Chinese Domestic Power Struggles, January 1976–January 1977

138. Editorial Note

On January 15, 1976, Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, received an executive summary of a report entitled "US Policy Interests in the Asian-Pacific Area" by William R. Kintner, former Ambassador to Thailand. Kintner argued that the ideological bitterness of the Sino-Soviet conflict provided the United States with unique opportunities for creative diplomacy in the Asian-Pacific theater of the Cold War. He noted that this area was "lining up into two groups: pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese countries." At the same time, he warned, "The evolving American relationship with Peking is complicated by the basic outlook of Chinese foreign policy. Peking has pioneered a new conceptualization of today's international disorder. The Chinese strategy for achieving global ascendancy is based on mobilizing the Third World (most of the globe's population, resources and real estate) against both the capitalist-imperialist power, the U.S., and the social-revisionist power, the USSR. The Chinese identify themselves with the Third World, not as a superpower, and assert that the ultimate conflict is between 'rural' Asia, Africa and Latin America and 'urban' Europe and North America. The PRC is continuing to foster the 'hardest' revolutionary activity in many parts of the world."

Among Kintner's recommendations, he suggested "continuing liaison with the PRC and case-by-case cooperation." On the issue of Taiwan, he wrote, "Do not recognize the PRC and concurrently derecognize the ROC in a manner or time frame that could lead both our adversaries and our friends to further doubt our interest in and commitment to retaining active and cooperative security, political and economic relations with other Asian states." (Letter from Kintner to Scowcroft, with attached study, October 31, 1975; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Box 1, Ambassador Kintner's Study of U.S. Policy Interests in the Asian-Pacific Area)

Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council staff, who analyzed Kintner's study before passing the summary on to Scowcroft, wrote that it was the "first comprehensive review of our Asian posture" since the collapse in 1975 of U.S. efforts to preserve non-Communist regimes in Indochina. Yet he observed, "While many of its judgments are sound, it reflects much of the traditional hard-line Kintner approach about the Soviet Union, which features more prominently than actual Soviet presence and influence in Asia would dictate." (Memorandum from Barnes to Scowcroft, January 15, 1976; ibid.) Scowcroft initialed Barnes' memorandum.

139. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, January 15, 1976.

SUBJECT

Ambassador Unger's Meeting with the Secretary

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Ambassador Unger, Republic of China
Philip C. Habib, EA

Ambassador Unger asked the Secretary what guidance he had for him in the period ahead, now that the President's visit had taken place. The Secretary asked what the Ambassador thought would be the reaction in Taiwan to normalization carried out according to the Japanese model. The Ambassador said that as far as it went this might be satisfactory but it did not cover the security question. There ensued some discussion as to what kind of formula it might be possible to persuade Peking to issue unilaterally at the time of normalization and also what might be said on the U.S. side. Ambassador asked whether, assuming Peking continues to desire to maintain good relations with the United States, it would not be possible for us to make the satisfactory resolution of this problem a condition for our proceeding with normalization.

There followed some discussion of what might occur on Taiwan if normalization does not give the island reasonable assurance of a stable future. Ambassador Unger mentioned possible initiative by independentists for example to try to establish a Republic of Taiwan and he expressed concern about Peking's likely reaction to this. This led to some discussion of the possibilities of Peking taking military action against Taiwan and also of action short of military assault such as blockade. The Secretary several times referred to the reluctance if not the likely refusal of the U.S. Congress to intervene militarily to help Taiwan.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Papers of William H. Gleysteen: Lot 89 D 436, Box 8132, PRC Related Papers 1976. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Unger on January 16 and designated as a "rough draft." A copy was sent to Habib and notations indicate he and Gleysteen saw it. Unidentified handwritten notations read: "Gleysteen only" and "Lord should be aware of this & if your [illegible] Solomon." On January 12, Unger met with Scowcroft and informed him that the decision against rapid normalization of relations with the PRC had "defused consternation on Taiwan," and that Jiang Jingguo was a leader with whom the United States could successfully work. Unger also advised that the United States continue to withdraw troops from Taiwan in a measured manner. (Memorandum of conversation, January 12; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Box 5, People's Republic of China)

The Secretary then referred to the probable timing of normalization saying first that it might come sometime in 1977 but then adding that mid-1978 might be the first likely time. He anticipated that around a year from now the PRC may choose to make an important issue of Taiwan and would emphasize in any case that it regards Taiwan as an internal Chinese matter. In the year ahead the Secretary said that there is not much to do on this matter and it would be advisable to keep the issue quiet and to play it down. Ambassador Unger said that he took this to mean that he should in a continuing, steady fashion keep before the GROC that we continue to intend to carry through normalization of our relations with the PRC so that the conditioning process continues. This point however does not have to be vigorously played but can be handled in low key.

Ambassador Unger returned to the question of actual arrangements which will have to be made if normalization is to be carried out without serious destabilizing effects on Taiwan. In addition to the security question already discussed he mentioned a whole range of economic issues including most favored nation treatment, the continued supply of nuclear fuel etc. and Mr. Habib mentioned also the continued supply of military equipment. The Ambassador said that it not only would require our formulating our plans in the executive branch but certain matters might require consultation with the Congress and even some Congressional expression; he felt this would be important particularly with regard to the security question. He added that it may also be necessary in advance of any final decisions or announcements to have further consultations with Peking on some of these matters. The Secretary acknowledged these points and turned to Mr. Habib to inquire whether studies of these matters were underway and Mr. Habib confirmed that they were.

140. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Habib) to Secretary of State Kissinger[1]

Washington, January 16, 1976.

Implications of Chou En-lai's Death[2]

As I depart for Hawaii, I would leave you with EA's thoughts on the policy implications of Chou En-lai's death. I understand that INR is working on a more detailed analysis.

The broad consensus is that the succession to Chou has been carefully prepared, that Teng Hsiao-p'ing is the odds-on favorite to move up to the premiership, and that PRC leaders will make determined efforts to project an image of continuity and stability in the wake of Chou's death. We agree this is the most likely outlook for the immediate future.

If the scenario in fact develops in this fashion, we have little reason to reassess our current expectations and policy assumptions at this time, particularly regarding PRC relations with the U.S. and the USSR.

But you should at least have in mind some of the imponderables that could alter this perspective.

—Chou's death is qualitatively different in its impact on the Chinese political process from the passing of other party elders before him. Even though the decision was probably made some time ago for Teng to succeed Chou as premier, and the Chinese body politic has been conditioned for this eventuality, the steps necessary to formalize this process—e.g. the holding of a party plenum and the convening of a National People's Congress—entail risks and uncertainties for Teng, with Chou no longer around to work out the necessary compromises with his unique prestige and skills.

—If Teng becomes premier, he probably will not remain as PLA Chief of Staff. Chou is also the second Vice Chairman of the party and the third member of the powerful Standing Committee of the Politburo to die in less than a year. An effort to strike a new balance in the party and the army at the same time that Teng is raised to the premiership will be tricky. One question is what roles are given to Chang Chun-ch'iao. Another major question is whether Wang Hung-wen (a most

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[1] Source: Department of State, American Embassy (Beijing) Files: Lot 80 F 64, POL 2, General Reports and Statistics, Internal, Jan–Feb 1976. Confidential. Drafted by J. Stapleton Roy and Oscar V. Armstrong (EA/PRCM).

[2] Zhou died on January 8.

unlikely successor to Mao) will remain as the titular number two to Mao in the party. All of these moves must be made in the context of the succession to Mao.

—Teng, with the evident backing of Mao and Chou, has been moving cautiously but steadily to tidy up the political mess left by the Cultural Revolution, to restore the party and government apparatus to a position of leadership, and to reduce the political role of the military. But this process is still incomplete. The recurrent domestic campaigns suggest that there remain many troublesome loose ends—that impasses and modi vivendi rather than solutions have been reached in many areas—even though the overall trend has clearly been in the direction of a return to rationality and viable development policies.

—Teng differs from Chou in temperament and style but he probably views China's external environment in much the same way Chou did. Events of the last few years demonstrate, however, that the Chou line has encountered recurrent difficulties in its implementation. Without Chou's authority, prestige, and special talents, Teng may find the going even tougher.

—To oversimplify, in the Mao–Chou team, Mao was the visionary with occasional manic tendencies while Chou was the pragmatist. While a pragmatist like Chou, Teng probably lacks Chou's ability to say "Yes, but . . ." to Mao or to implement Mao's ideas in the least disruptive way.

Even assuming that the succession to Chou proceeds smoothly, his death highlights the Mao succession problem, and at present there is no indication that the Chinese have sorted out this process, which is far more delicate and potentially disruptive.

141. Letter From President Ford to Republic of China Premier Jiang Jingguo[1]

Washington January 24, 1976.

Dear Mr. Premier:

Thank you for your letter of October 14.[2] I am always glad to have your views, and welcome the frankness with which you stated them.

In recognition of your concern over our China policy, I asked Assistant Secretary Habib to proceed to Taiwan from Peking to brief you on my recent visit to the People's Republic of China. I understand from Mr. Habib that his meeting with you was not only useful and constructive, but also reflected the trust and friendship which has characterized our relationship for these many years.[3]

As Mr. Habib made clear in the course of his presentation, in our search for better relations with Peking over the past several years, we have shown a prudent regard for the vital interests of your people. You may be assured that as we pursue our goal of normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China, we will continue to act in this same manner.

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, 1974–77, Box 1, China, Republic of. No classification marking. The Department of State prepared and submitted to the NSC a draft of this letter. (Memorandum from Jay Taylor to Paul Theis, December 30, 1975; ibid.) The Department sent this letter by telegram to the Embassy in Taipei for delivery to the ROC Government, and pouched the signed copy. (Telegram 19617 to Taipei, January 27; ibid.)

[2] Jiang's attached letter of October 14, 1975, written in anticipation of Kissinger's October 19–23, 1975, visit to Beijing, warned, "If 'normalization' implies eventual diplomatic recognition, it will virtually mean negation of the existence of the Republic of China." Jiang also avowed that total diplomatic isolation of his country "would entail consequences surpassing in magnitude and gravity the debacle of Indochina."

[3] During their meeting on December 9, 1975, Habib briefed Jiang on Ford's talks in Beijing, and discussed the overall state of U.S.–ROC relations. (Telegram 7854 from Taipei, December 10; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Box 5, Republic of China, State Department Telegrams) On December 26, in a memorandum to Scowcroft recommending rejection of Ambassador Shen's request for an appointment with the President to discuss the PRC visit, Springsteen noted, "As part of the conditioning process toward the ROC and to avoid arousing the PRC, for the past two years we have restricted Shen's access to high level U.S. officials." (Ibid.)

I believe our shared recognition of the importance of a prudent and understanding approach to the issues before us represents the best means to ensure the prosperity and well-being of your people and the continuation of the close and valued ties of friendship and cooperation between us.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

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142. Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting[1]

Washington, February 27, 1976, 3:03–3:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Troops Withdrawal from Taiwan

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman:
Brent Scowcroft

State:
Robert Ingersoll
Robert Miller
William Gleysteen

DOD:
William Clements
Amos Jordan
Morton Abramowitz

JCS:
Gen. George S. Brown
Lt. Gen. William Smith

CIA:
George Bush
James Lilley
Theodore Shackley

NSC Staff:
William G. Hyland
Thomas Barnes
Richard Solomon
Col. Clint Granger
Michael Hornblow

General Scowcroft: We are meeting to pick up the threads on the issue of troop reductions from Taiwan. The President wants a 50%

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[1] Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–67, NSDM 339. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. The minutes are labeled "Part I of II," and do not include the second part of the meeting, which began at 3:40 and addressed the topic of the U.S. equipment captured in Indochina. On February 4, Scowcroft approved a memorandum from several NSC staff members that recommended the convening of an SRG meeting to discuss U.S. troop reductions on Taiwan. (Memorandum from Barnes, Solomon, and Granger to Scowcroft, February 4; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–245, NSDM 248)

reduction over the course of the year for a year-end total of 1,400. Now how many people do we have there?

Gen. Brown: 2,277.

Mr. Gleysteen: 2,700 including civilians.

Mr. Jordan: Is that 50% figure based upon the 2700 total?

General Scowcroft: I am talking about a basic 50% reduction. We should make reasonable drawdowns and see where we come out. There have been two studies on this. Defense did a study a year ago [*less than 1 line not declassified*].[2] Bill, do you have an update for us?

Mr. Clements: A new paper was prepared this morning.

Mr. Abramowitz: We have provided the NSC staff with a summary of our suggested cuts.[3]

Mr. Clements: Our study excludes civilians. It is based upon a total of 2,200 military personnel and does not include intelligence personnel. The figure of 2,229 was used. We studied the alternatives of where the cuts should be to get to 50% and the implications of alternate locations. There are several alternatives. We chose alternative two with one small deletion. We would transfer the communications mission to Okinawa and Clark and continue in a minimum posture for the time being.

General Scowcroft: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Clements: Yes. Before this meeting we were just talking about the recommendation about the F–4 depot maintenance and I am having second thoughts. We can have a savings of $10 million a year by leaving it there. We may come back to that one. Let's leave those 27 people alone unless there are some political reasons for pulling them out.

General Scowcroft: Those 27 are military personnel. Can't we civilianize them?

Mr. Clements: Yes we could.

Mr. Ingersoll: That's a small number.

General Scowcroft: Do we want to keep that?

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[2] The Department of Defense study provided alternative plans to accomplish reductions of U.S. force levels on Taiwan. (Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements to Scowcroft, November 20, 1974; Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–16, SRG Meeting, 2/27/76, Taiwan) This study was based on a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. (Memorandum from Vice Admiral Harry Train to Schlesinger, November 9, 1974, JCSM–442–74; Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–77–0063, Box 3, China, Rep. of, 1974, 0001–320.2) [*text not declassified*]; see footnote 13, Document 112.

[3] The summary of "50 percent reduction alternatives" is in the Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–67, NSDM 339. The JCS also provided a position paper for this meeting. (Memorandum from Train to Schlesinger, February 26, 1976, JCSM–62–76; Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–79–0049, Box 67, China [Nats], 320.2, 1976)

Mr. Clements: Yes, it is highly efficient. We could civilianize it if we wanted to.

General Scowcroft: Well we don't have to face that now.

Mr. Clements: We are continuing our planning to reduce our manpower down to 1105 and can plan on meeting with the Japanese and Filipinos about the transfer [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. There is no problem.

Mr. Abramowitz: There may be a problem with the Philippines. It may complicate our negotiations over the bases.

Mr. Ingersoll: I suggest that a study be made of the present needs before moving. [*2 lines not declassified*]

Mr. Bush: [*7 lines not declassified*]

Gen. Scowcroft: After normalization we would still need to retain a sophisticated [*less than 1 line not declassified*] capability.

Mr. Bush: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Clements: We are in basic agreement with George.

General Scowcroft: Is the equipment moveable?

Mr. Lilley: Yes. We could move it out. The 80 people would be under civilian control. [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Bush: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Clements: 80 people?

Mr. Bush: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Clements: The only glitch between you and Lou is that he talks in terms of 125 people. That would mean a reduction of 350 people.

Mr. Ingersoll: This would increase our reliance on the ROC.

Mr. Shackley: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Gleysteen: Would there be 3rd country involvement?

Mr. Shackley: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

General Scowcroft: It would take two years?

Mr. Lilley: It would be finished between October 1976 and January 1977.

Mr. Abramowitz: If after normalization we could not keep the facility, [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

Mr. Jordan: We would have to look at the Philippines and Okinawa.

Mr. Bush: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Gleysteen: There have already been cuts [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

Mr. Shackley: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

General Scowcroft: There would be a two year wait [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

Mr. Lilley: 18 months.

Mr. Clements: It would take 18 months after you got started.

Mr. Shackley: It is back to the drawing board.

Mr. Solomon: You should look at the present level of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and see if it is all necessary, and then study the question of alternate sites.

Mr. Shackley: [*1 line not declassified*] We could not do it from anywhere else.

Mr. Lilley: There are other unique areas of [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Moving would cause some degradation.

Mr. Clements: What is our objective, Brent?

General Scowcroft: Our objective is to have a 50% reduction of the total.

Mr. Clements: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Shackley: We are looking at different time frames.

Mr. Bush: There are different assumptions on drawdowns by the end of the year.

Mr. Jordan: We can get down to 1000–1100 spaces but it might take a bit longer.

Mr. Solomon: I would like to ask what are the objections to resiting in terms of maintaining a stable base [*1 line not declassified*].

