional theater
missile operations. PLA officers note the requirement
to integrate the Second Artillery's automated
C2 system with that of the joint theater command's
automated C2 system.622
Missile
Strike Phase. During the missile strike
phase, Second Artillery units would support joint
theater operations by striking strategic and operational
centers of gravity. Missile firings would be coordinated
with other strike assets and directed against
critical nodes (yaohai) within an enemy's
infrastructure. Chinese writings indicate that
after an initial salvo, launchers could move to
new pre-surveyed launchsites within that brigade's
assigned area of operations.623
At least three raids are feasible if one assumes
availability of 400 theater missiles for the phased
campaign.624
The PLA intends to carry out synchronized launches
from a wide range of azimuths in order to stress
active missile defenses and associated battle
management systems.625
A range of space-based, airborne, and battlefield
intelligence systems are needed to adjust firepower.626
The
PLA has indicated prioritization of three target
sets: 1) air and missile defense sites; 2) airfields
and surface-to-surface missile sites; and 3) command,
control, communications, computer, and intelligence
(C4I) facilities. Neutralizing ground-based
air defenses, airfields, and C4I facilities
through multiple theater missile raids would present
a window of opportunity for follow-on airstrikes
to consolidate air superiority over the island.
PLA missile strikes against airfields could deny
outside powers the ability to rush additional
military equipment or military supplies to the
island.627
Some PLA-affiliated analysts speculate that parallel
strikes against airfields, air defense sites,
and other critical targets could permit PLA air
superiority over the skies of Taiwan in as little
as 45 minutes.628
Ground
Based Air and Missile Defense. PLA writings
identify ground-based air and missile defense
units as primary targets. The critical node within
an air or missile defense fire unit most likely
would be its radar and command van. If no missile
defenses existed, and CASC is able to meet the
PLA's accuracy requirement of 20 to 45 meters,
then only three to five missiles would be necessary
to cause significant damage to key nodes within
a fire unit with a high degree of confidence.
To neutralize active theater missile defense units,
PLA writings indicate use of coordinated strikes
from multiple directions, using a combination
of ballistic missiles, decoy drones, land-attack
cruise missiles, and/or antiradiation missiles.629
Radar and command vans could be subject to special
operations attacks and electronic countermeasures.
Because their re-entry speed precludes engagement
by endo-atmospheric interceptors, conventional
DF-21 MRBMs would be especially effective in neutralizing
lower tier missile defense fire units. Guided
submunition or an FAE payload likely would be
the warheads of choice.630
Airfields
and Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM) Sites.
Another critical target for PLA ballistic and
land-attack cruise missile strikes in a Taiwan
scenario would be airfields and SSM sites. Senior
Second Artillery officers write in internal journals
that "attack opportunities" (tuji de shiji)
will also exist against "intervening superpower"
forces as they build up airpower in the region.631
Airfields that could support offensive strike
operations against the mainland would be the first
priority. An "airfield blockade" would seek to
damage runways, taxiway surfaces, and other critical
nodes within an airbase. The PLA would need large
numbers of theater missiles for a complete "airfield
blockade." However, the PLA would need only a
handful to impede Taiwan's ability to generate
sorties. Strikes against runways likely would
be particularly effective in temporarily pinning
down much of the Taiwan Air Force.632
Any runway damage would slow aircraft operations,
simply because it takes time to determine the
location and extent of the damage. Destruction
of such key facilities as airbase command centers,
control towers, fuel depots, power generation
facilities, and maintenance hangars would have
a serious effect on air operations. Casualties
to pilots and maintenance crews could be especially
traumatic. Use of runway mines and targeting of
unprotected rapid runway repair equipment would
complicate recovery operations.633
Warheads of choice for runway damage would include
penetrator submunitions.634
To
aid in its training, the PLA has constructed a
mockup of one of Taiwan's key airfields. The mockup
of Chingchuankang (CCK) airfield near Taichung
includes an exact replica of the runway layout,
taxiways, fuel storage, aircraft shelters, and
revetments. The replica, located in a key training
area in Gansu, 120 km north of Jiayuguan, is intended
for both theater missile exercises and airstrikes.635
Leadership
Facilities and C4I Centers.
The PLA could strike at the heart of Taiwan's
political and military leadership to impede the
command and control of its forces. Early warning
and technical intelligence collection sites could
be subject to ballistic and antiradiation missile
strikes and electronic countermeasures. Such political
and military leadership facilities, as the Presidential
Palace and MND Headquarters, are soft targets
that would require fewer than five missiles to
destroy each with a high degree of confidence.
Fuel air explosive warheads are considered the
optimal choice for strikes against softer political
and military targets. Semihardened command and
control and intelligence centers would require
penetration warheads.636
Foreign
Intervention. The PLA has indicated a
willingness to use highly accurate SRBMs, MRBMs,
and LACMs against US assets, to include key bases
in Japan and aircraft carriers operating in the
Western Pacific. Chinese researchers have conducted
extensive feasibility studies of the use of theater
ballistic missiles against aircraft carriers.
Analysts have noted how such a capability would
require four components: ocean surveillance (haiyang
jianshi); mid-course guidance (zhongduan
zhidao); terminal guidance (moduan zhidao);
and applicable control systems to maneuver the
reentry vehicle to the target. PLA proponents
have proposed the use of GPS for midcourse inertial
corrections and the use of a millimeter wave seeker
for terminal guidance.637
Aware of the vulnerability of millimeter wave
seekers to jamming, PLA engineers are surveying
ECCM techniques to ensure effectiveness of terminally
guided ballistic missiles.638
In addition to aircraft carriers, other targets
would include regional airbases, naval facilities,
and key C4I and logistic nodes, as
indicated by Chinese writings.639
Counterstrike
Phase. For the counterstrike phase, PLA
planners rely on survivability as a critical aspect
of their theater missile force. In ensuring their
survivability, designers believe three systems
in particular pose the greatest challenges to
the survivability of China's theater missile force:
the F-117A, J-STARS, and AWACS. The most important
step to ensure survivability is counter-reconnaissance
(fanzhencha), that is, denying foreign
air and space assets the ability to detect missile
garrisons, storage facilities, and units in the
field. Counter-reconnaissance measures include
decoy launchers and missiles that must match the
optical, infrared, and radar characteristics of
real systems. The Second Artillery also intends
to use natural masking, radiation reflectors,
deception, and communications security. Chinese
camouflage is explicitly intended to counter US
air- and space-based reconnaissance platforms.640
There
are indications that each theater missile brigade
will have an organic electronic countermeasures
regiment equipped with specially designed equipment,
which automatically activates an integrated system
of radar jammers, lasers, chaff, flash bombs,
and smoke. According to one report, the system
was developed in large part to counter air-to-ground
munitions delivered by aircraft such as the F-117A.641
Conclusion
A
space-based surveillance architecture, the transition
to a force structure dominated by theater missiles,
and adoption of operational principles that stress
preemption and surprise have serious implications
for regional stability. An alleged arsenal of
over 650 SRBMs--augmented by additional conventional
MRBMs and LACMs--could provide Beijing with a
conclusive edge in a future Taiwan Strait conflict.
Such a force also could hold US forces in the
Western Pacific at risk, should a decision be
made to intervene.
China's
growing presence in space is intimately related
to the PLA's emerging capacity for theater strike
operations. Reconnaissance satellites are important
for strategic and operational intelligence, indications
and warning, and targeting. Space imagery is also
needed to support battle damage assessments. Digitized
satellite imagery is crucial for land-attack cruise
missile mission planning. In addition, space systems
could enable the detection, tracking, and targeting
of US forward-deployed assets operating in the
Western Pacific Ocean. The same space-tracking
network that manages China's space assets is crucial
for operational security during a theater missile
campaign.
Operational
Implications
China's emerging capacity for deep strike missions
has a number of operational implications. First,
theater missiles serve as critical enablers for
dominance in other spheres of warfare. Of most
significance is the relationship between theater
missiles and the rapid achievement of air superiority.
Consistent with emerging PLA doctrine of "rapid
war, rapid resolution," a successful PLA theater
missile campaign could strip Taiwan of its ability
to effectively conduct air operations in a matter
of hours (or minutes, according to PLA propaganda).
Strikes against key air defense units and airfields
would result in a temporary suspension of Taiwan
air operations, creating a more permissive environment
for PLA Air Force operations over the island.
Air superiority, like the missile strikes, is
not an end in itself. Lessons absorbed from the
Gulf war and the air campaign in Yugoslavia, however,
have demonstrated that air superiority enables
other missions to take place with reduced costs
and greater efficiency.642
Furthermore,
theater missile operations also could quickly
degrade Taiwan's capacity for naval warfare and
ground operations. Fifty percent of the PLA's
theater missile arsenal is to be dedicated toward
the opening phase of conflict. Remaining missiles
probably would be held in reserve to support naval
and ground operations. Theater missile strikes
against harbors and piers would complicate naval
operations. Strikes against key bridges and staging
areas would impede Taiwan Army counter-landing
operations.
Furthermore,
China's expanding network of space sensors and
long-range strike assets could pose a fundamental
challenge to the US ability to project power into
the Western Pacific Ocean. Increasingly accurate
and lethal theater missiles could raise the costs
of US intervention in conflicts around the periphery
of China. Space-based reconnaissance assets could
facilitate detection of US air and naval deployments
into the area of operations. The PLA clearly understands
US vulnerabilities that arise from dependence
on in-theater ports, airfields, logistic facilities,
and C2 nodes. Successful fielding of
terminally guided theater ballistic missiles could
pose challenges to aircraft carrier battle groups,
especially if operating within range of China's
large inventory of 600-km-range SRBMs.643
Political
Implications
Developing a capacity for theater missile operations
has political implications as well. Taiwan has
enjoyed a defensive advantage over the mainland
for many years. Adequate warning time and a robust
defense has enabled Taiwan to blunt PLA air, naval,
and ground assaults long enough to allow the international
community to adjust to the situation, decide on
a course of action, take diplomatic action, and/or
flow forces to the region if necessary. A successful
theater missile campaign--combined with information
operations and air strikes--however, could enable
Beijing to quickly strip Taiwan of its warfighting
capacity.
To
maintain the political and military viability
of its new "trump card," Beijing has launched
a coordinated foreign policy and propaganda campaign
to shape the existing debate within the United
States on defensive measures intended to counter
theater missiles. Beijing generally poses six
arguments against missile defenses, including
an assertion that defenses will cause an arms
race.644
Beijing's campaign against missile defenses exploits
existing biases by some within the United States
against missile defenses. A mutually supporting
dynamic exists between PRC officials and US critics
whose views on missile defenses are founded on
traditional nuclear stability paradigms.
The
Taiwan Strait case, however, may be unique in
that it is the first theater in which highly accurate
conventional ballistic missiles dominate
the strategic landscape. PRC officials, echoed
by many within US governmental and academic circles,
argue that defenses against the growing PLA conventional
theater missile threat would be destabilizing
since they would spark an arms race.645
A number of studies, however, have demonstrated
that, in the conventional context, defenses generally
have not been the cause of arms races. Conventional
arms races are sparked or intensified by a rapid
buildup of offensive capabilities.646
The
misplaced focus on missile defenses within academic
and policy communities in the United States has
resulted in neglect of at least three dangers
presented by Beijing's growing arsenal of increasingly
accurate and lethal theater missiles. First,
the conventional wisdom is that force would be
used against Taiwan only in the event the government
legally declares the island as an independent
political entity. Overwhelming offensive capabilities,
however, increase the chances that force could
be used short of a de jure declaration
of independence. Confidence in a quick military
victory could lower the perceived cost of conflict
and thus increase Beijing's incentives to use
force. At a minimum, a decisive PLA advantage
in offensive capabilities would increase risks
of greater PRC bellicose behavior in the cross-Strait
relationship. In addition, the ability to strip
Taiwan of its capacity for military operations--in
effect a first-strike capability--raises dangers
of preemptive war.647
The PLA preemptive strike doctrine is also destabilizing
since it decreases warning time that could allow
for diplomatic intervention. An overwhelming offensive
advantage may also reduce Beijing's incentives
for arms control and confidence-building measures,
and reduce their willingness to compromise in
future cross-Strait dialogue.
Second,
reduced costs for military action could lead to
another unintended consequence of the theater
missile buildup--a Taiwan punitive deterrent to
raise the costs of PLA military action. At least
one punitive deterrent is Taiwan's own theater
missile capability. A Taiwan ballistic or land-attack
cruise missile would serve as a political tool
to raise the costs of PRC military action. Even
more ominous is that a severe collapse in its
sense of security could prompt Taiwan to renew
efforts to develop a nuclear device. Some think
Taiwan has the capacity to develop nuclear weapons
quickly if the need should arise. Within the last
two years, an open debate has arisen in Taiwan
regarding the utility of developing weapons of
mass destruction.648
Third,
as Taiwan's national security community debates
the need for a deterrent, the magnitude of the
theater missile challenge may increase domestic
pressure for tactically offensive counterforce
operations, to include preemptive strikes. Theoretical
studies have demonstrated that maintenance of
an exclusively defensive force posture against
an overwhelming offensive force is prohibitively
expensive.649
Tactical offenses in support of a strategically
defensive doctrine are more cost effective. As
the PLA theater missile threat evolves, Taiwan
strategists may adopt operational concepts outlined
in US Department of Defense Joint Pub 3-01.5
that states "the preferred method of countering
enemy theater missile operations is to attack
and destroy or disrupt theater missiles prior
to their launch." This notion comes as no surprise
to the PLA Second Artillery, an organization whose
doctrine rests on the assumption that their phased
campaign would be answered with Taiwan or US counterattacks.
Theater
Missile Countermeasures
A preemptive strategy that relies on an overwhelming
offensive force is not only destabilizing, but
may be risky from a warfighting perspective. The
outlook described above is admittedly pessimistic
and worst case. The posited aim of a PLA air and
missile campaign is strategic paralysis, with
the expectation being that "paralysis" must somehow
equate to "surrender." Things may not work that
way. With proper preparations, Taiwan, or any
other adversary, could recover from initial attacks.
Observers have asserted that Taipei would fold
after the impact of a single missile on Taiwan.
However, lessons from World War II, the Vietnam
war, and elsewhere have shown that strategic attacks
could harden rather than diminish resolve.650
Taiwan
could take steps to reduce the operational effectiveness
of the PLA theater missiles and supporting surveillance
assets. The theater missile problem is already
forcing the Taiwan military to modernize in a
way that it would not have otherwise. The only
way to effectively counter a large-scale theater
missile threat is through jointness and innovative
warfighting concepts commonly associated with
the RMA. Assuming requisite changes and investments
are made, the PLA's ability to achieve a decisive
victory over Taiwan is not assured.
Perhaps
the most important countermeasure is a survivable
C4I architecture and robust passive
defenses. Passive defense includes: 1) tactical
warning; 2) reducing the effectiveness of PLA
targeting through operational security, deception,
and mobility; 3) reducing vulnerability through
hardening, redundancy and robustness, dispersal,
and effective civil defense; and 4) recovery and
reconstitution. In addition, the PLA's successful
fielding of sophisticated terminal guidance systems
would be accompanied by a new set of vulnerabilities.
GPS, and optical, radar, and millimeter wave seekers
can be jammed, as could the PLA's future space
reconnaissance assets.651
Furthermore,
the complexity of a theater missile campaign presents
opportunities for "induced friction." The challenges
presented by an overwhelming capacity for offensive
operations would naturally prompt defenders to
prevent the launch of theater missiles. This concept
would be carried out by attacking elements of
the overall system, including such actions as
destroying launch platforms, reconnaissance, surveillance,
and targeting platforms; command and control nodes;
missile stocks; and transport infrastructure.
Strikes against selected nodes in a theater missile
brigade could have significant systemic effects
that could reduce the frequency or intensity of
theater missile strikes.
The
effectiveness of theater ballistic and land-attack
cruise missiles strikes also could be reduced
through active missile defenses. Exclusive reliance
on active defenses, however, would be cost prohibitive
and only partially effective against the type
of theater missile threat that Taiwan is expected
to face. The most serious challenge to active
defenses may be the tyranny of geography--Taiwan
is close enough to the mainland to allow the PLA
to launch from a wide range of azimuths. Multi-axis
theater ballistic missile attacks could stress
even the best battle management and command, control,
and communication systems, especially if combined
with air and LACM strikes, electronic attack,
and special operations.652
In
the end, however, the optimal solution lies in
creating incentives for Beijing to moderate its
theater missile deployments. The first step is
recognizing the destabilizing nature of the PLA
theater missile buildup. Although urging PLA restraint
in deploying theater missiles opposite Taiwan
is a worthwhile endeavor, we should not be overly
sanguine about the chances for success. Theater
missiles are an integral part of the PLA's overall
modernization objectives. As long as the PLA seeks
to develop the kind of force that could give the
PRC a decisive military advantage over Taiwan,
then the ability to freeze or roll back theater
missile deployments will be limited. Nevertheless,
greater effort must be made to convince the civilian
leadership in Beijing that the large-scale deployment
of offensive weapons would adversely affect regional
stability and that resolution of sovereignty disputes
through other than peaceful means is not a viable
option.
Key
Indicators of Changes in Chinese Development and
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Kenneth
W. Allen
The
People's Republic of China (PRC) initiated its
nuclear weapons program during the 1950s as a
result of its political and military rivalry with
the United States. Since then, the Chinese Government
has consistently used its nuclear weapons and
ballistic missile technology as a political lever
against the United States.653
Although China has become a signatory to several
international nonproliferation treaties, this
paper contends that in the future China will continue
to proliferate nuclear weapons and missile technology
for political and economic reasons. Moreover,
this essay cites key proliferation indicators
and provides a methodology to recognize these
indicators.
The
PRC Government has consistently stated that China's
cooperation with other countries in the field
of nuclear energy is exclusively for peaceful
purposes. In 1986, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) spokesman stated, "The PRC does not advocate,
encourage, or engage in nuclear proliferation,
nor does China assist other countries in developing
nuclear weapons."654
A decade later, an MFA spokesman reiterated that,
"China, as a responsible state, has never transferred
equipment or technology for producing nuclear
weapons to any other country, nor will China do
so in the future."655
Since the 1970s, Beijing has concluded agreements
with as many as fourteen countries on the peaceful
use of nuclear energy.656
In
response to international concerns about the PRC's
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
over the past decade, Beijing has become progressively
involved in several international nonproliferation
agreements and has promulgated various domestic
export control regulations. These agreements include
the following:
-
Joined
the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA).
-
Acceded
to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT).
-
Signed
and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC).
-
Made
statements on fissile material production.
-
Made
statement on making only safeguarded nuclear
transfers.
-
Signed
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
-
Joined
Zangger Committee.657
During
the late 1980s, China and the United States clashed
over conventional missile proliferation when Beijing
began selling antiship missiles to Iran and DF-3/CSS-2
ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia. By the early
1990s, the gap between the two nations widened
as Beijing began providing DF-11/M-11 missiles
and components to Pakistan.
As
tensions mounted in the Taiwan Strait in late
1995, Beijing issued its first White Paper
on Arms Control and Disarmament. The twenty-page
paper, released during the negotiating endgame
of the CTBT and while China was conducting nuclear
tests, attempted to defuse concerns about a "China
Threat" and accusations that Beijing was supplying
weapons of mass destruction or related technologies
to friendly neighbors (i.e., Pakistan and Iran).
In July 1998, Beijing published its first defense
white paper, China's National Defense.658
These two reports summed up China's commitment
to conventional arms control by stating:
China
respects the right of every country to independent
or collective self-defense and to acquisition
of weapons for this purpose. China practices strict
control of the transfer of conventional military
equipment and related technologies and observes
the following principles: The export of weapons
must help the recipient nation enhance its capability
for legitimate self-defense; it must not impair
peace, security, and stability of the relevant
region and the world as a whole; and it must not
be used to interfere in the recipient state's
internal affairs. In October 1997, the Chinese
Government published the Regulations of the
People's Republic of China on the Control of Military
Products Export. China has been consistently
responsible regarding the transfer of missiles.
China is not a member state of the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) and has not joined its formulation
and revision, but the Chinese Government promised
to observe the guidelines and parameters of the
MTCR in February 1992.659
In
October 1994, China reaffirmed its promise. In
line with the above policy, China has exercised
strict and effective control over the export of
missiles and related materials and has never done
anything in violation of its commitments.660
China
as a WMD Proliferator
Despite
of China's pronouncements denying WMD proliferation,
the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported
in August 1996 that "China was the worst proliferator
of equipment and technology associated with WMD."661
In 1998, the CIA reported:
China
was continuing to take steps to strengthen its
control over nuclear exports by promulgating new
export control regulations covering the sale of
dual-use nuclear equipment, as well as the export
of equipment and materials associated exclusively
with nuclear applications. China also pledged
in late 1997 not to engage in any new nuclear
cooperation with Iran and to complete work on
two remaining nuclear projects--a small research
reactor and a zirconium production facility--in
a relatively short period of time. During early
1998, Chinese entities provided a variety of missile-related
items and assistance to several countries of proliferation
concern. Chinese entities also sought to supply
Iran and Syria with CW-related chemicals. China
has provided extensive support in the past to
Pakistan's WMD programs, and some assistance continues.662
This
paper assumes that China will continue to proliferate
WMD as a matter of official policy, regardless
of what international agreements have been signed.
In addition, certain organizations will attempt
to circumvent the government's policies and export
regulations by providing WMD technology and equipment
to proliferating countries.
As
described in other reports at this conference,
since the early 1980s, China has tried secretly
to provide nuclear technology and/or missiles
to several countries, including Pakistan, Iran,
Syria, Algeria, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia.
China's relationship with Iran also includes alleged
cooperation on chemical weapons. The following
work describes several driving factors within
China's foreign, domestic, and economic policies
for this proliferation activity.
Foreign
Policy Considerations
I assume that China will continue to support its
longstanding relations with Pakistan and Iran
by providing WMD technology and equipment for
existing programs, as well as for new programs
in the future. For example, an August 1999 Reuters
article states, "China has signed an $11 million
deal to improve Iran's anti-ship missiles, raising
questions about its 1998 vow not to supply Tehran
with cruise missiles or related technology."663
The
PRC's relations with the Republic of China (ROC)
on Taiwan also have been a factor in China's WMD
proliferation. During the 1980s, the PRC's competition
with the ROC for diplomatic recognition with several
key states, such as South Africa, Saudi Arabia,
and Israel, probably contributed to Beijing's
calculations concerning its proliferation activity.
Today, however, the ROC does not have diplomatic
relations with any states of similar stature where
the PRC could use WMD proliferation as an enticement
to switch recognition.664
Unenforceable
Compliance
Although the Chinese Government still officially
sanctions some proliferation with countries like
Pakistan and Iran, it does have and will continue
to have problems implementing and monitoring compliance
from certain suppliers. The best case in point
is the sale of 5,000 ring magnets to the A.Q.
Khan Research Laboratory in Kahuta, Pakistan,
sometime after 1994. The ring magnets, which can
be used in gas centrifuges to enrich uranium,
were sold for $70,000 by the China National Nuclear
Corporation (CNNC), a state-owned corporation.
CNNC reportedly sold the ring magnets directly
to the laboratory without receiving approval by
higher authorities because the items were not
covered by the Ministry of Foreign Affair's (MFA)
export control list or the dollar value required
for notification. In addition, although China
and Pakistan were members of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the laboratory was
not an IAEA-safeguarded facility.665
As
China moves further toward a market economy and
defense-related state-owned enterprises (SOE)
are required to sell more goods abroad in order
to survive, they will be tempted to circumvent
the growing list of export regulations and sell
restricted WMD technology and equipment secretly
to other countries. The decentralization of economic
decision making to the factory level and increasing
levels of technology available will further add
to the enticement to sell their goods for hard
currency.
Indicators
of WMD Proliferation
There
are various macro-level indicators that can provide
clues to China's proliferation of WMD. These indicators
include political relations with various countries,
particularly the United States and India, and
economic factors. China's relations with the United
States can be viewed as a barometer of Beijing's
WMD relations with other countries. Therefore,
when Sino-US relations are on a downward trend,
Beijing is more likely to circumvent prior agreements
as leverage with Washington. At the same time,
loosening of economic controls on individual organizations,
which must sell goods to survive, provides greater
opportunities for these organizations to become
involved in unauthorized sales of WMD goods and
services.
Sino-Iranian
Cooperation
The PRC's relations with Iran provide a good example
of how China's foreign, domestic, and economic
policies combine to promote WMD proliferation.
Initial relations in the early 1980s were based
on economic factors: Iran was willing to provide
hard currency for technology, weapon systems,
and the research and development conducted in
China for new weapon systems to meet Iranian specifications.
Since then, China's need for imported oil has
been a factor in their relations. Relations were
also important domestically for China, as Beijing
reportedly sought assurance from Tehran for Iran's
non-interference with Xinjiang's restive Muslim
population. As United States arms sales to Taiwan
have become more contentious during the1990s,
Beijing has tried to link its arms sales to Tehran
with Washington's arms sales to Taipei.
The
PRC often signs joint-venture contracts with foreign
countries for weapon systems that are not necessarily
intended for use within the People's Liberation
Army (PLA). With the Iran-Iraq war providing a
potential arms market, China began developing
tactical missiles, such as the M-9 and M-11, for
export in 1984 with the hope that the PLA would
become interested in the program later.666
At that time, China had the technical expertise
and facilities and was in search of hard currency,
while Iran had the money but was not able to develop
and produce new missiles. Since then, China has
reportedly provided complete M-11 systems, technology,
and components to Pakistan. Although this economic
and military relationship was good for Beijing
and Tehran, it conflicted with Washington's national
security interests in the Gulf region. The United
States alleges that the M-11 exceeds the MTCR
guidelines. Although China has denied the reports
and has verbally agreed to abide by the MTCR guidelines,
Beijing has not become a signatory to the agreement
and allegedly continues to provide Pakistan with
M-11 components.
During
the 1990s, Washington's pressure on China and
Iran to cease their energy cooperation has actually
worked to strengthen the relationship between
Beijing and Tehran. Although US companies had
already been barred from importing Iranian oil
since 1987, the United States conducted a campaign
during 1995 that focused on disrupting Iran's
energy sector further by banning American companies
from purchasing oil for resale to third parties.
