

Helsinki Summit, July 20–August 8, 1975

319. Editorial Note

Throughout July 1975, President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger discussed preparations for the President's trip to Helsinki for the final stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which would include meetings with individual European leaders in Helsinki and stops in Europe before and after the conference.

During their conversations, the issue arose of whether Ford should meet with Soviet dissident writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn, whom the Soviets had permitted to emigrate to the United States, before the Helsinki conference. Kissinger wrote in his memoirs: "Solzhenitsyn was expelled from the Soviet Union on February 13, 1974, and came to the United States some months later. The AFL-CIO, under the leadership of its strongly anti-Communist president, George Meany, invited him to address a dinner in Washington on June 30, 1975, not long before Ford's departure to sign the Final Act of the European Security Conference. The date had been carefully chosen; if Solzhenitsyn expressed anything like his well-known views, he would supply plenty of material for the opponents of CSCE. Solzhenitsyn did not disappoint his sponsors. [. . .] Solzhenitsyn urged the United States to lead a crusade against Communism even inside the Soviet Union and disdained the argument that such a course represented interference in Soviet domestic affairs: 'Interfere more and more,' Solzhenitsyn implored. 'Interfere as much as you can. We beg you to come and interfere.' [. . .] On July 2, Senators Jesse Helms and Strom Thurmond contacted Ford's counselor, Jack Marsh, to request an appointment for Solzhenitsyn with the President before July 5, when Solzhenitsyn was scheduled to leave Washington. [. . .] Ford decided not to receive Solzhenitsyn and had Marsh cite scheduling difficulties as the reason. [. . .] I was on vacation in St. John in the Virgin Islands when all this occurred. Scowcroft knew my views and informed me after the decision had been made. I concurred." (Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, page 650) For the text of Solzhenitsyn's speech, see Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *Warning to the West* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1976), page 48.

On July 13, Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft discussed the President's schedule before and after the conference in Helsinki, along with whether he should meet with Solzhenitsyn. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: "Kissinger: You [President Ford] should really stop in London on the way back. Schmidt wants you to spend one day, but he wants you to see the troops also. He wants a dinner that night. You could spend 1½ days in Warsaw and get to Helsinki on

the evening of the 29th. See Brezhnev the morning of the 30th, and the 2nd. That would give the 2nd and 3rd for Bucharest, and 3rd–4th in Belgrade. On the 4th and 5th you could see Asad, go through London on the 6th. The Poles want you to go to another city—Gdansk—but the Germans would be violently opposed. But you could go to Krakow. Ford: Okay. It would be good to go to one city, outside the city of Warsaw. Kissinger: I hope you won't see Solzhenitsyn before you see Brezhnev. President: He was pretty good on television. Kissinger: What would our guys say if he entertained someone trying to overthrow you? President: I think the worst is over. We took a lot of flak." On July 21, Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft discussed Ford's planned visit to Poland before the Helsinki conference. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: "Kissinger: Now Auschwitz. It is sort of bad taste to go to someplace which commemorates not an outrage basically against Poles, but against Jews. President: Your judgment is better than mine on this. Kissinger: I shouldn't have asked Schmidt about Gdansk. Scowcroft: I think we can separate the wreath-laying [at Auschwitz] from the museums, etc. President: I don't want to go to the horror parts." (Both in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 282, Presidential File, Memoranda of Conversation, 1975 July, Folder 1)

On the morning of July 24, Kissinger, Ford, and Scowcroft discussed the participation of Department of Defense representatives in the various meetings in Helsinki. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: "Kissinger: If you bring someone from Defense in the Brezhnev meetings, it will be taken. . . . President: It must be clearly understood that no Defense representative will be in the meetings. They can go to Helsinki but not to the meetings. Kissinger: Will you tell the Department of Defense that the meetings are usually restricted to the President, me, the NSC staff and a notetaker? Scowcroft: Yes." The same afternoon, Ford and Scowcroft met with Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger in the Oval Office. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: "Schlesinger: Helsinki. Ellsworth will go along on the understanding that if it's more people than you and Kissinger, he will sit in. President: I have decided on Kissinger, Scowcroft, and Stoessel. If there are expanded meetings, that is a different matter. But usually it has been just that. Schlesinger: Ellsworth is touchy. If he weren't sure he would be in the meetings, I think I would just as soon send Bergold. President: I think I can only say it will be the four I have mentioned. Schlesinger: I think I should send Jim Wade (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA) as a resource, then." (Both in Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 14; ellipsis in the original transcript)

320. Memorandum From Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, July 21, 1975.

SUBJECT

Legal Disclaimers in CSCE Final Document

In accordance with the request at Tab II,² I have drafted the memorandum at Tab I for your signature to the President reviewing the language in the CSCE documents which makes clear that the obligations undertaken by the signatories are not legally binding.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Tab I³

SUBJECT

Legal Disclaimers in CSCE Final Document

The following paragraphs identify the measures taken in negotiating the CSCE final document⁴ to make clear that the obligations undertaken by the signatories are not legally binding.

The United States, and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom and Federal Republic of Germany, have insisted throughout the CSCE negotiations that language be included in the final document establishing that the obligations undertaken by the signatories are not legally binding. Two elements of the final document and a letter transmitting it to the UN collectively ensure that it will not be legally binding:

—Within the document, there is a reference to the fact that it will not be registered with the United Nations. Article 102 of the UN Charter states that every treaty and international agreement will be

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Box 13, Presidential Trip Files, July 26–August 4, 1975, Europe, General (7). Confidential. Sent for action. Scowcroft wrote in the margin: “Discussed with Pres.” According to an attached routing memorandum, Scowcroft discussed it with the President on July 25.

² Tab II, a memorandum from Clift to Scowcroft, July 2, which contained a status report on the CSCE legal disclaimer, is attached but not printed. Scowcroft wrote at the bottom of the memorandum on July 19: “Denis—Will you update this *urgently* for the President? Thanks.”

³ This draft memorandum from Kissinger to the President, sent for information, was neither signed nor dated.

⁴ For the text of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, August 1, 1975, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

registered; by implication, therefore, the unregistered document is neither a treaty nor an agreement.

—A letter will be sent to the UN Secretary General asking him not to register the document but only to circulate it to the member states. *The letter is to be formally adopted by the CSCE Stage III participants and transmitted to the UN Secretary General by the Government of Finland. The letter text includes the following: “. . . permit me to draw your attention to the fact that neither the final act nor any of the documents referred to in it are treaties or international agreements, and therefore they are not to be registered in whole or in part with the Secretariat of the United Nations. . .”* This statement would clearly indicate that the document is not legally binding.

—Finally, there is an indirect disclaimer near the end of the final document. It reads as follows:

“Wherefore the undersigned high representatives of the participating states, conscious of the high political importance they attach to the results of the conference, and declaring their determination to act in accordance with the provisions contained in the above texts have subscribed their signatures below.”

This language serves to emphasize that the participating states are undertaking political commitments rather than legally binding obligations.

321. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford¹

Washington, undated.

Meeting With Americans of Eastern European Background To Discuss European Security Conference

Friday, July 25, 1975

11:00 a.m. (30 minutes)

The Cabinet Room

I. Purpose

You are having this meeting to review the results to be expected from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe summit you will be attending in Helsinki on July 30–August 1, 1975.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Box 13, Presidential Trip Files, July 26–August 4, 1975, Europe, General (13). Administratively Confidential. A stamped notation on the first page reads: “The President has seen.”

Your purpose will be to:

—explain CSCE as part of the East-West process of reducing tensions and increasing cooperation and stability, noting that this process, and in particular US–USSR efforts to build a more constructive relationship are central to efforts for peace in this nuclear era;

—state that CSCE does not represent the culmination of détente, that all participants will have to implement the provisions of the CSCE declarations if there is to be real progress; and

—emphasize that CSCE is not a peace treaty, it does not adversely affect the interests of Baltic-Americans; that, in fact, the language of the CSCE declarations supports peaceful change of frontiers and promises greater contacts between East and West.

II. Background, Participants & Press Arrangements

A. *Background:* American citizens of ethnic Eastern European background, particularly those of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian extraction, have expressed serious concern about implications of CSCE results for territorial questions in Eastern Europe.

In recent months, groups of Baltic-Americans have launched a major campaign to elicit reassurances that our policy of non-recognition of the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic states is not affected by CSCE. The Department of State has repeatedly noted in answer to Congressional inquiries that U.S. policy toward the Baltic states is unchanged, but the Baltic-American campaign continues.

Congressman Derwinski² has advised that if you will make an unequivocal statement that CSCE has no effect on United States non-recognition of the Soviets' incorporation of the Baltic states, this issue could be defused.

This meeting will provide you with the useful opportunity to place the CSCE results in proper perspective and to assure the Baltic-American and other Eastern European-American representatives that your going to Helsinki is in the best interests of the United States and does not adversely affect their interests.

B. *Participants:* List at Tab B.³

C. *Press Arrangements:* Meeting to be announced. White House photographer.

² Edward J. Derwinski (R-IL).

³ Attached but not printed. See Document 322.

III. Talking Points

Suggested remarks for the meeting, cleared with Paul Theis, are at Tab A.⁴

⁴ Attached but not printed. For the final text of President Ford's remarks at the meeting, see *Public Papers: Ford, 1975*, pp. 1030–1033.

322. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 25, 1975, 11:10–11:55 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Kazys Bobelis, President, Lithuanian-American Council
Dr. Lev Dobriansky, President, Ukrainian-American Congress
Aloysius Mazewski, President, Polish National Alliance
Joseph L. Osajda, President, Polish Roman Catholic Union
Dr. Andras Pogany, President, Hungarian Freedom Fighters Association
Frank J. Vodrazka, President, Czechoslovakian Society of America
Henry J. Scheib, President, Aid Association of Lutherans
Albert Bosch, National Chairman, Steuben Society of America
Joseph Lesawyer, President, Ukrainian National Association
Dr. Mikulas Ferjencik, Director, Czechoslovak National Council of America
Uldis I. Grava, President, Latvian World Organization
Paul P. Dargis, President, Lithuanian American Alliance
Heikki A. Leesment, Member, Board of Directors of the American Estonian
Organization
Edward Behuncik, Slovak League of America
Stephen P. Mugar, Chairman, Board of Directors of the Armenian Assembly
Mike Bachar, Vice Chairman, Byelo Russian Congress Committee
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Sowers, Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Max L. Friedersdorf, Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs
Representative Edward J. Derwinski
Representative Thomas E. Morgan
Representative Clement J. Zablocki
Representative Lucien N. Nedzi
Representative Dan Rostenkowski

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 14. Administratively Confidential. Drafted by Cliff. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

Representative Daniel J. Flood
Representative Jack F. Kemp
A. Denis Clift, National Security Council Staff (Notetaker)

President: Please sit down everybody. It is nice to see you all (the press photographers were admitted for photographs and then departed). Again, let me welcome you; this is an important subject, and I have a prepared statement that I'd like to read—I'll see that you all get copies—and then I'll be very happy to take your questions. I would note that the Secretary of State will be here until about 11:20 and then he will have to leave for a press conference.

(The President then read the statement at Tab B,² and upon conclusion there was applause. The President then opened the floor to questions.)

Dr. Ferjencik: Mr. President you understand our position. We don't trust the Communists; we don't trust the Soviet Union. Many of us have had personal experiences and so have our people. Mr. President, would it be possible for you to make a short brief statement to the people behind the Iron Curtain that we are not abandoning them?

President: I am not sure that I have understood every word of your question. However, I do think that the statement that I have just read does that. It will be a public statement.

Mr. Dargis: Mr. President, on behalf of the Baltic-American community, we greatly appreciate the disclaimer you have made on the Baltic States. Is there a possibility of your reading this in Finlandia Hall or in a press conference or in a meeting with the Baltic States delegation which will be there?

President: I'll take that suggestion under advisement. I do have a copy of my proposed remarks for Helsinki in my office, however because of other business I have not had a chance to go over it. I will take your suggestions into consideration.

Mr. Vodrazka: Mr. President, if you could issue a statement to the people behind the Iron Curtain it would be most important. Your remarks do this generally, however you do not address the people behind the Iron Curtain; what can we tell them through our press.

President: I think the countries that will be represented there are identified and the people who live in those countries will know that I have just read this statement.

Mr. Vodrazka: But you don't address them specifically.

President: But you can take this statement that I have just read and quite properly you can interpret it.

² Not attached. For the text of the President's address, see *Public Papers: Ford, 1975*, pp. 1030–1033.

Mr. Lesawyer: Mr. President we are concerned about the dissidents in the Soviet Union. When you went to Vladivostok we asked you to raise the case of Valentyn Moroz,³ the Ukrainian who is imprisoned. I know you have discussed the question of Soviet Jewish emigrants, but we would like you to raise the case of others. We would request and appreciate your bringing up the case of Moroz.

General Scowcroft: You have already done so, Mr. President.

President: Gentlemen, this is General Scowcroft of the National Security Council. As he says, we have done this and we will follow up.

Dr. Pogany: Mr. President we are going to give the Soviets propaganda that they will use. Your fine statement will not get behind the Iron Curtain. You expect us to do this for you; maybe we will, but our efforts won't get through the Iron Curtain. Even if we do get this through, your going to Helsinki is a disappointment to us and we are Republicans. This is a setback over here.

Mr. Mazewski: Mr. President, the Polish National Alliance has prepared a memorandum supporting your attendance at Helsinki with reservations. If at the time of signing the Helsinki documents you could issue some kind of statement—a conditional statement on the freedom of movement and the ultimate government of self-determination for all peoples—it would be helpful. The gentleman [Dr. Pogany]⁴ is right, the people over here are upset. But we recognize that your not going would be a greater catastrophe. We need some kind of assurance. We are not alone. The press doesn't understand it. *The New York Times*, *U.S. News and World Report*, *Newsweek* don't understand it. The writer said that seven Presidents have tried détente and failed. We feel that the State Department is bending backwards rather than forwards in dealing with the Russians. It is necessary to have a statement by you prior to signing the Helsinki documents. This should get into Radio Free Europe and the European press. I think this will make them think twice. Our people read more now. They know more, we need some kind of statement they can read.

President: We are in the process of preparing my statement for Helsinki and I welcome your suggestions. I haven't looked at your statement yet but we will see if it can fit in.

Rep. Derwinski: Mr. President, this statement that you have just delivered will be released to the press. It will be picked up by the VOA and RFE.

Mr. Mazewski: Can we be assured that VOA will carry it?

³ Moroz, an imprisoned Ukrainian historian, went on a hunger strike in the fall of 1974 to protest conditions at the prison in Vladimir.

⁴ Brackets in the original.

President: What I have just read you is an official statement by the President of the United States of America. I would think they could carry it.

Rep. Derwinski: Mr. President, I think VOA will undoubtedly report this.

Rep. Zablocki: We are assuming a great deal. We will have to follow through. Those here in 1948 and 1966 still don't believe as they still have reservations; they are fearful that they are giving up the rights of millions who are struggling to make sure they have their freedom. We should make sure that RFE and VOA carry this statement, and we should tell the press that we have met with you and that all are in accord with you.

Mr. Bachar: I want to make an appeal that VOA broadcasts reports in Byelo Russian; we have been told that Byelo Russians understand Russian, and that for this reason it is not necessary. They have to understand Russian! But, it is insulting, it deprives them of hope and the feeling that we care. We hope it will be possible to include a full hour of broadcasts in Byelo Russian.

Rep. Flood: Mr. President, I've been around a long time. This is the first time in 30 years that I've seen a meeting like this! If there could be a press release that these people are here, that the names of those organizations and the names of those speaking for them, if this could be known, this could make an impression behind the Iron Curtain.

President: I believe this is the first time that a President has met with a group of this kind.

Rep. Rostenkowski: Mr. President, I can only echo what Dan Flood has said, this is a courageous step on your part to bring these people together. I know there are reports of people not being happy about your making this trip but the fact that you have brought us together and have pointed out that you are President and working in search of peace and that you will not be closing the door by going there is important.