Mr. Lilley: [*2 lines not declassified*]

Mr. Shackley: [*1½ lines not declassified*]

General Scowcroft: [*1½ lines not declassified*]

Mr. Gleysteen: There is no great problem but it may not be a timely thing to do. We may have to balance things off. The original concept was to have a 50% reduction [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. With regard to [*less than 1 line not declassified*] you have to decide whether it would really be worth spending a great deal of money. You can hedge this by some resiting and some reduction of requirements. We should look at the stages leading up to a fallback position on the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] facility. Then the other factor is that it may not be possible to keep a [*less than 1 line not declassified*] facility on Taiwan after the normalization of relations with the PRC.

Mr. Ingersoll: Could the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] facility be used in other locations?

Mr. Lilley: [*1½ lines not declassified*]

General Scowcroft: [*1½ lines not declassified*]

Mr. Bush: [*1½ lines not declassified*]

Mr. Abramowitz: Part of the answer depends on us and under what the conditions would be for the normalization of relations with the PRC.

Mr. Shackley: [*1½ lines not declassified*]

Mr. Gleysteen: I agree. I don't think there would be any problem from the ROC side.

Mr. Lilley: But what if normalization does not take place. There might be problems in the Taiwan Straits and there is a discrepancy between PRC and ROC power. [*1½ lines not declassified*]

General Brown: We are proceeding backwards. We are considering a series of administrative steps which will box us into policy positions instead of the reverse. We should talk about the total. What does the US want to do on Taiwan?

General Scowcroft: We want to get our troops out. That basically is what we are working on.

General Brown: Yes but what functions do the troops perform. Are we trying to have our cake and eat it too?

General Scowcroft: That is not necessarily true. Some of the functions can go on. Maybe we will [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. All that we are talking about now is getting *all* our troops out.

General Smith: *All* the troops? That is the first time I have heard that.

General Scowcroft: Eventually we will have to.

Mr. Gleysteen: As we carry out these steps now we should be realistic about our assessments. It is doubtful that we could retain a facility of this kind.

Mr. Bush: [*2½ lines not declassified*]

Mr. Gleysteen: That is a real possibility.

Mr. Bush: [*2 lines not declassified*]

Mr. Jordan: If it becomes an ROC installation you would need a few hundred civilians. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] 200 civilians would be needed but these could be drawn down to 125. You could continue pulling down the number of American personnel and turn it over to the ROC.

Mr. Gleysteen: We must have some [*less than 1 line not declassified*] facility if we turn that over to the ROC.

Mr. Abramowitz: [*4 lines not declassified*]

General Scowcroft: You would then end up with a gap. How long would it take to fill it.

Mr. Lilley: Well, will we be able to keep [*4½ lines not declassified*].

Mr. Bush: [*2 lines not declassified*]

Mr. Clements: I agree and that would give time for the Filipinos, Thais and Okinawans to settle down. We could then look at the situation. If we made a precipitous decision today it might be the wrong one.

Mr. Ingersoll: The $22 million is a budgetary consideration.

Mr. Bush: [*1 line not declassified*]

General Scowcroft: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Look at the figures for next year—the FY 1977 budget—and see what you can do.

Mr. Bush: [*1½ lines not declassified*]

General Scowcroft: (To Clements) You are looking into the relocation of the Communications Command and the other things?

Mr. Clements: Yes. I personally am optimistic about the Philippines.

General Brown: It is hard to say now. It depends on how the negotiations go.

Mr. Miller: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Clements: I think Marcos will be more cooperative than a lot of other people.

Mr. Miller: It is hard to tell. After a few months we will be in a better position to judge.

Mr. Bush: (To Scowcroft) We will look the stuff over and get something to you in a week or so. If the figures look alright we could then get back together.

Mr. Clements: In the meantime we (DOD) can proceed with what we are trying to do.

General Brown: We can do civilianizing. We want the uniforms out. Those 27 men in the depot can be civilianized.

General Scowcroft: But I don't want a one-for-one substitution.

Mr. Clements: A net reduction of 1100 people is what we are talking about.

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143. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford[1]

Washington, March 12, 1976.

SUBJECT

Peking's Current Political Instability and Its Import for U.S.–PRC Relations

In view of recent surprising developments in the Peking political scene—the unexpected announcement that a relatively unknown

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Box 13, People's Republic of China. Secret. Sent for information. The correspondence profile indicates that Ford noted this memorandum on March 16. (Ibid.)

leader, Hua Kuo-feng (rather than Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing), has been appointed as acting Premier; the release in December of a long-detained Soviet helicopter crew; and the February visit to China of former President Nixon—I have had a member of the staff prepare for you an interpretive analysis.[2]

The study at Tab A[3] places the political turmoil now apparent in China in the context of tensions within the leadership of the People's Republic of China which have been evident in a general way since 1970. It also suggests some implications of these recent developments for the course of U.S.–PRC relations in the year ahead.

The study reaches the following major conclusions:

—*Teng Hsiao-p'ing*, groomed for the Premiership since 1973 by Mao and Chou but under continuing criticism from Party radicals, was blocked in gaining the Premiership in January because he had *alienated key military leaders who have become temporary allies of the Party's radical faction.*

—*The outcome of the current conflict in Peking is indeterminate,* but the most likely developments are either, (a) once the radicals have brought about Teng Hsiao-p'ing's demise they will draw back and work within the coalition leadership which Chou-En-lai built up over the past several years, or (b) the radicals will overplay their attack on Teng and other rehabilitated leaders, alienate their temporary allies, and produce a counterattack that will lead to their own fall. It seems doubtful that the Party's leftist faction can dominate the Peking political scene for a sustained period.

—*Mao Tse-tung's role in the current leadership dispute is ambiguous,* probably because the Chairman is not in full control of the situation. He has been aloof from various radical leaders in recent years, and thus far has not given overt support for their attack on Teng. He probably withdrew his backing from the Vice Premier when he was unable to command sufficient support from the Politburo for the Premiership, and he appears to have given at least tentative support to Hua Kuo-feng.

Mao, however, has his differences with the leftist faction and the military and may be playing a rather passive role in the current conflict. At this point we are unable to tell how much the Chairman is being used by the anti-Teng forces as opposed to siding with them. Mao's physical frailty, difficulty in speaking, and personal isolation (heightened by the death of his long-time associate Chou En-lai) increasingly

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[2] Solomon sent the study to Scowcroft on March 8 with a covering memorandum for Scowcroft to sign and forward to the President. (Memorandum from Solomon to Scowcroft, March 8; ibid.)

[3] Attached but not printed.

weaken him as an active leadership force. His death in the next year or two could compound the present instability in the leadership.

—The release of the Soviet helicopter crew last December, and the recent visit to China of former President Nixon, are indicators of *political cross-currents on foreign policy issues.* The military and some others in Peking may be urging a less hostile orientation toward the Soviets and greater aloofness from the U.S. Mao, however, remains determined to keep the Russians at a distance and strengthen relations with a U.S. that will actively counterweight the Soviets abroad.

—There is very little the U.S. can do to influence the PRC as the current leadership feud plays itself out. We are passive observers of that situation, as were the Chinese as they watched the unfolding of Watergate. *We are most likely to hold the Chinese to their foreign policy course of dealing with us if we can reassert a more active foreign policy* that combines efforts to reach agreements that serve our interests with both Moscow and Peking, and at the same time demonstrate a willingness to stand up to Soviet pressures. *Completion of normalization of U.S.–PRC relations might make the relationship less vulnerable to criticism in China,* but such a move would invite contempt rather than respect if taken from a position of weakness in foreign affairs, and with an attitude of beseeching China to hold to its "American tilt."

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144. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, March 19, 1976, 10:10–10:25 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Thomas S. Gates, Chief-Designate of U.S. Liaison Office in Peking
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[A press session takes place first for the public announcement. Then the press leaves.]

The President: The Ambassador issue is complicated. I can only grant it for six months.

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 6, China, unnumbered items (28), 3/9/76–4/27/76. Secret; Nodis. Ford's talking points for this meeting are ibid. All brackets are in the original.

Gates: That would be fine. I gather it was in part because you plan some movement and want to signal the Chinese.

Kissinger: They will interpret it that way.

Scowcroft: It will be a sign of the importance we ascribe to them.

The President: We do have to begin some movement, perhaps in 1977. But we do have to bite the bullet sometime after the election.

Kissinger: They are cold, pragmatic bastards. The President is right—we will have to move after the election. I would like to give Tom a letter either to Mao or Hua. Then we could have a verbatim report of what they say, to see if there are nuances of change. Nixon didn't record enough detail to be helpful.[2]

Gates: Hua may not have the confidence to make a policy statement.

Kissinger: Even if he reads it, it would be good. And I will give a lunch for you and invite the Chinese and put myself squarely behind you. I could also have Bush and Bruce there.

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[2] Nixon had recently visited China. Telegram 325 from Beijing, February 26, transmitted a report on his trip. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

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145. Letter From President Ford to Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng[1]

Washington, April 27, 1976.

Dear Mr. Premier:

I am pleased to introduce to you by way of this letter Ambassador Thomas S. Gates, Jr. the new Chief of our Liaison Office in the People's Republic. I have the highest confidence in Ambassador Gates, who has been a personal friend and political associate of mine since the period of the Second World War. I know he will effectively represent the views of my Administration, as did Ambassador David Bruce and Ambassador George Bush before him.

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, 1974–77, Box 4, People's Republic of China, Premier Hua Kuofeng. No classification marking. Solomon drafted this letter and sent it on April 20 to Scowcroft. Scowcroft forwarded it to the President on April 26. (Ibid.) Hua received the letter on June 10, during his first meeting with Ambassador Gates. (Telegram 1054 from Beijing, June 11; ibid., Presidential Country Files for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Box 15, People's Republic of China, State Department Telegrams)

Mr. Gates has rich personal experience in matters that are of concern to both our countries. As a former Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of Defense, he clearly understands the global security concerns we face. Moreover, he has long been an advocate of a policy of security through a strong American defense capability.

As I remarked during Ambassador Gates' swearing-in ceremony, while China and the United States have differences which neither side attempts to hide, we believe our common interests in resisting hegemony, and in enabling all peoples to follow their own unique paths of national development, provide a strong foundation for a durable and growing relationship. We must maintain an authoritative dialogue between our two leaderships in this turbulent and complex world, and grasp occasions for parallel or cooperative actions which will support our common objectives.

At the same time, we understand that the opportunities for such action will be enhanced as we are able to consolidate our bilateral relationship. I have indicated on a number of occasions since returning from your country last December that I remain determined to complete the normalization of our relations through joint efforts based on the Shanghai Communiqué. This not only will serve the interests of our two peoples, but also will contribute to building a more secure world order.

I hope you will share with Ambassador Gates your perspectives on both international developments and our bilateral relationship. He is prepared to sustain our side of this authoritative dialogue. At the same time, we welcome the return to Washington of Ambassador Huang Chen.

In closing, let me again offer you my good wishes in your new post. I hope you will also convey my personal regards to Chairman Mao.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

146. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, May 29, 1976, 10:05–10:55 a.m.

SUBJECT

U.S.-PRC Relations, Policy towards the Soviet Union, Africa, NATO, Turkey–Greece Relations

PARTICIPANTS

People's Republic of China
Huang Chen, Chief, PRC Liaison Office
Tsien Ta-yung, Counselor, PRC Liaison Office
Shen Jo-yun, First Secretary, PRC Liaison Office

United States
The Secretary
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary, EA
Oscar V. Armstrong, Director, EA/PRCM (Notetaker)

(The meeting, held at the Secretary's request, started at 10:05 a.m. and ended at 10:55 a.m. Miss Shen interpreted.)

The Secretary: I'm very glad to see you again.

Huang Chen: I'm also glad to meet with you again.

The Secretary: I've missed you.

Huang Chen: I also missed you.

The Secretary: We appreciate the friendly reception given to Ambassador Gates in Peking. I think you'll find him an excellent man. He's a good friend of mine and of the President.

Huang: I understand.

The Secretary: I haven't seen you for some time, and wanted to have this opportunity to review the world situation.

I spoke to former President Nixon after his return, and found his remarks very interesting. As you know, I always worked very closely with him and have great respect for him.

Huang: Did you read his report?

The Secretary: Yes, and I had several conversations with him. In China you always read our press, and you probably noticed that when the press was carrying various stories about Mr. Nixon's visit, I always said I would read his report. I believe he's the only senior American to have met your Premier; I don't think the recent Congressional delegation met him.

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 6, China, unnumbered items (30), 5/24/76–6/25/76. Secret. Drafted by Armstrong on June 1 and approved in S on June 8. The meeting was held in Secretary Kissinger's office.

(Miss Shen initially translated this incorrectly, i.e. that the Congressional delegation had met with the Premier. There was a brief back-and-forth to clarify the matter.)

Huang: Vice Premier Chang Ch'un-ch'iao met with the Congressional delegation.

The Secretary: I speak with Mr. Nixon about every two weeks, so we are in close contact.

I have followed with great interest the various statements about the main line of your foreign policy. I remember, of course, that Chairman Mao said that foreign policy is determined by the basic interests of each country.

Huang: During President Ford's visit, as well as yours, Chairman Mao made a clear presentation on our position on international and strategic issues, as well as on relations between our two countries.

The Secretary: On our side, we will pursue the policy discussed with Chairman Mao.

You will have noticed that during the Presidential campaign some candidates try to take advantage of our China policy and to raise embarrassing issues. But we are sticking to the Shanghai Communiqué and all the discussions we have had with your government. And I think that even if the Democrats win, they will follow the same policy. That's my strong impression. Only one man wouldn't follow that policy, and he won't be elected. (Huang laughed.)[2]

Huang: So far as the Chinese side is concerned, we will always carry out the line and the policy formulated by Chairman Mao, not only for foreign policy but also domestic policy.

The Secretary: I understand. As far as we are concerned, we deal with Chinese foreign policy, not domestic policy.

I hope you will understand—you are a careful student of the American scene—that during this election period we phrase our statements very carefully; we don't want any upheavals here.

Huang: We understand this. Frankly speaking, we have heard that some Senators and Congressmen have made anti-Chinese statements. We attach no importance to them. We also heard that a Senator said that you had told him that the U.S. would not normalize relations after the elections.

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[2] Kissinger is referring to Ronald Reagan's criticism of Ford's China policy. During a telephone conversation with Habib one day earlier, Kissinger expressed concern about public reports indicating that the United States would recognize Communist China after the election, and had warned against publicly discussing improvements in U.S.–PRC relations, which might "give Reagan ammunition to flog the President with." (Transcript of telephone conversation with Habib, May 28, 8:12 a.m.; Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Telephone Transcripts)

The Secretary: That report is not correct. I said that we have made no concrete agreement; you know why I said that. We discussed this question in Peking on many occasions; the President has discussed it, and I have discussed it, with your leaders. We will continue on the course we started.

Huang: I am very clear about this point, and about the discussions with Chairman Mao.

The Secretary: Some of the stories come from Taiwan. The stories will probably stop when the nomination process is completed, because the Democrats will not make it an issue. So for about two months we'll have a lot of noise. But you're used to that; you've heard a lot of noise before.

Huang: Yes.

The Secretary: I remember when Watergate started . . . People in America sometimes say that China is incomprehensible, but I sometimes think we are incomprehensible to the Chinese.

On other parts of the world, Mr. Ambassador . . . Incidentally, when I was in England I spoke to former Prime Minister Heath; he has warm memories of his visit to China last year.

Huang: You have been very busy. You were in England, before that there was the NATO meeting, and in London there was also CENTO.

The Secretary: We are going to organize, in the context of our discussions with Chairman Mao, barriers to Soviet expansionism. First of all, in Africa, we are not going to permit another Angola to develop. You must have noticed my repeated statements that if there is another Soviet-supported military adventure, we will do something. We are attempting to organize various of these countries to increase their capabilities. The Secretary of Defense will go to Zaire in July to discuss military assistance to that country. We are working closely with Zambia and other countries. I know that you are also quite active in Africa, and you will have noticed that we have raised no obstacles to your activities.

Huang: Frankly speaking, we think the United States should learn a lesson from Angola.

The Secretary: What lesson?

Huang: Well, the fact that the military situation in Angola developed to the point it did is inseparable from U.S. policy towards the Soviets. U.S. policy abetted the Soviet efforts.

The Secretary: We discussed our Angola policy in Peking. Congress stopped us from doing what was necessary. We would have defeated the Soviets in Angola if Congress had not stopped our assistance.

Huang: (Deliberately changing the subject) It is said that the ministerial meeting of NATO went well.

The Secretary: It was the best meeting in many years. It took decisions on the strengthening of defense and on close cooperation and coordination of policies against the Soviet Union on a worldwide basis. In this connection, I can tell you, so you can tell your government—it won't become public for about a week—that President Ford has invited the leaders of England, France, Germany, Italy and Japan to a meeting in Puerto Rico to develop a common strategy. The meeting will probably be June 27–28.

