China, 1973–1976

Kissinger's Visits to Beijing and the Establishment of the Liaison Offices, January 1973–May 1973

1. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

New York City, January 3, 1973, 10:15–11:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff

Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the United Nations
Mr. Kuo, Notetaker
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter

Ambassador Huang: Happy New Year.

Dr. Kissinger: I have been calling on your Ambassador in Paris. I don't know whether he sends you reports.

Ambassador Huang: Yes, I understood that.

Dr. Kissinger: I never know how much he understands because we have to communicate with a combination of French and English. (Ambassador Huang laughs) His French interpreter is very good, but mine isn't.

Ambassador Huang: I don't believe it.

Dr. Kissinger: It's true.

You probably realize this, but you have completely seduced Joseph Alsop. He has written articles like Harrison Salisbury did from the Soviet Union. I don't know whether you have read his articles. They have been very fair.

Ambassador Huang: Yes, I have read part of them, particularly his articles on his visit to Yunnan Province. That was a renewed visit of his; he had been there once before to the Province.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 94, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, January 1–April 14, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.

Dr. Kissinger: He told me when he came back that this was the greatest experience in his 41 years of professional journalism.

I wanted to see you principally to hand you personally a letter from the President to Premier Chou En-lai which he wanted to give you since it was not possible for me to be in China at this time. There is very little about Vietnam in it so that is not its principal . . . (Dr. Kissinger hands over the letter at Tab A and Ambassador Huang scans it.)

Ambassador Huang: It's quite a long letter. It is three pages single-spaced.

Dr. Kissinger: It attempts to summarize our view on our relationships.

Ambassador Huang: We will promptly convey this.

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted actually only to discuss two other matters with you. One, there is a great deal of speculation because of the appointment of Mr. Moynihan as Ambassador to India and also because of some of the overtures India has made to the United States. We want you to know, first of all, that until January 20th it is difficult for us to control everything that is being said by the State Department. But there will be no significant change in our policy toward the Subcontinent without prior discussion with you, and the essential elements of policy which we discussed with the Prime Minister still remain. In the next weeks we will make some shipments of arms to Pakistan, and after our new Ambassador comes to Iran we will do it on a more systematic scale. We simply wanted you to know this.

The only other subject . . . two other subjects. First, as the President says in his letter to the Prime Minister, if the Prime Minister is still interested, the President is still prepared to send me to China after the Vietnam negotiations are concluded, for a general review of the international situation before we are too far along in the second term. If the Chinese side wants to make a specific proposal, we would make every effort to make it possible, maybe toward the end of February or early March.

Now the last subject I wanted to mention to you is the Vietnam negotiation which I will start again next week. Now we have an understanding for your difficulties in this matter, but it is also a matter of extreme difficulty for us. It is simply not true that we are looking for a pretext not to sign the agreement. We feel quite frankly that your allies have courage, but they lack wisdom.

Our basic problem is that as a great power we cannot simply betray an ally, but we are prepared to make an agreement, even if our ally disagrees, which meets certain absolutely minimal conditions for us. You remember when we had dinner with the Vice Minister I told him that we thought we would sign on December 8 or 9. When we met

your Ambassador in Paris we told him we wanted to sign by December 22.[2] So it really is not true that we are holding up the agreement. The Vietnamese side has invented obstacles faster than we can remove them.

For example, let me cite one minor problem, and I don't ask you to judge its merits. (To Lord) Did you mention the question of the word "destroyed" in your presentation?

Mr. Lord: No, I did not, although I mentioned that they raised several new issues on the last day.

Dr. Kissinger: For example, with regard to military equipment, there is a provision that says that destroyed, damaged, worn-out or used-up equipment can be replaced. It has always been in there. On the last day of the last negotiations, when things were already not going well, the Vietnamese said that the word "destroyed" had to be taken out. When I asked why, they said you can't destroy something without damaging it. We had already given this language to Saigon as well as to our colleagues in Washington. I wouldn't care about the sentence if it hadn't already been in there. But for me to say that we spent the last day discussing whether one can destroy something without its being damaged won't make a good impression. It does not give an impression of seriousness.

I don't want you to get involved in the drafting details of this nature. (Ambassador Huang smiles.) I use it only as an example. The reason I am talking to you is that I read some speeches made last week in Peking, and I understand your necessities.

Mrs. Shih: Understand . . . ?

Dr. Kissinger: That you have certain necessities as well. Because I pay special attention to my old host Marshal Yeh Chen-ying. (Ambassador Huang smiles.) But that is not the issue.

We have offered the North Vietnamese to sign the agreement as it stood on November 23 with one additional modification. These are all things that had already been accepted. We are not asking for anything new, and if this is done then we have the moral basis to take very strong measures against Saigon, including cutting off aid if they don't agree. (Ambassador Huang nods slightly.)

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[2] At a dinner on November 13, 1972, Kissinger told Qiao Guanhua, PRC Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, that he sought to complete the Vietnam negotiations by December 8 or 9. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Document 166. During a late night meeting on December 7, 1972, Kissinger told Huang Zhen, then PRC Ambassador to France, that the United States had proposed a schedule that would allow the signing of a Vietnam treaty on December 22. See ibid., vol. XVII, Document 269.

But if the negotiations fail next week, I cannot possibly commit myself to be kept in Paris another two weeks and dealt with as frivolously as last time. We sent to you the transcripts of some of these meetings so you must have your own judgment, which I may say is more than we have done for our colleagues in the Foreign Ministry. So I hope you won't publish these some day.

If the negotiations now fail, we will abandon the October Agreement completely. We will not then continue to negotiate on the basis of the October Agreement. We may seek another basis of a more bilateral nature, but it will certainly not be the one we now have.

Now the consequences of this . . . we cannot believe, if we look ahead to the next four years . . . it is our conviction, as I told you before, that by 1973 when the new rocket program of your northern ally is completed, we assume certain consequences could follow, we don't know in which direction. Certainly we don't believe these weapons are being built in order to make your friends easier to deal with. What we would like to do—if it were not for the war in Vietnam—what we would like to do is to accelerate the normalization of our relationship with you and accelerate our relationships with Western Europe, and I believe for the same reasons you are accelerating your relationships with Western Europe. You have been long enough in the U.S., and you will have some judgment as to which people in the U.S. hold these convictions, and they are not very many. Therefore, the obvious consequences of discrediting the authority of the White House will go far beyond Vietnam, and conversely to get it finished would accelerate and enable us to concentrate on matters we consider to be of real priority.

We have no interest in a permanent presence in Indochina. Why should we? The decisive events in Asia will occur far north of there, and the hegemonial aspirations will not come from Washington in that area. But it is important that the American people not be so disillusioned by any events in Asia that we will be paralyzed with respect to what are the crucial events.

So if these negotiations fail, our attention will continue to focus on Indochina. We will not accept these pressures either domestically or internationally, and it will be over issues that are not essential for the major developments of the future. Conversely, if we can coexist with Peking we can certainly coexist with Hanoi. Our major concern in Indochina, which is not a central feature of our policy anyway, would be to cooperate with those who want to prevent other hegemonies from being established there.

This is simply our philosophy. I wanted the Prime Minister to know. The next two weeks will be very important. I took the liberty of asking to see you today because I am leaving Sunday and I will not be

available the next few days. I also thought it might be important for the Prime Minister to have our thinking.

These are the major things I wanted to mention to you. I don't think you have instructions to give a long reply. (Ambassador Huang laughs.)

Ambassador Huang: We will report what you said to Prime Minister Chou En-lai.

Dr. Kissinger: I also have a very selfish reason—if you can convince your allies to settle by the 10th, then we can still see one of the performances of the acrobats on the 11th. (Ambassador Huang laughs.)

Ambassador Huang: They won't leave until the 13th.

Dr. Kissinger: From Washington? I thought they would be there three days. (There was then some discussion on when the acrobats would be in Washington. It has become clear subsequently that Ambassador Huang meant they would be physically in Washington through the 13th; as the U.S. side thought, they would perform only on the 9th through the 11th.) If they are still there on the 13th I will certainly see them. But in any event I want you to know that they will be given a very warm welcome, and my office will contact them when they get there to see if there is anything to be done which will make them more comfortable.

Ambassador Huang: First, about the visit of our acrobatic troupe to the U.S. We appreciate the meticulous arrangements made by the National Committee for US-China Relations and the New York City Center as its host organization. New York is the third city the acrobats have been visiting, and we have been very satisfied with the results of the visit.

Dr. Kissinger: They are a spectacular success everywhere.

Ambassador Huang: They have been given a very warm welcome for the performances, and the acrobats have been encouraged because they feel that they have done their share and made their contribution to promoting understanding and friendship between the American and Chinese peoples. We believe that they will leave the United States with satisfaction for Latin America. And in this respect we also appreciate Dr. Kissinger's consideration, attention.