I was your emissary recently in Poland⁵ and every government official I talked to as well as people walking in the street are excited by the fact that you are going there. It gives them hope, the fact that you are going.

⁵ Rostenkowski visited Poland June 6–11 as the President's representative for the opening of the U.S. exhibition USATECH '75. Telegram 3931 from Warsaw, June 23, reads in part: "Treatment extended by the Polish authorities to Presidential representative Congressman Dan Rostenkowski and to the entire US participation in the Poznan Fair this year was particularly cordial. The Polish hosts went out of their way to show that they were pleased with the present state of US-Polish relations and were hopeful that our ties would continue to grow at the current pace. With no prodding from the Embassy, the Poles arranged an appointment for Congressman Rostenkowski with First Secretary Gierek, who received the Congressman even though he was so bothered by a cold that he did not attend the opening of the Poznan Fair." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

Dr. Bobelis: I join with Rostenkowski in expressing my appreciation for this meeting. However, we have tremendous apprehensions the Soviet Union is interfering in Portugal. The Russians are pouring money into Portugal to obtain a Communist government. We are happy with the statement you have made; we believe in you. You are a champion of freedom and human rights.

Dr. Dobriansky: Mr. President, I support what Dan Flood has said. This is an unprecedented meeting. I second the framework and thrust of your statement. I am overwhelmed by your statement!

Moscow is going to make Helsinki a prime propaganda tool—they are going to make use of it. What do we do with your statement? There should be follow up. People in Eastern and Western Europe will be looking for guidelines of interpretation. The RFE and Radio Liberty should carry this in full.

Rep. Flood: And what about MBFR?

Dr. Dobriansky: CSCE was predicated on MBFR.

President: Yes.

Dr. Dobriansky: If those guidelines could be reemphasized and you could make a similar statement at Andrews Air Force Base and in Bonn it would be good.

President: Thanks Lev, I'll take one more comment and then I have to go to another meeting. For sometime now in a number of communities—Atlanta, Miami, Dallas, eight all together—we have been bringing together a cross section of the community, labor, management and others for a meeting with spokesmen of the Executive Branch for talks about energy or some other aspect of policy. Usually we have about 600 to 800 people and I have normally spoken. This program is under Bill Baroody on the White House staff. We are going to continue this. I'll make sure we broaden the base. It is my intention to bring someone on the staff when we hold such a meeting who will be representing ethnic groups and making sure that they are included and have the opportunity to participate. We haven't selected the man on the White Staff yet who will do this.

Jack Kemp, you haven't spoken yet.

Rep. Kemp: With an ethnic name like Kemp? Seriously Mr. President, I agree with Dan Rostenkowski. We have much appreciated Ed Derwinski organizing this meeting. It's a real manifestation of your desire on this issue and the people of Buffalo will appreciate it.

Mr. Vodrazka: Mr. President, I have a request; would you make an appeal to the Soviets to withdraw their army from Czechoslovakia? It is a police force and it should be removed.

President: I will take that into consideration.

Thank you all for the meeting.

323. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford¹

Washington, undated.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

Wednesday, July 30–Friday, August 1, 1975

Finlandia Hall

Helsinki, Finland

I. Purpose

The *United States, Canada* and 33 European states will participate in the third and concluding summit phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. You and each of the other political heads of state or government will sign the CSCE's final act, and each leader will address the Conference.

Through your presence at the Conference, you will demonstrate that the United States retains a vital interest in Europe, and that the security of the United States is tied through our participation in the Atlantic Alliance, to the stability of the European continent.

Your address to the Conference is scheduled for the morning of August 1, 1975. (Speaking order for the 35 participants was drawn by lot: Prime Minister Wilson is first, General Secretary Brezhnev 13th and you are 26th.) *Your speech, which will command worldwide attention, and your bilateral meetings during the conference will provide you with the very valuable opportunity to place the CSCE results in correct perspective.*

Your purpose will be to:

—evaluate the results of CSCE by stating that its declarations are not legally binding but, instead, represent political and moral commitments to lessen East-West tensions and increase contacts and cooperation;

—stress that while CSCE is a step forward, it is not the culmination of the process of détente, that large standing armies still oppose each other and that major differences between East and West remain to be resolved;

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Trip Files, Box 13, July 26–August 4, 1975, Europe, General (15). Secret. A stamped notation on the first page reads: "The President has seen." According to an attached covering memorandum, Clift drafted the memorandum and forwarded it to Kissinger on July 22.

—urge concrete implementation of the promises contained in the declarations, noting the importance the United States attaches to the humanitarian provisions and stating that Europe's military security problems still must be dealt with in MBFR and that SALT II must still be concluded.

II. Background, Participants and Press Arrangements

A. *Background*: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is the product of a long-standing Soviet proposal first raised in 1954 and resurrected in the aftermath of the Czech invasion in 1968. The Western governments recognized the proposal for what it was—a vehicle by which the Soviet Union hoped first to freeze the political map of Europe and then to extend its political influence westward. *The strong Soviet interest in the Conference led the West to exploit it in three ways*:

—*to gain Soviet concessions in East-West political issues*. The successful conclusion of the Berlin agreement in 1971, the agreement between East and West Germany, and the initiation of MBFR talks all were to some degree related to the linkage established by the West between progress on these political questions and the West's gradual acceptance of a CSCE.

—*to allow governments of Western Europe, both neutrals and members of NATO, to participate in the détente process*. Western governments were thus able to respond to a strongly held public feeling that relations between East and West were changing, that the process should be encouraged and that the management of the process should not be left to the US and USSR alone.

—*to introduce into the CSCE, as a condition for its successful conclusion, the issue of human rights—the so-called “freer movement” questions*.

The United States has participated in the CSCE with restraint, wishing neither to block the efforts of its Allies nor to have the CSCE seen as a source of contention between the US and the Soviet Union. Our objectives have been to maintain Alliance cohesion; to insist that the CSCE's declarations are political, not legal; and to seek such possibilities of easing tension between East and West as might be possible.

After two years of difficult negotiation, a CSCE balance sheet shows that:

—*the Soviets have achieved a CSCE*. It will be concluded at the summit, in a historically unique event. The final declarations will give the Soviets some basis to claim that Europe's frontiers have been confirmed along their present configurations, and that the political consequences of World War II have been digested and are universally accepted.

—*the CSCE results are not wholly what the Soviets wanted*. The documents are not legally binding. The statement of principles, even if the

Soviets seek to lend it the color of law, by its language falls short of supporting the Soviet objective of freezing Europe's political configuration. Peaceful change of borders is allowed; the right to self-determination is stated in sweeping terms. Our rights in Berlin have been preserved. *The Soviets did not get agreement to a post-CSCE European security arrangement designed to undermine NATO.*

—beyond that, *the philosophy which permeates most of the CSCE's declarations is that of the West's open societies.* The thrust implicit in the declarations is toward greater human rights, the freer movement of peoples and wider access to information. In response, Warsaw Pact members have tightened internal discipline.

Final judgment on the results of CSCE will depend

—initially on which side is able most persuasively to propagate its version of the CSCE and its version of future European security. The solemnity of the occasion will favor the Soviet Union, as will the simplicity of the Soviet message—that peace has arrived. *The West has a more complex story to tell: that CSCE achievements are modest, that the proof of the CSCE's success lies in the future, and that a strong Allied defense posture is a precondition for security and future détente.*

The Conference Documents. CSCE work has covered four major substantive areas, known as "baskets," concerning: political and military questions; economic, scientific and technological cooperation; cooperation in strengthening human contacts, the exchange of information, and cultural and educational relations; and post-conference follow-up arrangements.

Basket 1

Under the first agenda item, conference negotiators have produced a declaration of the following ten principles of interstate relations:

- Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty.
- Refraining from the threat or use of force.
- Inviolability of frontiers.
- Territorial integrity of states.
- Peaceful settlement of disputes.
- Non-intervention in internal affairs.
- Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.
- Equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
- Cooperation among states.
- Fulfillment in good faith of international obligations.

The Soviets were especially anxious to gain Western acceptance of an unambiguous principle on inviolability of frontiers by force. Western participants made absolutely clear, however, that their agreement to this precept would in no sense constitute formal recognition of existing European frontiers or imply that present borders are immutable. The Federal Republic of Germany, with the firm support of its NATO

Allies, insisted on a reference in the Declaration of Principles to the possibility of effecting border changes by peaceful means. The United States took an active role in negotiation of this key text on peaceful border changes, which is included in the principle of sovereign equality.

Also under agenda item 1, CSCE participants have negotiated limited military security measures designed to strengthen mutual trust and confidence. Specific texts were produced on two modest but significant “confidence-building measures”: prior notification of military maneuvers, and exchange of observers at those maneuvers.

Basket 2

Under agenda item 2, the Geneva talks have produced a series of declarations or resolutions concerned with economic, scientific and technological, and environmental cooperation. These declarations should help broaden East-West industrial cooperation, reduce barriers to trade, increase scientific exchanges, and cooperation in the environment.

Basket 3

The third agenda item—Basket 3—deals with increased human contacts, flow of information, and cooperation in cultural and educational relations. This item was included on the CSCE agenda only as a result of energetic efforts by the United States, our Allies, and the neutral states. Here we have negotiated especially sensitive issues for both East and West, partly because they deal with “ideological coexistence,” which has always been anathema to Moscow. At Geneva, agreement was reached on basket 3 texts dealing with such issues as: family reunification, family visits, marriages between nationals of different states, the right to travel, access to printed, as well as broadcast, information, improved working conditions for journalists, and stepped-up cultural and educational cooperation.

Basket 4

Under the fourth agenda item, the conference produced a text on post-CSCE “follow-up” arrangements. The debate here turned on the degree of institutionalization and continuity to be accorded post-conference activities. The final compromise text provides for unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral actions designed to carry forward the work of the conference and monitor the implementation of agreed texts. A meeting of experts will be convened in the first half of 1977 to prepare for a gathering of senior officials, later the same year, to review results of CSCE and plan for possible additional meetings in the future.

The CSCE Signing Ceremony. The concluding ceremony at which the CSCE Final Document will be signed will take place immediately after the last plenary session at approximately 5:00 p.m. August 1, on the stage of Finlandia Hall. The 35 heads of state or government will

be seated around a horseshoe-shaped table in French alphabetical order. *You will sit between FRG Chancellor Schmidt and Austrian President Kirchschaeger, and will be third to sign.* The participants will each sign once after the last item of the CSCE document.

B. *Participants*: The principal CSCE participants are listed alphabetically by country at Tab A.²

C. *Press Arrangements*: The CSCE summit will receive full press coverage.

III. Talking Points

1. The current working draft of your address to the CSCE summit is at Tab B.³ The text is being cleared with Paul Theis.

2. Talking points for your bilateral meetings during the course of the summit are being staffed in separate memoranda.

The accompanying Department of State briefing books⁴ contain:

—additional CSCE background.

—biographic sketches of the CSCE participants.

² Attached but not printed.

³ Attached but not printed. For the final text of Ford's address at the CSCE summit, see *Public Papers: Ford, 1975*, pp. 1074–1081.

⁴ Not attached. Papers from President Ford's briefing books for his trip are in Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Trip Files, Box 10, July 26–August 4, 1975, Europe, Briefing Book.

324. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Bonn, July 28, 1975, 8:35–9:05 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Deputy Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 14. Secret; Nodis. The conversation took place during breakfast at Schloss Gymnich. President Ford visited the Federal Republic of Germany (July 26–28) and Poland (July 28–29) en route to the CSCE summit in Helsinki (July 30–August 1). Memoranda of Ford's conversations with Schmidt on matters other than CSCE or MBFR on July 27 and 28 are *ibid.*

President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

SUBJECTS

Portugal; Energy; MBFR

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

The President: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] With Helsinki off the agenda, can we make progress on MBFR?

Chancellor Schmidt: The dust must settle first, but it will eventually become the next item on the agenda.

Secretary Kissinger: We are now discussing Option III,² without a complete agreement.

The President: What are the problems?

Secretary Kissinger: There are some who object to discussion of nuclear matters. Then there is also implicitly a ceiling when forces are withdrawn.

Chancellor Schmidt: I think I was one of the inventors of MBFR—in the latter part of the '50s. Once one starts to discuss reductions mutually, it is easier to tell the Congress that you can't reduce unilaterally. This is what led the U.S. to agree to try MBFR. Things have not gone too energetically, and I am content to have it that way. As long as we can hold the Congress off, what is the hurry?

Secretary Kissinger: But the Congress one day will say that since they can't be negotiated, they must be done unilaterally.

The President: I think it will come sooner than later. Vietnam held it off, but I think it will not last long.

Chancellor Schmidt: Could we tailor progress to your domestic necessities?

The President: That would be helpful.

Chancellor Schmidt: On the substance, I can't say anything.

Secretary Kissinger: On the substance, we need a serious review. It is a ridiculous position. We have put forth Option III. Perhaps some serious people should get together to decide what a serious proposal might be.

Chancellor Schmidt: Then we will do it to suit your pace. We are under no pressure.

² See Document 357.

The President: I think now that CSCE is out of the way, the Congress may push again. The Congress can be most difficult. Vietnam kept it out of the debate last year, but we could have a bad year if it looks like stalling.

Chancellor Schmidt: We don't want to stall, but we have no reason to push. There are some pushing in my party but that I can handle.

325. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Warsaw, July 28, 1975, 4:30–5:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Poland

Foreign Minister Olszowski

Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Spasowski

Director, America Department—Jan Kinast

Director, Foreign Department, Central Committee—Ryszard Frelek

U.S.

The Secretary of State

Lt. General Scowcroft

Ambassador Davies

Counselor Sonnenfeldt

Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Olszowski: I think the words of the First Secretary inspired all of us and what I would like to do in our meeting this afternoon is to get right down to cases and I have ten points to present to you.

The Secretary: Why not? That's what God did.

Olszowski: I will try to concentrate this in a very short period. The first point is that I wish to welcome you most heartily. The second point is that I would like to present to you the state of our relations. I think that they are good, that they are growing better and developing. I think that we are generally moving to a higher stage. I would like to emphasize the important role which I believe Ambassador Davies has played.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 273, Memoranda of Conversation, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman. Approved by James Covey (S). The meeting took place in the Polish Foreign Ministry.

The Secretary: I am delighted to hear that. He is one of our very best Ambassadors and I have complete confidence in him.

Olszowski: That is our feeling too. On the economic side of our relations the joint US-Polish commissions and institutions are exploring means of cooperation. For example, on the coal side the Koppers Company has been doing good work. In industrial cooperation we have been talking to General Motors about a truck plant and, similarly, we have worked out an arrangement to build color television screens in this country. Our cultural exchanges are also very important. It seems to me that in our bilateral relations we are ahead of most of the obligations and demands that are made in the Helsinki documents. We are doing more already. We want to make the U.S. society more aware of our culture and vice-versa.

In political contacts they have been very close between our Foreign Ministry and the State Department. There are two special arrangements that I would like to mention. The first is on civil aviation where we would like to expand our bilateral cooperation. We have requested support from you to increase the frequency of our civil air exchanges. We also would like to see a new route developed to Chicago. The second is in the area of fishing. We express appreciation for the two agreements we have reached. We request consideration for Polish fishing vessels to call at the West coast.

Beyond the CSCE Conference we have a chance to develop positive relations in European cooperation by implementing the decisions of the Conference and we wish you to know that we are ready to implement those decisions. In general, on *détente*, we think cooperation in Europe is good. Both East and West seem to desire this. Our relations are excellent with all countries.

We still have some problems with the Federal Republic which I referred to in the car. Very briefly to evaluate these we have had several months of confidential negotiations. Both sides are trying to overcome the difficulties, but there are three issues that remain. First, the settlement of Poles in the Federal Republic. This is not a substantive disagreement but we differ over numbers. We think that the FRG figures are too high. There are not that many applications. We think a realistic figure is 110,000 with ten thousand more or less on each side of that figure. Second, there is the question of compensation for victims of Nazi acts. The Federal Republic does not wish to see this matter linked directly to compensation but searches for another way. They, for example, have talked about a social security payment and we think that it is possible to reach a conclusion on this if the Federal Republic shows sufficient imagination. We would like to sign such an agreement at Helsinki. That would be our contribution to a furthering of *détente*.