Huang: From reading press stories, I learned that the ministers attending the NATO meeting expressed concern about Soviet expansion, and that they stressed the need to resist Soviet military and political pressures. I also noticed that the European Governments and the European public are seeing that the Soviet threat is getting more serious. All this shows that the ministers' understanding of the situation is clearer.

The Secretary: At NATO, and also at CENTO, I said that we cannot accept the principle of coexistence in one part of the world and permit aggression in another part. That is our policy.

Huang: The Soviet Union will not change its policy of dividing and weakening Europe, with military strength as its backing and détente as the smokescreen.

The Secretary: That is one reason we are opposed to the inclusion of European Communist parties in government. That is bound to weaken the defense of Europe.

Huang: It seems that the West is getting very nervous about this possibility. But there are contradictions between the European Communists and the Soviets.

The Secretary: Maybe, to some extent. Perhaps the Italians, but not the French. But in any event, we favor the strength and unity of Western Europe, and will not let the Soviets succeed in their policy of dividing and weakening Europe.

Huang: That's very important.

The Secretary: At the same time, we shouldn't overestimate Soviet strength. It is strong in some categories, but it is not as strong as some newspaper stories suggest.

Huang: This point was also touched on in the conversations between the President and the Secretary and our leaders. The Soviets have wild ambitions but their capacity is not adequate to living up to those ambitions. On the other hand, it is important to keep up the guard. At a minimum, the Soviets will continue their policy of dividing and weakening. It is very important to strengthen unity and defense.

The Secretary: Defense should be strengthened, but we should not have an attitude of being afraid of the Soviets. They cannot feed their

people. In Europe, I found many, including in Sweden, who feel that the Soviet army is overrated. They have many men, but their army is not as strong as the numbers suggest. But we do have to strengthen defenses; all the NATO countries—almost all—are doing it.

Huang: How are relations between Turkey and Greece? They are in the Southern flank.

The Secretary: What success the Soviets have had has not been due to mistakes by the West.

The Turkey–Greece situation is complicated by the domestic situation in the two countries, and also, frankly, by the domestic situation here, because of the Greek lobby. I've talked to the Foreign Ministers of both Turkey and Greece. It is a weird situation. In the Middle East, the problem is objectively difficult. But Turkey and Greece have practically agreed on a solution. However, because of Makarios in Cyprus and their domestic situations, they have not been able to carry out what has been practically agreed upon. When the two Foreign Ministers met in Oslo, they spent most of the time not on substance but on procedures for putting forward a solution so they would not be attacked at home. I think that during this year they will move to a solution.

Will your Foreign Minister be coming to the General Assembly, or is it too early to know?

Huang: I don't know yet—I think he will come.

The Secretary: I will be delighted to see him and review matters with him. But we'll have opportunities before then to discuss matters.

Huang: It is always good to exchange views.

The Secretary: Always.

Huang: We are also good friends.

The Secretary: True. I have known you many years and consider you a good friend.

Huang: I understand you will visit Latin America next week.

The Secretary: Yes, for an OAS meeting. Then at the end of the month I will go back to Europe for an OECD ministerial meeting. While in Europe, I will try to do something to bring majority rule to Rhodesia, by meeting with black African leaders and maybe South African leaders.

Huang: You are always very busy, always keep moving.

The Secretary: It is better to dominate events rather than to let events run away. It also keeps me out of the political campaign.

Huang: Every time I come, I always like to exchange views. Are there any other points you wish to bring up?

The Secretary: Whenever you wish to discuss matters, you will always be welcome. When I come back from my next trip, I will ask you if you wish to exchange views again.

Huang: I am always pleased to exchange views.

The Secretary: If anything comes up in our political campaign that raises some question, you should not draw conclusions without consulting us. We have conducted our policy for five years with great care, and will not let it fail because of two months of political campaigns.

Huang: I understand.

(Miss Shen wanted to clarify the term "OECD" and there was a brief discussion of its membership.)

The Secretary: Mr. Habib is getting promoted.

Huang: I know—congratulations. I understand Mr. Hummel is coming back.[3]

The Secretary: Yes, as Assistant Secretary.

Huang: He is also Chinese.

The Secretary: Yes. I think he was born in China.

(There followed a brief discussion of Ambassador Hummel's China background.)

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[3] Arthur Hummel was then serving as Ambassador to Ethiopia.

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147. Editorial Note

On June 1, 1976, Thomas Barnes, Richard Solomon, and Clinton Granger of the National Security Council staff wrote a memorandum to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recalling that the previous August they had recommended an interagency review of U.S. interests and security objectives in Southeast Asia in anticipation of the forthcoming Philippine base negotiations. At that time, Kissinger had recommended the expansion of the review to cover the entire Asia–Pacific region. (Memorandum from Barnes, Solomon, and Granger to Scowcroft, June 1; Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–17, SRG Meeting, 6/4/76, U.S. Interests and Objectives in the Asia–Pacific Area, NSSM 235) Accordingly, National Security Study Memorandum 235, issued on January 15, 1976, had tasked the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia to review and prepare a study on "U.S. Interests and Security Objectives in the Asia–Pacific Region," especially as those interests and objectives pertained to "the upcoming base negotiations with the Philippines." (Ibid., National Security Decision Memoranda and Study Memoranda, Box 2)

According to the June 1 memorandum, the NSC staff received the Interdepartmental Group's study responding to the NSSM in March 1976, and circulated the first section to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Departments of State and Defense, which accepted it without changes. In the pages focusing on the People's Republic of China, the report argued that the top Chinese priority was "limiting the USSR's presence and influence in Asia." China also sought to avoid instability and conflict near its borders, while "constraining Japan's political-security role in East Asia" by encouraging the U.S.-Japanese alliance. The report stated that China had successfully sought "to isolate Taiwan diplomatically," but had avoided "a threatening posture toward the island" and placing "public pressure on the U.S. position." The report noted that the Sino-Soviet rivalry "has helped deter Peking from playing any useful role in brokering compromise solutions to the Korean issue in the United Nations." Although China sought to discourage offensive military action by North Korea, it had also "become the major supplier of military equipment to Pyongyang." In Southeast Asia, Chinese policies were shaped by rivalries with the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Japan. For this reason, it was willing to give countenance to continued U.S. political and military involvement in the region, and had "given its blessing to the concept of Southeast Asian neutrality—as espoused by ASEAN." China had participated in a number of island disputes, which, the report suggested, could become a source of international tension in the future. Ending on a cautionary note, this section of the report warned that changes in Chinese domestic politics could produce major changes in Chinese foreign policy. (Response to NSSM 235, Section I, Subsection on "The Policies, Intentions and Capabilities of the People's Republic of China," undated; ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–17, SRG Meeting, 6/4/76, U.S. Interests and Objectives in the Asia–Pacific Area, NSSM 235)

On June 4, the Senior Review Group held a meeting in the White House Situation Room from 3:10 to 4:08 p.m. to consider the NSSM 235 response. Few of the comments dealt with China. Philip Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, wondered whether "the China section could be beefed up." Much of the discussion revolved around the appropriate outcome of the NSSM response. Scowcroft said, "What we need is a memorandum ratifying this document, saying that it is a useful background document. I just don't like things like this to go into limbo." (Memorandum from Jeanne Davis to Scowcroft with attached SRG minutes, June 28; ibid., H–39, SRG Meeting, 6/4/76, U.S. Interests and Objectives in the Asia–Pacific Area, NSSM 235)

148. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency[1]

PR 76 10053 Washington, June 1976.

THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF CHINA'S SUCCESSOR LEADERSHIP

Executive Summary

Mao's successors will be confronted with the same foreign policy problem Mao has been facing for a long time—namely, a desire to project China's influence globally but a limited capability to compete with the superpowers in doing so, or even to defend itself against them. At present, it cannot compete even with the larger European powers in providing advanced-technology material aid to the lower developed countries (LDCs). China is essentially a regional, not a global, power; it is still confined to a secondary role in most international developments outside Asia. Moreover, in some respects it can even be regarded as a LDC, reaching out to acquire the products and advanced technological skills of the developed capitalist countries.

However, its political favor is sought by both large and small countries, mainly because it is big, already much stronger militarily than most other countries, and has the potential military capability to worry even the superpowers. It thus provides an alternative to exclusive political dependence on either superpower. Mao's successors undoubtedly will try to exploit this situation, and they will have two additional assets:

—the Soviets are likely to make a series of overtures for an improvement of relations, and

—the successors will not be bound by Mao's personal intransigence, and are likely to respond to some degree, especially in the border dispute.

Mao is *trying* to bind his successors irrevocably to his main foreign policies; actually, he has no guarantee of anything, apart from objective considerations that would bind anybody. Mao's death will provide the opportunity for the successors to reassess and change foreign policies, including that toward the USSR and the US. Whether major foreign policies will be changed probably will depend greatly on the nature of the successor leadership—that is, whether the relatively simple-minded ideologues or the relatively sophisticated moderates

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[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Job 79–M00467A, Box 9, Communist China, 010176–311276. Secret; Noforn. [*name not declassified*] of the Office of Political Research in the Directorate of Intelligence prepared this executive summary and the larger paper. On June 29, Lewis J. Lapham, Director of Political Research, sent the executive summary to Bush under a covering memorandum. (Ibid.) On July 6, Bush wrote on the covering memorandum, "Dave—read with interest! GB"

win out. On present evidence, the result probably will be less revolution and more realism.

The trend toward realism, already present, almost certainly will continue if moderates attain a majority in the post-Mao leadership. Those regarded as moderates—such as Party First Vice Chairman and Premier Hua Kuo-feng, the military leader Yeh Chien-ying, and Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua—probably *will* come to dominate the successor leadership. Most of the ideologues—such as Wang Hung-wen, Chiang Ching (Mme. Mao), and Yao Wen-yuan—do not seem to have an independent power base, and when Mao dies, they will lose their only real source of sustenance. At least two of the ideologues—Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan—are intensely disliked by government functionaries and probably within the party and army as well, and their chances of survival in the Politburo in particular seem slight.

On the other hand, if the post-Mao Politburo should be dominated by an alliance of ideologues and opportunistic military leaders, the result might be an orthodox revolutionary attitude toward the US. That is, there might be more intense opposition to a wider range of US policies. They probably would prefer a more equal balance of anti-US and anti-USSR policies (as the "ultra-Leftist" former Defense Minister Lin Piao had preferred).

In the post-Mao era, Chinese foreign policies will continue to revolve primarily around China's concerns regarding the USSR. The Russians will still be the "main enemy" to the moderates and still an enemy to the ideologues.

Even if Mao's successors choose to moderate their line toward Moscow, hatred and fear of the USSR almost certainly will continue to be the principal factor in their foreign relations. They probably will retain their anxiety about China's national security—namely, whether the Russians will use their overwhelming military superiority to undertake either a large-scale invasion or a disarming nuclear strike. Because China will not be a superpower, the realistic course for the successors would seem to be to continue to try to use American influence to deter the USSR from attacking China and to offset Soviet efforts to encircle China. Clearly, the successors will have nowhere else to go.

However, within a few years after Mao's death, his successors probably will conclude from a reassessment of the Sino-Soviet border dispute that the danger and material costs to China necessitate a reduction of overt hostility to the USSR. His successors will probably not see the same necessity to use the border dispute as part of an overall political polemic (the "paper war") against Moscow.

This shift in attitude—again, more likely to occur if moderates (realists) rather than ideologues were to attain a majority in the post-Mao leadership—would open the way for serious border talks. But a final

settlement would prove difficult to attain, inasmuch as the Chinese side would have to make the principal concession—i.e., dropping Mao's demands for a withdrawal of Soviet troops from all disputed areas before the Chinese will enter seriously into negotiations.

Any reduction in the degree of Peking's hostility toward Moscow following Mao's death almost certainly will fall far short of the cordiality which existed in the early 1950s. Even after a possible border settlement, the Chinese almost certainly will continue to feel less secure with the USSR (the in-area and still-menacing threat) than with the US (the out-of-area and receding threat).

Thus the successors probably will continue to view the Sino-US rapprochement in strategic terms—i.e., they will view the US as the only effective counterweight to the USSR. This assessment will reinforce the successors' view of Taiwan as being a secondary issue in the Sino-US relationship, subordinated to the strategic Sino-Soviet-US triangle and the national security of China. The successors will have to be "patient" and willing to "wait" (Peking's usage) for further US disengagement from Taipei.

Aside from the strategic consideration, there are other reasons for a probable subordination of the Taiwan issue. Briefly, Peking is militarily and politically impotent vis-à-vis Taiwan. The military obstacle (mainly insufficient airlift and sealift capability) forces the successors, like it or not, to try to reincorporate Taiwan by political methods. And that is likely to be a long-term matter.

Taipei's present leadership, and the immediate successors to the ailing Chiang Ching-kuo, almost certainly will be unwilling to negotiate any form of Communist annexation. Nor are attempts at subversion likely to hasten matters greatly. Central control of the police and security organs (used vigorously to crush real or suspected subversives) as well as general stability on the island will decisively impede Peking's efforts at least until the 1980s.

If, however, the US were *explicitly* to retreat from the Washington–Taipei defense treaty (e.g., declaring it void after establishing full diplomatic relations with the PRC), political and economic stability on the island would be put to a severe test. In such an event, the Republic of China (ROC) undoubtedly would act to sustain as much of the relationship with the US as possible, and undoubtedly would take steps to try to insure a "business as usual" psychology on the island. Taipei would make such capital as it could from the likely continuation of US commitments to supply it with defense needs (spare parts and assistance in aircraft manufacture). And it would strive to maintain current levels of trade with as many foreign countries as possible—although some economic diversification away from the US might be imposed as a new policy.

In any case, however, Mao's successors probably will be impelled to withhold a decision to gear up for an invasion until well into the 1980s or even later. Even if Taipei develops a nuclear device in the early 1980s, Peking probably would not feel compelled to prepare for an invasion any sooner.

Japan is the key element in Peking's anti-Soviet strategy in the Far East, and Mao's successors probably will encourage Tokyo to strengthen its defense forces. However, they probably will not agree to cooperate in any joint defense arrangement with the Japanese. In the political field, there is a good chance that Chinese moderates will be willing to conclude a Sino-Japanese peace treaty on Tokyo's terms in order to further exacerbate Soviet-Japanese relations.

In Korea and Indochina, the Chinese will be more concerned with impeding the expansion of Soviet influence than with seeking to establish the traditional hegemony of previous centuries.

It is primarily as a result of their decision to compete with Moscow for the good will of Kim Il-sung that the Chinese are now burdened with the task of keeping Kim's emotional revolutionary and militaristic policies from escalating into a war on the peninsula. The Chinese prefer long-term stability on the peninsula—that is, a de facto situation of "two Koreas"; Kim does not. However, they have increased their support for Kim on political issues apparently as part of the price for maintaining clear advantage over the USSR in Pyongyang.

Mao's probable successors are no more likely than he has been to extend their competition with Moscow to the point of supporting large-scale (and dangerous) North Korean harassment of the South. However, a Politburo majority of ideologues might be more willing to do so than a majority of moderates in the post-Mao era. Danger of military instability will arise when the US has left Korea and/or President Pak dies, retires, or is overthrown. If, on the other hand, US forces were to remain in the South at least through the 1970s, the Chinese would be assisted in keeping Kim deterred from initiating military provocations.

Although the Chinese are winning the competition with the Russians for influence in the northeast, they are losing it in Indochina. They retain an advantage in Cambodia, but they cannot prevent Vietnam and Laos from leaning toward the USSR. The Russians will continue to have an advantage over the Chinese in the post-Mao period on the matter of helping the Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao in the task of economic reconstruction. The Chinese will have the added problem of trying to manage a friction-sustaining territorial dispute with the Vietnamese over islands in the South China Sea. Moderates probably will do a better job of avoiding firefights between Chinese and Vietnamese forces than will ideologues in the post-Mao era.

The Chinese provided unprecedented assurances to a non-Communist government when they told Thai leaders in the summer of 1975 that if Vietnam eventually attacked Thailand in force, China would assist Thailand militarily.

The competition with the USSR probably will continue to be the controlling factor in other Chinese foreign policies, such as

—trying to regain some of Peking's past influence in India,
—sustaining support for the US policy of keeping troops in Europe and strengthening NATO, and
—lining up on the same side as LDCs on most political and economic issues between them and the developed capitalist countries (and of course between them and the USSR).

And the competition with Hanoi probably will become the controlling factor in sustaining Chinese support for Maoist insurgents in Southeast Asia.

Mao's legacy of revolution probably will not affect Peking's foreign policies in the future as much as will the *material constraint* of China's non-superpower status. Aside from the major political war to be waged against the USSR, China's goals must continue to be modest.