Dr. Kissinger: There are two other matters I might mention to you. We have a memorial service for President Truman in Washington.[3] There is a certain category of visitors that the President sees—everyone who is President or Vice President of a country primarily. We have

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[3] Harry S. Truman died on December 26, 1972. Foreign dignitaries attended a memorial service for him that was held at the Washington National Cathedral on January 5, 1973.

just been informed that Taiwan is sending its Vice President, so the President may see him for 15 minutes. So this has no significance. This is a protocol matter. Everyone of a certain rank is received as a courtesy by the President, only 15 minutes each.

Secondly, I wanted you to know for your own information that the Soviet Union has proposed June for the return visit of Brezhnev to the United States. We have not yet given a definite reply. We said that we will discuss it in February, but we will let you know when anything definite is arranged.

Ambassador Huang: About the Paris talks, I would like to convey a very serious piece of news. If the U.S. side truly wishes a settlement in the forthcoming private sessions, this opportunity should not be missed. It is hoped that serious reciprocal negotiations will be conducted and then fruitful results can be expected.

Dr. Kissinger: If there is a serious attitude on the other side, we will make every effort to settle it. We would like to end the war for the reasons which I have explained to you, and we will make a major effort to do so.

Is this news based on the visit of Le Duc Tho to Peking?

Ambassador Huang: I can't explain it. The last sentence of the message wishes Dr. Kissinger a happy New Year.

Dr. Kissinger: Thank you very much. I appreciate it. When I come to Peking, or through some other formula, we will be prepared to discuss Cambodia with you as I pointed out to the Prime Minister.

It is always a pleasure to see you, Mr. Ambassador, though it is not frequent enough. (Ambassador Huang smiles.)

Ambassador Huang: This evening our acrobatic troupe performed in New York City.

Dr. Kissinger: I didn't think carefully enough—maybe I should have arranged to see them here.

Ambassador Huang: We are very sorry we were late because many representatives to the United Nations were present, and also some American friends.

Dr. Kissinger: I understood that you were the host and couldn't leave. Anyway, it's such an unusual event for me to be here first.

(The Chinese then got up to leave and there was brief small talk about Mr. Alsop's enthusiasm concerning China before the Chinese left to take their own car back to their Mission.)

Tab A

Letter From President Nixon to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai[4]

Washington, January 3, 1973.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

As my second term in office begins, I would like to review with you some of the major questions that affect our two countries. I am writing this letter in lieu of Dr. Kissinger's meetings with you which I had hoped would be taking place during this period but which have had to be postponed due to Vietnam developments.

In looking back over the past four years no international development carries more significance than the reestablishment of communications and the launching of a new relationship between the People's Republic of China and the United States. It is with great personal warmth as well as historical sense that I recall my visit to your country and my frank exchanges with Chairman Mao and yourself. Let me take this occasion to reiterate that the further improvement of relations between our two countries remains one of the cardinal principles of American foreign policy.

I believe we can take satisfaction in bilateral developments since February. A good beginning has been made in people-to-people contacts and exchanges in various fields. We should expand and accelerate these efforts which are already making important contributions to mutual understanding and friendship between the Chinese and American peoples. In addition, we should continue to build on the first foundations which have been laid for meaningful Sino-American trade.

On the governmental level, I believe the candid dialogue between Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Huang in New York has served well to set forth our respective positions on major issues. In my coming term I propose we maintain this productive channel as the channel for all matters except technical issues which would continue to be discussed in Paris. These exchanges, I believe, should be supplemented by occasional personal visits which allow a more thorough and direct exposition of our policies. To this end I am prepared to accept your kind invitation and to send Dr. Kissinger to Peking as soon as the war in Vietnam has been ended through a negotiated settlement for a full review of Sino-American relations and world developments.

As you know, we have consistently fulfilled our undertaking to keep you apprised of U.S. attitudes and policies on all issues of major concern to the People's Republic of China. I intend to continue this practice

[4] No classification marking.

which I consider to be in our mutual interest. For example, you have been aware that the United States places no obstacles in the way of improved Sino-Japanese relations which we believe will contribute to peace in the Asian and Pacific region. We in turn have noted the restraint with which you have conducted your policy toward Japan. Elsewhere in the Far East, we favor the first steps toward more communication and less tension in the Korean peninsula. While this process should be left to the two Korean parties, it can only benefit all those who seek greater stability in the region. Our two governments have been in close contact with respect to South Asia, and we will continue to share with you our policy intentions toward the Subcontinent. In particular I want to assure you that any change in well-established U.S. policy toward the Subcontinent will be first discussed with the People's Republic of China. In our discussions with our allies in Western Europe we have made clear our positive attitude toward their increased communication with you.

As far as direct U.S.-Chinese dealings are concerned, I would like to reaffirm our intention to move energetically in my second Administration toward the normalization of our relations. Everything that has been previously said on this subject is hereby reaffirmed. Dr. Kissinger will be prepared to discuss this fully when he visits Peking.

We remain firmly committed to the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué,[5] including those that deal with aspirations for hegemony and spheres of influence. We believe that a vital and strong China is in the interest of world peace.

In short, a promising framework has been established in the past couple of years. But it is clear that the war in Indochina impedes the kind of further progress that so surely would benefit both our countries. We have kept you fully informed of developments in Paris in recent months, and as Dr. Kissinger will speak to this subject at some length with Ambassador Huang, I will not dwell on it in this letter. No one familiar with the recent record can in good conscience dispute the fact that the United States has made maximum efforts to restore peace in Indochina. We hope at long last to achieve that goal, but this will require from Hanoi a seriousness that was as absent in December as it was evident in October. The central question remains whether it is not in the interest of us all to bring this war to a rapid conclusion and thus remove the major obstacle to many constructive developments in international relations. This is the U.S. attitude. It will shape our approach to the negotiations which resume next week.

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[5] The Shangai Communiqué, issued on February 27, 1972, is printed in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 376–379. See also *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XVII, Document 203.

Mrs. Nixon joins me in personal greetings to you and Madame Chou and wishes for a healthy and prospering 1973.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

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2. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, January 5, 1973, 4:00–4:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Vice President Yen Chia-ken, Republic of China
Ambassador James Shen
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tsai Wei-ping

President Nixon
Richard T. Kennedy, Deputy to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Yen Chia-kan: Let me present you with this. It is a book of pictures of events since 1967.

President: I appreciate the long journey you have made to honor President Truman. It's also an opportunity for me to welcome you here.[2] I remember our meeting two years ago and my many visits to your country. I hope President Chiang is feeling better.

Yen Chia-kan: He is much better, thank you. His doctors advised him against travel. I do much of the protocol work, along with Premier Chiang Ching-kuo.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1026, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Jan.–Mar. 1973. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. In addition to the participants listed in the memorandum of conversation, the President's Daily Diary indicates that a military aide, Lieutenant Colonel William L. Golden, also attended. (Ibid., White House Central Files) A tape of this conversation is ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation, No. 834–16.

[2] Kissinger initially expressed reservations about advising Nixon to meet Yan Jiagan. (Memorandum from Kennedy to Kissinger, January 4; ibid., NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. 11, Aug 1972–Oct 24, 1973) Kissinger modified his position after receiving a letter from Department of State Executive Secretary Theodore Eliot on January 3, which argued that it was important for the President to meet Yan since he was acting as Chief of State in place of the ailing Jiang Jieshi. (Ibid., White House Special Files, Subject Files, Confidential Files, 1969–1974, [CF] CO 34–1, ROC) On January 4, Kissinger sent the President talking points for this meeting. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1026, Presidential/HAK MemCons, Jan.–Mar. 1973)

President: I know you have had problems continuing your diplomatic ties with many countries but you still have great economic strength. It comes from hard work.

Yen Chia-kan: Yes, and we will even work harder. The important part of our international relations is trade. We have a great expansion. It has increased from $4.2 billion to $5.9 billion in just two years, and it's going up. What you have done for us is bearing fruit. Our production is up per capita.

We know we will continue to work hard and face our future and keep the support of our friends. We have had an election of our legislative bodies. We are drawing more and more local people into politics, more younger people. Education is moving rapidly. We are also emphasizing citizenship and vocational education.

President: That's an excellent move.

Yen Chia-kan: You have been kind to send us scientists for technical exchange. We hope we can increase this and intensify it.

President: We will do all we can.

Yen Chia-kan: A word about our military situation. We have made the transfer of aircraft to South Vietnam as you wished.

President: The purpose was to strengthen the GVN and our common interest. We hope to break the deadlock soon. They [the North Vietnamese][3] had agreed before our election, then they back off, that's why we resumed the May 8 policy.[4] Now they are willing to start the talks again. We want to settle it—it will include a cease-fire and the return of prisoners. On the political side, there is no coalition. We want to end it, but we must end it the right way. A bug-out would hurt us everywhere in the world. The Congress is giving us a tough time.

Yen Chia-kan: We will do everything possible to coordinate our policy with yours.

On the military side, we are giving gradually more and more attention to our Air Force and Navy. We have to do everything to prevent our isolation. We will appreciate your help to keep us in international organizations. We need your help and support. We will do everything to merit your support.

You know, there is possibly oil near Taiwan. We are cooperating with U.S. oil companies on this. It's in the exploratory stage.

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[3] All brackets are in the original.

