

Concluding CSCE, January 1975–July 1975

268. Editorial Note

On January 9, 1975, President Ford wrote in a letter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev that “it will remain the clear policy of my Administration to work with you for the settlement of remaining international disputes, the elimination of crisis situations and building of a peaceful and cooperative world order. Such important efforts as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, in which we are jointly engaged along with many other countries, must in my view be brought to a successful conclusion, and we will certainly work energetically to that end. I well recall our discussions on this subject at Vladivostok, and we will proceed firmly on the basis we agreed to at that time.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 28, USSR, the “D” File)

On January 27, Brezhnev replied: “There is also no doubt that the common actions of our countries in the completion of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe should be made active to the maximum extent in the forthcoming weeks. A successful completion of this major event with the signing of the final documents at the highest level could also be an important contribution to Soviet-American relations. Therefore, we expect that the American side in the spirit of the assurances given in your letter and in the spirit of our understanding on this question reached in Vladivostok will make every effort to facilitate achieving exactly such an outcome. Yet even today, Mr. President, not everything is going smoothly in this respect.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 217, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Dobrynin, Anatolii, Chronological)

269. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 30, 1975, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

CSCE, EC-Arab Dialogue, Greece-Turkey-Cyprus, Southern Africa

PARTICIPANTS

UK

Foreign Secretary Callaghan

Ambassador Peter Ramsbotham

Sir Donald Maitland, FCO Deputy Under Secretary handling Economic Affairs

Thomas McNally, FCO Political Advisor to Callaghan

Anthony Ackland, Callaghan's Private Secretary

T. D. McCaffrey, Press Spokesman

John Thomson, Assistant Under Secretary of State responsible for PM matters

Michael Weir, Assistant Under Secretary responsible for Middle East and UN

C. C. C. Tickell, NATO and other Western Organization Affairs

Leonard Williams, Deputy Secretary, Department of Energy

Richard A. Sykes, Minister, British Embassy

US

The Secretary

Elliot Richardson, Ambassador-Nominee to the UK

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State

Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State

Charles W. Robinson, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

William A. Buell, Jr., Director, Office of Northern European Affairs, Department of State

The Secretary: How do you propose to conduct this?

Secretary Callaghan: Well, I suggest we get down to business. Let's start with CSCE.

The Secretary: Is the CSCE business?

Secretary Callaghan: I know you might not consider it business, but I am going to Moscow, and we would like to be as close as we can with your people to see just where we should aim. Before we came here, we had an approach from Ambassador Dubinin in Geneva, which was a follow-up of what I had said to the Soviet Ambassador in London; namely, that we get on with it. Dubinin said he had been authorized to approach us for bilateral talks, which were to be secret.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 10, POL 2 United Kingdom. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Buell. Approved by Hartman and Adams (S) on February 8. The conversation took place in the Secretary's Conference Room.

The Secretary: The unmitigated bastards! They offer secret bilateral discussions to everyone, which they are supposed to keep secret from their allies.

Secretary Callaghan: In fact, we welcomed the approach but we will not run out ahead of our allies. We want to respond positively and will say that we will attempt to persuade our allies to accept anything which makes sense. We will only talk about CSCE. We will not get into the peaceful change of frontiers because we know that you are handling the "floating sentence." But we could talk about Basket III and CBMs.

The Secretary: (to Hartman). Are the Russians talking to us?

Mr. Hartman: Just on peaceful change.

The Secretary: (to Callaghan). It is good to have you come here so I can learn something.

Secretary Callaghan: Hartman and Sonnenfeldt are the worst briefers I know. Now I see it is really a good technique. (laughter). (Resuming line of thought.) The Russians, in talking to us, have been tough. The tone is conciliatory but on substance they are tough.

The Secretary: They try out each ally in turn, to get one to move another. Once this has been exhausted, they will move toward the Summit they are so anxious to have this year. In my view, basically nothing in the Conference is going to be improved by a long negotiating process. The question is when to have the Summit in order to achieve what the Western countries want. We want to see moderate Soviet behavior for the greater part of this year, so if the Summit is in September and not in June, the American political purpose will not be defeated. But I am recommending that we let nature take its course.

Secretary Callaghan: Isn't there a danger that the Russians might become irritable over a delay?

The Secretary: No, not so long as it is before the Party Congress.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: That would be some time between September 1975 and the spring of 1976.

Secretary Callaghan: What shall we do on confidence-building measures? These movements and maneuvers. I know you are not interested in movements. Do you not want to try to get something on maneuvers?

The Secretary: Do you mean on the size of the units or the area of territory?

Secretary Callaghan: Yes, and the size of the units about which notification must be made, the number of days in advance, and the depth of territory. I suppose our people in Geneva know your views.

Mr. Tickell: Yes, we know them but it helps us to know how you propose we move towards a solution. We have two possibilities: (1) we

can change the obligations to make them not so binding, and (2) change the parameters on size and territory.

The Secretary: The Soviets would like the former. I am inclined to the latter. What's the point of this if it is not binding?

Mr. Hartman: We have been discussing this at Geneva; that is, voluntary notification.

Mr. Tickell: The Germans want to keep the idea of voluntary notification for all of Europe.

Secretary Callaghan: Would this really cover all of Europe?

Mr. Tickell: Yes, all participants, plus 500 kilometers of Soviet territory.

Secretary Callaghan: The real point, Henry, is that we are going to Moscow, so do you think we can carry this a stage further with Gromyko?

The Secretary: No, I don't think so. We talked about this over a year ago.

Secretary Callaghan: We will be closely in touch. We won't get out of line with you. We will see if there is any give in Gromyko's position. We have got to get on with this. I am getting fed up with it hanging around.

The Secretary: Don't worry, they will want to move by June. The question is, with whom are they going to move.

Secretary Callaghan: I imagine they would prefer to move with you.

The Secretary: A year ago I would have said yes, but now I don't think this is necessarily the case.

Secretary Callaghan: We could only bring something back to talk over with the Alliance. We can't really talk turkey with Gromyko.

The Secretary: We have always thought there could be some progress in this area. I have no fixed ideas. They have not accepted the proposal of 100 kilometers along the Soviet border.

Mr. Hartman: We must decide on the zonal concept. The question is how much into the Soviet Union. They once told us they would consider to Kiev.

Secretary Callaghan: I wouldn't be raising this unless Dubinin said they wanted to talk. Peaceful change we shall leave in your hands.

The Secretary: Don't believe them if they present our position as more forthcoming than we have told you. Once they said that Genscher told them that the Germans refused to accept a formula on peaceful change only because we were unhappy with the text. I couldn't have cared less about the text on peaceful change.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: In Berlin they said we were the only obstacle.

The Secretary: Their negotiating tactics are tawdry in the extreme.

Secretary Callaghan: I have never talked to Gromyko.

The Secretary: He is the world's greatest expert on CSCE.

Secretary Callaghan: I must say you are putting me off him.

The Secretary: He was insisting to me each principle must be equally applied and each equally valid. When he said that in Vladivostok, the President asked me what the hell he meant. I said I never understood the difference. In my view, he will want to settle with you in Moscow and not do it with your people and your fellow (Dubinin) in Geneva.

Secretary Callaghan: About the level of Stage III and the on-going. We agree that there can be a Summit but we don't want to give it away yet.

The Secretary: We have given it all away already. Why not use the French formula? I told Genscher the only issue was which European country would give away the Summit. My present view is that the Summit is inevitable. The margin of negotiation left is so small that a Summit really makes no difference. We give away nothing by implying that a Summit is probable. We should only keep for ourselves an escape route in case they turn bloody-minded in the next few months.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Their dream is to have it coincide with VE Day.

Secretary Callaghan: I must say this is the first time I have heard September mentioned.

The Secretary: It would be a guarantee of their good behavior, at least until then. But we are not delaying this. July would be fine with us.

Secretary Callaghan: We have nothing against September but people seem to be focusing on June or July.

Mr. Tickell: We agreed in Dublin, among the Nine, to a target date of June or July for Stage III.

The Secretary: Six weeks would make no historical difference.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We should finish Stage II six weeks before a Summit.

The Secretary: We have a Summit with them too, which will make them behave until June. We don't intend to make any concessions on CSCE at that Summit.

Secretary Callaghan: I know you don't have much interest in the future of these arrangements, but I think you underestimate the interest of the Europeans. The smaller countries want a resumption of the dialogue at some later stage.

The Secretary: I know that your view is that this might be 18 months later. This is a fairly reasonable proposal, but I think we should keep them as the demandeur. Your proposal is one we could live with.

Secretary Callaghan: The beginning of 1977 would be 18 months, but we won't talk about that in Moscow.

The Secretary: We need to keep something in our pocket. My view would be sympathetic to your approach. Do we have anything more on CSCE? On principles and equal validity, I don't understand the difference between equally valid and equally applied.

Mr. Tickell: The Russians want principles badly. If the Germans want to work on peaceful change we shouldn't need to tear our hearts out over that.

The Secretary: Nobody but the Germans understand the difference on this issue. I have no interest in getting this settled. Changes in Europe won't depend on the placement of a sentence or the use of the word "only." But all the pressures will be on the Germans, and the Russian aim is to have the Germans *the* obstacle to agreement.

Mr. Tickell: At our meeting of the Nine, we said no to the July 26 formula² and are back to the April 5 formula.³ But we must look at other formulas. The French are keen on that, and the Germans are more flexible.

The Secretary: We had it in the Sovereignty Section, but I don't give a damn.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We are in the crazy position of being asked to feed unacceptable texts to the Russians.

The Secretary: We could get an agreement on texts we don't believe in on behalf of the Germans? I said from the beginning there is no chance of changing the registered texts.

Secretary Callaghan: Why don't we let Arthur (Hartman) move ahead with the Germans. If in the Nine we don't agree on one route, we can agree on another. Anything agreeable to the Germans is okay with us.

The Secretary: Gromyko will raise that, and he will try to get a date nailed down for the Summit. I suggest we agree on the Summit 98 percent, leaving us just enough for an escape, and gear the date to progress in the Conference. He will give you an excruciatingly detailed account of his idea of principles. On CBMs you can give him satisfaction. On Basket III there is not much to discuss.

Mr. Tickell: In Basket III we still have working conditions for journalists, jamming, and a mini-preamble to human rights—the French formula—but we can handle this better in Geneva than in Moscow.

² See Document 239.

³ On April 5, 1974, the FRG agreed to a revised Soviet text on inviolability of frontiers in return for the inclusion of language on peaceful change somewhere else in the declaration of principles (Basket I). See Document 198.

The Secretary: He will give you a 25-minute speech on the immorality of interference in Soviet domestic affairs. You had better shift that to Geneva.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

270. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, February 16, 1975, 8:15–11:40 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrey A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Andrey Vavilov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

CSCC; Cyprus; China and Japan; Germany and Berlin; Emigration; SALT II

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Gromyko: Could we discuss the European Security Conference over the blini?

Kissinger: Could I tell one story about Vladivostok?

Kovalev: It seems that the texts at the European Security Conference are being done much more slowly than the blini.

Kissinger: Could I tell one story about Vladivostok? The Foreign Minister was explaining the difference between "equal applicability of principles" and "equal validity of principles," and the President turned to me and said, "What the hell is he talking about?" [Laughter. Gromyko looks slightly embarrassed.] My trouble was I couldn't

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 8, Soviet Union. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The conversation took place in the Soviet Mission. Brackets, with the exception of those indicating omission of unrelated material, are in the original. The complete text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.

explain it to him either. [Laughter.] You've ruined my prestige! Now the President has lost confidence in me.

Gromyko: The Americans at the highest level decided they're above principles!

Kissinger: We're going to enter a reservation that they don't apply to the U.S.

Sonnenfeldt: Good idea.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

Kissinger: What about the European Security Conference? We can settle it over the sturgeon.

Gromyko: If we speak seriously about this subject of the European Security Conference, I would say that after a certain rise in activity there, which was not sufficient, and happened before the last interval, a certain tranquility has set in.

Kissinger: [Interrupts the translation] Especially in the Russian delegation, I'm told.²

Gromyko: Of course, we think this is connected with the policy of certain countries. And this is not by accident. The European Security Conference reflects the state of mind of certain capitals. And we can conclude that not all possibilities are being utilized. Perhaps I'm being too frank.

Kissinger: Since I know the Foreign Minister isn't talking about Washington, I wonder what capitals he is talking about.

Gromyko: After a year, it's being relegated to next year, and then a third year, and then a fourth year, and then a fifth year. This cannot but reflect on policies in other areas.

Kissinger: Let's be concrete—what capitals?

Gromyko: I'll give an answer to that. We have a definite view that the FRG in certain questions is playing a negative role, and certain negative impulses proceed from her representatives. We've said the same

² A February 10 briefing item for President Ford, based on telegram 830 from Geneva, February 8, reads in part: "CSCE registered no new agreed text last week for the first time in many months as the Soviet dug in their heels on all Conference subjects. They are assuming widespread acceptance in principle of a summit conclusion in June–July and appear confident this will force Western and neutral delegations to give up their more ambitious proposals and agree to the minimal positions advanced by the East. The Soviets thus have refused any flexibility of their own and added to the frustration that once again dominates the Conference." (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Europe, Canada and Ocean Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 44, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe)

thing as we say to you to representatives of the FRG at the highest level—to Chancellor Schmidt and Minister Genscher. And the same thing we said to the British, at a high level—to Prime Minister Mr. Wilson and Foreign Secretary Mr. Callaghan. I do not know how the British Government will conduct itself in the future, but up until now on many questions, I would like to say their attitude was negative. We thought for quite a long time about the differences between the line of the Labour Government and the Conservative Government on questions of European security and in particular the European Security Conference, and up to now not noticed the great difference. However, I should make a reservation—we have detected signs of perhaps a greater degree of interest in the talks in Moscow on some matters which are of general interest to countries and on certain matters signs of interest in a positive outcome of the Conference. And we hope certain practical steps will come out in the future. And we have told this to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. Of course, we said this to them to a greater extent than to you now.

And I would like to mention about one more capital: Washington. I've spoken to the leader of our delegation, Comrade Kovalev, who is my Deputy. And so we feel the pulse of the European Security Conference. On certain questions there are good contacts between our representatives. Our representatives feel that when there is desire on the part of the American representatives to help promote progress on certain questions, this makes results. We do not always feel this desire. And sometimes we feel that the attitude of your representatives is somewhat like the attitude of observers, people who look at things happen and wait and see how things proceed.

In a nutshell, we think not all possibilities and opportunities are being utilized, and it's not by chance. The reasons are not clear but we think it has reasons. Perhaps you can answer. We think you can give more help. Sometimes there are impulses to help but the impulses go down and weaken until the next cycle.

Kissinger: No, Mr. Foreign Minister, sometimes toward the conclusion of a negotiation which is where we are now, the questions left to the end are the most difficult ones, and this is what is happening. Secondly, I'd be interested to hear what specific issues you're talking about, because there is no directive from Washington to slow down cooperation. On the contrary, our intention is unchanged to speed up cooperation. So I would appreciate hearing what issues you refer to.

Gromyko: I can answer that. We believe today there are a number of questions which are blocking further movement. Three. Or four perhaps. The first is formulations which pertain to the right of states to change frontiers peacefully only by agreement and in accordance with international law. Second is the measure of military détente or

confidence. Third is the question of the correlation of principles. That problem, by the way, is the one that created liveliness on the part of certain of the Vladivostok participants. In a good mood.

Kissinger: It was deliberately designed to undermine my prestige.

Gromyko: I can't question the intentions of the President. That is not my responsibility. [Laughter.]

Then there is the Third Basket. There are certain remnant questions in this Third Basket, not all of the same character, but they are blocking progress. Some countries probably are trying to show strong character, but it blocks progress.

Kissinger: Can I give you my impression of these issues? On peaceful change, we can give you another formulation tonight—or tomorrow. But it is a matter of principal interest to other countries, as you know, and connected to their domestic politics. So it's not an issue on which the U.S. is the principal agent.

Second, on the equal validity of principles, I frankly thought this was on the way to being solved. And there was the IPU Conference in Belgrade which had yet another formulation.³ So I thought it was moving toward a solution.

Gromyko: Not yet.

Kissinger: Isn't the Belgrade formulation acceptable?

Gromyko: [To his colleagues:] What is the Belgrade formulation?

Kissinger: We had the impression perhaps that that formula . . .

Gromyko: We can't negotiate it in Belgrade.

Kissinger: No. Tomorrow we'll give you the two formulas that we thought will lead to a solution.

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: We'll give them to you. In our internal discussions we genuinely thought those would solve it. We'll have it for you tomorrow at 10:00. Our Ambassadors will discuss it. Ours will be handicapped by the fact that I genuinely don't understand it.

Gromyko: Even after Vladivostok.

Kissinger: You expressed it, didn't explain it.

³ Telegram 553 from Belgrade, February 6, reported that the International Parliamentary Union conference was closing with "substantial degree of Soviet/EE acceptance of Western formulations on several key issues" with regard to CSCE, "e.g., equality of principles and Basket III proposals." The telegram continued: "After initial hesitation, Soviets accepted language referring to these 10 principles [of European security from the multilateral preparatory talks] 'which are of equal importance and each of which should be applied unreservedly by all countries, regardless of their social system, and interpreted in the context of each other.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

Gromyko: [To his colleagues:] What is the Belgrade formulation?

Dobrynin: [To Kissinger:] No one on our side is familiar with it.

Kissinger: We'll give it to you.

Hartman: There was another one which was discussed at the Conference.

Kissinger: [To Hartman:] What made you think it was acceptable?

Hartman: Because their delegation was there and accepted it, and it was advised by their Foreign Office.

Kissinger: Maybe it was an honest misunderstanding. Our people genuinely thought, when the IPU accepted it and your delegation was there. . . .

Gromyko: We weren't interested in this matter at Belgrade at all.

Kissinger: There is no point debating it; why don't our Ambassadors give you the two formulas on which we genuinely thought a convergence of views was developing? We'll do it tonight. And you look at it, and see.

Gromyko: Of course.

Kissinger: On Confidence-Building Measures, didn't the British discuss this with you in Moscow?

Gromyko: Callaghan said that maybe information about maneuvers can be exchanged on a voluntary basis.

Kissinger: Movements?

Hartman: No, both.

Gromyko: Maneuvers too. We didn't think it was against your line of thinking. We discussed it once.

Kissinger: I know.

Gromyko: He wasn't specific but it was worthy of consideration. Then, what is the point from which states should proceed when they exchange information?

Kissinger: The number of days?

Gromyko: The number of troops.

Kissinger: Number of troops and. . . .

Gromyko: For Luxembourg, maybe one regiment is a terrible force. For us, if five divisions are going from their winter to their summer quarters, we don't notice them.

Kissinger: We don't notice them either, as long as they don't come West.

On this issue, if we're willing to show some flexibility on both sides. . . .

Gromyko: This is not an important general matter. We think this was introduced rather artificially. In the long run it can be considered.

It's possible to consider other problems. In a sense it's a symbolic one, they said. But if symbolic steps should be considered, reasonable ones should be done.

Kissinger: What do you think?

Gromyko: We think it should apply to all countries equally and 100 kilometers from the borders. 100 kilometers. All this fantastic part about the European part of the Soviet Union and 500 kilometers, is fantastic. This is supposed to be about confidence but all this undermines confidence.

Regarding the number of troops, we think a corps. Do Americans have a corps?

Dobrynin: A corps or Army.

Gromyko: In the neighborhood of 30,000–35,000. This is not a terrible force. Otherwise you and probably you and we can report every day. And you should build skyscrapers to accommodate the staff who shall be engaged in such unproductive business.

Kissinger: Well, we have no agreement on this point. But I have always believed it was a point on which a solution should be possible. And I think if we both look again at the figures we gave to each other and try to find a compromise between the two positions, we'd be willing to cooperate. And if you want to instruct your Ambassador to be flexible, we'll instruct ours.

But these talks should be kept quiet.

Gromyko: Naturally they should be quiet, but it seems we're remaining at the same old positions.

Kissinger: No, if your Ambassador is instructed to show some flexibility, ours will, and we should find a compromise between the numbers and the distances. And if we agree, we can use our influence with other delegations.

Gromyko: Why not report to them tomorrow?

Kissinger: [To Hartman] Is Sherer here in Geneva?

Hartman: Yes.

Kissinger: All right, we'll do it tomorrow.

Gromyko: Do not discount this idea of voluntary.

Kissinger: They'll meet tomorrow.

Gromyko: The remaining two principles: On borders—we'll comment when we receive the text.

Kissinger: Then Basket III—it's too intellectual for me. There is a French text and there is a Russian text, so it's between you and the French. As for the rest, our people aren't causing any trouble, are they? Seriously, our people aren't causing any delay. We're staying out of it.

Gromyko: It's true. And we don't reproach you with creating difficulties. And it seems you have a more realistic approach to the problems than some others. But you seem to act as observers.

Kovalev: Sometimes they give help and sometimes they're passive.

Kissinger: It's a difficult problem for reasons with which you're familiar. We can't block the proposals of others in that area. Our impression is your delegation perhaps hasn't made all the efforts it could make in that area.

Gromyko: I think we have exerted so many efforts that if you read a memorandum of our concessions in the field of cultural contacts, information contacts, no one should wait for concessions only from the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries. Other countries may have a less flexible attitude than you, and we agree, but compromise should be the prevailing factor. We don't think you will worsen your relations when you pronounce your authoritative word. Because we have stated our view. And I can quote certain examples. There was a whole constellation of islands in the Pacific and there was a moment when the Soviet Union after the Second World War actively supported trusteeship by the U.S.—the Marshalls, the Marianas and the Carolines. I remember; I voted for this in the UN. But it was not an easy matter to explain, and public opinion was opposed. But it was a matter of allied relations and both of us were speaking on peaceful cooperation in the world. This was a striking example. In comparison with this, the questions being discussed now are extremely small.

Kissinger: As the Foreign Minister said himself, we have supported the Soviet view on several issues in Basket III and we have not opposed it on any issue in Basket III. And we'll be genuinely cooperative. But it is a difficult situation for us, given our domestic situation, to be too visibly active.

Gromyko: What can I say to that? We would like to express the hope that the U.S. will be more active than before on questions relating to culture, information and humanitarian contacts. It is up to you whether it should be tied to domestic considerations and to what extent. In a word—and we have a record of exchanges with you—we think you operate lower than your possibilities.

Kissinger: Frankly, our people think the same of you.

Gromyko: Read the list of what we've done and what others have done.

Kissinger: Let me review the subject. It eludes me from time to time. I read it before, and I will see what can be done.

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: What other issues are there?

Gromyko: It would be good to clear up these European matters.

Regarding the timing of the final stage of the Conference at the highest level, it doesn't seem that people are sticking to the dates discussed. There was agreement, and two months have passed and there is no agreement. This doesn't bring benefit to anybody when they are not complied with. The agreements bring some tranquility to public opinion, but the reaction is sharp when they are not complied with. Not much time has passed since Vladivostok.

Kissinger: I don't understand. Not much time has passed?

Gromyko: Only two months—and now we see the agreement is going to be broken.

Kissinger: That was a sarcastic remark.

Gromyko: Perhaps we'll sit together in the next room with notetakers and discuss this question.

Kissinger: About the Security Conference.

Gromyko: It is unlocked. They will not bind us.

Dobrynin: He's a flexible man.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Gromyko: [Omitted here is an unrelated comment.] I would like to tell you, Henry, we are very unhappy with the progress at the European Security Conference. This is a great contrast with the Vladivostok meeting which, you are aware, was of very great significance.

Look how many years this has been going on now. As we see the situation, the procrastination being done is artificial and this doesn't correspond to the interest of the whole cause. We think there are some political calculations, and it is happening not by chance. Maybe I am being too straightforward.

Kissinger: No, I appreciate it.

Gromyko: If you think it isn't right, maybe it's London, Bonn, but we don't understand why this is being done.

This is the personal feeling of our leadership and the personal view of General Secretary Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, whom I saw yesterday before I left.

Kissinger: Tell him my personal regards. I admire him for his courage.

Gromyko: Even now it is not known when the Conference will end. Let us settle the date of the final ending at the highest level.

Kissinger: I want to say first of all that when I saw the toast of Leonid Brezhnev when he referred to the European Security Conference I was somewhat surprised, because I thought things were going normally—not quickly but normally. Because with so many countries there, I thought it was progressing toward a conclusion this year.

Perhaps one mistake we made was to give deadlines which are too short, given the procedures and readings that are required. Let's discuss a realistic date. Look, we agree there will be a summit, without clauses. Let's find a date—say, late July or early September—a firm commitment. Or what is your idea?

Gromyko: I must say what you said about dates puts us on our guard. You remember the dates we discussed some time ago. Now you want July, September. I must say the Soviet leadership is discouraged with the situation—for want of a stronger word; I won't mention it. We think there is a possibility to finish the conclusion of the European Security Conference two months earlier. Look at—it's now half of February, so June or July means five months. Should we continue it five months? We don't understand this.

Kissinger: Your idea is June?

Gromyko: We think it is better in April, or at least May. It is better in April. This is possible. This is possible. Work remains for two weeks that is all.

Kissinger: It is not possible. I mean the third stage.

Gromyko: To complete the second stage, a couple of weeks are needed. Of course we are talking about the third stage. To conclude the second stage, we only need a couple of weeks. Maybe there is no wish. The orchestra is too large. Some countries do one thing; some do another.

Kissinger: Our people thought the second stage, with all the readings, couldn't be done until mid-April.

Gromyko: Today, one country inserts one comma, tomorrow another country inserts another comma.

Kissinger: Can we do this? I've noted what you say. We have no interest in a delay. Why should we create suspicion in the minds of the Soviet leadership? It is not a substantive issue. We agree there will be a summit.

Gromyko: I appreciate what you say.

Kissinger: So the only issue is the time. I'm seeing Giscard and Wilson in the next three days. Let me be in touch with you no later than a week from today with a proposal.

Gromyko: By the way, Giscard considered April.

Kissinger: May I be in touch with them? I'll give it to Vorontsov and it stays in our channel. But we will make a firm commitment for a realistic date.

Gromyko: I'm glad you say there are no calculations. We were guessing. We thought for basic reasons, Washington should not delay.

Kissinger: No.

Gromyko: But we thought there were some reasons we do not see from Moscow.

Kissinger: What do we gain?

Gromyko: Within a week?

Kissinger: Next Monday I'll give a proposal. Then you can reply to me.

Gromyko: I spoke on this with Callaghan.

Kissinger: What do they say?

Gromyko: They are having a Common Market referendum in June, and so they say they will be busy April and May. I said it's only two or three days; he didn't have another date. He said he would think over the matter. We have the impression—not the only impression—that if Washington gave the word for April, it would be accepted by London and Paris and the FRG—and Italy.

Kissinger: Let me get their views.

Gromyko: All right. All right.

Regarding the question we discussed in the dining room, on frontiers. One can look at the matter and say: "Let Bonn and Moscow settle this." You are saying this and Britain is saying this and not only they. But the question of borders is a very important one. Remember World War II started over the question of frontiers. It is not right to say that countries should settle the issue among themselves. World War I too started on the sorrowful question of frontiers. It is not accidental that the Kennedy Government and the Johnson Government and the Nixon Government took a stand on this very positively. The Ford Government hasn't made any clear presentation on this matter, but we believe it should have some interest in the matter.

Kissinger: It is only neglect. We stand by the statements of our predecessors. We will mention it in the next letter. Within the next two to three weeks, he will write again.

Gromyko: Good. I'll be waiting for a reply from you. I only wanted to express our deep anxiety and to underline the huge importance of the matter—the date of the ending of the second stage and of the third stage at the highest level, and in particular the resolution of the questions of frontiers and Confidence-Building Measures and measures that pertain to it. So we will be able to come back to these questions tomorrow when I see your formulas on the peaceful change of frontiers and Confidence-Building Measures.

Kissinger: Confidence-Building Measures . . . well, yes.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

271. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, February 17, 1975, 10:15 a.m.–3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Amb. Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of USA Division
Mikhail D. Sytenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of Near East Division
Amb. Sergei Vinogradov, Chief of Soviet Delegation to Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East
Vasili Makarov, Aide to Minister Gromyko
Andrei Vavilov, Interpreter
Oleg Krokhavev, Interpreter
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Amb. Walter Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
Amb. Ellsworth Bunker, Ambassador-at-Large and Chief of U.S. Delegation to Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

CSCE; Middle East

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Kissinger: We believe we made progress last night. We are prepared to speed up the work of the European Security Conference and already gave instruction to our Ambassador to stay in close touch, and who will today meet with your people.

I know we will start with the Middle East, but I wanted to make these few points.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 8, Soviet Union. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The conversation took place in the Intercontinental Hotel. Brackets, with the exception of those indicating omission of unrelated material, are in the original. The complete text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.

Gromyko: I have listened with interest to your remarks and would like to say the following: With regard to the general trend of our relations, I would like to say on behalf of the Soviet leadership that we reaffirm the trend of U.S.-Soviet relations and will continue to pursue this course.

And this is why I note with satisfaction that you have the same opinion.