[Omitted here is the body of the report.]

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149. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, July 12, 1976, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

China Policy, Firebee Drones for the ROC

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Under Secretary Philip C. Habib
Lawrence S. Eagleburger—M
Arthur W. Hummel—EA
Winston Lord—S/P
William H. Gleysteen, Jr.—EA
Richard A. Ericson—PM
David G. Brown—EA/ROC (notetaker)

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1974–1977, Box 6, China Exchanges, unnumbered items (31), 7/12/76–7/14/76. Top Secret. Drafted by Brown and approved in S on August 24. The meeting was held in Secretary Kissinger's office.

The Secretary: Look, what I'm trying to prevent is the mindless operation of the bureaucracy. How is Peking supposed to understand $5 million in extra money for the ROC? Just because there's some unused money available.

Habib: Now wait, they won't even notice. It will just disappear into the Transition Quarter monies. It's a small . . .

Secretary: It's four-fifths of what you get for Indonesia after I've been beating you over the head.

Habib: Indonesia wants grants not credits. We're trying to educate them that grants are out, only credits are possible. A cable has gone out to (Amb.) Newsom already.[2]

Secretary: Yes, if they're crazy enough to buy weapons rather than tractors. Are you telling me that the figure of 2200 (US military on Taiwan) is what was there?

Habib: No, the figure was 2700 or so when you went. It's . . .

Secretary: Can we make it?

Gleysteen: It will be hard, but we can . . .

Secretary: Are you saying that having told them 1400, we won't make it?

Gleysteen: We will do it, once we get the order issued. We can't operate on the basis of oral orders alone.

Secretary: What is so tricky about getting the order issued?

Gleysteen: The political sensitivity of the situation. Defense knows the order is coming. They're planning, but have not yet . . .

Secretary: I must have naive ideas that if the President tells the Chinese something, then it will be done.

Habib: We've been pushing to get it . . .

Gleysteen: It's clear it's not going to be issued until after the Convention.

Habib: We're not the ones who have violated the President's word.[3]

Gleysteen: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] may help us achieve it, if we force the pace of those withdrawals into this year. We can make it, if we get the order issued in August.

Secretary: This is dangerous. If I were Carter, I would say that I favored these reductions and that the administration's inaction on them showed its weakness and cynicism.

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[2] Not further identified.

[3] On December 4, 1975, President Ford told Vice Premier Deng that the United States had about 2,800 military personnel on Taiwan and planned "within the next year" to "reduce that by 50%, down to a figure roughly of 1,400." See Document 137.

Gleysteen: Yes, we have been overly cautious recently.

Eagleburger: Why not rush to move out the 700?

Secretary: I just have difficulty understanding why the instructions of the President and the Secretary only produce palaver in the bureaucracy.

Lord: Mr. Secretary, this is true, but we talked to Brent . . .

Secretary: When was I told? I wouldn't tolerate Brent sitting on such an order. I wasn't aware . . .

Gleysteen: In April, or March, you signed off . . .

Secretary: I don't accept the position that bureaus negotiate with Brent. You could get away with that with Rogers, but not with me.

Lord: I thought you understood, that you had discussed it with Rumsfeld and Brent.

Secretary: It is insanity to hold this up. It should have been done gradually, a hundred a month, no one would have noticed.

Gleysteen: That is just the point we made with Brent.

Lord: If you were not aware of this, we were delinquent.

Secretary: I naively believed it had been carried out. As nothing was mentioned to me, I thought we were below 2200.

Lord: We are delinquent . . .

Habib: You were informed . . .

Secretary: And I'm only raising hell for the fun of it.

Habib: I reminded . . .

Secretary: You didn't mention it in a way that made any impression on me, you probably just said something about a . . . NSDM.[4] By waiting, we have made this into a problem.

Gleysteen: I agree.

Habib: We just said that . . .

Secretary: It is one of the few things we have to show to the Chinese—our good faith. We must be meticulous.

Lord: We will make the deadline, and we lucked out on the publicity from the Quemoy–Matsu withdrawals.[5]

Secretary: I'm going to fire someone who tells me he's working with Scowcroft. I told the Chinese in October that it would be done.

Habib: . . . and the President reaffirmed it, yes.

Eagleburger: Why does it need a NSDM?

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[4] The eventual NSDM, NSDM 339, is printed as Document 156.

[5] The Quemay-Matsu withdrawal refers to the June 1976 withdrawal of U.S. military advisors from the islands of Quemay and Matsu. "U.S. to Quit Quemay and Matsu," *Washington Post,* June 24, 1976, p. A1.

Secretary: I don't know.

Gleysteen: I was very disturbed by involving others. I predicted it would involve delays.

Secretary: Since 1971, we've been making withdrawals. Have we had NSDM's each time?

Gleysteen: Well, yes, basically.

Secretary: Now, don't you assume that I will accept today the NSC procedures I established while I was over there.

Gleysteen: I'm not willing to go to Defense without . . .

Secretary: If you want my political judgment, I assume everything leaks, and you can bet this will leak out, too, after the Convention, when it's issued. Carter can have it both ways; he'll be for the withdrawals and criticize the President for lack of leadership.

Gleysteen: And also, today we got a cable from Taipei pointing out that Nessen's remarks were at variance with our press guidance on withdrawals.[5]

Secretary: What did he say?

Gleysteen: He mentioned there would be no more withdrawals.

Secretary: When?

Gleysteen: During the Quemoy withdrawal.

Secretary: Was it brought to his attention?

Habib: Yes.

Secretary: Well, you better start bringing things to my attention. Our China policy is operating on a thread now. The Chinese are not used to the assumption that we are irresponsible. If Nessen said it, they believe it. They may discount his remarks as election politics. But the issue is that we have always kept our word.

Habib: There have been ongoing reductions.

Gleysteen: They think it is continuous . . .

Habib: It has been ongoing.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the withdrawal of U.S. personnel from Taiwan.]

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[5] Telegram 4659 from Taipei, July 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

150. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, July 14, 1976, 7:02–7:43 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Philip C. Habib, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Arthur Hummel, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECT

China: Comments on Taiwan by Chang Chun-chiao and Ch'iao Kuan-hua

REFERENCES

Peking 1282, 1283, 1284; Peking 161 (Voyager Channel)[2]

Kissinger: They have made the same points that they made to us in November of 1974.[3] Whenever it was. After Vladivostok.

Lord: But they never have been pressed like this. On two successive days, by a Congressman carrying a letter from the President.[4] It's like Magnuson on Cambodia.[5]

Gleysteen: We all had misgivings about Barnett [Robert Barnett, Director of the Asian Society, accompanying Senator Scott].

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 6, China, unnumbered items (31), 7/12/76–7/14/76. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Secretary Kissinger's office. All brackets are in the original.

[2] Telegram 1282, July 13, described a meeting between Senator Scott and Zhang Chunqiao. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) Telegram 1283, July 14, provided a verbatim transcript of the Scott–Zhang meeting. (Ibid.) Telegram 1284, July 14, contained a transcript of a conversation between Scott and Qiao. (Ibid.) Backchannel message 161 was not found.

[3] Kissinger was referring to his November 25–29 trip to China in 1974, during which Deng Xiaoping articulated three principles regarding Taiwan and the normalization of U.S.–PRC relations. See Document 97.

[4] Pennsylvania Senator Hugh Scott (R), visited China for two weeks in the summer of 1976. On July 13, he met with Zhang Chunqiao, who told Scott that Taiwan could only be liberated by force. Afterward, Scott told President Ford, "they kept repeating the Taiwan line. It was rather chilling." (Memorandum of conversation, July 28; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 6, China, unnumbered items (32), 7/16/76–7/31/76)

[5] U.S. officials believed that Senator Magnuson angered Zhou Enlai in 1973 by advising him to be "patient" while the United States intensified its bombing of Cambodia. See Document 43 and footnote 7 thereto.

Lord: I took him aside after breakfast and told him not to raise the Taiwan issue. He mumbled as if he wouldn't.

Kissinger: They all have this idea in their heads that we are going to do this between the election and the inauguration.

Gleysteen: If you look at the succession of three conversations with Chang Chun-chiao—one with the New Zealand Ambassador, then with the Congressman Price group, and this. He is tough as nails. And he is becoming more prominent in dealing with foreigners.

Kissinger: Have we met him?

Lord: He was the host in Shanghai for Nixon in 1972.

Kissinger: What is your judgment, Art?

Hummel: I am afraid it is significant. This is the first time we have seen a direct reflection of the leftists.

Gleysteen: I think so.

Hummel: This could be the first reflection of a divergence of opinion.

Kissinger: In tone, it's the sharpest. In substance, it's the same thing Mao said to us. But Mao used to say also: "But we can wait 100 years."

Hummel: Ch'iao said the day before: "We are in no hurry."

Kissinger: The first thing to do is calm Gates down. Send him some analysis. Tell him our analysis is that the tone is tougher but in substance it was the same thing as the last time we raised it formally—which was in December of 1974. They can't but be annoyed that we raise it when they don't raise it.

I am not sure they want us out of Taiwan now. Suppose we leave, and they can't take it?

Lord: They have always lately been tougher in tone but said they were patient.

Gleysteen: If I were Chinese and read all these newspapers—the *Wall Street Journal* and *The New York Times*, and then see Scott coming out, all puffed up, it would be logical to take a tough line.[6]

Kissinger: It would be logical to make clear that these terms that are being talked about are unacceptable. They are just as inflexible now as with the Japanese on the anti-hegemony clause.

Gleysteen: They have been expecting the fall of the Miki Government.

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[6] Telegram 1288 from Beijing, July 14, discussed "the jelling of American editorial opinion in the most prestigious and influential papers behind the need to normalize with the PRC while preserving a relationship with Taiwan." (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Box 15, People's Republic of China, State Department Telegrams)

Kissinger: And here they are expecting the fall of the Ford Government. So why should they screw around with a Senator who is leaving office?

Gleysteen: There is a disturbing aspect. This is a leftist talking. There is more anti-Taiwan talk. And there are these maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait.

Kissinger: That could be interpreted both ways. The maneuvers are threatening, but the statements could be a way of compensating for not doing anything. They are showing what they could do.

Habib: The substance is the same as before.

Kissinger: No, what bothers me is the increasing element of disdain. On Angola, he says: You didn't handle it beautifully.

Habib: When they read Miyazawa's statement about the "division of labor" between us and Japan on Taiwan—after he's been in Washington—it will look like we set it up. Could they have seen Miyazawa's statement by that time?[7]

Gleysteen: Yes.

Kissinger: The Olympic thing must look like we are setting up two Chinas.[8]

Lord: Next year, if we look like a strong power . . .

Kissinger: But the White House is making a little defeat into a big one [on the Olympics]. Gates is sending back-channels to the White House saying it is going to explode domestically—that Scott will come back saying they have toughened their terms. They will put something in the Republican Platform demanding a peaceful transition.

They are all counting on our accomplishments and adding to it anti-Communism. [Laughter]

Gleysteen: We have seen this tone since October, in Angola.

Kissinger: In October, we looked pretty good about Angola.

Hummel: There is increasing disdain about the value of the U.S. relationship.

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[7] An account of Miyazawa's conversation with Senator Mansfield was transmitted in telegram 10553 from Tokyo, July 13, and telegram 10624 from Tokyo, July 14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

[8] Canada, the host of the Olympics, prohibited Taiwanese athletes from competing under the name "Republic of China." As a result, the International Olympic Committee threatened to withdraw its support for the Montreal Olympics, while the United States threatened to pull its athletes out of the games. (Steve Cady, "U.S. Threatens to Quit Olympics Over Taiwan," *The New York Times*, July 3, 1976, p. 47)

Kissinger: I am worried about Gates. Could you give him our analysis?[9] A realistic analysis. We see increasing leftist trends. Give him the context—with the Miyazawa statement; the Olympic flap; why it must have looked like a gratuitous insult to them. But make them calm down. Basically they need the relationship more than we do.

Gleysteen: That is true. Once before, Chang said: "The only common interest we have is the fear of the Soviet Union." This time he said "We have many international interests."

Kissinger: Each time they tried to turn the discussion to them, he [Scott] wouldn't let them. [Laughter]

[The Secretary takes a call from Secretary Simon on the Olympic flap.][10]

Simon used to be a member of the Olympic Committee. He says this could have been solved if someone had gotten to the key people on both sides at an early stage. Now it is hopelessly screwed up. He says it was almost impossible to screw it up like this but they did it. There were 100 ways it could have been solved.

I would like a message sent to Gates. Send a back-channel to the White House saying it will have severe domestic repercussions. Can you do it? For tomorrow. Also get to Scott to keep his mouth shut.

Habib: Barnett will write articles on it. He will mine this for weeks.

Kissinger: He will say we screwed it up by not doing it when Chou En-lai was alive.

Hummel: Chang made a point of confidentiality. Maybe we can get to them.

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[9] In telegram 177799 to Beijing, July 17, the Department sent an analysis of Zhang Chunqiao's meeting with Senator Scott. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Box 14, People's Republic of China, State Department Telegrams)

[10] No transcript of this telephone conversation was found.

151. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford[1]

Washington, July 19, 1976.

SUBJECT

The Passing of Chu Te and China's Domestic Politics

The death of Chu Te, the 90-year old Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Peoples Congress, has further reduced the ranks of the old guard. Chu Te, as the founder of the Peoples Liberation Army, was the only Chinese leader after the death of Chou En-lai whose historical role and prestige approached that of Mao. Although his formal role in the regime was only ceremonial, Chu probably represented an independent voice in the Politburo during critical decisions. Chu, for example, reportedly supported the moderate policies of Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Two poems by Chu, published in March, implicitly criticized the campaign against Teng and the resultant disunity in the Party.

The Central Leadership Organs

Chu's death brings to four the number of vacancies in the Politburo Standing Committee (out of a membership of nine) and probably enhances the strength of the two Shanghai leftist leaders in the Standing Committee, Chang Ch'ung-ch'iao and Wang Hung-wen. The only remaining moderate in the Standing Committee is the aging and ailing Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying. Premier Hua Kuo-feng, who is now Senior Vice Chairman of the Party, is presumably a Standing Committee member, although he has not been identified as such.

It is unlikely that the regime will in the near future be able to fill the vacant positions in the Politburo and the Standing Committee or to name a replacement for Teng Hsiao-p'ing as PLA Chief of Staff. The empty slots in the central leadership indicate the continuing standoff between the contending factions. It is problematic whether the Standing Committee itself is still functioning or whether an ad hoc group within the Politburo may currently be the ultimate decision-making body.

The Left

In any event, the leftists, with Mao's support, appear to have the political initiative. They should obtain further leeway with the passing

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Box 14, People's Republic of China. Secret. Sent for information. Ford initialed the memorandum and there is a notation on the first page that reads: "The President has seen." Sent to Scowcroft under cover of a July 13 memorandum from Barnes that recommended that Scowcroft send it to the President. (Ibid.)

of Chu Te. In addition to the Standing Committee and Party headquarters, leftist political strength resides in the central media, the students, the militia, the PLA political department, and the industrial heart of China—Shanghai.

There are still many constraints on the leftists, however. Most importantly, they seem to have little support among provincial leaders, military commanders, or the government bureaucracy. The leftists also would be unlikely to control a meeting of the Central Committee as presently composed.

Thus, the leftists, a disparate group apparently led by Chang Ch'ung-ch'iao, are probably anxious to exploit the advantage they currently enjoy at the center before Mao dies. They must move on two fronts—seeking where possible to weaken their opposition and at the same time broaden their own support. The July 1 joint editorial marking the Chinese Communist Party anniversary, while relatively constrained, indicated the regime's preoccupation with the domestic political struggle, and clearly suggested the need for the removal of at least a small group of Teng and Chou supporters.

The left is most probably concerned about gaining allies among the military. The role of people like Chien Hsia-lien, the Commander of the Peking Military Region, will be critical. The alignment of military commanders, however, remains the murkiest element of the obscure Peking domestic scene. Most military commanders are probably biding their time until the Chairman dies.

The role of Premier Hua Kuo-feng, and several others in the leadership who are apparently not factional partisans but essentially Mao loyalists, will also be vital to the course of the power struggle. Hua's control over the Public Security organs has obvious implications. In line with Mao's proclivities, Hua will presumably seek to protect the left. But, like Mao, the thrust of Hua's leadership may be to retain a dynamic balance between the left and the right. If so, Hua will probably not wish to see the left consolidate or expand its position at the Party center in the wake of the death of Chu Te.