On the UN question, Ambassador Davies has given us the text of an oral note. We have read with great interest your Milwaukee speech² and we are ready to cooperate. We'll consider any proposal you wish to make. We share your view that there should not be confrontation but rather negotiation. We are already very attached to the principle of universality and, therefore, we are very negative toward the expulsion of any member of the United Nations.

There is one further UN issue and that is the question of the succession to Waldheim and the new Secretary General. We would like to see that problem settled without too much difficulty. Now I believe that is nine of my points. The tenth is that I would like you to visit us for a longer period of time, Mr. Secretary.

The Secretary: I very much appreciate the points you have made and I particularly accept your tenth point with pleasure. My wife was sad that she was not able to be with me and she is very interested in coming to visit in Poland.

Olszowski: We are looking forward very much to such a visit.

The Secretary: First, let me say on our basic relations that I think they are good and that they are improving. We are prepared to continue such improvement on the understanding that there will be differences due to our different geography and ideology and we are prepared to be understanding of the effects of geography and ideology on your policies. We think that improvement can take place and that these things can be reconciled with our other objectives. We are sympathetic to many Polish ideas.

Second, on the fish problem I think we are making progress and I hope that we will be able to be helpful.

Third, on air routes there is a general difficulty in our air situation these days, but it certainly ought to be possible for you to fly between two Polish cities like Warsaw and Chicago. I will look into this further.

Fourth, on the European situation and the implementation of principles of Helsinki we will cooperate and we look forward particularly to some progress in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna. Despite the present tendencies in the United States, we think that détente will be irreversible. After next year and the elections things should be quieter in the United States.

Fifth, we very much appreciate the ideas expressed by the First Secretary at lunch on the UN et cetera. We should not have any confrontations. The developed countries including Poland have nothing to gain by conflicts in the UN. We want to encourage the LDCs to think about

² For Kissinger's news conference in Milwaukee on July 16, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 4, 1975, pp. 179–184.

their problems in a positive sense. We want to make a number of technical proposals to deal with LDC problems and not have an ideological debate. That is what we look forward to doing in the Seventh Special UN Session. We certainly appreciate your support for the principle of universality which we share. If there is an attempt to exclude Israel, we would have to reconsider our whole attitude toward the UN and I may say that we include suspension as well as exclusion in this attitude.

Sixth, on the Secretary General we will stay in touch. I think we see eye to eye on this matter.

Seventh, with respect to the FRG negotiations in our talks with them³ they mentioned to us that there were some 300,000 ethnic Germans who wished to emigrate from Poland. They feel that the minimum number they need in the negotiations with you is 130,000 over a period of three or four years but I am sure they are prepared to look at the question closely. They need, however, to have some provision that the matter can receive continuing consideration in the future.

Olszowski: We are prepared to accept such a clause and we should therefore be able to reach agreement on that. We do not think, however, that 300,000 is a real figure.

The Secretary: I think the 130,000 is the key. If you can accept that then there would not be a problem. They explained the complications particularly due to the fact that they need Bundesrat approval for part of the deal.

Olszowski: Yes, specifically, they have offered 1.3 billion Deutsch marks in social security payments and 1 billion in a straight payment to the Polish Government. Your mention of the Bundesrat is a new element and we hope that this will not delay a settlement.

The Secretary: No, I believe that they are very eager to have a settlement. We would like to see it also. Genscher is confident that there will be an agreement but he did not wish to sign it at Helsinki although he is prepared to see it concluded there. He would like it to be signed instead in Warsaw or Bonn.

³ No record of this conversation has been found. Sonnenfeldt wrote to Ambassador Hillenbrand in telegram Secto 8038 from Warsaw, July 28: "You should see FonMin Genscher and tell him that the Secretary has spoken to FonMin Olszowski on the subject of the repatriation of ethnic Germans. He took the matter up precisely as agreed between the Secretary and Genscher. Olszowski indicated he could accept an open-ended clause about the future. He also indicated he could go up to 120,000 in the present agreement. The Secretary made it clear that the West Germans were very firm about the figure of 130,000. He wants Genscher to know that he took the first opportunity of raising the subject." Hillenbrand replied in telegram 12162 from Bonn that he conveyed Kissinger's message to Genscher, who "expressed his gratitude." Genscher said that "the Germans would now carry on the negotiation in Helsinki." (Both in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

Olszowski: Thank you very much for this information. We want to have good relations with the FRG and good relations between our two peoples.

The Secretary: The FRG wishes to have the same and achieve it for all of Europe.

Olszowski: We want to conclude by thanking you very much.

The Secretary: I want to say that as far as the number of points is concerned I will recall a story of negotiating with Israel where they told me they had seven points to make. They then said that the first seven points would depend on an eighth point. After two hours of hearing their points, I said I would like to comment on their seven points. They were immediately outraged because they said I had forgotten their eighth point and was already trying to cheat them out of one point.

326. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Warsaw, July 28, 1975, 5:15–6:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

US-Polish Relations

PARTICIPANTS

Poland

Edward Gierek—First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party

Henryk Jablonski—Chairman of the Council of State

Piotr Jaroszewicz—Chairman of the Council of Ministers

Stefan Olszowski—Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ryszard Frelek—Member of the Secretariat and Director of the Foreign Department of the CC of the Polish United Workers Party

Jerzy Waszczuk—Director of the Chancellery of the CC of the Polish United Workers Party

Kazimierz Secomski—First Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers

Romuald Spasowski—Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Włodzimierz Janiurek—Undersecretary of State in the Office of the Council of Ministers and Press Spokesman

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 14. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Andrews and approved by Hartman. The conversation took place in the Sejm (the Polish Parliament).

Witold Trampczynski—Ambassador of the Polish People's Republic in Washington

Jan Kinast—Director of Department II in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

US

President Ford

Henry A. Kissinger—Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Richard T. Davies—Ambassador of the United States in Warsaw

Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft—Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Helmut Sonnenfeldt—Counselor, Department of State

Arthur A. Hartman—Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

A. Denis Clift—Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

Nicholas G. Andrews—Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State

The President: Is it permissible to smoke?

Gierek: Yes, I think so. This is a painting by Matejko.² It depicts a meeting of the Polish parliament on May 3, 1791. That was the date on which the Constitution was adopted. This painting is the story of that event.

The President: That is about the same time our Congress first met. (The press leaves.)

Gierek: There was a period when any Polish leader who wished to veto a proposal raised his hand and the proposal was finished. People speak of that period of Polish history as a period when true democracy flourished. But the question is: Was that really democracy or anarchy?

Mr. President, I would like once again on behalf of myself and the Polish Government and State to express my heartfelt satisfaction with your visit to Poland. I am convinced that you can feel the sympathy and respect which the Polish people have for the people of the United States and for you personally. Also, I would like to say again that my wife and I recall with great pleasure our visit to the United States.³ I recall my talks with you and your collaborators and I saw evidence in the United States of friendship for the Polish people. Your visit takes place at a time of particularly intensive development of United States-Polish relations and this makes me very happy. Our exchange of views will provide a new stimulus for the future development of relations as well as for peaceful cooperation on an international plane. For many important reasons, your visit, Mr. President, is of paramount importance. It seems to me that it comes about at the proper time. My col-

² Jan Matejko, a late 19th century Polish painter.

³ See Document 256.

leagues and I regret that it is such a short visit. I would like to have acquainted you with more of our achievements and with all that the Polish people have accomplished. With your permission, Mr. President, I propose, before we discuss Soviet-Polish-American relations, that I inform you briefly about developments in Poland.

The President: I would be very glad to hear you make that presentation.

Gierek: Your visit, Mr. President, is taking place in a year in which we are finishing our five-year program of economic development. We are now preparing a new program, 1976–1980. The balance sheet of the five-year plan which we are finishing is tremendous. During this period, we are achieving production growth of 70%. Growth in agriculture is more than 20%. We are increasing national income by about 60%. We are making a great investment effort. We are making very great efforts for the expansion of modern branches of industry, including raw materials, electrical engineering, ship building, food industry and light industry. As a result of these accomplishments we are achieving important social results. The growth of employment in the national economy will be increased by 1,800,000 people. During the current five-year plan, we have as salaried employees more than 11 million people in industries and services. Real wages will have grown by 40%. Equally high is the growth of the incomes of the rural population. I want to tell you that along with these achievements, during this five-year plan we are maintaining the same prices for basic foodstuffs. This is not easy for us. There are some problems, in the first place, concerning meat supplies. Consumption during this five-year plan has grown by 17 kilograms (more than 34 pounds) per capita. In other words, we are reaching our target of 70 kilograms per capita. Naturally, this is not the American standard, but if we consider that we have achieved in one five-year plan a growth of 17 kilograms, this points to the great effort which our State has taken and is still taking. On the subject of difficulties, the growth of wages and other incomes accounts for much greater demands for all kinds of market products. This we are trying to solve. These efforts of ours are not without difficulties. Our people have had a long period of hard work and sacrifices. They have had to build Poland up after tremendous war damage. Naturally, there are possibilities for us to improve the situation. We do it and strive for it but not without difficulties.

Our present speedy development is linked with the dynamic growth of foreign trade. This is true of all directions of our foreign trade. It is true of trade with the Soviet Union, the socialist countries, and economic exchanges with the West. The growth of oil prices, chemical semi-production and other raw materials, machinery and other equipment, result in quite definite difficulties faced by our economy.

We can also feel the effects of increases in prices in the West which accounts for nearly half of our foreign trade. I believe the situation will improve due to some advances in the relationships of certain goods which we export. We are now working on the main directions of our new five-year plan which in the fall we will present to all our people for a national discussion. Then, we will present the draft to the Seventh Session of the Party Congress in November.

In social policy, we are building during this five-year plan more than 100,000 apartments per year. During the next five-year plan, we estimate we shall build 1,500,000 apartments. These figures are not too high at all given our housing needs. The housing problem in Poland is extremely important, if you know what Poland was like after World War II. The first World War also resulted in certain damages and some of those damages have been preserved to this day. We try to devote much attention to housing. It is linked to the dynamic growth of the country in general and linked to a considerable birth rate. Poland has over 34,000,000 population and this trend still continues to be quite high. But houses have to be given to the people.

In the economy we now put much stress on the full utilization of raw materials including energy, the modernization of other branches of industry, and the acceleration of growth of food production. We have prepared a special program which we are now implementing. Poland has conditions for even more rapid development. We are one of the ten most highly industrialized countries in the world. We have an energy base, including not only coal (deposits of which are sufficient for 200 years), but also big deposits of copper, sulphur, salt and other raw materials. Naturally, we have a strong excavating industry and a scientific base. There are good natural conditions for an increase in food production which in a short period of time should make us self-sufficient. Our optimism and accelerated production make this possible. Poland has an exceptionally good structure of population. In 1971–80 about 6,500,000 young people start their work and they represent an active and very well educated cadre. I could mention also the conditions which assure us supplies of iron ore from the Soviet Union as well as conditions which provide opportunities for sale of our products in the Soviet Union. The most important factor on which we base ourselves is the active support of our people for a rapid socio-economic development of the country. The present development strategy should bring Poland a two-fold growth in income per capita. We shall, therefore, bring about a new quality in the living standards of our people. Naturally, Mr. President, the successful implementation of our strategy is based on the process of development of international détente. This favors the development of relations between the East and West and favors the easing of defense burdens which the country has to bear. Let

me not say anything more about social development. I shall pass to relations between our respective countries.

Poland is a socialist country linked by an unbreakable alliance with the Soviet Union. We are linked by the convergence of the basic interests of the socialist states. All our alliances strengthen the development of national identity and broad relations with our partners. This is true for reasons of development and it is particularly true with the United States. There are a number of objective factors which favor cooperation between Poland and the United States. They pertain to the role of the United States in the world, in Europe, and relations between our nations. The multi-million group of Americans of Polish descent, we consider, enrich and consolidate our relations. Today this is what *détente* means for the development of our cooperation. The key element in *détente* is cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result of our contacts in the economic, scientific, cultural and political areas and the contacts between our peoples, we can say that our relations have become less sensitive to inadvisable moments in the international session. This allows us to hope for further lasting cooperation between our two countries. We note with great satisfaction that we have made considerable progress both in the content of our relations and in the strengthening of the political climate. These are our feelings. It is your contribution and the contribution of your close collaborators whose support we very highly value. At this juncture let me thank Ambassador Davies for his personal share in the contribution to the development of our relations. He reminds us both of many issues from the position he occupies, and I should say that the process is reciprocal.

Before you came, we reviewed the implementation of all the agreements and decisions reached in the United States. We noted that they were being favorably implemented. We are convinced that these decisions and agreements will be implemented in the same way as thus far. It is our intention to expand Polish-American cooperation. We would like to ask you to sponsor this as you have done so far. During my visit to the United States, we concentrated on economic cooperation. I would like to call on the Prime Minister, but before I do so, let me touch upon some other questions. The present developments call for more frequent political contacts on different levels. I believe these contacts have proved useful and there is nothing against having topics developed, discussed and agreed in separate conversations.

As far as cultural cooperation and exchanges of information are concerned, we are aware of the position of the United States in CSCE on cultural exchanges and exchanges of persons, seeing in them a contribution to rapprochement among nations. Our people are eager to learn about the achievements of other peoples including the United States. The achievements of the United States in science and culture are

very widely known in Poland. We would like greater reciprocity. We see progress in that field. As for humanitarian relations, they do not have the character of a serious problem. Most cases are individual ones and we generally take care of them in a positive way.

We know that the United States is approaching its 200th anniversary. This was symbolized by the exhibit "The World of Franklin and Jefferson" which you were kind enough to speak about. The Bicentennial in the United States will be noted in a dignified way in Poland. We have been getting ready for a long time in Poland and will show all that which testifies to the greatness of the United States, the greatness of the American people.

Finally, Mr. President, we want to assure you that the people of Poland wish the great American people further development and further progress. Allow me to introduce the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, who would like to talk to you of specific economic problems.

Jaroszewicz: Mr. President, as we look at Polish-American economic relations, let me touch upon five questions. In 1974 trade exceeded \$770 million, an increase of 55 percent above 1973. In the balance sheet, this is accounted for by the growth of both imports and exports with an increase in Poland's disfavor from \$150 to \$250 million. This negative balance of trade was also affected by the growth in prices of agricultural products which we import.

First, in 1975 we have fixed a target of \$900 million. There are certain difficulties—passing difficulties—and we are taking a number of courses of action. What is particularly disquieting is the lack of new co-production agreements, as for instance the good cooperation with International Harvester.

Second, in agriculture, we note considerable possibilities for further exchanges, for agricultural exchanges. Poland is interested in long-term purchases of grain and fodder on the American market at a level of 1–1½ million tons annually within the framework of CCC credits. We are also interested in concluding a long-term agreement for the importation of grain and fodder. After the Soviet Union, the United States is the biggest partner for the improvement of the standard of living of the Polish people. We have had difficulties because the meteorological conditions have not been too satisfactory. We are able to count on the favorable attitude of the Soviet Union in this important question for us. We can offer long-term deliveries of our sugar to the United States. Deliveries of sugar would stabilize our trade and allow us to expand our sugar industry accordingly.

Third, concerning technology, present conversations which give hope for successful conclusion concern purchases of big investment projects. These negotiations in many cases are nearing conclusion. They include installation of coal gasification technology by Koppers; an

agreement on cooperation with General Motors on a plant to produce delivery trucks of 1½–2½ ton capacity at the rate of 100,000 per year; the purchase of technology and know-how from RCA for the production of TV screens for color TV; equipment for the production of glass and other parts for TV screens from Corning Glass; the purchase of forges from Swindell-Dressler; and the expansion of cooperation in construction machinery with International Harvester. What is significant is that these contracts would amount to \$1 billion and some are of particular importance, for example, the purchase of production and technology for TV screens to produce color TV.