We should look into the future and we should exert efforts to find on the basis of cooperation a resolution of outstanding problems. Some of these problems pertain to the situation in Europe and the European Security Conference. I agree our exchange yesterday was beneficial, but we should bring the exchange to a final end. All questions pertaining to normalization of the European Security Conference should be finalized. I believe it would be good to have another look at these formulas. After lunch.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

[At 1:15 the group breaks up. Dr. Kissinger and Minister Gromyko sit down again and discuss a new formula for the “peaceful change” provision for CSCE. Then everyone leaves the room and proceeds down the corridor to the Secretary’s suite for drinks. There was intermittent discussion of the CSCE formulas and the final communiqué. At 2:00 p.m., the party returned to the meeting room for luncheon. Excerpts from the conversation follow.]

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

272. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, February 17, 1975, 3:07–3:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Andrei Vavilov, Interpreter

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 8, Soviet Union. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The conversation took place in the Secretary’s suite at the Intercontinental Hotel. The complete text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

CSCE; Cyprus; Middle East; Economic and Energy Consultations; Europe; MBFR

CSCE

Gromyko: I would like to summarize some things, and on what questions we would be awaiting your considerations or replies. Questions that have been opened.

First, the question of Confidence-Building Measures. You promised you would give a certain formulation.

Kissinger: I told Hartman to meet with Kovalev this afternoon and see if you can work it out.

Gromyko: You promised to give formulations and to consult with allies. When you are ready, you can use the appropriate channel. When can we expect them?

Kissinger: After I talk to Hartman. Within the next two weeks.

Gromyko: Fine. Then you understand the sooner the better.

The second question is peaceful change of frontiers. You said you would be talking with Schmidt. But you are going to Paris, not Bonn.

Kissinger: I will write to him.

Let me sum up: You are prepared to put the phrase either in the section on sovereignty or on inviolability of frontiers.

Gromyko: We will consider it. When approximately can you do this?

Kissinger: Within ten days. I hope. It will give the Germans a sense that they accomplished something.

Gromyko: This question is not agreed on at all, and we want a definite answer and we will consider it. If some frictions remain, we will go back to our previous position.

Kissinger: I understand.

Gromyko: With respect to the date of the ending of the European Security Conference, I have put forward our views on the dates but I expressed a negative attitude on June and July. You promised to consult and reply next Monday.

Kissinger: By the end of next Monday.²

Gromyko: The third question is the question of correlation of principles. You promised to think it over and express your views to us.

² February 24.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

MBFR

Kissinger: On the Vienna negotiations on force reductions, we are now considering some reduction of new nuclear weapons and aircraft,³ but which has the positive side of not only a reduction but of a ceiling.

And I wondered if it is of interest.

Gromyko: Of course, certainly. It is one of our ideas.

Kissinger: If the principle interests you, we will then proceed to inform our allies.

Gromyko: We are interested.

Kissinger: Then we will present it to our allies.

Gromyko: It depends on the nature of the proposal and the relation to other elements.

Kissinger: Of course. But we are considering it in addition to other elements.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

³ See Document 357.

273. Editorial Note

Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Hartman met with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Kovalev the afternoon of February 17, 1975, at the Soviet Mission in Geneva to discuss possible compromise language at the European security conference on the peaceful change of borders. They also discussed confidence-building measures and Basket III. (Telegram 345 from Prague, February 19; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 217, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Dobrynin, Anatoliy, Chronological)

After the conversation, Kovalev called on Ambassador Albert Sherer the same evening to confirm that “Gromyko could accept the peaceful change text discussed with Secretary Kissinger,” but “without the word ‘only.’” Sherer reported in telegram 1057 from the Mission in Geneva, February 18: “Kovalev handed us a Russian text which he described as an exact translation of the peaceful change sentence

'agreed between Secretary Kissinger and Minister Gromyko.' Kovalev's interpreter translated this Russian text back into English as follows: 'The participating states consider, that their frontiers can be changed in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.' Kovalev said this text was the same, in both English and Russian, as text given to Secretary Kissinger by Gromyko last September in New York, except that the word 'only' has been deleted. We noted that the commas did not appear to be in the same places, but Kovalev insisted that the commas were exactly where they should be." The telegram continued: "With regard to placement, Kovalev said emphatically that he could not expand on what 'had been agreed' on this point between Secretary Kissinger and Gromyko. When we pressed for a more precise explanation of what he meant by this, Kovalev would say only that this was a positive formulation and that the Western allies should be pleased to place it in the sovereign equality principle." The telegram concluded: "*Comment:* Soviet acceptance of an English language text without the word 'only' is obviously an important step, since it appears to meet the principal FRG objection to the floating sentence on peaceful change which was provisionally registered last April 5. Sentence is now stated positively and thus should, prima facie, be acceptable to FRG in context of sovereign equality principle, where other aspects of sovereignty are all stated positively. Nevertheless, FRG reps have in the past made the separate point that peaceful change should not appear to be subject to all three conditions: international law, peaceful means, and agreement. Placement of commas before and after phrase 'in accordance with international law' would help to alleviate this problem, and FRG might still be sticky on this point. With regard to placement, we believe Kovalev's comment is an allusion to the fact that the FRG might be unwilling to accept placement in sovereign equality if they believe it is Soviet preference. Soviets evidently prefer to let FRG themselves seek placement in sovereign equality principle." (Ibid.)

In telegram 2850 from Bonn, February 20, Ambassador Hillenbrand reported his meeting with Political Director Van Well of the West German Foreign Office the preceding day "to inform him of the latest developments on the peaceful change problem." The telegram continued: "Van Well expressed his appreciation for the report and the 'interesting movement' on the peaceful change issue. He indicated his satisfaction that the Russians had dropped the 'only' from their latest draft text and said the FRG would study the new text very carefully before reacting. I stressed to Van Well our interest in minimizing Geneva chatter on the issue. He agreed that it would be best to confine further exchanges of views to Bonn or Washington." (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 7, Germany, State Department Telegrams, Tosec State, Nodis [2])

On February 19, Secretary of State Kissinger summarized his talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in a meeting with President Ford: “We gave a little on CSCE and they merchandized it in their tawdry way. We have hooks to keep them on the reservation with CSCE and the summit, but the Europeans are going to move to pal up with them. Wilson was floating on air—he is a pal. They are giving the Soviets \$2.5 billion in credits; the French are too. And none of it is tied to projects.” Kissinger continued: “On Vladivostok, we are still okay. I also gave him [Gromyko] Option III. He liked that very much. I pointed out that the effect would be a ceiling even if only one plane is removed. I thought maybe we should avoid two meetings close together and have CSCE in July and the summit in September.” Ford replied, “That may give us more time on MBFR.” Kissinger stated, “We can work that out as things develop.” (Memorandum of conversation, February 19; *ibid.*, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 9)

274. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 24, 1975, 3–3:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns
NATO Assistant Secretary General Jorg Kastl
President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Amb. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
Amb. David Bruce, Permanent Representative to NATO
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President: Do you have any thoughts on MBFR?

Luns: The Soviet Union has proposed equal reductions,² which is not reasonable.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 9. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office at the White House.

² See footnote 5, Document 345.

The tactical nuclear force issue³ is linked. Several of us are nervous that you will weaken the shield. Your efforts seem to be strategic weapons, but the problem in NATO is tactical.

I don't think the Soviet Union will plan a war in NATO. The outcome is too uncertain. I think the Soviet Union will wait to see the outcome of SALT and CSCE. I think we are in the position that CSCE will be a summit.

Kissinger: Thanks to the Europeans.

Luns: We must think about the possible euphoria and guard against it.

President: How about a Western Summit beforehand?

Luns: I think it is a good idea. The French were cool to the idea.

Kissinger: It is ridiculous to think the East and West can meet and [as?] consumer and producer, but not the NATO allies.

On the nuclear package, we won't press it as our solution. It is up to the Alliance whether it is to be presented to the Soviet Union.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

³ See Document 357.

275. Editorial Note

In late February and March 1975, the Department of State continued its efforts to find a compromise formula on the peaceful change of frontiers, acceptable to both West Germany and the Soviet Union, for inclusion in the CSCE final document. In telegram 3086 from Bonn, February 24, the Embassy sent a German position paper, approved by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, on peaceful change. It reads in part: "We welcome the efforts of Secretary Kissinger to try to reach a compromise with the Soviet Union on the question of 'peaceful change.' We also see a desire to cooperation on the part of the Soviets by the deletion of the word 'only.' Nevertheless, we are obliged to state that a dangerous element lies in the revised order of 'in accordance with international law,' 'by peaceful change,' and 'by agreement.'" The German paper continued: "Our clearly preferred formula is: 'The participating states consider, that, in accordance with international law, their frontiers can be changed by peaceful means and by agreement.' Should the American side consider it necessary, in view of the discussion with

Gromyko in Geneva, we could also agree that a comma be inserted in the sentence concerning peaceful change between the words ‘changed’ and ‘in accordance with international law.’ It appears to us to be essential to attain as a goal the insertion of the comma.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850081–2083)

On February 26, the participants in Secretary of State Kissinger’s morning staff meeting discussed the German response on peaceful change: “Mr. Hartman: CSCE, I talked to Vorontsov—I am going to go very easy on this German reply—because we now have further evidence that the Germans have told the French that they are prepared to cave and have that language go down in the lower part of the formulation, and just settle for a comma, as you [Kissinger] say. We have to tell him [Vorontsov] they still have not bought that formulation. In other words, give him a status report, rather than press him to accept this formula. Secretary Kissinger: But why don’t you try that comma? Mr. Hartman: Yes. We will tell him about that. I don’t think he will be surprised, because I really think the Germans fixed this up with the Russians. Secretary Kissinger: And making us the sucker? Mr. Hartman: No—it is not a sucker. I think from their own political point of view, they would like to be able to say this is what their allies felt they could say. And that is something I think we can serve their purpose with. Secretary Kissinger: Except if they told us that, we would do it. I don’t like the duplicitous maneuvering. Because if we take their instructions literally, we are going to get into trouble with the Russians.” An attached summary of the minutes of the staff meeting reads in part: “CSCE: Mr. Hartman will see Vorontsov about CSCE.” (Ibid., Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 6, Secretary’s Staff Meetings)

The same day, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Hartman met with Soviet Minister Counselor Vorontsov to discuss the formula on peaceful change. Telegram 45297 to Bonn, February 28, reported on the meeting: Hartman pointed out to Vorontsov that “following recent discussions among US officials, Gromyko and Kovalev in Geneva, US and FRG had discussed possible approaches to a compromise on the peaceful change issue. He said that if the text were placed in the sovereign equality principle, US would support clear FRG preference to include the phrase ‘in accordance with international law’ before the phrase ‘can be changed.’ Vorontsov asserted, echoing earlier Soviet view, that Moscow was strongly opposed to this approach, and could not accept placement of ‘in accordance with international law’ apart from ‘by peaceful means and agreement.’” Hartman then quoted to Vorontsov another formulation, “stating that if it were acceptable to Moscow, US would be prepared to encourage its acceptance by Bonn. He then handed to Vorontsov full text of proposed peaceful change formulation as follows: ‘The participating states consider

that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.’ Vorontsov said he would refer the new text to his authorities and report their reactions as soon as possible.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 6, Germany, State Department Telegrams, From SecState, Nodis [2])

On February 28, Vorontsov phoned Kissinger. A transcript of their telephone conversation reads in part: “V[orontsov]: I have got a piece of news about the Old European Conference.” Vorontsov continued: “I got a cable from Gromyko. The phrase about the peaceful change of border—he says to tell you directly that the formula suggested by Mr. Hartman is acceptable to the Soviet Union. K[issinger]: Good. V: The participating states consider their frontiers can be changed by peaceful means and by agreement—this is acceptable and we would not mind that this phrase will be put in the text of the principles of sovereignty as the Germans have agreed to do. K: That is my impression. Should we notify the Germans? V: Since Mr. Hartman told me that is your compromise language— K: Why don’t we notify the Germans, and we’ll get it to Geneva.” (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations, <http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000BBB3.pdf>)

Telegram 46561 to Bonn, March 1, reported that the Soviets had accepted the revised formulation “for placement in the sovereign equality principle.” “With regard to placement,” it continued, “you should inform FRG that we have not discussed with Soviets specific details of placement suggested by FRG” because “we believed issue of formulation should be resolved prior to dealing with placement question which might well be handled in framework of CSCE discussions rather than in bilateral channels.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 6, Germany, State Department Telegrams, From SecState, Nodis [2]) Telegram 3454 from Bonn, March 1, reported that the FRG had accepted the United States’ tabling of the revised formula prior to a decision on its exact placement in the sovereign equality principle. (Ibid., Box 7, Germany, State Department Telegrams, To SecState, Nodis [3])

Telegram 56434 to Geneva, March 13, instructed the U.S. delegation to CSCE as follows: “After appropriate consultations with allies and others, you should move promptly to table, for placement in the sovereign equality principle, the English-language version of peaceful change text: ‘The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.’” The telegram continued: “In tabling peaceful change formulation, you should point out that we consider its precise placement in the sovereign equality principle remains to be determined in ongoing negotiations of the principles subcommittee.” Telegram

1835 from Geneva, March 17, reported: “USDel tabled peaceful change text at outset of subcommittee’s March 17 meeting, proposed its early registration in first principle on sovereign equality, and suggested that subcommittee return to question on March 20. However, we added that consideration of exact placement of sentence within first principle could be deferred for time being. FRG and Soviets led in warm expressions of support on both the text and its placement in the first principle, and France, GDR, Italy, Spain, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Portugal, Ireland, Bulgaria, UK, and Belgium spoke in same vein. France, although favoring text and placement in first principle, demurred on early registration and asserted that a linkage exists between the peaceful change text, quadripartite rights formulation, and language on the interrelationship of principles.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

276. Letter From President Ford to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, March 1, 1975.

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

As you have pointed out, the work in another area of negotiation—the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—has been slower than anticipated. In part this is because so far the most difficult issues have been left open. But as a result of the recent discussions between Secretary Kissinger and your Foreign Minister, we have already made some substantial progress on one of the most difficult of the remaining issues—the question of peaceful change of frontiers.

As I see it, the Conference will still require some weeks to complete all the details, and then the results can be referred to governments for final consideration. I anticipate no difficulties, and the United States will raise no problems during this interval. Then, as agreed with you,

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 28, USSR, “D” File. Secret. According to an attached cover memorandum, Scowcroft forwarded the letter to Vorontsov on March 1. The full text of the letter is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.

the final stage can be convened at the highest level of participation for the closing ceremonies. This leaves only the problem of when, precisely, the final stage of the Conference should be convened. After some discussion with our friends and allies, it seems that with good will on all sides the most realistic date would be sometime in July. If this is an acceptable target date, we should commit ourselves to an appropriate work schedule.

In any case, the successful conclusion of this Conference, occurring during the year of the 30th anniversary of the end of the Second World War will be a signal accomplishment for which you, Mr. General Secretary, will deserve great credit. Unlike the situation that led up to both World Wars, we have within our grasp the means for building cooperation and ensuring security in Europe. The inviolability of frontiers, in particular, will be among the key elements of a solemn document. As you know, the United States has long since accepted the frontiers and territorial integrity of all European states, and I reaffirm this position without qualification.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

277. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Ford¹

Moscow, March 8, 1975.

Dear Mr. President:

Replying to your letter of March 1,² I would like at this moment to touch upon one question that was contained in the letter.

I have in mind the issue that we have discussed already many times and exchanged opinion upon, i.e. the question of the Conference on security and cooperation in Europe, and to be more precise—of the date of completing the Conference. We discussed in detail this question at the meeting in Vladivostok and came to mutual agreement. We believe as before that the Conference could have been completed quite

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 28, USSR, "D" File. Secret. A handwritten note at the top reads: "Delivered to White House by Vorontsov at 5 p.m., 3-8-75."

² Document 276.

within the nearest future, i.e. within the period of time we have agreed upon with you.

Now you name a new date—July. Frankly, the very fact that achieved agreements have repeatedly been changed does produce an impression which is far from being positive.

I repeat, we stand for upholding the agreed time-table and for moving ahead in accordance with it. This is even more important having in mind that the completion of the Conference has been in general delayed without any justification. Now, in our view, it is important to establish at last the final date of the completion of the Conference and then not to depart from it. Otherwise we would ourselves devalue the meaning of agreements which we achieve.

Therefore we would like to firmly agree to start the final stage of the Conference on the summit level in Helsinki in the last days of next June, say, June 30. I am sure that agreement on that is possible right now, moreover due to the fact that the situation at the Conference has improved after the known understanding.

In your letter you justly state that inviolability of frontiers is the key element in ensuring security and cooperation in Europe. It is with satisfaction that we received the clear reaffirmation by you that the US accepts without qualification the frontiers and territorial integrity of all European states. Your statement is highly appreciated by us.

There is no doubt that successful conclusion of the Conference on security and cooperation in Europe will constitute an important contribution to the cause of strengthening peace and stability on that continent. Its weight and importance will especially grow—and we share your opinion on that—in connection with the 30th Anniversary of the end of the Second World War, which will be marked soon by both European and all other peoples. It is necessary to do everything possible to complete the Conference with good results without further delay.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev³

³ Printed from a copy with this typed signature.

278. Letter From President Ford to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, undated.

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Since receiving your letter of 8 March, in which you suggested that the final stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe begin on June 30, I have been in consultation with our Allies, some of whom I learned received a similar proposal from you.² As I mentioned in my letter of March 1, on the basis of my previous discussions with our Allies, we had concluded that some time in July would be a realistic target date for planning the final stage of the Conference. This still seems to be the consensus among our Allies, and in any case I would find the proposed date of June 30 personally inconvenient.

Thus, we could proceed on the basis that the second half of July would prove an acceptable date to the majority of participants, assuming, of course, that the work in Geneva proceeds at the present pace and that the final results are acceptable to all the governments concerned.

As I have written previously, I believe there is now a general agreement that the Conference can be brought to a successful conclusion at the highest level and, for my part, I will continue to do whatever is necessary to achieve such an outcome.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 8, Soviet Union. Secret; Nodis. A note at the top of the letter by Scowcroft reads: "Delivered Vorontsov, 8:35 p.m., 3-18-75." The letter was based on a draft prepared by Sonnenfeldt on March 17. (Ibid.)

² Document 277. Scowcroft wrote in a transmittal memorandum to Ford on March 18: "Brezhnev also sent similar letters to Prime Minister Wilson, Chancellor Schmidt and President Giscard d'Estaing. Although not all issues have been resolved, we remain confident that agreement can be reached on the terms of an agreement that would justify a concluding session of the CSCE at the Summit level. Because the remaining negotiations will be difficult, and in view of other commitments on your schedule, we believe it would be wise to remain firm on your original proposal for a mid-July conclusion to the Conference. We have consulted with the European allies at a restricted meeting of the North Atlantic Council yesterday. They have agreed with our position and will respond to Moscow accordingly." (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 28, USSR, "D" File)

279. Editorial Note

During April 1975, the Ford administration debated the domestic political implications of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. On April 9, Secretary of State Kissinger met with President Ford in the Oval Office to discuss foreign policy issues, including the European security conference. According to the memorandum of conversation, Kissinger stated: "On the Baltic States, I have signed a memorandum. Technically, it is true that the CSCE doesn't add much to the legal status. Practically that is not true—that is why the Soviet Union wants it. It has numerous references to the sanctity of frontiers. President: Will that raise hell with our Baltic friends? Kissinger: There is a clause about peaceful change of borders. They may not like it. President: We need to find a way to reassure them. Kissinger: I would go to Warsaw, Bucharest, and Belgrade after Helsinki. Maybe even Budapest." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 281, Presidential File, Memoranda of Conversation)

A similar meeting took place between Ford and Kissinger on April 25. According to a memorandum of conversation, the President asked: "Did you see the criticism of CSCE? Kissinger: Yes, in the *Post*. It is popular for the soft line to be tough on the Soviet Union. The Jews do it also because polarization helps them make the Arabs look like Soviet stooges. When we came in, all the Europeans and American press pushed us hard for a Conference, and we didn't care about it. There is nothing in it for us. I think you must go if there is a Summit. Then go to Berlin. I would also recommend Warsaw, Bucharest, and Belgrade." (Ibid.) On April 25, the *Washington Post* ran an editorial, "Dubcek and European Security," which reads in part: "[T]he European status quo which the West is being asked to sanctify [at the European Security Conference] allows the Kremlin to crack the whip as it will in East Europe even while it freely exploits the openness in West Europe for its own end. . . . Is there any non-Communist in the West who can give a good reason why the West should, at a European summit, formalize this unequal and even insecure state of affairs?" (*Washington Post*, April 25, 1975, page A26)

On April 25, Counselor Sonnenfeldt wrote in a memorandum to Kissinger: "I joined Hartman and EUR staff in a session on CSCE with American Jewish Committee officers who feel we have not adequately bargained on human rights issues. I explained the history of the conference, noted what has been accomplished, pointed out our doubts about the wisdom of this exercise in the first place and cautioned them not to invest it with legal or definitive significance either in its accomplishments or its shortfalls. It is clear that CSCE is becoming the next issue on which an ethnic coalition plus others will belabor the Administration." (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 12, Daily Activity Reports, 1975)

280. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford¹

Washington, April 30, 1975.

SUBJECT

Status Report on CSCE

Summary

As the pressures of the final negotiating phase of CSCE start to build, the Soviets have tried to advance in certain subject areas, but have continued to probe Western positions and to remain firm on issues which they consider sensitive, such as individual contacts. Thus, there has been no rush of Soviet concessions and, partly as a result of this, many Western and neutral delegations are sticking to the ideas they consider important. The Soviets may have begun to feel time pressure, but thus far have been unwilling to make concessions to meet their own schedule. Nevertheless, our delegation in Geneva believes that if the Soviets make at least some key concessions, it is still possible to finish Stage II negotiations in time for a Stage III in early to mid-July.

The Current Situation

As Stage II of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe resumes following an Easter recess, earlier expectations of visible progress by Easter have proved unfounded. The optimism and compromising spirit of two months ago have been tempered by the dawning realization that the Soviets will not produce a rush of concessions—*at least not yet*. The lack of Soviet willingness to find reasonable compromises has produced a similar attitude among Western and neutral participants, who believe that if they simply accept Soviet terms, even on minor issues, the Soviets will be encouraged to insist on their way on issues of more fundamental importance.

The Soviets have reacted in this situation by beginning to use pressure tactics, coming down particularly hard on the French and the FRG. It seems likely that they have perceived the negotiating box now closing in around them: a deadline for completion of the Conference set by Brezhnev himself, and a limited number of concessions to offer in

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, Box 2, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Confidential. Sent for information. Clift drafted the memorandum on April 2 and forwarded it to Kissinger. Ford initialed the memorandum.

order to meet it. These trends are expected to continue to develop in this post-Easter period, which will compound the difficulty of trying to meet the timetable envisaged by most participants—completion of Stage II about the end of May or mid-June and a Stage III in early to mid-July.

Summary of Remaining Issues

The key remaining substantive issues at the Conference are as follows:

—*Principles (Basket I)*: Agreement is blocked by a knot of interlocking issues related to Germany and the Brezhnev doctrine. The United States has tabled a draft on peaceful changes of borders² which is widely accepted. The French, however, have linked their agreement to this text to acceptance of language which would protect Quadripartite rights and responsibilities in Berlin and which would assert the equal value of all the principles. Romania objects to the U.S. peaceful change text and, with the neutrals, strongly rejects the French position on Quadripartite rights as too general and as reinforcing the Brezhnev doctrine.

—*Confidence Building Measures/Maneuvers*: The Soviets have announced that they would be flexible on the geographic area and size of forces subject to prior notification of maneuvers if the Conference can agree “in principle” that such notification will be voluntary. The NATO countries and neutrals generally see no objection in principle to a voluntary approach to prior notification, if the Soviets will give a clearer idea of parameters acceptable to them. The Romanians have rejected the voluntary approach, with support from the Dutch.

—*Freer Movement (Basket III)*: Several separate questions relating to the overall issue of freer movement remain unresolved: introductory language for the human contacts and information sections of Basket III (human contacts), language on travel, audio-visual information (broadcasting), working conditions for journalists, libraries/reading rooms, and direct contacts among creative artists. Four out of the five remaining subjects under human contacts and information are presently stalled, due entirely or in part to US-Soviet differences. Our efforts to achieve better texts on the introduction on human contacts, travel, journalists and broadcasting have run up against the Soviets on matters they consider quite sensitive.

—*Final Documents (Basket IV)*: The EC-9, NATO and most neutrals support a Dutch proposal to include all CSCE resolutions in one overall signed document called “The Final Act” of the Conference. The So-

² See Document 275.

viets indicate that they prefer four separate signed documents, one for each Basket. The Western participants believe that one overall document is the only way to ensure that each Basket has equal status. This promises to be a difficult issue.

—*Peripheral Issues*: There are several political issues which, while not central to the CSCE negotiations, could make it difficult to conclude the Conference at an early date. These include *Cyprus* (with the Greeks and Cypriots stating they will not join a consensus on the results of the Conference unless there is clear progress toward resolution of the Cyprus situation, and the Turks threatening to question the credentials of the Cypriot delegation and refusing to accept the presence of Makarios at Stage III) and *Mediterranean representation* (the Maltese and Yugoslavs might hold out for some role for non-participating Mediterranean states in Stage III). Other international events, in the Middle East for example, or internal developments in participating states (such as Portugal) could also affect the timing of a summit conclusion.

Conclusion

Soviet reluctance to reach reasonable agreements on sensitive subjects, and the general unwillingness to give up important points has slowed Conference progress and will add to negotiating pressures in the weeks to come. However, it is still mechanically feasible for Stage II to be completed about the end of May or mid-June, provided the Soviets make some key concessions and peripheral problems can be kept under control.

This status report is for your information. As the Conference works toward a conclusion of Stage II during the next several weeks, I will keep you informed of the substantive developments and the timing of the Stage III summit in Helsinki.

281. Editorial Note

In the course of two meetings with President Ford on May 5 and May 16, 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger discussed the European security conference in the context of an upcoming meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. A memorandum of Kissinger's conversation with Ford on May 5 reads in part:

"Kissinger: We have another problem with the Soviets. I was going to meet with Gromyko. I was planning to announce the CSCE

summit date at the end of the meeting. That is crazy. My advisers generally think I should go ahead since I had cancelled a meeting in March.

“President: I think you could go ahead.

“Kissinger: If we meet, they will press me for agreement to a CSCE summit. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to CSCE.] Jackson and the others will start to hit you about the CSCE summit as a fraud that isn’t worthy of a summit. They will mobilize the Baltics and the East European emigrants. It doesn’t change the situation of the Baltic States.

“President: We must do what we can to explain to them. Can we baby them along? If I or you could talk to them and undercut Scoop.

“Kissinger: It is a cause celebre if you meet with them, or even if I do. Let me see what we can do. We could delay the summit, but I doubt we could cancel it.

“President: I think if we didn’t participate, it would appear we were sulking and going back to the Cold War. I don’t think the American people would understand.

“Kissinger: The public and the Congress want to be tranquilized about the results of Vietnam. But if you don’t point out the consequences, in a year we will have real problems. As the speeches come up, we should see if we can get statements in about future challenges—not the dissensions in the past.”

A memorandum of Kissinger’s conversation with Ford on May 16 reads in part:

“Kissinger: The major problem will be Gromyko. He will have three things: CSCE, SALT, and the Middle East. CSCE is out of our hands; we are staying a step behind the Europeans. The only question is the date. The Soviet Union and France want 13 July. I would not spend more than three days. For everyone to give a speech would take 4–5 days. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to CSCE.] I’ll agree to the last week of July with Gromyko, if nothing happens. You would come to the last two days and the signing ceremony.

“President: Can I put in my speech that this doesn’t involve territorial matters?

“Kissinger: No, it does not affect the Baltic States. We can brief the press on that, but Jackson and the like will hit us on that.” (Both in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 281, Presidential File, Memoranda of Conversation)

282. Memorandum From Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, May 16, 1975.

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Gromyko: Soviet Impatience at CSCE Growing

In a two hour conversation with Ambassador Sherer on May 15, Soviet CSCE delegation head Kovalev focused on problems of concern to the Soviet delegation and asked what steps were necessary to bring Stage II to a quick conclusion. Kovalev alluded several times to the need to have a clear idea of U.S. positions on CSCE issues before Foreign Minister Gromyko's meeting with you in Vienna.² Several of the substantive issues raised specifically by Kovalev included:

—Working conditions for journalists: the Soviets are annoyed by what they view as a tougher U.S. position on this Basket III text; Kovalev even accused the U.S. of trying to unite the NATO Allies on this subject. Ambassador Sherer reports that the Allies are indeed now united in pursuing the main points in this text—travel, individuals as news sources and no expulsion for pursuit of professional activity.

—CBM's: Kovalev asked what the Soviets should do to reach early agreement on this item and Sherer urged him to come forward soon with maximum moves toward Western positions on numerical parameters.

—Timing: Kovalev said the Soviets are now prepared to do everything possible to move forward. He asked for U.S. view of the key issues which would bring an early conclusion to Stage II and was told travel, journalists and CBM's.

Kovalev's *démarche* to Ambassador Sherer is the latest indication of growing Soviet impatience at their inability to wrap up Stage II quickly and without major concessions. In fact, their obvious need to fulfill Brezhnev's timetable of a Stage III conclusion this summer has the Soviets in a corner and, so far, their pressures and bluster aimed at the allied and neutral participants have not produced agreement on the unbalanced pro-East texts they are seeking.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 44, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, White House, 1975 (3). Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted by Robert Gates of the NSC staff. A handwritten note on the first page reads: "HAK has seen."