The Prospect

The political structure in the PRC is probably more fragile today than it has ever been—including during the Cultural Revolution. Mao's presence remains the key, but it is now a lingering presence and the old Chairman presumably cannot assert a dynamic role. Yet, so long as he lives, he retains the aura of political authority and the leadership stalemate is likely to continue. Realignments that will determine the shape of the post-Mao regime, however, may already be taking shape.

152. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, August 18, 1976, 5 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief, PRC Liaison Office
Mr. Chien Ta-yung, Counselor, PRC Liaison Office
Ms. Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter, PRC Liaison Office

Secretary Kissinger
Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., Assistant Secretary, EA
Winston Lord, Director, S/P
William H. Gleysteen, National Security Council

Kissinger: When I asked to see you I saw no particular urgency but thought we would benefit from an exchange of views.

Huang: I agree.

Kissinger: We have already expressed our sympathy for the earthquake and the self-reliant approach you have taken in dealing with it.

Huang: Thank you.

Kissinger: It is certainly an unusual attitude in this day.

Huang: The earthquake was very serious, but under the leadership of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of our Party and with the support of the people, we have learned to overcome great hardships.

Kissinger: Perhaps it would be helpful if I were to review a few issues and bring you up to date on our thinking.

Huang: Since our last meeting I think you have visited Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Kissinger: Correct. I think you may remember my talk with Chairman Mao where I emphasized the great importance and stabilizing influence of Iran in terms of the Soviet Union. During this trip we discussed continuing military relations and also a considerable expansion of our technological and industrial relations. I visited Afghanistan because the brother of the President said Afghanistan wanted to be more independent of the Soviet Union and hoped for more visible support from the United States. If we can conquer our bureaucracy, we will commence certain projects over the next few months. One of these is a power

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 6, China, unnumbered items (33), 8/1/76–8/28/76. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Secretary Kissinger's office. The attached correspondence profile indicates that on August 30 Scowcroft discussed the memorandum with President Ford.

project and another is an engineering school. We need a cultural revolution in our bureaucracy. (Laughter) Seriously, you know the importance of Pakistan and Prime Minister Bhutto to us. We are also working with Pakistan to improve our various relationships but these are affected by the nuclear issue on which our Congress has inhibitions.

Huang: Dr. Kissinger must still remember Chairman Mao's comment about forming a horizontal curve. You have just visited three of the countries. This is fine.

Kissinger: My visit was very much in the spirit of my conversation with Chairman Mao.

Huang: During that talk Chairman Mao singled out Iraq as a point of particular interest. What is the current situation there?

Kissinger: Iraq is becoming somewhat more dubious about the value of its connection with the Soviets. When the head of our interests section returns to Iraq, he will talk to them on re-establishing relations. Throughout the Middle East the Soviets have proceeded with their usual method of threats such as cutting off aid. Where they do, it has always had a bad effect as we have seen in Syria.

We have also been somewhat active in Africa working particularly with Tanzania and Zambia as well as putting pressure on South Africa to bring about a settlement in Rhodesia and Namibia. A settlement is a possibility, and depending on the prospects I may go to Africa in the first half of September.

Huang: After Angola I have the impression that Soviet influence has been expanding in an even more pronounced way in Africa.

Kissinger: Correct, but we are trying to counteract it. That is why we are giving arms aid to Zaire and Kenya.

Huang: Some time ago Castro claimed, I think through the Swedes, that he would soon withdraw Cuban troops from Angola. By now we can see that this was nothing but a false profession.

Kissinger: Right. That is why we will not accept them (Angola) in the UN. Angola is occupied by Cuba and they cannot maintain themselves without Cuban arms.

Huang: In the long run we believe that foreign forces cannot control and plunder countries such as Angola.

Kissinger: In the long run you are correct though we wish to avoid a repetition of the Angolan situation in Rhodesia and Namibia where the Soviets may otherwise be tempted.

Huang: In the press we have seen some discussion of this possibility.

Kissinger: Yes, but we think we have a chance of defeating such Soviet moves if we succeed with our policies.

I also wish to discuss the matter of communist party participation in West European governments. We oppose such participation. I

recognize that you are perhaps not an ideal target for our views, because we once opposed communist participation in the Chinese government. (Laugher) People say that the West European communist parties are independent of Moscow. I don't know if one can judge this to be the case when it is so much in their (communist parties) interest to pretend this. I am suspicious, for example, of the French Communist Party which has always been one of the most loyal Stalinist parties, when it voted overwhelmingly 120 to 0 for a posture of independence. I would have been far more impressed by a closer vote. But the 120 to 0 vote suggests the largest mass conversion in history. I remember the time when the East European communist parties were saying the same thing that we are now hearing from the West European communist parties. I have had a compilation made of these statements and will send one along to you if you like. (Lord to send copy.) In any event our principal concern is that the communist parties will come into power with positions and the kind of public support that will undermine West European defense and lead to the Finlandization of Europe. This is what we are trying to prevent. If you believe the statements you have made to us that the Soviets' basic objective is to make a feint toward the East while attacking the West, I think you must share our concern.

Huang: During our last conversation we also talked about this. Our views are still the same. We think you are too worried about this matter. We believe the West European parties are not simply tools of the Soviets. In saying this I should point out, nevertheless, that we don't have connections with the French and Italian communist parties.

Kissinger: I just wanted to explain our position.

Huang: As we see it the problem faced by Western Europe is the Soviet expansionist threat. The Soviets operate under the banner of détente.

Kissinger: I agree that expansion is the Soviet strategy. The question is how do we deal with it.

Huang: Foreign Minister Chiao recently said to Senator Scott that a policy of détente with the Soviet Union is less and less effective. In any event we do not think the West European communist parties can be viewed simply as a Soviet fifth column.

Kissinger: I must say your Foreign Minister was effective in somehow managing to get his own views across during his discussions with the Senator. Senator Scott has his own ideas and his own solutions. I read with interest the reports of his conversations with your leaders.[2]

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[2] See Document 150 and footnotes 2 and 4 thereto.

Huang: What did you think of Senator Scott's report?

Kissinger: The Senator raised a number of topics too insistently and he advanced certain solutions we would not have proposed. He was so persistent that he seems to have prompted some of your people into firing off some cannons. I say this on the basis of our reports though I recognize it is possible the reports were not accurate.

Huang: I would like to say something about this (Taiwan). Recently people in the United States have made many official and non-official comments about Sino-U.S. relations.

Kissinger: Which have been official? I don't consider the Republican Party platform official.[3]

Huang: (interrupting) I wish to say something. I have something to say. The United States invaded Taiwan (the interpreter incorrectly translated this as "committed aggression against Taiwan") thus owing China a debt. The U.S. must fulfill the three conditions of breaking diplomatic relations with Taiwan, withdrawing its military forces from Taiwan, and abrogating its defense treaty with Taiwan. There can be no exception about any of these conditions, and there is no room for maneuver in carrying them out. The delay in normalizing relations is entirely the responsibility of the United States. The method and the time for liberating Taiwan is an internal affair of China and is not discussable. The Chinese position was clear to you even before you sought to re-open relations with us. Now Americans are saying that China's liberation of Taiwan will cripple the development of Sino-U.S. relations. They (Americans) are saying that Sino-U.S. relations will prosper only if the Chinese side takes into account U.S. concerns. This is a premeditated pretext. It is a flagrant threat against China, and we cannot accept it.

Kissinger: What is a threat?

Huang: Vice Premier Chang Chun-chiao and Foreign Minister Chiao told Senator Scott very clearly (what is a threat), I think I should stop here.

Kissinger: I should point out that the statement about taking U.S. views into account doesn't apply principally to the Taiwan issue but rather to our broader cooperation. Certainly I thought reciprocity was a basic Chinese policy.

Huang: I hope we can proceed on the basis of the Shanghai Communiqué as Vice Premier Chang pointed out to Senator Scott.

Kissinger: It is our firm purpose to do so. We will act on this basis, and not on the basis of what is written in this or that platform.

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[3] The Republican Party platform of 1976 expressed support for "the freedom and independence of our friend and ally, the Republic of China, and its 16 million people."

(This was translated in a way suggesting the Chinese did not make the connection to the party platforms.)

Huang: You remember Chairman Mao told you in 1973 that we would have to liberate Taiwan and that we do not believe in peaceful liberation. Vice Premier Chang explained to Scott that the Shanghai Communiqué did not specify that the solution to the Taiwan problem would be peaceful or otherwise. May I remind you that I did not come (to see you) for this discussion but I had to say something (about the Taiwan issue).

Kissinger: I appreciate your comments. Basically Vice Premier Chang did not say anything new. Chairman Mao and others have made the same points to us before. We appreciate that this is your basic view. Quite frankly we would not have recommended that Senator Scott open this issue with you as he did. As we told you last year, these election months in the United States are not the time for working out an agreement on normalization of our relations. We must instead move not long after our elections. I assure you we will maintain our support for the Shanghai Communiqué and will work to complete normalization. Nobody is authorized to speak for us. When we do it, we will do it at this level. I recognize there is not unlimited time. On our side we are doing our utmost to curb unhelpful discussion. We feel private discussion is better than public discussion.

Huang: Is there anything else? Are you going elsewhere in the near future?

Kissinger: Maybe to Africa, depending on the progress of discussions. And I am playing with the idea of going to the Philippines in October to discuss our base negotiations.

Huang: The Philippines also had an unfortunate earthquake.

Kissinger: We have offered them assistance. May I raise one or two bilateral matters. I remember a conversation with your trade minister and the President also mentioned that in certain special trade matters such as the sale of computers, we wish to be helpful to you. But the trouble is that you deal at a very low level through commercial channels. If you approach Mr. Lord or Mr. Hummel we will do our best to make special arrangements to help you. We have problems such as our procedures for dealing with the Soviets, but if we know what you want, we may be able to make exceptions.

Huang: (Following a query to Chien) As Chien says, President Ford did raise this issue with us, and he also points out that we have already replied that we will deal with these matters through commercial channels.

Kissinger: Yes I understand, but this creates infinite problems. I suggest instead that you informally tell Mr. Lord so we can watch and try to be helpful. We know your attachment to private enterprise

(laughter), and we are not saying that you should avoid commercial channels. We are simply suggesting that you supplement these by keeping us privately informed.

Huang: All right. I understand and will report your suggestion to Peking.

Kissinger: On Korea. It would of course be best if we could avoid a confrontation. I realize you don't have instructions on the matter, but I should note that there was an event in Korea today in which two Americans were beaten to death.[4] This is a serious matter which could have grave consequences if restraint is not shown.

Huang: I heard about it on the radio, but I don't have any details. As for solution of the Korean question, I think our respective views are well-known to each other. Although I am not informed about the latest incident I can say that we know the Koreans pretty well since they are friendly to us. The Korean people will put up a strong self-defense when they are provoked.

Kissinger: Two U.S. officers are dead and we know from very good pictures that no Koreans were killed. The U.S. officers couldn't have beaten themselves to death.

Huang: Why were the cameras ready?

Kissinger: That is a good question.

Huang: Having the cameras there makes it look as though you were prepared for the incident.

Kissinger: The reason for the cameras is that the observation post nearby the site of the incident takes photographs constantly. Our people were trying to cut down trees which obstructed their view.

Huang: I see.

Kissinger: When is the Foreign Minister coming to the United Nations for the General Assembly?

Huang: I have no news of it so far.

Kissinger: Will you invite him to come down to Washington? I know he will not accept my invitation but he may accept yours.

Huang: As long as the Chiang Kai-shek Embassy is here, he will not come.

Kissinger: We can offer him Camp David.

Huang: We would prefer to come in through the front gate.

Kissinger: I hope we can have our annual exchange.

Huang: Sure we can in New York!

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[4] U.S. and South Korean soldiers were attacked while pruning a tree in the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Korea.

Kissinger: Of course.

Huang: Are you going to Kansas City? We have watched quite a bit of television lately. Last night I watched until 12, although I gave up after the voting.

Kissinger: All the rest was quite unimportant.

Huang: I won't take any more of your time.

Kissinger: You have had many visitors. I think you will have many visitors in September, won't you?

Huang: To whom are you referring?

Kissinger: I think Senator Mansfield is going, and I understand that my former colleague Schlesinger will be inspecting your fortifications during September.

Huang: He will not be making an inspection; rather he has asked to get around the country, and we are trying to accommodate him. Moreover, Senator Mansfield will go to even more places.

Kissinger: I don't object.

Huang: You remember that we invited him (Schlesinger) in 1974. Don't be jealous. You have been to China nine times I believe. You even said you yourself wanted to go to Inner Mongolia.

Kissinger: But I didn't get there. I wanted to go see the musk ox of Mongolia.

Huang: There is only one left. The Mayor of San Francisco offered us a second one, and it was reported to the State Department. But, there has been no action. I understand that the musk ox in San Francisco is related to the one we have in China.[5]

Kissinger: Either we didn't like the musk ox's political attitude or we feared incest. (Laughter) But, we will look into it.

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[5] At the time of his February 1972 visit to the People's Republic of China, President Nixon brought two musk oxen as gifts for his hosts.

153. Memorandum for the Record[1]

Washington, August 25, 1976.

SUBJECT

Ambassador Gates' Meeting with the Secretary, August 25, 1976

Ambassador Gates met with the Secretary for about 45 minutes. Also participating were Mr. Hummel, Mr. Lord and myself.

Meeting with Foreign Minister Chiao

After opening exchanges about Ambassador Gates' service in Peking and the effects of the earthquake, the Secretary asked Ambassador Gates if he planned to stay in the U.S. until the meeting with Foreign Minister Chiao. In discussion of the probable date of the meeting, Ambassador Gates noted that Federal Reserve Chairman Burns was scheduled to arrive in Peking after the Manila meeting, which concludes October 7 or 8, and that a New York meeting after October 1 might put him (Ambassador Gates) in a time squeeze. The Secretary confirmed that Ambassador Gates "might as well sit in" on the Chiao meeting.

Chiao's Role; Hua's Potential

The Secretary asked Ambassador Gates to assess Foreign Minister Chiao's role in the PRC. Ambassador Gates said it is hard to fathom, that Chiao had recently been strangely quiet and not very visible. Ambassador Gates added that Chiao seems to be rather "unaligned", at least publicly, and remains a bit of a mystery. After the earthquake, Ambassador Gates said, Premier Hua Kuo-feng was much more visible than others.

The Secretary asked if Hua were smart enough to take charge of the country. Ambassador Gates said he didn't have such an impression, indicating that he thought that Chang Chun-chiao is a more likely candidate. The Secretary asked if this was the man who "beat up Scott," and this led to discussion of Senator Scott's visit.[2]

The Scott Visit; Chinese Hard Line

The Secretary noted that Senator Scott was "asking for it" from Chang; when Ambassador Gates mentioned Robert Barnett's

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 6, China, unnumbered items (34), 9/1/76–9/29/76. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Harry E.T. Thayer (EA/PRCM) on September 1 and approved in S on September 23.

[2] See Documents 150 and 152.

unhelpful role, the Secretary characterized Mr. Barnett as a "horse's ass." Speaking of the Presidential letter that Senator Scott carried with him, the Secretary first suggested that it was a responsibility of the "bureau" to prevent such letters. Mr. Hummel or Mr. Lord said they didn't know about the letter before it was sent. The Secretary said that, in any event, Senator Scott had no real mission for the President. Ambassador Gates said that Senator Scott and Mr. Barnett had no judgment or discretion, recalling his talk with the Senator before the Chang meeting at which Ambassador Gates had tried to dissuade Senator Scott from raising contentious subjects. Ambassador Gates said that Mr. Barnett apparently had restimulated the Senator unhelpfully. Ambassador Gates asked if the Secretary had received his back-channel message on the Scott visit.[3] The Secretary said he had and complimented Ambassador Gates on his handling of the problem. The Secretary went on to comment that now Scott had turned the Chinese hard line back onto the Taiwanese. He added that the Scott visit had not had the impact in the U.S. that he, the Secretary, had anticipated.

Ambassador Gates said that he had at first thought that Chang had been needled by the Senator into the hard position. Ambassador Gates now felt that the Chinese before the meeting had intended to take the line and have it go public. The Secretary speculated that perhaps the Chinese had thought that both the Republican and Democratic Parties were trying to "pocket" peaceful liberation before the election and that they were determined to avoid having a bipartisan consensus in the U.S. on this.

U.S. Response to Chinese Hard Line

Ambassador Gates thought that the Administration should now act, telling the Chinese that they are freezing U.S. public opposition to normalization. The Secretary recalled that he had said this to the Chinese last week.[4] Ambassador Gates said that it is important for the Secretary to do it more strongly. The Secretary asked if the idea would be to stop the Chinese from holding the view that military liberation will be required or to stop the Chinese from talking about it. It was agreed that the point is to stop the Chinese from talking about it. Ambassador Gates mentioned the Republican platform, wondering how the Administration could back off it. The Secretary noted that the platform means a two-China solution, adding that it would have been better to have said that Taiwan is the legitimate government of all China. He said that he will just have to ignore the Republican platform. He had

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[3] Presumably backchannel message 161 from Beijing, not found. See footnote 2, Document 150.