Washington also put pressure on other such countries
as Japan and Azerbaijan to cease economic cooperation
on Iranian energy projects. This pressure, which
came at the same time President Clinton authorized
Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui to visit his alma
mater at Cornell, provided a backdrop for Beijing
to increase its energy cooperation with Tehran.
Whereas China needed to import greater amounts
of oil, Iran needed Chinese nuclear energy technology
for civilian and military uses.667
Moreover, the PRC has consistently tried to justify
its military equipment sales to Iran by citing
US military sales to Taiwan. Therefore, for all
these reasons, China and Iran's independent relations
with the United States, as well as complementary
energy requirements, will continue to provide
a good indicator of the continuing cooperation
between Beijing and Tehran on WMD proliferation.
China's
Five-Year Plan
China's five-year plans provide the framework
for the PRC's official political and economic
policies. A careful review of these plans gives
valuable clues about China's priorities in several
areas, including military spending, R&D, and
weapons acquisitions. For example, the current
ninth five-year plan (1996-2000) identifies several
areas where China can cooperate with foreign countries
in conventional weapons and WMD. The plan also
gives guidance for economic growth, whereby companies
and ministries must meet certain growth targets.
The
current plan encourages defense companies to develop
military technologies for the PLA through joint
ventures with foreign investors and to boost attempts
to develop new weapons. Owing to attempts to revitalize
the defense-related State-Owned Enterprise (SOE)
system and the PLA's R&D and procurement system,
the Central Military Commission (CMC) has again
restructured the entire PLA's weapons acquisition
structure. The plan calls for concentrating on
only a few key projects but also calls for an
increase in spending on overall civilian science
R&D from less than 1 percent of the gross
domestic product to 3 percent. The defense science
and technology establishment will benefit from
this added funding because its appropriations
come from the civilian science budget rather than
the defense budget.668
Determining
which projects the CMC has decided to focus on
provides one of the keys to analyzing which future
weapon systems the PLA will receive and China
will produce for export. Chinese open-source material
often identifies various projects as focal points
(zhong dian zhi yi), which means that these
projects receive the highest political support.
This political support, in turn, equates to financial
support.
The
PLA's Economic Situation
Besides monitoring the five-year plans and defense
industry economic indicators, the PLA's economic
situation provides valuable clues as to military
involvement in WMD proliferation abroad. The military
began commercial activities in 1985, following
directives issued by the CMC and State Council,
mainly as an expression of Deng Xiaoping's economic
reform drive. At the movement's peak in the early
1990s, PLA-affiliated businesses were estimated
at about 20,000.669
One of the driving forces was the PLA's need to
supplement its budget. As a result, several large
companies, the most notable being the General
Staff Department's Poly Technologies, emerged
as valuable import and export arms of the PLA.
Some of these companies became involved in purchasing
foreign military equipment and for selling surplus
PLA equipment abroad. 670
Poly
Technologies is best known for its 1988 sale of
CSS-2 ballistic missiles from the PLA inventory
to Saudi Arabia. Several issues coalesced in the
CSS-2 sale. First, Saudi Arabia actively sought
out China's support. Second, like Iran, Saudi
Arabia was able to pay China with much-needed
hard currency. Third, China saw the sale as a
way of pulling Saudi Arabia away from its diplomatic
recognition of the Republic of China (ROC) on
Taiwan. This goal was finally achieved when the
PRC and Saudi Arabia established diplomatic relations
in July 1990. Fourth, the PLA's ongoing modernization
program led to the availability of the surplus
missiles from its active inventory. Finally, the
PLA was actively seeking ways to accrue much-needed
additional money to supplement its official budget.
The
1988 situation may be replayed over the next few
years, following Jiang Zemin's 1998 ruling that
the PLA must divest itself of its non-agriculture
and industrial production companies. Although
the State Council has reportedly increased the
PLA's annual budget, the PLA might seek ways to
supplement this budget with further WMD sales
abroad--either officially or unofficially.
High-Level
Exchanges
Indicators for official government involvement
in WMD activity will include exchanges by high-level
officials, as well as visits by officials from
the nuclear industry, defense industries, and
the military. Although the official government
media may cover the existence of high-level visits,
those by lower-level officials most likely will
not be covered. These types of visits, however,
may be reported in local newspapers or in factory
or ministry newsletters. Cross-referencing multiple
sources often gives a good indication of the people
and organizations involved.
Another
indicator of official activities involves the
use of military aircraft to transport Chinese
delegations abroad or foreign delegations around
China. When transporting Chinese delegations abroad,
these aircraft most likely will stop in various
locations around China to pick up or drop off
passengers. Once negotiations have begun in earnest,
these flights may become routine.
Absence/Presence
of Key Officials
Although the negotiation process largely will
be concluded in secrecy, one possible indicator
is the unexplained absence or presence of certain
key people for extended periods of time. Key people
include ministers, vice ministers, factory managers,
military procurement officers, scientists, import/export
company representatives, and interpreters.
If
negotiations are handled through the Chinese Embassy
abroad or the foreign embassy in Beijing, the
permanent or temporary assignment of a new embassy
official often provides an indication of ongoing,
long-term negotiations and contract implementation.
If the PLA is involved, the PLA may assign military
representatives from the appropriate organization
such as the newly established General Armament
Department to the defense attache office. These
officers will not participate in normal military
attache functions, but will be responsible for
the military sales or assistance program. This
was the case when the United States had four foreign
military sales (FMS) programs with China during
the 1980s. At that time, the Commission for Science,
Technology, and Industry for National Defense
(COSTIND) had uniformed military representatives
assigned to the PRC Embassy in Washington.
Many
Chinese ministries have established branch offices
of their import/export companies in foreign countries.
These representatives are posted abroad to establish
business links, facilitate contract negotiations,
and to conduct follow-on support for existing
contracts. The addition of new representatives
to these offices or an unusual number of visitors
from China provide indicators of negotiations
or completed contracts.
Equipment
Support
When the Chinese provide any type of major equipment
abroad, they also provide training and follow-up
support either in China or in the host country
for that equipment. This training may be conducted
for several years in some cases. Thus, the continuing
presence of large numbers of Chinese in key cities
or weapons-related areas is a valuable indicator
of on-going activity. Since the Chinese do not
readily publish lists of key personnel or organizational
structures, knowing who the key personnel are
is often difficult. Therefore, compiling organizational
data as it becomes available is important, so
that names can be cross-referenced later.
Monitoring
Contract Implementation
Information gathered from reconnaissance satellites
provides classic indicators of impending, ongoing,
or previous sales or acquisition of WMD. These
indicators include communications, electronic
emissions, and photography of production facilities,
deployment areas, and transportation hubs.
Each
ministry or corporation has its own import/export
company. These companies arrange the transportation
for components and full systems, and use their
warehouse and loading facilities along the route,
whether by road, rail, or sea. Because they generally
use the same shipping companies, monitoring these
facilities could provide indicators of deliveries.
Monitoring
of China's ground and sea transportation systems
also can provide potential indicators of delivery
activity. Because almost all of China's goods
are moved by rail at one time or another within
the country, unusual rail movements may provide
important clues to the transfer of equipment.
As China's economy grows, competition for cargo
space is becoming more intense. The PLA must submit
requirements through the proper military and railway
ministry channels anywhere from three to twelve
months in advance. When such hazardous cargoes
as munitions are carried on trains, the amount
of coordination and limitations increases exponentially.
The cargo must be delivered immediately and is
not allowed to remain in one spot for more than
twenty-four hours. The shipping organization must
notify public security organizations en route
to ensure that there are no problems.671
Occasionally, a local newspaper may carry an article
describing the role the local police or other
organizations played in the train's movement.
Even
nonhazardous cargo oftentimes receives local media
attention. For example, during 1988, the Ministry
of Aviation's weekly newspaper described the transfer
by road of a Y-8 transport aircraft from the production
facility in northern Sichuan Province to the flight
test center at Xian. The planning process took
nearly a year and involved the police in every
small town en route. Local newspapers may also
carry similar articles covering activities at
facilities involved in WMD.
The
difficulty comes when nonhazardous cargo containing
items such as weapons or nuclear components rather
than entire systems are shipped by rail or sea
on a non-urgent basis. Specific indicators of
this activity are unlikely, other than by monitoring
the place of origin and destination.
International
Exhibitions and Symposiums
A review of industry literature and information
provided at international exhibitions and symposiums
may render clues to ongoing domestic and foreign
programs. Chinese attendance at international
symposiums provides a good indication of China's
interest in certain technologies. Chinese hosting
of international exhibitions and symposia enables
them to agenda-set and invite foreign scholars
and scientists who have information tailored to
China's needs and interests. Furthermore, hosting
these exhibitions provides the most cost-effective
means of obtaining information, since the Chinese
normally charge foreign companies high prices
for exhibition space.
Upgrading
the PLA's Ballistic Missile Force
There are several indicators for proliferation
of WMD systems within the PLA. First, occasional
articles in PLA and non-military publications,
when added to previous information, unveil organizational
changes related to impending or recent missile
deployments.
Second,
an increase in the number of launch bases would
point directly to missile proliferation. A close
review of the PLA's organizational structure for
the Second Artillery Corps provides valuable clues
to the future structure of China's ballistic missile
force.672
If China were to double or triple the number of
ballistic missiles, as suggested in the 1997 Department
of Defense report to Congress, the Second Artillery,
headquarters for six bases, would have to 1) increase
the number of bases; 2) increase the number of
brigades per base; 3) increase the number of battalions
per brigade; and/or 4) increase the number of
reserve missiles. The PLA has historically adhered
to the "rule of three," which means that each
division has three regiments, each regiment has
three battalions, and each battalion has three
companies. Although this rule is not hard and
fast, it has provided the guiding principles for
the PLA's organizational structure for fifty years.673
The Second Artillery appears to have as few as
two brigades per base and as many as four battalions
per brigade in some cases, but the PLA most likely
would be reluctant to increase the number of brigades
or battalions beyond four at a time when the rest
of the PLA is shrinking. Because the only real
way for the PRC to radically increase the total
number of missiles, other than increasing the
number of reserve missiles, is to build more bases,
an increase in bases would be a glaring indicator
of missile proliferation.
Summary
For
political and economic reasons, the PRC is likely
to continue as a WMD proliferator regardless of
its acceptance of international regimes. Sales
of WMD technology and equipment abroad will be
done officially and unofficially, involving the
defense industry and the PLA. Key indicators include
changes in China's foreign and economic policies,
especially as they pertain to relations with the
United States.
All
of China's WMD proliferation activity has taken
place in South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.
Other than the possibility of war between Pakistan
and India, the acquisition of WMD by the other
countries would not directly affect China's security.
Therefore, monitoring of requirements by countries
in these regions where China could fulfill some
or all of their demands should provide an indicator
of at least the potential for China to become
involved in WMD proliferation there. China is
constantly seeking markets for its WMD technology
and equipment. Although China might not be able
to provide everything these proliferator countries
are seeking, PRC companies, whether legally or
illegally, might be willing to sell what they
have available for the right price.
Footnotes
1
Dr. Bates Gill is Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy
Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Director
of the Brookings Center for Northeast Asian Policy
Studies; Dr. James Mulvenon is Associate Political
Scientist at the RAND Corporation, and Deputy
Director of the RAND Center for Asia-Pacific Policy.
The authors wish to thank Peter Almquist, Torrey
Froscher, Catherine Johnston, Evan Medeiros, Brad
Roberts, and Michael Swaine for comments on earlier
drafts.
2
This research focuses on China's nuclear arsenal,
and does not address other possible Chinese weapons
of mass destruction such as chemical and biological
weapons (CBW). According to treaties to which
China is a party, the country is prohibited from
developing, producing, or stockpiling CBW. China
states that it "does not produce or possess chemical
weapons" and that it "has never developed, produced,
stockpiled, or otherwise acquired or retained
biological agents, toxins, or weapons equipment
or means of delivery for them." See "China: Arms
Control And Disarmament," Information Office of
the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China,
November 1995, Beijing Review, 27 November-3
December 1995, pp. 12-13, 18; "Explanation by
the Government of the People's Republic of China
on its Observance of the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction," BWC/CONF.III/3/Add.1,
1991. Many open-source publications, including
documents from the US Government, claim otherwise.
Among the open-source reports, see, for example,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation:
Threat and Response (on-line version); Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence To
And Compliance With Arms Control Agreements
(Washington, DC: ACDA, 1997) (on-line version);
"Albright warns of Chinese BW," Iran Brief,
5 February 1997, p. 9; "US Suspects Chinese Biological
Arms," Asian Defence Journal (September
1995), p. 106; Bill Gertz, "China has biological
arsenal, Congress told," Washington Times,
15 July 1995, p. A2; R. Jeffrey Smith, "China
May Have Revived Germ Weapons Program, US Officials
Say,"Washington Post, 24 February 1993,
p. A4; Countering the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Threat in the Post-Soviet World, Report
of the Special Inquiry into the Chemical and Biological
Threat of the Committee on Armed Services, US
House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, second
session, 23 February 1993, pp. 12-13.
3
See, for example, Mark A. Stokes, China's Strategic
Modernization: Implications for the United States
(Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute,
US Army War College, September 1999); Robert S.
Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard Fieldhouse,Nuclear
Weapons Databook, Volume Five, British, French,
and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1994); Robert S. Norris and William M.
Arkin, "British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Forces,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
(November/December 1996).
4
Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking':
The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International
Security 20, no. 3 (winter 1995/96).
5
See, for example: John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai,
China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of
Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1994); John Wilson
Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988).
6
Chong-pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy:
Tradition within Evolution (Lexington, MA:
Lexington Books, 1988).
7
Alastair Iain Johnston, "Prospects for Chinese
Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence
Versus Multilateral Arms Control," China Quarterly
(June 1996); Litai Xue, "Evolution of China's
Nuclear Strategy," in John C. Hopkins and Weixing
Hu, eds., Strategic Views from the Second Tier:
The Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Britain,
and China (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction
Publishers, 1995).
8
Johnston, "Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force
Modernization," op. cit., p. 552.
9
John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic
Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals,"
International Security, vol. 17, no. 2
(fall 1992), pp. 6-7.
10
See Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984),
especially pp. 59 et seq.
11
Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation:
Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the
Spread of Nuclear Weapons," International
Security, vol. 18, no. 4 (spring 1994).
12
The single-most in-depth elaboration of how China's
strategic tradition shapes its nuclear strategy
is found in Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy:
Tradition within Evolution, op.cit. Lin writes,
"China does have a distinctive nuclear strategy
of its own which, even while evolving, manifests
certain persistent strategic principles found
in Chinese traditional culture." Ibid.,
1. He focuses particularly on the relevance for
contemporary Chinese strategic doctrine of such
traditional concepts as "ambiguity," "extramilitary
[i.e., political and economic] emphasis," "the
art of waiting and yielding," "minimalism," and
the use of "negative" strengths.
13
Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking'," op.
cit.
14
Lewis and Xue, China's Strategic Seapower,
op. cit., pp. 232-33.
15
Hua Hongxun, "China's Strategic Missile Programs:
Limited Aims, Not 'Limited Deterrence'," Nonproliferation
Review 5, no. 2 (winter 1998), pp. 60-68.
16
A more detailed analysis of how these Maoist concepts
affected Chinese nuclear doctrine is in Alice
Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in
the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, 1962), especially chaps. 1 and
2. See also Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy,
op. cit., pp. 18-22.
17
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith,
trans., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).
Mao's debt to Sun Zi is evident in virtually all
of his works on military strategy, and especially
in Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary
War, On Protracted War, and On Guerrilla
Warfare.
18
One recent analysis takes issue with this historical
interpretation that China has traditionally eschewed
violence in its external relations. Relying on
analysis of the ancient Seven Military Classics
and Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) memorials on
foreign policy which make frequent reference to
classic Chinese strategic thinking, Iain Johnston
shows that resort to violence, elimination of
threats by force, and the imperative of offensive
solutions were very much a part of Chinese strategic
tradition. As Johnston acknowledges, however,
the proclivities evident among Chinese strategists
some 500 years ago or more are not necessarily
reflected in contemporary China. However, he shows
that, contrary to widely held opinion, there is
a tradition of violent and offense-oriented strategies
in traditional Chinese military thought. Alastair
Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic
Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
What is important for our analysis here is that,
in spite of this historical record, the more benign
model is widely held in China to be the
defining character of Chinese foreign policy,
and probably influenced Mao's thinking on Chinese
nuclear weapons doctrine.
19
Statement by Sha Zukang, Chinese Disarmament Ambassador,
at the General Debate of the First Committee of
the 50th Session of the UN General Assembly, 17
October 1995 (emphasis added); discussions with
Chinese nuclear weapons strategists, November
1996, March 1998, and September 1998. For a further
discussion of Chinese distinction between offensive
and defensive deterrence, see the conference report
on the results of the Center for Nonproliferation
Studies--organized track 1 dialogue between US
and Chinese counterparts on arms control and nonproliferation,
<http://cnssun2.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/beijing/report.htm>.
On the discussion of Chinese terms for deterrence,
see also Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy,
op. cit., p. 110.
20
Note that "factional networks" and decisions based
on "personal relations" have been linked to traditional
aspects of Chinese political culture. On this
point, and a more in-depth discussion of Chinese
Party-Army relations, see Ellis Joffe, "Party-Army
Relations in China: Retrospect and Prospect,"
China Quarterly, no. 146 (June 1996), pp.
299-314.
21
David Shambaugh, Reforming the Chinese Military
(Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming),
in chap. 3; see also the papers delivered by Paul
H. B. Godwin and David Finkelstein at the RAND-CAPS
Conference on the PLA, Washington, DC, July 1999.
22
Report of the Select Committee on US National
Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with
the People's Republic of China [The Cox Committee
Report], House of Representatives Report 105-851,
vol. 1(Washington, DC: US Government Printing
Office, 1999), p. 192.
23
Lewis and Xue, Strategic Seapower,
op. cit., p. 4: "Nie [Rongzhen, military
leader and "father" of the Chinese bomb]'s group
did not discuss or appear to consider relevant
how these programs, if successful, would fit any
new strategic concept. The members of Nie's group
did not explicate the underlying strategic rationale
for the program, and no one asked them to do so."
Also ibid., p. 20: "[China's] strategic
doctrines are the product, not the cause, of the
[weapon] project's political-technical evolution."
See also Michael D. Swaine, The Role of the
Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking,
rev. ed., (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1998),
p. 39: "[Chinese] nuclear weapons development
was apparently target- and technology-, and not
specifically doctrinally driven."
24
Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, op. cit.,
p. 214.
25
Lewis and Xue, China's Strategic Seapower,
op. cit., p. 19.
26
In the context of developing the Chinese nuclear
arsenal, Lewis and Xue describe the Chinese conundrum
of balancing the need for Soviet aid with a traditional
"self-reliance" posture in their China's Strategic
Seapower, pp. 2-4. A more in-depth explication
of this conundrum and its impact on Chinese defense
industrialization is found in John Frankenstein,
"Back to the Future: A Historical Perspective
on Chinese Military Modernization," a paper presented
at the annual meeting of the International Studies
Association, Anaheim, CA, March 1986, and in Bates
Gill and Taeho Kim, China's Arms Acquisitions
from Abroad: A Quest for "Superb and Secret Weapons"
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), especially
chap. 2. A discussion of historical and socio-cultural
developments, and their impact on Chinese military-technical
modernization (especially in relation to the Revolution
in Military Affairs) is found in Bates Gill, China
and the Revolution in Military Affairs: Assessing
Economic and Socio-Cultural Factors (Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania: US Army War College, May
1996).
27
The database on China compiled by the East Asia
Nonproilferation Project, Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies,
is particularly helpful in covering the Chinese
nuclear principles discussed here.
28
See, for example: Lewis and Xue, China Builds
the Bomb, op. cit., pp. 11-34.
29
Statement of the Government of the People's Republic
of China, 16 October 1964, found in Lewis and
Xue, China Builds the Bomb, pp. 241, 242.
30
Lt. Gen. Li Jijun, Traditional Military Thinking
and the Defensive Strategy of China, Letort
Paper no. 1 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War
College, 29 August 1997), p. 7.
31
China's no-first-use pledge: "China undertakes
not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at
any time or under any circumstances." (China's
National Statement On Security Assurances, 5 April
1995.)
32
China's negative security assurances: "China undertakes
not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free
zones at any time or under any circumstances.
This commitment naturally applies to non-nuclear-weapon
States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons or non-nuclear-weapon States
that have undertaken any comparable internationally
binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire
nuclear explosive devices." China's National Statement
On Security Assurances, 5 April 1995.
33
Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking'," pp. 21-23.
34
China's National Statement On Security Assurances,
5 April 1995; see also China's white paper China:
Arms Control and Disarmament (Beijing: Information
Office of the State Council, November 1995).
35
As presented by Ambassador Steven J. Ledogar,
US Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament,
6 April 1995.
36
China's National Statement, op. cit.
37
China: Arms Control and Disarmament (Beijing:
State Council Information Office, November 1995).
38
Unless otherwise noted, this section draws from
Xie Guang, et al., eds., Dangdai Zhongguo
de Guofang Keji Shiye [Contemporary China's
Defense Science and Technology Undertakings],
vol. 1 (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1992),
chaps. 8, 9, and 10.
39
Robert Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard
W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook,
Volume Five: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear
Weapons (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1994), pp. 377-78.
40
Lewis and Hua, China Builds the Bomb, p.
212.
41
General Dynamics, The World's Missile Systems,
8th ed., (Pomona, CA: General Dynamics,
August 1988), p.52.
42
Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military
Posture FY 1982, p.109.
43
Lewis and Hua, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs,"
p. 9.
44
Norris, et al., Nuclear Weapons
Databook, p. 380. The DF-3 may have drawn
in part from research and development conducted
on the DF-1 that was originally based in part
on the Soviet R-12 (NATO code name SS-4 or "Sandal"),
which, like the DF-3, had a cluster of four engines,
and which Chinese rocket scientists had learned
about during training in Moscow in the 1950s.
See Lewis and Hua, "China's Ballistic Missile
Programs," op. cit., p. 13.
45
Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems.
46
Center for Defense Information, Nuclear
Weapons Database: Chinese Arsenal.
47
Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb,
p. 213.
48
Norris, et al., Nuclear Weapons
Databook, p. 381. Lewis and Hua, "China's
Ballistic Missile Programs," op. cit., p.
16, also provides the May 1971 date.
49
Lewis and Hua, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs,"
op. cit., p. 17.
50
Ibid.
51
Norris, et al., Nuclear Weapons
Databook, p. 383.
52
Lewis and Hua, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs,"
p. 24.
53
Norris, et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook,
p. 383.
54
Ibid., p. 382.
55
This section draws from "China's Solid Propellant
ICBM Research," in Xie Guang, et al., eds., Dangdai
Zhongguo de Guofang Keji Shiye [Contemporary
China's Defense Science and Technology Undertakings],
vol. 1 (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1992).
56
Lewis and Hua also note that problems in warhead
miniaturization, nuclear submarine development,
and bureaucratic turf battles also slowed the
program.
57
The nuclear capability of these missiles is cited
in US Department of Defense, "Selected Military
Capabilities of the People's Republic of China,"
report to Congress pursuant to Section 1226 of
the FY98 National Defense Authorization Act, October
1998.
58
The authors are indebted to Evan Medeiros for
this point.
59
US Department of Defense, "Selected Military Capabilities
of the People's Republic of China," report to
Congress pursuant to Section 1226 of the FY98
National Defense Authorization Act, October 1998.
60
On the 1995 and 1996 Taiwan Strait missile tests,
see "China Announces Missile Launch Testing,"
Executive News Service, 19 July
1995; "Taiwan Detects Chinese Missiles," Executive
News Service, 8 March 1996.
61
US Department of Defense, "Selected Military Capabilities
of the People's Republic of China," report to
Congress pursuant to Section 1226 of the FY98
National Defense Authorization Act, October 1998.
62
Reported in Mark Stokes, "PLA Strategic Warfighting
in the 21st Century: Space and Theater Missile
Development," (paper presented at the Conference
on the People's Liberation Army, 10-12 September
1999, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania).
63
1999 DoD Report to Congress on the Security
Situation in the Taiwan Strait, (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1999), p. 4.
64
See Jane's Defense Weekly coverage
of the parade.
65
An informal testing moratorium among four of the
nuclear weapon states--Soviet Union/Russia, the
United States, France and the United Kingdom--had
already been in place for several years. The Soviet
Union's last test was in October 1990; the newly
independent state of Russia has not since tested;
the last US test was in September 1992; the last
UK test was in November 1991. France had participated
in the moratorium for nearly four years, from
late 1991 until late 1995, when it resumed its
final series of six tests, which ran from September
1995 to January 1996.
66
With 45 tests over a period of 381 months (October
1964 through July 1996), China averaged about
0.118 tests every month, or 2.95 tests on average
for a 25-month period. Comparably intensive testing
for China occurred over the period October 1975
to December 1978, when China tested nine times
over a 38-month period, and four times in 1976
alone.
67
Thirty-two of China's 45 tests--more than 70 percent--took
place in either May-June or September-October.
68
This line of argument is most credibly presented
by Richard Garwin and Wolfgang Panofsky. See Richard
L. Garwin, "Why China Won't Build US Warheads,
"Arms Control Today (April/May 1999),
pp. 28-31; and Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, "Assessing
the Cost vs. Benefit of US-Chinese Nuclear Cooperation,"
Arms Control Today (April/May 1999),
pp. 28-31.
69
Paul Godwin, "China's Nuclear Forces: An Assessment,"
Current History (September 1999).
70
The Intelligence Community Damage Assessment
on the Implications of China's Acquisition of
US Nuclear Weapons Information on the Development
of Future Chinese Weapons, 21 April 1999.
71
See, for example, Robert S. Norris and William
M. Arkin, "British, French, and Chinese Nuclear
Forces," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
(November/December 1996), p. 66; Robert S. Norris
and William M. Arkin, "Global Nuclear Stockpiles,
1945-1997," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
(November/December 1997), p. 67.