² Telegram 3572 from Geneva, May 15, reported on Kovalev's conversation with Sherer. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

It therefore would seem very much in our interests to impress upon Gromyko the need for the USSR to take a more reasonable position on issues of importance to the West, and, at the same time, for us to encourage the Allies to stay together and hold their ground in the coming weeks. The Soviets should be forced either to make important concessions or face a major political reverse—and will probably opt for the former.

283. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meeting¹

Washington, May 16, 1975, 8 a.m.

IN ATTENDANCE

Secretary of State Kissinger—Chairman

D	Mr. Ingersoll
P	Mr. Sisco
E	Mr. Robinson
T	Mr. Maw
M	Mr. Eagleburger
AF	Mr. Mulcahy (Acting)
ARA	Mr. Rogers
EA	Mr. Habib
EUR	Mr. Hartman
NEA	Mr. Atherton
INR	Mr. Hyland
S/P	Mr. Lord
EB	Mr. Katz (Acting)
S/PRS	Mr. Anderson
PM	Mr. Vest
IO	Mr. Buffum
H	Mr. McCloskey
L	Mr. Leigh
S/S	Mr. Springsteen
S	Mr. Bremer
S	Mr. Adams

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Mr. Hartman: On the CSCE, I think both in your conversations with Schmidt and with Gromyko the date is going to loom large. The Soviets are coming in now from all sides saying they definitely want to nail us down and they want to have a meeting in July. They're very

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 6, Secretary's Staff Meetings. Secret.

concerned about any efforts—either consciously or not through design—to postpone it into the fall. I think, also, the European leadership is going in the same direction.

We know a little bit of that from the Germans. They want to fix the schedule. They want to fix their calendars, and Schmidt particularly—he's thinking of the third week in July—so that will come up at that time.

The Europeans have come up with a minimum package² now to really wind up that Conference, and we're supporting it. It has everything in it that one could expect, and there are some concessions the Soviets are going to have to make.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know what I expect. What does it have in it?

Mr. Hartman: It has the minimum acceptable texts on all of the humanitarian affairs. You've got family reunification, marriage texts—what are the others?

Mr. Hyland: Travel.

Mr. Hartman: Travel.

Mr. Hyland: Radio broadcasting, exchange of information—radio broadcasting where there will not be a commitment.

Secretary Kissinger: Will I get a memo?

Mr. Hartman: You will have a memo which should be with you now, which gives you a status report.

Secretary Kissinger: Where is it, Jerry? Where are any of these memos?

Mr. Adams: I think they're in your action folders.

Secretary Kissinger: This I have to read before I go to Europe.

Mr. Hartman: On dates, I'd like to be able to tell people—for example, on the President's schedule in Brussels—give them the exact hour.

Secretary Kissinger: You can not, until I have shown it to the President.

Mr. Hartman: I wondered whether you had done that.

Secretary Kissinger: I can't show that to the President until my friends here put it in my folder to take to the President.

O.K. As soon as that's done, I'll take it to the President, along with his statement. Where is that?

Mr. Adams: It's in a special folder.

² Telegram 3570 from Geneva, May 15, contains the complete text of the West's "global initiative for human contacts and information," presented to the Eastern delegations to CSCE the same day. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

Secretary Kissinger: If you want me to take it up with the President, you might put it in the folder with the papers that I'm taking to the President. That isn't an unreasonable request, is it? (Laughter.) It doesn't mean I'm harassing you.

Mr. Hyland: According to what Art said, my figures say there will be 175 hours in speeches at the CSC (laughter)—if the present plan prevails.

Secretary Kissinger: Which is what?

Mr. Hartman: 20 minutes a head at that.

Mr. Hyland: 20 minutes a head. But this is—

Secretary Kissinger: How can that be?

Mr. Lord: That with 50 countries? (Laughter.)

Mr. Hyland: I'm just kidding. This is an issue that has to be taken up—how long it's going to last.

Mr. Hartman: Schmidt would like to have five days in order to allow for good long bilaterals with people.

Secretary Kissinger: It's absolutely out of the question. Our press will kill us. It will be an unbelievable nightmare to have five days.

Mr. Hyland: Most Europeans want at least four.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

284. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Vienna, May 19, 1975, 6:15–8:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrey A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 7, Soviet Union. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting took place in the Gobelin Saal of the Hotel Imperial. All brackets, with the exception of those noting errors in the text, are in the original. The night before, Kissinger had met with his staff at the hotel to discuss the upcoming meeting with Gromyko. Lodal's handwritten notes from the meeting read in part: "We met to go over CSCE, SALT, ME [Middle East]. CSCE—he yells at Hartman because Hartman can't give him the substance of what the issues are (example in travel)." (Ford Library, NSC Program Analysis Staff, Jan Lodal Convenience Files, Box 6, Memcons and Summaries of Discussion)

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of the American Department and Member of the
Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Vasily G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister
Oleg M. Sokolov, Chief, American Section of the American Department
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, INR
Jan M. Lodal, NSC Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECT

CSCE

Gromyko: [points to portrait on wall, next to tapestry] There is a good view of a hunter there. It's good for Sonnenfeldt. We need a wild boar.

Kissinger: Sonnenfeldt will shoot it.

Gromyko: Perhaps, as we agreed, we could start by having an exchange on European affairs and the European Security Conference.

Kissinger: I agree. And Mr. Foreign Minister, since we're technically on our ground, I'd like to take this opportunity to reaffirm what I told you privately:

The basic line of United States policy remains intact and we are determined to overcome problems where differences exist. I want to say this in front of my colleagues, and I was asked specifically by President Ford to say this.

Gromyko: Let me say briefly what I've just had occasion to tell the Secretary of State personally, that the line of the Soviet Union towards the United States is the same as the line that has taken shape in recent years mainly as a result of the Soviet-American summits and the documents signed by the two countries. We, for our part, are rigorously following that line and we believe both sides should pursue it. We feel we should not allow events or any countries or combination of countries to cause any harm to that policy or the principles underlying that policy. In other words, we should follow the line to strengthen détente and Soviet-American relations and strengthen peace.

That is something that reflects the thinking of the entire Soviet leadership and of General Secretary Brezhnev personally.

Kissinger: Should we turn to European matters?

Gromyko: Yes, I think we should turn to European matters and take up the European Security Conference first.

Kissinger: As one of the world's great experts on the European Security Conference and as the only Foreign Minister who has read the documents, why don't you start.

Gromyko: I don't know.

Kissinger: Did I tell you the story about Vladivostok, how you undermined the President's confidence in me?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: He [the President] turned to me and asked "What is he talking about?" and I said I didn't know. [Laughter]. That problem is settled—between "equal validity" and "equal applicability." I had two difficulties—I couldn't tell the difference between the two positions, and what is more embarrassing for a Foreign Minister, I didn't know which side had which position. [Laughter].

Gromyko: Your mind must have been on more significant matters than the European Security Conference.

Kissinger: It's now solved, isn't it?

Gromyko: Let us then turn to those matters, and I trust our discussion will be both serious and productive.

Kissinger: That is our intention.

Gromyko: I may have to say some words on this subject that may not be very pleasant for you to hear. Maybe pleasant, but not very pleasant.

Kissinger: The Foreign Minister is a disciple of Maréchal Foch, always on the attack.

Gromyko: Of late we have formed the impression that the American position at the Conference has become harsher and tougher on several matters related to the European Security Conference and the questions in that forum. In the past the Soviet Union and the United States have in several examples shown they can cooperate quite well. In this context, I'd like to refer to the understanding you and I reached in Geneva on peaceful change of frontiers, and there are other examples of such cooperation. But of late—I say this just half in jest—I say it's as if someone had switched somebody else for the American delegation at Geneva, though it's the same good people. Someone has done this.

Kissinger: Sonnenfeldt.

Gromyko: I hope the line pursued by the United States will be a line aimed at removing differences and reaching agreement. Of course, only you can give clarity to this situation. I say this by way of introductory remarks and I'm sure you'll have something to say in reply.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I'm aware of your view that the United States has perhaps not proceeded as rapidly as desirable. I do not believe this is the case. I believe perhaps it's the Soviet Union that

has not made all the moves it could. Be that as it may, I have reviewed the European Security Conference and we believe it's possible to conclude the European Security Conference in substantially the time frame we've discussed, and concluded at the summit level, and have it all concluded by the end of July.

So perhaps we could most usefully spend our time on what needs to be done.

The principles are done. Quadripartite rights and responsibilities. We have the problem of Basket III, of confidence-building machinery, and while we are here we should say something about how it [the summit] should be conducted—the length of time, speeches, if you're ready.

Gromyko: I am ready.

Kissinger: So that's how we think we should spend the time.

Gromyko: I certainly agree to that approach. Let's direct our gaze into the future and see how we can do away with the remaining complexities and difficulties and see how we can conclude in the period we have agreed upon.

Kissinger: On confidence-building measures, the differences concern the number of days of prior notification, the depth of the zone to be covered, and the size of forces that would be concerned. Those are the three issues.

Regarding the length of time, the Soviet view is 14 days and the Western view is 40 days.

Hartman: 49 days.

Kissinger: [to Hartman]: How did we arrive at that?

Hartman: Seven weeks.

Gromyko: Ours is 12 days.

Kissinger: Well, we won't accept 12.

On the depth of the area, we have said 500 kilometers, and you had said 100 kilometers. On the size of forces, you had said 30–35,000, informally. What is the formal position.

Hartman: 40,000.

Kissinger: And we had said 20–25,000.

We are prepared to find a compromise on all of these points, and not to insist on our position, if you don't insist on yours. And we could instruct our delegations accordingly to find a compromise.

Gromyko: Let's take up point by point. Depth.

Kissinger: On depth, we'd be prepared to settle in the middle, say 300 kilometers, we had said 500 and you had said 100.

Gromyko: [Thinks] That is not the basis. Even now, 100, when you say it takes all the territory, when compared to Western Europe, our

territory is larger, and the whole line, from north to the south. Try to compare it—all the territory, a stripe down.

Kissinger: There is more territory because the Soviet Union is larger?

Gromyko: Eastern Europe is covered. But this is not taken into account by your and the Western European delegations.

You mentioned formal and informal positions.

Sonnenfeldt: On numbers.

Gromyko: No, on depth.

Kissinger: We gave you no informal position on that.

Gromyko: On numbers.

[Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt confer]

150. I think 150 is much larger if you compare the territory.

Dobrynin: In square miles.

Kissinger: Our problem is some of our allies—I don't want to mention names because we don't want to be in the position of negotiating separately—say that 300 is their minimum. So we want to agree on something that has a chance to be implemented. I really think the lowest number we could get without difficulty or checking with our allies is 250 kilometers. This is not bargaining because I've taken no interest, but we think that's the lowest.

Gromyko: 150 is our position. This is on depth.

On numbers . . .

Kissinger: The official allied figure is 12,000. Our personal compromise is 20–25,000. Your position is 30–35,000.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: If we would get everything else worked out, we'd recommend to our allies something between 25–30,000 and that would bring us very close to each other.

[There is a conference on the Soviet side.]

Gromyko: On 30,000, that's good. We would be prepared to agree on that, but without being conditioned on another condition. 30,000, that we could agree on, because that represents the maximum you are prepared to agree to and it's the minimum we are prepared to accept, but we cannot accept the other figure regarding depth. But the area of the Soviet Union that would be subject to notification would be greater than all of the area in Western Europe.

As regards the third element, that is, the time of notification, frankly speaking we believe this question is raised especially artificially. Why should we be expected to give two months' notice in advance?

Kissinger: Seven weeks. So we can mobilize to go to war.

Gromyko: Let us reason coolly on this. Maybe for one country, one regiment or two or an entire division is a great force which, when it starts moving, really causes the whole world to shake, and maybe they take three or four months to plan. It may take three months for them to get boots and uniforms fitted. But for us a division is nothing.

Kissinger: You're talking about number.

Gromyko: I'm talking about preparation.

Kissinger: My view is, when we need the warning we won't get it, and when we get the warning we won't need it. If one is going to attack, one can violate the agreement.

So I'm not going to insist on seven weeks. I was supporting you. Because I was prepared to settle for six and one-half weeks.

Gromyko: I was just about to come out in solidarity with you when you said the same thing about me.

Two weeks.

Sonnenfeldt: From twelve to fourteen days.

Gromyko: Two weeks ahead of time we notify you that 30,000 troops are about to move.

Kissinger: In two weeks that information couldn't possibly get from the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They couldn't put it on the agenda of a NATO meeting in two weeks.

Gromyko: Maybe we should put an effort to rectify matters where it is really needed.

Two weeks.

Kissinger: I gave up four days; you gave up two days. How about 30 days?

Gromyko: Mr. Secretary, I can't give an agreement to that because we think, especially after what you said about the real importance of such matters, that someone is just giving vent to psychology matters.

Kissinger: The whole thing is psychological.

Gromyko: The whole thing is being lauded to the skies.

Kissinger: But you want it to be, because that gives the European Security Conference its importance.

Gromyko: You think it's that that will give it importance.

Kissinger: No, it's "equal applicability" compared to "equal validity."

Gromyko: Is that Mintoff's view?

Kissinger: Mintoff got a tremendous reception in the People's Republic of China and hasn't been the same since.

Gromyko: We read about that.

Kissinger: The minimum we could convince our friends to do is 25 days.

Gromyko: In that case we will have to leave that question open.

Kissinger: All right. Then we have depth and warning. . . .

Gromyko: We cannot accept that figure.

Far more important than this question of number of days are the questions of depth and warning. On numbers, like Apollo, we've managed a docking.

Kissinger: If it's too short a time and too narrow [an area], it has no significance.

Dobrynin: Here, you can pick up the telephone and call anywhere in two minutes.

Gromyko: Mintoff must have frightened everybody.

Kissinger: A very persuasive man.

Gromyko: He must be virtually terrorizing everyone at the Conference.

Kissinger: He's threatening to join Libya.

Gromyko: Let me add to that, that those who want agreement on a different time should give earnest thinking to our latest proposal. And generally speaking, a strange phenomenon is visible at the Conference, that it's only the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries that should retreat and retreat and retreat and then we'll come to an agreement.

You know our delegation at the Conference has told the Conference that the Soviet Union is prepared to send notification to all participating countries and not only to those bordering on the Soviet Union.

Then when we mention a depth of 100 kilometers, that depth will apply also to Turkey.

Kissinger: What do you mean?

Hyland: Turkey has to notify countries of movements 100 kilometers from its borders.

Gromyko: Turkey won't have to notify everyone of movements, but only those 100 kilometers from its borders.

Kissinger: Not on Bulgaria and Greece. [to Sonnenfeldt:] Well, what's your answer?

Gromyko: I'm sure your advisers are advising you to accept that proposal.

Dobrynin: They're all making notes urging you to agree.

Makarov: Even Sonnenfeldt.

Gromyko: Even Sonnenfeldt.

Try measuring in terms of square mileage the size of the zone about which we intend to give notification.

Kissinger: Yes, but that's not the problem. It cannot be done on the basis of territory, but it has to be done in terms relevant to the problem people are concerned about.

Dobrynin: It's on the whole border, north to south.

Kissinger: Let me say this: that the problem of voluntary notification raises this problem. When we testify to Congress we will say that though it's voluntary, we will expect it to be done, and if it is done and not notified, it will be inconsistent with the spirit of the treaty.

Sonnenfeldt: Agreement.

Kissinger: Agreement. If it is not voluntary, since we will hold you to it anyway, we could be more flexible on other elements.

Gromyko: When we mention the figures we are prepared to accept, we can accept them only on the condition that the principle of the voluntary notification is recognized. This is the principle we discussed with you at Geneva. All we accept is conditioned on that.

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: And we discussed it with France and England, and they accepted. So we consider that's accepted.

Kissinger: Yes, but . . .

Gromyko: We received the suggestion of the form of words from Britain or NATO; we are not entirely satisfied with those, but we have some amendments. Not big ones, but some amendments.

Let me also say, if the voluntary principle is accepted, the mechanism of notification would operate more effectively in fact than if some other principle will be agreed upon. It's a less sharply worded formula, and would affect the scheme of things less than the other formula. It would be more acceptable politically and legally, and would in fact be more effective. I want to emphasize, more effective.

Kissinger: But in fact that means there would be notification.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: And we would testify to that effect to Congress.

Dobrynin: Yes, Henry.

Gromyko: If you are prepared to look into this British formula, we are prepared to discuss an amendment to it.

Kissinger: May I see it?

Sukhodrev: This is in Russian, sir.

Gromyko: But we are prepared to lend it to you in Russian. At a very low interest rate.

[Hartman looks for it]

If you are prepared, I could make our suggestions.

[Sukhodrev hands over Tab A.² Hartman discusses it with Secretary Kissinger]

² Attached but not printed is the a British text on confidence-building measures with headings in Russian.

Korniyenko: The top part, Mr. Secretary.

Sukhodrev: The top part is the British.

Kissinger: What's the second part?

Korniyenko: Some neutral countries.

Gromyko: Don't pay attention to that.

Korniyenko: The Minister would like to suggest some changes in the British text.

Gromyko: My suggestion is the following:

Sukhodrev: Here is the amendment.

Kissinger: We'll agree to take it out if you add 50 kilometers.

Gromyko: We already added 50 kilometers. [laughter]

Kissinger: 50 more. We have both learned that in some parts of the world that you never get paid anything for services already rendered.

[There is a conference on the Soviet side.]

Gromyko: The preamble does not cause enthusiasm.

Kissinger: I have no particular recollection of this preamble. If this is the agreed text, I have no problem with deleting "therefore" from the preamble. Let us check it. If this is correct text, we agreed to drop "therefore."

Gromyko: This is the original English.

Kissinger: We'll agree to drop the word "therefore." If the British disavow this, then we're in a new situation. But on the assumption that this is the agreed text, we agree to drop the word "therefore."

Gromyko: Check with your delegation and verify it.

Kissinger: We will do it tonight. By the end of the meeting tomorrow, we'll have it.

Gromyko: What I've told you is my tentative concern. Tentative.

Kissinger: We just want to check. If they confirm it, we agree to drop the word "therefore."

Gromyko: The Third Basket.

Kissinger: We'll leave this then. I just want to check. We have not settled the issues of depth . . .

Dobrynin: And timing.

Kissinger: And length of notification.

Can I have a 3-minute break?

[There was a break from 7:25 to 7:34 p.m. The meeting then reconvened.]

Makarov: [Shows a bottle of mineral water on the table labeled Güssinger.] Küssinger.

Kissinger: I saw it. I had the same idea.

Gromyko: Cult of personality. [Laughter]

[Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt confer]

Kissinger: Shall we leave the confidence-building measures now and go to Basket III. Have we finished?

Gromyko: Let's take up Basket III.

Kissinger: All right.

Gromyko: Let me ask you: Is it your intention to set up a state within a state? Because that's a new one in international practice. Up until now we have spoken in terms of—and this is something you have spoken of on several occasions—that domestic legislation must be respected. Now it appears—and I repeat you have spoken of it on several occasions—that newsmen are to set up a state within a state?

Kissinger: That's already the case in the United States.

Gromyko: On that we can only sympathize with you, but here we are dealing with an international agreement.

Kissinger: We have made a major effort to get our allies to make a global proposal on Basket III, where in turn, we have made a major effort to meet your concerns. If this is acceptable as the basic approach, in Geneva we could instruct our delegation to be flexible in dealing with yours and make an effort to meet your concerns. But we have made a major effort.

As for journalists, no one has suffered more from journalists than I have, so I have no particular affection for them. But in the United States how it will be received will depend very much on how the press presents it, so to be hard on all the press points would be counterproductive.

Gromyko: To accept it as the basis for discussion wouldn't solve the problem. We would be prepared to discuss the text, but only after we get clarification on what we regard as the most thorny, the most prickly. So let's take those points up one by one.

You, in that text, try to put forward the point of view—even though not in those literal words—that journalists should enjoy absolute freedom. If we accept the point of view that both journalists and the practices of the states concerned would take into consideration the laws operating in the country concerned, that would help us overcome that difficulty.

Kissinger: Don't we already have that in there?

Gromyko: But, secondly, there is the question of sources of information and accessibility of those sources.

We see one provision, one clause, which says in effect that there must be free access to information including individuals. Now we see that as a sally against us, and we don't think any state could sign such a clause. We don't have any laws that state that journalists cannot have access to individuals. There are no such laws. So if the present situation continues in being, that should suit everybody

concerned. But to demand that we give our stamp of approval to an idea which for some reasons—and you know best for what reasons—is aimed against us, is at best an insult.

And there is the clause calling for equality in terms of treatment between journalists and so-called technical personnel. I'm sure there are people who come in your office every couple of months to check on maintenance and so on; it's as if we called them diplomats. Just because they work in the same roof.

Kissinger: Are you sending people into my office to check my telephones?

Gromyko: It is the same with journalists and technical people—why should we extend the same rights to them on the same footing? That's not in your interest. That's another one that has thorns in it. Even from a purely technical standpoint, if a certain apparatus is used unlawfully, whatever such persons are called—whether journalist, technician or an angel—he'll get slapped down.

Kissinger: There is no question about doing something unlawful. There is no question here of sending TV crews onto your strategic missile bases.

I have to go back to the original question. If we could reach an agreement on this as the basic approach, we could take a look at some of the concerns you raise. We are not saying every point here is on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. I can say now, several of the points you raise here are reasonable—without going into language.

Gromyko: Let's take out the parts of it that are objectionable, and we will not be against taking it as a basis for discussion.

Then there is another question, and that is the freedom of broadcasting. Where did that question spring from? Let me quite frankly say, do you expect us to sign a document whereby we would be sanctioning the creation of radio stations directed against us and other Socialist countries? Do you expect us to accept that?

Kissinger: We can always try. I didn't think you would notice it.

I understand your point on this one. There are two aspects to this. So that we get to the key issues. I have innumerable times expressed my view on Basket III. I don't think you'll change your system as a result of Basket III.

Gromyko: I think there are grounds for doubts.

Kissinger: This paragraph has to do, to put it crudely, with jamming. I think it's poor drafting. It shouldn't be put in terms of sanctioning broadcasting into the Soviet Union. We'd be prepared to put it into better language.

Gromyko: The problem here doesn't simply boil down to polishing the text. Because you yourself would never accept calling for broadcasting of all forms of propaganda for friendship, peace, détente. . . .

Kissinger: I wouldn't accept it?

No, it's not a question of polishing the text. It's a question of encouraging information flow and not interfering with legitimate broadcasting. One is a positive concept; one is a negative concept.

Gromyko: The word "legitimate" wouldn't solve anything because immediately we'd come to polarization along ideological lines. You know we'd never accept broadcasting that undermined our system or offended public morality. There are some countries that permit publication of pornography or other materials.

Kissinger: Your objection is to access to individuals as laid down in this document, second to treating technicians as journalists, and to this text. Those are your objections.

Gromyko: No. It's not just freedom of journalists. What about questions of security?

Kissinger: What do you mean by freedom of journalists?

Gromyko: If a journalist drove up to a missile installation, I don't think he'd be comfortable there after a while.

Kissinger: Where is it in the text?

[Hartman indicates for the Secretary the place in the text, in his briefing paper.]³

But this makes a specific reference to areas closed for security reasons.

Gromyko: You submitted many versions.

Kissinger: The version we submitted on May 18 refers to "regulations relating to the existence of areas closed for security reasons."⁴

Gromyko: We have areas closed for security reasons, but we would have to open up some.

Kissinger: [reading from briefing paper] The text says "to ease on a reciprocal basis, the procedures for arranging journeys by foreign journalists, thereby facilitating wider travel by them within the country in which they are exercising their profession subject to the observance of regulations relating to the existence of areas closed for security reasons."

Gromyko: It says "wider" in comparison to the existing situation. It means we would have to get rid of some areas.

Dobrynin: We want the status quo.

Kissinger: My impression is that it's not easy for journalists to travel in the Soviet Union. It would have to be somewhat wider, yes.

³ Not found.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 283.

Is security the only reason?

Gromyko: Yes. Only security.

Kissinger: Can a journalist just buy a ticket and go to Khabarousk?

Stoessel: He would have to get permission.

Dobrynin: It is the same in your country.

Kissinger: But we would abolish some too. It would be reciprocal.

Gromyko: I don't think this can be done.

Kissinger: Let me say a word on some other matters, I see your concerns. On this one, all we want is that in areas permitted for travel, that it be facilitated on a wider basis than before.

Gromyko: I'm sure travel in open areas and assistance given to such travel is greater than in many countries, even the United States.

Dobrynin: In six years, I don't remember a single case where the State Department arranged a tour for Russian journalists.

Kissinger: It's a different system. We don't organize trips, but we approve them.

Gromyko: We pay attention more to "facilitate" in this country.

Kissinger: You can also keep an eye on them better that way.

Dobrynin: You can too.

Kissinger: We suggested this to take account of the concerns of the journalists. Do you have any other concerns?

Gromyko: Let me make just one general comment. The media and journalistic people generally should be concerned with one basic task—to strengthen friendship among peoples, and they should do nothing hostile to the social system of the country of their stay.

Kissinger: Can we apply that to American journalists in America?

Gromyko: It would be an interference in your domestic affairs!

But when formulated proposals are placed before us, it turns out they amount to absolute freedom. When someone walks down Park Avenue and insults someone or knifes someone, the police can't do anything?

Kissinger: It happens every day on Park Avenue. We had Human Kindness Day in Washington last week—we had five people killed. I went to a meeting of the Organization of American States last week and I noticed my security had increased. I asked why? They say, "they're celebrating Human Kindness Day across the street." One senior official lost an eye.

Gromyko: You have efficient writers on your staff. You can change it.

Kissinger: This is something we worked out with our allies, and we made a major effort to meet your concerns. This was not made on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

Gromyko: You said that.

Kissinger: There are some of your points we could take into account.

Gromyko: If you take them into account, I would like to see what text you come up with.

Kissinger: I suggest our Ambassador meet with yours in Geneva, rather than my negotiating it here where I can't consult with other countries.

Gromyko: If that is your suggestion, there is nothing we can do about it. That's an expression of a perfectly good desire. But even when we make certain understandings with you, it is very hard to get it across to Geneva.

So what I want to emphasize here is the question of time.

Kissinger: I agree with you. If we work with your characteristic precision, Mr. Foreign Minister, I think we are going to have trouble meeting the deadline. If you can tell us tomorrow which of these paragraphs you can accept, if we give you a new text on three paragraphs, after which the negotiation only begins—as the entrance price to a negotiation . . .

Gromyko: Which do you want? Who can do it? We or you? We, ourselves, could sit down and look.

Kissinger: That's a good idea. We'll take Korniyenko. It's nine paragraphs.

Gromyko: Do you swear by that? Only nine paragraphs?

Kissinger: Ours has nine.

Gromyko: This is a human text.

We'll give you a text with our corrections.

Kissinger: Ours begins with human contacts.

Korniyenko: There are two separate things, contacts and information.

Kissinger: Yes, but we've given you both and we'd like a reaction to both.

I think this would be a good way to proceed.

Gromyko: I haven't yet read the text on contacts.

Kissinger: This is an historic occasion. Never have we had an occasion when my friend Gromyko hadn't read every document.

Korniyenko: We just got it from Moscow.

Kissinger: When did we [*you*] present it?

Korniyenko: Today in Geneva.⁵

⁵ Telegram 3772 from Geneva, May 22, reported that the Soviets presented their response to the West's global initiative on human contacts and information informally in meetings with the U.K., U.S., Irish, and Danish delegations on May 21 and 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) See Document 290.

Kissinger: If you keep in mind that the fewer changes you have, the easier it will be to meet your concerns on the key paragraphs.

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: What else?

Gromyko: You mentioned certain organizational matters with the third stage in Helsinki.

Kissinger: Yes. One of our concerns, Mr. Foreign Minister, is the length of the Conference. If we give every speaker a half hour, it would take four and a half hours [*days*]. The most our President can give is two and a half days, and we would prefer two days. The symbolic importance is not in the speeches made, but in the documents that will be signed. The newspapers will have to report every day. It will devalue the conference. We should focus on a few key speeches.

Gromyko: I spoke also to the General Secretary on this. He, too, would prefer three days, two and a half.

Kissinger: We think it should be two days for speeches and a half day for ceremony.

Gromyko: We're thinking in the same categories.

Kissinger: So, shall we work in the same direction?

I'll tell you, the President won't come for more than two and a half days, so if they want more, it will have to be at a lower level.

Gromyko: How can we work it out as far as length of time is concerned?

Kissinger: It will be tough.

Gromyko: Mintoff the Terrible.

Kissinger: Mintoff the Terrible will want a half hour. The Greeks and Turks will want a half hour.

Gromyko: We're thinking in the same terms.

Kissinger: The alternative is to begin at the lower level and have the heads of state arrive later.

Gromyko: That will not be good.

Kissinger: If necessary, we'll agree to 10 minutes for everybody.

Gromyko: I think it's better what you said—five key countries.

Kissinger: If 35 heads of state each speak a half hour, that's 17 hours. No head of state can leave while another head of state is speaking.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: It's mind-boggling.

Gromyko: You convinced us.

Kissinger: Let's work together on it.