[4] See Document 152.

told the Chinese last week not to pay any attention to the platform, although maybe they did not get the message clearly.

Ambassador Gates said that the Chinese now had to bear the responsibility for damaging our ability to progress on normalization. The Secretary recalled that Chou En-lai knew that the Chinese had to do something themselves to contribute to progress. He recalled that the most forthcoming meetings with the Chinese had been in 1973, as was reflected in that year's communiqué(s). Chou himself had pointed this out. But later, as soon as Chou was out of the picture, the Chinese dropped any effort to settle the claims issue. He lamented that if Nixon had stayed in office everything would have been easier. Ambassador Gates reiterated that it would be useful if the Secretary would say something further to the Chinese. The Secretary said he could do so to the Foreign Minister. Ambassador Gates urged that this be done before the election instead of during a possible lame-duck period.

The Secretary asked how Ambassador Gates thought the Taiwan issue should be settled. The Ambassador said that the only idea he had been able to come up with was a Congressional resolution expressing the sense of Congress on a peaceful solution. The Secretary characterized this as "ingenious". He went on to say that the question would have to be resolved probably by two unilateral statements—one by the PRC and one by the U.S. Reverting to the Scott visit, the Secretary said that even if the PRC had a peaceful liberation formula now they would still hold it back from us until one minute before final settlement. The Chinese are "not nuts," and therefore would not reveal their formula to Senator Scott.

Referring to earlier discussion of the Republican platform, Ambassador Hummel said he agreed with Ambassador Gates about the difficulty of going back on the platform, but he had noticed that Jimmy Carter had repudiated his adherence to the Democratic platform. Mr. Lord, in response to the Secretary's question as to how Governor Carter had done this, said that the Governor had announced that he was not bound by everything in the Democratic platform. The Secretary commented that if the President had repudiated the platform, it would have given Governor Reagan ammunition to assault him. The platform, nevertheless, is "an outrage," the Secretary said. Ambassador Gates said we could truthfully tell the Chinese that they had helped write the Republican platform. The Secretary responded that the "yahoos" would have written the platform that way anyhow. He went on then to confirm that he would "do it with" Chiao Kuan-hua.

Schlesinger Visit (first mention)

The Secretary, now referring to the Schlesinger visit, said that the Chinese were "bloody-minded", and that it was an outrage to invite him, particularly to invite a man they know to have been fired by the

President. All the news coming out of the Schlesinger visit is going to be anti-Administration, he said. (This portion of the conversation concluded by a general exchange on the Chinese habit of inviting people who were out of office. Mr. Lord noted that in this sense Tanaka would now be a new hero, and the Secretary jokingly said that they might be inviting him next.)

USLO's Role

Ambassador Gates said that he had a "gripe" which he would like to raise with the Secretary. He said that the people in the Department ought to think up opportunities to facilitate more contact between USLO and the Chinese. He said that USLO also should be more involved with the Secretary's meetings here with the Chinese. The Secretary agreed. Ambassador Gates said that it would have been helpful to know in advance that the Secretary was going to be seeing Ambassador Huang Chen. The Secretary said: "I want them to know in the future." He went on to add: "We should get the transcript to Peking within 48 hours and you should know about the meeting ahead of time." The Secretary said he didn't mind Ambassador Gates' getting this information if he could protect it. He added: "I just don't want country directors writing letters about it." (Referring presumably to the Official Informal letter transmitting the CDC memo,[5] the letter which went by international mail.) Ambassador Gates reiterated that he should know ahead of time and should have an input in the preparations for the Secretary's meetings here with Huang Chen. The Secretary indicated agreement.

Events in China

The Secretary asked about the mood in Peking. Ambassador Gates said that a struggle is going on, so the leadership is talking for internal purposes. It is hard to understand what is going on and he thought that Wang Hai-jung, for example, was talking for the record, directed internally. He said that he thought the struggle was so intense that the leadership is marking time. The Secretary asked if Hua would last. Ambassador Gates said that Hua was the only visible figure following the earthquake and he might last if he doesn't get shot. Ambassador Gates said he didn't buy the coalition theory and thought that somebody, some individual, is going to emerge, either Hua or Chang. He said it is certain that the struggle is intense, and would be narrowing down

[5] CDC in this instance probably stands for Control Data Corporation, a U.S. company that manufactured a computer that the Chinese Government wanted to buy as part of a seismic oil exploration system. (Telegram 261496 to Beijing, October 21; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Box 14, People's Republic of China, State Department Telegrams)

both the players and ideological issues. He noted that the Chinese showed themselves to be really organized following the earthquake, mentioning effective security and effective cleanup of streets after the Peking residents moved out of their tents and back into their residences.

Schlesinger Visit (second mention)

Mr. Hummel recommended that the Secretary, when he meets former Defense Secretary Schlesinger, ask him to request the Chinese to have USLO participate in any Schlesinger meeting with Chinese high officials. The Secretary said that he would "recommend" this to Schlesinger. However, he added, he knew what Schlesinger's answer would be (implying a negative answer). Ambassador Gates asked the identity of Schlesinger's host for the trip, and he was told that it was the Chinese Friendship group. (We have since discovered this to be an error; the host organization is the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs.) The Secretary, referring again to Mr. Hummel's recommendation, confirmed that he would tell Schlesinger, but went on to note that the Government had changed since Ambassador Gates was in Washington and that people aren't working for the country any longer but rather for themselves. He repeated: "I'll request and let him turn it down." The Secretary added that he did not think that the Chinese should get away with inviting Schlesinger to Peking. Gates said (ironically) that Schlesinger was a "decent fellow", since Schlesinger had decided to postpone his trip until after the political conventions. The Secretary said he had not known that Schlesinger had been invited to go last spring. In any case, he said, Schlesinger overestimates his own influence.

Japan Problems

Ambassador Gates said that he was worried about the effect of the Japanese now talking about Taiwan. The Secretary said that Tanaka had told former President Nixon that the U.S. should take care of Taiwan and the Japanese would take care of China. He said that the new element is that the issue now has become involved in Japanese domestic politics. Referring to the Lockheed scandals, the Secretary said that what we've done to the LDP guarantees that the Japanese will be increasingly nationalistic. He said, "We're going to pay for this in Japan." Ambassador Gates referred to his recent talks with a leading business executive in Tokyo, who said the LDP is finished. The Secretary again made the point that the Japanese would be moving toward an intense nationalism and the U.S. had been responsible for it, the damage growing from Senator Church's political ambitions. The United States has done this to Japan, the Secretary repeated. In the case of the Netherlands we can survive, but "in Japan it is going to take some very ugly forms."

154. Letter From President Ford to Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng[1]

Washington, September 9, 1976.

Dear Mr. Premier:

Please accept my personal condolences, and those of the Government and people of the United States, on the occasion of the passing of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Few men in any era achieve historic greatness. Chairman Mao was one of these men. His leadership has been a decisive element in the shaping of the Chinese nation for several decades, and his works have left a deep imprint upon our civilization. He was truly a major figure of our times.

I was privileged to meet Chairman Mao during my visit to Peking in December 1975. Our discussion furthered the development of U.S.-China relations along the lines that our two countries had earlier envisaged. Let me affirm now, as I did then, the determination of the United States to complete the normalization of our relations on the basis of the Shanghai Communiqué. This would be a fitting tribute to his vision, and of benefit to the peoples of our two countries.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 6, China, unnumbered items (34), 9/1/76–9/29/76. No classification marking. Ford received this letter for his signature under a September 9 covering memorandum from Scowcroft. (Ibid., Presidential Country Files for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Box 14, People's Republic of China)

155. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford[1]

Washington, September 17, 1976.

SUBJECT

Troop Drawdowns in Taiwan

You will recall from our discussion on Saturday[2] that I said the impact of the proposed troop drawdown from Taiwan could be moderated in important measure by moving ahead promptly with the deployment of the [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. As explained below, most of the remainder has already been taken care of by natural attrition. I have also modified the proposed NSDM to narrow its focus to troop drawdowns only.

When you originally told the Chinese in Peking in December 1975 that we intended to cut in half our then-current force levels on Taiwan (from 2800 to 1400) by the end of 1976, we contemplated that the drawdowns would come from a broad spectrum of units.[3] Although no specific plans were ever approved, DOD was considering a number of highly visible moves, including complete closure of our two air bases and return of the facilities to the ROC.

[*1 paragraph (4½ lines) not declassified*]

It was against the above background that you originally approved the issuance of the Taiwan troop drawdown NSDM last spring. (Attached at Tab B is the original package which you approved last spring. The original NSDM is at Tab B of that package.)[4]

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[1] Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–67, NSDM 339, U.S. Force Reductions on Taiwan. Top Secret; Umbra; Sensitive. Sent for action. The attached NSC correspondence profile indicates that Ford approved the recommendations in this memorandum on September 20. Scowcroft received this memorandum under a September 15 covering memorandum from Gleysteen. (Ibid.)

[2] According to the President's Daily Diary, Ford met with Scowcroft on Saturday, September 11, from 9:35 to 10:15 a.m. Kissinger was also present. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

[3] On December 4, 1975, President Ford told Vice Premier Deng that the United States had about 2,800 military personnel on Taiwan and planned "within the next year" to "reduce that by 50%, down to a figure roughly of 1,400." See Document 137.

[4] Attached but not printed. In the spring of 1976, Ford approved a memorandum from Scowcroft that recommended the issuance of a NSDM that would have reduced Defense Department personnel to a level of 1,400 or less. (Memorandum from Scowcroft to Ford, April 23; Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–67, NSDM 339, U.S. Force Reductions on Taiwan) This NSDM was not issued, however, and was superseded by NSDM 339 (Document 156).

A number of events in the last few months, however, have changed the picture significantly, permitting the proposed drawdown to be made with minimum adverse fallout.

[*1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified*]

Moreover, since the beginning of the year, the number of DOD personnel actually on Taiwan has fallen below authorized levels to around 2300. This means that to achieve the goal of 1400, the number of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] personnel required to be drawn down will be in the range of 200–400. None of the drastic steps contemplated earlier (e.g., turning over air bases to the ROC) will be necessary.

Finally, to reduce the potential negative impact even further, I have eliminated a number of provisions in the earlier version of the NSDM, cutting out those measures which can be postponed. I have eliminated:

—A requirement that DOD submit to the NSC plans to transfer out of Taiwan the U.S. Army Communications Command and the War Reserve Matériel storage facility during 1977.

—The prohibition against any deployment of new military units or War Reserve Matériel to Taiwan.

[*1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified*]

In light of the above, I believe the problems posed by the troop drawdown NSDM are manageable.

Recommendation:

That you authorize me to release the verbal hold on the NSDM directing deployment [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

and that you authorize me to sign the revised NSDM at Tab A calling for an authorized level of DOD personnel on Taiwan by December 31, 1976 of no more than 1400.[5]

[5] Ford initialed the Approve option under both recommendations. See also footnote 1 above.

156. National Security Decision Memorandum 339[1]

Washington, September 20, 1976.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. Force Reductions on Taiwan

The President has approved the following:

—A manpower reduction on Taiwan to a ceiling of not more than 1400 by December 31, 1976 of Defense Department personnel, military as well as civilian. (This ceiling does not apply to those assigned to the American Embassy and contractual personnel, including those associated with the remoting facility to be installed at Shu Lin Kou).

—Notification to Embassy Taipei in advance of specific drawdowns.

—An injunction against the total withdrawal during 1976 of any single unit or activity without prior NSC approval.

[*8 lines not declassified*]

Brent Scowcroft

[1] Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–67 and Box–68, NSDM 339. Top Secret; Umbra; Sensitive. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

157. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

New York City, October 8, 1976, 8:30–11:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Chiao Kuan-hua, PRC Foreign Minister
Ambassador Huang Hua, PRC Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Lai Ya-li, Deputy PRC Permanent Representative
Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
Kuo Chia-ting, Notetaker

Secretary Kissinger
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Thomas Gates, American Ambassador to the PRC
Arthur Hummel, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
William Gleysteen, National Security Council (Notetaker)

Chiao: Is this your first time here at our Mission headquarters?

Kissinger: It is my first time in this room. I was downstairs once. I was trying to be helpful finding a place for you. Ambassador Huang did better himself without my help. Do you find it satisfactory?

Huang: It is very convenient for both work and living.

Kissinger: I agree. Mr. Chi won't have time to go back to his alma mater? Both of us studied chemistry there. I got extremely high grades in chemistry but it reflected memory, not understanding of the subject. Those who deplore my political views could perhaps have spared the world by keeping me in chemisty. I once asked Professor Kistiakowsky whether I should keep on in chemistry, and he answered that anyone who had to ask such a question shouldn't. (Laughter)

Chiao: If you had continued your studies in chemistry, it might have benefited your political activities more.

Kissinger: My accomplishments in chemistry were just the result of brute memory. I remember once in the laboratory doing an elaborate experiment where I got results which were precisely opposite from the ones I was supposed to get. Perhaps the professor who analyzed how I managed to do this went on to get a Nobel Prize. (Laughter)

Chiao: How is Mrs. Kissinger?

Kissinger: She is fine and asks after Mrs. Chiao.

Chiao: She didn't go with you to Africa did she?

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 6, China, unnumbered items (35), 10/2/76–10/8/76. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held at the PRC Mission to the United Nations.

Kissinger: Yes she did.

Chiao: (Turning to Gates) How long have you been here?

Gates: I have been here since last week, and I am returning to Peking next week.

Chiao: (To Lord) How is your wife?

Lord: Fine, thank you.

Chiao: (Turning back to the Secretary) We last met in December, I believe.

Kissinger: Yes, when I was with President Ford in Peking. Before we go on, I would like to extend my personal condolences on the death of Chairman Mao. He was a great man in the history of our era. All of us who knew him felt that it was a great event in our lives.

Chiao: Thank you very much. I would also like to thank many of your friends who went to our offices to extend condolences. General Scowcroft was among them here in Washington and Ambassador Gates, of course, did so in Peking.

Of the Americans who knew Chairman Mao, you are probably one of the ones who saw the most of him.

Kissinger: Yes, five times. The first meeting was with President Nixon in 1972; then I met him in February 1973 and November 1973 when I had my long talk with him; and then again last year in October and with the President in December.

Chiao: He had a great effect on the Chinese people.

Kissinger: Surely. I remember during our meeting in October 1975 that while he had great difficulty speaking, the content of his thought was profound.

Chiao: He had difficulty speaking, but his thoughts were clear.

You have seen from our public statements and documents that the Chinese Government is determined to carry on the policies of Chairman Mao.

Kissinger: I saw it in your speech.[2]

Chiao: Actually, since liberation, our policy has always been grasped and looked after by Chairman Mao. I noted that President Ford also mentioned that Chairman Mao looked after (was responsible for) the opening of our relationship.

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[2] Supplementary briefing material for Kissinger described Qiao's UN speech. (Memoranda from Hummel and Lord to Kissinger, October 5 and 8; ibid.) Qiao delivered his UN speech on October 5. ("China, at UN, Spurns Attempts by Soviets To Resume Old Ties," *The New York Times*, October 6, 1976, p. 1)

Kissinger: I remember that during our negotiations Chinese leaders would go to Chairman Mao at crucial points and return with instructions.

Chiao: Chairman Mao always kept an eye on many matters, not only major strategic issues.

Kissinger: I remember during negotiation of the Shanghai Communiqué when Premier Chou went to see Chairman Mao and came back with some rather firm proposals which permitted us to proceed successfully.

Chiao: Yes, that was the first part of the Shanghai Communiqué. It was a good method because it did not hide anything.

Kissinger: It was an original method which suited the circumstances.

Chiao: Not covering up contradictions is the beginning of their solution. Then, the agreements which follow are genuine.

Kissinger: Yes, the points of agreement then have more meaning. Mr. Foreign Minister, how do you propose to proceed tonight?

Chiao: Let's proceed as usual. I would like to take the opportunity to hear your views. Why don't you start? You have been to so many places.

Kissinger: Because we are in your place tonight. (Laughter)

Chiao: We have two sayings. One is that when we are the host, we should let the guests begin, and the other is that when we are guests, we should defer to the host.

Kissinger: You can always use this so I have to start in any event. (Laughter) But I will be glad to start. First, perhaps I could make a general assessment of the relations between us. Then I might say something about the world situation, and finally, we might discuss some specific issues.