Gierek: It would be great propaganda because of the number of pieces involved.

Jaroszewicz: And the motor car industry. These transactions also provide for co-production and for export, including to the U.S. market. All of this would depend on the availability of favorable credits to finance them. This means that we ask for the support of all those transactions by the U.S. Government and the greatest possible support from Ex-Im Bank.

Fourth, cooperation by means of the facilities of the mixed commission on trade (Joint U.S.-Polish Trade Commission). We would like to request you to agree that at the next meeting we would discuss ways and means to accelerate the dynamic growth of mutual cooperation by implementing the decisions taken during the talks in Washington. We should also take up the question of certain limitations in new agreements. We would be grateful to you, Mr. President, if you could lend these questions favorable consideration and if you could accept the conclusions of the Commission following its meeting next October.

Fifth, scientific and technical cooperation. We link our great expectation for progress on coal research which we have discussed many times. We would like to expand our relations in agriculture by exchanges of experience and by means of the conversations which our Minister of Agriculture will have next fall in Washington. We are willing to consider a long-term contract which would open up good prospects. Among other questions, it is important for the development of tourist and personal traffic to have further air connections. These are a few of the things which we believe offer great possibilities for the development of economic relations. As I said, there is great significance to these fields and we would like to have your favorable support. Thank you.

The President: Mr. Secretary, let me thank you and your colleague for this very broad and detailed presentation of our relations. But I should at the outset say that this visit and this occasion brings back three memories. The first is the memory of meeting in Washington last October. The establishment of personal relations gave us the opportunity to discuss in detail the relations between our countries and how to

broaden and improve these relations. The second came 16 years ago in Warsaw—my first experience in public life to meet with the Parliamentarians from many, many countries. And we met for ten days in this building with 100 Parliamentarians. The third memory is the warmth of that reception by the Polish people today which is a symbol of the close relations we have with Poland. It is not only based on the feelings of millions of Americans of Polish background but also the feelings we have for many, many reasons.

If I might, let me say a few words about relations between Poland and the United States. We feel that in a number of areas considerable progress has been made. In the cultural field, artists who have come from Poland to America make a magnificent impression. They are loved in the United States and we would like to see more of them. And ours who have come here know how warmly they have been received here.

In trade, the figures cited indicate a great increase in the purchases by Poland of commodities. We hope trade can increase on a reciprocal basis. The companies cited by your colleague—General Motors, Corning Glass—I know would like to expand trade with Poland. I know the commission working on such matters will work out details and Eximbank will be as helpful as possible. Private banking can also help. My understanding is that David Rockefeller and his bank are interested in expanding trade through the private sector.

In the area of agricultural sales, let me say that the United States is very fortunate that, with only 6% of our people involved in agriculture out of a total of 214 million people, they do a tremendous job. They have tremendous productive capacity and make it possible not only to feed our people but provide food to people in Europe, in other countries and throughout the world. As you know, agriculture is not the most consistent industry and we cannot be sure of a certain harvest. Last year, the harvest in grains and corn was not at the level anticipated. It was big but not as big as expected. This year, we anticipate a favorable wheat harvest, the largest in our history. If the weather is good during the next month, we will have the largest corn crop in the history of the United States. We have noticed that other areas of the world have far less favorable conditions for agricultural production. The United States to the maximum degree possible will seek to help countries in need. We have had good relations with Poland in the past in feedgrains. This year, too, I would hope to have good relations in feedgrains.

We are interested in your suggestion that your sugar production capability might help us. Last year, we had a shortage and prices were very high throughout the world. The situation has been mitigated to some extent but we are interested. If your Minister of Agriculture is coming to the United States in the near future, he might discuss this with Mr. Butz, the Secretary of Agriculture.

I was very interested in your comments on energy and coal. The United States and Poland have ample supplies of coal. You said you have anticipated supplies for 365 years. The United States has anticipated supplies for 300 years. Both of us have a mutual interest in the production of coal. You have mining techniques, first-hand, and we have technology and equipment which can be used on a reciprocal basis.

In the field of science and technology in certain areas, we have made great progress. In space we have done extremely well. The many byproducts of space technology can be made available to peoples throughout the world. In medicine, we feel benefits can be made available. These benefits can be exchanged with the advances made in your country.

There are, of course, a number of cases of people with relatives who want to be reunited with their families. I was very interested in your statement that most cases can and will be resolved. That would be beneficial to our relations.

I met with Congressman Rostenkowski, my representative at the Poznan Fair. He met with you. He gave me a full report.⁴ He was very complimentary about how he had been treated and explained how you wanted to establish close relations with the United States.

Let me turn now to *détente* and the many ramifications which come from it. I have long been, am now, and continue to expect to be an advocate of *détente*. I am aware that *détente* cannot solve all problems, but that concept is and has been very useful in relieving tensions. *Détente* in the future will be a useful tool for the betterment of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States as well as the associates of the Soviet Union and the allies of the United States.

There are people in the United States who raise questions about the advisability of *détente*. Some raise questions on the basis that the United States got less than the Soviet Union. Others have a strong dislike of the political system in the Soviet Union and believe that somehow *détente* perpetuates that system. My feeling is that we have our system and the Soviets have their system. *Détente* is not aimed at changing the system but at problems which can be resolved. On the other hand, it has to be understood, particularly in our system, that in order to maintain *détente* and in order to defuse political criticism in the United States certain statements both oral as well as written have to be made to soften the criticisms of some of our people. Otherwise, some people in authority face internal political problems. There must be a sophisticated understanding of our political system. Those in the

⁴See footnote 5, Document 322.

Soviet Union must understand that our system works differently, that a person must be judged by his actions, not his words. As I meet with Brezhnev in Helsinki and, hopefully, in the United States, I can assure you, as I will him, that détente has been of great benefit to the United States, the Soviet Union, and the world as a whole. And we must continue détente for the benefits which we have had in the past and which we hope to achieve in the future. It requires understanding and sophistication. We very sincerely want to build better cooperation and a bridge for better relations between us and the world. You, I and Dr. Kissinger are going to Helsinki. There has been some criticism in the United States that I should not go—criticism from the extreme right and some liberals and left-inclined. I believe Helsinki is a step in the right direction. Much will depend on execution and implementation. It is our obligation to see to it that it is implemented in the right fashion. If it achieves what I think, criticism in the United States will be eliminated and I am optimistic enough to believe that it will be accomplished.

With the USSR, we have made significant progress in SALT I. While in Helsinki, we expect to discuss the outgrowth of very successful talks in Vladivostok. If the talks bring us closer, then it will be another giant step forward in limiting strategic arms and lifting the arms burden and increasing opportunities for peace throughout the world.

In closing, I feel our discussion this afternoon and earlier today broadened the foundations for much better relations between both our peoples. I pledge to you, we will make a maximum effort so that Poland and the United States have an opportunity to feel closer in the years ahead.

Gierek: Thank you heartily, Mr. President, for what you said. (Looks up and down the table.)

I don't know if anyone wants to say anything. Mr. President, let me refer to one subject. This is our attitude to matters of détente and all that is linked to Helsinki. I want to speak here not as a Pole alone because if I were to approach this as a Pole from a narrow point of view, I would have to emphasize the need for understanding. I would like to speak as one whose country ranks second in our socialist group after the Soviet Union, both in economic and in military terms. We are grown up. We are a country which is a member of the Warsaw Treaty with all the consequences which ensue from that fact. As the second largest in the Warsaw Treaty, we, like the Soviets, are not interested in Helsinki only for the merely spectacular phenomenon but in all that will follow from it. We realize there are some forces in the world against détente. You speak of a very narrow group in the United States. We would note there are broader groups. We should make no less effort

after Helsinki than the effort that we have made up to now. I say this for Poland, the second socialist country. I am not aware of what Brezhnev is going to talk to you about—I am not curious but one day I will learn. But I am convinced that Leonid Brezhnev will say what he feels, and he feels the need for consistent consolidation of the process of détente. This is not only his feeling but the feeling of Soviet leaders, of the Soviet people. I base all this on something—the willingness and readiness to strengthen détente is because of the means of destruction, which are sufficient to destroy everything many, many times. The problem is to seek ways and means to freeze the situation and bring about such a degree of mutual trust that we could rest assured that the world would not be changed into a place of danger. Naturally, the world has all kinds of dangerous situations. But all these are not as dangerous as if you and the Russians enter the path to war. We shall use all our possibilities—and we have quite a lot of them—not only to smoke a peace pipe but also to see that all the consequences of the peace pipe are implemented. We are going to Helsinki to sign the documents and to implement them.

The President: This has been a very fruitful and beneficial discussion. Thank you and your colleagues for the opportunity to be with you this afternoon. We shall see you this evening.⁵

⁵ No record of this meeting has been found.

327. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford¹

Warsaw, July 29, 1975.

SUBJECT

Meetings with Brezhnev

Your Purposes and Basic Line

This is a crucial encounter for two reasons; first, it will largely determine the future course of the SALT talks, and, therefore, the

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Trip Files, Box 14, July 26–August 4, 1975, Europe–General (16). Secret; Sensitive.

prospects for Brezhnev's visit; second, and equally important, it will be the opportunity to reestablish a mutual commitment, at the highest level, to improve Soviet-American relations as the basic policy of both sides. The latter is not a question of atmospherics, but a substantive problem in light of growing criticism of détente on both sides.

—Your aim is not so much to reassure Brezhnev about your policies, but to explain frankly and candidly that the relationship has reached the point where problems are emerging, as they inevitably would in any such attempt to alter the basic character of Soviet-American relations as they were shaped for over two decades of bitter hostility.

—Your main point is that détente must, in fact, be reciprocal, a two-way street, that you are committed to this course, but must defend it against a strong residue of suspicion that détente is being exploited; thus Soviet-American relations must be given new momentum; this means progress in SALT and MBFR, a real effort to implement CSCE, and a reaffirmation of the principles contained in the 1972 and 1973 summit agreements.

—You should stress that Soviet leaders should not be dismayed or surprised that certain segments in the US are skeptical, indeed, hostile to better relations with the USSR; after all, a complete turnaround in public and political opinion, whether in the US or USSR, cannot be² expected in two or three years; the key is to demonstrate by deeds that the new course of relations is grounded in specific accomplishments benefitting not only the American and Soviet people, but international stability in general.

—This means that détente cannot be a cover for aggravating tensions, for regional advantage, or for applying differing criteria to various aspects of relations.

At these meetings with the General Secretary you want to accomplish three objectives; (1) to review the course of Soviet-American relations, both bilateral aspects and their impact on international issues; (2) to break the back of the SALT issues, if possible, by referring to the Geneva negotiations a number of issues where positions coincide or are quite close, and by discussing frankly those issues, like cruise missiles, where important differences remain; (3) to discuss the General Secretary's visit to the US and the accomplishments that can be achieved by the time of, or during that visit.

—On this last point of the General Secretary's visit, you will want to emphasize the critical importance of tying it to substantive accomplishments, particularly in the arms control, so that it will be clear in

² Ford highlighted the paragraph up to this point.

both countries that the regular summits are a stimulus for reach [real?] achievements.

Brezhnev's Position

Brezhnev will probably be in a somewhat buoyant mood;³ whatever the criticism abroad, CSCE in his eyes must seem a successful achievement denied all his more illustrious predecessors. Being center stage with a host of his European colleagues cannot fail to appeal to his innate vanity and his pretensions to world statesmanship.

But, at the same time, and more basically, he knows that the Conference has become a contentious issue in the West and that this is symptomatic of a disenchantment with détente. He can only add the controversy over CSCE to a series of events that cause him and his colleagues to question the future potential for the so-called "peace program" which he initiated at the 24th Party Congress in March 1971.⁴

In his view the setbacks to the trade bill last December, following so closely an unexpected criticism in the US of the Vladivostok agreement initiated a trend which he probably regards as ominous. He may point to such occurrences as Secretary Schlesinger's remarks on a pre-emptive strike and first use of tactical nuclear weapons,⁵ the intelligence activities of the US that have received a great deal of publicity, the outcry against Soviet grain purchases, the anti-Soviet campaign that he cannot fail to see in the publicity to the Soviet base in Somalia,⁶ the reception given Solzhenitsyn, the debate over alleged Soviet SALT violations, the attacks on CSCE, our recent statements on the Baltic states, and our policy in the Middle East which seems aimed at the exclusion of the USSR.

In short, Brezhnev must wonder whether the support for détente in the US is weakening to the point that either you will abandon it, or be replaced with a more militant successor.

From his standpoint, however, you are his best bet, and he cannot afford to gamble that other events will weaken the US to the point

³ Ford underlined "buoyant mood."

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 49.

⁵ During a breakfast meeting with reporters on July 1, Schlesinger said that the United States had not disavowed the first use of nuclear weapons, especially tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, if it was facing defeat in a conventional war. He said: "If one accepts the no-first-use doctrine, one is accepting a self-denying ordinance that weakens deterrence." (John W. Finney, "Schlesinger Says U.S. Is Willing to Use Nuclear Weapons First," *New York Times*, July 2, 1975, p. 8)

⁶ Telegram 81064 to Mogadishu, April 9, reads in part: "Articles appeared in *New York Times* (April 7) and *Washington Post* (April 8), attributed to 'Defense Department officials' and 'Pentagon spokesman,' respectively, concerning Soviet cruise missile storage facility at Berbera." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

where he can resume a forward, offensive policy if we back away from détente. Brezhnev's problem is that he must, in effect, face his constituency in February at the 25th Party Congress; he must defend a foreign policy record that is tied to détente in Europe and with the US, that promises benefits in the encirclement of China, and the strengthening of Soviet influence in Asia and the Middle East.

—In defending his policies, Brezhnev must also recognize that he will almost certainly be making a farewell appearance before his party; he may retire of his own volition, or be asked at some point to step aside, or simply be thrown out. With his ingrained sense of historical perspective, he wants to bind his successor, and define Soviet policy for the next period, and preserve his own positive image in the history books.

—He cannot do this, if his policy is in a shambles; thus SALT, the US visit, the impact on China, the Middle East outcome, US-Soviet economic relations, all assume an importance in the perspective of his Party Congress.

All of this means that you have a strong bargaining position; Brezhnev needs to restore the momentum to détente, he cannot afford to abort his visit or leave SALT stalemated, unless he is also prepared to inaugurate a wholesale shift in policy next spring.

This does not mean, of course, that he can readily make a series of concessions; he must face his colleagues, and his position—for reasons of health and because he is in effect a lame duck—is more circumscribed than in previous summit meetings.

—He is still in charge and can make decisions on the spot, but he must be more solicitous of the collective in Moscow, lest he risk the fate of Khrushchev.

Nor can he fail to see elements of strength and opportunity for the USSR in the fact that there is a weakening of the western coalition, especially the southern perimeter, that the industrial west is in some disarray, that Europe is shifting to the left, that there is a debate in the US over the control of foreign policy, and that there continue to be openings in the Middle East and Southeast Asia for the expansion of Soviet influence.

Nevertheless, in a broad sense, your objectives and Brezhnev's coincide: he wants to make progress on SALT, though not at any price, he hopes for a successful visit to the US (though he may be very wary of his public reception), he wants to demonstrate that détente is reciprocal and that it brings gains to the USSR.

In sum, Brezhnev may be apprehensive, even somewhat truculent about the course of relations since you met him at Vladivostok; but objectively, he has no major options, other than to pursue this course, but he will do so in a more sober manner, looking for weaknesses that can be exploited.

Substantive Issues

A. CSCE/MBFR

The issue here is not so much the wording of documents or who won or lost, but what happens in the future: the Soviets no doubt have a different appreciation of CSCE and a different interpretation of it than we do. For them it is, in fact, a general postwar settlement recodifying the status quo politically and territorially. We can expect Brezhnev to make these points, however subtly, in his address to the conference though no doubt he will clothe his remarks in high-sounding phrases about peace and progress.

—You will want to explain that CSCE should be a guide to future relations, and in this sense a yardstick for measuring conduct.