Gromyko: Let's work together on it.

Kissinger: I have to tell you, the President just can't come for five days. I think two days of speeches and one day of ceremony.

Gromyko: You convinced us.

Kissinger: Reluctantly.

Gromyko: So, the other way: We convinced you.

Kissinger: Let's discuss post-Conference machinery.

Gromyko: What's your thinking?

Kissinger: We would support the Danish proposal,⁶ that a group of deputies meet two years from now to discuss . . .

Gromyko: Foreign Ministers?

Kissinger: Deputy Foreign Ministers, senior officials.

Gromyko: What will be the terms of reference?

Kissinger: To see how best to implement the agreement, and to see what steps should be considered.

Gromyko: Some kind of conference?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: In two years, such a group would be convened?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: To see how it's going?

Kissinger: And to see what could be done to strengthen the terms of the agreement and to consider possibly what permanent institutions there might be.

Gromyko: You are not in favor of consultative machinery?

Kissinger: No.

Gromyko: The terms of reference should be simple: to consider the terms and possible institutions.

Kissinger: I would add: to review the progress in implementation, and number two, your formula.

Gromyko: Let us think this over.

Kissinger: All right.

Gromyko: Will your European friends go along with this?

Kissinger: I think we could convince them.

Gromyko: What about the neutrals?

⁶ According to telegram 2806 from Geneva, May 5, the Danish delegation to the CSCE tabled an EC-Nine proposal for "follow-up based on an interim period followed by a meeting of high-level officials in 1977 to review the results of CSCE." The telegram reported, "The Danish proposal drew predictably mixed comments, with Western delegations, including US, supporting it, and Eastern and neutral countries critical." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

Kissinger: The neutrals are more difficult.

Gromyko: What about Mintoff?

Kissinger: Yes. We could discuss shortening the interval, if this helps anybody—to 18 months.

Gromyko: Three to four years.

Kissinger: No, shorten it.

Gromyko: So we would have more experience.

Kissinger: This would not help us with the neutrals.

Gromyko: Fine. Let us think it over.

Kissinger: All right.

Should we have something to eat?

Gromyko: Probably. For the time being. [Laughter]

Kissinger: For the time being? That's all we wanted you to do. We don't expect you to eat all night.

Gromyko: We're in a plot with the Secretary of State to have the dinner last only 30 minutes flat.

Kissinger: We can't do it with dinner, but we'd appreciate it if we could do it with lunch tomorrow. Seriously. A working session. All my colleagues would appreciate it—a very light lunch.

[The meeting ended]

285. Editorial Note

On May 20, 1975, President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft sent a memorandum to President Ford containing a summary by Secretary of State Kissinger of his ongoing talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. The summary reads in part: "In formal meeting with Gromyko, we spent virtually the entire time on CSCE. Gromyko remains an inveterate haggler and we were not able to make enough progress on the so-called confidence building measures (advance notification of maneuvers) or 'basket three'—human contacts and improvements in operation of news media—to meet allied positions or our own requirements. At one point I threw in the point that at this rate it is unlikely that the July deadline for the summit finale can be met. Gromyko agreed to review the latest allied compromise on basket three overnight and to provide me with amendments in the morning. On the whole I am confident that we shall more or less stay on schedule but in the usual ungenerous haggling Soviet way. We did

make some progress on the matter of follow-up to CSCE, where a compromise seems likely; it will be some kind of review conference of deputies after a year or two to review progress and make recommendations for possible next steps. The Russians, after first proposing elaborate follow-on machinery, have now become very cautious since they fear we will use such machinery to police their performance on basket three. Gromyko also agreed that the summit finale should be no more than three days with speeches as brief as possible." (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 32, USSR, Gromyko File)

286. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Vienna, May 20, 1975, 9:50–10:17 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Members of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Viktor Mikhaylovich Sukhodrev, Counsellor, MFA (Interpreter)

SUBJECTS

CSCE Summit; India-Pakistan

Gromyko: Your press is very ingenious.

Kissinger: But we are going to beat them down. I am going across the country and speaking.

Gromyko: Of the newspapers, which ones do you recommend I read?

Kissinger: In Washington, the *Washington Post* and *New York Times* are the most influential because everyone reads them. In the country, in St. Louis, no one reads the *New York Times* and the *Post*.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 7, Soviet Union, April–May 1975. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy. All brackets, with the exception of those indicating omission of unrelated material, are in the original. The complete text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.

Gromyko: Well, Mr. Secretary, what do you think we should discuss, just the two of us?

Kissinger: I leave it up to you.

Gromyko: After all, in which direction are you and your friends conducting matters at the All-European Conference? Can I tell General Secretary Brezhnev and my colleagues the thing is in good hands, that Dr. Kissinger and President Ford have things firmly in hand and are working toward an early conclusion?

Kissinger: We are working toward a summit the last week of July. What is the Monday?

Sukhodrev: [Checks calendar] The 28th.

Kissinger: No.

Sukhodrev: The 21st.

Kissinger: Yes. We are planning on that week.

Gromyko: Regarding the length of time to be set aside, I have had several occasions to talk this over with the General Secretary, and his opinion is not in discord from President Ford—that is, two, two and a half, three days. That too is acceptable to us. It should be conducted in a businesslike style. Who needs those speeches?

Kissinger: I talked to Kreisky² and he agrees. I'll talk to Schmidt tomorrow.

Gromyko: I heard he wants four–five days.

Kissinger: So have I.

Gromyko: But I don't think he will be very strong on it.

Kissinger: If we can get Schmidt, I think the French and British will go along.

May I tell him this is agreeable to you?

Gromyko: You may. You may.

Another question I have is this: Yesterday you and I discussed certain specific matters regarding the European Security Conference.³ You said you would continue to be in touch with your West European friends—this is our understanding.

Kissinger: That is correct.

Gromyko: Are you sure they won't cast reproaches on you for being in some kind of collusion? Am I correct you were speaking with their knowledge?

Kissinger: No. It was my best estimate.

² A memorandum of Kissinger's conversation with Kreisky is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820125–0443.

³ See Document 284.

Take the confidence-building measures: If we say 30,000, 21 days and 250 kilometers, that I am sure we can get them to accept. If we said less, I can only say we will try. I am not saying it is impossible. It is our best estimate.

Gromyko: I was now asking really about the broad fact. In your estimate, will no one reproach us for collusion?

Kissinger: On what?

Gromyko: On CSCE generally. The French will say, "we are not bound"? I am just asking; because in the past it has happened.

Kissinger: Yes. Look, it is a problem, and it depends how it is handled. If we come to an understanding here and you let us handle it first with them before you approach them . . .

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: I think it is better we deal with it.

Gromyko: All right. Let me say quite frankly what we would be prepared to accept on these CBM's. I was quite frank in my opinion yesterday on the depth of the zone. I would like you to understand our situation. And the same with the numbers.

Kissinger: Thirty.

Gromyko: But as regards the time limit of notification, we would be prepared to agree to 18 days. Our private position was twelve. We would be willing to do 18.

Kissinger: Why don't we talk urgently to our allies, and let you know by next Monday, or Tuesday. We want to move it to a conclusion. There is no sense arguing about two days and 50 kilometers.

Gromyko: All right. Do that.

Kissinger: I think they will find 50 kilometers too little. But why don't we talk to them and make counterproposals if we have to?

Gromyko: Up 'til now we have felt that whenever the U.S. really had the desire, problems were solved to mutual advantage. It happened in many cases, and we feel it will happen in the future.

Kissinger: We will talk to them.

Gromyko: As regards journalists, we have revised your text⁴ and made amendments. Korniyenko is supposed to give it to Hartman. But as regards the first part, human contacts, that is for the delegations to go into because I haven't had time.

Kissinger: Except we should discuss them together. Our delegations can do it. Journalists and contacts together. Let them do it at Geneva. But they will move it.

⁴ Not found.

Gromyko: Yes, but please don't forget to give your delegation instructions at Geneva. In earlier cases when we reached agreement, sometimes we had the impression they didn't get instructions.

Kissinger: Sometimes we had the impression your delegation didn't get instructions. [Laughter] Maybe our delegations are both very cautious. We will do it, in the meeting. It depends really on what instructions you give. We have made a major effort; we would like to see some Soviet move.

Gromyko: Please don't demand of us the impossible. Surely you don't want to topple the Soviet system with that document.

Kissinger: I had great expectations. [Laughter]

Gromyko: We don't try to topple the capitalist system.

Kissinger: If the Soviet system toppled, which I don't expect by this document or otherwise, I am not sure the successor wouldn't be more of a problem. The government Solzhenitsyn would establish would be more aggressive.

Gromyko: To us, Solzhenitsyn is a zero within a zero.

Kissinger: On Basket III, we have met several of your points, and made a major effort. On several points of yours yesterday, I told you your positions were reasonable.

Gromyko: On "appropriate" points.

Kissinger: But also it depends on whether you accept some of the other points.

Gromyko: Then on those several points, Korniyenko probably already has given you our final communiqué. He has probably already done it.

Kissinger: It should not be significantly shorter than on the earlier occasion. It can be somewhat shorter.

Gromyko: This is a little bit shorter. It might be hard to go into detail, and not good to repeat formulas.

Kissinger: Let's look at it.⁵

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

⁵ The final joint statement, issued on May 20, reads in part: "Also discussed were a number of international problems of mutual interest—the progress of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its speedy conclusion; the situation with regard to a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East . . . and other matters. In these discussions both sides proceeded from the agreements and understandings reached as a result of the U.S.-Soviet Summit meetings held in Moscow, Washington, and Vladivostok. The conversations, which proceeded in a constructive spirit were, in the opinion of both sides, useful." (Department of State *Bulletin*, June 16, 1975, p. 811)

287. Editorial Note

On May 20, 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko held their final day of talks in Vienna. During a conversation at the Soviet Embassy from 3:10 to 3:40 p.m., they briefly discussed the European security conference. A memorandum of conversation reads in part: "Gromyko: On European security, we believe that when it is finally resolved, we will rise one step higher in our own relationships. But what we don't like is when somebody tries to tread on our feet. Kissinger: But we have really made an effort in Basket III. We'll make an effort to meet the deadline. We have already reserved the week of the 21st on the President's calendar. Gromyko: So on CSCE we will be expecting to hear from you in the very near future, and we expect it will be positive. Kissinger: On Basket III, we'll instruct our delegations to begin immediately. On the military, we'll let you know by Tuesday of next week. Gromyko: Good." (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 32, USSR, Gromyko File [25])

On May 21, Kissinger sent a report to President Ford on the second day of talks in the form of a message to President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft. The message, which Scowcroft forwarded to the President as a memorandum, reads in part: "I spent some six hours with Gromyko today, including two private sessions. The meeting took place in the garish Soviet Embassy built along Stalinist architectural lines. We skipped lunch to allow more time for talks. He continued to be genial in tone and manner and anxious that our meeting should be portrayed positively in public. In the plenary sessions, however, Gromyko was almost completely unyielding on SALT issues." The memorandum continues: "I pointed out that in conjunction with unhelpful Soviet positions on CSCE, impact could be quite negative on whole détente outlook. I deliberately overdrew negativism of Soviet positions to see if this would smoke out any flexibility. Gromyko himself merely urged that we not overlook helpful elements in Soviet positions (in fact, there were none in his formal presentation which closely followed a set of handwritten notes)." The memorandum notes with regard to CSCE: "Gromyko produced amendments to the Western compromise proposal on the rights of journalists. These are extremely restrictive and will require a good deal of further haggling. I agreed that these issues can be reviewed by our representatives in Geneva on condition that Soviets provide comments on the whole Western counterproposal and that all outstanding texts on journalists, broadcasting and human contacts be examined. As I indicated yesterday, I think these matters will eventually be settled, but only after a miserable series of haggles. There also was some slight give

on maneuver notification. Gromyko agreed to 18 days advance notice instead of 12—and here too I think after some horse trading there will be a resolution.” Gromyko, the memorandum further notes, “indicated that Brezhnev now firmly intends to come to the U.S. in October. This is probably realistic in view of the great amount of work remaining on SALT and the fact that the CSCE finale may well not be feasible by late July. Brezhnev’s health is also a factor that was not clear.” (Ibid.)

On May 22, Scowcroft replied to Kissinger in telegram Tohak 45: “The President said that he had been thinking about Gromyko’s stonewall positions on SALT. He said that if they were a reflection of Soviet attitudes at this point, perhaps we should think about using the leverage of the convening of the CSCE summit conference. I pointed out to him that Gromyko had never been a principal SALT negotiator and that Dobrynin had substantially softened Gromyko’s positions. The President concurred, but said we ought to keep this possibility in mind, because CSCE was for us a minus, not a plus, and there is no reason we should give it away for nothing. I think this reflects the unease which the President has discussed several times with you about CSCE, stemming obviously from the Baltic-American pressure groups.” (Ibid., Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974–76, Kissinger Trip Files, Box 9, May 18–23, 1975, Europe and Middle East, Tohak [5])

288. Telegram From Secretary of State Kissinger to the Mission in Geneva¹

Bonn, May 20, 1975, 2030Z.

Secto 1053. Subject: CSCE discussion with Gromyko. For Sherer from Secretary.

1. Hartman gave you an account of yesterday’s discussion.² Today I told Gromyko³ that our delegations should be in touch in Geneva to discuss the whole package. I said that our delegation would not ne-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Washington. Kissinger was in Bonn for talks with Schmidt.

² See Document 284.

³ See Document 287.

gotiate until the Soviets had commented on both human contacts and information aspects. (They gave us Soviet redraft on journalists⁴ but I requested that this be presented in Geneva along with comments on other parts of proposal.) I stressed that speed depended on the Soviets showing maximum flexibility since Allies had made major effort to meet Soviet concerns.

2. In fact the text on journalists as re-drafted completely guts the proposal as presented by the Allies. The text drops the wider definition of “journalists,” paragraph 5 drops wider travel and limits provisions to those journalists in country of residence; paragraph 6 drops implied positive response; paragraph 7 limits direct contact to organizations and official institutions; paragraph 8 drops specificity on imports; paragraph 9 waters down free transmission and further restricts it by providing that it must be done through official channels; paragraph 10 as you predicted calls only for telling a journalist why he has been expelled.

3. You should send us the full translation of the Soviet comments and suggested changes when received and give us your analysis of these and recommendations for next steps in the negotiation.

4. You should inform your British colleague that the Soviets will be commenting on the whole of the “global initiative,” that we do not wish to become the negotiators but will try to play a helpful behind-the-scenes role. When the comments have been received, we should have a full discussion in the NATO caucus.

5. For your information only, I indicated to Gromyko that we would be prepared to foresee summit in the week of July 21st but that this could only be achieved if the Soviets showed sufficient flexibility to enable a balanced result to be agreed. You should see that your Soviet colleagues understand this.

6. On CBMs, Gromyko came up to 18 days, but remained at 150 KMs and 30,000 men. We said that we would try this out on Allies and neutrals but that depth looked thin and numbers of men, fairly high. After discussing with British and others, I want your assessment of whether this is adequate and, if not, what alternative we should try to push for.

Kissinger

⁴ Not found. Regarding the revised Soviet proposal at CSCE on journalists, see Document 290.

289. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Bonn, May 21, 1975, 8:10–9 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor, FRG

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Vice Chancellor, FRG

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: Why don't we start with MBFR? We have been talking to you and the British about this but we really don't want to go to NATO without knowing your real view. If the problems are technical, it is one thing; but if they are real or fundamental reservations then it is another matter.

Genscher: It is alright if you introduce the new proposal² but it has to be without prejudice to the future.

Kissinger: We don't want a big debate in NATO.

Genscher: You will not get it from us.

Kissinger: I want to be sure that you realize there will be ceilings.

Genscher: Yes, we know that but that does not bother us as long as they are not specifically applicable to us.

Schmidt: Shouldn't we want the CSCE to end?

Kissinger: Yes, that's right. But we need NATO consultation on the MBFR proposal before that. We would not give it to the Russians until after CSCE is over. But we really don't want a big NATO debate.

Schmidt: There are a good many views on MBFR in Bonn. Genscher here is rather hard and rigid. Leber and his ministry take a very military position. I myself don't necessarily have a particular view.

Kissinger: We need MBFR mostly because of Congress.

Schmidt: I know that very well because I convinced you of it 5 years ago.

Genscher: What the Chancellor means by a "hard" position is our opposition to special treatment for the Federal Republic.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 23, External Classified Memcons, May–December 1975, Folder 1. Secret. The conversation took place in the Chancellor's Bungalow.

² See Document 357.

Kissinger: I agree. But we need ceilings because we cannot reduce 54 aircraft without having a ceiling on the remaining ones.

Genscher: But we agree with that.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: We have somewhat the same impression. They³ are being very pedantic on CSCE and Berlin and they are still haggling on CSCE as though they were at the beginning of negotiations rather than at the end. SALT is different because there Grechko is in charge. Gromyko was very tough on this and so was I.

Schmidt: It all seems very uncertain.

Kissinger: We know very little about the succession.⁴

Schmidt: Do you still want CSCE this summer?

Kissinger: We will do it but we don't insist. We will not make any further concessions. The Soviet counter proposal on Basket III as far as I can tell is worthless and it is also foolish. It is bound to cause domestic problems.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] Gromyko complained to me about my Berlin trip but I laughed. President Ford is thinking of stopping in Bonn on the way to the CSCE.

Schmidt: That would be very good.

Kissinger: Just one more thing. They would like as short of a CSCE Summit as possible. I don't think the President could stay more than two and one half days. If it takes any longer the Secretary of State should represent him.

Schmidt: I am not so sure. People want to talk to each other. Friends have begun the only opportunity for this now. I for instance want to talk to Brezhnev and to the Pole⁵ and to the GDR man.⁶ I have to do that. And then I need to balance them with others. Two and one half days would be too short. What we need is Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday to allow for bilaterals. And we should have a western meeting on the Monday night. There will be 35 leaders and each should talk 20 minutes.

³ The Soviets.

⁴ An apparent reference to the uncertain state of Brezhnev's health; see Document 290.

⁵ Gierek.

⁶ Honecker.

Kissinger: We prefer short speeches.

Schmidt: But there is Tito, Palme, Kreisky—you can't walk out on them and there is also the Dutch Prime Minister.

Kissinger: Van der uyl.

Schmidt: No, not Van der uyl. den Uyl.

Kissinger: Okay, Den Uyl.⁷

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

⁷ On May 21, Scowcroft sent Ford a memorandum containing a report from Kissinger on his talks with Schmidt. It reads in part: "On other matters, Schmidt and Genscher agreed to be helpful on MBFR in NATO; Schmidt, in contrast to Kreisky and Gromyko, seems to favor a somewhat longer CSCE summit to allow for bilateral meetings and a possible Western caucus as well as speeches." (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974–6, Kissinger Trip Files, Box 8)

290. Editorial Note

In telegram 3772 from Geneva, May 22, 1975, forwarded to Secretary of State Kissinger's party in Ankara, the delegation reported: "Soviets gave their response to Western global initiative on human contacts and information at May 21 and 22 informal meetings with US, UK, Irish and Danish dels, in form of oral indications of modifications they wish to make to Western paper, or in some cases in form of general statements of the type of text they have in mind. Western dels made no comments on substance during meetings. At conclusion UK rep indicated Western dels would give serious consideration to Eastern suggestions. Eastern dels took great pains to characterize their response as a serious attempt to reply to the Western initiative in a constructive way, which they hoped would make it possible to wind up these subjects quickly. However, the substance of their reply belied their words, contained few meaningful concessions, and proposed a whole shopping list of amendments, many of which were matters of detail, style or translation.

"NATO caucus discussed Soviet response afternoon of May 22, and was unanimous in finding it most disappointing. Not only have Soviets stuck to virtually all their substantive points, they have also proposed many minor changes on issues which global approach was devised to avoid, such as organization, translations, and brackets, and on which West had already attempted to strike a 50–50 balance with Soviet positions. Allies noted that Soviets apparently realize they have

made a serious blunder in mixing major substantive points with minor details, and that Soviet reps are now saying in corridors that only about 10 of their list of almost fifty changes are really important. Thus far they have not told anyone which points are the important ones or whether this means other points could be dropped. Allies also believe Soviets are now under considerable pressure, both because of approaching NATO summit where Stage III timing may be discussed, and because of their evident interest in keeping the global initiative alive. Some Allies are convinced that Soviet response was written on the basis of instructions they had received prior to global initiative, and that more flexible instructions may be forthcoming from Moscow when global initiative has been studied there. For all these reasons, NATO caucus concluded that Soviets should be made to understand that negotiating ball is still in their court, that their long list of changes would take months to negotiate, and that they should identify the real points for negotiation and drop the rest.

“NATO caucus reached consensus on following tactics for the next few days: (a) take no precipitate action, either to enter negotiations on substance or to withdraw global initiative; (b) maintain Allied unity on all aspects of global initiative; (c) in contacts with Soviets, Eastern delts and neutrals express disappointment with Soviet response, and convey message that serious consideration will now have to be given as to whether global initiative should be withdrawn; (d) seek to get Eastern reps to identify the really important points which need to be negotiated, and to indicate whether other points can be dropped; (e) wait for Soviets to give further signals of flexibility; (f) exchange information and review situation again in caucus on Tuesday, May 27.

“In view of disappointing Soviet response, we believe it would be a mistake to enter negotiations on substance at this time, since this would lead Soviets to believe agreement can be obtained on basis of their present demands. On the other hand, we would prefer to keep the global initiative alive, since it forms a good basis for reasonable conclusion of negotiations on these subjects. In these circumstances we believe tactics agreed in NATO caucus are only reasonable course of action for the next few days. Should Soviets cut down their list of changes, or offer a few more serious concessions, we would recommend moving with our Allies to enter serious negotiations on remaining points at issue, pressing firmly for the reasonable substantive results we want.

“Highlights of changes proposed by Soviets are as follows:

[Omitted here are paragraphs a–c.]

“(d) Soviets suggested complete deletion of our paragraph on radio broadcasting.

“(e) In paragraph 5 of journalists text Soviets made woefully inadequate move in direction of facilitating wider travel by suggesting ‘gradually facilitating journeys,’ with no attempt to deal with our concept of

providing wider opportunities for travel. In sixth para on early response to requests for travel they wished to eliminate alleged automaticity by inserting 'as far as possible.' In para seven on access to sources, they could only accept Swiss formulation which makes no reference to individuals. In the eighth and ninth paras on admission of technical equipment and on transmission of journalists work Soviets proposed amendments which would make these texts more restrictive than those they had informally agreed to in principle last fall and which are substantially reflected in Swiss text. In last para on expulsion they could only accept the Swiss formulation, which omits any mention that a journalist is not liable to expulsion for legitimate professional activity. They rejected any mention of technical staff, either in the text or in a footnote definition of journalists as in the Western proposal." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

291. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 26, 1975, 9:05–10:27 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: On your trip² we didn't get to discuss CSCE.

On CBM's, the issue left is what territory should be included for notice of maneuvers. The Europeans wanted 500 kilometers inside the Soviet Union, maneuvers involving 12,000 troops, and notice 96 days ahead. The Soviet Union proposes 30,000 troops, 18 days ahead, 150 kilometers. The Soviet proposals are inadequate.

On human contacts, it is a total fraud. Only Gromyko can understand the language. The language is very abstract, but even this the Soviet Union won't accept.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 12. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

² It is unclear to which trip Kissinger is referring.

As for post-conference machinery, the Soviets previously wanted a permanent Secretariat. We wanted an assessment in two years. Now the Soviet Union is on our side; but they want to delay four to five years since they now are afraid Yugoslavia and Romania will use the machinery against them.

I think your position must be hard-line. No more concessions to the Soviet Union. If they want a conference, let them concede.

The President: Did you see the *New York Times* editorial?³

Kissinger: It was unconscionable. You should see the editorials they had in '69 and '70. But the Jews are trying to get the maximum polarization with the Soviet Union.

But on CSCE, I would listen and not get engaged. Say if we can get a decent settlement, fine; if not, wait a few months.

The President: If the Soviets are so eager to get a CSCE, can we use that for SALT leverage?

Kissinger: It would be difficult; it could have been done a year ago maybe, but the Europeans would leave you. We should, three years ago, have linked it with MBFR. But if it isn't finished but early June, there can't be a meeting in July. Our negotiation can drag just a bit behind the Europeans and slow it up as much as possible.

The President: I think we should hang back. Will the Europeans care?

Kissinger: Yes. Brezhnev said he wouldn't come here before the CSCE. I told him that is OK; we are better off domestically on our anti-Soviet line.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

³ On May 26, the *New York Times* published an editorial entitled, "What Price Security?" It reads in part: "The agreement [on European security] is something the Soviet Union has sought for two decades and, especially, since 1966. There is not much the West expects to get out of it except some pious phrases, which are more likely to be honored in the breach, although it would be an error to yield on the minimum points the West is now down to defending. The real issue is whether the President of the United States, the President of France, the Chancellor of West Germany, the Prime Minister of Britain and virtually all the other heads of government of West Europe should take part in a Helsinki gala with Mr. Brezhnev and his East European satellites that might create a false euphoria over 'peace in the world.'" (*New York Times*, May 26, 1975, p. 14)

292. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva¹

Washington, May 27, 1975, 2023Z.

Tosec 20020/122749. Subject: CSCE: Reply to Soviets on CBM's. Ref: Geneva 3837.²

You should contact Kovalev and indicate that Secretary has asked you to convey following points growing out of your soundings of allies following conversations with Gromyko in Vienna re CBM's parameters.

—Our discussions with allies in last few days indicate that new Soviet proposal on parameters could be expected to elicit a generally favorable response.

—At the same time, however, Soviets should understand that none of the allies is prepared to accept Soviet proposal—18 days, 30,000 troops, 150 km—as a final solution to parameters problem. Soviets have not yet moved far enough in direction of allies.

—As to priorities among different parameters, the allies continue to attach particular importance to (a) area of USSR to be covered and (b) threshold for size of exercises of be notified. Therefore we believe Soviets will have to show further flexibility on both of these parameters to make progress. However, the area of the USSR to be covered remains the most basic problem, and the Soviets should focus their major attention on this. 150 km coverage of USSR would not be an acceptable outcome. Deeper zone is required.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by John S. Davison (EUR/RPM). Cleared by Dobbins (C) and approved by Armitage. Repeated to Moscow and to Kissinger in Paris. Kissinger was in Paris for talks with Giscard d'Estaing.

² In telegram 3837 from Geneva, May 24, Sherer informed Hartman that the U.S. delegation at CSCE had "contacted reps of UK, FRG, and France and several smaller [nations?] individually for reactions to parameters set forth by Gromyko. These allies all believe Soviet offer is insufficient, and that more satisfactory results can realistically be obtained with sustained pressure on Soviets. Of the three numerical parameters, these allies also agree that timing is least important, but are evenly split on whether they should exert maximum effort to lower threshold or increase depth of area. On threshold, some now believe that most practical outcome would be a numerical range on the order of 20–25,000 vice a single set figure. On area, allies not only wish Soviets to increase width of band of territory along their land borders, but also to measure band from sea frontiers in Baltic and Black Seas. However, allies have limited leverage to exact these further concessions without using movements issue, and we would appreciate authorization requested in ref b to join allies in developing appropriate tactics." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

—In our view next step should be for Soviets to table more ample parameters which will take into account allied views.

—We would be prepared to work actively with allies to develop a forthcoming response to a Soviet proposal which in itself gives evidence of flexibility and realism on the important matters we have indicated.

Ingersoll

293. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Paris, May 28, 1975, 8 a.m.

SUBJECT

Quadripartite Breakfast on Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

Foreign

Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs James Callaghan
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher
Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean Sauvagnargues

US

The Secretary
Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Assistant Secretary Arthur A. Hartman
Ambassador Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations
Mr. David Anderson, Director, EUR/CE

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Sauvagnargues: I think at this point I should mention my recent discussion with the Yugoslavs about QRRS in the CSCE. I gave them an amended text of the original language which we had prepared and presented in Geneva. I suggested, "The participating states note that the present (title of document) cannot and will not affect their rights,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975, P820125–0256. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Anderson. Cleared by Hartman and approved by James Covey (S). The meeting took place in the Quai d'Orsay.

obligations or responsibilities specifically defined and recognized or the corresponding treaties, agreements or arrangements." I think this will be acceptable to the Yugoslavs² although it may be difficult for the Russians to accept. I would like to have your views on this new text today or tomorrow. Perhaps the Bonn Group could consider the new text. Once we have your views, I would then be prepared to try to convince the Russians.

Callaghan: I agree that we should let the Bonn Group look at this.

The Secretary: Thinking about Soviet policy generally, I have to say that I have the impression that the Soviets are simply marking time. They are keeping various negotiations alive but just barely. Even the preparations for the Brezhnev meeting with President Ford are just ticking over. I suppose that Brezhnev's physical condition is presenting a problem in this area. My meeting with Gromyko in Vienna went well. He went out of his way to be friendly in the meetings and with the press. But I have difficulty understanding the Soviet tactics in the CSCE, where they were apparently interested in reaching a speedy conclusion. On SALT, they made some impossible proposals in Vienna but Gromyko's informal remarks to me afterwards suggested that an agreement this year was very probable. But all in all it is a curious performance.