Chiao: Quite alright.

Kissinger: I might begin in the spirit of the Foreign Minister's comment that pointing out contradictions may help their solution. Speaking frankly and as someone with some sentimental involvement in the start of our relationship—I was the first senior U.S. official visitor to China, my impression, and that of my colleagues, is that there has been a certain deterioration in our relationship since the time of President Ford's visit. It is seen in the way we exchange views and hear Chinese views much more through Chinese statements to visitors than official representatives.

Chiao: What we say to non-official visitors is at one with what we say to you officially.

Kissinger: True. But it is often at greater length and higher levels. Moreover, these delegations will usually repeat what you say so that it practically constitutes a form of public pressure on us.

Chiao: Can it be so said?

Kissinger: Despite the fact that I am attacked directly or indirectly, I still feel that the opening to China is the most important thing I have done in my public life. If the Foreign Minister will permit me to use it as an example, his speech to the General Assembly is a reflection of the problem. Some of his speech was so subtle that only a few people understood who was being attacked. But I can assure him that they knew. Don't worry, your efforts weren't wasted. I will pass on your views to Mr. Sonnenfeldt the next time I see him. (Laughter) If my father ever sits next to you at dinner, you can be sure he will explain his views on the subject.

As I understand it, you said in your speech that when the U.S. negotiates with the Soviets, it is engaging in appeasement and pushing the Soviets toward China. But when the United States resists the Soviets, it is engaging in a rivalry of the superpowers against which all mankind should unite. Under those conditions we are playing under rules where we cannot possibly win. It reminds me that the British Foreign Minister has a game where only he knows the rules. He keeps a point score. Every day he tells me of the score. Every day I'm defeated and the only question is the extent of my defeat. (Laughter) Possibly we have different assessments of the Soviet Union, but I doubt that the difference is so large. It is a tactical difference. Fundamentally, if you criticize our negotiations with the Soviet Union as appeasement and describe our efforts to resist them as superpower rivalry, then what did your Prime Minister have in mind when he suggested to Schlesinger that we "pool our efforts"?

Chiao: Right.

Kissinger: What do you mean by right?

Chiao: I mean the reference to pooling our efforts is right.

Kissinger: We are ready to pool our efforts, but I don't see how we can proceed when you attack us for our policy, e.g. in Europe and Africa. When we conduct negotiations out of tactical considerations you attack us. If you do so, how, in your view, can we oppose the Soviets?

Chiao: Your comments are too general. We are never against negotiations with the Soviet Union. We are negotiating with them now. We are not opposed to negotiations. The problem is the basic position from which one negotiates. You will recall that Chairman Mao discussed with you the problem of the Helsinki Conference. After Helsinki the Soviets went on a large scale offensive in Angola and we believe this was caused by the weak attitude you adopted at Helsinki toward the Soviets. In the Middle East, as you know, we have supported dual tactics. You adopted dual tactics and we supported them. We did not attack.

Kissinger: You couldn't attack us because you suggested it.

Chiao: We did not suggest it, but we put it forward for your consideration.

Kissinger: But you have opposed us in Africa.

Chiao: We have had doubts.

Kissinger: What doubts?

Chiao: We have doubts that you will reach your objective.

Kissinger: We have two objectives in Africa. One is the liberation of black Africa. The other is to prevent Soviet intervention of a direct or indirect kind. We must try to separate the issue of liberation from Soviet intervention.

Chiao: We have always separated these issues. In Angola we supported liberation and after the Angolans won a victory the Soviets moved in.

Kissinger: What we want—and it is a complicated process—is to create a basis for resisting Soviet intervention while not obstructing liberation movements.

Chiao: Just not opposing liberation movements is not enough.

Kissinger: We are supporting them.

Chiao: I have doubts that you are. You are not thoroughgoing, speaking quite frankly.

Kissinger: You said so publicly in your speech!

Chiao: Not quite.

Kissinger: What would be thoroughgoing? Or what should we do differently?

Chiao: You should support the demands of the blacks.

Kissinger: We are supporting them.

Chiao: The procedures you are adopting in Zimbabwe won't achieve their aim.

Kissinger: There are two ways events could develop in Zimbabwe. One is straight armed struggle which would bring in outside forces and add to the credit of those outside forces. If this were to occur, we could not resist those outside forces because we could not go to the support of white regimes against blacks. So we are trying the second way to bring together the black forces of Mugabe, Muzorewa, and Nkomo in one black government that we can support to resist the intervention of outside forces. I consider Smith's position only the opening move.

Chiao: You can try, but we have our doubts.

Kissinger: Maybe there are grounds for doubt. But we had to get control over events so we would have some basis to resist outside forces. We are not asking you to do anything but we are asking that you not oppose us.

Huang: You should analyze carefully the attitudes of the five front line African countries. If you do not (satisfy them), they will be forced to accept Soviet assistance.

Kissinger: That is just what we are trying to do. And we need help in doing so. I think we have the support of at least four of the five front line governments.

Huang: At most four.

Kissinger: We can't have more than four because Angola will never support us. It would be like trying to get the support of Outer Mongolia.

Chiao: I don't want to go into details, but your efforts are only half measures. You may keep on trying, but you may find that the result is the opposite of what you expect. You may end up angering the blacks.

Kissinger: What, in your opinion, would be thorough going measures?

Chiao: That would be going into detail. All I want to stress is the importance of attitude. Is the key, in your opinion, the interim government?

Kissinger: We can only have an interim government if the blacks will support it.

Chiao: The situation may not develop that way.

Kissinger: What is the alternative?

Chiao: As for the specific method, I cannot say that you should do this or that. But fundamentally, you must stand on the side of the blacks.

Kissinger: There are two approaches among the blacks. The bulk of the blacks are not happy about fighting and would like to find a way to avoid it. But there is a minority which is ready to fight with Soviet help.

Chiao: I do not think it is fair to look on proponents of guerrilla warfare as supporters of the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: I don't say that they are—at this time. But if developments proceed toward control by these elements, it will go that way.

Chiao: We will have to see.

Kissinger: I'm hopeful that Mugabe, Muzorewa, and Nkomo are going to join forces.

Chiao: We will have to see. We have reservations.

Kissinger: I see you have no better strategy.

Chiao: It is your problem.

Kissinger: It is more than our problem. I remember in November 1973 when Premier Chou spoke to me regarding the need for global equilibrium to prevent Soviet expansionism.

Chiao: That is your summation of his views, is it not?

Kissinger: To be sure, Premier Chou made many other points. But if expanionist countries gain advantages, eventually other countries will suffer.

Chiao: Yes. We recognized this in the Shanghai Communiqué where we said that we would not seek hegemony ourselves and would oppose the efforts of any others seeking hegemony. This was a common point between us.

Kissinger: But we are having difficulty putting it into practice. Let us leave Africa and discuss another issue which you have raised repeatedly; namely, the accusation that we are following a Munich-like policy of appeasement or that we are pushing to deflect the Soviets to the East, and so on. I have explained it to you before but let me summarize it again. I do it for you once a year and quite obviously it has never made a lasting impact.

I see Soviet expansionism as a geo-political problem not limited to one region. There is no solution where we can allow a push in one place and preserve our interests in another. I see the following as the Soviets' strategic problem: they face powerful countries in the West; potentially powerful countries in the East, in the case of China and Japan; and confusion and weakness to their south and in the Middle East. The Soviets have an inefficient bureaucratic system; they cannot create real power. They don't conduct a brilliant foreign policy. They are rather good at amassing physical power but they don't know what to do with it. The Red Army seems effective only when used against Soviet allies, not enemies. Soviet forces have not achieved a diplomatic success for the Soviet Union.

Chiao: Didn't the Soviets win a diplomatic victory at Helsinki?

Kissinger: I don't agree.

Chiao: Why did President Ford make those remarks (about Eastern Europe) at San Francisco?

Kissinger: You don't think this was the result of Helsinki! (Laughter) Actually, it reflected panic. In this case, the President transcended his advisors. (Laughter)

Let me get back to strategy and how the Soviets can be contained. As for their strength, the latest plane that we got in Japan shows that they are really quite backward.[3] The plane is about 10 percent better than our planes of 14 years ago. If this achievement is the result of a high priority project in the Soviet Union, I hate to think of the outcome of their low priority projects. (Laughter)

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[3] On September 6, Victor Belenko, a Soviet Air Force officer, defected to the West by flying his MiG–25 jet fighter to Japan.

As I look at the Soviet Union, they have certain opportunities for the next ten–fifteen years. After that, their circumstances will prevent expansionism. In the Middle East, whatever they touch turns into disaster. All sides in Lebanon are fighting with Soviet weapons and the Soviets don't know which end to touch. The Soviets may try to break out of the situation at some point, though not under the present leadership which is too bureaucratic and too old. But they may try to break out under Brezhnev's successors. But the consequences will be the same for us wherever they try to break out.

I believe, personally—if the elections turn out the wrong way, you won't see me again and may not care about my personal views. In any event, I believe that if the Soviets attack, it would be best if they attacked in the West. Because if they do attack in the West, our political possibilities for resistance are very great. My strategic nightmare is that they will attack in the East—I recognize this would not be consistent with the line in your speeches and papers. If the Soviets attack in the East and have an initial success, it would have a massive impact on Japan and even in Europe and would contribute to the hegemonial effect we want so much to avoid. My own conviction is that if the Soviets were to attack in the East, the United States would still have to oppose them whether asked to or not. We would be doing it because of our own interests and not as a favor. But the psychological and political conditions for U.S. action would hardly be ideal. Nor is it our view that we can buy off the Soviet Union with little concessions in the West to deflect them toward the East. I agree with what you say about the importance of a strong West.

Even though you may not agree with my political analysis, I want the Soviets to negotiate first with us, not Europe, because we are stronger politically. If some of the people you admire come to power in the U.S. and are able to destroy our diplomatic flexibility, the Soviets will be able to move to negotiations with Europe and threaten Europe by a process of selective negotiations. They have recently approached the Germans and the French and they will surely approach the British. All are searching for concessions they can make to the Russians as a way of dealing with their internal pressures. Since the beginning of our détente policy in 1971, the defense effort in Europe is larger than before because we have been able to paralyze these compromising elements in Europe who oppose defense efforts.

Chiao: What is the logic of that? You took the lead in détente so you can hardly blame the Europeans for moving in the same direction.

Kissinger: No. We insist that we proceed toward détente together with no one going out in front. You can see the objective results of our policy on defense efforts as they are reflected in the United States, Germany, and to some extent throughout NATO. You just need to look at statistics to see what I mean.

Chiao: It is important not to confuse negotiations and strength.

Kissinger: I agree completely.

Chiao: For example, early this year you used strong language about Angola, but then you went ahead with negotiations on SALT. If you behave this way why do you think the Soviets will heed your warnings?

Kissinger: I was almost alone in the U.S. over Angola. Let me explain what I was trying to do. I forced the U.S. to do something about Angola. By December 1, we were on the verge of assembling a force which, when deployed, would have exhausted the Cubans. Several countries were involved. On December 8, President Ford called in Ambassador Dobrynin and told him to stop arms shipment to Angola. A few days later, the Soviets did stop shipments. We were prepared to have a resolution in the January 12th meeting of the OAU. Then on December 19, Congress voted to cut off all money for Angola, and there was no prospect of our using force. On December 24, the Soviets resumed armed shipments. When the time came for me to go to Moscow in January, the only thing left for me to use was a bluff and I tried it. It didn't work. Since then I have made violent attacks on the Soviets. In Angola we were defeated by our own people. I know this is no consolation to you. But I wanted to explain.

Chiao: When did you go to Moscow?

Kissinger: At the end of January.

Chiao: Our view is that the Soviets, through Helsinki, see your weakness.

Kissinger: Really, Mr. Foreign Minister, I don't want to be impolite, but I don't agree. We are not weak. Rather, we are temporarily weak until after our elections. We have gone though a period of temporary weakness when the forces which overthrew Nixon have been dominant in this country. But that will end on November 2.

Frankly, we considered the Helsinki Conference a second-rate enterprise. We gave instructions to our delegation to stay one-half step behind the Europeans and to take no initiative. Maybe I'm lacking in imagination, but I really can't see what you think the Soviets gained from Helsinki. All they got was just words.

Chiao: I know your views. You mentioned them in the car to me last year. I considered them seriously.

Kissinger: And rejected them!

Chiao: No, but we don't agree with you.

Kissinger: What is the Soviet victory at Helsinki?

Chiao: I don't want to be impolite. The Soviets, through Helsinki, have come to feel that the West is anxious to reach agreement. This is a long-range problem and nothing very terrible but it is a fact that the Soviets have reached such a conclusion.

Kissinger: I think you know the Soviets. Gromyko's strength is to pursue something relentlessly. I find that Gromyko persists even when it makes no sense whatsoever.

Chiao: We understand Gromyko's practice. We will persist in resisting this practice of Gromyko. This is our policy in our talks with them.

Kissinger: The Soviets started agitating for Helsinki in 1963–64. At that time they tried to exclude the U.S. and to push for abolishment of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Finally, we decided to go along in 1971, and the talks dragged out four years. The Soviets got nothing out of the Conference; only empty principles. If they had made a demand on Berlin, I would advocate total resistance. In practice, however, they got nothing. Their foreign policy is ineffective. Helsinki didn't in any way affect the legal situation in Europe.

Chiao: I don't think it can be put this way. At least the Soviets gained your agreement that their boundaries can't be changed.

Kissinger: By force.

Chiao: Why not use the policy of non-recognition?

Kissinger: Because European borders were already set long before Helsinki. The Baltic borders were set in 1946–47 and then other borders were accepted by both Germanies in the 1960's. How could the U.S. oppose things accepted so long ago?

Huang: Why did President Ford have to go to Helsinki to give overall recognition to the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe?

Kissinger: He didn't give such recognition. Maybe we are stupid and not as intelligent as you. I remember once Premier Chou told me that I was intelligent. I said that he meant by Chinese standards I was not very intelligent. He didn't protest—he just laughed. (Laughter) I grant it may be just an example of our mediocre comprehension that led us to Helsinki. But it was not we who agreed to go. It was the British, French and Germans who agreed to go. If we had stayed away, it would not have helped. Of course, we would have stayed away if the conference had involved basic principles. But it didn't. Apparently this is also the Soviet interpretation because they have never mentioned any principles. As for the countries of Eastern Europe that the President so helpfully mentioned the other night, (laughter) they were the ones who were eager for the conference. Did you know we have a new campaign slogan on liberating Eastern Europe? We discovered the other night that we have already carried out the Republican platform of 1952 without anyone noticing it. (Laughter)

Chiao: Perhaps we should drop this.

Kissinger: In our view, the Helsinki agreements were rather irrelevant documents. The issues were drawn out for four years. At any rate, whether we were right or wrong, the matter is irretrievable.

Chiao: Regarding the policy . . .

Kissinger: There is a question of perception and a question of execution with regard to overall policy toward the Soviet Union. As for our perception, I have tried to explain our view—though without apparent success. In execution of our policy, we may make mistakes. Even with people on our staff like Mr. Lord who has a Chinese wife, we occasionally make mistakes.

But back to the matter you mentioned to the recent unofficial visitor—the question of pooling efforts.

Chiao: Chairman Mao mentioned that the U.S., China, Europe, Japan, Pakistan, and Iran should unite to oppose the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: I agree, but your criticism of our policy affects our ability to do this.

Chiao: We have mentioned our concerns because in our view we cannot adopt a weak attitude toward the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: We don't adopt a weak attitude toward the Soviet Union.

Chiao: You have your own attitude. We have ours. The real question is when, under what conditions, and with what objectives one negotiates with the Russians.

Kissinger: I agree there are differences in our approach. Your tactic is one of firmness with relatively little flexibility. Ours is one of protracted negotiations which don't achieve anything. We don't ask you to adopt ours; and I admire yours. However, we must adapt to our own requirements. The end result should be the same—no Soviet expansionism.

Chiao: Tactics must obey strategy. If they are divorced there can be no talk of tactics.

As for your "nightmare", that is one way of putting it, but I don't agree either with your nightmare or your way of thinking.

Kissinger: If we are really serious about the danger of Soviet expansionism, we must be prepared to look in all directions.

Chiao: On this we don't disagree.

Kissinger: Let's talk concretely. How should we do it?

Chiao: On the one hand, I agree there is Soviet expansionism all over, but the point of emphasis is in the West.

Kissinger: I won't dispute that.

Chiao: But the point of emphasis is important because it affects strategy. Before the end of the war in Vietnam, we told you that your forces were too scattered. The Soviets took advantage of the situation to expand elsewhere. As for China, we have not neglected Soviet expansionism towards China. We have preparations, and, as Chairman

Mao has said, we are all on the defensive against the Russians. We don't want to attack the Soviet Union. The point of emphasis is important, however, and I can't agree with your statement about your nightmare. Our defense posture is not less than others.