72
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation:
Threat and Response (Washington, DC: US
Government Printing Office, November 1997) (online
version).
73
Norris, et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook,
pp. 370-371. Beijing has not acknowledged possession
of tactical weapons. Jonathan D. Pollack, "The
Future of China's Nuclear Weapons Policy," in
John C. Hopkins and Weixing Hu, eds., Strategic
Views from the Second Tier: The Nuclear Weapons
Policies of France, Britain, and China
(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1995),
p. 160.
74
David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker,
Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996:
World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.77,
129.
75
Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking'," p. 36.
76
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation:
Threat and Response (on-line version).
77
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation:
Threat and Response (on-line version).
78
Xinhua, 23 May 1996, in Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report:
China, FBIS-CHI-96-105, 23 May 1996.
79
We suspect that the CEP of the DF-15 is now much
lower than 600 meters. Lower estimates of the
DF-15's CEP have been discussed in the Hong Kong
and Taiwan media, but 600 meters is the only verifiable
number in open sources.
80
Stokes, "PLA Strategic Warfighting," pp. 10-11.
81
Lockwood, "The Status of US, Russian, and Chinese
Nuclear Forces," p. 24.
82
Ibid.
83
Ibid.
84
National Intelligence Council, "Foreign Missile
Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat
to the United States Through 2015," September
1999, p. 11.
85
Lockwood, "The Status of US, Russian, and Chinese
Nuclear Forces," p. 24.
86
There is a discrepancy among analysts as to how
many Xia-class submarines China has. Some analysts
state that China has two such vessels. The Jane's
Information Group, however, notes that "To maintain
one submarine on continuous patrol takes a minimum
of three, and, to be absolutely safe, and optimum
number of five hulls. Because of this known requirement,
there has been a tendency in the West to exaggerate
the Chinese [nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarine] programme, both in terms of numbers
and timescales." Richard Sharpe, ed., Jane's
Fighting Ships 1994-95 (Coulsdon, Surrey:
Jane's Information Group, 1994), p. 114.
87
Godwin, "China's Nuclear Forces."
88
The Military Balance 1997/98 (London:
Oxford University Press, October 1997), p. 178;
Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, "Appendix
11A. Tables of nuclear forces," in SIPRI
Yearbook 1997 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1997), Table 11A.5, p. 401. According to
the Military Balance, China still
deploys over 200 of the older H-5 bombers in a
conventional role. For information on Chinese
military aircraft production, see Randall Forsberg,
ed., International Fighter Study
(Cambridge, MA: Institute for Defense and Disarmament
Studies, January 1994), Table 3.5; Kenneth W.
Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack,
China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995).
89
Lewis and Hua, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs,"
pp. 6-7.
90
Ibid., p. 6.
91
Ibid., p. 17.
92
Of course, it must be recognized that the Chinese
may not believe the 1991 withdrawal took place.
93
Claire Hollingsworth, "China's Growing Missile
Might," Defense and Foreign Affairs,
March 1985, p. 28.
94
See, for example, Institute for National Strategic
Studies, Strategic Assessment 1997 (Washington,
DC: National Defense University, 1997), p. 50;
Godwin and Schulz, "Arming The Dragon," p. 6;
Xue, "Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy,"
pp. 173-76.
95
Robert Walpole, National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, briefing to
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 17
September 1998.
96
Godwin, "China's Nuclear Forces."
97
On 23 October 1978, the DF-3 was able to achieve
a response time of 2 hours, 32 minutes. See Lewis
and Hua, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs,"
op. cit., pp. 22-24.
98
The Cox Committee Report, vol. 1, op. cit.,
p. 192, citing testimony by Robert Walpole,
states that "the intercontinental CSS-4s [DF-5s]
are deployed in their silos without warheads and
without propellants during day-to-day operations."
99
Lewis and Xue, China's Strategic Seapower.
100
Estimates vary as to the minimum number of submarines
necessary for sustained patrolling, ranging from
four to six hulls.
101
Harlan Jencks, "PRC Nuclear and Space Programs,"
in Richard H. Yang, ed., SCPS Yearbook on
PLA Affairs 1987 (Kaohsiung, Taiwan: Sun
Yat-sen Center for Policy Studies, National Sun
Yat-sen University, 1987), p. 110.
102
Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Nuclear Weapons
and Arms Control Policies: Implications and Options
for the United States, CRS Report 94-422S
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,
25 March 1994), p. 7.
103
This section relies in part on Mark A. Stokes,
China's Strategic Modernization, especially
the section on the Second Artillery.
104
Xue, "Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy,"
p. 180; see also Lewis and Xue, China's
Strategic Seapower, p. 325, fn. 31.
105
For an excellent analysis of Chinese command and
control of its military forces, see Michael Swaine,
The Military and Political Succession in
China: Leadership, Institutions, Beliefs,
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, R-4254-AF, 1992).
106
"Daodan shixian 'quantianhou' tongxin baozhang"
["Missile launch 'all-weather' communications
secured"], Jiefangjun Bao [People's
Liberation Army Daily], 5 January 1998,
p. 2.
107
US Department of Defense, "Selected Military Capabilities
of the People's Republic of China," report to
Congress pursuant to Section 1305 of the FY97
National Defense Authorization Act, April 1997.
108
Ge Xinqing, Mao Guanghong, and Yu Bo, "Xinxizhanzhong
daodan budui mianlin de wenti yu duice" [Questions
and Countermeasures Facing Missile Units in Information
Warfare], in Junshi xueshu, ed.,
Wojun xinxizhan wenti yanjiu [Studies
into Information Warfare Issues for Our Military],
(Beijing: National Defense University, 1999),
pp.189-192.
109
Han Tiejun and Li Qinsuo, "Didi changdui daodan
budui zuozhan de jiben yuance" [Fundamental Principles
of Conventional Surface-to-Surface Missile Unit
Operations], in Lianhe zhanyi yu junbingzhong
zuozhan [Joint Theater and Service Operations],
(Beijing: National Defense University, 1998),
pp. 232-235.
110
For a Chinese perspective on this issue, see Yang
Huan, "China's Strategic Nuclear Weapons," in
Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of
Future Warfare, (Washington, DC: National
Defense University Press, 1997), pp. 131-135.
111
Godwin, "China's Nuclear Forces."
112
Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking'."
113
Mark A. Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization:
Implications for the United States (Carlisle
Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army
War College, September 1999), p. 96.
114
Godwin, "China's Nuclear Forces."
115
Secretary of Defense William Perry, Annual
Report to the President and the Congress,
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995),
p. 83.
116
US Department of Defense, "Selected Military Capabilities
of the People's Republic of China," report to
Congress pursuant to Section 1305 of the FY97
National Defense Authorization Act, April 1997.
117
Gen. Patrick M. Hughes, Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, Senate Armed Services Committee
hearings on "Current and Projected National Security
Threats," 2 February 1999.
118
National Intelligence Council, "Foreign Missile
Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat
to the United States Through 2015," September
1999, p. 11.
119
Report of the Select Committee on US National
Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with
the People's Republic of China, (Washington,
DC: US Government Printing Office, 1999), pp.185-86.
120
Ibid.
121
General Patrick M. Hughes, Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, Senate Armed Services Committee
hearings on "Current and Projected National Security
Threats," 2 February 1999.
122
Department of Defense, "Selected Military Capabilities
of the People's Republic of China."
123
Lewis and Xue, Strategic Seapower,
p. 181.
124
Lewis and Hua, "China's Ballistic Missiles," p.
27.
125
National Intelligence Council, "Foreign Missile
Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat
to the United States Through 2015," September
1999, p. 11.
126
Lewis and Hua, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs,"
p. 29.
127
Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide
Submarine Challenges 1997 (February 1997),
p. 22.
128
Lewis and Xue, China's Strategic Seapower,
pp. 236-37.
129
Lewis and Hua, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs,"
p. 25.
130
Ibid., the struggles over the transition
from liquid to solid-fuel are well documented.
131
Godwin, "China's Nuclear Forces."
132
Gen. Patrick M. Hughes, Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, Senate Armed Services Committee
hearings on "Current and Projected National Security
Threats," 2 February 1999.
133
Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization,
p. 91.
134
US Department of Defense, "Selected Military Capabilities
of the People's Republic of China," report to
Congress pursuant to Section 1305 of the FY97
National Defense Authorization Act, April 1997.
135
Scott Pace, et al., The Global
Positioning System: Assessing National Policies
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, Critical Technologies
Institute, MR-614-OSTP, 1995), p. 68.
136
Report of the Select Committee on US National
Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with
the People's Republic of China, (Washington,
DC: US Government Printing Office, 1999), pp.
185-86.
137
Godwin, "China's Nuclear Forces."
138
Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, "Chinese
Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control," International
Security 20, no. 3 (winter 1995/96), pp.
55-56; Godwin and Schulz, "China and Arms Control,"
p. 9; Robert S. Norris, "Nuclear Arsenals of the
United States, Russia, Great Britain, France and
China: A Status Report," presented at the 5th
ISODARCO Beijing Seminar on Arms Control, Chengdu,
China, 12-15 November 1996, p. 5; Norris and Arkin,
"British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Forces,"
pp. 66-67.
139
Lewis and Hua, "China's Ballistic Missiles," p.
21.
140
Dingli Shen, "The Prospects For A Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty: Implications Of Chinese Nuclear
Testing," in W. Thomas Wander, Eric Arnett, and
Paul Bracken, eds., The Diffusion of Advanced
Weaponry: Technologies, Regional Implications,
and Responses (Washington, DC: American
Association for the Advancement of Science, 1994),
pp. 272-273.
141
Report of the Select Committee on US National
Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with
the People's Republic of China [The Cox
Committee Report], House of Representatives Report
105-851, vol. 1(Washington, DC: US Government
Printing Office, 1999).
142
Ibid.
143
The Intelligence Community Damage Assessment
on the Implications of China's Acquisition of
US Nuclear Weapons Information on the Development
of Future Chinese Weapons, 21 April 1999.
144
Lewis and Hua, "China's Ballistic Missiles," p.
21.
145
Ibid., pp. 21-22.
146
Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy, p.
51; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
SIPRI Yearbook 1987: World Armaments and
Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1987), p. 34.
147
The Intelligence Community Damage Assessment
on the Implications of China's Acquisition of
US Nuclear Weapons Information on the Development
of Future Chinese Weapons, 21 April 1999.
148
Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking'," p. 5.
149
Ibid., p. 19.
150
Ibid., p. 20.
151
Godwin, "China's Nuclear Forces."
152
Ibid.
153
Ibid.
154
Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking'," pp. 35-36.
155
Yu Xinhua, Yang Qingzhen, eds., Shengwu
Wuqi yu Zhanzheng, 1997, op. cit.,
p. viii.
156
Karlheinz Lohs, Synthetic Poisons (Chemistry,
Effects and Military Significance), Second
Edition (East Berlin: German Military Publishing
House, 1963) translated in JPRS 23,681, p. 34.
157
Wang Qiang, Yang Qingzhen, eds. Wuqi yu
zhanzheng jishi congshu (#14): Huaxue
wuqi yu zhanzheng (Beijing: Guofang
Gongye Chubanshe, 1997), p. 2. I rely upon this
source out of necessity, for it is one of the
few extant PRC writings on the subject, and it
is reasonably competent. While it distorts the
historical record with regard to allegations of
US having used chemical and biological weapons,
especially during the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts,
it probably reflects the current wisdom among
the CBW cognoscenti in the PLA.
158
Other names are beta-Mehylacrolein, Propylene
aldehyde, Crotonic aldehyde, 2-Butenal. It is
reasonably toxic and rather noxious.
159
Wang Qiang, Yang Qingzhen, eds. Huaxue wuqi
yu zhanzheng, 1997, op. cit.,
p. 3.
160
A.k.a. Guan Yu, Guang Fu Zi, etc.
161
Wang Qiang, Yang Qingzhen, eds. Huaxue wuqi
yu zhanzheng, 1997, op. cit.,
p. 5.
162
Much of the information seems to have been lifted
from the SIPRI series on CB weaponry by Robinson,
Leitenberg, et al.
163
Zhang Bucai, Dizhan Qishilu (Beijing:
Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, 1990) pp. 239-240.
164
Wang Qiang, Yang Qingzhen, eds., Huaxue
wuqi yu zhanzheng, 1997, op. cit.,
p. 52.
165
Benjamin Garrett, "The Chinese Warlords' Chemical
Arms Race," The ASA Newsletter,
No. 98-4, August 14, 1998, p. 16.
166
Ibid., p. 17.
167
Wang Qiang, Yang Qingzhen, eds. Huaxue wuqi
yu zhanzheng, 1997, op. cit.,
p. 101.
168
Ibid., p. 97.
169
Ibid., p. 102.
170
SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological
Warfare, Volume I, 1971, op cit.,
p. 309; Brown, p. 315.
171
Wang Qiang, Yang Qingzhen, eds. Huaxue wuqi
yu zhanzheng, 1997, op. cit.,
p. 73.
172
According to one member of the Chinese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.
173
Wang Dejian, Xinzhongguo Zhanshi,
Volume 1 (Huhehaote, Mongolia: Yuanfang Chubanshe,
1998), p. 222. I have not read the complete work;
however, only passing mention of CBW in Korea
is made in pages 183-237.
174
Wang Qiang, Yang Qingzhen, eds., Huaxue
wuqi yu zhanzheng, 1997, op. cit.,
pp. 123-124.
175
Ibid., p. 124.
176
Ibid., p. 144. There are rumors
in the American Vietnam veteran community that
Czech chemical shells were found by US soldiers
in Vietnam. I cannot verify these claims, although
it is possible that Czech equipment did find its
way to Southeast Asia.
177
Harlan Jencks, "Ground Forces," in Gerald Segal
and William T. Tow, eds, Chinese Defense
Policy (Hong Kong: MacMillan, 1984), p.
65.
178
Joachim Krause and Charles K. Mallory, Chemical
Weapons in Soviet Military Doctrine (San
Francisco: Westview Press, 1992), p. 131.
179
Jappie, "Dutch Claim lead in CW Antidotes," Jane's
Defence Weekly, Vol. 11, No. 23, June
10, 1989, p. 1203.
180
This person shall go nameless to avoid possible
embarrassment.
181
"Government Denies Selling Sarin Nerve Gas to
China," Unian (Kiev), March 13,
1997, transcribed in FBIS FTS19970313000256.
182
"Special Dispatch: China Reportedly purchases
500 tonnes of Sarin Toxin from Ukraine for Secret
Manufacture of Chemical Weapons in Preparations
Against Taiwan," Ping Huo Jih Bao
(Hong Kong), March 3, 1997, translated in FBIS-CHI-97-062.
183
Supposedly 5-10 times more potent than VX, novichok,
or newcomer, may not even exist, at least not
in the way it is conceived in the open literature.
184
" [A]rtillery cannot match the surprise dosage,
area-coverage performance of multiple rocket launchers."
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI), The Problem of Chemical and Biological
Warfare, Volume I: The Rise of CB
Weapons (New York: Humanities Press, 1971),
p. 105.
185
Wang Qiang, Yang Qingzhen, eds., Huaxue
wuqi yu zhanzheng, op. cit.,
p. 245.
186
Ibid., p. 232.
187
Zhou Jinhuang, et al. Chinese Medical Encyclopedia:
Protective Medicine against Chemical Weapons (Zhongguo
Yixue Baike Quanshu: Huaxue Wuqi Fanghu Yixue,
1985. Translated by Canadian Ministry of National
Defense, DSIS/CRAD, Ottawa, p. 33.
188
Ibid., p. 34.
189
Tributyl phosphate (TBP) was actually one of the
first substances recorded in A. E. Arbusov's early
work in organophosphorus compounds. It is not
only a useful, nonflammable additive for hydraulics
and synthetic oils, but is employed as a chelating
agent for uranium and plutonium extraction.
190
Wang Qiang, Yang Qingzhen, eds., Huaxue
wuqi yu zhanzheng, 1997, op. cit.,
passim.
191
Joachim Krause and Charles K. Mallory, Chemical
Weapons in Soviet Military Doctrine, 1992,
op.cit., p63. Soviet chemical doctrine was, at
least in the early days, developed by none other
than Marshal M. N. Tukhachevskij.
192
Ibid., p. 197.
193
Joachim Krause and Charles K. Mallory, Chemical
Weapons in Soviet Military Doctrine, 1992,
op. cit., p. 100. Hirsch also reports
the use of metallic substances and sawdust, a
traditional carrier for HCN, as delivery aids
from aircraft.
194
Wang Qiang, Yang Qingzhen, eds. Huaxue wuqi
yu zhanzheng, 1997, op. cit.,
p. 196.
195
Ibid., p. 68.
196
Rosita Dellios, Modern Chinese Defense Policy
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 69.
197
Wang Qiang, Yang Qingzhen, eds., Huaxue
wuqi yu zhanzheng, 1997, op. cit.,
p. 167.
198
Ibid., p. 174.
199
See diagram in Brian Beckett, Weapons of Tomorrow
(New York: Plenum Press, 1983), p. 133.
200
Leader of the Chinese delegation at the Fourth
Conference of States Parties to the CWC, Gong
Chunsen, at The Hague, June-July 1999.
201
Wang Qiang, Yang Qingzhen, eds., Huaxue
wuqi yu zhanzheng, 1997, op. cit.,
p. 232.
202
Ibid., p. 231.
203
This is consistent with contemporaneous press
accounts, e.g., William Flannery, "Tactics: US
Unlikely to Use Nuclear Arms in Gulf Conflict--No
Matter What," St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
February 6, 1991, p. C1.
204
Albert J. Mauroni, Chemical-Biological Defense:
US Military Policies and Decisions in the Gulf
War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998): "First,
the Army was preparing to remove the US chemical
weapons from Germany to Johnston Island (Operation
"Steel Box") in November 1990. Instead of shipping
them to Johnston Island as planned, they could
reroute the chemical munitions to Saudi Arabia.
. . . [B]inary projectile shells themselves (minus
the second component) could be shipped to the
Gulf to fool the Iraqis into thinking there were
US chemical munitions available for retaliation.
Both of these options were ultimately rejected
as politically too controversial. . . . [Later]
in the month . . . ODCSOPS officially confirmed
to CENTCOM that there would be no chemical munitions
deployment to Saudi Arabia. No plans were developed
for US retaliation using chemical munitions."
p. 48.
205
Wang Qiang, Yang Qingzhen, eds., Huaxue
wuqi yu zhanzheng, 1997, op. cit.,
p. 146.
206
Ibid., p. 234.
207
Ibid., p. 242.
208
Maj. Gen. Jiang Zhizeng, Chief of the Chemical
Defense Department, "Jiang moshen bing zhan
xiong zi," (Heroic stance of the demon
corps), PLA Pictorial, No. 11, 1989,
p. 30.
209
He is listed as "primary editor" for the NBC portion
of Zhongguo Junshi Baike Chuanshu
(Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, 1990).
210
Zhang Dongwen, Xia Wei, and Zhang Yanzhong, "Cradle
of the Chemical Defense Troops: The Anti-Chemical
Warfare Command and Engineering Academy," Xiandai
Bingqi, No. 4, April 8, 1998, pp. 37-38,
translated in FBIS FTS19980721001507.
211
Ibid.
212
Ibid.
213
Li Junting and Yang Jinhe, eds., Zhongguo
Wuzhuang Liliang Tonglan, 1949-1989 (Beijing?:
Renmin Chubanshe, no imprint date) p. 214.
214
Wang Dejian, Xinzhongguo Zhanshi,
Volume 2 (Huhehaote, Mongolia: Yuanfang Chubanshe,
1998), p. 427.
215
Ibid., p. 436.
216
Maj. Gen. Jiang Zhizeng, PLA Pictorial,
No. 11, 1989, op. cit., p. 31.
217
Chuanjian Jiangzeijun Yiqianduoming,"
Ren Min Ri Bao, January 20, 1955,
p. 1.
218
Maj. Gen. Jiang Zhizeng, PLA Pictorial,
No. 11, 1989, op. cit., p. 30.
219
Ibid.
220
Chen Peifu, Wang Zhaogu, eds., Fanghua Xuebing
(Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe, 1957),
p. 9.
221
Li Junting and Yang Jinhe, eds., Zhongguo
Wuzhuang Liliang Tonglan, 1949-1989, op.
cit., p. 214.
222
Wang Qiang, Yang Qingzhen, eds., Huaxue
wuqi yu zhanzheng, 1997, op. cit.,
p. 22.
223
Ibid., p. 202.
224
Ibid., p. 203.
225
Li Junting and Yang Jinhe, eds., Zhongguo
Wuzhuang Liliang Tonglan, 1949-1989, op.
cit., p. 215.
226
Zhu Kewen, Gao Zixian, Gong Chun, eds., Zhongguo
Junshi Yixueshi (Beijing: Renmin Junyi
Chubanshe, 1996), p. 515.
227
Wang Qiang, Yang Qingzhen, eds., Huaxue
wuqi yu zhanzheng, 1997, op. cit.,
p. 209.
228
Ibid., p. 210.
229
Zhongguo Junshi Baike Chuanshu,
1990, op. cit., p. 124.
230
Wang Qiang, Yang Qingzhen, eds., Huaxue
wuqi yu zhanzheng, 1997, op. cit.,
p. 214.
231
Ibid., p. 217.
232
Zhongguo Junshi Baike Chuanshu,
1990, op. cit., p. 143.
233
Wang Qiang, Yang Qingzhen, eds., Huaxue
wuqi yu zhanzheng, 1997, op. cit.,
p. 217.
234
Zhongguo Junshi Baike Chuanshu,
1990, op. cit., p. 139.
235
Zhu Kewen, Gao Zixian, Gong Chun, eds., Zhongguo
Junshi Yixueshi, 1996, op. cit.,
p. 515.
236
Zhongguo Junshi Baike Chuanshu,
1990, op. cit., p. 130.
237
Zhu Kewen, Gao Zixian, Gong Chun, eds., Zhongguo
Junshi Yixueshi, 1996, op. cit.,
p. 510.
238
Ibid., p. 511.
239
Ranajit Ghosh, to Imperial Chemical Industries,
British patent #797,603, July 2, 1958, covering
"pesiticidal compds. of the type RP-(O)(OR)SR'
in which R are like or unlike alkyl groups and
R' is an amino group containing aliphatic or heterocyclic
group." Chemical Abstracts, 2157I, 1959.
240
Nicholas Wade, "Going Public with VX Formula--A
Recipe for Trouble?" Science, Vol.
187, No. 4175, February 7, 1975, p. 414.
241
James. A. F. Compton, Military Chemical
and Biological Agents (Caldwell, NJ: The
Telford Press, 1987), p166.
242
Lev A. Fedorov and Mary S. Svetlakova, "Russian
V-Gas Production and Its Legacy," The ASA
Newsletter, No. 95-6, December 8, 1995,
p. 1.
243
Zhu Kewen, Gao Zixian, Gong Chun, eds., Zhongguo
Junshi Yixueshi, 1996, op. cit.,
p. 512.
244
Junshi Yixue Cidian (Shanghai: Shanghai
Cishu Chubanshe, 1997), p. 331.
245
Zhou Jinhuang, et al., Chinese Medical Encyclopedia:
Protective Medicine against Chemical Weapons,
1985, op. cit., p. 248.
246
Ibid., p. 248.
247
Zhu Kewen, Gao Zixian, Gong Chun, eds., Zhongguo
Junshi Yixueshi, 1996, op. cit.,
p. 512.
248
Ibid., p. 513.
249
Ibid.
250
Ibid., p. 514.
251
Ibid., p. 516.
252
Ibid., p. 515.
253
Ibid., p. 516.
254
SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological
Warfare, Volume I, 1971, op. cit.,
p. 134.
255
Restriction of pinacolyl alcohol exports from
the West in the late 1980s, and its subsequent
control in export legislation (Australia Group
and CWC) may have prevented Iraq from pursuing
GD further.
256
Yu Yan Wu, "Zaonian junshi jishu duling
fengsao, kaifang how gexiang keji xianzhe jinbu,"
Touzi Zhongguo (Fortune China Monthly),
October 1999, p. 32.
257
Patricia L. Layman, "BASF Still Tops Global Top
50," Chemical & Engineering News,
Vol. 77, No. 30, July 26, 1999, p. 24.
258
John D. Baldeschwieler, ed., Chemistry and
Chemical Engineering in the People's Republic
of China: A Trip Report of the US Delegation in
Pure and Applied Chemistry (Washington,
DC: American Chemical Society, 1979), p. 1.
259
Ibid., p. 2.
260
Brian Harvey, The Chinese Space Programme:
From Conception to Future Capabilities (West
Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 1998), pp.
xi, 6.
261
Ibid., pp. 9-10.
262
Siwei Cheng, "Focusing on R&D in China," Chemical
Engineering, Vol. 97, No. 2, February
1990, p. 35.
263
Roderick MacFarquhar, Origins of the Cultural
Revolution, Vol. 3, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1997), p. 192.
264
"China's Chemical Industry Growth," Chemical
Week, August 25-September 1, 1993, p.
S6.
265
John D. Baldeschwieler, ed., Chemistry and
Chemical Engineering in the People's Republic
of China, op. cit., p. 2.
In fact, some of the older generation mainland
Chinese still remember Lysenko's harebrained genetics
being taught in textbooks adapted from the Soviet
Union.
266
Michael Freemantle, "A Makeover for Science in
China," Chemical & Engineering News,
Vol. 76, No. 34, August 24, 1998, p. 23.
267
John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds
the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1988), p. 88.
268
Robert S. Desowitz, New Guinea Tapeworms
and Jewish Grandmothers: Tales of Parasites and
People (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981),
p. 126.
269
Brian Harvey, The Chinese Space Programme:
From Conception to Future Capabilities,
op. cit., pp. 7-8. As far as one
can tell, only Liu Shaoqi personally reduced his
own rations in sympathy with the plight of the
Chinese laobaixing.
270
John D. Baldeschwieler, ed., Chemistry and
Chemical Engineering in the People's Republic
of China, op. cit., p. 3.
271
Michael Freemantle, "A Makeover for Science in
China," Chemical & Engineering News,
op. cit., p. 21.