[4] On May 8, 1972, Nixon addressed the nation on the situation in Southeast Asia during which he announced the use of increased military measures against North Vietnam and the presentation of a new peace proposal. See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 583–587.

President: I hope it is there. If you had the oil Saudi Arabia had, you'd be the strongest nation in the world. You've done remarkably with your resources. It comes from hard work and organization.

Yen Chia-kan: We are helping others in land reforms. Our success in land reform is the result of many factors. We are doing multi-cropping now—with up to four crops a year. We are now producing more industrially than agriculturally. Our industrial growth is greater than our agriculture now. Your help has been very important. Ford's decision to come to Taiwan is very helpful.

President: How is Madame Chiang?

Yen Chia-kan: Fine.

President: She is strong and highly intelligent. We'll keep in close touch. If there is any change in our Ambassadors, we will let you know.

[The President gave him a Presidential ash tray and pin and escorted him to his car].

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3. Letter From Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai to President Nixon[1]

Beijing, January 6, 1973.

Mr. President,

I have received your letter of January 3, 1973.[2]

Chairman Mao has read the letter and also takes satisfaction in bilateral developments since last February.

We appreciate Mr. President's wish for continued improvement in Sino-U.S. relations as was expressed in the letter. The Chinese side believes that the normalization of relations between China and the United States step by step in accordance with the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué[3] is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples, but will also contribute to the easing of tension in Asia and the world. However, Mr. President, we would not be frank if we did not point out at the same time that the continuation of the Viet Nam

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 94, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, January 1–April 14, 1973. Top Secret; Exclusively Eyes Only. This letter was sent to Nixon under a covering letter, January 8, from Richard T. Kennedy. (Ibid.) A handwritten note on Kennedy's cover letter states, "The President has seen per RTK 1/8/73."

[2] Tab A, Document 1.

[3] See footnote 5, Document 1.

war, particularly such bombings as recently carried out by the United States against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, are bound to affect the progress of Sino-U.S. relations. We believe, as Mr. President correctly mentioned in the letter, it is in the interest of us all to bring the Viet Nam war to a rapid conclusion and thus remove the major obstacle to many constructive developments in international relations. As the Chinese saying goes, one should not lose the major for the sake of the minor, and I think it would be of significance to reflect upon these words again at this important juncture. We hope in this round of private meetings between Viet Nam and the United States, interferences can be overcome and an agreement to end the Viet Nam war finally concluded through serious reciprocal negotiations and joint efforts.

It is understandable that Dr. Kissinger's planned visit to Peking cannot materialize as originally envisaged. You are welcome to send Dr. Kissinger to Peking for a meeting at an appropriate time after the negotiated settlement of the Viet Nam war.

With regard to the series of international issues and questions concerning the development of Sino-U.S. bilateral relations as referred to in the letter, we prepare to have a direct and thorough exchange of views with Dr. Kissinger during his visit to Peking.

My wife and I thank you and Mrs. Nixon for your good wishes and extend our regards to you.

Chou En-Lai[4]

[4] The letter bears Zhou Enlai's typed signature.

4. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, January 18, 1973.

SUBJECT

Current State of Sino-American Relations, and Possibilities for the Immediate Future

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 526, Country Files, Far East, People's Republic of China, Vol. 6, Jan–Apr 1973. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum and Richard Solomon initialed it on behalf of Holdridge.

Since your last trip to Peking in June of 1972 there has been substantial movement in non-governmental contacts between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China, but largely inaction at the governmental level (in the sense of lack of PRC response to several authoritative proposals that we have made to them for negotiations or contacts of a more formal nature).

In the cultural exchange area, the Chinese sent to this country in the second half of 1972 delegations of scientists and physicians on exploratory "friendship-building" missions. In both cases, the groups were hosted by the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC, a "facilitating organization" that we had recommended to Peking in June. In addition, an acrobatic troupe made a highly successful tour of the U.S. in December and January, again under the sponsorship of a non-governmental organization that we had recommended to them—the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations.

In contrast, there has been minimal American "traffic" to China over the past six months. The National Committee was invited to send a 15 man delegation in December, and the top leadership of this group has now completed a successful visit to the PRC that included discussions with Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua and top commercial officials on exchange and trade issues. A number of American journalists visited the PRC for month-long tours in the fall; and U.S. businessmen were given increased access to the Canton Trade Fair in October and November. At the same time, the PRC has accelerated its effort to develop good relations with Chinese-Americans, in what is evidently an effort to erode a major constituency of the Republic of China on Taiwan. About 60% of all Americans traveling to China in the past year have been of Chinese ancestry; and in recent months Peking has made special efforts to bring groups of Taiwanese resident in the U.S. to the PRC for "friendship" tours.

In contrast to the above areas of activity, the PRC has not given positive responses to a number of official communications addressed to them via the Paris channel. A series of proposals presented in early November for sports and artistic exchanges, and a visitation by a group of state governors, has not been answered.[2] In late July we proposed to the PRC that we begin negotiations on the issue of private U.S. claims against the PRC, but as noted in a memorandum to you of January 3 (at Tab A),[3] their response has been an ambiguous one of expressing the intent to give our proposal "positive consideration," while in fact focussing attention on the details of individual cases and putting off

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[2] In telegram 204265 to Paris, November 9, 1972, the Department requested that the Embassy solicit Chinese reaction to possible visits to the PRC by several American groups involved in sports or music. (Ibid.)

[3] Attached but not printed.

efforts to establish a general framework for the resolution of this impediment to the expansion of economic relations.

In political matters, the PRC has taken a low-key and two-sided approach to the Vietnam situation, at once expressing verbal support for their Indochina allies, but keeping the tone of their rhetoric against the USG quite cool. On December 22, Peking made an oral protest via the Paris channel in response to the damaging of one of their ships in Haiphong Harbor during a U.S. bombing raid. Throughout the past three months, PRC public statements have continued to call for a peaceful resolution of the Vietnam war, and they have avoided attacking the President by name. More recently they have asserted, however, that the U.S. "went back on its word" in not signing the October draft agreement to end the war; [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Chinese diplomats in Europe have begun to express doubts about the "sincerity" of the U.S. in ending the war. At the same time, the PRC leadership responded to the President's New Year's greeting cards by sending a standard card of their own to the President via Paris, and in late December Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei sent a cordial letter to Secretary Rogers thanking him for the exchange of language teaching materials and requesting that such exchanges continue.

Regarding the Taiwan situation, the Chinese have begun to suggest to foreign diplomats—as Mao did last July to French Foreign Minister Schumann—that Taiwan is not really an obstacle to the normalization of Sino-American relations. In addition, Peking's media, as well as their "people-to-people" contacts with Overseas Chinese, have begun efforts to shape opinion among relevant groups of Chinese in the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan for "liberation" of the island.

Areas for Further Progress

Chinese authorities have indicated to several recent visitors that once the Vietnam war is concluded there will be an acceleration in the expansion of Sino-American relations. How far and how fast they might be prepared to move in governmental contacts remains to be seen. Following is a series of suggested bilateral actions which might be taken in the next six months or so which would visibly improve Sino-American relations and build the groundwork for more fundamental steps in the normalization process—particularly the eventual establishment of diplomatic relations. This set of issues would remove important obstacles to progress, yet each can be handled in such a way as to sustain both ambiguity and flexibility about the pace of progress in the normalization process.

Release of U.S. Prisoners

At present the PRC is detaining three American citizens. Two military officers, Major Philip Smith and Lt. Commander Robert Flynn, have been held since 1968 when their aircraft—involved in hostilities re-

lated to the Vietnam War—were shot down over Chinese territory. We assume that the PRC will be unwilling to release these men in advance of a prisoner release by Hanoi; but should progress on a peace agreement in the next month or two reach the stage of a return of American prisoners from Vietnam, it would create the context for the PRC to release these two men. Indeed, our expectation is that the Chinese are likely to release these men without our raising the issue with them as a gesture of good will in the context of an ending of hostilities in Vietnam, and as a demonstration of their desire for further progress in Sino-American relations.

A somewhat more complex case is that of John Downey, a USG employee held prisoner since Korean War days. Downey's original life sentence was commuted by the Chinese in late 1971 to five additional years. In October of that year, and again in June of 1972, the Chinese indicated to us that prisoners might obtain early release on the basis of good behavior. Otherwise, they were non-committal when you raised the Downey case with them. We have had reports over the past two months that Downey's elderly mother is in increasingly poor health. Thus, you may wish to raise again with the PRC the matter of Downey's release as a humanitarian action which would give visible reinforcement to our mutual efforts to further normalize relations. We would not be surprised, however, if the Chinese took their own initiative in this case as well as with the release of Flynn and Smith.

Economic and Trade Matters

American trade with the PRC increased significantly during 1972, totalling over $170 million with the balance strongly in our favor. Interest in the China market among U.S. businessmen has expanded along with the increase in trade, and to cope with this we have taken steps, with your approval, to form the *National Council for Sino-American Trade.* We notified the PRC of the formation of this private group via the Paris channel in late December, and now are working with State, CIEP, and Commerce to bring this council into active being.