—We expect to be attacked for signing what appears to many to be a meaningless document, and, as the General Secretary knows, we cannot constitutionally treat these documents as solemn treaty commitments.

—Nevertheless, you will stand behind the results and defend their value in the US, but you will do so in the sense that they establish standards for behavior that should be translated into practice through implementation of bilateral agreements.

—You should remind Brezhnev that we have no territorial issues in dispute and that we long ago accepted the existing borders, subject to our special rights and obligations for Germany and Berlin.

—We have played a key role in this conference, and sought to cooperate with both the Soviet Union and our allies.

—Now that it is completed, it is time to look to the other key negotiations—on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). You may wish to say that we recognize Soviet motives for not proceeding in the MBFR talks until CSCE was completed, but that if MBFR now remains deadlocked, it will only increase the skepticism in the US about the value of European security negotiation.⁷

—You are prepared to initiate some changes in our position, in the direction of meeting Soviet complaints about reduction in nuclear systems, but this must be reciprocal—the Soviets must be prepared to respond to your initiative.

—In particular, the goal of these talks must be one of rough parity, rather than codifying existing imbalances.⁸ Moreover, the US and

⁷ Ford highlighted this paragraph.

⁸ Ford underlined “rough parity” and “codifying existing imbalances” in this sentence.

USSR must assume a special responsibility by making reductions first in the first phase.

—You and the General Secretary ought to take this occasion to emphasize the necessity for progress on what he calls “military détente” to provide the substance of the political détente of CSCE.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

328. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Helsinki, July 30, 1975, 8:05 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

UK

Harold Wilson, Prime Minister

James Callaghan, Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs

US

Gerald R. Ford, President

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Callaghan: What do you think of Gierek?

Ford: He was very impressive. We received a great reception, crowds were good and I liked the look in their faces.

Callaghan: I like Gierek too. Also Kadar. The Polish Foreign Minister² is a fat fellow but pleasant.

Kissinger: Like me.

Ford: We have to watch Henry’s weight.

Kissinger: What is the reaction to CSCE in the UK?

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 13, Misc. Docs, Tels, Etc., 1975, Folder 2. Secret; Nodis. A note at the top of the memorandum reads: “Draft prepared from notes taken by Mr. Sonnenfeldt but not yet reviewed by him.”

² Olszowski.

Wilson: Not much in the press. If there were a Conservative Prime Minister it would be a great success. There has been some serious comment.

Ford: We have had some criticism.

Kissinger: *Time* has a very good cover story.

Wilson: Thatcher³ suddenly burst forth.

Ford: We started concerted efforts to explain it.

Callaghan: I read it and I liked it.

Kissinger: Gierek made a good comment. He said implementation was critical now.

Wilson: He said that publicly?

Kissinger: In a toast.

Callaghan: Kadar told us yesterday that they regarded it as a moral and political commitment.

Kissinger: Even inviolability of frontiers has proved more helpful to others than to the Soviet Union.

Callaghan: No Soviet government can ever justify invasion again.

Kissinger: CSCE will not prevent it, but it can never be explained again.

Callaghan: Now we must turn to MBFR.

Ford: We should make a major effort on it.

Wilson: We'll say so today.

Kissinger: You and the Pope are in control. San Marino, Liechtenstein and Luxembourg are the last speakers.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

³ Margaret Thatcher, Leader of the Conservative Party.

329. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Helsinki, July 30, 1975, 9:35 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

USSR

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Georgi M. Kornienko, Director of the USA Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Andrei Vavilov, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

US

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, Ambassador to the USSR
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
William G. Hyland, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Alexander Akalovsky, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

US-Soviet Relations; Middle East; Emigration; Nuclear War

[The President greeted the Soviet party at the front door. As they entered the Residence, the General Secretary called out “Where is Sonnenfeldt?” The President laughed. The group was seated at the table. The press entered for photographs.]

Brezhnev: You’ve lost weight.

Ford: You look like you have too.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 1, July 30–August 2, 1975, Ford/Brezhnev Meetings in Helsinki. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The conversation took place at the American Ambassador’s Residence. Brackets, with the exception of those indicating omission of unrelated material, are in the original. The complete text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.

Brezhnev: I've been stabilized.

Ford: You look excellent.

Brezhnev: I'm about 78 kilograms. I'm 78.9, 80 at times, but within that limit. That's my stable weight nowadays. I've been stable the last six months or so.

Kissinger: I'm stable within a 10-kilogram range. (Laughter).

Gromyko: You're old acquaintances.

US-Soviet Relations

Brezhnev: Mr. Kissinger, I was saying to the President that we've done a very good job in space.²

Kissinger: Yes.

Ford: The handshake was indicative of the progress we have been making.

Brezhnev: Your boys came down at 1:00 a.m. in our country, and our TV was still working.

Kissinger: You saw it.

Brezhnev: We saw it live.

Ford: In our country it was after dinner.

Brezhnev: It is really fantastic when you come to think of it. They go up; they meet somewhere in the limitless vastness of space.

Ford: It's wonderful to know that the technicians and scientists have that capability—to link up hundreds of miles away.

Brezhnev: [fiddles with his pocket]. I've been thinking—I know Kissinger's mind works that way—I'll take a little bomb, put it in my pocket, and . . .

Kissinger: As long as it's a little one.

Brezhnev: It's a long-range one.

Ford: I'm glad they were up there, and not you and I.

Gromyko: Those are the MIRVs.

Brezhnev: Of course, that is a very complicated issue, seriously.

[The last of the photographers departed.]

Frankly speaking, Mr. President, the latest proposals we received on the night of our departure for Helsinki. We can't go into details today. I was just informed of them, and you can't get to the bottom of them right after getting out of the plane.

Kissinger: You mean on strategic arms?

² Reference is to the docking of the U.S. spacecraft, Apollo, with the Soviet spacecraft, Soyuz, in outer space from July 18 to 20, 1975.

Brezhnev: Yes. Maybe while we are here we can look them over and discuss them the next time we meet.

Ford: Mr. General Secretary, I'd like to make some comments first about détente.

Brezhnev: Please.

Ford: In the United States, there is a very encouraging overall attitude as to the progress we have made, the Soviet Union and the United States, in moving in the right direction on détente. On the other hand, I think it is fair—and I want to be frank: we have those on the right as well as on the left, who for various reasons, political and otherwise, would like to undermine what we have tried to implement and to destroy détente.

[Mr. Hyland comes in to join the meeting.]

And critics of détente are Democrats as well as Republicans. They would like to slow down or destroy the benefits that come from détente. But I can tell you very forcefully I am committed to détente, and the American people agree with me. I strongly feel our negotiations and our agreements in Vladivostok were pluses, were very successful. I believe the CSCE negotiations, the documents we will sign here, are pluses, and I am confident as we talk about SALT II, we can achieve success in this area. Perhaps as in our country, you have some critics in your own government who don't believe that Vladivostok, CSCE, and SALT II are in the best interests of your country. But I can tell you in my term of office—and I expect that to be the next 5½ years—my aim, objective and total effort on my part will be to narrow our differences and achieve the benefits for your people, for our people, and I believe for the world as a whole.

Brezhnev: [interrupts translation at reference to critics of détente:] The only two people who are against détente are Kissinger and Gromyko. [Laughter].

Kissinger: Because as long as there is no détente, we can keep meeting. [Laughter].

Brezhnev: [interrupts translation at reference to 5½ years:] Why do you say only five years in office? Why not eight years?

[Mr. Akalovsky joins the meeting.]

Ford: Mr. Secretary, of course we have these critics of Vladivostok, the European Security Conference, and SALT, who would like me to have a term of office for 1½ years. But I am convinced beyond any doubt, if we can move the Vladivostok agreement beyond SALT and implement the atmosphere in which CSCE took place, I believe the critics will be pushed aside and the American people will support what you and I want to achieve. If we can make the kind of progress [we seek] on SALT, today and Saturday, it would be a great delight for me

to have you visit the United States this fall. I was up in Camp David two weeks ago and Mrs. Ford and I were discussing what a beautiful place it was. I know you enjoyed your visit there before. But the main point is to make headway that will result in a fruitful agreement, that will be of benefit to your country and mine, and will make possible a meeting in the United States between us some time in 1975.

Brezhnev: [interrupts Sukhodrev's translation at reference to Camp David:] I did like Camp David.

Ford: It is beautiful in the fall.

Brezhnev: Quiet and relaxing.

Ford: With those general observations, Mr. Secretary, I'd be very pleased to have your reactions and any suggestions or comments you would like to make, sir.

Brezhnev: I, too, want to be perfectly honest—and I trust you will have the opportunity to see that this is so—let me say once again that we received your latest proposals on SALT some time at night, practically before I was due to leave. They need a thorough working on. Let me say a new agreement on that is something you and we need equally. We had no less difficulties working out the earlier agreement, but we worked them out and solved them. I believe this time, too, it should be possible to work out an agreement that would be advantageous to both sides.

Gromyko: Difficulties ought to be worked out and we will solve them.

Brezhnev: Perhaps during the next few days we will have a respite and see things more clearly. Yesterday after I arrived I met with President Kekkonen, leaders of the GDR and Tito, and got back very late at night. These matters are complicated, serious and do not lend themselves to a cursory glance. As for our objectives, they remain the same—Vladivostok determines those objectives. Of course, there are some details to be solved.

I would like in this meeting to turn to other matters of interest to the two sides.

I was a bit surprised to learn that in the United States there were some people who were against the Apollo-Soyuz project, arguing that "their technology is weaker" or something. In the United States, everything is criticized. The only person who is never criticized is Dr. Kissinger, but they sometimes criticize even him for the fun of it. [Laughter].

Kissinger: I was going to say it's reached the point where even I am criticized. [Laughter]

Brezhnev: I saw a day or two ago some piece in the press that—every paper has certain errors, typographical or letters missing—and every day they print a little note correcting it.

Ford: Always on the back page.

Brezhnev: I often ask, why do they publish this note? They say “it’s for the pleasure of our readers.”

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Brezhnev: All right. Maybe we could talk about this: We complete the European Security Conference. But we should not stop at that. We should make further headway. Relaxation of tensions doesn’t stop with Europe, the U.S. and Canada.

We should extend further. Maybe we should talk about that. I think it was you who said *détente* is useful not only for Europe but for all the world, and I certainly associate myself fully with those words.

Ford: I agree. In this connection, I want to note that the United States Senators who met with you in Moscow³ came back with very favorable reactions to the discussions they had with you, Mr. Secretary. And the Senators join with me in the view that *détente* is the way our two countries should proceed. They were impressed with the very frank discussions they had with you on energy, economy, trade and other areas. Their impression was that there are distinct possibilities for cooperation in these areas. And I was greatly impressed by the hospitality extended by you and your associates during that visit and the frankness and spirit of cooperation with which these were discussed at the time of their visit.

Brezhnev: In Washington, Mr. President, when I met with a large group of Senators and Congressmen and answered some of their questions,⁴ there was one man who sat in the back and asked a question about something. He asked the question in a delicate way, and I said “You are not bold enough. You are obviously referring to the Jewish population in the Soviet Union.” When they were in the Soviet Union, he admitted: “It was me.” It was Senator Javits,⁵ and we then had an interesting discussion with him.

Ford: Javits sitting in the back of the room? [Laughter]

Gromyko: He admitted it was him. He was sitting to one side.

Brezhnev: [To Kissinger] Were you present in Washington during the meeting?

³ A delegation of 14 U.S. Senators visited Moscow from June 30 to July 2 for meetings with Soviet officials.

⁴ No record of this meeting has been found. For documentation on Brezhnev’s visit to the United States, June 18–25, 1973, see Documents 160–163.

⁵ Jacob Javits, R-NY.

Kissinger: No. I knew about your meeting. You presented some figures to the Senators in that meeting.

Brezhnev: I have some figures on that for this meeting too. It is soon going to be a veritable tragedy!

Ford: Let me say on that point, Mr. General Secretary, I have indicated to you that I intend to submit legislation as to trade and also as to credits. The handling of Congress is a very delicate problem. As you know, it is dominated in our system by the opposition party, so I have influence but not necessarily control. So the matter of timing when to submit legislation on trade and credits is very important. It is my hope this fall to submit remedial amendments so that we can have trade relations as initially contemplated. I think it was very unfortunate that you were forced to cancel the trade agreement,⁶ although I understand the action in Congress might have compelled you to do this. Perhaps by some appropriate action you could help me convince the Congress to approve the changes we will recommend. That would be a very important step, so détente can proceed and we can move in trade relations forward as we anticipated in a constructive way.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, on the whole let me say, there has been no change in our policy. We want as before to have good relations with the United States.

Ford: Mr. General Secretary, a few moments ago you said you had some figures in mind to discuss. I would be most interested.

Brezhnev: I will look. I do have somewhere a brief on this question. We have already added Solzhenitsyn to the list! [Laughter]

Gromyko: What we won't do for the sake of friendship!

Ford: I have heard the name before.

Brezhnev: [Reads over his talking paper and confers with Gromyko] Here are some data. In 1972—the first figures are the number of requests for exit permits—in 1972, there were 26,800 requests. In 1973, there were approximately 26,000. In 1974, there were 14,000. In the first six months of 1975, there were 5,000 requests to leave.

As regards the number of people who actually left for Israel—actually some went elsewhere—in 1972, there were 29,000. In 1973, 33,000. In 1974, 19,000. And in the first six months of 1975, 6,000. Some were carry-overs from the past year; there were only 5,000 requests.

I have another figure. From the start of the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union, which dates back to 1945, until July 1, 1975, a total

⁶ On January 14, Kissinger announced that the Soviet Union had decided to cancel the 1972 U.S.–USSR trade agreement in response to passage of the Jackson–Vanik Amendment. (Department of State *Bulletin*, February 3, 1975, pp. 139–143)

of 116,000 persons left the Soviet Union. This amounts to 98.4 percent of all requests submitted, 98.4 percent were met. You see, at present there is a process of falling off of requests, and probably it will continue. In your country, there are some to whom you don't give permission on security grounds; we also have such people.

[Secretary Kissinger gets up to leave briefly.]

Ford: I must say Mr. General Secretary, Mr. Solzhenitsyn has aligned himself—

Kissinger: I am not leaving because you mentioned that name. [Laughter]

Ford: Mr. Solzhenitsyn aligned himself with those who are very severe critics of the policy I and you believe in, *détente*. Senator Jackson, Mr. George Meany, President of the American Federation of Labor, have spoken out critically. Meany has embraced Mr. Solzhenitsyn. Some of these critics encouraged Mr. Solzhenitsyn to continue his criticism of *détente*. As I said before, it is my firm belief that *détente* must continue and become irreversible if we want to achieve that kind of world which is essential for peace. The figures you mentioned, of course, are very disappointing to those who criticize *détente*. And any improvement there—in the requests or the figures of those who get permission to leave—would undercut some of the criticism and enhance our ability to proceed with *détente* as we want to do. But I repeat: *détente* can and will work and can be made irreversible—particularly if this Saturday we can make headway on SALT.

Brezhnev: I mentioned Solzhenitsyn just in passing. There was some information that he wanted to change his way of life and become a monk or something. Reportedly there was some priest going around with him at some point. He is nothing more than a zero for the Soviet Union. But why do you feel these figures will be disappointing to the people you mentioned?

Ford: In the case of Senator Javits, and Senator Ribicoff,⁷ they want to be helpful in Congress to approve the legislation I want to recommend, legislation that will permit trade, to extend credits, that will be very beneficial. If the figures were more encouraging, Mr. General Secretary, they would provide them with arguments for revising legislation that was so harmful to the continuation of *détente*.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, maybe you didn't understand me correctly. I said we are reaching the point where there will be a tragedy. But what are we to do? Start talking people into leaving? I merely made a factual statement: The number of applications has been decreasing. The number of applications we have been receiving since I was in

⁷ Abraham Ribicoff, D-CT.

Washington has been declining. I am sure you and Dr. Kissinger realize this is so. I know virtually dozens of people of Jewish origin. Am I to go to Dymshits, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, and say “You’ve got to leave?” And Leibman of the Moscow Soviet—should I grab him by the hand and tell him to go?