272
Michael Roberts, "China: Cultivating Home-Grown
Technology," Chemical Week, May
15, 1996, p. 39.
273
John D. Baldeschwieler, ed., Chemistry and
Chemical Engineering in the People's Republic
of China, op. cit., pp.
4-5.
274
Ibid., p. 36.
275
Michael Freemantle, "A Makeover for Science in
China," Chemical & Engineering News,
op. cit., p. 21.
276
Dr. Walter Hirsch, chemical warfare specialist
and former Chief of the Chemical Warfare Section,
Germany Army Ordnance Development Department (OKW--WA
Pruef A), Soviet BW and CW Preparations
and Capabilities, "Section I, Soviet CW
Agents, Installations, Production, Research,"
(Washington, DC: Intelligence Branch, Plans, Training
& Intelligence Division, Office of the Chief,
Chemical Corps,1947), p. 25.
277
Ibid., p. 28: "Owing to the action
of impurities hydrogen accumulated within the
container building up a considerable pressure
(8-12 atmospheres)."
278
By way of Hirsch, found in Joachim Krause and
Charles K. Mallory, Chemical Weapons in
Soviet Military Doctrine, 1992, op.
cit., p. 47.
279
US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass
Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington,
DC: US Government Printing Office, December 1993),
p. 22.
280
Hirsch, Soviet BW and CW Preparations and
Capabilities, Section I, Soviet CW Agents,
op. cit., p. 32.
281
Ibid., p. 44.
282
News of VX in the open press appeared in the late
1950s, but probably too late for China to do very
much about it until much later.
283
Ibid., p. 7.
284
Li Junting and Yang Jinhe, eds., Zhongguo
Wuzhuang Liliang Tonglan, 1949-1989, op.
cit., p. 214.
285
Zhu Kewen, Gao Zixian, Gong Chun, eds., Zhongguo
Junshi Yixueshi, 1996, op. cit.,
p. 514.
286
Arthur Dock Fon Toy, Phosphorus Chemistry
in Everyday Living (Washington, DC: American
Chemical Society, 1976), p. 220. It may be noted
here that the author of this book (d.1996), was
one of the foremost experts on phosphorus chemistry,
especially in the field of contact insecticides
utilizing organophosphorus compounds, and has
over 80 patents to his name. A native of Guangzhou,
Dr. Toy received his Ph.D. from the University
of Illinois, and worked at the Victor Chemical
Works in Illinois and then the Stauffer Chemical
Company in Westport, CT. He retired as director
of research from Stauffer in 1981. Being from
a generation that would have been at the right
age (35) during the Chinese Communist takeover,
his expertise would, of course, been invaluable
to the PRC, but he lived out his life and career
in the United States.
287
"Country Focus: Clear Path Into China," Chemical
Week, August 25/September 1, 1993, p.
S27.
288
Michael Freemantle, "A Makeover for Science in
China," Chemical & Engineering News,
op. cit., p. 21.
289
Siwei Cheng, "Focusing on R&D in China," Chemical
Engineering, February 1990, op.
cit., p. 35.
290
Michael Freemantle, "A Makeover for Science in
China," Chemical & Engineering News,
op. cit., p. 26.
291
"Japan-China Deal to Include Chemical Plants,"
Chemical Week, February 22, 1978,
p. 25.
292
Gene Linn, "China's Chemical Boom Prompts Fears
of Glut," Journal of Commerce, October
1, 1992, p. A1.
293
P.T. Bangsberg, "China Predicts 9 Percent Annual
Growth in Chemical Sector over 5 Years," Journal
of Commerce, December 26, 1995, p. B5.
294
"China Adjusts Development Goals for Chemical
Industry," Beijing Xinhua news service, in English,
August 23, 1997, transcribed in FBIS, FTS19970823000347.
295
Wang Luxian, "Chemical Pesticides," China
Chemical Industry Yearbook (English Edition)
(Beijing: China National Chemical Information
Centre), 1997, p. 41.
296
Shen Liao, "Agrochemicals Draw Attention," China
Daily, May 24, 1999, transcribed in FBIS
FTS19990524000029.
297
Siwei Cheng, "Focusing on R&D in China," Chemical
Engineering, February 1990, op.
cit., p. 35.
298
Ibid., p. 35.
299
Howard Qiu, "Booming Domestic Demand Pushes China,"
Chemical Market Reporter, Vol. 251,
No. 22, June 2, 1997, pp. SR19-22.
300
Con Coughlin, "China Helps Iran to Make Nerve
Gas," The Sunday Telegraph (Internet
Version), May 24, 1998, transcribed by FBIS, FTS
19980525000796.
301
Ren Min Ri Bao, June 15, 1998, mainland
edition.
302
Chemical Business Newsbase, May 20, 1999.
303
China Chemical Week, Electronic edition, May 13,
1999.
304
Wang Luxian, "Chemical Pesticides," China
Chemical Industry Yearbook, 1997, op.
cit., pp. 35-36.
305
"China: General Aspects of Domestic Pesticide
Production," China Chemical Week,
May 13, 1999, p. 3.
306
Shen Liao, "Agrochemicals Draw Attention," China
Daily, May 24, 1999, op. cit.
307
Wang Luxian, "Chemical Pesticides," China
Chemical Industry Yearbook, 1997, op.
cit., p. 33. Wang Luxian, incidentally,
is secretary general of the China Association
of Pesticide Industry. Shen Liao, "Agrochemicals
Draw Attention," China Daily, May
24, 1999, op. cit.
308
Chemical Market Reporter, June 2,
1999.
309
Huaxuepin Duxing, Fagui, Huanjing Shuju
Shouce (Beijing: Zhongguo Huanjing Kexue
Chubanshe, 1992), p. 696.
310
Ibid. Pentasulfide route also indicated
in Thomas A. Unger, Pesticide Synthesis
Handbook (Park Ridge, New Jersey: Noyes
Publications, 1996), p. 1032.
311
Joachim Krause and Charles K. Mallory, Chemical
Weapons in Soviet Military, 1992, op.
cit., p. 131.
312
Yu Xinhua, Yang Qingzhen, eds., Wuqi yu
zhanzheng jishi congshu #13: Shengwu
Wuqi yu Zhanzheng (Guofang Gongye Chubanshe,
1997), p. 87.
313
Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman, The
United States and Biological Warfare (Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press, 1998). The reader is
encouraged to look at this book, if only to see
how sycophantic admirers of communist
movements can maintain their faith. But do not
waste more time than necessary.
314
Ibid., p. 150.
315
Yu Xinhua, Yang Qingzhen, eds., Shengwu
Wuqi yu Zhanzheng, 1997, op. cit.,
pp. 77-85. "Jinian yihou, Meiguo zhengfu
chengren, zai Chaoxian Zhanzheng zhong tamen shiyong
guo shengwu wuqi."
316
Considering that there were experts from the United
States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Disease (USAMRIID) who visited northern China
in the late 1980s to assist in characterizing
and treating Korean hemorrhagic fever, one wonders
if such "good will" gestures are appreciated or
even widely known in the PLA.
317
Yu Xinhua, Yang Qingzhen, eds., Shengwu
Wuqi yu Zhanzheng, 1997, op. cit.,
p. vii. The contributors to this volume, and who
are listed as the primary editors, are not your
ordinary authors of jeremiads and calumny, but
a research instructor of colonel rank (Yu Xinhua),
and Yang Qingzhen, an associate professor at the
National Defense University with the rank of senior
colonel.
318
Fu Zhigang, Monterey, spring 1999.
319
Yu Xinhua, Yang Qingzhen, eds., Shengwu
Wuqi yu Zhanzheng, 1997, op. cit.,
p. viii.
320
My appreciation goes to Dr. Bates Gill for obtaining
the documents.
321
Chinese BWC declarations for 1996.
322
Ken Alibek, Biohazard (New York:
Random House, 1999), p. 273.
323
Conversation following roundtable with academics
in Taipei, fall 1999. Due to the nature of the
sponsoring organization, this person shall go
nameless. He is well versed in PRC military affairs.
324
Yen Yu-Chen, et al., "Characteristics of Crimean-Congo
Hemorrhagic [sic] Fever Virus (Xinjiang Strain)
in China," American Journal of Tropical
Medicine and Hygiene, Vol. 34, No. 6,
p. 1169. Dr. Robert Shope assisted with the publication
of this article, and seems to concur with the
possibility of a natural outbreak. CCHF is very
unique, he reports, and requires BL-4 (at least
in the West). Conversation with Dr. Shope.
325
Steve Goldstein, "US Could Face New Terror Tactic:
Agricultural Warfare," Philadelphia Inquirer,
June 22, 1999, p. 1.
326
Sofia Wu, "Taiwan Rules out Imports of mainland
China-Made FMD Vaccine," CNA, June 23, 1999.
327
Terrance M. Wilson, D.V.M., Ph.D., Defense Intelligence
Agency, Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center,
"Foot-and-Mouth Disease Control in Taiwan," lecture
and unpublished paper, 1999.
328
Fang Qingquan, "Cong Kodiyi Tan Yangzhu
Zhengce," (Nongmu Xunkan),
No. 1265, September 25, 1999, p. 43.
329
Ibid., p. 280.
330
Zhu Kewen, Gao Zixian, Gong Chun, eds., Zhongguo
Junshi Yixueshi, 1996, op. cit.,
p. 521.
331
Zhongguo Junshi Baike Chuanshu,
1990, op. cit., pp. 115-116.
332
Zhu Kewen, Gao Zixian, Gong Chun, eds., Zhongguo
Junshi Yixueshi, 1996, op. cit.,
p. 519.
333
Christopher S. Cox and Christopher M. Wathes,
eds., Bioaerosols Handbook (Boca
Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1995), p. 247.
334
Yu Xinhua, Yang Qingzhen, eds., Shengwu
Wuqi yu Zhanzheng, 1997, op. cit.,
p. 260.
335
Christopher S. Cox and Christopher M. Wathes,
eds., Bioaerosols Handbook, 1995,
op. cit., p. 278
336
Yu Xinhua, Yang Qingzhen, eds., Shengwu
Wuqi yu Zhanzheng, 1997, op. cit.,
p. 260.
337
Christopher S. Cox and Christopher M. Wathes,
eds., Bioaerosols Handbook, 1995,
op. cit., p. 250.
338
Zhu Kewen, Gao Zixian, Gong Chun, eds., Zhongguo
Junshi Yixueshi, 1996, op. cit.,
p. 520.
339
Ibid., p. 516.
340
Ibid.
341
Ibid., p. 517.
342
For the purposes of this paper, WMD is broadly
defined to include nuclear weapons, chemical weapons,
biological weapons, and delivery systems such
as ballistic and cruise missiles. However, this
paper does not address biological weapon (BW)
because there are few consistent and reliable
reports in the open-source literature about Chinese
exports of BW-related items.
343
See Appendix I.
344
The most comprehensive account of China's nuclear
exports in 1980s can be found in the series of
books on global proliferation developments written
by Leonard S. Spector. These include: Nuclear
Proliferation Today, (NY, NY: Vintage
Books, 1984); New Nuclear Nations,
(NY, NY: Vintage Books, 1985); Going
Nuclear (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing
Co., 1986); The Undeclared Bomb
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1988),
and Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1990.) For additional information,
see Yan Kong, China and Nuclear Proliferation,
1980-1990: A Select Annotated Bibliography of
English-Language Publications, (Cambridge,
MA: Center for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard University, 1990.)
345
Yitzak Shichor, Peaceful Fallout: The Conversion
of China's Military-Nuclear Complex to Civilian
Use, Bonn International Center for Conversion,
Brief 10, November 1997.
346
China has also signed nuclear cooperation agreements
with: Belgium, Canada, Chile, Finland, France,
Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Romania, Russia,
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. The United
States and China signed a peaceful nuclear cooperation
agreement in 1984, and it was approved in 1985
by Congress but conditions were attached that
delayed the accord's activation until 1997 when
the President certified that China's nonproliferation
record had improved.
347
For the official Chinese statement on the Sino-Algerian
reactor deal, see "Chinese Nuclear Cooperation
with Algeria is Entirely Peaceful," Xinhua,
30 April, 1991.
348
These factors include the secretive nature of
the reactor project; the absence of electrical
power lines leading away from the plant; the facility's
location in the desert far away from population
centers; the large cooling towers which suggested
a reactor core as large as 60MW; and the fact
that the reactor site was surrounded by several
SA-5 surface-to-air missile batteries. Some reports
say that there were signals that a reprocessing
facility might be built next to the Chinese reactor.
For more details, see Barbara Gregory, Algeria:
Contemplating a Nuclear Weapon Option?,
(Mclean, VA: Science Applications
International Corporation,), 25 March 1995.
349
Elaine Sciolino and Eric Schmitt, "Algerian Reactor
Came from China," The New York Times,
14 November 1991, p. A1.
350
Mark Hibbs, "Bonn Will Decline Teheran Bid To
Resuscitate Bushehr Project" Nucleonics Week,
2 May 1991, pp. 17-18.
351
In the early stages of Iraq's nuclear weapons
program, calutrons were used to enrich uranium
but this method was abandoned because it was highly
inefficient; Iraq then turned its energies toward
the gas centrifuge program.
352
Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, Bombs From
Beijing: A Report On China's Nuclear And Missile
Exports, (Washington, DC: The Wisconsin
Project on Nuclear Arms Control, May 1991), p.
17.
353
For details on Chinese nuclear exports to Pakistan
in the 1980s, see the biannual series of books
by Leonard Spector listed in note 2. Also see
R. Jeffrey Smith, "US Aides See Troubling Trend
in China-Pakistan Nuclear Ties," The Washington
Post, 1 April 1996. Smith's article importantly
points out that Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation
was a two-way street. Chinese scientists benefited
from Pakistan's advanced gas-centrifuge designs
because up to that point China was not able to
master gas centrifuge enrichment technology and
mainly relied on gaseous diffusion to produce
HEU. For reports on tritium exports to Pakistan,
see Mark Hibbs, "Pakistan Rebuts Proliferation
Charge, But Germans Step Up Investigation," Nuclear
Fuel, 3 April 1989.
354
Zhu Mingquan, "The Evolution of China's Nuclear
Nonproliferation Policies," The Nonproliferation
Review, Winter 1997; Hu Weixing. "China's
Nuclear Export Controls: Policy and Regulations,"
The Nonproliferation Review, December
1994, pp. 3-9.
355
This discussion of the early years of China's
arms control community is based on extensive discussions
with Chinese Foreign Ministry officials, both
active and retired. For a discussion of the growth
of China's arms control community, see Alastair
Iain Johnston, "Learning Versus Adaptation: Explaining
Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s
and 1990s," The China Journal,
January 1996; Individuals, Institutions,
and Policies in the Chinese Nonproliferation and
Arms Control Community, Conference Report,
East Asia Nonproliferation Project, (Monterey,
CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1997).
356
Mark Hibbs, "Sensitive Iran Reactor Deal May Hinge
On MFN For China," Nucleonics Week, 1 October
1992, pp. 5-6; Steve Coll, "US Halted Nuclear
Bid By Iran," The Washington
Post, 17 November 1992, p. A1.
357
R. Jeffrey Smith, "China in Rebuff to US, Defends
Its Nuclear Dealings with Iran," The Washington
Post, 18 April 1995, p. 13; Steven Mufson,
"China Says It Sees No Reason to Halt Plan to
Sell Nuclear Rector to Iran," The Washington
Post, 18 May 1996, p. 22. For information
on the UF6 facility, see R Jeffrey Smith, "China
Nuclear Deal with Iran is Feared," The Washington
Post, April 17, 1995, p. A1; Bill Gertz,
"Iran Gets China's Help on Nuclear Arms," The
Washington Times, 17 April 1996, p. A1.
358
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
"Press Briefing by Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger,"
29 October 1997; R. Jeffrey Smith, "China's Pledge
to End Iran Nuclear Aid Yields US Help," Washington
Post, 30 October 1997, p. 1; Mark Hibbs
and Michael Knapik, "China Agrees to End Nuclear
Trade with Iran When Two Projects Completed,"
Nuclear Fuel, 3 November 1997, pp.
3, 4.
359
The most recent report was submitted to Congress
in February 1999 and surveyed proliferation developments
in the first half of 1998. Unclassified
Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions: 1 January Through 30 June
1998, The Nonproliferation Center, Directorate
of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, 9 February 1999.
360
For Chinese assistance to the Khushab facility,
see Leonard S. Spector, et al., Tracking
Nuclear Proliferation, 1995: A Guide in Maps and
Charts, (Washington, DC: The Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1995), p. 49;
Bill Gertz, "Beijing Flouts Nuke-Sales Ban," The
Washington Times, 9 October 1996, pp. A1,
A9; R. Jeffrey Smith, "China Sold Nuclear Items
Before Vow," The Washington
Post, 10 October 1996, p. A38
361
Rodney W. Jones, et al., Tracking Nuclear
Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998,
(Washignton, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1998), pp. 52-53.
362
"China and Pakistan Discuss US Demarche on Nuclear
Assistance," classified CIA memorandum, 14 September
1996, released as an addendum in Bill Gertz, Betrayal,
(Washington, DC: Regnery Publishers, 1999), pp.
266-267.
363
The official Chinese statements about the magnet
deal were somewhat contradictory. Officials from
China's National Nuclear Corporation admitted
in an early April statement that the magnets were
exported but that the deal did not constitute
a proliferation risk. By contrast, the Foreign
Ministry vehemently denied that the sale had ever
occurred. See Vivian Pik-Kwan Chan, "Nuclear Sales
Talks Bid to Stop Sanctions," The South
China Morning Post, 3 April 1996.
364
China is still not a member of the NSG because
joining the regime would require China to end
all of its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan such
as the 300 MWe reactor project. The NSG requires
all members to pledge not to export any controlled
nuclear items to nonnuclear weapon states that
have not placed full-scope safeguards on at its
nuclear facilities. Chinese officials have unofficially
stated that China will join the NSG when the Chasma
power reactor project in Pakistan is complete
but they maintain that China's membership in the
NSG is a nominal step because China has already
incorporated the NSG control lists into its domestic
export control laws.
365
Conversations with US officials, Washington, DC,
July and September 1999.
366
See Appendix II.
367
In one incident, an Iranian patrol craft hit two
ships operating under US flag using Chinese-supplied
Silkworm missiles. For details, seeR. Bates Gill,
Chinese Arms Transfers: Purposes, Patterns
and Prospects in the New World Order (Westport,
CT: Praeger Publishers, 1992); Richard Bitzinger,
"Arms To Go: Chinese Arms Sales to the Third World,"
International Security, Fall 1992.
368
For the origins of the DF-3 sale, see Lu Ning,
The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision-making
in China, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1997,) p. 113-117; John W. Lewis, Hua Di, and
Xue Litai, "Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving
the Arms-Export Enigma," International Security,
Spring 1991. These two sources differ about the
internal debates leading up to the DF-3 sale.
Lu Ning argues that the Foreign Ministry supported
the deal, whereas Lewis argues the Foreign Ministry
opposed it and that Deng Xiaoping made the final
decision. For an assessment of the implications
of the deal, see Yitzhack Shichor, East
Wind Over Arabia: Origins and Implications of
the Sino-Saudi Missile Deal, China Research
Monograph No. 35, Institute of East Asian Studies,
(Berkley, CA: University of California, Berkley,
1989).
369
Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile
Sales--Few Changes For The Future," Jane's
Intelligence Review, December 1992, p.
562; for an analysis of the motivations for China's
M-9 and M-11 exports, see Hua Di, "China's Case:
Ballistic Missile Proliferation," in William C.
Potter and Harlan W. Jencks (eds.), The
International Missile Bazaar, (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1995.)
370
Statement by Tom Lantos, Chairman, Subcommittee
on International Security, International Organizations
and Human Rights, 20 May 1993.
371
"Syria, Iran Want to Buy China's M-9," Flight
International, 22 January 1992, p. 18.
372
Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile
Sales--Few Changes For The Future," Jane's
Intelligence Review, December 1992, p.
561; "Iran Now Top Threat In Region," The Washington
Times, 30 May 1991, pp. A1, A11.
373
testimony of Dr. Gordon Oehler, Hearing on The
Proliferation of Chinese Missiles, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, US Senate, 11 June 1998.
Some sources suggest that the November 1992 M-11
shipment was in retaliation for Bush's fall 1992
decision to sell F-16s to Taiwan; yet there is
still not sufficient information to make such
a determination.
374
Private discussion with James Baker III, London,
October 1998. For a public acknowledgment by Baker
that the M-11 was not covered in China's 1991
MTCR pledge, see James Mann, About Face:
A History of America's Curious Relationship with
China from Nixon to Clinton, (New York,
NY: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.), p. 271.
375
Barbara Opall, "US Queries China on Iran," Defense
News, 14-25 June 1995; Elaine Sciolino,
"CIA Report Says Chinese Sent Iran Arms Components,"
New York Times, 21 June 1995.
376
testimony of Dr. Gordon Oehler , Hearing on Proliferation
of Chinese Missiles, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, US Senate, 11 June 1998; Bill Gertz,
"China Assists Iran, Libya on Missile,"
The Washington Times , 16 June 1998, pp.1-3.
377
Fred Wehling, "Russian Nuclear and Missile Exports
to Iran," The Nonproliferation Review,
Winter 1999, p. 134-143; Aaron Karp, "Lessons
of the Iranian Missile Programs for US Nonproliferation
Policy," The Nonproliferation Review,
Spring-Summer 1998, pp. 17-26.
378
China's cruise missile exports to Iran are exempt
from MTCR prohibitions, given their short ranges,
and this allowed China to broaden and expand its
cruise missile exports to Iran. These cruise missile
shipments could be banned under the MTCR if China
adhered to the 1993 revision of the MTCR guidelines
and if these cruise missiles were "intended for
the delivery of weapons of mass destruction."
In 1993, MTCR members expanded the scope of the
guidelines to ban exports of any and all delivery
systems that are intended for the delivery of
WMD.
379
Bates Gill argues that China sold Iran more than
110 HY-2 missiles in the 1980s, and by the mid-1990s
Iran deployed close to 200 C-801 missiles. See
R. Bates Gill, Chinese Arms Transfers,
op. cit.
380
For details on China's C-802 shipments to Iran,
see John Mintz, "Tracking Arms: A Study in Smoke,"
The Washington Post, 3 April, 1999,
p. 3. This press report is based on a set of highly
detailed, classified intelligence documents that
outline the scope of Sino-Iranian cruise missile
cooperation, especially regarding China's production
assistance to Iran for the C-802 missile. These
documents were made available by the National
Security News Service in Washington, DC; the author
surveyed these intelligence documents in preparing
this article.
381
Barton Gellman, "Reappraisal Led to New China
Policy," The Washington Post, June
22, 1988, p.1; Barton Gellman, "US and China Nearly
Came to Blows in 1996," The Washington Post,
June 21, 1998, p. 1. Steve Erlanger, "US Says
Chinese Will Stop Sending Missiles to Iran," The
New York Times, 11 October 1997, p.1.
382
Note to NSNS documents.
383
Oehler testimony, op. cit. Chinese
firms have tried to ship chemicals used to make
rocket fuel to Pakistan. In 1996, one of Pakistan's
key missile builders was caught in Hong Kong trying
to ship more than 10 tons (200 boxes) of ammonium
perchlorate (used to make solid rocket fuel) from
a Chinese firm in Xian. The News
(Islamabad), 20 September 1996 as translated in
FBIS-NES-96-185, 20 September 1996. The Pakistani
Government denied these reports.
384
Proliferation: Threat and Response,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, The US Department
of Defense, November 1997.
385
R. Jeffrey Smith, "China Linked To Pakistani Missile
Plant," The Washington Post, 25
August 1996, pp. A1, A25; Tim Wiener, "US Suspects
China Is Giving Pakistan Help With Missiles,"
New York Times, 26 August 1996,
p. A4.
386
Interviews with US and Chinese officials, Beijing,
September 1999.
387
For the Syria deal, see "Sneaking In The Scuds,"
Newsweek, 22 June 1992, pp. 42-46;
for the Libya deal, see "US Complains To China
About Libyan Arms Shipment," Washington
Post, 28 April 1992, p. A6; for the Iraq
deal, see R. Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq Buying Missile
Parts Covertly," Washington Post,
14 October 1995, pp. A1, A20 and "New York Trader
Nabbed For Iraq Shipment," Export Control
News, 30 December 1994, p. 14.
388
Bill Gertz, "Missile Parts Sent to North Korea
by Chinese Companies," The Washington Times,
20 July 1999, p. A1.
389
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition
of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions, op.
cit.
390
Evan S. Medeiros and Bates Gill, Chinese
Arms Exports: Policy, Players and Process,
East Asia Nonproliferation Project, Occasional
Paper, (Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, July 1999.)
391
For Chinese views on the linkages between TMD
and missile proliferation, see Evan S. Medeiros,
Missile, Theatre Missile Defenses and Regional
Stability, Conference Report of the Second
US-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament
and Nonproliferation, (Monterey, CA: Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, April 1999.) For a technical
assessment of the TMD-MTCR linkage see Li Bin,
"Ballistic Missile Defense and the Missile Technology
Control Regime," Paper presented at 8th Castiglioncello
Conference on New Challenges in the Spread
of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Castilioncello,
Italy, 23-26 September 1999.
392
testimony of Robert Gates to Hearing on The International
Security Environment Over the Next Decade, Committee
on Armed Services, US Senate, 22 January 1992.
393
Shirley A. Kan, Chinese Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Background and Analysis,
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress,
13 September 1996, p. 37.
394
Proliferation: Threat and Response, Office of
the Secretary of Defense, US Department of Defense,
November 1997.
395
The regulations were officially issued by the
State Council and the "schedule" was issued by
the Ministry of Chemical Industry. The regulations
divide the controlled chemicals into four categories:
(1) chemicals that can be used as chemical weapons;
(2) chemicals that can be used as precursors in
the production of chemical weapons; (3) chemicals
that can be used as main raw materials in the
production of chemical weapons; (4) discrete organic
chemicals excluding explosives and hydrocarbons.