There remain several major outstanding economic issues in Sino-American relations which impede the development of trade. In July of 1972 we proposed to the Chinese that we begin negotiations on the question of *private American claims against the PRC.* The Chinese, as noted earlier, gave an ambiguous reply to our proposal, requesting additional information on specific cases. On January 3 we sent you a memorandum,[4] on which you have not yet acted, recommending that:

—We supply the PRC with a summary of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission decisions on private U.S. claims against them.

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[4] Attached but not printed.

—We provide them as well with a recently completed Treasury census of PRC assets blocked by the USG.

—At some appropriate time you raise with PRC authorities the desirability of moving on the claims negotiations in order to further progress in the normalization process.

We have, in addition, learned that the PRC is very much interested in securing *Most Favored Nation* tariff treatment. At a time when we are planning to request MFN authority from the Congress for the Soviet Union, the PRC will undoubtedly feel discriminated against if we do not accord them equal status.

The PRC is also very interested in having a *trade exhibition* in the U.S., apparently because of their growing trade imbalance with us. PRC officials raised this matter with officials of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations during their recent visit to Peking, and suggested that the National Committee draw up a proposal for such an exhibition.

Two additional problems relate to *textile exports* and provision of *end use information for products under U.S. Export Control.* Chinese cotton textiles are entering the U.S. at an increasingly rapid rate. We have prevented Commerce from becoming too excited about this, but if imports continue, there will be complaints from the domestic producers and foreign countries whose access to the U.S. textile market is limited by negotiated quotas. With regard to end use information, the Chinese have not seen fit to provide such data. Unless they do so it will be very difficult to extend export licenses on a large number of products requiring that the purchaser provide assurance of peaceful end use. David Packard's company is one of many producers now facing this problem.

It would be very useful to discuss with PRC officials these various economic issues. Moreover, most are interrelated, or can be utilized in an integrated scenario to achieve our objective of removing impediments to the smooth development of Sino-U.S. trade. The Chinese interest in a trade exhibition and MFN might be wrapped up in a negotiating package whereby we secure payment of private claims and unpaid bonds held by American citizens. This would remove the possibility of attachment of PRC products exhibited here (although this problem could be avoided by other temporary measures) or the impounding of any of their ships or aircraft which might call at U.S. ports. Solution of the claims and blocked assets issues would be a visible step which would improve the economic climate, thus making it easier for the President to request from Congress authorization to negotiate with the PRC an MFN agreement. In addition, we could explain to the Chinese the need for end use information and the type of data required, thus facilitating their purchases of U.S. products. The textile problem presumably can be worked out amicably if we go to them with a reasonable limiting figure, ask them to confine their exports to it, and negotiate on any differences.

Permanent U.S. Representation in Peking

While PRC authorities were unresponsive to our low-key suggestion of October 1971 that we establish some form of permanent U.S. presence in Peking, progress on Vietnam and the concomitant prospect of a reduction in the U.S. military role on Taiwan may make the Chinese more inclined to accept some form of American representation in their capital. This might take a number of forms: a non-governmental "liaison office" for the purposes of coordinating trade and cultural exchange activities; a semi-official office for the same purposes, but staffed in part by USG employees who could perform communication and representational functions; or by an official presence of low visibility, such as a special interests section in the embassy of a friendly country already accredited to the PRC (presumably the British).

From the U.S. perspective a special interests section would be the preferred choice as this would give us maximum control over the selection of personnel and the conduct of affairs. However, it is our sense that at present the PRC is most likely to respond favorably to the notion of a "liaison office" related to trade and cultural coordination. Chinese trade officials, at their own initiative, mentioned to the National Committee delegation which visited Peking in December the past PRC practise of establishing unofficial trade offices with countries with which they do not have formal diplomatic relations. (This was the case with Japan and Italy before they established diplomatic relations with Peking, their trade offices then being converted to commercial sections of their embassies.) It is unclear whether this was a signal of Chinese intent. A good case can be made, however, that at this point in time interests on both sides would be served by some more formal point of contact in Peking (or offices established on a reciprocal basis in an American city as well) which would be less cumbersome than the indirect Paris channel.

Cultural and scientific exchanges are likely to expand significantly over the coming year, and the rather ad hoc planning and management arrangements which have been effective thus far will almost certainly have to be regularized. In addition, the development of Sino-U.S. trade would make reciprocal trade offices to facilitate exchange of information a logical development of value to both sides. A liaison office in Peking might be staffed by State Department specialists in cultural and economic affairs on "temporary leave," and by representatives of the National Committee, the Committee on Scholarly Communication, and the National Council on Sino-American Trade in order to give the office a semi-official status. The Chinese might wish to establish a similar type of office in the United States, probably in New York City rather than Washington given the GRC Embassy in the latter location, as well as the proximity a New York office would have to their U.N. mission and to cultural and trading centers.

5. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, February 1, 1973.

Nixon: I also think when you're in Peking you should explore the possibility of my taking another trip there. I don't know whether we should or not, but let me say—of course, if I go we have to put Japan on.

Kissinger: But that might not be bad.

Nixon: Japan is always a problem because of the radicals. But at the present time, I saw something—a Japanese poll indicating that 60% thought that the Emperor should visit us, and 78% wanted the President to go to Japan. So we have a lot of friends in Japan, you know. The Japanese are not all that dumb.

Kissinger: But if you want that option we have to invite the [unclear] Emperor over here.

Nixon: Have the Emperor first?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: I don't mind having the Emperor.

Kissinger: I mean, if we could put him on the schedule—

Nixon: That will be the only other visit this year, Henry. It can't be the Zulus or anything else.

Kissinger: But if you have him here then after that you have the option of going there.

Nixon: I would like to go to China, you see, at a time, again, a better time of year, when it's more pleasant. We might get a better reception too with the Chinese at that time.

Kissinger: Oh, no question.

Nixon: And I just don't see him again, you know what I mean? Chou En-lai?

Kissinger: Oh, you certainly would get a popular reception next time.

Nixon: Yeah. And that could be helpful.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: See?

Kissinger: I'll get this [unclear] set with Chou.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 846–2. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. The President's Daily Diary indicates that this discussion occurred as part of a longer conversation between 9:45 and 10:03 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

Nixon: Well, just tell him I'd like to do it. There are great important things that I feel that I have to turn this country around. You can tell him things like that. But I did not want to do it, but tell him that we have to meet with the Russians. But I want to keep talking to them.

Kissinger: Well, then I'll tell him that—

Nixon: That I would like to do it.

Kissinger: Well, also that we expect if the Russians attack them it's very useful to have [unclear].

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. Another point we have to have in mind is what the hell we do on Taiwan? Now, as you know, I think they might call in our chip on that. You think they will?

Kissinger: They will, yes. Well what I thought—

Nixon: Our chip there is not too much anyway. All we promised is that—

Kissinger: We'd pull out our forces.

Nixon: Cut down our sources—forces, right? Vietnam related forces come out anyway.

Kissinger: The Vietnam related forces come out immediately. And the other ones would be reduced gradually.

Nixon: So do it.

Kissinger: I thought I should preempt it by telling them when I get there that we will pull out the Vietnam related forces and give them a schedule.

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: That way they can't raise the other forces.

Nixon: Yeah. But you see, what the Chinese have done to work out, Henry, is this. And I don't know whether this is in their—I mean, it wouldn't be possible with the jackasses from North Vietnam. The Chinese may be subtle enough to understand. Taiwan is such a bustling, productive, et cetera community, they ought to work out some kind of federation, you know what I mean?

Kissinger: I think they're willing to do that.

Nixon: What I call—like basically, Puerto Rico. And I mean let both flowers bloom. See my point?

Kissinger: What I think they will come to, what they will gradually accept—

Nixon: Otherwise it's war. You know what I mean?

Kissinger: No, they won't use force. That you can count on.

Nixon: Well, not with us. But how else are they going to get the Taiwanese, for example? [unclear] But I don't see—the Taiwanese are doing so well economically, Henry, they're never going to let, never going to say, "All right, we're now going to become part of the PRC." Never.

Kissinger: No, it's not going to happen that way. I think what they will want from us—well first, that we pull out some of our forces. That will get us through this year.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: For the time being, what they really want from us is protection against Russia. Taiwan is subsidiary. Eventually, we may have to come to a position similar to Japan's, which is that we maintain consular relations in Taiwan and diplomatic relations in Peking, in return for a promise by them they wouldn't use force against Taiwan, but we hope that Chiang Kai-shek will have died before then.

Nixon: Japan has consular relations with Taiwan?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: It'd be a bitch for us.

Kissinger: It'd be a bastard.

Nixon: Well, the thing to do is to have it build up—

Kissinger: But this wouldn't be, I don't see that—

Nixon: The thing to do is have it build up in American public opinion before then. We just got to do it.

Kissinger: It can't happen much before '75.

Nixon: The later the better. I still think Chou En-lai should consider—reconsider—not Washington, but San Clemente. You see my point?

Kissinger: Let me talk to him about it.

Nixon: You see my point?

