
NOT FOR PUBLICATION



UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 In re

CHARLES DOUGLAS FREELAND,

APM PROFIT SHARING TRUST; PHILLIP G. LARSON, TRUSTEE,

CHARLES DOUGLAS FREELAND,

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v.

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Bankruptcy No. 02-01651-JM Adversary No. 03-90064-JM

Debtor.

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

NOTICE OF DECISION

Τ

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Charles Douglas Freeland ("Debtor") filed a petition to commence a Chapter 11 case on February 15, 2002, to stay a pending foreclosure of his home. After the house was sold, the case was converted to one under Chapter 7 on August 2, 2002. The deadline to file complaints under Section 523(a)(2) expired on November 8, 2002. On February 14, 2003, APM Profit Sharing Trust ("Plaintiff") filed this complaint to

determine the dischargeability of a stipulated judgment entered against the Debtor in a California State Court on July 11, 2000 ("Judgment"). The Debtor filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on March 14, 2003. The Court denied that motion after a hearing on April 24, 2003, after finding that the notice given to Plaintiff was inadequate to satisfy procedural due process.

On February 23, 2004, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment as to the \$150,000 portion of the Judgment that was allocated to the two fraud claims alleged in the state court complaint based on principles of collateral estoppel. After various stipulations and continuances, Debtor responded and filed a cross motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the nondischargeability complaint was not timely filed.

After a hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment, the Plaintiff's motion was granted and Debtor's motions were denied and a judgment was entered on December 10, 2004. The Debtor appealed. The District Court issued a decision which affirmed the Bankruptcy Court decision regarding the application of collateral estoppel as to the Judgment, but vacated the Bankruptcy Court's judgment and remanded the matter for factual findings on the adequacy of the notice.

After an evidentiary hearing, the matter was taken under submission as of February 8, 2006. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds Plaintiff was provided with adequate notice of the case and the complaint will be dismissed as untimely.

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FACTS

Mr. Larson is the Trustee for, and a beneficiary of the

Plaintiff, APM Trust. The address for both Plaintiff and Mr. Larson is 176 Encinal Avenue, Atherton, California. The Debtor's original Chapter 11 schedules listed Mr. Larson as a creditor with an incorrect address in St. Louis, Missouri. When the original schedules were prepared, the Debtor was in West Virginia caring for his parents who both had cancer. His secretary gathered the information from his desk to prepare the schedules and found the St. Louis address in the APM file. The address actually was that of a partner of the Debtor. The Debtor did not notice the error at the time of the filing.

After the case was converted, the Debtor reviewed the schedules and found some errors in addresses and some additional creditors. He gave the corrected information to his attorney, Barry Ruderman, who then prepared the necessary documents and filed amended schedules on October 9, 2002. The amendment included the correct address for Mr. Larson. According to the certificate of mailing from Barry Ruderman's office, a Notice to Creditors added by Amendments was sent to Mr. Larson on that date, which included a copy of the Notice of Deadlines ("Notice"). The Notice was sent to Mr. Larson exactly 30 days before the deadline to file a complaint under § 523(a)(2) expired on November 8, 2002.

Mr. Larson testified that he did not receive the notice and did not learn that the Debtor had filed a bankruptcy petition until he was contacted by another creditor on December 6, 2002. Beyond his testimony, Mr. Larson submitted no other admissible evidence to establish that he did not receive the Notice sent by Mr. Ruderman's

¹ As Exhibit 1, Plaintiff offered a letter from Mr. Larson to the Chapter 7 Trustee dated December 19, 2002. Since the letter was not produced during discovery, the Court will not admit Exhibit 1 as part of the record.

He did not request an extension of time to file a non dischargeability complaint, and this complaint was not filed until February 14, 2003.

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III

DISCUSSION

The Court finds the testimony of all the witnesses to be credible, and the decision rests upon the burden of proof as allocated by case law. When mail is properly addressed, stamped and deposited in the mail system, a presumption arises that it was received by the party to whom it was sent. In re American Properties Inc., 30 B.R. 247, 250 (Ks. 1983). Proof of the custom of mailing is sufficient to carry the burden of proper mailing, and the mailing employee need not testify. Id.

In this circuit, the appellate courts have determined that the denial of receipt of a properly mailed notice is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of receipt. In re Bucknum, 951 F.2d 204, 207 (9th Cir. 1991); <u>In re Ricketts</u>, 80 B.R. 495, 497 (9th Cir. BAP 1987). The party denying receipt must provide more positive evidence of an objective nature to overcome the presumption of receipt. <u>In re</u> Williams, 185 B.R. 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1995).

Without additional objective evidence beyond his own testimony, Mr. Larson has not overcome the presumption that he received the Notice that was properly addressed and mailed to him on October 9, 2002. Under the case of In re Dewalt, 961 F.2d 848 (9 th Cir. 1992), 30 days notice should be sufficient since that is the amount of notice required by BR 4007(c). The court also indicated that "even 30 days notice may not be enough if truly extraordinary circumstances are

presented, as when an unsophisticated creditor, not represented by counsel, receives only the most sketchy notice that a bankruptcy has On the other hand, a somewhat lesser period may be been filed. sufficient where there is clear evidence the creditor has enough advance knowledge of the bar date to file the complaint or request an extension and has purposefully chosen to lie in wait rather than present its claim." DeWalt, 961 F.2d at 851. As in DeWalt, neither extreme exists in this case. As a result, 30 days notice is sufficient for the creditor to file a complaint or request an extension by the deadline set forth in the Notice as imposed by B.R. 4007(c). Due process as defined in this circuit was met, and failure to meet the deadline subjects the complaint to dismissal.

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IV

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff did not meet its burden to overcome the presumption of 17 receipt of the properly mailed Notice. The complaint filed by 18 Plaintiff was untimely and should be dismissed. Debtor's counsel is 19 instructed to submit a proposed judgment within fourteen days of the filing of this Notice of Decision.

JAMES!

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Judge

\$tates Bankruptcy Court

21 Dated: JUN 9 2006

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