A copy of these and other WMD-related export control
regulations in English and Chinese can be found
on the China Profiles database operated
by the East Asia Nonproliferation Project at the
Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey,
CA.
396
Anthony Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions,
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999); Bill
Gertz, "China Sold Iran Missile Technology," Washington
Times, 21 November 1996.
397
"The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons
of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions--July-December 1996," Central Intelligence
Agency, Report to Congress, June 1997.
398
Anthony Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions,
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999.)
399
Con Coughlin, "China Helps Iran to Make Nerve
Gas," The Sunday Telegraph, 24 May
1998; "Iran Denies Report of Chemical Arms Shipment
from China," Agence France-Presse,
27 May 1998.
400
This information was culled from the voluminous
Directory of Chemical Products and Producers
in China, China's National Chemical Information
Center, (Beijing, China: Chemical Industry Press,
1998).
401
Discussions with US officials, Washington, DC,
July 1999 and September 1999.
402
For the Chinese critique of the AG, see Sha Zukang,
"Some Thoughts on Non-Proliferation," Speech at
the 7th Annual Carnegie International Non-Proliferation
Conference on Repairing the Regime, Washington,
DC, 11-12 January 1999.
403
Edward J. Markey, Benjamin A. Gilman, and Christopher
Cox, "China and Nuclear Trafficking," Washington
Post, 29 October 1997, p. A23.
404
Even the US Government continues to have problems
controlling exports of dual-use technologies that
could be used for WMD development in other countries.
A 1999 GAO report noted that the US sold Egypt
two machine tools that could be used to produce
ballistic missiles. Foreign Military Sales:
Review Process for Controlled Missile Technology
Needs Improvement, US General Accounting
Office, NSIAD-99-231, 29 September 1999.
405
For details on Chinese activities that have been
reported to advance the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and missiles as well as US
policy responses, see CRS Issue Brief 92056, Chinese
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Current Policy Issues, updated regularly;
and CRS Report 96-767, Chinese Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Background and
Analysis, September 13, 1996, by Shirley
A. Kan.
406
Director of Central Intelligence, "The Acquisition
of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions, July-December
1996," June 1997.
407
Director of Central Intelligence, "Unclassified
Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December
1998," July 1999.
408
Director of Central Intelligence, "Unclassified
Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June
1998," February 1999.
409
Wall Street Journal, January 7,
1999; Washington Post, February
17, 1999; New York Times, March
6, 1999.
410
See CRS Report RL30143, China: Suspected Acquisition
of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Data; and CRS Report RL30220,
China's Technology Acquisitions: Cox Committee's
Report--Findings, Issues, and Recommendations,
June 8, 1999, by Shirley A. Kan.
411
Washington Times, April 15, 1999.
412
Washington Times, July 20, 1999.
413
See CRS Report 98-485, China: Possible Missile
Technology Transfers From U.S. Satellite Export
Policy--Background and Chronology, by
Shirley A. Kan.
414
National Intelligence Council, "Foreign Missile
Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat
to the United States Through 2015," September
1999.
415
Wall Street Journal, December 15,
1998.
416
Far Eastern Economic Review, July
16, 1998.
417
For a similar description of China's basic security
environment, see John Wilson Lewis, "China's Military
Doctrines and Force Posture," in Thomas Fingar,
ed., China's Quest for Independence: Policy
Evolution in the 1970s, Boulder, CO, Westview
Press, 1980, p. 148.
418
John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds
the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1988), pp. 215-216, Lewis (1980), p. 149.
419
This charge has been rejected by most outside
observers, however. For Chinese views on the alleged
use of chemical weapons against Chinese forces
during the Korean war, see Wang Qiang and Yang
Qingzhen, eds., Wuqi yu Zhanzheng Jishi
Congshu: Huaxue Wuqi Zhanzheng (Action
Report Book Series on Weapons and War: Chemical
Weapons and Warfare), Number 14, Guofang Gongye
Chubanshe, Beijing, 1997, pp. 128-135. I am indebted
to Eric Cotter for drawing my attention to this
source.
420
The nearby deployment of tactical WMD capabilities
by the superpowers became increasingly important
from the late sixties onward, as discussed below.
421
See, for example, China: Arms Control and
Disarmament, Information Office of the
State Council of the People's Republic of China,
Beijing, November 1995; and China's National
Defense, Information Office of the State
Council of the People's Republic of China, Beijing,
July 1998. We should also point out that, for
some Chinese, the complete prohibition of weapons
of mass destruction would serve to increase the
relative leverage exerted by China's large conventional
forces in a political or military crisis near
China's borders.
422
"China's Nuclear Exports" and "Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT)," from the database of the Center
for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute
of International Studies, at http://cns.miis.edu/.
These sources also point out that China continues
to state that it does not view nonproliferation
as an end in itself, but rather as a means to
the ultimate objective of the complete prohibition
and destruction of nuclear weapons.
423
China: Arms Control and Disarmament,
Information Office of the State Council of the
People's Republic of China, Beijing, November
1995; Statement by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs on the Yinhe Incident, September 4, 1993;
Statement by the Chinese Government upon signature
of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), January
13, 1993; Letter from Chinese Foreign Minister
Wu Xueqian to US Secretary of State George Shultz
on China's accession to the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC), November 16, 1984; Explanation
by the Government of the People's Republic of
China on its Observance of the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, BWC/CONF.III/3/Add.,
January 1991.
424
For a summary of China's participation in arms
control regimes, see Michael D. Swaine and Alaistair
I. Johnston, "China and Arms Control Institutions,"
in Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, eds.,
China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects,
Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, 1999,
pp. 90-135.
425
Lewis and Xue (1988), p. 36. Also see "Traditional
Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of
China," An address at the US Army War College
by Lt. Gen. Li Jijun, Vice President of the Academy
of Military Science, The Chinese People's Liberation
Army, Letort Paper No.1, August 29, 1997.
426
Indeed, some Chinese strategists apparently believe
that nuclear weapons will become increasingly
important for medium-sized nuclear states like
China, given supposedly inherent contradictions
between the interests of such states on the one
hand and US hegemony and its vision of a new world
order on the other. See Alaistair Iain Johnston,
"China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited
Deterrence," International Security,
Vol. 20, No.3 (Winter 1995-96), p. 10.
427
Lewis and Xue (1988), p. 70.
428
Johnston (Winter 1995-96), p. 8.
429
"China's Nuclear Doctrine," from the database
of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey
Institute of International Studies, at http://cns.miis.edu/.
Also see Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, "The Chinese
Strategic Rocket Forces: Transition to Credible
Deterrence," paper prepared for a seminar on China
and Weapons of Mass Destruction sponsored by the
National Intelligence Council and the Federal
Research Division of the Library of Congress,
Washington, DC, November 5, 1999, especially pp.
5-6.
430
Lewis and Xue (1988), p.216.
431
See "China's Nuclear Doctrine," from the database
of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey
Institute of International Studies, at http://cns.miis.edu/.
432
See China's National Statement on Security Assurances,
April 5, 1995. China has also called on all nuclear
powers to issue unconditional NFU pledges, and
to issue negative and positive security assurances
to the non-nuclear weapons states, to support
the development of nuclear-free zones, to withdraw
all nuclear weapons deployed outside national
territories, and to halt the arms race in outer
space. See China's Instrument of Accession to
the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), March 11, 1992.
433
Jonathan D. Pollack, "The Future of China's Nuclear
Weapons Policy," in John C. Hopkins and Weixing
Hu, eds., Strategic Views From the Second
Tier: The Nuclear Weapons of France, Britain,
and China (New Brunswick: Transactions
Publishers, 1995), pp.157-165; Shen Guofang, PRC
Policy: No First Use of Nuclear Weapons, Xinhua,
October 13, 1999; China's National Statement on
Security Assurances, April 5, 1995; "On Effective
International Agreements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapons
States against the use or Threat of Use of Nuclear
Weapons," Chnese working paper to the Conference
on Disarmament, April 16, 1982.
434
In particular, the Chinese oppose the doctrine
of "Mutual Assured Destruction" (known as MAD)
employed by the United States and the former Soviet
Union. The MAD doctrine relied on the offensive
deployment of huge numbers of nuclear weapons
by both sides as part of a supposed "warfighting"
approach to nuclear deterrence. See Malik J. Mohan,
"Chinese Debate on Military Strategy: Trends and
Portents," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies,
Volume 9, Summer 1990, p. 21.
435
For a Chinese military assessment that other states
are continuing to develop chemical weapons, see
Johnston, (Winter 1995-96), p. 9.
436
"China and Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW)
Nonproliferation," from the database of the Center
for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute
of International Studies, at http://cns.miis.edu/.
437
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation:
Threat and Response, Washington, DC, April
1996, p. 9, and November 1997 (online version).
438
See "Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)," and "China
and Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Nonproliferation,
from the database of the Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies,
at http://cns.miis.edu/.
439
"Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control
Agreements," U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, Washington, DC, 1997.
440
US officials have stated their concern that a
suspected Taiwan biological weapons program (dating
from the 1970s) may have acted to encourage a
Chinese program. See "China and Chemical and Biological
Weapons (CBW) Nonproliferation," from the database
of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey
Institute of International Studies, at http://cns.miis.edu/.
441
For many Chinese, such action would not constitute
a violation of the NFU principle, given the assumption
of an imminent attack.
442
Lewis (1980), p. 164. Also see Johnston, (Winter
1995-96), p. 16.
443
Lewis (1980), p. 150.
444
For an excellent overview of China's nuclear weapons
assistance to Pakistan see Evan S. Medeiros, "The
Changing Character of China's WMD Proliferation
Activities," a paper prepared for a seminar on
China and Weapons of Mass Destruction sponsored
by the National Intelligence Council and the Federal
Research Division of the Library of Congress,
Washington, DC, November 5, 1999, especially pp.
3-5.
445
See "China's Nuclear Exports," from the database
of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey
Institute of International Studies, at http://cns.miis.edu/.
446
Lewis and Xue (1988), pp. 12, 14-15, 34, 195.
447
Ibid., (1988), pp. 66, 215-216;
Lewis (1980), p. 153.
448
Lewis and Xue (1988), p.210. Also see Alice Langley
Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the
Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
1962); and Chong-pin Lin, China's Nuclear
Weapons Strategy: Tradition within Evolution
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988).
449
Lewis and Xue (1988), pp. 67-68.
450
Lewis (1980), pp. 150-152, 156.
451
Lewis and Xue (1988), pp. 191-192.
452
Ibid., (1988), p. 211.
453
Lewis (1980), p. 151.
454
For a useful overview of this expanded effort,
see Litai Xue, "Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy,"
in John C. Hopkins and Weixing Hu, eds., Strategic
Views From the Second Tier: The Nuclear Weapons
of France, Britain, and China (New Brunswick:
Transactions Publishers, 1995), pp. 173-175.
455
Wendy Frieman, "New Members of the Club: Chinese
Participation in Arms Control Regimes 1980-1995,"
in The Nonproliferation Review,
3:3, pp. 15-31, Summer 1996; Swaine and Johnston
(1999), pp. 90-135.
456
Michael D. Swaine and Alistair I. Johnston, "China
and Arms Control Institutions," in Elizabeth Economy
and Michel Oksenberg, eds., China Joins
the World: Progress and Prospects, Council
on Foreign Relations, New York City, 1999, pp.
118-120.
457
Evan S. Medeiros, November 5, 1999.
458
Lewis and Xue (1988), p. 217.
459
Litai Xue, (1995). Also see Robert S. Wang, "China's
Evolving Strategic Doctrine," Asian Survey,
Volume 24, 1984, University of California, Berkeley,
CA, pp. 1044-1051.
460
David Shambaugh, "The Insecurity of Security:
The PLA's Doctrine of Threat Perception Toward
2000," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies,
Vol.XIII, No.1, Spring 1994, pp. 3-15.
461
For a representative example of the Chinese response
to the Kosovo War, see Chi Shulong and Wang Zaibang,
"Thoughts on International Situation and China's
Response," Contemporary International Relations,
China Institute of Contemporary International
Relations, Beijing, China, Vol. 9, No. 9, September
1999, pp. 1-24.
462
For a presentation of several Chinese strategists'
views on the need for a variety of theater and
tactical nuclear weapons, see Johnston, (Winter
1995-96), pp. 26-29.
463
Godwin, Paul H. B., "Changing Concepts of Doctrine,
Strategy, and Operations in the People's Liberation
Army 1978-87," The China Quarterly, No.
112, December 1987, pp. 573-590.
464
The deficiencies of the Chinese Air Force are
discussed in detail in Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn
Krumel, and Jonathan Pollack, China's Air
Force Enters the 21st Century, RAND Project
Air Force, 1995.
465
For a general discussion of Chinese views toward
ballistic missiles, see John Wilson Lewis and
Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies,
Strategies, Goals," International Security,
Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992).
466
See "China's Missile Exports," from the database
of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey
Institute of International Studies, at http://cns.miis.edu/.
As this source points out, China has argued that
if one type of delivery system, such as ballistic
missiles, is to be restricted, then other delivery
systems, such as combat aircraft, should also
be restricted.
467
Robert Norris, Andrew Burrows, Richard Fieldhouse,
Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume Five: British,
French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1994).
468
Johnston, (Winter 1995-96), pp. 5-6, 17-23. As
Johnston points out (p. 19), some Chinese strategists
argue that "a limited deterrent should be able
to respond to any level or type of attack from
tactical to strategic, and the initial response
should be calibrated to the scope of the initial
attack. Limited deterrence thinking appears to
entertain war-winning possibilities."
469
Alaistair Iain Johnston, "Prospects for Chinese
Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence
Versus Multilateral Arms Control," The China
Quarterly, June 1996, pp. 552-558. Also
see Johnston, (Winter 1995-96), p. 6.
470
See "China's Nuclear Doctrine," from the database
of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey
Institute of International Studies, at http://cns.miis.edu/.;
Johnston, (Winter 1995-96), pp. 5-42.
471
An additional impetus toward such an expansion
in China's WMD capabilities could also result
from a significant enlargement of India's nuclear
capabilities.
472
As Iain Johnston points out, some Chinese military
strategists consider space one of China's "strategic
frontiers" and are "seriously concerned about
the need to incorporate space satellites and weapons
into China's nuclear and conventional operational
doctrines." Alaistair Iain Johnston, (Winter 1995-96),
p.24.
473
According to Department of Defense Joint
Publication 3-01.5, "theater missile
applies to ballistic missiles, cruise missiles,
and air-to-surface missiles whose targets are
within a given theater of operation." This term
generally does not apply to shorter-range systems
such as Maverick and Harpoon.
474
Wang Xuejin and Zhang Huaibi, "Didi Changgui Daodan
Budui Zuozhan Zhidao Sixiang Fenxi," (Analysis
of Conventional Surface-to-Surface Missile Operations
Guiding Thought) in Lianhe Zhanyi Yu Junbingzhong
Zuozhan, (Joint Theater and Service Operations)
Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1998,
pp. 223-227.
475
Nan Shih-yin, "Inside Story of Enlarged Central
Committee Meeting," Hong Kong Kuang Chiao
Ching, 16 Jan 96, in FBIS-CHI-96-027;
also see Jen Hui-wen, "Latest Trends in China's
Military Revolution," in Hong Kong Hsin
Pao (Hong Kong Economic Journal), 9 Feb
96, in FBIS-CHI-96-047; for other comments on
lessons from the Gulf War, see Ho Po-shih, "The
Chinese Military Is Worried About Lagging Behind
in Armament," Tangdai, 9 Mar 91, pp. 17-18.
476
Liang Zhenxing, "New Military Revolution and Information
Warfare," Zhongguo Dianzi Bao (China
Electronic News), 24 Oct 97, p. 8, in FBIS-CHI-98-012.
477
According to Joint Pub 1-02, air
superiority is "that degree of dominance in the
air battle of one force over another which permits
the conduct of operations by the former and its
related land, sea, and air forces at a given time
and place without prohibitive interference by
the opposing force."
478
For one of the best overviews of these doctrinal
shifts, see Nan Li, "The PLA's Evolving Warfighting
Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 1985-95: A Chinese
Perspective," in China Quarterly,
July 1995, pp. 443-463; and Nan Li, "The PLA's
Evolving Campaign Doctrine and Strategies," in
James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, The
People's Liberation Army in the Information Age,
RAND: Washington, DC, 1999, pp. 146-172. For more
detail, see Liu Mingtao and Yang Chengjun, Gaojishu
Zhanzhengzhong de Daodanzhan, (Missile
War Under High-Tech Conditions), Beijing: NDU
Press, 1993, pp. 5-26; Also see Li Qingshan, Xin
Junshi Geming Yu Gaojishu Zhanzheng (New
Military Revolution and High-Tech Warfare), Beijing:
AMS Press, 1995; Liu Senshan and Jiang Fangran,
Gaojishu Jubu Zhanzheng Tiaojianxia de Zuozhan
(Operations Under High-Tech Local War Conditions),
Beijing: AMS Press, 1994, pp. 13-33.; and Senior
Colonels Huang Xing and Zuo Quandian, "Operational
Doctrine for High Tech Conditions," Zhongguo
Junshi Kexue (China Military Science),
20 Nov 96, pp. 49-56, in FBIS-CHI-97-114.
479
Senior Col. Jiang Lei, Xiandai Yilie Shengyou
Zhanlue (Modern Strategy of Pitting
the Inferior Against the Superiority),
Beijing: NDU Press, 6-49. Senior Col. Jiang is
one of the few PLA officers awarded a Ph.D. in
Operations Research from AMS. He is currently
assigned to AMS Strategic Studies Department;
on the pre-emptive strike concept, see Lu Linzhi,
"Pre-emptive Strikes Endorsed for Limited High-Tech
War," Jiefangjun Bao, 14 Feb 96,
in FBIS-CHI-96-025. Among numerous references,
see, for example, Wang Pufeng, Xinxi Zhanzheng
yu Junshi Geming (Information Warfare
and the Military Revolution), Beijing: AMS Press,
1995.
480
With air and sea superiority, some of more seemingly
outlandish scenarios for an amphibious invasion,
such as the large-scale use of PLA commercial
fishing vessels, become more feasible.
481
For a summary of Chinese writings on perceived
US weaknesses, see Dr. Michael Pillsbury, Dangerous
Chinese Misperceptions: The Implications for DoD,
Prepared for Office of Net Assessment, 1998.
482
See Desmond Ball, "Signals Intelligence in China,"
Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 Aug
95, pp. 365-375; and Robert Karniol, "China Sets
Up Border SIGINT Bases in Laos," Jane's Defense
Weekly, 19 Nov 94, p. 5.
483
China Aerospace S&T Corporation (CASC), directed
by Wang Liheng, is an offshoot of the former China
Aerospace Corporation. The new organization adopted
the former's CALT (1st Academy); the 4th Academy;
CAST (5th Academy); SAST (8th Academy); 062 Base;
and the 067 Base. The China Aerospace Electromechanical
Group (Hangtian Jidian Jituan) includes
the Second and Third Academies and the 61 and
66 Bases.
484
There seems to be a debate within the PLA on control
of China's future space architecture, pitting
GAD against the Second Artillery. See Sen. Col.
Ping Fan and Capt. Li Qi, "A Theoretical Discussion
of Several Matters Involved in the Development
of Military Space Forces," Zhongguo Junshi
Kexue, 20 May 97, pp. 127-131, in FBIS-CHI-97-0302.
485
This conclusion is drawn from ONI's 1994 study,
"Chinese Space-Based Remote Sensing Programs and
Ground-Based Processing Capabilities," discussed
in Jefferey Richelson, "Navy Says China Poised
To Close Space-Intel Gap," Defense Week,
24 Feb 97, p. 9.
486
Ibid. Weather satellites are also
an important sensor but are beyond the scope of
this study.
487
Data collected by China's airborne SAR remote
sensing platform can be transmitted real time
to a ground station that is within 120 km of the
aircraft. A tactical ground-processing system
equipped with a VSAT terminal can then transmit
the data to a command center. See "Remote Sensing
Technical Systems for Reducing Flood Disasters,"
Yaogan Kexue Xin Jinzhan, Apr 95,
in FBIS-CST-96-002; and Xu Guanhua and Guo Huadong,
"Progress, Mission of Remote Sensing Research,"
Yaogan Kexue Xin Jinzhan (New Progress
of Remote Sensing Science), Apr 95, in FBIS-CST-96-002.
488
The HY-1 is a small satellite that will based
upon the CAST986 bus. The CAST986 is an inexpensive
common-use bus will be used for a range of other
satellites to include the SJ-5 experimental satellite,
a constellation of electro-optical satellites,
a generation-after-next navigation satellite constellation,
and a tactical SATCOM system. The 863 Program
includes a special budgeting mechanism for R&D
in seven key technology areas. The PLA is responsible
for oversight of space and laser components of
the 863 Program. The specific designation of the
national SAR effort is the 863-308 program that
also includes a near-real-time electro-optical
satellite system. The airborne system was tested
on board a US space shuttle mission (SIR-C). See
Wang Wei, "State S&T Organs Approve Design
of Spaceborne Synthetic Aperture Radar," Zhongguo
Kexue Bao (China Science News),
3 May 95, in FBIS-CST-95-010; "Woguo Xingzai Hecheng
Kongjing Leida Yingyong Yanjiu Qude Zhongda Jinzhan,
(China's Satellite SAR Applied Research Achieves
Tremendous Advances), Zhongguo Hangtian,
Feb 96, p. 16; "Spaceborne-SAR Modern Information
Technology Highlighted," Zhongguo Kexue
Bao, 20 Sep 96, p. 4, in FBIS-CST-96-020;
Yuan Xiaokang, "High Speed Data Transmission of
Satellite-borne SAR," Zhidao Yu Yinxin
(Guidance and Detonators), 1995(4), pp. 8-14.
(509th RI), summarized in China Astronautics and
Missilery Abstracts (CAMA), Vol. 4, No.4. Also
see Yuan Xiaokang, "Performance Parameters and
Design Requirements of Satellite SAR," in
Shanghai Hangtian, 1996 (3), pp. 12-18;
and Long Zhihao,. "Application of Radar Satellites,"
Aerospace China, Nov 91, p. 29.
Li Yudong, "Satellite-borne Radar Reconnaissance,"
New Electronic Warfare Technology and Intelligence
Reform Studies Abstracts, 1995.10, pp.
126-133. Li is from the Southwest Institute of
Electronic Equipment (SWIEE). For comments on
preliminary research on the second-generation
SAR satellite, see "China's Microwave-Imaging
Radar Systems Engineering Highlighted," Zhongguo
Kexue Bao, 20 Sep 96, p. 4, in FBIS-CST-96-020.
489
Long Zhihao, "Leida Weixing de Yingyong" (Applications
of Radar Satellites), Zhongguo Hangtian,
Nov 91, pp. 29-31; Zhang Wanzeng, "Weixing Hecheng
Kongjing Chengxiang Leida de Tedian Jiqi Zai Junshi
Zhenchazhong de Yingyong" (Applications and Characteristics
of Satellite SAR for Military Reconnaissance),
Zhongguo Hangtian, Nov 93, pp. 20-22.
Zhang Wanzeng is assigned to the PLA GSD Second
Department's Technology Bureau. Huang Weigen,
Zhou Changbao, and Wan Zhongling, "Woguo Xingzai
SAR Haiyang Yingyong de Xianzhuang yu Xuqiu,"
(Current State and Requirements of China's Satellite-borne
SAR for Maritime Applications), in Zhongguo
Hangtian, Dec 97, pp. 5-9. China began
exploration of space-based SAR systems for antisubmarine
warfare purposes in the 8th Five-Year Program
(1991-1996). As a side note, a US Los Alamos employee
under contract for TRW was arrested in May 1999
for providing the Chinese information on a classified
project he was working on with regards to SAR
satellite imaging of submarines.
490
See Stokes, China Strategic Modernization,
p. 26.
491
Ibid, p 22.
492
The US and the Soviet Union attained a near-real-time
capability in 1976 and 1982, respectively.
493
Jean Etienne, "Les Nouveaux Projets de L'Asie
Spatiale," in Space News, No. 110,
4 Nov 96, at http://www.sat-net.com/space-news.
Also see Chou Kuan-wu, "China's Reconnaissance
Satellites," Kuang Chiao Ching,
16 Mar 98, pp. 36-40, in FBIS-CHI-98-098.
494
China's remote-sensing program is funded at least
in part by the 863 Program, specifically the 863-308
project. Hong Mei, "Tactical Application Satellite
Imagery System," Hangtian Fanhui Yu Yaogan
(Spacecraft Recovery and Remote Sensing), 1995,
Vol. 16, No.1, pp. 30-33, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No.
5. A 700-km orbit optimizes coverage at the expense
of resolution--a lower orbit naturally will increase
the resolution. See "China To Launch Ten More
Satellites by 2000," Xinhua, 22
Feb 98, in FBIS-CHI-98-053.
495
These concepts has been closely examined and strongly
advocated by the space and missile industry. See
Zhang Dexiong, "Guowai Xiaoxing Weixing de Guti
Huojian Tuijin Xitong" (Solid Rocket Propulsion
Systems for Foreign Small Satellites), in Hangtian
Qingbao Yanjiu, HQ-93011, pp. 139-155;
Wang Zheng, "Screening Studies and Technology
for All-Solid Space Launch Vehicles," Guti
Huojian Fadongji Sheji Yu Yanjiu (Solid
Rocket Engine Design and Research), Apr 1996,
pp. 63-73, in CAMA, 1996, Vol. 3,
No. 6; and Zhang Song, "Design and Optimization
of Solid Launch Vehicle Trajectory," Guti
Huojian Jishu, 1997, 20 (1), pp. 1-5;
and Zhang Dexiong, "China's Development Concept
for Small Solid Launch Vehicles," CASC Fourth
Academy Information Research Reports, the Fourth
Edition, October 1995, pp. 1-11, in CAMA,
Vol. 5, No. 2.
496
Mao Genwang and Wang Liang, "Weixing de Junshi
Yingyong Tedian, Fazhan Xianshi yu Yingyong Qianjing"
(Military Satellites and their Prospects for Development),
Zhongguo Hangtian, May 92, pp. 33-53.