Ford: Certainly the figure of 98 percent is a good record.

Gromyko: Ninety-eight point four percent.

Ford: That is certainly a good batting average, as we say in the United States. I am not suggesting ways for increasing the number of applications. All I want to say is that Ribicoff, Javits and others must be made to understand that if the revised legislation is adopted, there will be the possibility, if not the certainty—that the figures will be like those of 1974 or 1973. I understand you can’t take people by the hand and tell them to leave, but the perception, the appearance, makes a difference.

Brezhnev: I really can’t understand what I can do in this regard.

Ford: Let me summarize the situation as I see it from the point of view of détente. I came here, Mr. General Secretary, despite the criticism in the United States, because I believe in détente. The portions I have been connected with—Vladivostok and here—have been concrete forward steps, meaningful progress. As I said, the criticism at home has come from elements in America that can be, as I said, brushed aside. Coming here will contribute to détente despite the détente critics. I hope we will achieve in Helsinki what we talked about in Vladivostok. Thinking people in the U.S. know that Vladivostok was a success which serves the interests of both sides. The American people, the majority of the population, hopes for more progress. The majority feels the same way about this conference, and the implementation of the document we sign will be the most conclusive proof that we are on the right track. So I hope we can make progress in SALT. This will be a good preliminary discussion for what we discuss on Saturday. But I repeat with quiet emphasis, détente must be made irreversible. It was my conviction at Vladivostok. I hope we can leave Helsinki with the same feeling, leading hopefully to a visit by you to the United States this fall.

Brezhnev: [Interrupts the translation] And I appreciate very highly the fact that you came here despite the criticism in the U.S.

[Interrupts the translation at statement that détente is beneficial:] And I agree with you on that.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

330. Editorial Note

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe opened its third stage on July 30, 1975. From July 30 to August 1, the leaders of the 35 assembled nations addressed the assembly. Jan Lodal of the National Security Council staff described the first day of the gathering in his daily log:

“I met Hyland, Bremer, and Stoessel at 8:45 to go to the President’s Residence. We arrived while Wilson was still there. Wilson left about 9:15. We stood around in the Ambassador’s Library while Kissinger huddled with Ford and bustled about. Brezhnev arrived at 9:30. After picture taking, the meeting started. It went on for the appointed two hours until 11:30. Brezhnev was accompanied by the usual crew—except that Vavilov wasn’t along. Nothing at all happened on SALT. Brezhnev said that he simply had not had time to study our note, and perhaps we would discuss it on Saturday.

“I went in the President’s motorcade to the opening session of the CSCE Conference. It was really quite a surreal experience—all of these heads of state milling about in this huge hall, attending a function which was run something like a Shriner’s Convention. All of the great men seemed to blend in with the crowd and, except for a few well known faces such as Brezhnev, Wilson, and Ford, many of the others were simply anonymous.

“After lunch with Scowcroft, Hyland, and Sonnenfeldt, I returned to hear the afternoon speeches. Wilson gave the first speech—a brilliant performance. It was excellent substantively, as well as rhetorically. It was fascinating to read the distributed texts as he gave the speech. He would make minor changes as he went along—always to the improvement of the text. He simply never misspoke a word. I guess this is one of the skills you learn by speaking in the House of Commons daily for many years.

“Trudeau’s speech was well delivered—half in French and half in English. Schmidt finished up with a somewhat lackluster performance.

“The seats Bill Hyland and I occupied were near the Soviet Delegation. We had a good view of Brezhnev. At one point, he took what appeared to be a piece of paper out of his pocket wrapped around a pill which he took with some water. He put the piece of paper in his ashtray in front of him. It would be interesting to know what kind of medicine he is taking.

“During the break, I was chatting with Crispin Tickell when Prime Minister Wilson returned. Tickell introduced me to the Prime Minister as the man in the National Security Council who handles MBFR. We chatted briefly. He said that perhaps this would push things along somewhat in MBFR now. I asked him how he felt Brezhnev looked. He

said he wasn't a doctor, but he thought Brezhnev should be pretty happy—he got what he wanted here. I mentioned that he didn't have a SALT agreement yet. Wilson seemed surprised. I told him there had not been much discussion that morning. He then said it was all business, was it—not just pleasantries? I said it was supposed to have been business, but it ended up being more pleasantries. We really didn't do much on SALT. Wilson was quite surprising in his personal appearance—a rumpled suit with dandruff all over it.

“The whole experience really was quite unbelievable—all of these great men wandering around this conference hall. Brezhnev and Gromyko sat through it all—it was their idea so apparently felt compelled to avoid bilaterals and other interferences.

“I went to dinner at a sister Russian Restaurant with Peter Rodman and some of the SS people. I had tried to go to the Prime Minister's dinner, but got my invitations mixed up. As usual, the State Department functionaries who arrange these things totally mess up the NSC people on the trip.” (Ford Library, NSC Program Analysis Staff, Jan Lodal Convenience Files, Box 70)

On August 1, President Ford addressed the Conference. For the text of his speech, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1, 1975, pp. 304–308.

331. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Helsinki, July 31, 1975, 1:25–3:25 p.m.

SUBJECTS

President Kekkonen's Dinner
Reaction to Brezhnev's Speech at CSCE Summit
Brezhnev's Health
The Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

UK
Prime Minister Wilson
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Callaghan

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 14. Secret. Drafted by Obst. The conversation took place at the Residence of the British Ambassador.

France

President Giscard d'Estaing
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sauvagnargues

FRG

Chancellor Schmidt
Foreign Minister Genscher
Gisela Anders, Interpreter

US

President Ford
Secretary of State Kissinger
Harry Obst, interpreter

(These excerpts refer only to the first hour of conversation at the lunch table. The remainder of the conversation, held in the garden, discussing the pre-agreed agenda was held by the eight participants only without the presence of interpreters or notetakers.)

President Kekkonen's Dinner

Both the President and Chancellor Schmidt complained about the unfortunate seating arrangement at the dinner and in the plenary of the CSCE. President Ford remarked that he spent virtually all his time talking to Erich Honecker and Archbishop Makarios. Chancellor Schmidt also complained about his delegation being seated next to the GDR which left him no choice but to converse with Mr. Honecker. Secretary Kissinger commented that the long talk Makarios had with the President was ironic inasmuch as the United States Government had not previously agreed to a meeting between the two.

Reaction to Brezhnev's Speech at CSCE Summit

President Giscard asked the participants about their reaction to today's (July 31) speech of Leonid Brezhnev.² President Ford commented that he had found it very interesting inasmuch as it had been restrained and very moderate in its statements. At any rate, it definitely had been quite different from what it could have been. Chancellor Schmidt agreed. He said that there had been no "stings" in the speech and that it had been more moderate than that of Gierek. Prime Minister Wilson said that he was surprised that the speech actually contained some reference to actions based on the Helsinki documents. Secretary Kissinger said that Brezhnev's statements on "no interference" had been read by some as meaning that he was ready to bury the Brezhnev Doctrine.

² For the text of Brezhnev's speech, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XXVII:22 (August 27, 1975), pp. 6–7.

Brezhnev's Health

When the question of Brezhnev's health was raised, President Ford commented that Brezhnev had clearly seemed very tired at the end of the very long sessions he had had with him in Vladivostok. Prime Minister Wilson said that he definitely thought that Brezhnev was looking much better than when he had seen him in Moscow in February.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

332. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Helsinki, July 31, 1975, 9:50–11:25 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Henry Bradsher (*Washington Star-News*)

John Wallach (*Hearst Newspapers*)

Bruce Van Voorst (*Newsweek*)

Henry Trehwitt (*Baltimore Sun*)

Richard Growald (UPI)

Kenneth Freed (A/P)

Stanley Carter (*N.Y. Daily News*)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

[The Secretary proposed that this be off-the-record, but it was agreed that it be deep background. The correspondents could use what was discussed but without attribution to any U.S. official.]

Kissinger: What the hell has got into the press corps that 20 years later they are back to the John Foster Dulles policy? [Laughter] If they are against recognizing frontiers, what frontiers are they for changing?

When the President can visit Eastern Europe and I can have bilateral meetings with Eastern European leaders, the case can be made that we are giving them more flexibility. I am not saying this is the greatest conference in the history of mankind.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 273, Memoranda of Conversation, Chronological File. Confidential. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting took place in the Secretary's Suite at the Hesperia Hotel. Brackets, with the exception of those indicating omission of unrelated material, are in the original.

Van Voorst: Isn't this the result of a new look at détente, with the Solzhenitsyn thing?

Wallach: It's a rebound from Solzhenitsyn.

Growald: It's a chance to beat you over the head on.

Kissinger: Me, or the Administration?

Growald: Both.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Bradsher: I'd like to change the subject. Everybody says now they are for MBFR. You said we need a political decision. Is it really ready?

Kissinger: It needs a political decision to move forward. Everyone starts with an absurd position to satisfy their own hardliners. We start with a position just to start it. We have no problem on our side, in the United States. The problem is the allies.

Wallach: Will the Germans want it?

Kissinger: Bill Safire says we've been screwed because we didn't get MBFR.² I'm not so certain MBFR is unambiguously good for us. All we get is a ceiling on all forces in Germany. The Russians get a limitation only in Europe.

Bradsher: The Germans are against it.

Kissinger: The Germans will hold their noses but what they want is to keep the remaining American forces there.

Freed: Where is the momentum for it?

Kissinger: In Congress.

Wallach: It was a response to the Mansfield Amendment.

Kissinger: A response to the Mansfield Amendment.

MBFR isn't something to which we needed to link CSCE.

Trewhitt: It would put the U.S. at an enormous disadvantage.

Kissinger: What the cold warriors have to realize is that if they want to do it, they'll have to double the defense budget. It would start with great glory, but then it would be like Vietnam.

² Safire wrote in an editorial entitled "Super Yalta": "The criterion that Mr. Kissinger most wants to get away from is the actual quid pro quo promised us by the Soviets in return for holding a supersummit so valuable to their interests. Its name is 'MBFR'—mutual and balanced force reduction—and it is the forgotten topic at Helsinki. Two years ago, we agreed to begin meeting the Soviets in preparation for the conference they wanted in return for an agreement to prepare for a deal we wanted: the actual reduction of Soviet and American troops in Europe. The security-conference talks led to this week's glorious conclusion; the troop reduction talks led nowhere. We were had. Now, of course, our Secretary of State insists that while the two subjects started together, progress on the one was not connected to progress on the other. In other words, bad faith on their part was to be matched by good faith on our own." (*New York Times*, July 28, 1975, p. 21)

Wallach: Is there any concern on Berlin? It seems to have gotten great emphasis.

Kissinger: There is concern that after CSCE, there might be pressure. But there is no evidence.

Growald: It has been said you opposed going to Auschwitz, because it would offend the Germans.³

Kissinger: I'm going to throw up.

I have personal reasons to go. On Solzhenitsyn, I never spoke to the President about Solzhenitsyn except to give him the *Gulag Archipelago* when he came into office. On this trip I checked a box when it came around to give my approval or disapproval.⁴ I never spoke to him.

Growald: That's why I asked the question. It's the same old stories.

Van Voorst: Add Berlin to that. They say you didn't want the President to go.

Kissinger: The Germans didn't want him to go. There was fear of the Baader Meinhof gang. We wanted to go. But with sharpshooters there . . .

Freed: Why did the President go to Auschwitz?⁵

Kissinger: How can he go to Krakow without going to Auschwitz?

Freed: They said it was public relations, which offended me.

Kissinger: To lay a wreath on the memorial was the only thing he could do.

Freed: They said it was to pick up support at home. That sickened me.

Kissinger: Why shouldn't he go? There was discussion of whether to go to the museum—the question was whether he had to go see the teeth and the ghoul.

I had a reason to be moved. I think he did it right. To do more would have been like PR.

It was not a foreign policy question.

Bradsher: You are aware that the Poles never mentioned the Jews in their presentation?

Growald: That is a standard policy with the Poles.

Kissinger: I didn't know that.

³ See Document 319.

⁴ The memorandum to which Kissinger refers was not found.

⁵ On July 29, Ford visited the Nazi death camp, Auschwitz, in Oswiecim, Poland, where he laid a wreath at the International Monument and signed the Memorial Book.

Bradsher: It's domestic politics in Poland.

Carter: Why go to East Europe?

Kissinger: To show that we do not recognize, within the military realities, Soviet predominance in East Europe. By the time we leave, the President and I will have seen every East European leader.

Wallach: The Yugoslavs say the last time you discussed spare parts and T-28's. But they can't get it.

Kissinger: I've read that *New York Times* story.⁶ It must be true. I'm going to look into it.

Wallach: Is Schlesinger opposed to it?

Kissinger: No. If he is, he hasn't told me.

Growald: Why do you want the President to go to Yugoslavia?⁷ Because Tito is coming to an end?

Kissinger: You say, "Why do you want the President to go?" It is conceivable that the President does something on his own.

Growald: You approved it.

Kissinger: Because Tito is coming to an end. It is important for the U.S. to stake something on the independence of Yugoslavia in the post-Tito period.

Bradsher: You didn't see all of them here?

Kissinger: Because we want to make a distinction between certain East European countries.

Bradsher: The President won't see Husak.

Kissinger: But I saw his Foreign Minister.⁸

Bradsher: That is one of the distinctions.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

⁶ Kissinger is apparently referring to the article by Malcolm W. Browne, "Hope Dims for Arms Sales to Belgrade," *New York Times*, July 26, 1975, p. 2.

⁷ President Ford visited Yugoslavia August 3–4. See Document 337.

⁸ Telegram Secto 8089 from Helsinki to Prague, July 31, reported on the meeting: "In half-hour meeting on July 31, Secretary told Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chnoupek that we are in favor of improving our relations both within and outside the trade areas. He expressed regret for the provisions of the trade act affecting Czechoslovakia and said we have to see if we can negotiate a package with Congress and then present it to Czechoslovakia. Chnoupek expressed appreciation for President's and Secretary's personal attitude in calling on Congress to reevaluate aspects of the trade act." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

333. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Helsinki, August 1, 1975.

PARTICIPANTS

Luxembourg

Prime Minister Thorn

Ambassador Georges Heisbourg (to Finland)

Paul Helminger, Chef du Cabinet of the Prime Minister

US

The Secretary

The Counselor

The Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

John J. Maresca

SUBJECT

The Secretary's Bilateral Meeting with Thorn

The Secretary: The President seems to want to stop to have lunch in Luxembourg on his next trip to Europe.

Thorn: We certainly hope he will be able to. I hope to see you in New York in September. Do you have any advice for me?

The Secretary: The best thing is to conduct the whole thing in the fairest and most impartial way. If every group tried to rig it for their own purposes it would be very unfortunate. What do you think of the Conference?

Thorn: It is going very well. It was a good thing Wilson was the first speaker. The tone of the communist speeches has been quite moderate. President Ford gave a very good speech.²

The Secretary: It was a good speech. The West has really dominated the Conference. Even some of the Eastern European speeches seemed to be aimed at the Soviets. Kadar talked about having lost some territory.

Thorn: Some journalists are now asking themselves if this is not really a Western conference.

The Secretary: There is no question that intellectually the Conference has been dominated by the West. If a man from the moon were to walk into the Hall, he would think it was a Western conference. Brezhnev has played a very minor role.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Official, Chronological. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Maresca and approved by Hartman. The meeting took place in Finlandia Hall.

² For the President's speech before the CSCE on August 1, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1, 1975, pp. 304–308.

Thorn: It is up to us now to see that the results of the Conference are not forgotten, and to do something with them.

The Secretary: I don't think there is much danger that they will be forgotten.

Thorn: Do you expect progress in Vienna now?

The Secretary: Speaking personally, and not as Secretary of State, I think we may live to regret starting MBFR. If we can get them to withdraw 300 miles, we will have to withdraw 3000 miles. But I say this as a professor. There are many who would have liked us to link CSCE and MBFR, but I am just as happy that we did not.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

334. Telegram From Secretary of State Kissinger to the Department of State¹

Helsinki, August 2, 1975, 0640Z.