Kissinger: If the Soviets expand militarily in Europe, the political problems of a military response would be much easier for the U.S. The political problems would be much more difficult if the attack were to come in Asia. If it were to come in Asia, we should respond anyway. But creating the proper political conditions to do so is what makes it a nightmare. I am not referring to your military preparations, and I am not suggesting that you lack resolve or vigilance. Clearly you do not.

Chiao: I noted something in your General Assembly speech[4] about relations between our two countries that I don't agree with. Roughly speaking you said that you will take account of the interests and concerns of China in the conduct of your relations and that China must exhibit a similar attitude toward the United States. Your remarks seem to me to exceed what was said in the Shanghai Communiqué.

Kissinger: In what way?

Chiao: In the case of Taiwan?

Kissinger: No.

Chiao: On Taiwan, you owe us a debt.

Kissinger: These are separate issues. First, there is the Taiwan issue and second, there is the question of the conduct of our relations on a global basis. As for Taiwan, the problem has complexities . . . And in my speech I did not mention normalization in the same context as the need for mutuality in our approach to global issues. In the global context, you must understand our needs just as we try to understand yours. Of course, you can if you wish attack me for something I did not intend to say . . . On normalization, it seems to me that after our elections we should take an extremely serious look, keeping in mind the things that you have been saying recently—you can rest assured that we have gotten the message. As for the conduct of our relations on a global basis and our common resistance to hegemony, there has been no progress, only a barrage of attacks on us through unofficial delegations to Peking and sometimes even foreign delegations. We are trying to understand your position. You must try to understand ours. But this is quite separate from the problem of normalization.

Chiao: The first section of your speech dealt with normalization. The latter part with this global question.

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[4] "Toward a New Understanding of Community," Department of State *Bulletin*, October 25, 1976, pp. 497–498.

Kissinger: The first part was on normalization, the second was on expanding global cooperation.

I might interject that I believe that Senator Scott did enormous damage with his letter from the President and the impression he conveyed that he had been sent by the President to negotiate with you and to make specific proposals. Scott did not reflect the views of the Administration. In fact, before he left, I told him not to discuss the matter of normalization because it was not a suitable issue to talk about before our elections.

Chiao: We were not clear about what you told Senator Scott. Our attitude was one of sincerity since he raised questions with us.

Kissinger: You had no choice, and we did not object to what you said.

Chiao: What we said to Scott was the same as what we have said to you. To normalize relations you must break diplomatic relations with Taiwan, withdraw all U.S. military forces from Taiwan, and abrogate your Defense Treaty. This has been our position all along. We have always said that how we liberate Taiwan is our internal affair. We have never agreed to peaceful means.

Kissinger: Correct. The President was wrong in his reference to the Shanghai Communiqué. He was referring to what we said, not what you said. This was an inadvertent, incorrect statement which will not be repeated by any U.S. official. I think we can guarantee that.

Huang: But what about the misunderstanding that has been caused?

Kissinger: We will arrange to have a question next week which will allow us to clarify our position. We can do it on Monday or Tuesday. Monday is a holiday so perhaps we should do it on Tuesday. We will have a question regarding the legal status of the Shanghai Communiqué in this regard. We will do this if you like. Or you yourselves could do it.

Chiao: It is better for you to do it since it was in your public debate.

Kissinger: I agree.

Chiao: I saw it myself and the President was obviously incorrect.

Kissinger: The President compressed a paragraph of the Shanghai Communiqué a little too much. (Laughter)

Chiao: It really affected our legal interest.

Kissinger: After our 1974 discussions in Peking, I saw no possibility of progress on the Taiwan issue before our elections. I haven't raised the issue since that time because I did not want to engage in fruitless discussion. I understand what you have said and what Chairman Mao has said. We could not do what would be necessary before

our elections. After our elections, we must study very carefully what we can do. However, in addition to Taiwan, we have our global relations and that is what I was addressing in my speech. Incidentally, I was confident my words would get your attention. (Laughter)

Chiao: Right. What Chairman Mao said . . .

Kissinger: Your suffering days may soon be over. I believe we share your general strategic outlook. In the last two years, we have tended to drift apart because of the consequences in this country following Nixon's overthrow. After our elections, we will see if we cannot once again get together for some frank exchanges which will permit carrying out the kind of global cooperation we have in mind.

Chiao: Global cooperation is the big matter; Taiwan is the small matter. As for the former, we have never covered up our diferences of view.

Kissinger: I never said you did! (Laughter) Our government must make decisions, and if everybody is told by you that our policy amounts to a Munich or a Dunkirk—even foreigners are told this—then a malaise will develop in our relations with you. Of course, we can each go ahead with our separate policies, but there will be no collaboration.

Chiao: As for coordinated actions between our countries, I have explained before that our social organization and ideologies are different. We use our method to oppose Soviet expanionism and you use yours. Only in this way can our policies be as one.

Kissinger: Yes, but our policies must be in harmony.

Chiao: Yes. We will tell you when we see things we think are wrong. These will be our views and you will have to decide what to do.

Kissinger: I think to improve the situation we should tell you about events in advance, not after the event on U.S. television. Then you can choose either method.

Chiao: What do you mean?

Kissinger: We will keep you informed in good time before we initiate actions. You might sometimes do the same with us and perhaps take this into account in your actions. Recently we feel we have had pressure from you rather than discussions and this has led to the deterioration which I mentioned quite frankly at the beginning of our talk tonight.

Chiao: We have not—as I have said several times—said anything differently to our American guests from what we have said to you.

Kissinger: I have made my point. If we told everybody else what we have told you it would add a new dimension to our relations.

Chiao: Things aren't really that way. People come to Peking and ask our views. Then we tell them. If we didn't it wouldn't be good. It

is quite different from what you have said. Furthermore, you know we haven't told them everything.

Kissinger: Not quite!

Chiao: We can't obscure the major strategic outlines of our relations.

Kissinger: If you study my remarks tonight, you will understand the pattern of our mutual relations as it appears to us. However, I want to assure you that even if the election goes against us, I attach the greatest importance to progress in U.S.–PRC relations and I would do my best to work for progress.

Chiao: To be quite frank, in global affairs you act as though everything is up to you and the Soviets to decide. In your General Assembly speech you referred first to the Soviets then Europe, Japan, and only then to the PRC. We were like this in importance (holding up his little finger).

Kissinger: I mentioned Western Europe, Japan, and then the Western hemisphere first.

Chiao: My impression is . . .

Kissinger: Of course, we do attach great importance to these areas.

Chiao: We recognize this and it's quite proper. You recall Chairman Mao told you about the importance of U.S. relations with Japan. Furthermore, we approve of your relations with Western Europe.

Kissinger: As for the Soviet section of my speech, most people thought it was very harsh. In the case of China, the speech unfortunately had to reflect the fact that there is not much going on. Our relations with the Soviet Union are in a different category from our relations with you. The Soviet Union is an adversary with whom we co-exist. China is an ideological opponent but a country that in strategic terms we cooperate with globally. In my conception, I attach an importance to China comparable to that of Western Europe as a factor on the world scene. But in the case of our bilateral relations there is nothing going on, and I think this is a mistake.

Chiao: Whose fault is it?

Kissinger: Frankly, it depends on your viewpoint. If you say there can be no progress in this area until normalization, then the fault lies with us. But if you say that we need to progress in this area to create the basis for normalization, then we both have responsibility.

Chiao: That is probably not a fair statement. On bilateral relations the responsibility is on your side. On other questions, such as our criticism of you, we have done it frankly giving our thoughts from a strategic point of view as to the best way to deal with our opponent. Don't take them (the opponent) lightly.

Kissinger: Precisely. Why was my statement unfair?

Chiao: From the beginning the Taiwan problem has been your affair. You said you had to maintain diplomatic relations, keep troops on Taiwan, and maintain the treaty.

Huang: How about the Olympics?

Chiao: It is true there has been some deterioration in our relationship, but the source of it is you. Why did you take your position on the Olympics?

Kissinger: If you must know the truth, because of the Republican Convention.

Huang: And perhaps the Taiwan lobby?

Chiao: And then we have Governor Scranton's remarks about welcoming Taiwan into the UN.

Kissinger: What's that?

Chiao: (Reading from a transcript of the October 3 NBC *Meet the Press*)

"Mr. Hunt: Just one more question, Bill. You mentioned the idea of universality, that every sovereign government should be a member of UN. On that basis, why should not Taiwan be readmitted?

Scranton: In my judgment, I would be glad to have them."

Kissinger: Ridiculous, outrageous! Perhps you can't believe me when I say I didn't know about this until you told me just now.

Chiao: This reflects a trend.

Kissinger: Yes, in public opinion.

Chiao: Not only in your society but in your government too.

Kissinger: Governor Scranton is a friend of mine. He is a fine man. I have no idea why he said what he did.

Chiao: I smile bitterly.

Kissinger: You have several choices. You can say that it was all a plot and smile bitterly. Or you can believe what I have said sincerely about our being in the last stages of the post-Watergate confusion. The day after the election you will see discipline and cohesion beginning in the United States. I recommend that you think in terms of the latter.

Chiao: I don't want to attach too much importance to these things.

Kissinger: You should attach no importance to them.

Chiao: Perhaps a little?

Kissinger: No, really none. Governor Scranton hadn't thought through what he was saying. I must say, however, that in the kind of cooling atmosphere that has been created there is less vigilance in this country about such remarks. But don't worry. I promised Premier Chou in 1971 that we wouldn't support two Chinas. We won't go back on this statement.

Chiao: The language in the Shanghai Communiqué on this point was your creation.

Kissinger: Scranton should have said that we don't recognize the Government on Taiwan as the Government of Taiwan.

Chiao: Yes. The cooling of relations is not our responsibility.

Kissinger: You have some responsibility for what has happened. Some Chinese actions have had a negative impact on developments.

Chiao: I don't agree. Our criticism of you proceeds from our common objective. If it were not for the common objective there would be no need to say anything. Do you remember in 1971 Premier Chou told you that China was ready to deal with the enemy from all sides.

Kissinger: Yes, it was in the Fukien Room.

Huang: Chairman Mao told some Germans that we wanted Europe to be strong and united. The Germans said then the Soviets would turn to the East. Mao said we were ready for them.

Chiao: Up to now, we have supported a strong Western Europe and strong U.S. West European relations.

Kissinger: Let us both reflect on this conversation and see if we can begin a dialogue on a governmental level to analyze the situation.

Chiao: (Turning to Huang and speaking in Chinese) Is there anything else we should raise?

Huang: At the beginning, Secretary Kissinger mentioned Soviet problems in developing their power. Do you foresee a period of protracted peace?

Kissinger: No. Up to 20 years I think it will be very dangerous. We are heading into a period of increasing danger. If we get through it, then there may be an era of peace.

Chiao: As for the Soviet threat, the Soviets are internally soft but one should not underestimate their expanionist ambitions. When we say there is a danger of war increasing, it is because we have given it very serious thought. The question is how to deal with the USSR. They bully the soft but fear the tough.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, we have talked with each other for almost five years. You can't believe we are soft. We have to devise a strategy which suits our own and our allies' domestic requirements. It must be sustainable for the longest period of time. We would have won in Angola had it not been for Watergate in the United States. Please give us credit. We have no illusions.

Chiao: We have discussed this many times. Your tactical concepts negate your strategic objective.

Kissinger: I don't agree. We have held the Western Alliance in better shape than it was four years ago.

Chiao: We have criticized Munich thinking because it corrodes.

Kissinger: But we don't have Munich-like thinking. Frankly, we find it insulting. At Munich the allies sacrificed others. We have not.

Chiao: There is not much change in the trend of appeasement.

Kissinger: Repeating twice something we find insulting doesn't make it true. (Laughter) The increase of our Defense budget, our actions in Portugal, Angola, the Middle East, and Africa and the sale of arms hardly amount to a Munich.

Chiao: We have not opposed your Middle Eastern and Iranian policies, but you created some trouble for yourselves in Pakistan.

Kissinger: What trouble?

Chiao: I have been reading some things about trouble.

Kissinger: Bhutto wouldn't agree with you. Why don't you ask him?

Chiao: We approve of U.S.–Pakistan relations. It is good that they are improving.

Kissinger: If we keep on repeating these arguments, we will only create a controversial frame of mind.

Chiao: We should concentrate on the common objectives. Chairman Mao said you have interests which you want to preserve; the Soviets have expansionist desires. The Chairman said this to you. Some here tonight may not know that these were his words.

Kissinger: You used them in your speech. I agree with you about the danger of war. Our defense budget has increased 25 percent in two years.

Chiao: There are material means, but weapons are made for man and man must have high morale.

Kissinger: Yes. But each side must decide for itself what is best for its morale.

Chiao: I agree.

I have brought along this volume of Chairman Mao's poems. It includes the two final poems he wrote. It is in both Chinese and English.

Kissinger: Thank you so much. I recently read a beautiful poem by Chairman Mao. I believe it was the last one he wrote.

Chiao: This is the complete, published edition of Chairman Mao's poems.

Kissinger: I'm very touched and deeply moved by Chairman Mao's poems and I thank you very much for your volume.

Chiao: I promised it to you and I'm glad I remembered to bring it.

(Chiao then escorted the Secretary downstairs to the door of the PRC mission and the two bade a warm farewell.)

158. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and Director of Central Intelligence Bush[1]

Washington, November 3, 1976.

SUBJECT

U.S. Force Reductions on Taiwan

The recommendation of the Department of Defense that the draw down to 1400 DOD civilian and military personnel on Taiwan directed in NSDM 339 be achieved by March 31, 1977 vice December 31, 1976, is approved.[2] The "authorized level" of DOD personnel on Taiwan should be reduced as directed to 1400 by December 31, 1976; however, the number of individuals actually on Taiwan should be approximately 1950. Status reports on the drawdown should be provided at regular intervals.

Brent Scowcroft

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[1] Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–67 and H–68, NSDM 339. Top Secret; Umbra; Sensitive. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a November 5 memorandum to the same recipients, Jeanne Davis removed the codeword classification. (Ibid.) William Gleysteen, in an October 21 memorandum to Scowcroft, recommended the course of action set forth in this memorandum. (Ibid.)

[2] The recommendation was in an October 22 memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Ellsworth to Scowcroft. (Ibid.) NSDM 339 is printed as Document 156.

159. Editorial Note

On November 11, 1976, the Central Intelligence Agency issued National Intelligence Estimate 13–76 entitled "PRC Defense Policy and Armed Forces." This estimate concluded that the People's Republic of China perceived the United States as weakened and as less of a direct military threat than the Soviet Union. It also noted the PRC's fear of a U.S.–USSR compromise that would leave the PRC to confront the Soviets alone. (National Intelligence Council, *Tracking the Dragon* from accompanying compact disc with additional documents)

On December 21, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with Chief of the PRC Liaison Office Huang Zhen from 4:35 to 5:40 p.m.

Huang remarked that it had been several months since he had met with Kissinger. In the interim the United States had held a presidential election, while in the People's Republic of China, "Our Party's Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng has followed Chairman Mao's behest and smashed at one blow the 'Gang of Four' and the anti-Party clique." Huang queried Kissinger about Cyrus Vance, whom President-elect Jimmy Carter had designated to be Secretary of State in his upcoming administration. Kissinger said, "It's my conviction that the line as we discussed it with Chairman Mao and other Chinese leaders, especially Chairman Mao, about having common interests, especially in relations with the Soviet Union, must be a basic principle of American foreign policy. I will always support this policy and do my best to see to it that it is maintained, and I believe that Secretary Vance will also see matters in a similar light." (Memorandum of conversation; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 6, China, unnumbered items (38), 12/3–12/29/76)

A few weeks later, on January 8, 1977, Kissinger hosted Huang and Vance in the Secretary's Dining Room at the Department of State. Huang declared that his country continued to insist upon three actions that the United States must take before there could be an improvement in relations with the People's Republic of China: "sever the diplomatic relationship with Taiwan, withdraw U.S. troops from Taiwan, and abrogate the Treaty." Huang complained about Carter's recent interview in *Time* magazine, in which "he openly called Taiwan 'China' and even in the same breath put Taiwan on a par with the People's Republic of China. And we think this kind of remark runs counter to the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué." Vance responded, "As far as President Carter is concerned, let me assure you that he stands firmly behind the implementation of the Shanghai Communiqué as the guiding principle which should govern our bilateral relations." A few minutes later, Vance noted, "Let me say that I fully accept the principle of one China." (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., unnumbered items (39), 1/6–1/14/77)