497
Mao Genwang and Wang Liang, "Weixing de Junshi
Yingyong Tedian, Fazhan Xianshi yu Yingyong Qianjing"
(Military Satellites and their Prospects for Development),
Zhongguo Hangtian, May 92, pp. 33-53.
498
Jefferey Richelson, "Navy Says China Poised To
Close Space-Intel Gap," Defense Week, 24
Feb 97, p. 9.
499
Mei Lin, PLA Methods of Operations Assessed,"
Chung Kung Yen Chiu, 15 Nov 97,
No. 371, pp. 50-60, in FBIS/China, 3/10/98.
500
Chang Jijun, "Remote Sensing Image Data Compression
and Its Performance Evaluation," Kongjian
Jishu Qingbao Yanjiu, Jul 1994, pp. 37-54.
501
"Wo Weixing Yaogan Tuxiang Shuzihua
Shebei Shijie Lingxian" (Our Satellite Remote
Sensing Digitized Imagery Equipment Leads the
World), Zhongguo Hangtian, Jan 96,
p. 39; also see "China's Satellite Remote Sensing
Image Digitization Equipment Meets Advanced International
Standards," Keji Ribao, 26 Oct 95,
in FBIS-CST-96-002.
502
"China To Use Italian Software to
Interpret Imagery," Space News,
2-8 Mar 92, p. 23. Two other Chinese organizations
involved in the project include China's Research
Institute for Surveying and Mapping and the National
Laboratory of Resources and Environmental Information
Systems. Peng Yiqi, a senior engineer at the National
Remote Sensing Center, led the Chinese negotiations.
503
China is working toward the development of data
relay satellites (shuju zhongji weixing).
China signed agreements with France (1993) and
Chile (1994) for joint use of their ground stations.
Seeking to transmit imagery directly to theater
and field commanders, China's remote-sensing community
has also begun to explore development of mobile
remote-sensing ground stations. On China's data
relay satellite program, see Zhang Wanbin, "Spaceflight
Development Strategy: Mid-Long Term Development
Strategy, Zhongguo Keji Luntan (Forum
on Science and Technology), Nov 92, pp. 9-12,
in JPRS-CST-93-002; and Cheng Yuejin, "Information
Transmission System of Data Relay Satellites,"
Space Technology Information Research,
1993 in CAMA, 1994, Vol. 1, No.
6. On China's contracting for access to French,
Kiribat, and Chilean ground stations, see Wang
Chunyuan, China's Space Industry and Its
Strategy of International Cooperation,
Stanford University, July 1996, p. 4. LTC Wang
serves on the senior staff of COSTIND's foreign
affairs bureau. On mobile ground station acquisition,
see Wang Mingyuan, "Mobile Remote Sensing Ground
Stations," Kongjian Dianzi Jishu
(Space Electronic Technology), 1997 (2), pp. 32-37
in CAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 6. One
of the first US mobile imagery ground station,
EAGLE VISION, entered the inventory in 1995. China
has expressed interest in acquiring a foreign
EAGLE VISION-like system from either US or French
vendors.
504
Dragon in Space, 24 Jul 99. Its
data rate is about 150-300 Mb/s. SWIET is the
major tracking and telemetry systems provider
for the Chinese space program.
505
As of 1997, the State space budget was about $100
million, or 0.035 percent of the overall GNP.
506
"Luan Enjie Fuzongjingli Tan Hangtian Zhiliang,"
(Vice-General Manager Luan Enjie Discusses Space
Quality), Zhongguo Hangtian Bao
(China Space News), 21 Mar 94, p.1.
507
China's space community is assessed to have grossed
more than $500 million since the first commercial
launch in 1990. China signed agreements with Russia
for cooperative development in ten areas, including
surveillance systems, propulsion, joint design
efforts, scientific personnel exchanges, space
systems testing, and satellite navigation systems.
See "Wang Liheng Fujuzhang Lutuan Fangwen E'Wu
Liangguo" (CASC Deputy Director Wang Liheng Leads
Delegation to Russian and Ukraine), Zhongguo
Hangtian Bao, 11 Apr 94, p.1. Cooperation
with France is focused on small satellite development,
space tracking, and attitude control systems.
508
Ibid. Mei Lin, "New PLA Methods
of Operations Assessed." Chung Kung Yen
Chiu, 15 Nov 97, No. 371, pp. 50-60, in
FBIS/China, 3/10/98.
509
PLAAF deficiencies are discussed at length in
Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan Pollack,
China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century,
RAND Project Air Force study, 1995, p.112-113.
510
Yuan Jun, "Zhanshu Dandao Daodan Weixie yu Fangyu
de Jiben Wenti," (Fundamental Problems Associated
With Tactical Ballistic Missile Threats and Defense),
Zhongguo Hangtian, Nov 98, pp. 35-40.
511
Liu Mingtao and Yang Chengjun, Gaojishu
Zhanzhengzhong de Daodanzhan (Missile
War In High Tech Warfare), Beijing: NDU
Press, 1993, pp. 4-26; and Wang Jixiang, "Inspiration
for Chinese Ballistic Missile Development From
the Gulf War," Hangtian Keji Qingbao Yanjiu
Baogao Xilie Wenzhai, Apr 94, pp. 49-56
in CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 6.
512
Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 1305
of the FY97 National Defense Authorization Act,
p. 4. The report states that most of these missiles
are likely to be short- or medium-range systems.
513
The $500,000 per missile figure is from Yuen Lin,
"Probing the Capability of Taiwan's Antiballistic
Missiles," Hong Kong Kuang Chiao Ching,
16 Aug 98, pp. 54-61 in FBIS-CHI-98-252. In comparison,
the cost of three MADS batteries with 180 missiles
amounts to $850 million. An AEGIS ship runs about
$850 million-$1 billion. Taiwan's FY98 defense
budget totaled NT 275 billion (US$ 916 million),
amounting to 22.43 percent of the national budget.
It is important to note, however, that the value
of a missile defense system is judged on the basis
of what is being defended rather than the costs
of the offensive missiles.
514
It should be noted that recent Beijing-affiliated
publications out of Hong Kong have resurrected
the issue of the DF-25, a 2,000-km-range system
that is armed with a 1,700-kg conventional warhead.
The DF-25 allegedly utilizes the first two stages
of the DF-31 ICBM. However, author's discussions
in Beijing during the 1993-94 timeframe indicated
that the DF-25 program had been cancelled in favor
of the conventional DF-21. The primary difference
between the two systems was the warhead size--the
nuclear DF-21 had a throw weight of only 600 kg,
while the DF-25 was designed to have a 2,000-kg
warhead. The DF-25 was first discussed in John
Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile
Programs," International Security,
Fall 1992, pp. 5-40. If based at Tonghua (80301
Unit), the DF-25's 1,700-km range would have permitted
strikes against the main islands of Japan, but
not Okinawa. Assigning the 1,700-km system under
the Luoyang base (80304 Unit) would have enabled
strikes against all of Taiwan. Lewis and Hua asserted
that the DF-25 was intended to defend claims in
the South China Sea. However, to range the Spratly
Islands, the system would have had to be based
on Hainan Island. Past PLA deployment practices
indicate that deployment of theater missiles on
Hainan Island is not likely since: a) theater
missile units are unlikely to stray too far from
their established base headquarters; and b) basing
on Hainan renders the units vulnerable to strikes.
515
Duncan Lennox, ed. Jane's Strategic Weapon
Systems, Issue 24, May 97, Surrey, England:
Jane's Information Group.
516
See Edward R. Harshberger, Long-Range Conventional
Missiles: Issues for Near-Term Development,
RAND: Santa Monica, 1991, p. 142. For an upper
range estimate of 60 meters, see Lin Chien-hua,
"What Equipment Should Taiwan Use to Defense Itself,"
Taipei Tzu-li Wan-pao, 9 Nov 97,
p. 2, in FBIS-CHI-97-364.
517
George Lindsey, The Information Requirements
for Aerospace Defense: Limits Imposed by Geometry
and Technology, Bailrigg Memorandum 27,
CDISS, Lancaster University, p. 18. If moved closer
to the target, the DF-15 most likely would be
launched on a lofted trajectory that would increase
the flight time outside the atmosphere, thus increasing
the missile's vulnerability to upper-tier systems.
On the other hand, a lofted trajectory could increase
the missile's reentry speed, reducing the footprint,
or defended area, of lower tier systems, such
as PATRIOT.
518
Zhao Yunshan, Zhongguo Daodan Jiqi Zhanlue,
Jiefangjun de Hexin Wuqi, (China's Missiles
and Strategy: The PLA's Central Weapon), Hong
Kong: Mirror Books, p. 232. Other sources credit
the DF-15 with only as good as a 150-meter CEP.
See "Missiles! China Has Them Too!," Wen
Wei Po, 1 Jun 99, p. A5, in FBIS-CHI-00169,
22 Jun 99.
519
Ibid. Informed sources assert the
Mirror (Mingjing) series of books
have a mixed record of reliability. Zhao states
that the expanded range DF-15 incorporates a more
advanced propellant. There is often confusing
reporting on an unidentified 1,000-km system--the
M-18--that may in fact be the rumored extended
range DF-15. While an extended range DF-15 can
not be confirmed, there certainly could be a motive
for developing a conventional theater ballistic
missile with a 1,200-km range. First, a 1,200-km-range
system would significantly reduce the defended
area or "footprint" of land- and sea-based lower
tier missile defense systems due to its reentry
speed. Because of its existing infrastructure,
one could speculate that an extended range DF-15
brigade could be established under the Second
Artillery's Huaihua Base (80305 Unit). Huaihua,
situated in western Hunan Province, is just over
1,200 km from Taipei. Secondly, a 1,200-km DF-15
fired from a notional site in the area of Nanping
in Fujian Province could easily range Kadena AB,
Okinawa, and all of the Luzon Strait (Bashi Channel).
520
See the 1999 DoD Report to Congress on the
Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait.
It should be noted, however, that foreign sources
familiar with the PLA believe that the 300-km
DF-11 has already been fielded by at least two
PLA ground force group armies. In addition, a
29 Mar 99 edition of Jiefangjun Bao
discusses the conversion of an unidentified Nanjing
Military Region artillery unit to an SRBM brigade.
The conversion began in early 1997. The author
is indebted to Ken Allen for this information.
521
Zhao, p. 234.
522
Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense
Options in the Asia-Pacific Region, Feb
99.
523
The 700-meter CEP is extracted from Jane's
Strategic Weapons Systems 1998. The conversion
of the DF-21 from a strictly nuclear mission to
a conventional role was reported as early as 1994
in the Chinese journal, Guoji Hangkong
(International Aviation). Initial indications
of a terminally guided DF-21 are from discussions
between Richard Fisher, who was a Senior Policy
Analyst at the Heritage Foundation, and an engineer
from CALT's Beijing Research Institute of Telemetry
(704th Research Institute) at the 1996 Zhuhai
Air Show. Extensive CASC technical writings on
terminally guided theater ballistic missiles tend
to substantiate the engineer's comments.
524
Zhu Bao, "Di-Di Dandaoshi Zhanshi Daodan de Fazhan
Qushi," pp. 9-19. The CEP is the radius of a circle
within which 50 percent of missile fired will
impact.
525
John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic
Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, and
Goals," International Security,
Fall 1992 (Vol. 17, No. 2), p. 29.
526
Zhu Bao, pp. 9-19. Development of VLSIC and LSIC
technology is one of Beijing's highest priorities.
In one effort, China has invested RMB 1.39 in
the Huajing Group's Project 908 program, which
seeks to miniaturize and mass-produce VLSIC/LSICs.
China hopes to develop sub-micron VLSICs in the
next few years. See Zhang Longquan, "Huajing Group
Builds 'Project 908' VSLIC Production Line," Jisuanji
Shijie, 8 Jan 96, No. 2, p.1, in FBIS/CHI,
01/08/96. With the help of Project 908, CASC's
Ninth Academy would most likely actually produce
the application-specific integrated circuits.
The Scud-B payload known as the AEROFON uses an
optical sensor during the latter stages of flight
to detect and home in on a target.
527
Xie Lei, "Technical Research on Millimeter Wave
Guidance," Aerospace S&T Information
Studies Series Abstracts (6), pp. 235-250;
and Xie Lei, "Application of Millimeter Wave and
Infrared Technologies in Weapons Systems," Aerospace
S&T Information Studies Series Abstracts
(7), pp. 241-258.
528
Zhu Bao, pp. 9-19.
529
For a summary of test results, see Sun Mei, "GPS
For Evaluating Inertial Measurement Unit Errors,"
in Hangtian Congzhi (Aerospace Control),
1995, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 69-75, CAMA,
1995, Vol. 2, No.4; also see Wang Shuren, "Principles
of Onboard GPS Navigation Transponders," in Hangkong
Dianzi Jishu, undated, pp. 20-23. Wang
is from the Second Artillery's Academy of Engineering.
530
Li Yonghong, "Ballistic Trajectory Determination
Using the Differential Global Positioning System,"
Binggong Xuebao, 1997 18(4), pp.
372-374. DGPS upgrades the civilian GPS signal
though a precisely located GPS station that broadcasts
a correction signal on a different frequency to
other GPS receivers. In addition to military uses,
a DGPS reference station is often used for surveying
and maritime safety. Reference updates can be
transmitted to the missile via a data link. As
part of its Ninth Five-year Plan,
China is constructing 20 DGPS stations along its
eastern coast, each with a range of 300 km. The
positioning accuracy is 5 meters, a marked improvement
from the original positioning system's minimum
error of 100 meters.
531
See for example, Bill Gertz, Betrayal,
Boston: Regnery Press, p. 249.
532
Zhu Bao, "Di-Di Dandaoshi Zhanshi Daodan de Fazhan
Qushi" (Developmental Prospects of Surface-to-Surface
Tactical Ballistic Missiles), pp. 9-19.
533
Lianhe Zhanyi Di Erpaobing Zuozhan (PLA
Second Artillery Joint Campaign Operations), unpublished
manuscript, 1996, p. 11. The document is believed
to be an internal PLA academic paper, but its
authenticity has not been established. However,
a number of sources have corroborated much of
the paper's content. For technical studies, see
Yang Xiaolong, Wan Chunxi, and Li Xingcheng, "General
Technical Research on Use of Strategic Missile
Terminal Submunitions for Blocking Airbases,"
Space/Missile General Information Network Conference
Paper (97021), Oct 97; Yu Renshun, Qi Zhanyuan,
Yang Xiaolong, "Guidance Law of Terminally Guided
Submunitions for Attacking Runways," Zhanshu
Daodan Jishu, Feb 1998, pp. 25-31. Authors
are from Bejing Ligong Daxue. For a study addressing
submunition dispersal problems, see Yan Dongsheng,
"Technical Means for Reducing Dispersal of Mini-Warheads,"
paper presented at the October 1995 Annual Conference
on Flight Mechanics. Xu is from CALT's 13th Research
Institute, the entity responsible for warhead
development. For other studies on use of missiles
against airfields, see Yu Renshun, "Research on
Terminally Guided Submunitions for Blocking Airfield
Runways," paper presented at Nov 97 conference
of National Missile Designers Network, in CAMA,
Vol. 5, No. 3; Yang Bingwei, "Structural
Design Problems and Test Methods of Anti-Runway
Penetrators," in Aerospace S&T
Intelligence Studies Report Series Abstracts
(5), 1995.5, pp. 288-303; and Liu Jiaqi, "Penetration
Technology for Tactical Missile Warheads,"
Aerospace S&T Intelligence Studies Abstracts
(5), 95 (5), CAMA 96 Vol 3, No. 6; Yang Bingwei,
"Test Methods of Antirunway Penetrators," Aerospace
S&T Information Studies Series Abstracts
(6), pp. 213-234. Yang Bingwei, from CALT's Beijing
Institute of Special Electromachinery (Beijing
Teshu Jidian Yanjiusuo), is the most prolific
technical analyst on runway penetrators. The PLAAF
is believed to have already fielded an antirunway
submunition cluster bomb.
534
See, for example, Li Xinyi, "On the Air Supremacy
and Air Defense of Taiwan and China: Is Taiwan
An 'Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier'?," Taiwan
de Junbei (Taiwan Military Preparations),
1 Jul 96, pp. 11-18, in FBIS-CHI-97-323.
535
Gong Jinheng, "High-Powered Microwave Weapons:
A New Concept in Electronic Warfare," Dianzi Duikang
Jishu, Feb 95, pp. 1-9. Gong is from the Southwest
Institute of Electronic Equipment (SWIEE), China's
premier electronic warfare research entity.
536
For a comprehensive overview of the technologies
associated with HPM weapons, see Carlo Kopp, "The
E-Bomb--A Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction,"
in Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare,
New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1994, pp. 296-297;
also see J. Swegle and J. Benford, "State
of the Art in High-Power Microwaves: An Overview,"
paper presented at the Lasers 1993 International
Conference on Lasers and Applications, Lake Tahoe,
Nevada, 6-10 Dec 1993. Swegle and Benford point
out that the US, Russia, France, and the UK have
HPM programs in addition to China. Zhu Youwen
and Feng Yi, Gaojishu Tiaojianxia de Xinxizhan,
(Information Warfare Under High Technology Conditions),
Academy of Military Science Press, 1994, pp. 308-310;
"Beam Energy Weaponry: Powerful as Thunder and
Lightening," Jiefangjun Bao, 25
Dec 95, in FBIS-CHI-96-039; Outlook for 21st Century
Information Warfare," Guoji Hangkong,
(International Aviation), 5 March
1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-114; "Microwave Pulse Generation,"
Qiang Jiguang yu Lizishu, May 1994,
in JPRS-CST-94-014. CAEP's Institute of Applied
Electronics, University of Electronic Science
and Technology of China, and the Northwest Institute
of Nuclear Technology in Xian are three of the
most important organizations engaged in the research,
design, and testing of Chinese HPM devices. The
PRC appears to have mastered at least two HPM
power sources--the FCG and vircator. The greatest
challenge is the weaponization process.
537
See Liu Shiquan, "A New Type of 'Soft Kill' Weapon:
The Electromagnetic Pulse Warhead," Hubei
Hangtian Jishu, May 1997, pp. 46-48. Liu
is from the Sanjiang Space Industry.
538
Xu Licheng, "Research on Penetration Depth of
Projectile Into Thick Concrete Targets," Qiangdu
Yu Huanjing, April 1996, pp. 1-7, CAMA,
Vol. 3, No.1; Zhu Bao. Xu is from the Beijing
Institute of Special Electromechanics; for discussions
on negating hardened targets, see Xu Xiaocheng,
"Research on Penetration Depth of Projectiles
Into Thick Concrete Targets," Qiangdu Yu
Huanjing, 1996 (4), pp. 1-7. Also see
Zhu Bao, pp. 9-19.
539
For references to FAE warheads, see Lianhe
Zhanyi Di Erpaobing Zuozhan, p. 11; Yuen
Lin, "The Taiwan Strait Is No Longer a Natural
Barrier--PLA Strategies for Attacking Taiwan,"
Kuang Chiao Ching, 16 Apr 96, in
FBIS-CHI-96-104; and Jane's Strategic Weapons
Systems 1998, section on the DF-15. Also
see John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic
Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, and
Goals, in International Security,
Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 92), p. 33. An FAE is a variation
of the napalm bomb that hits the ground, breaks
open, and creates a mist of flammable liquid.
A small, delayed-action explosive then goes off,
causing the cloud to ignite. The pressure of the
blast is sufficient to wreck aircraft, ships,
and equipment as well as being fatal to personnel.
The only other device to produce similar results
is nuclear weapons. Fortunately, FAE warheads
are not as reliable as other types of bombs, and
weather conditions can seriously degrade their
effects.
540
Zhu Yifan, Zhang Xuebin, and Wang Weiping, "ATBM
Intercept Decision Modeling," Guofang Keji
Daxue Xuebao, 1 Jan 99, pp. 29-32, in
FBIS-CHI-1904, 17 Jun 99.
541
Zhang Minde, "Simulation Research of Defenses
Against Conventional Ballistic Missile Re-Entry
Vehicles," Xitong Gongcheng Yu Dianzi Jishu,
1997, 19 (4), pp. 45-49. The simulation was conducted
by CASCs Beijing Optoelectronic Engineering General
Design Department. For general background on saturation,
see Harshberger, pp. 169-170.
542
David Fulghum, "China Exploiting U.S. Patriot
Secrets," Aviation Week and Space Technology,
18 Jan 93, pp. 20-21
543
Gan Chuxiong and Liu Jixiang, Daodan Yu
Yunzai Huojian Zongti Sheji (General Design
of Missiles and Launch Vehicles), Beijing:
Defense Industry Press, January 1996. pp. 42-43;
and Wu Ganxiang, "Guowai Fanjichang Wuqi," (Foreign
Antirunway Weapons), in Xu Dazhe, Guowai
Dandao Daodan Jishu Yanjiu Yu Fazhan,
Astronautics Publishing House, 1998, pp. 65-76.
The control maneuver may be necessary to slow
down the reentry speed to allow acquisition of
the target image in the ballistic missile's seeker.
544
Gan and Liu, p. 45. Also see Zhang Demin, "Study
on Penetration Techniques on New Generation Ballistic
Missiles," in Xinjunshi Gemingzhong Daodan
Wuqi Fazhan Qianjing, Nov 96, pp. 18-24.
545
Gan and Liu, p. 45.
546
Wang Guobao, "Initial Discussion on Tactical Ballistic
Missile Electronic Warfare," Hangtian Dianzi
Duikang, Apr 97, pp. 1-7 (CAMA).
547
Bill Gertz, Betrayal, Boston: Regnery
Press, p. 254.
548
Li Qiang, "Current Status and Follow-On Development
of Laser Cladding Wear-Resistance Coatings," Yuhang
Cailiao Gongyi, Jan 97, pp. 13-18. At least one
institute involved in the testing is Harbin Institute
of Technology. Also see Ji Shifan, "Laser Resistant
Protection of Missiles," Daodan Yu Hangtian Yunzai
Jishu, May 96, pp. 35-42.
549
Jin Weixin, "Mathematical Modeling of Tactical
Surface to Surface Missiles Against TMD," in Systems
Engineering and Electronic Technology,
1995, 17 (3), pp. 63-68. Zhang Demin and Hou Shiming,
"Simulation Research of Offensive and Defensive
Capability of Conventional Manuevering Reentry
Missile," Xitong Gongcheng Yu Dianzi Jishu,
1997, 19 (4), pp. 45-49. Full translation in FBIS-CHI-97-272.
Zhang is from the Beijing Electromechanical Engineering
Design Department, also known as the CASC Fourth
Systems Design Department. According to one evaluation,
PAC-2+ has a probability of kill of 10 to 25 percent
against an unidentified tactical ballistic missile.
See Zhao Yuping, "Probability of PAC-2 Intercepting
a Certain Tactical Ballistic Missile," paper presented
at Nov. 97 conference of National Missile Designers
Specialist Network in CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 3.
550
Du Xiangwan, "Ballistic Missile Defense and Space
Weapons," in Quanguo Gaojishu Zhongdian
Tushu, Jiguang Jishu Linghuo, (National
High-Technology Key Reference--Laser Technology
Realm).
551
DoD Report to Congress on the Cross-Strait
Security Situation, Feb 1999.
552
Wang Jianmin and Zhang Zuocheng, "Jiasu Jibenxing
Xiliehua Jincheng Nuli Fazhan Woguo Feihang Daodan
Shiye" (Rapid Progress in Series Development
of China's Cruise Missile Industry), Zhongguo
Hangtian, Sep 96, pp. 12-17. Some have
estimated that a developing country like China
could acquire at least 100 land-attack cruise
missiles at a cost of $50 million (i.e., $500,000
apiece). See Dennis M. Gormley and K. Scott McMahon,
"Proliferation of Land-Attack Cruise Missiles:
Prospects and Policy Implications," in Henry Sokolski,
Fighting Proliferation: New Concerns for
the Nineties, Air University Press, 1996,
pp. 131-167.
553
A land-attack Silkworm can readily fit within
a 12-meter standard shipping container equipped
with a small erector. See Dennis M. Gormley, "Cruise
Missile Proliferation: Threat, Policy, and Defenses"
Proliferation Roundtable, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, October 9, 1998.
554
Two principles in particular are "basic serialization"
(jiben xingxiliehua) that calls
upon reliance of a basic airframe from which several
upgraded variants can be derived. The second basic
principle is "sanbuqi" that calls
for having one system in production, one in applied
R&D, and a generation-after-next in conceptual
development. The China's space and missile industry
generally prefers to make incremental modifications
to tried and trusted designs.
555
As a general rule, the Haiying series (HY-2, HY-3,
HY-4) is surface-to-ship. The Yingji (YJ) designator
is normally air-launched (i.e., YJ-6). There are
exceptions--the YJ-8 can be ship or submarine
launched.
556
See "Zhongguo Jingmi Jixie Jinchukou Gongsi,"
(CPMIEC) Xiandai Junshi (CONMILIT),
25 anniversary edition, 1996, pp. 16-23. The "XY"
designation is likely a temporary one. Air-launched
LACMs would be expected to have a "Yingji" designation.
The initial Silkworm, the Haiying-2 (HY-2), utilized
liquid propellant that limited its range to fewer
than 100 km. Variants incorporated radar or TV-guided
terminal guidance systems. An air-launched variant--the
YJ-6 (C-601)--utilized the basic HY-2 airframe.
The YJ-6 is launched from the B-6D bomber that
has an operating radius of 1,800-2,000 km. Like
the HY-2, however, the YJ-6 range is fewer than
100 km. In the 1980s, CASC's Third Academy developed
an extended-range Silkworm variant that integrated
a turbojet engine (wopen fadongji). The turbojet
variant has a range of up to 135 km, is equipped
with a 500-kg warhead, and can be launched from
the B-6D or from shore. See Wang Jianmin, "Jiasu
Jibenxiliehua Jincheng Nuli Fazhan Woguo Feihang
Daodan Shiye," Zhongguo Hangtian,
Sept. 96, pp. 12-17.