Kissinger: What he could do is go to the UN.

Nixon: He could go to the UN; we've talked about that. And then we'd meet up there, you mean?

Kissinger: No. In connection to that, stop in San Clemente.

Nixon: Oh, I see. I will not in 4 years go to the UN. I'm never going there again.

Kissinger: But of course, it hurts you. If he goes to the UN, he's going to give a tough—

Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: Now the disadvantage of having Brezhnev in October is that he'll certainly go to the UN.

Nixon: Oh, well, Henry that's part of it. What the hell do we care.

Kissinger: We shouldn't care.

Nixon: Look, we always worry about them huffing and puffing. There are worse things.

Kissinger: I think, Mr. President, from our point of view, assuming—we could find a formulation on that nuclear treaty that doesn't

drive the Chinese up the wall. The Russians are sufficiently eager to have it, so if we could keep it out there in front of them until October it would buy us good Russian behavior for the rest of [unclear].

[Omitted here is discussion of Kissinger's schedule.]

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6. National Security Decision Memorandum 204[1]

Washington, February 6, 1973.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce

SUBJECT

Sale of Inertial Navigation Systems to the People's Republic of China

The President has considered your memoranda on this subject[2] and has decided that the United States should approve the export of eight inertial navigational systems to be included on four Boeing 707 aircraft, as well as that number of INS required for the three Concordes sold to the People's Republic of China. He has disapproved transferring inertial guidance systems from the U.S. Munitions Control List.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–238, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 204. Secret. Robert Hormats, with the concurrence of Executive Director of the Council for International Economic Policy Peter Flanigan, sent a January 22 memorandum to Kissinger recommending approval of the sale and disapproval of the transfer of civil inertial navigational systems to the Commodity Control List. (Ibid.) On January 30, Hormats sent Kissinger a memorandum recommending the approval of the draft NSDM which Kissinger initialed and forwarded to the President, who also approved it. (Ibid.)

[2] Acting Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson sent Nixon a November 24, 1972, memorandum supporting the sale of inertial navigation systems to China and advocating the transfer of civil INS from the U.S. Munitions List, overseen by the Department of State, to the Commodity Control List, administered by the Department of Commerce. Johnson noted, "the Departments of Commerce and State and the Federal Aviation Administration are satisfied that separate definitions can be found to distinguish civil from military INS equipment for purposes of export control safeguards." (Ibid.) On January 4, 1973, Laird sent the President a memorandum opposing both the sale of INS to China and the proposed transfer of INS to the Commodity Control List. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0001, Box 66, China Reds, 452, 1973)

Approval of the sale of INS in this specific case is subject to the following conditions:

—The manufacturer shall retain control by means of serial numbers and shall report annually to the Department of Commerce on maintenance and supply of spares for each unit.
—The equipment should be of the technology level of the Delco Carousel IV or the Litton LTN–51.
—Maintenance and repair standards should be of a Delco "level 0."
—The Boeing sale shall provide only eight extra INS units.

Future export of INS shall continue to be decided on the merits of each case.

Henry A. Kissinger

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7. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, February 7, 1973.

SUBJECT

Grant Military Assistance for Taiwan

Defense, State, and we had agreed that because military equipment grants to Taiwan were so small they are not important to ROC security.[2] We also agreed that defense of our entire Security Assistance Program on the Hill would be greatly eased if we could eliminate the small matériel portion of the FY '74 Taiwan program. Accordingly, we substantially increased the Foreign Military Sales credit requested for

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI, Aug 1972–Oct 24, 1973. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: "The President has seen." At the bottom of the memorandum is a typed note: "Flanigan concurs." With Holdridge's concurrence, Richard Kennedy sent this memorandum to Kissinger under cover of a January 17 memorandum, recommending he transmit it to the President. (Ibid.)

[2] According to Kennedy's January 17 covering memorandum to Kissinger, the NSC staff in cooperation with the Departments of Defense and State decided to eliminate the military assistance programs to Taiwan and Greece in anticipation of the Congressional discussion of military aid for the 1974 fiscal year. Kennedy noted that the small amount of aid, when combined with the size and growth of Taiwan's economy, made feasible a shift from grant matériel programs to arms sales backed by more generous U.S. Foreign Military Sales credits.

Taiwan and dropped $4 million for grant matériel. ($6 million of grants for training and supply operations would be retained.)

The Secretary of Defense now has urged that we continue a $10 million grant program.[3] This would actually have the effect of merely reinstating the $4 million in matériel grants.

Given the major increase in military sales credits being made available to Taiwan and continuance of our grant training program, I do not believe this is essential. Moreover, I believe we will get more Congressional support for our total program request if we eliminate this very small matériel request from the list.

The Chinese will understand and have for some time been counting on the sales program to satisfy their military hardware needs.

Secretary Rogers continues to believe that it is not necessary to provide the $4 million in matériel grants. Cap Weinberger agrees.

If you approve, I will so advise Secretary Richardson.[4]

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[3] Laird defended the continuation of the program by citing Taiwan's assistance to the U.S. war effort in Indochina and warned about the uncertainties of the Congressional authorizations that would be used to reimburse Taiwan. (Memorandum from Laird to Nixon, January 13; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0001, China Nats, 091.3, 1973)

[4] Nixon signed the Approve option. On February 14, Scowcroft informed Laird of the decision to eliminate the Military Assistance matériel grants to Taiwan. (Memorandum from Scowcroft to Laird, February 14; ibid.)

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8. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, February 15, 1973, 5:57–9:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council
Chi Peng-fei, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Chang Wen-chin, Assistant Foreign Minister

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 98, Country Files, Far East, HAK China Trip, Memcons & Reports (originals), February 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People. Kissinger visited Beijing as part of an 11-day trip to East Asia that included stops at Bangkok, Vientiane, Hanoi, and Tokyo.

Wang Hai-jung, Assistant Foreign Minister
Ting Yuan-hung, Staff
T'ang Wen-sheng, Staff (interpreter)
Shen Jo-yun, Staff (interpreter)
Ma Chieh-hsien, Staff
Lien Cheng-pao, Staff

Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Alfred LeS. Jenkins, Department of State
Mr. John H. Holdridge, NSC Staff
Colonel Richard T. Kennedy, NSC Staff
Mr. Winston Lord, NSC Staff
Mrs. Bonnie Andrews, Notetaker

(The Premier greeted Dr. Kissinger and his party and led them to the table where the meeting was held. The meeting was preceded by conversation regarding members of Dr. Kissinger's staff who were visiting the People's Republic of China for the first time.)

Prime Minister Chou: (Referring to Mr. Kennedy.) Is he part of the Kennedy family?

Dr. Kissinger: He is a partial replacement for General Haig. He is a financial expert.

P.M. Chou: You mean you want to talk finances.

Dr. Kissinger: He isn't really.

P.M. Chou: And this is the first time for Mrs. Andrews. Welcome.

Dr. Kissinger: The only time I ever exchanged economic views was in the Azores and I was extremely successful because I did not know what I was doing. I had to stick to what I had written down. I couldn't yield. Like your Vice Minister at the UN.

P.M. Chou: This time you also fought another war?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. That was a very long and difficult negotiation. Perhaps they will continue.

I don't think your southern friends survived for 2,000 years by being easy to get along with.

P.M. Chou: Not necessarily. It is indeed a very precious thing for a country to have such an independent spirit.

Dr. Kissinger: We will have to continue talking with them. I think we have made a reasonable beginning and I think that we are now on a positive course.

P.M. Chou: First of all in welcoming you here we want to congratulate you on the successful negotiation in Paris.[2] So today we meet

[2] On January 27, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the South Vietnamese Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) signed a peace agreement in Paris.

here to welcome you and to hear what you envision. You may begin. And you can say anything you want.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, on behalf of my colleagues I want to thank you for the warmth with which we have been received. It is always an honor to be here.

P.M. Chou: That is what we are supposed to do.

Dr. Kissinger: You are supposed to carry out foreign policy on the basis of interests, but there is also a strong feeling of warmth. But Mr. Prime Minister I thought I would depart from my past custom of reading a long statement to you. I have this whole book here.[3] I thought I would talk to you in a general way of why we think this meeting is important and why this is an opportune time for the U.S. and the PRC to exchange views on the future direction of our relations. When I came here first in July 1971, we made an important decision to begin normalization of our relations and to set a definite direction of improving relations between our two countries. And we more or less fulfilled the general direction which we had established. Now we are again at a point where we can make important decisions. You have always been very frank in telling us that the war in Vietnam was a major obstacle to improving our relations. Now the war has a negotiated conclusion. Of course, history will not stop in Southeast Asia and, of course, difficulties will remain. But we now have an opportunity, given the nature of the complexities of our task, to put Southeast Asia into the context of our larger relationship. Let me, therefore, review what I think it might be worthwhile discussing on this occasion.

—We should make a general appreciation of the state of our relationship.

—We should talk about the specific problems connected with the normalization of relations:

- The problems of Taiwan. The Taiwan problems and the specific steps we intend to take regarding it and over what period of time.
- The relationship that the PRC and the U.S. can have in the interval.