Callaghan: I would like to clear up CSCE by mid-summer. This is not a matter of policy, it is simply a matter of order. What are the outstanding issues that we need to consider? CBMs and Basket III?

Sauvagnargues: Yes, I would be interested in knowing how the FRG views the progress on Basket III.

Genscher: We have no problem now with Basket III. For us the question of CBMs is most important.

² Telegram 3640 from Geneva, May 17, contains information on the Yugoslav position on quadripartite rights and responsibilities. (Ibid.) Telegram Secto 2054 from Brussels, May 30, reported that the French subsequently modified Sauvagnargues's original text to read: "The participating states note that the present (title of document) cannot and will not affect their rights, obligations or specifically defined and recognized responsibilities nor the corresponding treaties, agreements and arrangements." (Ibid.) Telegram 8710 from Bonn, May 30, reported that the French had presented the revised text to the Yugoslav delegation at CSCE. The same telegram reported that while the U.K. representative to the Bonn Group was willing to accept the French formulation, as long as the English language version made it clear that only "'responsibilities' are modified by specifically defined and recognized.'" The US and FRG reps expressed reservations on text. (Ibid.)

The Secretary: As you all know, I have had the greatest doubts about CSCE. Soviet practices will not change in any respect simply because of the wording in Basket III of the Security Conference documents. However, having presented our global initiative to the Soviets, it would be a mistake now to fall back from it. After all there is nothing in our proposal that involves any action. I think we should try to hold out. This has become a domestic political problem in the U.S., where we now have to explain what we are getting in Basket III. I think we are in a good position to defend ourselves publicly. It is therefore difficult to see why the Soviets won't settle. If they don't show signs of concessions in the next two weeks, I don't see how we can have a summit by the end of July.

Sauvagnargues: I think that we could have a summit at that time if we wind up the present negotiations in Geneva by the middle of June.

Callaghan: I think we should stick with our position on CBMs and on Basket III and let the Soviets come to us.

The Secretary: You are aware of the CBM proposal which Gromyko made to me in Vienna, i.e. 30,000 troops, 18-day pre-notification and a distance of 150 kilometers. I told him that I would have to discuss this proposal with our Allies but that I did not think it would be acceptable.

Genscher: We could accept the proposal except for the 150 kilometer provision. We would want to stick with 300 kilometers.

Callaghan: I think that seems reasonable. Why don't we all agree to take this approach?

Sauvagnargues: All right, and if the neutrals want to push for Soviet concessions on the other aspects of CBMs, then they can do so without our support.

The Secretary: Agreed.

Genscher: One further matter. I would like us to agree to refer to the Bonn Group for study the question of the extent to which Berlin is affected by CSCE documents. This will be an important issue domestically in the FRG.

Sauvagnargues: I think that the Bonn Group could study this problem, but I want to make one point: I do not believe that we should try to insert a sentence in the CSCE documents which would cover Berlin's interests. This would be very difficult and would involve us in very long discussions. I think the point can be made by getting a common sentence covering Berlin's interests into the speeches of the three Allied chiefs of state.

Genscher: That would be fine. That is basically our objective.

Callaghan: Can we all agree on the proposed sentence on Berlin for inclusion in the NATO Declaration?³

Sauvagnargues: I think the sentence is a good one and unless I hear objections, I think we should accept it.

³ The North Atlantic Council met in Brussels May 29–30 with the participation of heads of states and government, including President Ford. The text of the final communiqué reads in part: “The security afforded by the Treaty enables the Allies to pursue policies reflecting their desire that understanding and cooperation should prevail over confrontation. An advance along this road would be made if the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe were concluded on satisfactory terms and its words translated into deeds. The Allies hope that progress in the negotiations will permit such a conclusion in the near future. They reaffirm that there is an essential connection between détente in Europe and the situation relating to Berlin. The Allies participating in the negotiations in Vienna emphasize that the development of understanding and cooperation also requires mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe in a manner which would contribute to a more stable relationship and enhanced security for all.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, June 30, 1975, p. 890)

294. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Brussels, May 30, 1975, 8:35–9:20 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
Prime Minister Harold Wilson
Foreign Secretary James Callaghan
Sir John Hunt, Cabinet Secretary

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 12. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Residence of the American Ambassador. Ford and Kissinger were in Brussels for a NATO summit. On May 29, they met with Schmidt. The memorandum of their conversation reads in part: “The President: We are prepared to go to the summit for the CSCE, but there is not much movement. Kissinger: There were some concessions in Basket III. If there are more in CBM, there may be a chance. If they extend the territory to about 300 kilometers . . . Schmidt: That is the only real issue. Because of the relation to MBFR. Kissinger: Now I think the chances of a summit in July are slightly better than 50–50.” (Ibid.; ellipsis is in the original)

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President: What do you think are the prospects for CSCE?

Wilson: What do you think?

Kissinger: The Soviets are moving on Basket III.² The only real sticking point is CBMs—the question of the depth of the zone. I think we could settle on 250 kilometers. On follow-on, I had an exchange with Gromyko in Vienna. I said we supported the Danish proposal, but I said that perhaps there could be meetings after a year or 18 months, but Gromyko said no, it should be after three to four years.

Callaghan: The Romanians want a much shorter time.

Kissinger: The East Europeans want permanent machinery because they want to be able to monitor the Soviets.

Callaghan: One of the results of CSCE is that it has brought the East Europeans into equal status with other countries.

President: Is a summit likely to be in July?

Kissinger: Yes. I think the chances are two out of three that it will be unless the Soviets change their tactics. They are dribbling out concessions.

Callaghan: Stage II should really be settled in two weeks if the summit is to be in July.

Wilson: It really would kill the Geneva industry. We will need a public works program for all the diplomats who have been so busy with CSCE.

President: How long should we allow for the CSCE summit? Five days is very long. There will be 35 speeches.

Wilson: The more time you allow, the longer the speeches will be. Maybe we should plan to arrive on Monday in the afternoon or evening, and then work Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and into Friday.

² In an undated memorandum to Kissinger prepared on May 29, Hartman wrote that "on May 28, the Soviets offered some significant concessions on Basket 3 issues in the Allied 'global initiative' on human rights and information." Hartman noted that "while this demonstration of Soviet flexibility will help accelerate the search for a Basket 3 final compromise, the NATO caucus at Geneva expects further hard bargaining." Hartman continued: "At a May 28 luncheon in Geneva, Kovalev told the US, UK, and French delegation heads that Moscow offered these concessions as a 'gesture of good will' aimed at speeding up efforts to overcome differences on the 30 points still to be resolved in the human contacts and information area. A NATO caucus meeting immediately following the luncheon produced agreement that the Soviet moves included at least two significant concessions—on *travel* and *journalists*—and that the remaining list of Soviet-proposed changes form an adequate basis for opening global negotiations." (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 44, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1975 WH [3])

Callaghan: At the OECD meeting in Paris, I got rid of 20 speeches in one morning. Your's was long though, Henry.

President: It will lose luster if the speeches are too long.

Wilson: Yes, like at the UN.

Callaghan: So maybe it would be arriving on Monday, and then Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday.

Wilson: Will it all be wrapped up at that point or will there still have to be negotiations?

Callaghan: No. There would be valedictory speeches only.

Kissinger: You know that the Turks don't want Makarios to be there, but Denktash.³

Callaghan: Yes, I gather. Mintoff will make trouble on relations with the Arabs⁴ and he may hold that until we all get there.

Kissinger: The conference could end on Thursday and we could then stay on Friday for bilaterals. The press in the United States would get very impatient if it drags on. They are already saying there has been no accomplishment.

Callaghan: There is very little in Basket III.

Kissinger: And it is unenforceable.

Callaghan: We should go for a short conference.

Wilson: I would like to miss question time in the House for once.

Callaghan: And Cabinet.

President: You don't enact bills when you are not there?

Wilson: No, no, it goes right on.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

³ Telegram 2113 from Geneva, March 26, reported that "Turkish delegation head (Benler) has written to all CSCE delegation heads, except Cypriot, recalling allusions he made earlier to possibility that he might question Cypriot credentials at some stage in CSCE." It noted that "in private conversations Benler has hinted that real problem for Turks is possibility of presence of Makarios at Stage III." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

⁴ Telegram 3830 from Geneva, May 23, reported that the Maltese delegation had introduced at CSCE an amendment to the conference's draft declaration on the Mediterranean calling for the eventual withdrawal of all U.S. and Soviet forces from the Mediterranean. (Ibid.)

295. Editorial Note

On June 4, 1975, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin telephoned Secretary of State Kissinger to discuss the European security conference. According to the memorandum of their phone conversation, Kissinger asked, "Do you want to finish it up in Geneva or not? D[obrynin]: What in Geneva? K[issinger]: The Security Conference. D: I don't understand. K: I see no obstacles to clearing it. D: I would like to discuss this with you. K: O.K. Let us discuss it. You come by tomorrow, or I will call you no later than tomorrow, and you can come the day after." (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations, <http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000BFFE.pdf>)

In preparation for his meeting with Dobrynin, Kissinger held several telephone conversations with Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Hartman on June 5. During a conversation at 4:24 p.m., Kissinger asked Hartman, "What is Dobrynin likely to raise about the Security Conference?" Hartman replied: "I think he will probably say that they have begun to move in Geneva and that they need our help. They are moving there, we have gotten reports on it. I would stress that speed is essential. The Finns say they need four weeks for translations and things like that." (Ibid., <http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000C009.pdf>) At 4:45 p.m., Kissinger spoke with Hartman about confidence-building measures and a final summit conference for CSCE. A transcript of their telephone conversation reads: "K[issinger]: If the Soviets went to 250 kilometers, do you think we could get the allies to accept the 30,000? H[artman]: I think so. K: And what was the other? 18 days? H: I think it is the depth that concerns them. K: I wanted to make sure. I was right. Could we sell 250? H: I think so. K: I know they are insisting on 300, but could we make it 300? H: We would have a selling job. K: We would? Could we in good conscience get behind it? H: Yes. K: O.K. What is their view of the date? The week of the 21st or the 28th? H: The Finns say they need four weeks. If we could finish by the 20th of June that would give them until July. They need the flexibility for translation and such. K: The 20th of June. O.K. Good. H: They really have made a lot of concessions. H: Good, thank you." (Ibid., <http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000C00B.pdf>) At 4:50 p.m., Kissinger spoke with Hartman again. A transcript of their telephone conversation reads: "K: Can I agree with Dobrynin that the confidence building measures are the only ones remaining? H: Right. There are still other issues like the desire for the Mediterranean [Declaration?], but that is not between us and the Soviet Union. K: Suppose the Soviet Union agrees to 250 kilometers, could we take a common stand with them? Then we could work together to get the other measures developed. It is the only issue

outstanding between them and us. H: Right. The French are still trying to negotiate the quadripartite, but that is not between them and us. K: Good, and then their delegate and ours can work together on the translation. H: And also on calming down the other high flown propositions. K: Then our Ambassador and theirs will work together to get the thing finished if we can agree on the kilometers. H: Right. K: O.K. Thank you.” (Ibid., <http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000C00D.pdf>)

No memorandum of conversation of Kissinger’s meeting with Dobrynin on June 5 has been found. Kissinger reported on the meeting in a conversation with President Ford on the morning of June 6: “Dobrynin said they would make the remaining concessions on CSCE. They will give on Basket I and on the depth of CBM’s.” Kissinger later added: “We can probably plan on CSCE the week of 21 July. I think you should not go to Berlin—but you could visit the troops.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memcons, Box 12) Kissinger also discussed his meeting with Dobrynin in a telephone conversation with Hartman at 6:35 p.m. on June 6. The transcript of their telephone conversation reads as follows: “K: The Russians are willing to accept the 250 kilometers if we assure them about the other two parameters. H: I think we should go to work on it. The British, French, and Germans will buy it. K: We should say we will support them if they are willing to do it. We should assure them of our support. H: The major countries will also join us. K: Right. H: Do you want me to get the message to them? K: Well, no. I will call them. H: Alright.” (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations, <http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000C019.pdf>)

296. Briefing Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of European Affairs for Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, undated.

CSCE: Soviets Moving to Wrap Up the Conference

The Soviets have clearly been moving vigorously to wrap-up remaining CSCE issues so that they can have a summit at the end of July. Tentative

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 7, Soviet Union. Confidential. Sonnenfeldt sent this memorandum to Kissinger under cover of a June 5 memorandum.

agreement was reached June 4 on the text dealing with working conditions for journalists, a significant breakthrough which leaves radio broadcasting in basket 3 and CBMs as the only major substantive items to be completed and which could give impetus to a completion of stage II in late June or early July.

The journalists text which the Soviets have accepted parallels very closely the West's proposals in the "global approach" (see Tab 1).² The one remaining obstacle to full agreement on the journalists text is the Romanians, who have indicated that they will have difficulty accepting the language on expulsion.

The Soviets have also recently accepted the text on travel as proposed in the Western global approach, and are now negotiating earnestly on the broadcasting text. Here the Soviets have agreed to accept a formulation expressing hope that the "broadening of dissemination of broadcast information will continue" (a euphemism for cessation of jamming), but they wish to see accompanying language implying responsibility for broadcast content, a point about which the FRG is acutely sensitive.

Assuming that the Soviets will soon start pursuing CBMs with equal intensity, there is a good chance that both basket 3 and the military aspects could be wrapped up within the next few weeks. Accordingly, even with many of the secondary issues like follow-up, translation problems, and the scenario for stage III unsettled, we can expect a strong upsurge of interest from the Soviets and others in setting a precise date for stage III. *Ambassador Sherer believes that the Soviets will attempt before June 20 to get a firm Allied commitment to a summit meeting opening July 21* (see Tab 2).³

² Attached but not printed.

³ Tab 2, telegram 4167 from Geneva, June 4, reads in part: "Western delegations continue to believe strongly that no firm commitment on level or timing of Stage III should be given until key substantive issues (e.g., CBM's, human contacts and information) of interest to the West are resolved. However, current Soviet attitude toward the negotiations, and their evident haste to complete Stage II, poses the possibility that they may make enough concessions during this week and next week to substantially fulfill this condition and make it necessary for Western dels to take decision on timing and level during week of June 16–20."

297. Letter From the Soviet Leadership to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Moscow, undated.

We are ready to consider the possibility of enlargement of the depth of notifications up to 250 kilometers. However can we be sure that in this case two other parameters (number of troops—30 thousand and time of notification—18 days) with the depth of 250 kilometers will be finally accepted and thus the whole question of military measures will be closed at the Conference?

We proceed from the fact that the formulation on the voluntary basis of notifications concerning major military exercises, agreed upon with you, Mr. Secretary, in Vienna, will keep in force and will not be subject to any changes. Only on this basis we are ready to consider the question of depth in the abovementioned direction.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Europe, Canada and Ocean Affairs, Box 44, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1975 WH (3). No classification marking. A handwritten note at the top of the letter reads: "Handed to Gen. Scowcroft by Mikoyan, Soviet Embassy, 6:00 p.m., June 6, 1975."

298. Editorial Note

On June 9, 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger discussed the Soviet letter of June 6 (Document 297) with President Ford. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: "President: I see the Soviets have made concessions in CSCE. Kissinger: They did on Basket I and earlier they gave us 250 kilometers, up from 180 kilometers. I have let Genscher and Callaghan know this. If it works, we could have a summit conference about the 23rd. I have said 2-1/2 days of formal meetings; to have it longer than that without any accomplishments would be bad. We will get a press beating here anyway. You should see Brezhnev—maybe you can wrap up SALT." (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 12)

On June 7, Kissinger sent letters appraising the Soviet offer to Foreign Ministers Callaghan, Sauvagnargues, and Genscher. The letters read in part: "At our quadripartite meeting in Paris we reviewed the negotiating status of the confidence-building measure on advance notification of military maneuvers. In addressing which aspect of the meas-

ure is most important to Western interests, we reached a general consensus that it would be most important to have depth of territory increased and that the number of troops involved and the number of days' notice would be by comparison of secondary importance. Since returning to Washington, I have learned from the Soviets that they are now prepared to consider a zone of 250 kilometers in depth providing that the other parameters remain at 18 days and 30,000 men. It is my impression that this represents an important concession and adequately meets Allied requirements. I would appreciate your reaction to the Soviet proposal, and if you agree with me that it provides a basis for satisfactory compromise on this issue that you will so notify your representative in Geneva." The letters to Callaghan, Sauvagnargues, and Genscher were sent on June 7 in telegrams 133604 to London, 133605 to Paris, and 133606 to Bonn, respectively. Kissinger also informed Ambassador Sherer at CSCE about the Soviet proposal in telegram 133597 to Geneva, June 7. The telegram reads in part: "I told Dobrynin that you will get together with Kovalev to work out the tactics and manner of presentation of this proposal, and that we will support it with the Allies as meeting essential Western requirements." (All in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

On June 11, Counselor Sonnenfeldt wrote to Kissinger as part of his daily activities report: "Hartman and I were in touch throughout the day in regard to CSCE. All the Allies, except France, consider most recent Soviet moves on CBM's inadequate and we need to convey this fact to the Soviets promptly." (Ibid., Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 12, Daily Activities Reports, 1975)

299. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 11, 1975, 3–4:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania
George Macovescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Official, Chronological. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office at the White House. Brackets, with the exception of those indicating omission of unrelated material, are in the original. Ceausescu visited the United States on June 11 for one day of discussions with President Ford.

Vasile Pungan, Counsellor to the President
Corneliu Bogdan, Romanian Ambassador to the U.S.

President Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Amb. Harry Barnes, U.S. Ambassador to Romania

Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs

SUBJECTS

Bilateral economic relations; CSCE; Middle East; Korea; Spain; Disarmament

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President: I know you are concerned about the European Security Conference and about the problems that held up the agreement. We of course have had some reservations about Baskets I and III. I would appreciate hearing your own appreciation about the prospects and what you anticipate.

Kissinger: Macovescu and Gromyko are the only ones who have read all the documents.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President: Mr. President, I appreciate your personally delivering the invitation to come to Romania. There is a distinct possibility and I would like to do it. If there is a European Security Conference Meeting in July or August it might be possible to stop for a visit in Romania after the conference in Helsinki.

Ceausescu: Following the European Security Conference?

President: Yes.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

CSCE

Ceausescu: As far as European Security is concerned, we are concerned not so much by the fact of delay as by the content and expected results of the Conference. For us, it is not a problem of the dates, but of the results of this Conference. Of course, if it can take place in July, that is fine, or if it is in August or even September, that is fine. The principal thing is to get results which will contribute to the strengthening of confidence and will enhance détente. Therefore, it is not Basket III which is essential, the question of how many journalists or artists travel. That is for the experts. This isn't what is so essential. As far as we are concerned, let as many as want travel around. The essential problems are in the first Basket. On this hangs the movement toward détente and for that matter the conditions of things like cultural exchanges.

In connection with this we see some problems which must be solved if the Conference is going to wind up with good results. First of all there should be firm engagements of states on the renunciation of force and noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. Secondly, there is the problem of certain military aspects. Granted it is not a question of resolving basic problems, but we have sought nonetheless to make sure that there will not be interference in the internal affairs of other states. It is a question for example, of these engagements regarding military maneuvers. And even here it is not so much whether it will be 250 or 180 kilometers or 10 to 20 thousand men, but the very fact that the content of these measures should be obligatory and not something voluntary. Therefore if all these problems are going to be reduced to something voluntary, it no longer makes any sense to waste time and energy over 100 kilometers of distance here and there. But what we are doing is introducing into international law certain rules which have existed up to now. When a group of states arrives at certain understandings, these would be mandatory and not voluntary. That is important.

Macovescu: One of the other principal problems is that connected with continuity of the Conference, the follow-up.

Ceausescu: I don't know what your opinion is but we believe the most dangerous situation is still in Europe where there are the two military blocs with modern armaments, huge concentrations of troops, atomic weapons as well. Therefore we would want to have the summit meeting represent not the conclusion but rather the beginning of European security. For this reason we are in favor of an organism, a process for assuring the continuity of this conference.

President: How often do you see it meeting? Every year, every two years?

Ceausescu: Once a year, once in two years, any time when it is necessary. If there should appear some tense situation, if something should happen, then it could discuss what might be done to prevent things getting worse.

Kissinger: What do you think of the idea of a review conference in 18 months or two years?

Ceausescu: In our opinion that is a good idea. We think as a matter of fact that this sort of permanent organism could have the role of preparing such a conference. I don't have in mind something that would be set up with a lot of bureaucracy, but rather something that would meet periodically once a year or every six months. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of one of the countries would have the role of coordinator, and this could be on a rotational basis.

Kissinger: For example, rotating?

Ceausescu: United States, Soviet Union, Romania.

President: [Smiling] Romania.

Kissinger: We have explained to Romania² and we have been in close touch with the Romanian delegation to the Conference, that the very reason Romania wants this is why we are not agreeable. We are not eager to grant to countries the right of permanent interference in the West. Quite frankly, this is the problem with a permanent mechanism. I understand why you want something to which you could appeal, but we do not want established structures in the West to be exploited. We are sympathetic, though, to your concerns.

Ceausescu: We don't think of this organism as having any sort of right to do this, and in order to avoid this problem we could regulate the basis on which it would act to exclude such possible intervention. We see it as preparing for new conferences and for solving such problems as will appear. We don't want any Eastern intervention in the West or Western intervention in the East or Western intervention in the West or Eastern intervention in the East. I would ask you to reflect some more on this problem and to review your position.

[Both Presidents and the Secretary nod agreement.]

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

² See Document 259.

300. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, June 12, 1975.

SUBJECT

CSCE: The Maneuvers CBM

I called in Vorontsov at 5:30 to tell him we had tried our best all week with the allies at Geneva to sell Dobrynin's suggested parameters of 250 kilometers, 30,000 men and 18 days for the CBM on notification of military maneuvers. I noted that Art Hartman had told

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 7, Soviet Union. Secret; Exdis.

Dobrynin earlier today² that we were having difficulty with the allies on this issue, and that we had just received word from Geneva³ that it was not acceptable to either the allies or the neutrals.

I then gave Vorontsov our estimate that it would probably be possible quickly to wrap up this CBM, if Moscow could accept final parameters of 300 kilometers, 25,000 men and 21 days. I emphasized that this was not a formal proposal on our part, but simply an estimate of what others would require. I repeated that, for our part, we could accept the figures put forward by Dobrynin.

Vorontsov reacted with some theatrics to emphasize what he assumed would be a “very bad” feeling in Moscow about this turn of events. He said Gromyko would doubtless be very unhappy since he had thought that “agreement” had been reached with you on two parameters: a threshold of 30,000 men and notification time of 18 days.

I suggested that Moscow might want to consider shifting its position somewhat further just on the area involved but could not predict how this would be received by others in Geneva. I wanted to get this to you quickly since Dobrynin may be calling you about it at any time.

² No record of this conversation has been found.

³ Telegram 4410 from Geneva, June 12, noted that “Austrian neutral caucus leader confirmed to us June 12 that neutrals are continuing to hold back proposed compromise on parameters for fear that they will be undercut by Western deal with Soviets on basis of ‘Washington parameters’ ” and that “neutrals will probably not move until reassured by Allies, in particular US, that no deal will be made on the basis of ‘Washington parameters.’ ” The telegram continued: “Since all progress on CBM’s is now held up pending Allied response to Soviets on Washington parameters, we would strongly recommend earliest possible reply to Soviets to effect that they will have to accept neutral package (300 km/25,000 troops/21 days) within next few days (preferably by close of business on Friday, June 13) if they still hope to have Stage III in July.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

301. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, June 12, 1975, 6:23 p.m.

D: I just came back from the meeting with Sonnenfeldt.² He told us the bad news—300 kilometers and 25 level. Also 21 days.

K: I can only tell you . . .

D: You really meant this answer. We were thinking about 250 and now back to Vienna.

K: I have written a letter to every foreign minister personally.³ It was telling them that it is our proposition. I have had replies from the British, French and Germans, in fact, I will let you see my letter some time. I don't think you have to meet all three points in my judgment.

D: The question is whether we can meet the basic ones.

K: That is what I thought.

D: For the first time I am debating whether to telegram Brezhnev because he will be mad at you.

K: In this case he has no reason to be mad.

D: Now Sonnenfeldt has proposed that we come to Vienna, and look where we [are with?] the proposal—the same place it was originally.

K: If he did want to go to 21 and if he wanted to compromise with 275 and 20,000 as a last offer so that they could say they have exacted something from you, I think it would work.

D: Already we gave 50. It is worse than the previous one.

K: This is an issue on which we have no American interest.

D: If you would like it would be even better if I don't say anything. He really did believe in you—all the other things you have done. But now coming back again—I don't know what the reaction will be.

K: I don't know how Sonnenfeldt presented it.

D: He presented it very well. He said that we failed and nothing else could be done unless we went to 250 and 21.

K: Let me call Hartman and call you back.

D: O.K.

¹ Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations, <http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000C042.pdf>. No classification marking.

² Dobrynin met with Hartman; see Document 300.

³ See Document 298.

302. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, June 12, 1975, 6:35 p.m.

K: Anatol, I have had our people check. We have been active there, your man should know. It is not only our allies it is the neutrals. We would really like to help bring this to a conclusion. What interests do we have if it is 50 kilometers more or less.

D: As far as the U.S. is concerned, what we discussed with you is acceptable? Unless the Germans, French or British come to our delegation, our channel sounds ridiculous.

K: I will suggest that the head of the delegation inform your delegation.

D: If you suggest that the British and French come to our delegation, Gromyko asked me to tell you the same thing.

K: Don't report it and we will have to deal with Kovspeloff.

D: It is your position that it is acceptable. I could report to him that your position is agreed upon by [*but?*] the allies are not.

K: We can't make a joint initiative on this with you and the allies.

D: As far as you are concerned, you don't mind if we use it.

K: I would rather they don't use it. Can you wait till tomorrow morning? I haven't found Hartman, but I will talk to him. Wait until tomorrow morning.

D: I will wait. Gromyko said that the 21st and 22nd are o.k. with Brezhnev.

K: O.K. Fine. I have seen somewhere that the Finns prefer it a week later.² We are prepared to start the 22nd, we have no reason to change. As far as you and we are concerned, the 22nd is fine.

D: You will call me tomorrow?

K: Yes.

D: I will do nothing.

K: I think it is better. If I send something, I will tell you what I am sending.

D: It is helpful to both of us.

¹ Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations, <http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000C045.pdf>. No classification marking.

² Telegram 4282 from Geneva, June 9, reported: "Finnish delegation head (Iloniemi) told us June 6 that current Finnish preference for timing of stage III is week of July 28, and that several Western European governments had expressed a similar preference." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

K: You are absolutely right. Our people recommended that we do it that way—I over-ruled them—I was wrong.

D: We should talk.

K: Let's wait a day.

D: If you confirm your position, our delegation will work separately with them.

K: I think it is an excellent suggestion and I will let you know what we are doing. I will check it before we do it.

D: O.K.

303. Oral Message From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Ford¹

Washington, undated.

I would like once again to draw your attention, Mr. President, to the question of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation having in mind today's, to be frank, rather strange state of things in Geneva.

On one hand, there is not just a simple movement forward at the Conference especially lately, but a major breakthrough. Now practically the whole set of issues put on the agenda of the Conference has been resolved on the basis of the balance of interests of the sides.

We think you would agree that to a great extent it was possible to achieve due to the goodwill shown by the Soviet Union. Given a desire to complete final agreement on the Conference documents, it would be literally a matter of days to clear fully the way to holding its final stage at a summit level in Helsinki. A similar view, as we have noted with satisfaction, was recently expressed in public also by you at a press conference.²

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 7, Soviet Union. No classification marking. Sent to Kissinger by Dobrynin on June 16 under cover of a letter that stated: "taking into account the urgency of the matter, I decided to send it to you by messenger. I will appreciate early comments to this message."

² President Ford said during a press conference on June 9: "While I was in Europe, I discussed with many European leaders the status of the European Security Conference, their views. It appears that there are some compromises being made on both sides between the Warsaw Pact nations and European nations, including ourselves, that will

However, we cannot help getting the impression that some new pretexts are being constantly sought, some artificially created and worthless issues are being tossed in with the aim to delay the conclusion of the work in Geneva. Over several weeks in a row the attempts are being made to conduct the matters in such a way that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries would make unilateral concessions. It is clear that this is not the way that could lead to a successful conclusion of the common cause which this Conference in fact represents. We have conceded all that might have been conceded, and what, by the way, the U.S. side had requested in confidence that this would be followed by complete agreement. It is difficult for us to judge who is behind all this and what goals are pursued by this. But if someone conscientiously takes up the course of delaying the Conference then we at least should have been told about it straightforwardly.

We talk about all this with frankness since we believe that reservations and lack of clarity on this account could damage the mutual understanding that exists between our countries on the questions of the European Conference.

It may be hardly contested that by now there exist all objective prerequisites to bring the Conference to a conclusion within the shortest period of time. Only one thing is needed—the political decision on the part of the governments of all the countries represented at the Conference.

I would like to express the hope, that you personally, Mr. President, and your Government will proceed, including your contacts with other Western countries, in such a way as to contribute in a maximum degree to the conclusion of the second stage of the Conference and to hold its final phase starting on July 22, which has been agreed upon between us.

potentially bring the European Security Conference to a conclusion. Those final compromises have not been made, but it's getting closer and closer. I hope that there will be sufficient understanding on both sides to bring about an ending to this long, long negotiation. If it does, in the near future we probably would have a summit in Helsinki." (*Public Papers: Ford, 1975*, p. 795)

304. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meeting¹

Washington, June 16, 1975, 8 a.m.