557
Teal Group Corp., "Chinese Anti-Ship Missiles,"
in World Missiles Briefing, Fairfax,
Virginia, Teal Group Corp, May 1995, p. 2. One
should not discount the possibility of extending
the range through modest elongation of the fuselage
that would provide space for additional fuel.
558
Shirley Kan and Robert Shuey, "China: Ballistic
and Cruise Missiles," CRS Report for Congress,
21 Mar 97 (97-391), p. 11. For the Israeli connection,
see "Israel To Equip Chinese Cruise Missile With
Penetrator Warhead," Flight International,
5-11 Feb 97, p. 13.
559
Undated China Precision Machinery Import &
Export Corporation marketing brochure, "C-201W
Coast-to-Ship Missile System." The "W" probably
stands for "wopen," or turbojet engine. According
to Chinese aerospace publications, the US Tomahawk
Land-Attack Missile (TLAM) B utilizes a turbojet
engine and has a range of 500 km. The TLAM-C adopts
a more efficient turbojet (woshan)
engine which extends to the range to 1,200 km.
A turbofan engine (woshan fadongji)
could significantly enhance the range of China's
land-attack cruise missiles. China's aviation
industry has produced turbofan engines since the
1960s. The WS-7, a variant of the Rolls-Royce
Spey Mk 202 engine, is used to power the H-7 fighter-bomber.
560
See Jason Glashow and Theresa Hitchens, "China
Speeds Development of Missile With Taiwan Range,"
Defense News, 4-10 Mar 96, p. 1;
and Duncan Lennox, "China: Offensive Weapons,"
Jane's Air-Launched Weapons, Surrey,
United Kingdom, Jane's Information Group, 1996.
By contrast, the US Standoff Land-Attack Munition
(SLAM) is equipped with a 220-kg warhead. Tomahawks
have between a 320 and 480-kg warhead.
561
Si Xicai, "Research on Long-Range Antiradiation
Missile Passive Radar Seeker Technology," in Zhanshu
Daodan Jishu (Tactical Missile Technology),
1995, Vol. 2, pp. 42-52; other studies on specific
approaches to ARM technology include Yang Huayuan,
"Study on Superwideband High-Accuracy Microwave
DF System," in Daojian yu Zhidao Xuebao,
Feb. 95, pp. 7-12. There are also strong indications
that SAST's system engineering organization, the
Shanghai Institute of Electro-Mechanical Engineering,
is carrying out preliminary R&D on a long-range,
air-to-air, antiradiation missile for targeting
airborne early warning platforms, such as the
US E-3 AWACS or Taiwan's E-2Ts. Engineers note
critical technologies for development of a long-range
ARM include a passive seeker with a sensitivity
of greater than 100 dB, as well as monolithic
microwave (danpian weibo), gallium arsenide, very-large-scale,
and very-high-speed integrated circuits (MMIC,
GAAS, VLSIC, VHSICs). The seeker makes up for
greater than 50 percent of the R&D and production
costs for an ARM. At least one Second Academy
entity that has conducted work on antiradiation
missile-seeker technology is the Beijing Institute
of Remote Sensing Equipment (probably the CASC
25th Research Institute).
562
Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems,
1998, People's Republic of China; Jane's
Air-To-Ground Missile Programs. There
are several systems which CASC appears to be studying
to serve as the basis for an indigenous version:
The US AGM-88 HARM utilizes a solid motor and
has a range of 40 km. The UK's ALARM has a range
of 70 km; Israeli's STAR-1 uses a small turbojet
enginer, has a range of 100 km and weighs only
182 kgs. Chinese engineers note the Kh-31P has
both long-range (i.e., 200 km) air-to-air and
air-to-ground variants.
563
Lu Xiaohong, "Launch Technology for Air-Launched
Antiradiation Missiles," Astronautics Information
Research, HQ-97038, Astronautics Publishing
House, Dec 97. Lu is from Third Academy's Beijing
Institute of Special Machinery, which is responsible
cruise missile launching technology.
564
For one reference on land attack cruise missile
and supporting GIS efforts, see Xu Haijiang, "Cruise
Missile Mission Planning Research," Astronautics
Information Research, HQ-97020, in CAMA,
Vol. 5, No.1, Dec 97. The author is from the Beijing
Institute for Electromechanical Engineering.
565
A GPS receiver is available in the US for as little
as $5,000, a radar altimeter for $2,500, and an
IMU for $20,000 to $30,000. A flight-management
computer could involve a miniaturized $2,500 commercial
system with software to permit flight control,
autopilot functions, onboard system monitoring,
and flightpath and course navigation.
566
This process is described in Edward Harshberger,
Long-Range Conventional Missiles: Issues
for Near Term Development, Santa Monica:
RAND, 1991, pp. 46-50. Also see Zhou Rui, "Image
Guidance Aimpoint Selection System," Zhanshu
Daodan Jishu, Jan 96, pp. 32-36.
567
Zhong Longyi, "Zuhe Daohang Xitong he Bingxing
Duoji Xitong Zai Xunhang Daodanzhong de Yingyong,"
(Application of Combined Navigation Systems on
Cruise Missiles) in Hangtian Qingbao Yanjiu
(China Information Research), 1993 (3),
pp. 432-445. Zhong is from the Third Academy's
8357 Research Institute, responsible for cruise
missile control systems. One of China's first
research projects on digital image processing,
written by Sun Zhongkang and Shen Zhenkang, was
published by the PLA National Defense University
in 1985.
568
Guan Dexin, "The Investigation of Compatible Receiver
for GPS and GLONASS," Xitong Gongcheng Yu
Dianzi Jishu, 1996, Vol. 18, No. 7, pp.
69-74; and Sheng Jie, "Demonstration of Navigation
Performance of GLONASS/GPS Composite Receivers,"
Weixing Yingyong, Feb 94, pp. 56-59.
569
Zheng Wanqian, p. 43; The PLA likely has been
developing an imagery library that could support
DSMAC targeting for several years. TERCOM requires
highly sophisticated digital mapping systems and
powerful computers. COSTIND and the Second Artillery
have made significant achievements in both areas.
See Wang Yongming, "Introduction to Military Electronic
Maps," Xiaoxing Weixing Jisuanji Xitong,
(Mini-Micro Computer Systems), Aug. 95, pp. 12-18,
in FBIS-CST-96-001. Wuhan Technical University
of Surveying and Mapping is one institute involved
in digital mapping. Also see Jing Shaoguang, "GPS/SINS
Integrated Navigation System for Cruise Missiles,"
Xibei Gongye Daxue Xuebao, 1997,
15 (1), pp. 79-83. At least one State Laboratory
is dedicated to R&D on scene matching technology--the
Image Information Processing and Intelligence
Control Laboratory, Imaging Institute, under Huazhong
University in Wuhan.
570
One Taiwan source explicitly asserts land-attack
cruise missiles will be assigned to the Second
Artillery. See "Mainland Acquisition of Russian
Weapons Viewed," Lien-Ho Pao, 29
Apr 96, in FBIS-CHI-96-086; In support of this
new mission, the Second Artillery's Fourth Research
Institute has been modeling the ability of cruise
missiles to penetrate air defense systems. See
Sun Xiangdong and Qin Xiaobo, "Operational Efficiency
Analysis of Cruise Missiles Against SAMs," in
Xitong Gongcheng Yu Dianzi Jishu
(Systems Engineering and Electronics), Oct 96,
pp. 59-63, in FBIS-CST-97-013. Sun and Qin are
from the Second Artillery's Fourth Research Institute.
571
Liu Kejun, "Information Warfare Challenge Faced
by Navy," Zhongguo Dianzi Bao, 24
Oct 97, p. 8, in FBIS-CHI-98-012.
572
Tian Baolong and Li Wengang, "Feihang Daodan CAM
Chejian Danyuan Xitong" (Cruise Missile CAM Workshop
Unit System), Zhongguo Hangtian,
April 1993, pp. 44-46; Xu Haijiang, "Virtual
Reality and Its Application in Development of
Cruise Missiles," in Feihang Daodan,
1996 (8), pp. 1-9; Wang Zhenhua, "Parallel Computation
on Supercomputers for Axisymmetric Interaction
Flow," Yuhang Xuebao (Journal of
Astronautics), Jan 95, pp. 43-45, in JPRS-CST-95-005.
573
Li Weiliang, "Jiang Zemin dao Beijing Fangzhen
Zhongxin Zhouyan" (Jiang Zemin Inspects Beijing
Simulation Center), Zhongguo Hangtian Bao,
17 Jan 94, p.1; Li Li, "Chinese Simulation Technology
Among Leaders Worldwide," Liaowang Zhoukan,
16 Aug 93, pp. 4-5, in JPRS-CST-93-017. American
aerospace representatives who have been allowed
access have remarked that the CASC Beijing Simulation
Center is very close in capabilities to Western
simulation facilities.
574
London Quds Press, 9 Feb 99, in
FBIS-CHI-1441-99.
575
Stokes, p. 49.
576
If the Chinese are looking to develop a 1,500-km
missile, the Russian 1,500-km-range AS-15 could
be used as a model. Some modifications would have
to be made to enable it to launch from the ground.
The Tomahawk has a 450-km range, while the US
AGM-86B has a 3,000-km range.
577
Russia's Raduga Design Bureau has reportedly assisted
the Third Academy in application of stealth technology
to an unidentified air-launched cruise missile.
See "Russian Missile Assistance to China,"
Flight International, 31 Aug 95.
578
In other words, radar that can pick up an airborne
target at 200 km will now be able to detect the
target at only 50 km, resulting in less reaction
time. Undated brochure, "Xikai (Zhongguo) Guangxue
Jishu Youxian Gongsi," (Seek China Optical Technology
Company). The brochure notes that the radar-absorbing
material, designated BD-21/SF-18, can reduce a
target such as a cruise missile to an RCS of 0.1
square meter (-10 dB). The absorbing material
and structural modifications can reduce the RCS
to -30 dB.
579
Zhang Haixiong, "ADN: Oxidizer for a Low-Signature
Propellant," in Feihang Daodan,
July 1996, pp. 35-38, in CAMA, 1996, Vol. 3, No.
6; and Lu Xiaohong, "Camouflage and Concealment
Technology of Mobile Missile Launchers and Ground
Equipment," in Harbin Institute of Technology
Journal, Dec 96, pp. 266-277. Lu is from
the Third Academy's Beijing Institute of Special
Machinery, responsible for cruise missile launchers.
580
See Wang Jianmin, "Work Hard To Develop Cruise
Missile Industry," Zhongguo Hangtian,
Sep 96, pp. 12-17; Sun Qingguang, "Study on Laser
Imaging Guidance," Feihang Daodan,
Mar 95, pp. 46-50, in CAMA 1995, Vol. 2, No. 3;
Liu Yongchang, "Infrared Imaging Precision Seeker
Technology," Hongwai Yu Jiguang Jishu
(Infrared and Laser Technology), 1996, Vol. 25,
No. 3, pp. 47-53, in CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 6; Zhao
Jun, "Applied Research Into Laser Imaging Guidance
Technology Development," Hangtian Qingbao
Yanjiu, HQ-96039, in CAMA, 1997, Vol.
4, No.2; and Li Jin, Development of Infrared Focal
Plane Array Imaging Technology," in Feihang
Daodan Qingbao Yanjiu Baogao Wenzhai (Cruise
Missile Information Research Reports), Dec 96,
pp. 190-209, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 6. Leading the
infrared imaging effort is the Third Academy's
Tianjin Jinhang Technical Physics Institute.
581
Sun Qingguang, "Jiguang Chengxiang Zhidao ji Ganrao
Moushi de Yanjiu" (Research Into Laser Imaging
Guidance and Jamming), in Hangtian Qingbao
Yanjiu, HQ-93017, pp. 228-241.
582
Zheng Wanqian, p. 43.
583
Bases are located at Shenyang (80301 Unit); Huangshan
(80302 Unit); Kunming (80303 Unit); Luoyang (80304
Unit); Huaihua (80305 Unit); and Xining (80306
Unit). The Second Artillery has one engineering
design academy and four research institutes to
solve problems associated with operations, TELs,
and logistics (First Institute), command automation,
targeting, and mapping (Third Institute), and
missile and warhead engineering design (Academy
of Engineering Design). The Second Artillery's
Command College in Wuhan prepares officers for
leadership positions within headquarters elements
and launch brigades. The Engineering College in
Xian educates technicians associated with equipment
and technology departments at various headquarters
and field units. General Second Artillery organizational
information is drawn from numerous sources, to
include open and internal (junnei)
Chinese publications and from discussions while
assigned as the assistant air attache in Beijing,
China, from 1992 to 1995. Also see PLA Directory
of Personalities, USDLO Hong Kong, 1996,
pp. 48-51; Bill Gertz, "New Chinese Missiles Target
All of East Asia," Washington Times, 10
Jul 97, p. 1; Hisashi Fujii, "Facts Concerning
China's Nuclear Forces," Gunji Kenkyu,
Nov 95, in FBIS-CHI-96-036; "Guangrong Bang"
(Outstanding Units)," Flying Eagle
(Changying), 3 Nov 93; "Guangrong Bang"
(Outstanding Units), Flying Eagle, May 1992; Lewis
and Xue, p. 213 footnote; and Nuclear Weapons
Databook, Vol. 5, pp. 324-335. Among sources,
Flying Eagle, one of a handful of
Second Artillery-associated publications, is most
useful in piecing together the organizational
structure. Second Artillery organizational issues
are also discussed in author's Strategic
Modernization monograph.
584
"The Strategic Nuclear Force Organization,"
in Guojia Junzhixue (The Science
of the State Military System), undated, p. 3.
585
Stokes, pp. 59-61. The 80302 Unit's first conventional
SRBM brigade is said to be garrisoned in Leping,
Jiangxi Province. According to an unsubstantiated
Washington Times article, the 80302
Unit is replacing its older DF-3 missiles with
the DF-21. Whether or not these DF-21s will eventually
have a conventional mission is unknown. See Bill
Gertz, "New Chinese Missiles Target All of East
Asia," Washington Times, 10 Jul 97, p.
1.
586
Lianhe Zhanyi Di Erpaobing Zuozhan,
p. 4. Another article supports the assertion that
conventional Second Artillery units would be subsumed
into the theater command structure, but notes
that Beijing may direct operations though the
Second Artillery chain of command. See Li Junsheng,
"Lianhe Zhanyi Didi Changgui Daodan Budui Zuozhan
Zhihui Wenti Tantao" (Inquiry Into Joint Conventional
Theater Surface-to-Surface Missile Unit Operational
Command Problems), in Lianhe Zhanyi Yu Junbingzhong
Zuozhan, (Joint Theater and Service Operations)
Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1998,
pp. 228-231. Li is from an unidentified (probably
Second Artillery) Third Research Institute.
587
Ibid, p. 5. During peacetime, these units are
subordinate to the base headquarters.
588
Ibid., p. 4. The equipment assurance subunits,
the transfer point, and the transport may be the
responsibility of a battalion-level "technical
unit" (jishu ying). A nuclear brigade's
technical battalion manages a warhead station
(dantizhan), an inspection station
(zhuangjianzhan), and a technical
service station (jishu qinwuzhan).
See "Guangrong Bang," Flying Eagle,
undated (probably 1993), p. 11.
589
For reference to a fourth battalion within a Second
Artillery brigade structure, see "Guangrong Bang"
(Glorious Honor Roll), Flying Eagle,
2 Nov 93, p. 10.
590
Sr. Col. Wang Benzhi, "Didi Changui Daodan Huoli
Yunyong de Jige Wenti," (Some Questions Related
to the Use of Conventional Surface-to-Surface
Missile Firepower), in Lianhe Zhanyi Yu
Junbingzhong Zuozhan, (Joint Theater and
Service Operations) Beijing: National Defense
University Press, 1998, pp. 236-241. Sr. Col.
Wang is the Chief of Staff of the Second Artillery
Huaihua Base (80305 Unit). One source states that
an operational zone could be 20 to 40 square km.
It is unclear what echelon would operate in this
size zone. See Lu Xiaohong, "Daodan Jidong Fashe
Zhuangbei Ji Dimian Shebei Weizhuang Yu Yinshen
Jishu Fenxi," (Analysis of Mobile Missile Launch
and Ground Equipment Camouflage and Stealth Technology),
in Xu Dazhe, Guowai Dandao Daodan Jishu
Yanjiu yu Fazhan (Study and Development
of Foreign Ballistic Missile Technology), Beijing:
Astronautics Press, Oct 98, pp. 193-202.
591
Mao Guanghong, "On Electromagnetic Management
of the Modern Battlefield," Jiefangjun Bao,
21 May 96, p. 6, in FBIS-CHI-96-134.
592
Zhang Jian, "Analysis of ECCM Principles of Spread
Spectrum Unified Satellite Tracking, Telemetry,
and Control Network," Hangtian Dianzi Duikang,
Apr 97, pp. 26-30. Zhang is from the China Academy
of Engineering Physics' Electronic Engineering
Institute. Also see Wei Chenxi, "ECCM Measures
for Military Communications Satellites," in Hangtian
Dianzi Duikang, March 1997, pp. 31-34.
593
Qin Zhongping and Zhang Huanguo, "ALT: Algorithim
for Attacking Cryptosystems," Jisuanji Xuebao,
Vol. 20, No. 6, pp. 546-550, in FBIS-CHI-97-311;
and Zhou Hong and Ling Xieting, "Encryption by
Inverse Chaotic Systems," Fudan Xuebao,
Jun 97, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 301-308, in FBIS-CHI-97-281.
594
Gan and Liu, pp. 42-45.
595
Lu Xiaohong, "Camouflage and Concealment Technology
for Mobile Launchers and Ground Equipment of Strategic
and Tactical Missiles," Aerospace Industry Press,
HQ-96034, 1996. The key institute for CCD technology
related to missile launchers is the Beijing Institute
of Special Machinery. Wen Longzhi, "Evaluation
of the Strategic Missile Survivability,"
in Aerospace Science Intelligence Studies
Report Abstracts, No. 5, 1995.5, pp. 353-368.
596
Li Chunshan, "Introduction and Explanation of
the National Military Standard 'Camouflage Requirements
for Surface-to-Surface Missile Weapon Systems',"
in Hangtian Biaozhunhua (Space Standardization),
1994, Vol. 5, pp. 12-15. Li is from the Beijing
Space Systems, Engineering Design Department.
597
Kang Qing, "IR Stealth of Buried Targets," Hongwai
Jishu, 1996, 18 (6), pp. 21-24. Kang is
from the PLA Academy of Logistics Engineering.
598
R&D of synthetic aperture radar satellite
jammers is the speciality of Southwest Institute
of Electronic Equipment (SWIEE). See Chen Ning,
"Jamming Technology Against Synthetic Aperture
Radar Satellites," Hangtian DIanzi Duikang,
1997 (4), pp. 45-48.
599
Chou Kuan-wu, "China's Reconnaissance Satellites,"
Kuang Chiao Ching, 16 Mar 98, pp.
36-40, in FBIS-CHI-98-098. Kuang Chiao Ching,
or Wide Angle, is a Hong Kong-based publication
with close ties to the PRC military establishment.
Official US Government reports are consistent
with this assessment. The 1998 Report to Congress
on PRC Military Capabilities (pursuant to Section
1226 of the FY98 National Defense Authorization
Act) states "China already may possess the capability
to damage, under specific conditions, optical
sensors on satellites that are very vulnerable
to damage by lasers. However, given China's current
interest in laser technology, it is reasonable
to assume that Beijing would develop a weapon
that could destroy satellites in the future."
600
Wu Jinliang, "Range Testing of Satellite Communication
Countermeasures," in Electronic Countermeasure
Technology and Intelligence Reform Abstracts,
Nov 1995, pp. 96-101. Reference to a Chinese study
on GPS jammer is included in author's unpublished
report, China's Space and Missile Industry,
Jun 1995.
601
Stokes, pp. 72-78. One should note that in the
1980s, the US considered modification of the Pershing-2
for ASAT missions, a system similar to the DF-21.
602
Xu Hui and Sun Zhongkang, "Temperature Differences
Between Satellites and Satellite Decoys," NUDT
Journal, 94, Vol. 16, no. 3; also see
Li Hong, Identification of Satellites and Its
Decoys Using Multisensor Data Fusion," Xiandai
Fangyu Jishu, June 1997, pp. 31-36. Li
is from the NUDT Electronic Technology Department.
603
DoD Report to Congress on the Cross-Strait
Security Situation, Feb 1999.
604
Wang Chunyuan, China's Space Industry and
Its Strategy of International Cooperation,
Stanford University: Center for International
Security and Arms Control, July 1996, p. 4; "China
Building Satellite Tracking Station on Tarawa,"
Asian Defense Journal, March 1997,
p. 66; and "Satellite Command Station Operational
in Kiribati," Zhongguo Xinwenshe,
14 Oct 97, in FBIS-CHI-97-287.
605
Trip report, NASA visit to China, 12-22 June 1991.
For example, China plans to develop a 500 meter
aperture radio space telescope for deep-space
exploration. With a price of approximately $25
million, the system, which will be based in Guizhou
Province, will support primarily civilian academic
research, but could also be used to supplement
China's space surveillance network. CAST and the
China Academy of Sciences are involved. See "Beijing
Plans To Develop 500 Meter Radio Telescope," Xinhua,
9 Apr 98, in FBIS-CHI-98-099.
606
A 1993 edition of the Second Artillery journal
Flying Eagle discussed a "comprehensive
satellite early warning information management
system" (erpaobing weixing linkong yubao
zonghe xiaoxi chuli xitong) that began
operations in as early as 1991.
607
Lianhe Zhanyi Di Erpaobing Zuozhan,
p. 17.
608
Ibid, p. 10; and Guan Lin'gen, "Brief Analysis
of Combined Fire Assault," Jiefangjun Bao,
21 Apr 98, p.6, in FBIS-CHI-0519-98. Some Western
observers have asserted the initial phase would
include strikes against the general population
and infrastructural targets, such as power plants,
fuel, industry, and transportation hubs as a means
to weaken overall national resolve. However, the
effects from these targets would take a while
to materialize. The PRC objective would be to
achieve military dominance over Taiwan within
two weeks to a month, before negative international
economic and political developments can occur.
For comments on the importance of strikes against
enemy intelligence and electronic attack facilities
in support of information dominance, see Yang
Zhiguo, "Didi Changgui Daodan Budui Zhanfa Chutan"
(Initial Discussion of Surface-to-Surface Missile
Unit Doctrine), in Lianhe Zhanyi Yu Junbingzhong
Zuozhan, (Joint Theater and Service Operations)
Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1998,
pp. 242-245. Sr. Col. Yang is Chief of Staff of
the Second Artillery's Luoyang Base (80304 Unit).
609
The PLAAF appears to be placing more emphasis
on developing a deep-strike capability. In 1995,
the PLAAF conducted a major strike exercise in
the Lanzhou Military Region. The exercise involved
a Red force strike package that conducted a night
mission from a distance of 1,000 km to strike
the Blue force's airbase. In Oct. 95, a conference,
chaired by GSD DCS LTG Wu Quanxu was held at LMR
HQ to review the exercise and associated doctrinal
development issues. A more complex strike exercise
was carried out in northwest China in September
1996 (Exercise 96-9) when the PLAAF used multiple
types of aircraft (i.e., A-5s, B-6s, F-7s, F-8IIs,
and SU-27s) organized into composite formations.
The strike package included electronic countermeasures,
strikes against enemy missiles, airfields, and
radars. This is an initial indication that the
PLAAF could be shifting from an exclusively air
defense mission to one including long-range strike
missions. Like the USAF, the PLA views offensive
counterair missions as an integral aspect of air
defense. Lanzhou MR exercise areas appear to serve
as the primary test bed for evolving doctrinal
development. See Mei Lin, "PLA Methods of Operations
Assessed," op.cit. and Zhang Lianfu, "'96-9' Yanxi,"
Zhongguo Kongjun, May 1998.
610
Sr. Col. Wang Benzhi, pp. 236-241.
611
Lianhe Zhanyi Di Erpaobing Zuozhan,
p. 10.
612
Guan Lingen, "Brief Analysis of Combined Fire
Assault," Jiefangjun Bao, 21 Apr
98, p.6, in FBIS-CHI-0519-98. In comparison, allied
forces in the Gulf war used 137 theater missiles
(TLAMs/CALCMs) during the first 24 hours of the
conflict. Each wave consisted of about 50 missiles.
Western reporting indicates the PLA currently
has only one brigade consisting of 150 to 200
SRBMs. See Tony Walker and Stephen Fidler, "China
Builds Up Missile Threat," Financial Times,
10 Feb 99, pg. 1.
613
Guan Lingen, "Brief Analysis of Combined Fire
Assault," Jiefangjun Bao, 21 Apr
98, p.6, in FBIS-CHI-0519-98.
614
See Sun Xiaohe, "Jiaqiang Huoli Xietiao, Fahui
Zhengti Weili" (Strengthen Firepower Coordination,
Give Play to Comprehensive Power), in Lianhe
Zhanyi Yu Junbingzhong Zuozhan, (Joint
Theater and Service Operations) Beijing: National
Defense University Press, 1998, pp. 281-285. Sr.
Col. Sun is Deputy Director of the Guangzhou Military
Region Service Arms Department.
615
Lianhe Zhanyi Di Erpaobing Zuozhan,
p. 10. Also see Wang Xuejin and Zhang Huaibi,
"Didi Changgui Daodan Budui Zuozhan Zhidao Sixiang
Fenxi," (Analysis of Conventional Surface-to-Surface
Missile Operations Guiding Thought) in Lianhe
Zhanyi Yu Junbingzhong Zuozhan, (Joint
Theater and Service Operations) Beijing: National
Defense University Press, 1998, pp. 223-227. Wang
and Zhang call the strike phase the "operations
implementation phase" (zuozhan shishi jieduan).
616
Most of the critical targets in a Taiwan scenario
are static and would not change significantly
over time. Therefore, a satellite revisit rate
of a few days, or even weeks, could be sufficient.
China's commercially acquired imagery could meet
its strategic targeting requirements. However,
with the possible exception of Russia, Beijing
could not rely on foreign sources of imagery after
initiation of hostilities. For follow-on tactical
strike missions, domestic imaging satellites would
be needed for theater reconnaissance and warning.