—We are prepared to discuss also our assessment of the international situation in general. In this connection two problems are of paramount importance:

- Our assessments and our intention with respect to our relations with the Soviet Union.
- The relationships and the future evolution of Southeast Asia.

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[3] Winston Lord oversaw the creation of Kissinger's briefing book for his trip to China. (Ibid., Visit to the PRC, Briefing Book, February 1973)

We are also prepared to discuss with the Prime Minister our assessment of the evolution in Korea and Japan, and to have an exchange of views on South Asia.

P.M. Chou: South Asia?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. India and Pakistan. And also to discuss with the Prime Minister what is likely to happen in European politics this year. We have followed with great interest the visits of various European leaders to China and we believe that their experience here has been very good for what we detect as our common objectives. I remember my conversation with the Prime Minister last summer. I believe that the impact of China on the general situation is in the direction which we have discussed. While I have been here I have already mentioned to the Assistant Minister some of the special problems which I am prepared to discuss when we are in smaller groups and I think we might have a review of the general problems that are being discussed in the Paris channel. These are the major topics which I propose, but, before we turn to them specifically perhaps the Prime Minister will permit me to make some general observations.

First, I think that the Prime Minister notices that I am especially inhibited in his presence right now.

P.M. Chou: Why?

Dr. Kissinger: Because I read his remark to the press that I am the only man who can talk to him for a half hour without saying anything.

P.M. Chou: I think I said one hour and a half.

Dr. Kissinger: This is true. But it destroys my professional secret. The only thing that reassured me was that the Assistant Minister told me on the plane that the Kuomintang knew your strategy but couldn't do anything about it.

Now on the general observations that I wanted to make. We find our relationship to have developed in an usually profitable direction and not by accident, because between China and the United States there are no basic differences except those which have been produced by historical accident. When I came here the first time the Prime Minister mentioned to me that various countries were combining to bring pressure to bear on China, but as far as the U.S. is concerned now and in the future, a strong, self-reliant, independent China exercising control over its own destiny is in our own interest and a force for peace in Asia. So our relationship is not an accident of personalities but based on very fundamental calculations. We both are opposed to hegemonial aspirations, not because we want to do each other a favor, but because a drive toward hegemony in one direction must inevitably seek hegemony in another direction. So we believe that our assessment of the situation is very comparable.

Now let me speak first about our special problem, the problem of Taiwan. The Prime Minister is aware of a number of understandings we have with respect to Taiwan. I think it is important that at the beginning of a second term and at the end of the Vietnam war that we reaffirm those in a very formal way. We have said to the Chinese side, and we have had publicly stated in the Shanghai Communiqué, that we acknowledge that all sides recognize there is only one China. We reaffirm that.

P.M. Chou: That was a famous quotation of yours—all Chinese on all sides of the Taiwan Strait agree there is only one China. I have heard that there is a tendency to copy that phrase in other places.

Dr. Kissinger: It was reported to you, but then I thought we had a monopoly on it.

Mr. Jenkins: It is patented.

P.M. Chou: Pardon?

Dr. Kissinger: He speaks with a southern accent some of the time. Secondly, we have affirmed, and reaffirmed, that we will not support an independence movement on Taiwan or encourage it. Thirdly, we will use our influence to discourage any other countries from moving into Taiwan or supporting Taiwan independence. Fourth, we will support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and we will give no support whatsoever to an attack from Taiwan against the China mainland, and we will of course work, as I have said before, toward seeking a normalization of our relations. I am reaffirming this only because we had an election and because the war is over in Vietnam, and want no misunderstanding that this was for tactical reasons or because of the election in the U.S. This is the considered policy of our Government. Also, we told you, both I and the President, that upon the conclusion of the Vietnam war we would reduce our forces on Taiwan. During this visit I will give you a precise schedule of our reduction during this year, and it will be substantial. This is being done on a confidential basis because we cannot start until our withdrawal from Vietnam is completed in April. But I will give you a precise schedule.

P.M. Chou: They are saying that you are going to build or assist Chiang Kai-shek to build fighters on Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger: There are two problems—two separate propositions. One is to give Chiang Kai-shek the Phantom fighter plane. This we have refused. We have not yet made the official notification but I tell you it has been refused and he will be notified during the next week.

The second is not the production but the assembly from U.S. parts of some shorter range fighter planes to replace fighter planes that we borrowed for some other purpose. These planes cannot reach the mainland.

P.M. Chou: They might be able to come but they won't be able to go back.

Dr. Kissinger: No, they don't have the reach to come.

P.M. Chou: If they don't want to go back they can come here!

Dr. Kissinger: But that might be true of the F–4s too. But this . . . we are aware of our understanding in this respect of not augmenting their capability. Our intention in some of these measures is to make it easier for us to disengage from the direct military supply relationship, and we will be prepared to discuss with the Prime Minister future steps that can be taken after this year. At any rate I want to repeat what was discussed when the President was here, and in addition to the steps that I mentioned to the Prime Minister, we will complete the steps that we envisioned while the President was here during the present term of the President. Part of these will occur before our election in 1974, and the remainder after the election.

Translator: You mean the mid-term election?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. In the meantime we are prepared to proceed as rapidly with the specific steps toward normalization as the PRC may be prepared to take. I would like to explain to the Prime Minister our reasoning. We believe that in assessing military developments, certain proposals which have been made to us, and about which we have informed you, have been submitted against other nations, from which it is not inconceivable that in the next three years some other country may want to develop at least the opportunity for realizing hegemonial aspirations toward one side or the other. I do not predict what will happen, but I am saying that there is a better than even chance it will happen during the term of our President. And when we discuss some of the special problems we can explain to you why. We consider it important.

P.M. Chou: This other country that you mention is seeking hegemonial aspirations. So you mean that they seek hegemonial aspirations toward Taiwan in particular or toward the whole Asian-Pacific region?

Dr. Kissinger: The whole Asian-Pacific region. They may develop some moves toward Taiwan, but basically with respect to the whole Asian-Pacific region.

P.M. Chou: It may also get its satellite countries to cooperate. You probably got some information in Hong Kong.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but also in some of the conversations which we and you might be familiar with here. It is very noticeable that they have had some conversations with satellite countries, and for that matter with some Western European countries.

Now with respect to the Soviet Union, we are pursuing a very complicated policy which I will explain to you, and when we discuss it, will be discussed in more detail. At this point I want to concentrate

on the basic objectives. We want to bring about a situation in which it becomes clear to our people that an attempt to bring about hegemony in the Asian-Pacific region is not only contrary to the Joint Communiqué, but to point out to our people that the Joint Communiqué represents a basic U.S. interest and is not just polite words issued at the conclusion of the visit. So when we speak about speeding up the process of normalization and make it more visible, it is frankly not because we consider the existing channels inadequate. Almost always they work extremely well. But, because it is important, we believe, in the 2–3 years we have had available, to stress to some extent the symbolic nature of this relationship. Frankly, this is our attitude toward trade, exchanges, and those other matters. To us, it is not a commercial problem, and in this respect our attitude is quite different from the Japanese attitude.

P.M. Chou: But our approach is even far away from the Japanese approach. Has your Department of Commerce given you statistical information?

Dr. Kissinger: Actually, our commercial relationship has developed extremely well.

P.M. Chou: But the situation about Sino-American trade is quite the opposite than to Sino-Japanese trade because your imports of Chinese commodities are much less than our imports of American commodities and much less than the rate of imports from Japan. I can give you examples. And, actually some of the trade between China and the U.S. last year has been indirect although it need not be indirect. It was because of some statement by the press last year that compared our agricultural situation with the Soviet Union's and the fact that the harvest last year was less than the year before, that made us call off the trade.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I now about that, and it's also the total inability of some of the departments to keep quiet. We have finally taught a few persons in the State Department, such as Mr. Jenkins, he is one of them. He is here on probation. (laughter)

P.M. Chou: I think we should also put in a good word for Mr. Rogers. On many occasions he says the same things as you. So, it is good for him to come with you? Also, Mr. Jenkins.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, because if so we have some continuity in our policy.

P.M. Chou: And we think that is one of the good things about your President's serving a second term.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly. You can be sure that his policies will be such as not to be affected by any changes. So that is why we think that this exchange at the very beginning of the new Administration can be very

significant. This is our general approach, and it is in this spirit that I am planning to conduct our discussions. And now I would be happy to speak about any subject more thoroughly—I know I need not tell the Prime Minister this.

P.M. Chou: I would like to thank you first of all for your initial assessment and explanation. And since you have mentioned the international situation I would like to ask you what are the views of the Nixon Government in its second term regarding the over-all situation? Do you think we are moving toward a kind of relaxation, or toward a more intense competition, including a military competition?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, Mr. Prime Minister, we speak a great deal about an era of peace, and there are certain factors which point in that direction. I think, for example, that if certain leading countries show restraint in Southeast Asia, that that area can be tranquil over the next four years. But when we speak in longer term trends I must give the Prime Minister our honest opinion that there are countervailing factors as well. First, there is the factor of the intensive Soviet military preparation which occurred really in all directions simultaneously. Now, I may have a too skeptical assessment of human nature, but I cannot believe that these preparations are being made so that the Soviet leaders can be more pleasant toward us. And, indeed, for the Prime Minister's information I have just ordered a study by our intelligence department of what rationale such leaders might have in their minds when they push for an increase of both strategic and tactical weapons in this particular time frame. We know the facts, but we need the motivation.