IN ATTENDANCE

Secretary of State Kissinger—Chairman	
P	Mr. Sisco
E	Mr. Robinson
T	Mr. Maw
M	Mr. Eagleburger
C	Mr. Sonnenfeldt
AF	Mr. Mulcahy (Acting)
ARA	Mr. Rogers
EA	Mr. Habib
EUR	Mr. Hartman
NEA	Mr. Atherton
INR	Mr. Hyland
S/P	Mr. Lord
EB	Mr. Boeker (Acting)
S/PRS	Mr. Anderson
PM	Mr. Stern (Acting)
IO	Mr. Blake (Acting)
H	Mr. McCloskey
L	Mr. Leigh
S/S	Mr. Springsteen
S	Mr. Bremer

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Secretary Kissinger: Art?

Mr. Hartman: Our position in the CSC conference this week is one of appearing helpful but not pressing and not trying to round up a lot of people to get the thing over with, because I think otherwise we're going to get in the middle here. Our allies will accuse us of having made a deal, of trying to end it in July, and trying to get everybody pushed to make a position. And our Delegation understands that. And, as of now, I would say it's not going to happen.

Secretary Kissinger: End of July?

Mr. Hartman: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: How do you interpret the Brezhnev speech Saturday on foreign policy?²

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 7, Secretary's Staff Meetings. Secret.

² Telegram 8264 from Moscow, June 13, reported on Brezhnev's election speech of the same day: "He [Brezhnev] made passing reference to CSCE, noting that

Mr. Hyland: I thought that speech, plus all the leadership speeches that preceded it, revealed a fairly conciliatory line on general foreign policy. But he was a little careful on specific relations with the U.S., as were all of his leaders. But then in his informal remarks yesterday, he said he's coming to the United States after the CSC. So he's still got, I think, in the back of his mind a linkage to that and SALT.

In fact, we got a CIA report³ saying that after Gromyko met you, he prepared a report for the Politburo saying we were toughening our line on SALT and linking it to the CSC, and the tactics were to get SALT concessions. And Gromyko recommended that the Russians stand tough themselves and be prepared for some deterioration of relations. But I thought the speeches that were conveyed were in an optimistic mood.

Secretary Kissinger: That Gromyko is a menace, an absolute menace. He doesn't understand a damn thing about it, and he turns it into one of these negotiating ploys.

Mr. Hyland: Brezhnev talked as if he didn't really expect a CSC in July. He said this year—

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It was going out of his guidance because I had correspondence from him last week on this CBM business.⁴ He said that "Everybody is trying to blackmail us on CSC, and we're just not going to accept it. And maybe we should wait until next year with CSC."

Mr. Hyland: There was one interesting speech in all this. The whole leadership spoke, you know, in the last two weeks. Andropov, as the head of the KGB, made a pretty vicious attack⁵ without relating them to CSC. But he took up freedom of information, freedom of movement, and freedom of ideas and so forth—gave each one of them very hard, which is presumably his job. It stood out like a sore thumb. I don't think he would have made such a speech unless—

Secretary Kissinger: What is the situation, Art—that if they don't settle by the end of this week we can't do it any more?

Mr. Hartman: 20 is roughly the last day. It can go on to maybe the 24th. But there are just so many little loose ends that I really don't think it's possible.

conclusion is almost at hand. On MBFR, he said that progress can be made if both sides approach talks 'honestly and objectively' without attempts to achieve unilateral advantage." (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files)

³ Not found.

⁴ It is unclear to what correspondence Sonnenfeldt is referring.

⁵ In a speech on June 9, Soviet KGB chief Yuri Andropov said that "unnamed adversaries in the West were attempting 'ideological sabotage' against the Soviet Union under the guise of calling for democratic reforms there." (Christopher Wren, "K.G.B. Chief Says Foreign Foes Lie," *New York Times*, June 9, 1975, p. 11)

Secretary Kissinger: Then the Europeans will cave over the summer. They'll accept 250 kilometers. Of course they'll accept it. It's one of these grandstand plays.

I wanted the Conference in the fall, to begin with, so it doesn't bother me particularly.

Mr. Hartman: We should tell Genscher today the position that we've taken with Sauvagnargues on the rights, because the Germans have been told by the French that we have been appealed to again to change our position and the Germans have continued to maintain their objections to what Sauvagnargues is trying to do.⁶

Secretary Kissinger: Well, our position is basically to do what the Germans want.

Mr. Hartman: Yes. And also to point out to them what our concerns are.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, why don't you show him the letter?⁷ That's the easiest.

Mr. Hartman: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Will you have it there for me?

Mr. Hartman: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: O.K.

(Whereupon, at 9:00 a.m., the Secretary's Staff Meeting was adjourned.)

⁶ As reported in telegram 9593 from Bonn, June 14, the West Germans still saw some difficulties with the Belgrade formula and did not like it because "they did not want to 'relativate' responsibilities." When the Embassy pointed out that the only thing in the formula that was restricted was "responsibilities," the Germans said their fear was that the Soviets would argue that only those QRR's that were recognized in the QA would be in effect and not the tripartite allied responsibilities concerning Germany as a whole (since the Soviets did not recognize that there is such a thing as responsibilities for Germany as a whole). The Embassy also reported that Sauvagnargues told Genscher he had asked the United States to reconsider its opposition to the French-Yugoslav formulation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) Sauvagnargues's letter to Kissinger, June 12, is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 3, France (5).

⁷ Kissinger was apparently referring to a draft version of his letter to Sauvagnargues, transmitted in telegram 139951 to Paris, June 16. It reads in part: "In response to your question, the difficulties we expressed with your formula stemmed, in part, from a different appreciation of the quadripartite agreement and the quadripartite declaration. We view neither document as providing a comprehensive definition of our responsibilities." The letter goes on to propose possible revisions to the Belgrade formula: eliminating the word "responsibilities" altogether, qualifying the word "responsibilities" differently, or possibly substituting another formula, such as the CSCE agreement "cannot and will not affect their rights, obligations and specifically defined or recognized responsibilities, or the corresponding treaties, agreements and arrangements." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

305. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 16, 1975, 11:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Walter Scheel, President of the Federal Republic of Germany
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
FRG

Ambassador Berndt von Staden, FRG Ambassador to the U.S.

Paul Frank, State Secretary, Director of President's Office

Dr. Heinz Weber, Foreign Ministry (interpreter)

President Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Ambassador Martin Hillenbrand, U.S. Ambassador to the FRG

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President: What do you foresee about CSCE? Are the compromises going to permit progress, Mr. Foreign Minister?

Genscher: I hear from Kissinger there is a good prospect of agreement on the 300-kilometer line in CBM's.

Kissinger: No, I said we would support it. I don't know about the Soviet Union.

Genscher: That is the most important thing for us. Then there is the question of reserved rights² and how the French will stand. That is important to me for Berlin.

President: Will the Russians hold fast for follow-on machinery?

Kissinger: Ceausescu argued here for it.³ We are not interested and neither are the Soviets.

Genscher: I don't think the Russians will make much of it. They will probably agree to consultations in 1977.

Kissinger: The Soviets are now going in the other direction—Gromyko even suggested four years.

Scheel: If not July, then will it meet in September?

Kissinger: Probably October if not July—the elections are in September.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 5, Germany, 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

² A reference to quadripartite rights and responsibilities; see Document 304.

³ See Document 299.

Genscher: The Finns require four weeks to prepare.

Kissinger: We are trying to stay a half step behind Europe. We are not pushing for July.

Scheel: I didn't see any real push from the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: I have the impression they want it in July. Their planning seems geared to that. Since 300 kilometers are the only issue, they could resolve it tomorrow if they wanted.

Genscher: I think they have one fixed date—the Party Conference in early '76. Three months after CSCE they want a summit meeting of Communist leaders to prepare for the Party Congress.

Scheel: Isn't it in our interest to facilitate their Congress, because this is a basic policy determination for them—whether or not to continue détente?

Kissinger: Yes. I think that is why a successful CSCE and SALT have symbolic importance.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

306. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 16, 1975, 3:30–4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Secretary's Tour d'Horizon with FRG Foreign Minister Genscher

PARTICIPANTS

FRG

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister

Dr. Juergen Ruhfus, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office

Niels Hansen, Minister, FRG Embassy

Dr. Klaus Terfloth, Press Counselor, Foreign Office

Juergen Chrobog, Personal Assistant to the Foreign Minister

US

The Secretary

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor

Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820123–1320. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Anderson and cleared by Hartman. Approved by James Covey (S) on July 22.

David Anderson, Director, EUR/CE (notetaker)
Harry Obst, OPR/LS (interpreter)

The Secretary: We have just received an irate communication from the Soviets accusing us of delaying the CSCE.² We are in our usual happy position of being accused by our Western allies of speeding the negotiations up and by the Soviets of slowing them down. The fact is that we are doing neither.

Genscher: We are in no particular hurry to conclude the talks. The summit could take place in the fall if necessary. What is important is to have a constructive Stage II. There are of course still some open questions. For example, what about the language on quadripartite rights?

The Secretary: I have just had an exchange of correspondence with Sauvagnargues on this subject. He wrote me complaining about our not supporting him on this subject. I have written him back and explained our position and I believe it is one that is close to your own. Let me give you a copy of my letter.³

Genscher: I spoke in Paris with Sauvagnargues on Friday about this problem.⁴ The French are aware of our German reservations concerning the present text, and I have the feeling that the French will be making further efforts to find a solution.

The Secretary: What about the question of CBMs? If the Soviets agree to a zone of 300 kilometers, can you accept the other two parts of their proposal, i.e., the 18-day pre-notification and the 25,000 troop level?

Genscher: Only the depth of the zone is a question for us. On that we remain firm. The other parts of the proposal pose no problem for us.

The Secretary: Fine. Then let us now see what happens in Geneva. My preference all along was for a summit in September but I had to be careful: if some European wished to make the inevitable last minute concessions, I did not want the US to be too far behind.

² Document 303.

³ See footnote 7, Document 304. On June 18, Sonnenfeldt and Hartman wrote Sherer in telegram 142540 to Geneva: "The Secretary has discussed the QRR problem this week with Genscher, who can support either of first two changes suggested in our letter to Sauvagnargues. Genscher dislikes, however, the minor modifications of French formula put forth in our fallback position because he thinks it does not provide sufficient protection of allied rights. The Secretary has assured Genscher that we would support German desires in moving toward a final compromise on this issue. You should pursue search for a final compromise on QRR text with other representatives of Bonn Group at Geneva, bearing in mind our desire to support German wishes while leaving initiative primarily to the French." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

⁴ See footnote 6, Document 304.

Genscher: What is the exact state of play right now on the CBMs? Do we expect a new Soviet proposal?

The Secretary: I think we have put our position to them on the non-acceptability of the latest proposal made in Vienna. A counter-proposal was to have been put forward by the Western side.

Hartman: I think the UK or one of the other neutrals is to put the new Western position to the Soviets today. Perhaps this irate Soviet reaction was an answer to that new proposal.

The Secretary: No, I don't think so. We instructed Ambassador Sherer to tell the Soviets that the 250 kilometer proposal was not sufficient,⁵ and I think the Soviets may be reacting to that statement.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

⁵ In telegram 138400 to Geneva, June 13, Sonnenfeldt and Hartman told Sherer to contact Kovalev and inform him that "we tried our best but were unable to persuade our allies to accept the Soviet proposal of 250 kilometers, 30,000 men and 18 days for the CBM on maneuvers, despite our strong emphasis that these figures were acceptable to us." The telegram continued: "You should not suggest alternative parameters of 300 kilometers, 25,000 men, and 21 days to Kovalev. Instead, you should get in touch immediately with your UK colleague, in his capacity as NATO caucus leader on CBM's, and ask him either to suggest to Kovalev what it takes to nail down a final compromise or have him ask the Austrian neutral caucus leader to do so." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

307. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, June 17, 1975, 12:47 p.m.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

D: Just for your information, because I called you yesterday,² for your own—we approached I should say, there was a British, I guess French and West German—similar but without mentioning as I understand difficulty about this conference [from now on].

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 3, Dobrynin/Kissinger Telcons (3). No classification marking. Brackets, with the exception of those indicating omission of unrelated material, are in the original.

² No record of this telephone conversation has been found.

K: Now, I think frankly—I talked to the Germans yesterday.³ We don't say it that explicitly. If you could accept 300 kilometers, we can take care of the other two items—of the size of the forces and the days—and I really don't see how 50 kilometers can make any real difference.

D: No, you see the question is, quite frankly and off-the-record—the question is not a difference or no difference, the question rather is as Gromyko shall say himself—feels a little bit in a rather awkward situation. And I know what I'm telling you because he was so sure really that when—

K: Well, I was pretty sure. And frankly, I'll tell you this—let me tell you this, if you want to wait—if you want to have the conference delayed til September, I think you can get 250. If you wait long enough, they're going to give ground.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: So it is really a question of—I don't think they're going to hold out beyond the end of the summer, but if you want rapid progress, then I think that's the answer.

D: Well, I may put this as your remark as thinking aloud, but not as a recommendation, all right?

K: That is my—you know, that is my advice as a friend.

D: I understand.

K: From our point of view, there is nothing to be gained. I mean, the basic thing—

D: [What I speak about, not too highly] because I'm just telling you quite frankly, Henry—this is rather a matter now—maybe he could [not comment?]; I'm sure he could be as of now, it stands exactly, because I know what I'm telling you. Because he himself convinced Brezhnev and all the other leaders that now he has the word of Henry so everything is all right. And then if it turns out not to be the case, it doesn't matter who will really hear . . . Unintentionally. No, I'm just telling you.

K: What I think we can—so look, my judgment turned out to be right. What turned out to be wrong was the speed with which I could get it implemented.

D: Yeah. So if you say they could wait until September, then it will be all right. Do you think that it's possible then to have this agreement or would you have it with you? I mean—

K: I think there is a better than 50/50 chance that we can overcome the objections if you wait long enough.

³ See Document 306.

D: Yes, until September.

K: If you wait until September. But I don't think we can do it without going—you know, then we go through 3 weeks of stalemate, and then we can say look here, we've now done our best and now we think you ought to move.

D: I understand your point. Well, I could mention to Gromyko that you are just thinking aloud of the situation.

K: Conversely if he wants to move fast, we will support 30,000 and 18 days, so you get two out of three.

D: But it's most important that other—this is exactly one.

K: Oh, none of them are important.

D: Out of three. No, I understand. It is not whether the matter is of his personal thing. It's not really a question of more importance, I agree with you. But it's a question of how he—I don't know how he is handling now.

K: I don't even know how they are going to count the 30,000. And how that's going to be considered.

D: Yeah, I understand. So as of now, I mention to you that you think it's another pretty good [omission in original transcript] but rather a question of as your own thinking.

K: That's right. And I'm sending over a formal note.⁴

D: You send already, yeah?

K: I am sending it now. I am giving it to General Scowcroft.

D: Okay. So he will send it to me.

K: Okay. I've got to run. I've got to see the German.⁵

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

⁴ Document 308.

⁵ Genscher. No record of this meeting has been found.

308. Note From President Ford to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, undated.

The President has carefully considered the oral message from General Secretary Brezhnev delivered by Ambassador Dobrynin on June 16.² The President agrees that there has been major progress in recent weeks at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and he fully appreciates the constructive role of the Soviet Union in bringing this about. From a review of events at the conference, it can be said that there is now a strong movement to bring it to a successful conclusion in the very near future. We are not aware of any deliberate efforts to delay the conference; in any case, the United States will continue, as it has in the past, to use the influence at its disposal to bring about compromise solutions on issues where differences still exist.

As the General Secretary will have been informed, we moved immediately following the very positive Soviet proposals concerning the advance notification of maneuvers—and we agree that these were indeed a breakthrough—to have this problem solved on the basis of the Soviet parameters. While we regret that it did not prove possible, despite our efforts, to persuade others to go along with the solution proposed, it is our strong conviction that a compromise can be achieved in the very near future. If the depth of territory subject to notification were set at 300 km, the United States believes it can persuade its allies to accept the other parameters as proposed by the Soviet side.

The President would like the General Secretary to know that we have been in the most intensive contact with our Allies in recent days in an effort to bring matters to a rapid conclusion and we will continue these contacts. We remain prepared to set the beginning of the final stage during the week of July 21 or, at any rate, before the end of July. Once the question of maneuver notification has been settled, our representatives should be in immediate contact to determine how best to bring about conference acceptance of this time frame, bearing in mind the fact that more than 30 sovereign states are involved.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 7, Soviet Union. No classification marking. A handwritten note at the top of the page reads: "Delivered to Amb. Dobrynin 1:45 p.m., Tues., June 17, 1975." The note was drafted by Sonnenfeldt and forwarded to the President by Kissinger. (Ibid.)

² Document 303.

309. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, June 18, 1975, 9:12 a.m.

D: In connection with this parameter. What he [Gromyko?] is verifying is before taking a final position, he said all of this mentioned about parameters was clear misunderstanding. He said you discussed it with him in Vienna.

K: That is correct. I know there are some of our Western allies that are changing their minds on that but we will not support them.

D: I will tell him you will support it.

K: I will firmly support it.

D: I mentioned this to him yesterday.

K: Also tell him I made this clear to the Germans yesterday.²

D: I will say on behalf of NATO. . . .

K: I think we can hold that together. I think the Dutch or one or two others will object but we will not go along with it. I am quite confident that we can hold this.

D: This is one question he was asking me urgently to give him a reply.

K: Right.

D: If you could see me today about our meeting.

K: It may be better on Monday.³

D: O.K. with me.

K: We will do it on Monday.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 3, Dobrynin/Kissinger Telcons (3). No classification marking.

² No record of this June 17 meeting has been found. For Genscher's meetings with Kissinger on June 16, see Documents 305 and 306.

³ June 23.

310. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 19, 1975, 4:05–5:02 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns
 NATO Deputy Secretary General Pansa Cedronio
 Assistant Secretary General for Defense Planning and Policy Colin Humphreys
 Ambassador Andre de Staercke, Belgium
 Ambassador Arthur Menzies, Canada
 Ambassador Ankar Svart, Denmark
 Ambassador Francois de Rose, France
 Ambassador Franz Krapf, Germany
 Ambassador Byron Theodoropoulos, Greece
 Ambassador Tomas Tomasson, Iceland
 Ambassador Felice Catalano, Italy
 Ambassador Marcel Fischback, Luxembourg
 Ambassador A. K. F. (Karel) Hartogh, Netherlands
 Ambassador Rolf Busch, Norway
 Ambassador Joao de Freitas Cruz, Portugal
 Ambassador Orhan Eralp, Turkey
 Ambassador Sir Edward Peck, United Kingdom
 Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, United States

The President
 Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
 James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
 Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
 Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Robert Goldwin, Special Consultant to the President
 H. Allan Holmes, Director, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military
 Affairs, Department of State
 A. Denis Clift, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President: [Omitted here is an unrelated comment.] I also think that we, that the United States, should continue détente with the Soviet Union. This can be helpful in areas of importance to the Alliance. We are extending our negotiations in SALT II; there is no resolution as yet but we are building on the Vladivostok meeting of last December. The MBFR negotiations, the negotiations in Geneva—without consideration of Phase III—have shown progress in Phase I. What are the numbers, Henry?

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Official, Chron. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Clift. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Luns and the NATO Permanent Representatives visited the United States June 18–20 to meet the President and to participate in a symposium at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis.

Secretary Kissinger: In MBFR or CSCE—in MBFR there are some 28 to 32 thousand on our side to 68 thousand on their side, together with equipment.²

President: The point I am making is that in Phase I we are on dead center. I know that consultations have gone forward on the nuclear element and that we are now looking at the question of including Pershings and some of our aircraft.³ Is it the F-104s?

Secretary Schlesinger: F-4s, sir.

President: We are also interested in the European security negotiations. I understand that there is now some movement, and if there is an acceptable compromise I would assume there will be something in Helsinki in the latter part of July. These are among the principal issues that we see of interest to the Alliance, together with standardization, rationalization, and other matters of present concern.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Secretary General Luns: On one other matter, Mr. President, until the day before yesterday my impression was that the Helsinki meeting would not be held in the near future because of the lack of progress in the Conference and because the Finns need a month to prepare for the meeting. This morning I heard that the Soviet Union had been in touch with several governments—I don't know if the United States was one—concerning a July 22 starting date for the meeting. I was surprised since it was my impression that the feeling is in Geneva that it wouldn't be held earlier than the end of September. How do you view this?

President: We haven't been pushing this. We have continued to feel that our Western Alliance partners should be the main parties involved in directing the pace of the negotiations. I must admit that I have been concentrating so heavily on other matters—the Greek-Turkish question with the Congress, for example—that I haven't taken a fresh look at this with Henry. Henry?

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets have proposed a July 22 date. Our position continues to be that we are prepared to meet whenever the second stage is completed satisfactorily. We haven't accepted or rejected the Soviet proposal, and we won't agree to a date before the second stage of the Conference is finished. You should all know this so that we won't be whipsawed by the Soviet Government contacting each of our governments and saying that one or the other of us has agreed to

² See footnote 2, Document 345.

³ See Document 357.

this or that. Our instructions, to be completely frank to you, to our Ambassador in Geneva are to stay a half a step behind the Europeans—and to let you drag us into the Conference. We aren't pressing, and we aren't holding back.⁴ Until the Soviet Union makes a concession on the question of three hundred kilometers, Basket I will not be completed.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

⁴ On June 28, Hartman updated Kissinger on progress toward setting a date for the final conference in Helsinki. A transcript of their telephone conversation reads in part: "K[issinger]: When is it most likely to be—the 28th or the 22nd [of July]? H[artman]: Bud's guess is that people are moving toward the 28th. The Soviets have insisted on the 22nd. K: They'll yield on that. H: I think they will. K: Well, let us stay out of it." Kissinger continued, "just let the Russians fight it out with the Europeans. It's a matter of total indifference to me." "Bud" was Sherer's nickname. (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations, <http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000C07D.pdf>)

311. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meeting¹

Washington, July 7, 1975, 8 a.m.

IN ATTENDANCE

Secretary of State Kissinger—Chairman	
D	Mr. Ingersoll
P	Mr. Sisco
E	Mr. Robinson
T	Mr. Maw
M	Mr. Eagleburger
AF	Mr. Davis
ARA	Mr. Rogers
EA	Mr. Habib
EUR	Mr. Hartman
NEA	Mr. Atherton
INR	Mr. Hyland
S/P	Mr. Lord

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 7, Secretary's Staff Meetings. Secret. An attached summary of the meeting's outcome reads in part: "CSCE developments. *Secretary wants it understood that we absolutely could not attend European Security Conference in August.*"

EB	Mr. Enders
S/PRS	Mr. Anderson
PM	Mr. Vest
IO	Mr. Buffum
L	Mr. Leigh
S/S	Mr. Springsteen
S	Mr. Bremer
S	Mr. Barbian
H	Mr. Goldberg (Acting)

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Secretary Kissinger: How is the European Security Conference?

Mr. Hartman: Do you think that's foreign policy? (Laughter.)

Secretary Kissinger: That's at least foreign.

Mr. Hartman: Well, the only thing that I think can actually bring a conclusion to that conference is the cooperation that now seems to be under way between the Soviets and the Germans.

Now, it will take the Soviets to hold the Finns. The Finns want to say, "Sorry, you can't have this conference in July because you didn't give us the go-ahead at the time." The Soviets, I'm sure, are going to try to hold the Finns to keep open the possibility of a July conference because I think that there are a number of countries that can have—

Secretary Kissinger: But this isn't the sort of problem—

Mr. Hartman: The Germans are fine. We're now at the point where the Romanians are holding up one piece, and that's the key piece for the Germans. In other words, until the Germans agree on a fundamental language—

Secretary Kissinger: What's their complaint?

Mr. Hartman: Their complaint is it doesn't talk enough about the sovereignty of states—that, somehow or other, it affects the Romanian claims on its borders.² And the Soviets have been talking to them, trying to talk them out of their objection. But they are the last ones to—

² Telegram 2622 from Geneva, April 16, reported that the Romanian representative to the CSCE, Lipatti, informed the U.S. delegation that the language on peaceful change of March 17 was "unacceptable to Bucharest." Lipatti said that "as now drafted it was an invitation to border changes, not an exception to rule of border inviolability." The Romanian fear, the telegram noted, "was that Soviets would interpret 'inviolability' as applying to themselves and 'change' as applying to their allies." The telegram continued that the "primary problem, according to Lipatti, was to reinstate the word 'only,' so that text again looked like an exception, not an invitation." The Romanians suggested "that this could be done in various ways, e.g., inserting it between 'changed' and 'in accordance with'; inserting it between 'international law' and 'by peaceful means'; or by reordering the text to read: 'can be changed by peaceful means and by agreement, only in accordance with international law.'" (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files)

Secretary Kissinger: But why? Is it the affirmation of the sovereignty of states that makes it harder to change borders?

Mr. Hartman: That's right. And you'd think with their Bessarabian and other claims³—

Secretary Kissinger: They might be worried about them.

Mr. Hartman: —they may be worried about them. There are a lot of Hungarians leaving Romania now going back to Hungary. That is the fundamental issue for the Germans. Unless that clause is agreed to, they cannot go ahead with what is now the French plan—which would be to agree on the 28th in principle, subject to all the conference documents being finished up by the 14th.

Secretary Kissinger: The point is: Delaying it till August, there's no substantive position on which the issues will improve.

Mr. Hartman: That's right.

There's another issue—that is, to extend all the provisions of the conference, declarations and so forth. Berlin and the Soviets have accepted this.

Secretary Kissinger: But who doesn't?

Mr. Hartman: Well, the Turks have a difficulty. They want to take an exception on the maneuver provision because they don't want it to apply to areas out of Cyprus.⁴ You know, there's just a whole bunch of very small issues. And no one, other than the Germans, is taking a firm leadership.

Secretary Kissinger: It's now 250 kilometers.

Mr. Hartman: It's 250, 25,000 men.

Secretary Kissinger: It's certainly stupid that the Germans would agree to 275.

Mr. Hartman: Well, they didn't want to be accused of holding up the conference.

³ Telegram 2004 from Bucharest, May 9, reported the reaction of the Romanian Government and Romanian historians to various assertions made by Soviet historians in a publication commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic. Ceausescu, it reported, "was attacking particularly Soviet claims that tsarist empire 'liberated' Bessarabia (part of historic Romanian lands since Dark Ages) from Turks in 1812 in 'progressive' move and that a separate 'Moldavian language and people' had formed within USSR." The telegram noted that "most ominous to Romanian historians was fact that a few Soviet colleagues seemed to be hinting that Soviet 'Moldavia' did not necessarily end at Prut River" and that historical nucleus of this Soviet republic "might be due for more expansion in future if GOR did not come to heel." (Ibid.) Romania ceded Bessarabia to the Soviet Union at the end of World War II.

⁴ Telegram 4318 from Geneva, June 10, reported Turkey's position on applying CSCE's proposed confidence-building measures to Cyprus. (Ibid.)

Secretary Kissinger: I think we could have got 300, but we could certainly have got 275.

It makes no difference. It makes absolutely no difference to it.

Mr. Hartman: I think we ought to have our fellow say a little more clearly today that August is absolutely out.

Secretary Kissinger: That's right. Just tell them August is out.

Mr. Hartman: That might, in fact, bring some of the others around, because I think many of them are counting on August as a fallback.

Secretary Kissinger: Just tell them August is out for us.⁵

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

⁵ Kissinger and Hartman further discussed the issue in a telephone conversation on July 8. A transcript of their discussion reads in part: "K[issinger]: On the European Security Conference, I don't see that we can let it slip beyond July 29, or if worse comes to worse, the very end of August. H[artman]: The last few days. K: Yes. H: OK. I got the word around yesterday about all of August. I think the Finns are getting angry with everybody. They say they're going to slip a day every day they miss getting an agreement in Geneva. I called the Romanian Ambassador and said they could not change the [omission in transcript] in my judgment. They're still trying to make all kinds of changes in Geneva. K: Yes. H: We'll be in touch. K: Just make sure it doesn't slip back to that week. H: How about it on Wednesday or Friday? Is that too late? That would leave practically no time at the other end. K: Yes, it makes it tough. H: The end of August is better. That would allow more time to make sure all documents are in order. K: Let's say the 28th. H: OK." (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations, <http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000C093.pdf>)

312. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, July 8, 1975.

CSCE

Your meeting with Gromyko takes place during what may be the last full week of negotiations at Geneva. There are no significant differences between US and Soviet positions on remaining CSCE issues which in-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 14, Briefing Memos 1975, Folder 4. Secret. Drafted by Frowick. Sent through Sonnenfeldt. Lodal initialed for Hartman.

volve mainly EC-Soviet disputes over details or last minute haggling by the smaller powers, especially the Dutch and Romanians.

If Gromyko attacks us for not effectively lining up Allied support for compromised texts, you might point to Romanian obstructionism on the Warsaw Pact side.

This paper briefly outlines issues and offers suggested talking points.