Secto 8109. Department pass to all CSCE capitals. Subject: CSCE III: Final day.

1. *Summary.* CSCE closed at 6:00 pm on August 1, following signing of Final Act² by thirty-five heads of state or government. Highlights of final day were President Ford's speech, which was considered by many conference delegates as most forceful expression of Western view during three days of speeches, delayed appearance of Portuguese President Costa Gomes,³ apology by Maltese for their behavior during last days of the negotiations, and circulation by Cyprus of a statement in reply to Turkish reservation on Cypriot representation. Full verbatim records will be pouched to Department (EUR/RPM) when available. *End summary.*

2. Portugal: Portuguese President Costa Gomes, who had postponed his appearance from July 31 for reasons of "force majeure," gave standard review of conference results, but stressed Portugal's "new path," and stated that Portuguese foreign policy was now based on full

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Limited Official Use; Immediate.

² For text of the CSCE Final Act, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

³ General Francisco da Costa Gomes.

respect for the principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention in the internal affairs of others, and the recognition of the right of all peoples freely to dispose of themselves.

3. US: President Ford's speech, which was considered by many to be strongest statement of Western view of CSCE heard during Stage III, emphasized that both sides have to benefit from détente, and that CSCE results would be a yardstick by which performance will be measured. The President stressed the deep devotion of the American people and their government to human rights and fundamental freedoms and said the US intends to participate fully in turning the results of the conference into a living reality. Like Wilson, Schmidt, and Giscard, he noted that CSCE results are also applicable to Berlin. The President closed by stating that history will judge the conference not by what is said but what is done to carry out the promises of CSCE.

4. Malta: In absence of Mintoff, who was reportedly ill, Deputy Prime Minister Buttigieg concentrated on Mediterranean aspects of CSCE and Maltese role in ensuring that Mediterranean interest in the conference was fully reflected. Buttigieg apologized to all present "for any offense we may have given during the exciting days in Geneva." All that Maltese did, he said, was "in a good cause," and any animosity was due more to "our inexperience than to any bad intention."

5. Netherlands: Prime Minister Van Den Uyl was somewhat reserved but expressed hope that Basket III results would promote better understanding among peoples, and admitted that "some optimism" might be justified. He underlined that results of CSCE would have to be implemented if conference was to have any meaning, and looked for progress now in MBFR negotiations.

6. Monaco: Minister of State Saint-Mleux⁴ stressed need for protection of environment in the Mediterranean.

7. Norway: Prime Minister Bratteli⁵ reviewed conference results, expressed hope they would be implemented, and looked forward to continuation of multilateral process begun by CSCE.

8. Romania: In a long speech in which he departed considerably from his prepared text, Ceausescu brought out the principal elements of Romanian foreign policy: equal rights and sovereignty of all states, renunciation of aggression or intervention in the affairs of other countries, banishment of the threat or use of force, and peaceful settlement of disputes. He called for further steps toward disarmament and cooperation, but qualified his endorsement of Basket III results, noting that information should serve the cause of friendship among peoples.

⁴ Andre Leon Saint-Mleux.

⁵ Trygve Bratteli.

Ceausescu thought CSCE results would be conducive to the elimination of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

9. Liechtenstein, San Marino: These countries gave standard review of conference results, emphasizing role of small states in CSCE.

10. Luxembourg: Prime Minister Thorn also stressed role of smaller states at CSCE, and recalled that implementation of results would be real test of the success of the conference.

11. Holy See: Archbishop Casaroli⁶ read personal message addressed to the conference by Pope Paul VI expressing hope for the success of the CSCE enterprise, "in the name of God."

12. Cypriot interpretive statement: In response to Turkish reservation on Cypriot representation circulated to the conference on July 31,⁷ Cyprus circulated a formal interpretive statement that participation in CSCE was on the basis of the full equality of states, and that Turkish statement that it will not apply CSCE results to relations with Cyprus "is of no effect."

13. Signing: Following last speech, all thirty-five heads of state or government gathered at broad horseshoe-shaped table and signed single original copy in all six languages of the Final Act of the conference. Completion of signing ceremony brought long round of applause. Finnish President Kekkonen made brief closing statement, and adjourned the CSCE.

Kissinger

⁶ Archbishop Agostino Casaroli.

⁷ Not found.

335. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Bucharest, August 2, 1975, 7–8:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Nicolae Ceausescu, President of Romania
Manea Manescu, Prime Minister

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Official, Chronological. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Barnes. The meeting took place in the Council of State. Barnes sent the memorandum as an attachment to a letter to Sonnenfeldt on August 8.

George Macovescu, Foreign Minister
Sergiu Celac, Interpreter

President Gerald R. Ford
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Harry G. Barnes, Jr., Ambassador—Interpreter

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President Ceausescu: [Omitted here is an unrelated comment.] As far as European problems are concerned there was so much talk at Helsinki that any other words now wouldn't have all that much importance. What is important will be to see what can be accomplished, what each country will do to carry out what was declared and signed.

President Ford: I have the impression, though I may be overoptimistic, that there will be honest efforts to live up to these words. After all, in two years there will be the periodic accounting. I think you'll see done what was promised.

President Ceausescu: I'm by nature an optimist but this time I'm not really all that optimistic. The problems which need to be solved are very serious ones and they require solutions, some of which go beyond by a great deal what was signed in Helsinki. To be sure, if I were to mention economic problems but we can discuss them later. Rather, with regard to some of the other problems concerning Europe, they are really quite serious. Of course I have already had the occasion to touch on some of these with Dr. Kissinger but I would like to use this possibility to share with you a few of my thoughts if you are agreeable.

President Ford: Please.

President Ceausescu: In the first place, 30 years after the war Europe is still living under armistice conditions. The document we signed at Helsinki and for that matter some of the statements made there were intended to say we should continue to live in the spirit of the Potsdam Agreement² until peace is concluded. This of course implies that those who were victorious in the war, and this has to do with all the rights regarding Berlin, have the right to intervene in places where there is no peace treaty at any time they feel like it. There are of course certain understandable rights but there are also very great risks. I don't think it's a secret from anyone that there are very few Germans who approve of this state of things or are in any way enthusiastic about this situation. Hitler as you know came to power thanks to the situation which was created for Germany as a result of the first World War.

² For relevant excerpts of the 1945 Potsdam Agreement, which established four-power rights in occupied Germany, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 54–65.

President Ford: That's right.

President Ceausescu: There is a certain existing situation, there is a certain correlation of forces now on a worldwide scale, but this situation will not be eternal nor in my opinion will even last that long. Of course I'm not saying anything new to Dr. Kissinger. What I'm telling you now is that although there is a very clear situation today where the United States and the Soviet Union both control the major military forces including nuclear armaments, even that situation is not immutable. Anyway, in order to solve this problem, to do away with this situation, to achieve a peace treaty, requires putting every state involved on an equal footing including Germany. This it seems to me is one of the problems which it will be essential to be solved for the future of Europe. You know in recent years how quickly many situations have changed with what great rapidity.

President Ford: Would you suggest that these problems be solved on a bilateral or broader basis?

President Ceausescu: To be sure, in the first instance they need to be solved by the four powers and the Germans themselves because first of all the four powers are tied in by the Potsdam treaty with the situation in Germany proper.

Secretary Kissinger: Could I ask the President what problems worry you most in Europe. You were saying just now the situation might change.

President Ceausescu: You know very well some of the changes that have taken place even in Europe in the relative positions of different states. To continue to live under the aegis of the Potsdam treaty means the risk of intervention at any moment. This is the essential problem.

Secretary Kissinger: You would like a solution to the German problem.

President Ford: Unification?

President Ceausescu: Yes. But now a treaty of peace.

Secretary Kissinger: A peace treaty for Germany?

President Ceausescu: Getting rid of the Potsdam status and the achievement of a normal state of affairs in Europe which would exclude such a right of intervention in the internal affairs of other states.

Secretary Kissinger: What about with regard to Berlin?

President Ceausescu: In the context of a peace treaty a solution would have to be found for Berlin. So long as this will depend on the good will of the four powers any one of which could take the initiative to intervene whenever it believed it was entitled to do so. I note that many others as well as you yourself mentioned in their declarations at Helsinki that they agreed with the right of assigning a special status in Germany and Berlin to the four powers.

Secretary Kissinger: We made them.

President Ceausescu: It seems to me others did as well.

President Ford: Yes.

President Ceausescu: Without a doubt preservation of this state of affairs means maintaining a permanent lack of security and constant danger of tension in Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: What terms would be in such a treaty?

President Ceausescu: It's difficult to say now what provisions there might be. In the first place, one has to arrive at the realistic conclusion that it is time to put an end to this sort of situation. The peace treaty should do away with any sort of rights of some states over other states. Granted I'm not talking about the Leninist slogan of no annexations or reparations. That belongs to the past. But a peace, even with reparations and territorial changes, that would still be just.

Secretary Kissinger: In the humanist tradition?

President Ceausescu: I prefer to say the realist tradition.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

336. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Bucharest, August 3, 1975, 9–10:25 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Nicolae Ceausescu, President of Romania

Manea Manescu, Prime Minister

George Macovescu, Foreign Minister

Sergiu Celac, Interpreter

President Gerald R. Ford

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State

Harry G. Barnes, Jr., Ambassador–Interpreter

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Official, Chronological. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Barnes. The meeting took place on board the train between Bucharest and Sinaia. Barnes sent the memorandum as an attachment to a letter to Sonnenfeldt on August 8. A note at the bottom of the first page reads: "Notes were not taken by the interpreters during this conversation."

President Ceausescu began by saying that after the CSCE conference it was necessary to think about what problems needed to be tackled next. In his opinion, disarmament was such a problem. The President asked what opinion President Ceausescu had about the MBFR talks, President Ceausescu said "not much." The sorts of reductions being discussed, on the order of 20–30,000, were of a kind which could be achieved just as well through more efficient organization of any army. In addition, it wasn't really a question of numbers of soldiers, but rather of armaments, fire power, and in the first instance the US and the USSR. To take an abstract example, even with numbers, it wasn't right for reductions to be applied across the board, with Romania and Holland being subjected say to the same 10% reductions that would apply to the Soviets and Americans. The Secretary asked why this wasn't fair, and President Ceausescu replied that for the US this meant 200,000 troops and for the Soviets 300,000, but it still left their basic strength intact. The Secretary asked what 10% would mean for Romania, to which President Ceausescu replied in the order of 20,000. The element of fire power was what counted anyway. President Ford asked if what really bothered Romania wasn't 10% but what would happen when things got to 50% or 60%. This is exactly right, President Ceausescu said, and then went on to say that what counted, so far as troops were concerned, was not a transfer from say Czechoslovakia to Hungary of a couple thousand men but withdrawals. The Secretary said he wondered whether Romania really wanted US troop withdrawals given the fact that the continued presence of American troops in Europe was useful for preserving equilibrium on the continent from the standpoint of Romania, and in particular Yugoslavia. President Ceausescu said he wasn't talking about US troop withdrawals but about real reductions which should be balanced and under adequate control. What was needed was a mechanism for ensuring both reductions and control. As a matter of fact, he noted, the Chinese have done more than anybody else to bring about troop reductions in Europe by obliging the Soviets to move substantial troops to the Chinese border. The Secretary recalled that there are about 44 Soviet divisions there now and that whenever he mentions their "northern" ally to the Chinese, they tremble, not from fear of course.

Returning to the subject of disarmament, President Ceausescu said that one error that some countries, including the United States, make at times is to ignore the role of small, less-developed states. So long as the major nuclear powers make no real steps toward nuclear disarmament, the danger exists and will increase that any number of smaller countries will try to acquire nuclear weapons—countries in the Middle East, Asia or even Latin America like Brazil. The Secretary noted

that the Indians may be in that category though they are so very moral and pacifistic. They're not all that pacifistic, replied President Ceausescu. In any event, these same countries could also develop chemical or biological weapons which are cheaper and may well be more destructive.

President Ceausescu then brought the conversation back to Europe and remarked that he would be involved before long in what would in effect be a follow-up conference to CSCE—the conference of European communist parties. It could well turn out to be even more important than CSCE itself because at it would be decided whether a communist party in say Italy or France could have its own policies or would have to take orders from outside. The President asked what attitude President Ceausescu thought such parties would take. He replied that the Italian and Spanish parties, from all he knew of their leadership, would not accept outside dictation. With regard to the Portuguese party, President Ceausescu observed it was hard to say, but the military leaders he had met, including President Costa Gomes, were definitely committed to a policy of independence. In response to the Secretary's asking where and when the conference would take place, President Ceausescu said probably in November and probably in Berlin. (After the conversation broke up Ambassador Barnes asked President Ceausescu whether he really thought agreement could ever be reached on a document to be submitted to the conference. President Ceausescu replied that eventually there would be one on the same consensus basis as used at Geneva for CSCE. In any case, he was not looking forward with any great enthusiasm to this conference but Romania would definitely participate.)

Prior to that will be the CMEA (COMECON) summit conference called to discuss integration. When the Secretary asked what would be Romania's position, President Ceausescu said it was clear—they were against it. What about the other countries in COMECON, asked the Secretary. Some of them have reservations but they'll go along, said President Ceausescu. In fact the Poles are one of the strong supporters of the plan, as are the Bulgarians. The Secretary interposed "Then you'll be isolated." "It won't be for the first time," said President Ceausescu.

The Secretary then remarked how several of the Eastern European countries had talked to US representatives at the Helsinki conference about improving their relations with the United States, and asked what would be President Ceausescu's advice as to how the United States should treat them—in what order for example after Romania of course. President Ceausescu reflected for a while and then said he thought it was worthwhile trying to improve relations with them all. The President recalled that the Bulgarian representative at Helsinki had made a

particular effort to be friendly,² and President Ceausescu noted the existence of good Romanian–Bulgarian relations. After he mentioned that the US had already made a good start with Poland, the Secretary asked about East Germany in view of the fact that we had maintained a certain reserve with them. President Ceausescu said that in the recent past Romanian relations with East Germany had improved considerably. At the same time what the East Germans could do was obviously limited by the Potsdam treaty and they too would always go along with the Soviets. Ambassador Barnes mentioned that for that matter all the other European countries in COMECON had Soviet troops on their territory save Bulgaria and this could not help but limit their options. The Secretary said that knowing the Germans he could believe they might succeed in uniting in 15 years. They're romantics. They'll probably set themselves up as teachers of communism to the whole world. President Ceausescu responded that he agreed they would reunite though he wasn't so sure it would happen within 15 years. (At about this point the Secretary picked up the map of Romania which had been brought in at the President's request and a geography lesson ensued which concentrated on territories lost by Romania to the Soviets—President Ceausescu talking about the “restitution” to the Soviet Union of Bessarabia after World War II and the ceding of Northern Bukovina as “damages” for Romania's having held Bessarabia for 20 years. In fact, he noted, Romania in some ways fared better at Hitler's hands because Hitler turned down Molotov's³ November 1940 ultimatum to give the USSR a free hand in Romania and Bulgaria which would have meant the Soviets taking a still larger slice of northern Romania. In the context of talking about the differences of railway gauge between the USSR and other countries, President Ceausescu noted that the Bulgarians were urging Romania to build a wide gauge (Soviet type) line across Romania, but the Romanians were not interested.