The second factor in the situation is the intellectual confusion in Western Europe. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister have had occasion to meet with many of the leaders of Western Europe. I don't know if you agree with my judgment, that this is not a period in which leadership in Europe is accomplished via precision of thought. So one problem is that you have here, in effect, local party chieftains who are conducting foreign policy from domestic considerations and who seek to avoid difficulties and complications over what might happen. The result is that one of the richest areas in the world is not playing this role to which its history and resources entitle it and, therefore, it is not acting as a counterweight to the extent it should. We will, if you are interested, discuss this more in relation to the European Security Conference and the MBFR Conference. A third problem area is Japan.

P.M. Chou: Before you go into that I would like to interrupt. Do you know a bit about Chairman Mao's conversation with Mr. Schumann?

Dr. Kissinger: I know Mr. Schumann's version, which improves with each month.

P.M. Chou: But I believe he transmitted the Chairman's words to Pompidou.

Dr. Kissinger: I only know what he told us.

P.M. Chou: One of the things that the Chairman told Mr. Schumann was that if a great war broke out in Europe, including a large-scale nuclear war, France would still have to rely on the U.S. This maybe shook them a bit.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, it did. Since this is not necessarily the policy of the French Government he didn't tell us quite that much, only about one half of it. But I have enough experience now with the Chinese way of presenting issues to know that if you present anything at all, you do it completely. So I assumed somewhat more was said than what we were told.

P.M. Chou: Sir Alec Douglas-Home seemed to have more understanding.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, yes.

P.M. Chou: And the results of the West German elections is that the two original parties are still in power. But it was the foreign spokesman of the minority party who came to China.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

P.M. Chou: But, they also have to admit that after their Ostpolitik has been put into effect, changes have now begun to appear.

Dr. Kissinger: The Germans believe that if there is a choice between two policies, the best thing is to carry them out simultaneously. (laughter)

P.M. Chou: Maybe that is why their original Ambassador to the U.S. has now been sent to our country—because he supported Adenauer. And, therefore, it might be more suitable to accredit him to China than to your country.

Dr. Kissinger: We would be prepared to support Adenauer's party but it can't seem to win an election.

P.M. Chou: But Mr. Schroeder came first to China, and his work was done not too badly.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, his work was done well.

P.M. Chou: The question in Europe is not entirely one of ideological confusion, but because there are peaceful illusions which were created by those now in power, and the people might have been taken in. The Soviet Union has made great use of that. I believe you said that we represented Western Europe in meetings with Western European Foreign Ministers, and indeed, I said to each foreign minister from Western Europe that I didn't believe peaceful illusions should be maintained. It seemed that Mr. Schroeder has a clear idea of that.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, he had. The election was lost by stupidity. But, I agree with the Prime Minister on two counts. First, with respect to Germany, within two years they will face a serious dilemma between Ostpolitik and the requirements of maintaining their western orientation. They will find this course did not advance their national aspirations and will lead to great domestic confusion.

P.M. Chou: But they seem to have treated you rather well in the recent battle to support the U.S. dollar.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, they are not anti-American. And they do not intend to move toward the Soviet Union, at least not at the present time.

P.M. Chou: That can generate quite large-scale illusions.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly. The danger is not what they intend but the process they can start. They have reached about the limit of their present course, and then they will have to decide whether to make endless concessions or go back closer to the Adenauer line. Many European leaders as individuals know what is necessary, but don't dare carry it out for domestic reasons.

P.M. Chou: This is one of the results created since the end of the Second World War.

Dr. Kissinger: This is true.

P.M. Chou: Perhaps they want to push the ill waters of the Soviet Union in another direction—eastward.

Dr. Kissinger: They don't think in such long-range terms, but perhaps they may bring that about too.

P.M. Chou: Not necessarily, but we can discuss it at a later time. Is that what you are thinking about?

Dr. Kissinger: Whether the Soviet Union attacks eastward or westward is equally dangerous for the U.S. The U.S. gains no advantage if the Soviet Union attacks eastward. In fact, if the Soviet Union attacks it is more convenient if it attacks westward because we have more public support for resistance.

P.M. Chou: Yes, therefore, we believe that the Western European aspiration to push the Soviet Union eastward is also an illusion.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think that they want to push the Soviet Union eastwards. They believe that the Soviets don't have any aggressive intentions anyway.

P.M. Chou: Do you believe that?

Dr. Kissinger: No. It is inconsistent with their military preparations. Every time we analyze the Soviet military preparations—and I am not talking about Siberia, but the strategic forces pointed toward the U.S., there is an intense effort of major military proportions going forward which cannot be accounted for unless one assumes that the option of use is being prepared. So, to get back to the original point,

we have to prevent the Soviet Union from breaking out in one direction or another in the next four years. Resisting in the East is politically and psychologically more difficult for us. The West is easier, and we have no interest in pushing them to the East. But the consequences to us of not preventing their pushing to the East is equally dangerous for us. This is our assessment.

P.M. Chou: Therefore, we have to prepare for their coming.

Dr. Kissinger: That is correct.

P.M. Chou: But it seems that Western Europe is not in this respect so fully prepared.

Dr. Kissinger: For an attack on the West or East?

P.M. Chou: For an attack on them. At least they do not realize the menace it presents.

Dr. Kissinger: The Europeans do things which pass comprehension, and can only be done by irresponsible leadership. For example, I have one personal obsession with respect to NATO. NATO military dispositions are supposed to be on the basis of supplies for 90 days, but they have done it on an average basis so that in some categories there are 120 days and in others, 35 days, as if a war can be run on anything but a minimum basis. So they don't do you any good if sometimes you run out of the goods. (laughter) This is the bureaucrats' conception of strategy. Then they have not standardized among each other the rate of gasoline, etc. So we do not even know what it means. I don't want to bore you with these details, Mr. Prime Minister, but this is something that I will settle within the next two years because I won't stop until it is settled. This is too stupid not to be solved.

P.M. Chou: Yes, and this is something that the Soviet Union can use both militarily and politically to break down the Western European countries one by one.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, especially politically because I believe it is too dangerous for the Soviet Union to attack Western Europe. We have 7,000 nuclear weapons in Western Europe and many other weapons, and they can never be confident enough that we won't use them. You know the Soviet leaders. I made a comment about their bureaucracy which they did not like. They do not like to take excessive risks.

P.M. Chou: What I meant by military and political aspects was that they would use this military threat to overcome the Western European countries politically one by one.

Dr. Kissinger: I believe that they will first create such an atmosphere of peace that they can thereby free themselves to move East or South.

P.M. Chou: We think that first of all they want to achieve a certain success in dividing the Western Europe nations politically. So in this

aspect you should forgive President Pompidou because if you don't help him in the election and it falls to the Communists or Socialists, the situation will be greatly different.

Dr. Kissinger: We strongly favor Pompidou.

P.M. Chou: You must forgive other points. It isn't easy for him to turn around that corner.

Dr. Kissinger: We forgive. We have shown considerable restraint. We didn't respond to him as we did to his colleague in Sweden.

P.M. Chou: The comparison is favorable to the Swedes in that they stayed the same, while you faced Madame Gandhi, an Asian, down. This does not add much luster to Asia. As soon as the Secretary of State opened his mouth she softened.

Dr. Kissinger: I liked the fact that she said she wasn't talking especially about the U.S. I have been looking for a country that she might have been talking about.

P.M. Chou: And Mr. Heath probably also had some complaints to present in the White House although he is one of your friends.

Dr. Kissinger: In the relations among friends there are always some problems but he didn't have any significant complaints. He would agree with what you and I are saying. We have a problem, I say this confidentially, about the British nuclear program which is becoming obsolete because of advances in the Soviet Union's program. And we, again this is very confidential, we are working on ways to keep them in the nuclear business because we don't want them to leave it. We are in the process of determining what of our advanced technology we can give them. And we will solve this problem. But it was a very amicable discussion. There were no disagreements.

P.M. Chou: But in the economic field there is always trouble.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but between Britain and us there are less than between Western Europe and us.

P.M. Chou: But, of course, Britain is also part of Western Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but it can be a positive influence in this respect and in retrospect we probably made a mistake in the 1950's—several mistakes by Mr. Dulles—we discouraged them from integrating in defense in favor of economic union. We should have done both.

P.M. Chou: So that resulted in the military and economic fields developing in an unbalanced way.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly, they are very strong economically, and weak militarily.

P.M. Chou: But, of course, the Soviet Union has its own weak points. They are just the opposite.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly, but this may create an incentive at some point to use the military machine while it is still so strong.

P.M. Chou: But once they begin that action there will be no end. This will be a mess for them.

Dr. Kissinger: That is true. And, of course, they must decide if they do it, which direction they want to go.