The projected 5-meter spatial resolution of China's
EO/SAR satellite constellation would support most
PLA targeting requirements.
617
Open sources indicate the DF-15s are most likely
transported to assembly areas via rail. While
the DF-15 TELs are road mobile, the DF-15 MAZ-543-like
TEL is limited to a maximum of 63 km an hour on
open highway. Barring major infrastructure investments,
road conditions and traffic in this area, however,
are not ideal for rapid and distant deployment
of 20-ton TELs and a quiver of three-ton missiles.
In addition, road travel significantly increases
the chances of detection. There is a major 15-year
project under way to expand the rail network in
Fujian and Jiangxi Provinces that will increase
the number of available launchsites and complicate
the tracking of the missiles on the ground. Highest
priority is being given to linking Nanping to
Hengfeng/Shangrao, creating a racetrack bounded
by Yingtan, Shaowu, Nanping, Shangrao/Hengtian,
and back to Yingtan. Funding in part is being
provided by Japan. See "Fujian Seeks Foreign Funds
for Railroad Construction," Xinhua,
12 Feb 96, in FBIS-CHI-96-029; and "Fujian Governor
Announces Plans for Six New Railways," Xinhua,
1 Aug 97, in FBIS-CHI-97-213. For comments on
Leping garrison, Yong'an launchsite, and use of
rails, see "Defense Ministry Analyzes 4th Missile
Launch," China Broadcasting Corporation
News Network, 13 Mar 96, in FBIS-CHI-96-051.
618
Lianhe Zhanyi Di Erpaobing Zuozhan,
p. 17. Theater command authorities would determine
a deployment pattern that would be centered on
the brigade's mobile command center. Also see
Richard D. Fisher, "China's Missiles Over the
Taiwan Strait: A Political and Military Assessment,"
paper presented at Sep 96 Coolfont Conference
on the PLA, pp. 1-30. For reference to a unit
having an assigned operating area, see Sr. Col.
Wang Benzhi, pp. 236-241.
619
Zhu Bao, pp. 9-19.
620
Zhang Hu, "Application of GPS in Missile Maneuvering
Positioning," Zhongguo Yuhang Xuehui Fashe
Gongcheng Yu Dimian Shebei Wenzhai (China
Astronautics Society Launch Engineering and Ground
Equipment Abstracts), Nov 93.
621
Ge Xinqing, Mao Guanghong, and Yu Bo, "Xinxizhan
Zhong Daodan Budui Mianlin de Wenti Yu Duice,"
(Questions and Countermeasures Facing Missile
Units in Information Warfare), in Wojun
Xinxizhan Wenti Yanjiu (Studies on Chinese
Information Warfare Issues), Beijing: National
Defense University, pp. 189-192. The authors are
from the Second Artillery's Command Academy in
Wuhan. It should be noted that Fujian Province
by itself has 16,000 km of fiber-optic cable.
622
Wang Jixiang and Chang Lan, "Guowai Jidong Dandao
Daodan Dimian Shengcun Nengli Yanjiu," (Study
on Survivability of Foreign Mobile Ballistic Missiles),
in Xu Dazhe, Guowai Dandao Daodan Jishu
Yanjiu yu Fazhan (Study and Development
of Foreign Ballistic Missile Technology), Beijing:
Astronautics Press, Oct 98, pp. 96-108. Wang and
Chang are from CALT's systems integration department.
The article describes foreign capabilities but
concludes with specific recommendations for China.
Chinese defense industries have developed a range
of tactical communications systems, including
mobile 1 to 3 meter very-small-aperture terminal
(VSAT) satellite communication dishes and highly
directional tactical digital microwave system.
VSAT dishes are optimized for Ku- or L-Band satellite
communications. Based on author's discussions
in Beijing with foreign diplomats in 1995, the
Second Artillery has been particularly interested
in steerable spot beam satellites. According to
its brochure, the tactical microwave system, produced
by Shenyang Huitong Electronic Research Institute,
has a 50-km range. At the end of 1997, culminating
a three-year effort, the Second Artillery's Communications
Department completed the acceptance testing of
a new digital microwave communications system.
VSAT systems are produced by a wide range of manufacturers.
One tactical VSAT system, outlined in another
brochure, is a mobile 3-meter dish produced by
the Nanjing Research Institute of Electronics
Technology. Use of digital microwave at the company
level would indicate that launchers could be limited
to an operating area of within 50 km of the battalion
command center. It is not clear, however, if such
a communications mode would be assigned to such
a low echelon. For reference to the automated
C2 system, see Han Tiejun and Li Qinsuo, "Didi
Changui Daodan Budui Zuozhan de Jiben Yuance,"
(Fundamental Principles of Conventional Surface-to-Surface
Missile Unit Operations), in Lianhe Zhanyi
Yu Junbingzhong Zuozhan, (Joint Theater
and Service Operations) Beijing: National Defense
University Press, 1998, pp. 232-235.
623
See Wang Jixiang and Chang Lan, pp. 96-108. Pre-Gulf
war estimates assessed that it would take approximately
one half hour to move a transporter-erector-launcher
after it launched its missile. The reality was
that the Iraqis were able to do this in four to
five minutes.
624
A brigade consists of at least four battalions
probably with three to four companies. Each company
likely is responsible for at least one launcher.
If one assumes a notional structure of four battalions
per brigade with four companies/launchers each,
then a brigade would be able to execute a raid
size of at least 16 SRBMs at one time. Seven Second
Artillery brigades, equipped with a mix of SRBMs,
LACMs, and MRBMs, could notionally achieve a raid
size of at least 112 theater missiles. Three salvos
would utilize 336 missiles. Remaining theater
missiles in the PLA arsenal would likely be kept
in reserve for other contingencies and/or to support
naval operations and amphibious landings. The
Chief of Staff of the 80305 Unit in Huaihua, Hunan
Province, refers to only two salvos in the opening
phases of a conflict (see next footnote). See
Sr. Col. Wang Benzhi, pp. 236-241.
625
Lianhe Zhanyi Di Erpaobing Zuozhan,
p. 17. The concept of synchronized, multiaxis
strikes is a fundamental principle of Second Artillery
conventional doctrine (duodian, duofangxiang,
tongshi tuji). Other important operational
concepts discussed by Sr. Col. Wang from Huaihua
include "xushi bingyong, shengdong xiji,"
(literally "use reality, make a noise in the east,
but strike to the west"); and "xiaojiange,
duoboci tuji" (literally "cut time and
strike in multiple waves"). The first calls for
integration of simultaneous launches from different
launch azimuths and use of infrared radiation
"disruption" to confuse enemy satellite early
warning systems and complicate enemy attack operations.
The second includes use of two strike waves, the
first "screening" the second by exploiting "time
lags" (shijiancha) in missile defenses.
See Sr. Col. Wang's "Didi Changgui Daodan Huoli
Yunyong de Jige Wenti."
626
Ibid.
627
"The U.S. Military's Three Choices on Intervention,"
in Taiwan de Junbei, 1 Jul 96, pp.
76-79, in FBIS-CHI-97-302.
628
See Li Xinyi, "On the Air Supremacy and Air Defense
of Taiwan and China: Is Taiwan An 'Unsinkable
Aircraft Carrier'?" Taiwan de Junbei
(Taiwan Military Preparations), 1 Jul 96, pp.
11-18, in FBIS-CHI-97-323. For a general discussion
on the combined use of ballistic and land-attack
cruise missiles, electronic warfare, and air strikes,
see Yuan Lin, "The Taiwan Strait is No Longer
a Barrier--PLA Strategies for Attacking Taiwan,"
Kuang Chiao Ching (Wide Angle),
16 Apr 96, No. 283, pp. 14-19. Wide Angle
is a Hong Kong-based publication with close association
with the PLA.
629
The PRC has closely studied the effectiveness
of missile defense systems and is investing in
developing the capacity to jam Taiwan's PATRIOT-like
Modified Air Defense System radar. See, for example,
Xiao Shunping, Wang Guoyu, and Ma Jianwu, "Detection
Simulation Modeling for PATRIOT Radar Networks,"
Guofang Keji Daxue Xuebao (Journal of the
National University of Defense Technology),
1 Jan 99, pp. 33-36, in FBIS-CHI-1924, 17 Jun
99.
630
Estimated missile requirements are drawn from
Edward R. Harshberger, Long-Range Conventional
Missiles: Issues for Near-Term Development,
RAND: Santa Monica, 1991, p. 183.
631
Sr. Col. Wang Benzhi, "Didi Changui Daodan Huoli
Yunyong de Jige Wenti," (Some Questions Related
to the Use of Conventional Surface-to-Surface
Missile Firepower), in Lianhe Zhanyi Yu
Junbingzhong Zuozhan, (Joint Theater and
Service Operations) Beijing: National Defense
University Press, 1998, pp. 236-241. Sr. Col.
Wang is the Chief of Staff of the Huaihua Base
(80305 Unit) in Hunan Province.
632
The PLA could attempt to limit the useable segment
of a runway to less than the minimum takeoff distance
for the aircraft using them. Generally, for example,
an attack on a standard 10,000-foot runway would
attempt to cut the runway into three segments,
permitting only 3,000 to 3,500 feet per segment.
One source asserts that it would take 15 to 48
missiles to close a base, assuming a 50-meter
CEP. An increase in CEP would reduce the number
of required missiles. See David Blair, "How To
Defeat the United States: The Operational Military
Effects of the Proliferation of Weapons of Precise
Destruction," in Henry Sokolski, Fighting
Proliferation: New Concerns for the Nineties,
Air University Press, pp. 75-94 Also see Sr. Col.
Wang Benzhi, "Didi Changui Daodan Huoli Yunyong
de Jige Wenti," (Some Questions Related to the
Use of Conventional Surface-to-Surface Missile
Firepower), in Lianhe Zhanyi Yu Junbingzhong
Zuozhan, (Joint Theater and Service Operations)
Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1998,
pp. 236-241 Sr. Col. Wang is Chief of Staff of
the Second Artillery's Huaihua Base (80305 Unit).
633
For a superb discussion of airbase attacks, see
Christopher M. Center, "Ignorance Is Risk: The
Big Lesson From Desert Storm Air Base Attacks,"
in Airpower Journal, Winter 1992,
pp. 25-35; and Capt Peter C. Bahm and Capt Kenneth
W. Polasek, "Tactical Aircraft and Airfield Recovery,
Airpower Journal, Summer 1991, pp. 32-45. It is
worthy to note that during the Oct. 73 Arab-Israeli
War, Arab repair teams restored runways in just
nine to 12 hours. The Iraqis were able to repair
runways in as little as four to six hours.
634
See Wang Jixiang and Chang Lan, p. 107.
635
Lu Ting-hua, "Simulated Attack on Taiwan?" Tsu-li
Wan-pao, 28 Apr 99, p.1, in FBIS-CHI-639-99,
29 Apr 99.
636
Harshberger, p. 183.
637
Xu Minfei, Zhu Zili, and Li Yong, "Feasibility
of Technologies for Use of Ballistic Missiles
To Counter Aircraft Carriers," Guofang Keji
Cankao, 1997, 18(4), pp.126-130, summarized
in CAMA.
638
Wang Guobao, "Initial Discussion on Tactical Ballistic
Missile Electronic Warfare," Hangtian Dianzi
Duikang, Apr 97, pp. 1-7, summarized in
CAMA.
639
See Wang Jixiang and Chang Lan, p. 107. Most vulnerable
would be Kadena AB and Yokosuka Naval Base in
Japan.
640
For a good summary of Second Artillery CCD practices,
see Ge, et al., "Xinxizhan Zhong Daodan Budui
Mianlin de Wenti Yu Duice," p. 189-192. Also see
Wang Jixiang and Chang Lan, pp. 96-108. Wang and
Chang are from the Beijing Institute of Astronautical
Systems Engineering, and Lu Xiaohong, "Camouflage
and Concealment Technology for Mobile Launchers
and Ground Equipment of Strategic and Tactical
Missiles," Aerospace Industry Press, HQ-96034,
1996. The key institute for camouflage, concealment,
and deception (CCD) technology related to missile
launchers is the Beijing Institute of Special
Machinery (CALT 15th Research Institute).
641
The system is probably known as the Bodyguard,
unveiled at IDEX '97 Arms Show. The brochure notes
that the Bodyguard is a mobile system consisting
of four vehicles. The Bodyguard can defend a 10-square
km area. The ECM system was developed by the Northeast
China Research Institute of Electronic Technology.
See Liu Hsiao-chun, "Combat Effectiveness of China's
Electronic Technology in Perspective--Causing
the F-117 Stealth Fighters To Malfunction," Kuang
Chiao Ching, 16 Jul 98, pp. 96-98, in
FBIS-CHI-2875-98. The organic Second Artillery
ECM system is discussed in a very comprehensive
account of developments within the PLA by Lin
Chong-Bin (Chong-Pin Lin), entitled Heba
(Nuclear Hegemony), p. x.
642
For one of the best Taiwan assessments of the
challenges presented by the PLA's growing arsenal
of theater missiles, see Teng Hsin-yun, "Another
TMD Episode--The PRC Missile Threat and Our Countermeasures
as Well as Blind Spots in Taiwan's Defense Thinking,"
Chien-Tuan K'o Chi, 1 May 99, pp.
100-107, in FBIS-CHI-0872-99, 6 Jun 99.
643
This "area denial" concept is discussed in Thomas
G. Mahnken, "Deny U.S. Access?" Proceedings,
Sept 98, pp. 36-39. For another evaluation of
the implications of increasingly accurate and
lethal theater missiles, see Paul Bracken, "America's
Maginot Line," Atlantic Monthly,
December 1998.
644
The six specious arguments are: 1) TMD will cause
an arms race; 2) TMD will contradict the ABM Treaty;
3) TMD will encourage Taiwan independence sentiment;
4) TMD can be used offensively; 5) TMD will lead
to the militarization of space; and 6) TMD "violates"
the Three Communiques. All are based on oversimplifications
and half-truths: 1) Arms races generally are caused
by one side's rapid buildup in offensive capabilities.
One could argue that an accelerated arms race
has been under way in the Taiwan Strait since
the early 1990s. Undercutting Beijing's overwhelming
offensive advantage through viable defenses could
enhance cross-Strait stability by raising the
costs of using force. 2) Questions surrounding
the ABM Treaty only applies to upper tier
systems--US upper tier systems now being tested
have been certified as ABM Treaty compliant. 3)
The argument that TMD will encourage Taiwan independence
sentiment is also misleading. There are more important
factors besides defenses that fan the flames of
Taiwan independence. PRC policies that alienate
Taiwan are most relevant. Besides, active missile
defenses would not encourage independence sentiment
any more than other weapon systems, such as fighters,
surface-to-air missiles, or ships. One could also
argue that Taiwan's indigenous capacity for defense
is only a minor factor influencing public sentiment
regarding greater autonomy since, according to
some sources, Taiwan's domestic polity is largely
uninterested in defense issues. 4) The argument
that active missile defenses can be used offensively
is also based on a half-truth. Converting upper-tier
interceptors to surface-to-surface missiles could
enable strikes against targets at long ranges.
However, such a means is not cost efficient due
to payload limitations. The argument that missile
defense systems incorporate technologies useful
to ballistic missiles (i.e., gyroscopes and accelerometers)
assumes that: a) Taiwan does not have the indigenous
capacity to develop viable inertial measurement
units; b) would be willing to violate MTCR assurances
granted to the US; and c) would take the trouble
to reverse-engineer the guidance technology. 5)
The argument that TMD could lead to a militarization
of space is partially true. If supported by a
robust search, acquisition, and tracking network,
upper-tier systems could be used
to strike some satellites in low Earth orbit.
6) Finally, active missile defenses would not
"violate" the Three Communiques. First, the Three
Communiques are parallel statements of policy
that have little standing in international law.
Secondly, the argument that US provision of active
missile defenses would revive the US-Taiwan defense
alliance, undermining the foundation of US-PRC
relations as spelled out in the 1979 Communique,
is based on the assumption that TMD would require
operational connectivity (i.e., satellite early
warning) with the US. This is not necessarily
true. While satellite early warning could enhance
the effectiveness of missile defenses, systems
such as PATRIOT and THAAD can operate autonomously.
Missile defenses do not "violate" the 1982 Communique
any more than other weapon systems. As Assistant
Secretary of State John Holdridge pointed out
in his August 1982 Congressional testimony, the
US agreement to reduce arms sales to Taiwan was
contingent upon Beijing's peaceful approach to
resolving the Taiwan issue, generally characterized
by its military posture directed against Taiwan.
As Holdridge pointed out, a rise in the military
threat to Taiwan theoretically would be accompanied
by a rise in US security assistance, in accordance
with US domestic law under the Taiwan Relations
Act.
645
Among numerous references, see Tom Plate, "East
Asia, Infected by a New Arms Race, Risks Deadly
Miscalculations," LA Times, 7 Jul
99; and Vanessa Guest, "Missile Defense Is Wrong
Call on Taiwan," LA Times, 3 May
99.
646
Among numerous references, see Robert Jervis,
"Offense, Defense, and the Security Dilemma,"
World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Jan
78), pp. 186-214; and Stephen Van Evera, "Offense,
Defense, and the Causes of War, International
Security, Vol. 22, No. 4, (Spring 1998),
pp. 5-43.
647
See Stephen Van Evera's Spring 1998 International
Security article for a comprehensive argument
on the dangers of an offense-dominated security
environment. In line with this reasoning, one
could argue that Taiwan's newly procured F-16s
are to blame for intensification of the cross-Strait
arms race. However, Taiwan's F-16 fleet is optimized
for air-to-air operations, not long-range strike.
648
Hou Xiaoyan, "Taiwan Zhongkeyuan de Yanjiu Linghuo
he Chanpin Jieshao" (Introduction to Taiwan's
Zhongshan Institute of Science and Technology
Fields of Research and Products), Feihang
Daodan (Cruise Missiles),
Dec 98, p 39. This CASC journal asserts that CSIST
is converting the TK-II into a surface-to-surface
ballistic missile. The ballistic missile, called
Sky Halberd (Tianji), allegedly
has a design range of 320 km and a 150-kg warhead.
CSIST is integrating GPS with their inertial navigation
systems in order to achieve a CEP of fewer than
100 meters. Primary targets would be airfields,
military ports, and industrial areas. The CASC
author also asserts that a second-stage addition
to the Tianji missile would significantly
expand the range. As an example of the nuclear
weapons development debate, see Liao Hung-hsiang:
"Should Taiwan Develop Strategic Nuclear Weapons?"
Ch'uan-ch'iu Fang-wei Tsa-chi, 15
Mar 99, pp 18-21, in FBIS-CHI-0018-99, 29 Apr
99; and Liu Chien-hua, "What Equipment Should
Taiwan Use To Defend Itself," Tzu-li Wan-pao,
9 Nov 97, p. 2, in FBIS-CHI-97-364, 30 Dec 99.
For background on Taiwan's previous nuclear weapons
development program, see David Albright and Corey
Gay, "Taiwan: A Nuclear Nightmare Averted," The
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Jan/Feb
98, Vol. 54 No.1.
649
Robert Jervis, "Offense, Defense, and the Security
Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30,
No. 2 (Jan 78), pp. 186-214.
650
For an outstanding discussion on shortcomings
of air and missile campaign theory, see Col. Richard
Szafranski, "Parallel War and Hyperwar: Is Every
Want a Weakness?," in Barry Schneider and Lawrence
Grinter, eds., Battlefield of the Future:
21st Century Issues, Air War College Studies
in National Security No.3, Air University: 1995,
pp. 125-148.
651
See Teng Hsin-yun for a realistic Taiwan assessment
of countermeasures.
652
Theoretically, assuming two interceptors are employed
for every ballistic missile and a 100-percent
probability of kill, a MADS battalion could engage
a near-simultaneous salvo of 48 SRBMs directed
against targets within its area of coverage. For
background on countering theater missile threats,
see Joint Pub 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint
Theater Missile Defense, 22 Feb 96. DoD's
Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense
Architecture Options for the Asia-Pacific Region
notes there are multiple options for active missile
defenses. Twelve land-based lower-tier fire units
could provide for partial coverage of Taiwan's
most crucial assets. Eleven sea-based lower systems
could cover the entire island. Neither lower tier
system, however, can counter longer-range threats
such as the DF-21. In addition, a maneuvering
reentry vehicle that complicates lower-tier engagements
would drive Taiwan toward upper-tier solutions.
A single THAAD-like unit could engage all known
missile threats. The exo-atmosphere Navy Theater
Wide-like system can cover the entire island but
would not be able to engage shorter range threats,
such as the 300-km DF-11, since it would not leave
the atmosphere.
653
In this context, missiles include complete systems,
technology, or components.
654
"China's Cooperation With Other Countries in Nuclear
Energy Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes, Says
Spokesman," Xinhua, 26 September
1986.
655
"Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman on China's
Nuclear Position," Xinhua, 15 February
1996.
656
"China Calls for Promoting Peaceful Nuclear Use,"
Xinhua, 24 April 1995. The article
did not specify what the fourteen countries were.
657
The Vienna-based Zangger committee, founded in
1971 and consisting of thirty-three nuclear or
nuclear-related export countries, is the first
international organization formed on control over
nuclear technology. The committee's goal is to
strengthen consultation and cooperation on issues
of nuclear nonproliferation and export control
under the principles of the NPT.
658
China's National Defense, (Beijing:
Information Office of the State Council of the
People's Republic of China, July 1998), pp. 32-34.
The 1998 defense white paper was not Beijing's
first attempt at military transparency. In 1985,
the PLA began publishing the Shijie Junshi
Nianjian [World Military Yearbook],
which provided an overview of militaries around
the world. The section on the PLA was only seventeen
pages and provided almost no useful information.
Each subsequent yearbook, published about every
two years, has provided greater detail on matters
like organization and training. The Academy of
Military Science has also published journals with
numerous papers on military trends and how they
affect the PLA.
659
The MTCR group was originally established in 1987
with nine member nations. There are currently
twenty-nine countries, including Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and
the United States. The MTCR has two primary restraint
categories. Category I items have the greatest
restraints. These items include complete rocket
systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch
vehicles, and sounding rockets) and unmanned air
vehicle systems (including cruise missile systems,
target and reconnaissance drones) with capabilities
exceeding a range of 300 kilometers and a 500-kilogram
payload threshold; production facilities for such
systems; and major subsystems including rocket
stages, re-entry vehicles, rocket engines, guidance
systems, and warhead mechanisms. Category II items
include complete rocket systems (including ballistic
missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding
rockets) and unmanned air vehicle systems (including
cruise missile systems, target drones and reconnaissance
drones) not covered in Item I, capable of a maximum
range equal to, or greater than, 300 kilometers.
Also included are a wide range of equipment, material,
and technologies, most of which have uses other
than for missiles capable of delivering WMD.
660
China's National Defense, (Beijing:
Information Office of the State Council of the
People's Republic of China, July 1998), pp. 32-34.
661
Paul Mann, "China Alleged Top Trafficker in Mass
Destruction Weapons," Aviation Week and
Space Technology, Vol. 147, No. 5, 42.
662
"Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition
of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions: 1 January
Through 30 June 1998," Director of Central Intelligence
Nonproliferation Center, Internet. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian.html#china.
663
"China Set To Upgrade Iran Missiles," Reuters,
19 August 1999.
664
The ROC currently has diplomatic relations with
28 countries: Belize, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Commonwealth of Dominica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Christopher
and Nevis, Grenada, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Nicaragua, the Vatican, Macedonia, Liberia, Malawi,
Swaziland, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Senegal, Sao
Tome and Principe, Chad, Solomon Islands, Nauru,
Tuvalu, and the Marshall Islands.
665
Shirley A. Kan, Chinese Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues,
CRS Report for Congress, IB92056, 23 March 1998.
666
Shirley A. Kan, Chinese Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Background and Analysis,
CRS Report for Congress, 96-767 F, 13 September
1996. The Chinese have also developed other systems,
such as the 8610/M-7 (CSS-8) SRBM, solely for
export. The 8610 is an HQ-2 surface-to-air missile
that the PRC modified for Iran. Shirley A. Kan
and Robert D. Shuey, China: Ballistic and
Cruise Missiles, CRS Report for Congress,
97-391 F, 27 May 1998. The 8610 refers to the
date the program began--October 1986. This is
a common practice in China for designating various
weapons systems. Since this missile was developed
for export, China has openly provided information
about its capabilities. Other examples include
the K-8 trainer aircraft and FC-1 fighter joint
ventures between China and Pakistan. These aircraft
programs were developed for the Pakistan Air Force,
not the PLA Air Force, with the hope that the
PLA would become interested in the program and
purchase some of the aircraft at a later date.
667
Dr. Andrew Rathmell, "Iran's Liquid Lifeline,"
Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 September
1995.
668
"Post-2000 Delays to China's Arms Goals," Jane's
Defence Weekly, 21 January 1998.
669
"China Moves To End PLA's Commercial Interests,"
Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 September
1998.
670
During the late 1980s, aviation ministry personnel
cited instances where the PLA would circumvent
the spirit of the law by purchasing a new piece
of equipment from a factory and then have this
"surplus" equipment delivered directly to an overseas
customer.
671
This information is based on interviews with Chinese
personnel.
672
As noted in Bates Gill's and James Mulvenon's
paper for this seminar on "The Chinese Strategic
Rocket Forces: Transition to a Credible Force,"
the Second Artillery Headquarters oversees six
launch bases, which are division-sized elements.
Each base has two to three subordinate brigades.
Each brigade has up to four launch battalions.
Each battalion has three to four launch companies.
Each company has one missile launcher. Missile
brigades are generally structured by type of missiles.
In other words, one brigade only has one type
of missile, thus facilitating maintenance and
specialization. There are at least thirteen brigades,
most of which have been existence for 15 to 20
years. Their paper provides a chart depicting
the location of these six bases.
673
The Defense Intelligence Agency's July 1979 Handbook
on the Chinese Armed Forces shows artillery
and antiaircraft artillery divisions with four
artillery regiments.