Timing of Stage III

The CSCE Coordinating Committee is holding intensive discussions aimed at setting a date for commencement of stage III, and it is not possible to predict where this issue will stand on July 11, when you meet Gromyko. The French formally proposed on July 7² that the Helsinki finale take place before the end of July, provided all remaining texts are registered by mid-month, and over half of the CSCE delegations reportedly now favor a July summit. But the Finns adamantly insist they must have three weeks advance notification from Geneva in order to make arrangements.

Your Talking Points

—We are impressed with the substantial progress achieved in Geneva in recent weeks and, for our part, would consider a late July stage III meeting both desirable and feasible.

—However, there are those among our allies, your allies and the neutrals who insist that key unresolved issues be settled before a flat commitment is made to any specific date.

Basket 1—Principles

The Allies are supporting Genscher's efforts to register final texts on quadripartite rights, peaceful change, and a "Europe clause" extending CSCE benefits to all of Europe (including Berlin), before declaring their willingness to attend the Helsinki finale on a precise date. Virtually all other questions related to the declaration of principles are now settled.

QRR. On July 5, the following revised text was agreed, ad referendum to governments:

"The participating states, paying due regard to the principles above and, in particular, to the first sentence of (the tenth principle), note that the present (title of document) does not affect their rights and obligations, nor the corresponding treaties and other agreements and arrangements."³

² Telegram 5256 from Geneva, July 7, reported on the French proposal. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files)

³ Telegram 5243 from Geneva, July 7, reported on the registration of the text. (Ibid.)

We support this text and continue to follow the lead of France on QRR matters.

Your Talking Points

—We support the recently revised text on quadripartite rights and responsibilities and hope that it will provide the basis for a final compromise.

—We have supported the French initiatives and appreciate Soviet flexibility on QRR matters.

Peaceful Change. The Four Powers plus both Germanies are ready to register the peaceful change formulation, which we negotiated with the Soviets. However, the Romanians have asked that the text be revised, mainly by linking it specifically to sovereign equality language in the first principle.⁴ We have emphasized to the Romanians our strong hope that they drop efforts to change this hard-won compromise formulation.

Your Talking Point

—We believe it would be in everyone's interest to persuade Romania to drop its request that the peaceful change text be modified; Soviet help in this regard would be welcome.

"Europe Clause." On July 5, the Soviets and FRG worked out a compromise text extending CSCE benefits to all of Europe, implicitly including Berlin.⁵ Subsequently, the FRG has sought to steer this text toward rapid provisional registration.

Your Talking Point

—We welcome the Soviet and FRG success in developing a "Europe clause" and believe it only proper that results of this Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe should be extended to all Europeans.

Basket 1—CBMs

Since your last meeting with Gromyko, the Soviets have come around to acceptance of realistic parameters for the maneuvers CBM—250 kilometers, 25,000 troops, and 21 days—and are ready to accept compromise texts on maneuvers as well as movements, provided Ankara drops its demands for notification within only a limited zone of 100 kilometers inland from the Turkish sea coast.⁶ The Turks, however, are stub-

⁴ Telegram 5273 from Geneva, July 8, reported on Romania's position. (Ibid.)

⁵ Telegram 5257 from Geneva, July 7, reported on the Soviet-West German compromise. (Ibid.)

⁶ Telegram 5186 from Geneva, July 3, reported on the Soviet position. (Ibid.)

bornly pressing their insistence on exceptions and show little predilection as yet to give way to a compromise acceptable to all parties. At last report, Turkey indicated it would take its case to the NATO Council on July 9. The Soviets recently accepted a CBM on movements based on “voluntary” notification, and Gromyko may emphasize the need for unequivocal NATO acceptance of the “voluntary basis” concept. In NATO, the Dutch continue to balk at voluntary notification, and in the Warsaw Pact, the Romanians also object to this concept.

Your Talking Points

—We welcome Moscow’s acceptance of realistic parameters for the CBM on notification of maneuvers.

—It is now necessary for both of us to press our Allies to accept final compromises that will permit swift registration of voluntary CBMs on maneuvers and movements.

Basket 2

The last remaining substantive hurdle to concluding Basket 2 negotiations is development of a text ensuring *reciprocity* in reduction of trade barriers. We are following the lead of the Nine in their attempt to work out with the Soviets a balanced formulation taking account of MFN, EC quantitative restrictions, and COMECON trading practices.

Your Talking Point

—We hope all parties will display realism in the search for a final compromise on the question of reciprocity in the reduction of trade barriers.

Basket 3

—Since their positive reaction, on the eve of the NATO summit, to the Western “global initiative” on basket 3 texts concerning human contacts and information, the Soviets have shown great flexibility on all basket 3 questions, and all texts in this area are now provisionally registered.⁷

Your Talking Points

—We warmly welcome Moscow’s flexibility in recent weeks in permitting a satisfactory conclusion to the negotiations in basket 3.

—We had long argued for realism on basket 3 issues with our Allies, and we are pleased that the Soviet Union ultimately reciprocated with realistic positions of its own.

⁷ Telegram 5205 from Geneva, July 6, reported that all the texts for Basket III had been provisionally registered. (Ibid.)

Basket 4—Follow-up

With the Swedes chairing a Special Working Group on follow-up, negotiations are nearly complete on a satisfactory compromise text which will probably provide for: a preparatory meeting 18 months after completion of stage III; a meeting of senior officials about 24 months after stage III; decisions in follow-up to be taken by consensus; future meetings to be rotated among CSCE capitals; and acceptance, in principle, of a new Conference at some time in the future. The Soviets have displayed flexibility in the Working Group, while trying to enhance the political content of follow-up arrangements.

Your Talking Point

—We are following with interest the negotiations on a final compromise on post-CSCE follow-up arrangements, and are prepared to join a consensus on this issue.

Final Document

The Soviets have accepted inclusion of a disclaimer in the CSCE final document making clear its politically, but not legally, binding character and the submission of a letter to the UN Secretary General, the effect of which is to draw a distinction between international treaties and/or legally binding agreements, on one side, and the CSCE declarations of intent, on the other.

Your Talking Point

—We appreciate Soviet flexibility in negotiations on CSCE final document, which appears to be taking shape in a manner acceptable to all sides.

Helsinki Summit and Public Opinion

We suggest that you consider discussing with Gromyko the US and Soviet approaches to characterization of CSCE results. You could get across that if Brezhnev takes an extreme position in propagandizing CSCE as, for example, a quasi World War II peace conference, the Allies will inevitably have to react sharply.

Your Talking Point

—We believe it is in the interest of all sides to display moderation in characterizing the results of CSCE as a useful, if limited, step forward in the continuing process of East-West détente.⁸

⁸ Kissinger subsequently discussed the status of CSCE in a meeting with President Ford on July 9. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: "President: What about CSCE? Kissinger: It is hung up on things that are out of our hands. The Finns are getting mad. It may have to be postponed until the end of August." (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 13)

313. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, July 10, 1975, 5:15–6:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoli G. Kovalev, Deputy Foreign Minister and Chief of Soviet Delegation to CSCE
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of the American Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Vasily G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Oleg M. Sokolov, Chief, American Section of the American Department
Yuri E. Fokin, Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Amb. Albert W. Sherer, Jr., Chief of U.S. Delegation to CSCE
William G. Hyland, Director, INR
Jan M. Lodal, NSC Staff
Mark Garrison, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECT

CSCE

[Large bottles of Coca-Cola were on the table]

Kissinger: This is the biggest Coca-Cola I've ever seen.

Gromyko: Our Pepsi Cola, when you pour it into a glass, it's full and it remains full after two minutes. Your Pepsi, after you pour it, it's half gone.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 7, Soviet Union. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission in Geneva. All brackets are in the original. Lodal wrote in his daily log about the meeting and the arrival of Kissinger and his staff in Geneva: "We arrived in Geneva about 4:00, checked into the hotel (which was not air conditioned and very uncomfortable on a hot, sunny day), and then headed to the Soviet mission for our first meeting with Gromyko at about 5:00. Kissinger and Gromyko had a very brief (5 minute) private meeting, and then we went into the main meeting. We held talks about CSCE for about two hours. Most of the discussions centered on how to handle Malta (Mintoff), which had hung up the conference at the last minute. Kissinger was trying to be cooperative with Gromyko, while realizing we had a little bit more at stake in Malta than do the Soviets." (Ford Library, NSC Program Analysis, Jan Lodal Convenience Files, Box 70, Daily Log)

Kissinger: Ours—you pay for it all, and don't get it.

Gromyko: That's why you are so rich. Why do we have Pepsi Cola and not Coca-Cola?

Dobrynin: Because their chairman is more energetic.

Kissinger: And he was a friend.

Gromyko: May I greet the Secretary of State and all other gentlemen who are here with him.

We are indeed pleased to have this new opportunity to exchange views on several important problems. These matters we are to discuss relate both to our bilateral relations and to broad international concerns. I would submit—and we had a brief exchange on this a minute or two ago—that we start by having a word on European affairs and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Those were my brief opening remarks and our proposal.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, let me say I am glad we are meeting again, and given the responsibility of our two countries, the increasing regularity of our discussions is important to the stability of the world and we should meet even if we have no urgent matters to discuss.

In spite of the public notices you may hear from America, the President and I are committed to the course we have pursued since 1972 and we believe it is of great importance to peace and security of the world.

As for the agenda, I am in agreement.

Gromyko: Then let us begin to exchange views on the European situation and, first and foremost, the European Security Conference. Would you like to say a few words first?

Kissinger: In my experience no one understands the European Security Conference as the Foreign Minister does. As I understand it, the only thing holding up agreement on the date is Malta,² and all the issues are settled. They are getting ready to register all the rest. As I said

² Telegram Tosec 60025/161676 to Geneva, July 10, contained Hartman's assessment of the status of the CSCE negotiations: "Agreement on a late-July CSCE summit remains blocked by actions of smaller states—especially Malta and Romania—which refuse to join consensus on certain issues until they receive satisfaction on questions of primary interest to them." The telegram continued: "The Maltese indicated that Dom Mintoff would send a special envoy to Geneva to pin down a compromise Mediterranean declaration and that until this was accomplished, Malta would prevent agreement on follow-up. This action prompted Romanians to block registration of QRR text. Failure to register QRR as well as 'peaceful change' formulation (also blocked by Romania) caused FRG delegation to oppose any explicit target date for stage III." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

to the press in Paris,³ our government favors the most rapid possible conclusion, preferably at the end of this month. I understand the date they're now talking about is July 30th.

Gromyko: I would say the following: The situation at the European Security Conference as of today is this. In substance, practically all questions have been agreed upon. If perhaps there are some third-rate nuances, we believe, given the desire, it would require hours—literally hours—to clear away all those nuances, and would take a matter of days to prepare all the texts for signing. There is a question which is of particular interest to Turkey and they have not given final agreement, and that relates to the depth of the zone on one's territory for giving notice of troop maneuvers. But the basic question is setting a definite date for the final stage of the European Security Conference. Everyone seems to be in agreement with the Canadian proposal⁴ to begin the final stage on July 30th, although we have not given our formal approval because we believe more suitable is the proposal you and I discussed, and in fact no one in the Conference objected to it.

Kissinger: To meet on the 22nd.

Gromyko: And no one objected.

Kissinger: It's a little late now.

Gromyko: If we don't agree on an earlier date, we'll probably agree to July 30.

It is true we are now faced with a most formidable force—Malta—and there does seem to be the real possibility that Malta will twist all the others into a ram's horn. But let us see whether all the European states can talk Malta into July 30th as a real possibility. I think it is a possibility.

³ Kissinger visited Paris from July 9 to 10 for talks with Sauvagnargues and Giscard d'Estaing. On July 10, he and Sauvagnargues held a press conference. Kissinger responded to a question on the European security conference as follows: "With respect to the European Security Conference, I believe that both our countries are of the view that it should be brought to a conclusion as rapidly as possible and that both our delegations are working in that sense at Geneva." (Department of State *Bulletin*, August 4, 1975, p. 186)

⁴ Hartman wrote in telegram Tosec 60025 that "Canadians today spearheaded attempt to work out a compromise on timing, when they formally tabled a proposal calling for: (a) coordinating committee action to declare July 30 as a target date for opening of stage III; (b) intensification of efforts by all parties to complete substantive negotiations on all outstanding issues by July 15, when stage III target date would be confirmed, and (c) flexibility by Finland in holding to July 30 target date on understanding that financial and other obligations accruing to Finland as a result of summit preparations would be shared pro rata by all CSCE participant states. US delegation is supporting Canadian proposal while avoiding flat commitment to precise date and thereby remaining in step with EC-Nine on timing question."

Kissinger: We are prepared to meet on the 22nd, and we would also accept the 30th. We think there are no issues remaining and we think we can do it. That's really the latest we can do. If we do not have it then, we will have to move to the end of August, because we have other visitors.

Gromyko: Well, let us on both sides make an effort to get that date accepted. Let us then really act in that direction to assure it's accepted. Let us agree that this is not a formal agreement to this, because usually it happens that as soon as the United States and Soviet Union agree on something, someone else comes up with reproaches and says, "Aha, the United States and Soviet Union reached a separate agreement again. And we must have our own view." Let us act so as to insure success. If you want to refer to this agreement for any purpose, you're free to do so. The important thing is to do it de facto.

Kissinger: Let's get Kovalev and Sherer to both come here. I'm prepared to instruct him to work together with you. They know the tactical situation.

[Gromyko tells Fokin to go and call Kovalev. Garrison goes out to call Sherer.]

Don't you think that's the best way?

I want our representative here because I told him if we couldn't do it at the end of July we would do it at the end of August. I don't want him to be confused. He's waiting for a call.

Our preference is the earlier the better. July 28 would be better than the 30th.

Gromyko: What about on the duration?

Kissinger: Two and a half days. On this proposal, we would arrive the evening of July 30.

Sonnenfeldt: The end of the day on Wednesday . . .

Kissinger: The end of the day in Finland in July is . . . [Laughter]

What about 5:00 p.m.?

We'll talk to our representative.

I spoke to the French President today.⁵ He'd prefer to have it in July. Otherwise, August.

Gromyko: July would be best.

Kissinger: He'd prefer July. I see no problem. When I left his office I told the press we wanted it to conclude as rapidly as possible. The Germans I don't know. I'll see Schmidt tomorrow.

⁵ No record of Kissinger's meeting with Giscard d'Estaing has been found but he sent a summary of the meeting to President Ford in telegram HAKTO 2, July 11. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, President's Trip Files, Box 11, July 9–12, 1975, Europe, General)

But how do you move Malta?

Gromyko: 2–3–4 days—what do you mean two and a half?

[Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt and Hyland confer.]

Kissinger: Well, we'll just . . . Let's talk to our two representatives. It's a purely practical problem.

I have no idea how to move Malta. Maybe we could sell it to Libya.

Gromyko: The whole island?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: As a last resort. As a last resort. But we should first have the meetings. As a precondition.

Kissinger: How to move Malta I don't know. We'll certainly agree to make a joint representation.

Gromyko: Let's set the date and go to Finland, and Mintoff will go to Finland. If he doesn't, well . . .

Kissinger: He got a big reception in China. They had four people on the street who had lived in Malta.

The problem is countries that agreed to the 30th may not agree to this procedure, where everybody just accepts and Malta is just left out.

Gromyko: But there is a consensus.

Kissinger: We will agree with you to begin on the 30th. You will hear my instructions to Shorer: to work with you and consult with the Germans, French, and British, but to bring it to a rapid conclusion. We will work it out.

[Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt and Stoessel confer.]

What is old Garrison doing? Is he calling Hartman for authority?
[Laughter]

Did the one who went out for you come back yet?

Makarov: Not yet.

Kissinger: All I want is to make sure the speeches are kept to 15 minutes at the European Security Conference.

Ours is on the way. Yours is coming.

Gromyko: Let me say a few words about our cooperation, while we're waiting. There was businesslike cooperation, but there were times when cooperation was uneven. There were times when the American side preferred to remain on the sidelines. But in recent days it has been smoother.

Kissinger: In the cases when we remained on the sidelines, we were working to the same result, as on the 250 kilometers.

[Garrison and Fokin return.]

He's on the way?

Fokin: Yes.

Kissinger: [To Garrison] Is Sherer on the way, or is he checking with Hartman?

Garrison: He's on the way.

Kissinger: When I was in Hanoi, I stayed at a palace in the center of town. I went for a walk. They wouldn't let me back in, because I had no pass.

Gromyko: You told me that last time.

Kissinger: Now they're yours.

Gromyko: What's happening?

Kissinger: I understand they're making English a compulsory subject, but they won't have much of an opportunity to practice it.

Gromyko: By two and one-half days, you mean no business on the day of arrival.

Kissinger: I'm told by Sonnenfeldt that the French President is willing to stay only two nights. So we arrive the afternoon of the 30th, stay a full day the 1st and 2nd. That would be our definition.

Gromyko: Three full days.

Kissinger: This gives us two and one-half days. What Schmidt wants to do is to see some people. He can come right before and see them in the morning.

Gromyko: It's really three days.

Kissinger: Probably many delegations will arrive before.

I've talked to Anatol about the possibility of the President meeting Brezhnev while we're there.

Gromyko: All right. I tell you, all right.

Kissinger: Two meetings?

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: The morning after the Conference closes.

Gromyko: Yes.

They'll probably be arriving any minute now, so we can wait. Let's not switch to other subjects yet.

Kissinger: I agree.

Gromyko: Soon mothers will start frightening their children by saying, "Malta will come get you." Mintoff. If they said, "Mintoff will get you," that would be the cult of personality. [Laughter]

Did you see Mintoff?

Kissinger: I've never seen him. He's often asked me.

I already have half the madmen of the world as my clients. I have to leave some for after.

That's our strategy: We want him to join the Warsaw Pact; we'd never have a conclusion.

He was voted in by a one vote majority. They must be due for another election.

Gromyko: I saw him at Helsinki. He was at the meeting.

Kissinger: Why? Was it a Foreign Ministers' meeting?

Sukhodrev: He's both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

Gromyko: It will be speech after speech after speech.

Kissinger: I don't know how I am going to live through two and a half days of speeches.

Gromyko: Suppose they are 20 minutes. Suppose. It would take two and a half days. Two working days, six [hours] plus six.

Kissinger: Plus the closing ceremony.

Gromyko: For signing.

Kissinger: Can't we make it 15 minutes?

Gromyko: For us, 15 and 20 are the same.

Kissinger: They will take more time anyway.

[Kovalev comes in. The Secretary greets him.]

Gromyko: Here is a victim of Malta.

Kissinger: Where is Sherer? [Garrison goes out.]

Gromyko: Do you think Malta is melting? Maybe Malta is inclined to declare merci. He refused to answer his phone for 24 hours.

Sukhodrev: He is holed up somewhere where there is no phone. [Lodal goes out.]

Gromyko: Malta wants the unconditional surrender of the United States.

Kissinger: We are prepared to surrender to Malta. As long as we do it in startling fashion.

Where is Lodal? This is all a Soviet trick to cut down our delegation. Will someone go out to get Lodal? [Lodal comes in.]

Gromyko: He [Kovalev] wanted to go to attend NATO. They rejected our proposal. How narrow-minded.

[Sherer and Fokin come in.]

Kissinger: We wondered how you two fellows managed to prolong this negotiation.

Gromyko: Malta intercepted him.

Sherer: They are doing their best.

Kissinger: Could you describe the situation?

Sherer: I will try to, but it's a fast breaking situation. When I last spoke to Minister Kovalev, before meeting the Secretary's plane, we were faced with a very hard, very hard position by Malta with respect to the situation in the Mediterranean. Even though 34 countries favored

the Canadian proposal to go to Helsinki on July 30th. But Malta, it looks like, is going to interfere with that.

While I was meeting with the Secretary, the Soviet Union came forward with two very good initiatives, in my view. The first was to ask the Romanians to talk to Malta to try to soften their position.

Kissinger: That is very clever.

Kovalev: And the Yugoslavs too.

Sherer: I don't know whether it was the Yugoslavs and Romanians who brought about this possible compromise.

Kissinger: When the United States and the Soviet Union have to use intermediaries to talk to Malta!

Sherer: The compromise is that we will ask the Maltese to accept in toto the follow-up paper, which they have also tried to monkey with, fool around with. We will also ask them to accept Quadripartite Rights and Responsibilities by 7:30 tonight, no changes. We will also ask them to accept the Canadian proposal as is. We have to give them something.

Kissinger: Sicily.

Sherer: Two points on the Mediterranean paper that are boring but might be of interest. There are two phrases, that concern not only "contributing to peace and strengthening security in the area" but also "lessening tension." There was concern by someone that this could be used to remove the fleets.⁶ But that is arguable. It could be argued that the fleets contribute to stability.

Kissinger: Could you read me the sentence?

Sherer: "In order to advance the objectives set forth above, the Participating States also declare their intention of maintaining and amplifying the contacts and dialogue as initiated by the CSCE with the non-participating Mediterranean States to include all the States of the Mediterranean, with the purpose of contributing to peace, strengthening security, lessening tensions in the area, and widening the scope of cooperation, ends in which all share a common interest, as well as with the purpose of defining further common objectives."

Kissinger: Is all of this new?

Sherer: Only "lessening tensions." All the rest of the paragraph is agreed to. Only this sentence.

Kissinger: That is all right. We accept it. Is that all right, Mr. Foreign Minister?

Should I refer it to Washington? [Laughter] I will accept it as Assistant to the President.

We have no reason to add it but we have no objection.

⁶ See footnote 4, Document 294.

My colleagues tell me if I hold out a few minutes, I will get an additional concession.

Sherer: The second one is a compromise worked out by Romania, Yugoslavia and Malta: "The Participating States would seek, in the framework of their multilateral efforts, to encourage progress and appropriate initiatives and to proceed to an exchange of views on the attainment of the above purposes."

Kissinger: What are "the above purposes?"

Sherer: The Mediterranean paragraph.

Kissinger: Could you read it again?

Sherer [Reads the whole paragraph again.]

Gromyko: Without enthusiasm, we will accept it.

Kissinger: This means that all members of the European Security Conference agree to discuss a Mediterranean solution, right?

Gromyko: You see, "the Participating States would seek in the framework of their multilateral efforts"—it doesn't say what kind,— "and would encourage . . ."

Kissinger: "Encourage" doesn't bother me. It's "to proceed to negotiations . . ."

Gromyko: The substance of the matter is in the first paragraph.

Kissinger: [To Sherer] What do our allies think?

Sherer: When I left the Center, there was no problem.

Kissinger: [To Kovalev] Do you know?

Kovalev: According to our information, all the Western Europeans are in favor of this. That is what the French told me. I don't know what the NATO meeting did.

Sherer: There is not time for a NATO caucus.

Kissinger: Let me say that unless there is some objection by our NATO allies, which I don't know about, I will accept. We accept, with that one proviso.

Sonnenfeldt: Malta has not accepted.

Sherer: Mr. Mintoff has been out on the beach, or out riding.

Gromyko: Or on a mountain.

Sherer: Possibly, Mr. Minister. But their representative, Mr. Kingswell, is possibly high enough to accept for the President.

Kissinger: We will accept these two paragraphs. We will support the July 30 date.

[To Sherer] Our allies have no objection to the July 30 date?

Sherer: There is a consensus on July 30.

Kissinger: The only problem is these two paragraphs and to get Malta to agree to the date.

Sherer: It may be hard for Mintoff to swallow.

Kissinger: What happens if they don't yield?

Sherer: We have several alternatives. There is one which is proposed by the head of the Soviet delegation.

Kissinger: Just issue the invitations.

Sherer: To go on a bilateral basis with the Finns.

Kissinger: Can we get our people to go along?

Sherer: No. The Dutch and others will dig in their heels.

Kissinger: What other alternatives do we have?

Sherer: That is hard to say. We are dealing with a man who is just unreasonable.

Kissinger: [Whispers] Assassination. [Laughter]

What do you think, Mr. Foreign Minister?

Gromyko: I think we must be serious about this. We are doing a serious piece of business and we can't let it turn into a children's game. If one or two don't go along, we can't drag them there. If all the others go, Mintoff will probably go. If he doesn't . . . it will be a precedent of how to go about a serious job.

Kissinger: Our problem is the Dutch won't go, and many neutrals. [To Sherer:] Any others?

Sherer: The Italians.

Kissinger: And some nonaligned.

Gromyko: It's not serious.

Kissinger: The problem will be that some will say it establishes a precedent about treating small countries.

We will know by 7:30.

Gromyko: It's not a matter of principle, it's a matter of meeting the absurd.

Kissinger: We will know by 7:30 if Malta accepts, true?

Sherer: I can't say.

Kissinger: Why don't we do the following: Let's see by 7:30 whether the allies will accept these two paragraphs. Maybe Malta will accept them. Maybe it's not a good idea to go around about these; Malta will hear about it.

Gromyko: Let me make one correction: We should not start asking other countries their views before 7:30.

Kissinger: I agree. I modified my instruction. Why don't we ask both of them to come back as soon as they know.

Sherer: We should know by the end of the dinner. 9:30.

Kissinger: Does the Maltese Ambassador think he can get through?
[Kissinger and Sherer confer.]

Mr. Foreign Minister, I have no objection to stating—at the end of this evening, if there is no agreement—that we and you are prepared to meet on July 30.

Gromyko: Perhaps we could couch it in this form: We have come to an understanding and we agree with those states who agree to July 30.

Kissinger: We agree with those states who accept July 30.

Gromyko: Yes, and to inform the Finns that our heads of government and heads of state are prepared to go to Helsinki.

Kissinger: That will be more difficult. Why don't we wait until 9:30?

Gromyko: All right.

Could we have a 15-minute break?

Kissinger: All right.

[Kissinger and Sherer confer briefly.]

Gromyko: And then we will go to another subject. We will meet in 15 minutes.

[The meeting broke at 6:35 p.m. It was agreed that Ambassador Sherer would speak to the Maltese representative in the name of the Secretary of State. Kovalev had done it in the name of the Foreign Minister. At 6:40 p.m. the meeting convened in a small group in the ante-room to discuss SALT.]

314. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, July 10, 1975, 10:15 p.m.–midnight.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoli G. Kovalev, Deputy Foreign Minister and Chief of Soviet Delegation to CSCE (at end)
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of the American Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mikhail D. Sytenko, Chief of the Near East Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Vasili G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Oleg M. Sokolov, Chief, American Section of the American Department
Yuri E. Fokin, Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister
Vladimir Ya. Plechko, Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister
Leonid S. Chernyshev, Deputy Chief of Protocol

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Ambassador Albert W. Sherer, Jr., Chief of U.S. Delegation to CSCE (at end)
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, INR
Jan M. Lodal, NSC Staff
Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Mark Garrison, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 7, Soviet Union. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting took place during and after dinner at the Soviet Mission in Geneva. Brackets, except those indicating omission of unrelated discussion, are in the original. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976. Telegram 168188 to all NATO capitals, July 17, provided a summary of the meeting for presentation to the North Atlantic Council. It reads in part: "In general the meetings proceeded in quite a friendly manner. In fact, Gromyko seemed more mellow than on other occasions, possibly because he was eager to get CSCE settled. The Soviets might also be concerned about public attitudes in the US and elsewhere reflecting skepticism about Soviet intentions with regard to détente. We expect that the President will meet bilaterally with Brezhnev during the Helsinki meeting, principally to continue discussion of SALT issues. We still expect a Brezhnev visit in the fall, but no precise date has been fixed." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

SUBJECT

CSCE

[Mr. Sonnenfeldt and Mr. Garrison go out to take a phone call from Ambassador Sherer at the CSCE Conference. They return. Mr. Sonnenfeldt gives a report as follows:]

Sonnenfeldt: At 7:00 p.m. the Finnish Foreign Minister called Mintoff. He said he would make no problem.

Fifteen minutes ago the Maltese delegate Kingswell announced that there would be no answer from Mintoff until 11:00 a.m. tomorrow, and that Malta would probably seek amendments, that would be substantive.

The Soviet head of delegation, Deputy Foreign Minister Kovalev, pointed out that we are being subjected to blackmail and "humiliated." This represents an attempt by Malta to blackmail the other 34 countries.

The Romanian delegation has been urging Maltese reconsideration. It is ridiculous for the rest to sit around awaiting unacceptable amendments.

Mintoff is reported to have said the time element is not important. One more day is not important after the two years we have spent negotiating this.

Kissinger: [to Sonnenfeldt] What should we do?

Sonnenfeldt: I have dictated a message² which you can look at.

Kissinger: [to Garrison] What do you think? It's your department.

Garrison: I'd get a message ready.

Kissinger: I'm afraid it would inflate his ego.

Sonnenfeldt: Previously he's gone to the edge and then veered off.

Kissinger: It's purely a practical question. We're not dealing with exactly a rational man. It's not a substantive question.

Sonnenfeldt: We could talk to his representative here, who was impressed with your message earlier.

Kissinger: Really?

Sonnenfeldt: I could have Sherer talk to the Italian here.

Kissinger: That would get more countries involved. Do that. Tell him I think it would be a good idea to have the Italians talk to Mintoff. [Garrison goes out.]

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

[Mr. Garrison returns.]

² Not found.

Garrison: The two Ambassadors will come here and report.

Kissinger: Is that all right with you?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: Is there any indication?

Garrison: The Soviets have floated a consensus-minus-one proposal,³ but the Italians have rejected it.

Kissinger: That's what I thought.