The Secretary then asked who President Ceausescu thought would succeed Brezhnev. President Ceausescu said it was just hard to say and

² Telegram Secto 8089 from Helsinki to Sofia, July 31, reads in part: “In 25-minute meeting on July 31, Secretary told Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov that US has no conflict of interests with Bulgaria. There is no reason not to improve bilateral relations unless of course Bulgaria harasses us in international arenas or acts aggressively against its neighbors.” The telegram continued: “In subsequent press conference, Secretary stated: ‘I had a meeting with the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia and the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, and I expressed to both countries, both Foreign Ministers, that the United States has no—there is no obstacle on the United States' side to an improvement in relations. They expressed their strong desire to make progress in improving relations between the United States and their countries. We decided to start talks on scientific and technical exchanges and other subjects that might lead gradually to an improvement of our relationships.’” (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files)

³ Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, 1939–1949.

the Secretary then asked what he thought about post-Brezhnev Soviet policies, would they be tougher or more flexible. President Ceausescu replied “They could hardly be tougher than they are now.” “What about Shelepin?”⁴ asked President Ford. Saying “We’ve had fairly good experience with him,” President Ceausescu proceeded to recount the story of the Romanian gold bullion and royal treasure sent to Moscow in 1916 for safekeeping but which has never been returned. Lenin apparently signed a decree in 1918 stating that all would be restored after the establishment of a workers’ and peasants’ government in Romania. In 1960 the Romanians inquired of the Soviets whether they were yet prepared to believe that such a government had been installed in Romania. The initial Soviet reaction was to deny any knowledge of the gold, but Shelepin subsequently was one of those who was in favor of at least taking a serious look at the Romanian request. The Secretary noted that for someone like Shelepin it’s hard to make a comeback once you’ve lost your power base, and that the ranks of the Soviet leadership is no place for choir boys. President Ceausescu said the truth of the matter is that the whole present Soviet leadership is made up of people who got where they are thanks to Stalin, and only with a change to younger people will there be some real changes in policy.

The Secretary then asked whether Brezhnev had firm enough control to be able to make decisions stick. “On little, unimportant things” responded President Ceausescu, “like—MBFR.” What did he think of Brezhnev’s health? He said he was of course no doctor, but his own personal view was that Brezhnev would finish the same way Pompidou had. When the President wondered whether Brezhnev was aware of this, President Ceausescu said it was hard to say, citing Pompidou as having announced two days prior to his death that he was in good health.

⁴ Aleksandr Shelepin, member of the Soviet Politburo until 1975.

337. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Belgrade, August 4, 1975.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: The Democrats can't hurt you from the right. But if SALT blows up they can hurt you from the left, which is where they would then move.

All those guys talking about Helsinki; what frontiers have been recognized? All the frontiers but the German one were signed in '47–'48—with participation by a Democratic administration. West Germany agreed to the German one.

President: We had more overtures from East European countries than ever before, I think.

Kissinger: Absolutely.

President: Why did the East Europeans want CSCE? To keep the Soviet Union off their backs.

Kissinger: Of course. And whose frontiers have been violated? And by whom?

President: If we lost SALT, etc., shouldn't we make a speech saying the borders were approved by the Democrats, and the East Europeans wanted inviolability to protect against the Soviet Union?

Kissinger: How about a 15 minute report to the Nation Thursday?²

President: That has some merit. Let's think about it.

Didn't Tito go farther than ever before?

Kissinger: I wanted to mention that. Tito is a bellwether of European politics. He obviously liked you—he hasn't gone to the airport for years. His assessment has to be that you are dominant in world affairs.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 14, Secret; Nodis. Brackets, with the exception of those indicating omission of unrelated material, are in the original, which does not indicate the time of the meeting or where in Belgrade the meeting took place. President Ford was visiting Yugoslavia from August 3 to 4. (Ford Library, President's Daily Diary)

² August 7.

[There was more discussion of Tito.]

President: Let's make sure we deliver on the military equipment for Tito.

I have no hesitancy speaking up for CSCE and the whole thing.

Kissinger: Everything on this trip went right. Not a thing wrong. The Brezhnev problem is not your doing; something is going on.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

338. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 5, 1975, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

President's First Meeting with Prime Minister Miki

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Takeo Miki

Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa

Ambassador Takeshi Yasukawa

Toshiki Kaifu, House of Representatives and Deputy Cabinet Secretary

Sadaaki Numata, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)

The President

The Secretary

Ambassador James D. Hodgson

General Brent Scowcroft, NSC

James J. Wickel, Department of State (Interpreter)

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 14. Secret. Drafted by Wickel. The meeting took place at the White House. The following day, Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft discussed the meeting with Miki. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: "The President: What I told the Japanese about Helsinki is already in the paper. Kissinger: They simply leak everything. They are unbelievably tricky." The conversation continued: "President Ford: I have to be away giving a speech to the American Legion. I thought I would discuss détente. Kissinger: You should also discuss SALT and CSCE. I think you should lay it on the line: What in the hell have we given up or ratified at Helsinki? The Democrats want me to assure them I won't speak next year. The President: That shows one thing—they are scared. Don't you promise anything." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 282, Presidential File, Memoranda of Conversation, 1975 August, Folder 2)

Europe—CSCE

Miki: Turning to Europe, Mr. President, you just returned from there last night. In everyone's eyes the European Security Agreement appears to have resulted from Soviet efforts to realize their original concept of freezing the status quo in Europe. I am aware that the United States and other nations attached conditions to their acceptance of participation in the Helsinki Conference, but what I wish to ask, Mr. President, is what is your foremost diplomatic objective in the United States' Soviet policy?

President: First, let me comment on the CSCE. I believe there is a lack of sufficient background information on what the CSCE really does. In the first place, with respect to borders, it reaffirms the borders agreed to in treaties signed in 1947 and 1948, and nothing further, except in the case of Germany, where the CSCE reaffirms the borders agreed to by West Germany in 1971. Therefore, the CSCE does nothing more than reaffirm borders agreed to in 1947, 1948 and 1971. This point is not well enough understood.

Second, the CSCE Agreement adds an element of integrity and morality, in terms of the right way of doing things, so that the Soviet Union would not do again what it did in the cases of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The Eastern Europeans, if I may interpret what they said in the meetings and elsewhere, believe the CSCE is a document that will prevent the kinds of action from being taken as in the instances I described. They do not say this is guaranteed, but they seem to feel they have added protection that they didn't have before. In that sense CSCE is constructive. We will have a meeting in Belgrade in 1977, to review what happens in the subsequent two years.

My endorsement of CSCE is based on the good faith of those who agreed to it, including the Soviets. I expect all 35 signatories to live up to the agreement language.

In our relations with the Soviet Union we do not agree with their system (nor do they agree with ours). We do not feel that détente between the Soviets and the United States is a solution to all the world's problems, but it can be used, and has been in some cases, to ease tensions and avoid confrontations. I expect it to continue as a vehicle for those purposes.

Détente is a two-way street; it is not all one-way for the Soviets (and won't be as long as I am President). It is a mechanism for use at a time of rising tensions and confrontation. In some cases it has been disappointing, in other cases helpful. I do not mean that it is one-sided. It is mutually beneficial, and hopefully, can help solve some of the problems facing the world.

Secretary: If I may add a word, Mr. President, the debate about CSCE is totally cynical. It is generated by those who for 20 years advocated the exact opposite of what they now say. As the President has said, there are two realities in Europe, frontiers and political influence. There has been Yalta,² and then the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947 and 1948,³ and the German Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971.⁴ As a result there are no contested frontiers in Europe. To talk about frontiers is to reaffirm Treaties and legal language.

The political influence of the Soviets in Eastern Europe is not related to this conference. The Soviet Union has some 40,000 tanks between the Urals and the Elbe, and no Western nation wants to build that many tanks. Until someone does these critics are only engaging in an exercise of expressing demagogic platitudes.

I'm talking very frankly, but then I didn't have much sleep last night. I'm reading a new novel about Japan ("Shogun") and realize everything I'm doing is totally wrong.

Strategically we wish to weaken Soviet political influence in Eastern Europe, not confirm it. And we believe we can weaken it more effectively by détente than we could by cold war. During the cold war period we could use military force, but under détente we must use diplomacy.

If the President can be welcomed by tens of thousands as he was in Warsaw, Bucharest, Kracow, and Belgrade, this weakens the Soviet Union. This could not have happened without détente.

We are under no illusions about the Soviet Union. If they have the opportunity to use pressure, they will do so. We (and you) must adopt positions that our domestic opponents can't attack if we have to resist. I used the example yesterday of the prize-ring—is it better for us to fight flat-footed in mid-ring where we can be hit easily, or to move around and make ourselves harder to hit? Then if the Soviets do something, and we can tell our people we have done all we can for peace, we will be in a stronger position to resist.

If we look at the Middle East, détente has not helped the Soviet Union. We do not aim at hegemony, and dividing the world between us, because that would be suicidal. We wish to contain the Soviet Union

² Relevant extracts from the Protocol of Proceedings of the Crimea (Yalta) Conference, February 11, 1945, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 10–12.

³ Presumably Kissinger is referring to the Paris Agreements of 1954 between the three Western powers and the Federal Republic of Germany. For the text of the agreements, see *ibid.*, pp. 425–431.

⁴ Kissinger is apparently referring to the Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union, signed at Moscow on August 12, 1970, commonly referred to as the Moscow Treaty. For the text of the treaty, see *ibid.*, pp. 1103–1105.

with modern methods, which are not those of the cold war period but are entirely new.

SALT, MBFR

Miki: Based on the outcome of the CSCE conference what prospects do you see for further progress in SALT and MBFR?

President: I had two meetings with General Secretary Brezhnev,⁵ in which we made some headway on SALT. There are some problems which are very technical, and some which are very fundamental. I believe the odds on an agreement are better than 50–50, but not certain. We will continue to negotiate. I believe that SALT is in the interest of the entire world as well as US-Soviet relations. We will continue to work at it, but we will insist that whatever materializes must be mutually beneficial.

Regarding MBFR, we recognize that the negotiations have been stalled for some time. We are working with our European allies to try to develop a position that might move the talks forward, but this depends on the reaction the Soviets have.

We believe that a MBFR that reduces military forces on an equitable basis is in the best interest of Europe, but the talks are stalemated. We hope the Soviets will be as flexible as we will. We will continue to work closely with our allies so that our efforts will lead to greater unity and not split us.

When are the MBFR talks scheduled to reconvene, Henry?

Secretary: September, Mr. President.

CSCE Effect on Asia

Miki: Turning to the repercussions generated in Asia by the CSCE, the Soviets extended an invitation on July 30 to (LDP Diet Member) Hirohide Ishida, Chairman of the Japan-Soviet Parliamentarians Friendship Association, to hold a meeting to discuss an Asian Security Conference.

In the long term, although it may not be visible yet except in special circumstances, what the Asians are most sensitive to is Soviet and Chinese influence in Asia. The Chinese, for example, view the Asian Security Conference proposed by the Soviets as an attempt to encircle them . . .

Secretary: They're right.

Miki: . . . and therefore oppose any third nation hegemony. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship Japan is negotiating with China, as you know, has been stalled by opposition to the inclusion of the hegemony

⁵ See Document 329.

clause. It is obvious that the Chinese are vigilant against any increase in Soviet influence in Asia. What do you feel will be the effect of the CSCE on this trend in Asia, in the context of Soviet influence?

President: First let me speak about the United States' relations with the People's Republic. Our relations were initiated by Mr. Nixon. I fully support these relations, and believe they are of vital importance. I expect to go to the People's Republic sometime late this fall. I feel that our relations are moving along on schedule. The Shanghai document⁶ is the basis for continuing and expanding our relations. I see no serious problem developing in that regard.

We all recognize that there is competition in Asia between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic. We believe that our continuing relations with China are important in maintaining stability in Asia, and we will make every effort, in a responsible manner, to broaden our relations with the People's Republic. Secondly, we expect to maintain continued close relations with your government, Mr. Prime Minister. We feel this is vitally important for the stability and security of the Pacific. I have been encouraged by our discussions in Japan, and this morning. Tomorrow we can reaffirm the importance of our relations.

I recognize there are problems in the Pacific area, not in our relations but in peripheral areas. We should be frank in discussing those relations, as they refer to relations between the United States and Japan.

Therefore, we seek to broaden our relations with China, while maintaining and strengthening our relations with Japan. This will have an impact on the influence of the Soviet Union in the Pacific area. Henry, have you anything to add?

Secretary: I was asked in Helsinki about an Asian collective security conference, and said if there is such a meeting, it would take place without the United States. I do not think Asia can be compared with the situation in Europe.

Miki: I agree.

Secretary: We will not participate in an Asian collective security conference, or anything of that kind.

Second, we believe the Soviet Union is trying to encircle China, and in no way do we wish to participate. China has its own aspirations, and in ten years may cause trouble for all of us, including Japan, but at the present time it is not in our interest to weaken China. Therefore, we will not cooperate with the Soviets in any anti-Chinese maneuver in Asia. It was for that reason that we signed the Shanghai

⁶ For the Shanghai Communiqué of February 27, 1972, between the United States and the People's Republic of China, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 20, 1972, pp. 435–438.

Communiqué, with its hegemony clause. We knew what we were doing, and made it explicit.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

339. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 8, 1975, 2 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Cabinet Meeting

The first item is a report on CSCE and my trip in general. We stopped first in Bonn and had a good discussion with Schmidt,² who is very concerned over the economic situation. I will talk in greater detail with the economic group tomorrow, because Giscard and Wilson are also concerned. From there we went to Poland where we had good talks with Gierek.³

Then we went to Helsinki. There has been criticism of the meeting. But it bolstered the West and gave a greater sense of independence to the Eastern European countries. The meeting was a definite plus. The borders were settled by treaty, most of them 30 years ago. The agreement—the Final Act—specifies self-determination and peaceful change of the borders.

From there we went to Romania.⁴ That is a tough outfit, but with a fierce sense of independence. Then we stopped in Yugoslavia. I have never seen an 83-year-old sharper. We had good talks.

I met with Demirel and Karamanlis at Helsinki.⁵ The Turkish aid decision⁶ was the worst decision I have seen in my time in Congress.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 14. Unclassified. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Present at the meeting were the members of the Cabinet, White House staff, and heads of agencies.

² See Document 324.

³ See Document 326.

⁴ See Documents 335 and 336.

⁵ Records of Ford's conversations with Demirel (July 31) and Karamanlis (July 30), see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Document 233 and 51, respectively.

⁶ Congress banned U.S. aid to Turkey as part of the 1975 Foreign Assistance Act, which passed on December 11, 1974. On July 24, 1975, the House voted 206–223 to

I hope it will be reversed. I met with others, including Giscard and Wilson.⁷

I had two meetings with Brezhnev.⁸ We spoke about SALT, the Middle East and other subjects. We made progress, but more flexibility is needed. That is a quick rundown. Henry—

Kissinger: CSCE was never an element of US foreign policy. We never pushed it and stayed a half step behind our allies all through the process. But we didn't want to break with our allies or confront the Soviets on it. The complaints we are seeing show the moral collapse of the academic community. They are bitching now about the borders we did nothing to change when we had a nuclear monopoly. Indeed, they beat Dulles about the head for his position. As the President said, the borders were legally established long ago. All the new things in the document are in our favor—peaceful change, human contacts, maneuver notification. At the Conference, it was the President who dominated the Conference and it was the West which was on the offensive.⁹ It was not Brezhnev who took a triumphal tour through Eastern Europe—it was the President. And even if every spectator was paid—which I don't believe—the leadership in those countries felt strongly enough about demonstrating their independence to put out so much money.

Our relations now with our allies are better than ever since the early Marshall Plan days. Our relations with the Soviets—we didn't have the impression this group was on the upswing. Anyone observing from another planet would not have thought Communism was the wave of the future.

reject an amended version of S. 846, which would have permitted the resumption of military aid to Turkey. The following day, Turkey ordered the cessation of operations at the 27 U.S. bases on its territory. (*Congress and the Nation, 1973–1976, Vol. IV, pp. 858–860, 866*)

⁷ See Documents 328 and 331.

⁸ See Document 329.

⁹ Kissinger made similar remarks at a meeting with Callaghan, Sauvagnargues, and Genscher, at his suite in the Waldorf Towers in New York during the meeting of the UN General Assembly on September 5: "I was struck at Helsinki by the total bankruptcy of the Communist system where it's been in power for 30 years. They can keep in power only by a kind of petty bourgeois nationalism of the 1930's variety. But in the West, with prosperity and security, that is the only place where it is growing. It is an absolutely inexplicable phenomenon." (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 12, Nodis Memcons, Aug. 1975, Folder 9)