[Minister Kovalev and Ambassador Sherer arrive at 11:15 p.m.]

Kovalev: The situation at the Conference in the last several hours has become very acute. At first, the Maltese said they'd give a reply in an hour, then they said another hour. They recently said they'd get a reply from Mintoff tomorrow, but not until 11:00 a.m. Valletta does not like the text that was reported to you earlier today, and thought that new amendments would be required and would be more or less substantive. The Maltese are not giving a favorable reply to the Canadian proposal and for tonight are blocking.

Immediately after the Maltese interim response, there was a meeting of the heads of the more influential delegations—including the United States, the Soviet Union, West Germany, France, and others. The Finns regard Malta's action as an attempt to torpedo the holding of the third stage and that seems to be a justified assessment. All the delegations that took part in this meeting have taken note of two facts. First, indignation at the actions of the Maltese, regarded it as blackmail and completely irresponsible, as an attempt to humiliate all the 34 other participating countries. That was stated by all the delegations—neutral, Western, and Socialist. And the second fact is that the 34 delegations are in favor of the Canadian proposal with one minor amendment, which is acceptable to all—that is, they support convening the third stage on July 30 and all the other provisions of the Canadian proposal.

³ Reference to a Soviet proposal at CSCE to amend the consensus rule to permit the approval of portions of a CSCE agreement by all participants except one. Telegram 168188 summarized Kissinger's reaction to the Soviet proposal: "During the evening of July 10, the Soviets sought to enlist the Secretary's support for breaking the impasse by the 'consensus-minus-one' approach. The Secretary declined to do so then and there, in part because such an approach would have had to have the endorsement of our allies. More basically, however, the Secretary felt that however deplorable and dismaying the tactics of the Maltese, any decision to circumvent the basic consensus rule of the conference would have to be considered with utmost care. It raised not only the question of style but also an issue of principle with serious precedential implications. The Secretary thus informed Gromyko that he could not go along with 'extra-parliamentary' tactics to break the deadlock."

There was discussion of possible modes of action in this situation. The first suggestion was that at the next meeting of the Coordinating Committee, at 11:55 tonight, we will start to gain the maximum possible support for the Canadian proposal, including the July 30 date. The Finns are earnestly requesting this be done because they feel that every lost hour eventually tends to destroy the chances of convening on July 30.

The second mode of action, which doesn't rule out the first, but adds to it—and in this the Finns are interested—is that after the meeting of the Coordinating Committee, if a consensus can't be reached because of the opposition of the Maltese, outside the hall of the Coordinating Committee, all 34 representatives hand over to the chairman of the Finnish delegation the Canadian draft proposal on a bilateral basis, thus symbolizing their agreement to it. That would not be a violation of the consensus rule because outside the meeting hall the countries are free to meet bilaterally. But that would be symbolic of their goodwill, and the Finnish delegation would gain assurance that the 34 delegations would arrive in Finland on July 30. It would make it easier for Finland to begin immediate preparations for July 30.

That in brief is the situation in the conference, and Mr. Sherer may probably want to add to it.

Kissinger: [To Sherer] What is your view of the Western side?

Sherer: This is where I would reluctantly disagree with the Minister. He's absolutely right; all the delegations feel we are being humiliated. They all feel shabbily treated by the Maltese; it's a purposeful third-country maneuver. But some of them feel they did have communications problems—Mintoff was off on the beach or riding somewhere. I doubt we could get a consensus . . . isolate Malta as we proposed. I was at a pickup meeting of 12–15 delegations; I was called out twice for long telephone conversations. But I doubt we can do it because there will be a natural tendency of some of the small countries to support Malta against what seems to be big power pressure.

Kissinger: Did you ask the Italian Ambassador to make a representation to Malta?

Sherer: I did not, sir, because the Italians here were among the most reluctant to put pressure on Malta.

I drafted a letter for your consideration.

Kissinger: A letter?

Sherer: To Malta. I think a letter from you would have a good effect.

Kissinger: It might also have the opposite effect. [To Sonnenfeldt] Let's go out a minute.

[Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt, and Sherer leave the room to confer, then return.]

Kissinger: On the procedure, Mr. Foreign Minister, we'll be glad to join this 11:55 meeting and to join with any resolution that's agreed.

I'm not inclined to go along with handing over the Canadian proposal to the Finns, because it would be treated as an issue of principle by many Western delegations. I'd be prepared to issue a joint statement that we're prepared to go July 30.

Gromyko: I'm worried about how the others would react to our joint declaration, saying, "Here's collusion again."

Kissinger: I'd be prepared to say it as a unilateral statement.

Gromyko: That sounds more positive.

Kissinger: I'll be prepared to do that.

Gromyko: Because otherwise there may be people here who'll say you can't tread on Mintoff. But after all, you can't sacrifice the conference for this because this principle was designed to buttress the success of the conference. Principle should serve policy, not policy serve principle.

Kissinger: I'm worried about sending a letter to Mintoff because it would give him a tremendous ego trip.

Gromyko: It is really hard for one to talk you out of it or into it [sending a letter] because if you think it will have the opposite effect. . . . Maybe you could try getting in touch with the Italians.

Kissinger: That I'll be glad to do.

Gromyko: Because it's not substance but a real pathology.

Kissinger: I'll be glad to send a message to Rome.

Gromyko: There's this Malta that gets the idea it can hold up all the others. A real travesty. That's democracy?

Kissinger: I can say nothing in defense of Malta because we should be concluding stage two today.

[Sonnenfeldt goes around the table to confer with Kissinger to show him a draft of proposed statement.]

As I said, I'll be glad to make a statement—when I go into the hotel, there will undoubtedly be press there—that we support the Canadian proposal.

Stoessel: You'll be asked if this is the Foreign Minister's view.

Kissinger: I'll have to say, "ask him."

What is going to happen at five to twelve?

Sherer: There will be another meeting of the Coordinating Committee. I suppose the chair will ask if there is support for the Canadian proposal, and if Malta is there, I'd expect Malta to say, "we don't accept." Others will say we have to have 35 yeas. Malta will say, "Our Prime Minister will be in touch with us at 11:00 tomorrow."

Kissinger: When was the Canadian proposal submitted? Yesterday?

Sherer: Yes, sir.

Gromyko: Can you talk to your allies about acting outside of the conference on a bilateral basis to support the Canadian proposal?

Kissinger: I think it would be counterproductive. [To Sherer:] Don't you?

Sherer: I agree.

Kissinger: I think many countries—Italy, the Dutch and others—would see it as a matter of principle. When I go to the hotel I'll say we're prepared to join with the others in support of the Canadian proposal, and that I spoke to the French President. I said this today in Paris and I'll say it again. I'll also get in touch with the Italians. This will show them we have an interest.

When will we hear from Mintoff? Noon?

Sherer: He said 11:00, but today he said an hour and it dragged on.

Kissinger: Did you talk to the Maltese Ambassador? What did he say?

Sherer: I did. I think he took it very seriously and was very impressed with it. He then said he had changes to make in the compromise proposal that I submitted on your behalf, and these would be substantive.

Kissinger: [To Gromyko] I think they'll cave tomorrow, don't you?

Kovalev: What do the Maltese want?

Gromyko: It is impossible to give an analysis of their proposal. What do they want? To declare war on the US? The Soviet Union?

Kovalev: First of all, they want to humiliate all the participants. Second, for Mintoff to be in the world's limelight.

Gromyko: If that is so, he must be doing that with the blessing of someone else, because this Mintoff couldn't do it alone.

Kissinger: I don't know who else would be giving their blessing.

I think his strength is that he's doing it on his own. If someone else were doing it, it would be easy to do.

He's a good friend of the Chinese. I don't know if they're doing it. [Confers with Sonnenfeldt.]

I'm having Sherer talk to all the Western delegations today, so tomorrow we'll know better.

Gromyko: Can you add one sentence to your statement, that the United States is ready to go on the 30th?

Kissinger: Oh, yes. That is what it says. [Reading the draft statement:] "The United States supports the consensus that has developed that the last stage of the Conference should take place on July 30 as proposed by Canada and I have instructed our Ambassador to join this consensus."

Gromyko: Would it be possible to say, "The United States is prepared for a resumption on the 30th?"

Kissinger: Oh, yes, that's easy. And I'll say we believe the decision should be made as soon as possible so the Finns can begin preparations.

Gromyko: Good.

Kissinger: So, 10:30 tomorrow.

I think the less attention we pay to him the better. If he doesn't tomorrow, I'll be seeing the Germans and the English. It would be better to do something joint. Rather than a frantic letter tonight.

Sonnenfeldt: We couldn't get it delivered.

Kissinger: So by Monday morning we'll know.

What we discussed tonight: I'll get in touch with the Italians; I'll make a statement, and tell our Ambassador to get in touch with the allied delegates by 10:30 tomorrow.

And to the press we'll say we discussed SALT and Europe and the results were constructive and the atmosphere was cordial.

If asked if progress was made, we can say, yes.

Gromyko: Just a general formula.

[The meeting ended. The Foreign Minister escorted the Secretary and his party down to the front door.]

[The Secretary's remarks to the press, made in the lobby of the Intercontinental Hotel on his return, are attached.]⁴

⁴ Attached but not printed. The full text of Kissinger's remarks are in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 4, 1975, p. 188. Kissinger said with regard to CSCE: "With respect to the European Security Conference, the United States supports the consensus that has developed that the last stage of the conference should take place on July 30 as proposed by Canada, and we are prepared to bring this to as rapid a conclusion as possible in order to permit the Finnish hosts to make their preparations."

315. Editorial Note

On July 11, 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger summarized his talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko for President Ford in telegram Hakto 2. With regard to the European security conference, he wrote: "I spent over seven hours with Gromyko this evening in very intensive talks on CSCE and SALT. On the former, the main problem is now the obstruction of Malta in reaching the decision to convene the summit on July 30. The Soviets tried to enlist our support for some strong-arm

tactics to isolate Malta and move to Helsinki without them if necessary. This would be a violation of the consensus rule prevailing in the conference and would be rejected by many of our smaller allies, as well as neutrals. It would also have broader implications for other international groups which we might come to regret. We did, however, assure Soviets that we support a consensus to move to Helsinki on July 30, and I so stated to the press later. Mintoff is supposed to be heard from around 11 a.m. Friday our time, and we will have to review the bidding at that time. Our CSCE ambassador is keeping closest touch with our allies to assure we remain in step. On the whole, the Soviets seem pleased with our efforts, which is one of the objects of our tactics in order to keep them generally quiet in the Middle East. I obtained Gromyko's agreement to a two-and-a-half day Helsinki summit, if it takes place, beginning around 3 p.m., Wednesday, July 30, and ending around 6 p.m., Friday, August 1. This will also allow time for two meetings between you and Brezhnev as well as for other travel before the Japanese come." (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, President's Trip File, Box 11, July 9–12, 1975, Europe, General) Prime Minister Takeo Miki of Japan was scheduled to visit the United States from August 2 to 10 to meet with President Ford and other government officials on August 5 and 6.

316. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, July 11, 1975, 10:45 a.m.–1:07 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Anatoli G. Kovalev, Deputy Foreign Minister and Chief of Soviet Delegation to CSCE

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 7, Soviet Union. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting took place in the Carnival Bar at the Intercontinental Hotel. Brackets, except those indicating omission of unrelated discussion, are in the original. Kissinger and Gromyko subsequently met for a luncheon at 2:15. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: "Gromyko: The conference should be settled. It is important. Kissinger: It's inconceivable it won't be solved. Sonnenfeldt: It's conceivable, but it will be solved. Kissinger: All right, Sonnenfeldt can conceive that it fails, but he joins my prediction." (Ibid.) The full text of both memoranda of conversation are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.

Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of the American Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mikhail D. Sytenko, Chief of the Near East Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Vasily G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Oleg M. Sokolov, Chief, American Section of the American Department
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Amb. Albert W. Sherer, Jr., Chief of U.S. Delegation to CSCE
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECT

CSCE; Middle East

[Photographers and press came in to photograph.]

CSCE

Kissinger: Twice I've given briefings in bars in Moscow in the In-tourist Hotel.

Mr. Foreign Minister, first let me welcome you to—I can't say our place. Could we have our Ambassador here? I see Ambassador Kovalev. Where is Sherer?

[He looks over draft of joint statement.]²

Gromyko: Mr. Secretary, you are the chairman. You didn't know you were elected?

Kissinger: Oh. I thought Mr. Kovalev would give us a report.

Kovalev: We've just received a reply from the Maltese. They are prepared to accept the entire text of yesterday of the Canadian proposal, including the date of July 30, to register all the understandings except the one on the Mediterranean which was the subject of discussion yesterday between the Foreign Minister and Secretary Kissinger. Let me read the text.

Kissinger: To whom did they communicate this?

Kovalev: We received it just now from Mintoff's special representative, Kingswell.

² The final text of the joint statement is in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 4, 1975, pp. 188–189.

Kissinger: Did we get it too?

Kovalev: It was virtually two minutes ago.

Sherer: I was probably at the hotel.

Kovalev: "In order to advance the objectives set forth above, the Participating States also declare their intention of maintaining and amplifying the contacts and dialogue as initiated by the CSCE with the non-participating Mediterranean States to include all the States of the Mediterranean, with the purpose of contributing to peace"—the amendment is "reducing armed forces in the region"—"strengthening security," and so on.

Kissinger: The only amendment is "reducing armed forces in the region?"

Kovalev: Right.

Kissinger: Do you have any problem with this?

Gromyko: Why don't we talk for a minute?

[Kissinger and Gromyko get up and go to corner of the room to confer alone, from 10:57–10:59. Kissinger then confers with Sonnenfeldt, Stoessel, Sisco and Sherer to 11:02.]

Kissinger: I assume if we now accept this, you will not be calling for a nuclear-free zone or disarmament.

Gromyko: [Laughs] Nothing.

Kissinger: I will instruct Ambassador Sherer to call the NATO caucus and discuss it. I foresee no problem. If there is, we can discuss it.

Sherer: There will be no problem.

Kissinger: We should know, say, within an hour. Then we can conclude it today.

[Sherer leaves. Kovalev gets up and talks to Gromyko.]

Gromyko: I'm telling him [Kovalev] to grab Sherer by the coattails.

Kissinger: He's joining the NATO caucus?

Gromyko: He will be active among our friends and the neutrals.

Kissinger: I think it will be settled in the next hour.

Kovalev: [in English] Goodbye.

Kissinger: Goodbye. Thank you.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

[Kovalev and Sherer return at 12:19 p.m.]

Kissinger: Should we hear from our Ambassadors first?

Gromyko: Can we guess what they have? Augurs used to guess from looking at them.

Kissinger: I think it is now humanly impossible to make the European Security Conference fail. [Laughter].

Sherer: It took a little time to assemble the NATO chiefs of delegation. They were aware of the Maltese amendments. I polled the room to find out how people felt and I think without exception the major powers have to seek instructions before giving any opinion at all.

Kissinger: You should have said that too.

Sherer: And the countries almost all took a generally negative view.

Kissinger: Which? Italy?

Sherer: Italy, France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Germany.

Kissinger: Does Germany have forces in the Mediterranean?

Sherer: They all spoke in a generally skeptical way.

Kissinger: Let me talk to Mr. Sherer for a minute.

[Kissinger, Sherer, Sisco, Sonnenfeldt and Stoessel confer in the corner until 12:37 p.m. and then return to the table.]

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, on the European Security Conference first, as I understand it from Mr. Sherer, all the NATO delegations are asking for instructions and the answer is expected to be negative. I am asking Sherer to ask the delegations to hold an answer until I have a chance to confer with Schmidt and Callaghan, and I can get in touch with the French.

I think the Conference will take place on July 30. It is only a question of tactics. It's a stupid . . . We are only committed to maintain contacts and dialogue on these questions.

Sisco: It is not operative.

Kissinger: We are not committed to do anything. I will recommend to them that we stay in low gear on this. [To Sherer] Tell them we construe this only as a commitment to a dialogue, that we don't construe it as calling for a reduction, and we have no intention on our part to reduce our forces. And I don't detect a burning desire by my Soviet colleagues to reduce. No, you speak for yourself.

[The Secretary confers with Sherer]

Sherer will proceed as I indicated. I am seeing Genscher tonight³ and Schmidt tomorrow and Callaghan. I will call Sauvagnargues tonight or tomorrow. I think the Finns should proceed as if it will go forward on the 30th. It is inconceivable to me that it should fail at this late date.

I'm told the Finns are proceeding anyway on the assumption that it will go forward.

³ See Document 317.

And our two Ambassadors will stay in touch and we will let you know everything we are doing. We will let Vorontsov know Saturday night or Sunday morning what the results are.

Gromyko: All right. I think evidently somebody somewhere seems to be not too aware of the consequences of what is going on.

Kissinger: You are talking about the European Security Conference?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: I think it has become an industry in each Foreign Office working on the European Security Conference. No one asks himself what the purpose is.

I think of all the countries, Turkey is the most difficult one on this question of reducing forces.⁴

[Gromyko confers with Kovalev]

Gromyko: Yesterday they agreed with the Canadian proposal.

Kissinger: Yes. But on the Maltese addition.

Gromyko: We don't know, since the NATO countries discussed it.

Sherer: The Turks here will consult their government, but the delegation here had a generally negative attitude.

Kissinger: We could cut off arms to them.

[To Sherer] Will they be able to get instructions by this afternoon?

Sherer: The Turks will take a while.

Kissinger: All of them.

Sherer: They are all phoning now.

Kissinger: Let me know the lineup before I leave.

Sherer: All right.

[Exeunt Sherer and Kovalev].

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Gromyko: The next step in Helsinki?

⁴ Telegram 5480 from Geneva, July 12, reads in part: "Area exception for maneuver CBM—Turks want a frontier zone of 100 km (150 km for fallback) for area of notification for maneuver CBM. They also want exemption for frontiers with non-participating states (Iran, Syria, Iraq), and for ports facing Cyprus. Latter demands have been met, but 100 km border zone is particularly difficult because Soviets say they will insist on an equal zone, thus undercutting Allied efforts to get present 250 km commitment from Soviets." The telegram continued: "Subthreshold for amphibious and airborne maneuvers—Turks proposed on July 8 a special lower threshold (two brigades, which they define as 4,000 troops) for amphibious and airborne maneuvers, based on their fear that a two-brigade amphibious attack could gain control of the Bosphorus straits. This provoked angry reaction from Soviets, and NATO allies believe Turkish proposal is non-negotiable." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

Kissinger: The next stage of discussion should be at Helsinki. And you and I could meet, if necessary, while the meetings are going on. While Mintoff is speaking. Our Chiefs have to stay there but we don't.

I fell asleep at the NATO meeting. Did you see those photos? The thing is, I knew the cameras were on me and I knew I was falling asleep, but I couldn't do anything about it.

[The meeting ended. The Joint Statement later released is at Tab A].

317. Editorial Note

Secretary of State Kissinger visited Bonn, July 11–12, 1975, for talks with Foreign Minister Genscher and Chancellor Schmidt. On the night of July 11, Counselor Sonnenfeldt informed Ambassador Sherer and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Hartman about Kissinger's discussion of the Maltese issue with Genscher in telegram Secto 6042: "The Secretary and Genscher discussed Maltese problem. Germans are supporting what they say is firm French opposition to Maltese amendment. They also report that British are with the French. Germans indicated to the Secretary that on the basis of their conversations with Mintoff during latter's recent visit to Bonn, they believe they can influence him to withdraw amendment. Germans will accordingly make direct approach to Mintoff, probably via Brandt. They will inform Secretary of result and in the meantime, you should do nothing further." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) A memorandum of conversation of the meeting is *ibid.*, P820123–1675.

Sonnenfeldt followed up the following afternoon in telegram Secto 6061 for Sherer and Hartman: "As indicated in telecon earlier today, Germans informed us today that French were softening in their opposition to Maltese amendment because of fear they might damage their relations with the Arabs, who are praising Mintoff. As a result, Germans decided they would not use their own capital with Mintoff and would not make previously-arranged phone call to him. Germans also indicated that NATO caucus in Geneva was working on softer version of Maltese formula, and that French had indicated they would take the lead in this effort. Germans also indicated that as soon as a softer version has been agreed upon in NATO caucus, Romanian Foreign Minister would then contact Mintoff directly to urge his support for it. Germans have also indicated that they would thereupon make their own phone call to Mintoff. Secretary agreed with Genscher that above procedure should be followed. You may join efforts to find compromise formula, but should not lead. You may join consensus. Please stay in

close touch with your German colleague and keep us promptly informed.” (Ibid.)

On July 12, Kissinger discussed the Maltese amendment during his stop in London at Heathrow Airport, where he met with British Foreign Secretary Callaghan. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: “Callaghan: Will the CSCE meet? Kissinger: I don’t understand the phrase that the Maltese want. All it does is commit us to continue contacts on a range of questions in multilateral forums, that doesn’t mean anything. My view is it’s ridiculous to hold up the Conference on that paragraph. Callaghan: That’s my view. [He reads the text of the Maltese amendment to the Mediterranean Declaration.] When you look at that paragraph, Mintoff will make something of it, but it means nothing. Kissinger: If Macovescu can produce a compromise, we’ll go along. I don’t know what a compromise to ‘reduce armed forces’ is. Killick: The Finns are more relaxed now, but we have something to work with. The Turks have to be brought along on the Confidence Building Measures. They have to put it to the Cabinet. Kissinger: They also have problems with the Maltese. Callaghan: Let me tell you a story about the Commonwealth Conference. When Mintoff made a long speech and went all around the world, Seretse Khama—of Botswana—said to me, ‘You know what Dom means in Afrikaans? Stupid!’ [Laughter]” (Ibid., Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 4, Britain)

Later the same day, telegram 5479 from Geneva, passed to the Secretary’s party, reported that the NATO caucus had “agreed to accept Maltese amendment as it stands.” The telegram continued: “NATO delegations all regretted circumstances of the situation, and several will probably express their views on Maltese negotiating techniques at first appropriate occasion. US del took low profile and sought views of NATO dels as element in reaching final USG decision. Neutrals and Warsaw Pact countries are expected to accept Maltese amendment as soon as NATO acceptance is made known.” Telegram 5501 from Geneva, July 14, summarized the results of the NATO caucus’ efforts: “Hectic negotiations on July 10 and 11 resulted in two not entirely innocuous new paragraphs for the Mediterranean Declaration announcing the intention of CSCE participants to continue the contacts on Mediterranean security begun in CSCE and specifying the purposes which such contacts should serve. These paragraphs were included in a package deal leading to acceptance of the Canadian proposal on stage III date. After considerable delay, Mintoff’s special envoy, Ambassador Kingswell, said the package deal would be accepted if participants agreed to an additional phrase making ‘reduction of armed forces in the region’ one of the purposes of continued contacts on the Mediterranean. Expected acceptance of the Maltese phrase on July 14 will mark completion of work on the Mediterranean Declaration.” (Both *ibid.*, Central Foreign Policy Files)

318. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, July 21, 1975, 1530Z.

5767. For EUR/RPM. Subject: CSCE: Stage II highlights—July 14–21.

1. *Summary.* A cliff-hanger to the end, CSCE confirmed July 30 opening date for Stage III summit, completed all its substantive and procedural work, reached consensus on the final documents of the conference, and closed Stage II at 4:00 a.m. on July 21. Belgrade was accepted as the site for the two follow-up meetings set for 1977. *End summary.*

2. Stage III—coordinating committee confirmed July 30 date for Stage III in early morning hours of July 19, after key remaining substantive questions had been settled.

3. Final act²—By July 18 completion of final act had become question of whether or not to accede to Soviet desire to include reference to irreversibility of détente.³ As Soviet pressure increased, resistance of NATO and neutral participants to inclusion of concept stiffened. By the late evening of July 18, the question revolved around finding a suitable compromise which would allow the Soviets to back off without losing face. Problem remained critical because Soviets tied approval of Europe clause covering Berlin to satisfaction of their desires on “irreversibility.” Shortly after midnight on July 19, Soviet delegation chief Kovalev apparently telephoned Moscow for agreement to fall back. When instructions were received, the Soviets proposed substitution of the formulation “make continuing and lasting” for irreversible. Other participants agreed immediately and negotiation of final act was completed. Package of statements and documents accompanying final act also includes letter which Government of Finland will transmit to UN Secretary General notifying him that the final act “is not eligible, in whole or in part, for registration with the Secretariat under article 102

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to all CSCE capitals, Cairo, Lisbon, Nicosia, Oslo, Sofia, USNMR SHAPE, USCINCEUR, UNCOCOSOUTH, USLO SAACLANT at Norfolk, CINCLANT, USDEL SALT Two at Geneva, Ankara, Luxembourg, Rabat, and Tunis.

² The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed on August 1, 1975, at Helsinki, is in Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

³ Telegram 5501 from Geneva, July 14, reads in part: “The Soviets wish paragraph 1 of the Final Act to refer to the ‘irreversibility’ of détente, a concept which Western participants have succeeded after difficult negotiations to remove from the language of the principles and their preamble.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

of the Charter of the United Nations, as would be in the case were it a matter of a treaty or international agreement. . . ." This statement, combined with a reference to "non-registerability" and a so-called "disclaimer" paragraph in the final act itself, provide sound legal backing for the position that CSCE commitments are not legally binding. A further element in final act package is entry into official journal of statement by executive secretary of conference calling for participants to notify Secretariat of exact titles they wish to have inscribed under signature of their representative. This procedure was arranged to establish the principle that each participant may supply any title or titles he wishes to have placed under his name. The arrangement was worked out between the USSR and EC participants as a means of providing for inscription of EC presidency title under the name of Italian Prime Minister Moro. By making submission of titles a general principle, the EC relieved the Soviets of the need to give approval to inclusion of Moro's EC function. Since the Secretariat statement was entered into the journal with a comment that the coordinating committee had "taken note" of the request the EC has a certain guarantee that the procedure will be honored.

4. Principles and their implementation—during intensive informal sessions, principles subcommittee gradually narrowed the outstanding questions down to a series of interrelated issues the key to which was the manner in which the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force was to be qualified, an issue on which Cypriots and Turks were bitterly divided. Breakthrough became possible when Turkish del received flexible instructions allowing him to accept a compromise package from the chair with only minor changes. After this decision, principles declaration quickly fell into line and final stylistic review was completed. Subcommittee registered the text on July 19 and committee I registered it on July 20 as a number of delegations filed interpretive statements on various issues. Following Romanian-Soviet agreement on voluntary basis issue in CBMs, special working body on implementation sent texts of Romanian and Swiss proposals to committee I which registered texts on July 20.

5. Military security—in order to appease Turks and overcome last major stumbling block on area of application of maneuver CBM, Soviets and Warsaw Pact allies early in week reluctantly accepted last-minute addition of sentence to effect that notification of combined maneuvers should be considered even below threshold of 25,000 troops, if there were "significant" numbers of amphibious or airborne troops involved. Neutrals expressed gratification with this step, which enabled them to abandon idea of a separate threshold for independent amphibious and airborne maneuvers, and with US agreement to clarification of threshold, so that there is no misunderstanding that all maneuvers in Europe involving over 25,000 troops are to be notified,

whether the troops are land forces, airborne or amphibious, or combinations thereof. Concurrently Soviets, Romanians, and Dutch reached agreement on compromise text for preamble expressing “voluntary basis” for prior notification of maneuvers. Despite these moves by others, Turkish delegation held fast until final hours of Stage II on its original area text, and real negotiations on a substitute began only on July 18. Substitute text was introduced by Turkish delegation which accepted principle of equal application of CBM measure in USSR and Turkey and thus met requirements of most participants, but exception for areas close to Iran, Iraq and Syria was initially expressed in a manner unacceptable to Cyprus. After marathon mediation by allies, with assistance from Soviets and others, an awkward text mutually acceptable to Turkey and Cyprus was agreed in the early morning of July 19, enabling conference to confirm consensus on July 30 summit date. Subcommittee completed work on smaller remaining points and inserted numerical parameters on July 19, and registered text on July 20.

6. Economics—last remaining issue in Basket II was resolved when Soviets accepted a phrase linking reciprocity and MFN.

7. Humanitarian cooperation—questions of title for Basket III document and link phrase between overall preamble and substantive texts were settled and full document was registered by coordinating committee.

8. Mediterranean—Maltese compromise phrase making “reduction of armed forces” in the Mediterranean region one of the purposes of continued contacts on the Mediterranean was accepted and Mediterranean Declaration agreed.

9. Follow-up—site for 1977 follow-up meetings was not agreed until final hours of the conference. Belgrade and Helsinki were both offered as possibilities, but Yugoslavs refused on principle to compromise by splitting the meetings between the two capitals, and insisted that both should take place in the same location. Yugoslavs and Romanians felt strongly that a further meeting in Helsinki would undercut the concept of rotation and could be the beginning of a permanent site. Since Finns have hosted preparatory talks, and Stages I and III, and since Yugoslav candidacy for hosting follow-up meetings had been presented first, pressure built for Finns to withdraw, which they did in early morning hours of July 21. Coordinating committee immediately agreed that both 1977 follow-up meetings should take place in Belgrade.

10. *Comment:* This is the last highlights cable which USDel CSCE will send. We hope these cables have served to keep addressees informed of the development of the Geneva negotiations, and that they have been useful to those who have followed CSCE from a distance.

Dale