P.M. Chou: We would welcome it. Would you like to talk about Japan?

Dr. Kissinger: So, if you want we can go on to Japan.

P.M. Chou: Do you want to take a five minute break?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

(The meeting adjourned at 7:35 p.m. It resumed again at 7:47 p.m.)

Dr. Kissinger: (Speaking of comedians) There are some American comedians who want to come to China and they are driving me crazy. There is one who . . . You probably don't know about it . . . Bob Hope is a very famous comedian who wanted to do a show in China. He wanted to film his own show in China and he kept plaguing me and I . . . So he submitted a letter to Ottawa and you wrote back, I mean your Government wrote back, saying he had addressed it to the Republic of China. (laughter) So you wrote back that since he addressed it to the wrong country that you couldn't accept it now. I think in any event that your Embassy in Ottawa must operate very efficiently. I know one man who sent a request for a visa. He was told the time was not appropriate. He said, could he leave an application? He was told no, applications were accepted only from those who were given visas. (laughter)

P.M. Chou: So, should we go on to Japan.

Dr. Kissinger: With respect to Japan I am still advocating the negative aspects of its involvement in the world. We think that the normalization of relations between Japan and the PRC is a good thing.[4] It is in our interests. And, as the Prime Minister knows, we not only did not place obstacles in the way, we encouraged it.

P.M. Chou: Yes, because you know that it is our policy to do things step by step and you know also that we do not exclude their contacts with others, and, therefore, it has never touched upon your relations. We only borrowed one sentence from the Shanghai Communiqué. A statement which you signed and which they accepted. A common statement that neither side would seek hegemony. It was copied word for word.

Dr. Kissinger: That is a good stance to generalize.

P.M. Chou: We did it to realize a strategic part of our requirement, and as soon as we did it, a fourth country became nervous and unhappy. A fourth country because three others have already given their views on this.

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[4] The People's Republic of China and Japan signed a joint statement on September 29, 1972, that established diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Dr. Kissinger: They also pointed that out to us.

P.M. Chou: In your Moscow Communiqué,[5] you changed that sentence to a different version. Perhaps that was the result of a controversy.

Dr. Kissinger: What did it say?

P.M. Chou: I don't have it with me.

Dr. Kissinger: I think it said that we "would not seek" hegemony rather than that we "would oppose" it.

P.M. Chou: Perhaps. But in our Communiqué we said that neither should seek hegemony and that we opposed other countries from seeking that hegemony.

Dr. Kissinger: In any declaration we make with the Soviets, our problem is not to provide anything that will bring an action by them against other countries. Oh, it is related in the Soviet-U.S. Communiqué to the UN Security Council. There is no specific sentence about hegemony. (Dr. Kissinger reads the text.)

P.M. Chou: I think it was something about security interest on a reciprocal basis. It was in the Twelve Principles.[6]

Dr. Kissinger: (Mr. Kissinger reads a section of the Communiqué.) Yes. "They will always exercise restraint in their mutual relations, and will be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means." But it makes no specific reference to hegemony. It says "they will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war . . ." "Discussions and negotiations will be conducted in a spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommodation and mutual benefit."

P.M. Chou: Perhaps it was.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. To go back to Japan, we value your relations positively because we think it is important that Japan be anchored with as many countries as possible that have peaceful intentions. The danger in Japan is what we already discussed, that the very aggressive economic nationalism which now exists could in time become political nationalism and perhaps even military nationalism.

P.M. Chou: That is what we had previously discussed—that economic expansion would lead into military expansion.

Dr. Kissinger: And certain tendencies indicate at least—our experience is (I don't know what yours has been) that the individual Japan-

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[5] The text of the agreements signed in Moscow during President Nixon's visit in May 1972 are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 26, 1972, pp. 918–927. The text of the Joint Communiqué is ibid., pp. 899–902.

[6] The text that Nixon and Brezhnev signed on May 29, 1972, laying out the twelve basic principles for U.S.-Soviet relations, is ibid., pp. 898–899.

ese leaders are not particularly impressive but the over-all Japanese performance is extremely impressive. And there is also a danger that if the Japanese pursue this economic policy so aggressively they could get sucked into arrangements with other people with less peaceful intentions in Siberia, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, which could affect their interests. But I only mention this on a balance sheet of positive and negative factors. On the whole, developments have been positive. And then, of course, among the several areas which could lead to difficulties is the Middle East. If the Prime Minister asks me, as I look ahead, do we foresee a period of quiet, I would have to say that the majority of the American people and perhaps a majority of our Government *do* foresee a period of quiet. But, the President, who demonstrated his ability to make the decisions, holds the assessment that I have given. Therefore, you shouldn't be misled by even official statements unless they come from the White House if they deal with the strategic situation.

P.M. Chou: Can you say something about the Middle East?

Dr. Kissinger: In the Middle East, right now the situation is that no conceivable solution will leave the Israelis in as strong a position as they are in now, so therefore they are now not willing for a solution. But any solution which the Israelis are likely to accept will be unlikely to be acceptable to the Arabs. Nor am I sure that the Soviet Union really wants a settlement in the Middle East.

P.M. Chou: In my opinion, that is not true either. I think you are wrong.

Dr. Kissinger: You don't agree with me? How?

P.M. Chou: No, it is that our views approach yours. If the Soviet Union feels that a certain kind of settlement would be in their interest, they would be willing to accept it step by step.

Dr. Kissinger: But they now maneuver in such a way that it is difficult to settle step by step, because they always get enough ahead of the Arabs to prevent them from getting a step by step settlement but don't give them enough military equipment to allow them to reach a military solution.

P.M. Chou: And they not only want to maintain their position in the Middle East but also to use it to expand their influence westward in the Mediterranean Ocean and into the Indian Ocean in the East. They actually have made advances in there and also in the Persian Gulf.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

P.M. Chou: And recently there has been a most ugly incident. Three hundred machine guns were found in Pakistan in the Iraqi Embassy, with Soviet markings. That was only the portion that was discovered, and there are more in the hands of the Baluchistanis.

Dr. Kissinger: I can tell you that this was one reason why we sent Mr. Helms to Iran[7]—because he understands these special problems and he will have more authority than our normal Ambassador does.

P.M. Chou: In this aspect, your steps have been taken too slowly and prudently but the Soviet Union has not ceased its activities in the Subcontinent and in the Middle East. And, as soon as the Egyptians chased out their foreign advisers, they immediately settled upon the Iraqis. As soon as the British recognized Iranian sovereignty over the three islands (the Tunbs) the Soviet Union took the opposite course and supported Iraq in breaking relations with Iran. And, when Pakistan has been having some internal disruption, then the Soviet Union has never ceased to support nationalistic ambitions in northwest Pakistan and to send them arms. Therefore, you can see they want to link up the issues of the Middle East with those of the Subcontinent, and one must have sufficient assessment of the new Czars in comparison with the old. The new ones are extremely sly. You must not think that they are overly honest, because the Brezhnev doctrine[8] on the one hand has timid aspects and they talk about reducing nuclear weapons with you, but in another aspect they are not timid at all. They are extremely aggressive. They can disregard all diplomatic promises or courtesies, not to mention that they can consider a document like that as waste paper and abolish it at any time. And, as soon as you slack your steps in that area, they will step in.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Helms will be given special authority for the Persian Gulf, and also for getting arms to Pakistan through Iran.

P.M. Chou: But they can't be weapons like you gave them last time from Jordan.

Dr. Kissinger: The weapons were all right, but their training was not. There were only 21 planes.

P.M. Chou: You can't fight with some of them like that.

P.M. Chou: But you gave Thieu quite a lot very quickly, including over 30 aircraft from Taiwan. You think we are easy to talk to. You want to reach out to the Soviet Union by standing on Chinese shoulders.

Dr. Kissinger: No.

P.M. Chou: I am speaking now because you know we wouldn't care about this sort of thing because we look at things from the strategic point of view. The more you do this, the more naughty the Soviet Union becomes. That is why I spell out everything.

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[7] Richard Helms was appointed Ambassador to Iran on February 8 and presented his credentials in Tehran on April 5.

[8] The Brezhnev Doctrine asserted the right of the Soviet Union to intervene in any socialist state in which the leading role of the Communist party was threatened.

Dr. Kissinger: We try to look at things from the strategic point of view as well. By standing on Chinese shoulders, what can we gain?

P.M. Chou: That is what I want to prove to you. And you moved a lot of military equipment into South Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: South Vietnam was a special case. We had to see if we could overcome obstacles to the negotiations, but we had accepted restrictions on arms supplies and needed to give as much as possible in advance of a settlement. There were no restrictions on arms supplies to the other side. It had nothing to do with the Soviet Union.

P.M. Chou: You mean that it had something to do with China?

Dr. Kissinger: No. It had something to do with North Vietnam and I wanted to explain why we sent these supplies to South Vietnam. It had to do with the fact that there is no restriction on the importation of weapons into North Vietnam, and that is why I am explaining to the Prime Minister why this situation is not comparable to the Pakistan situation. I'm being very honest. If we want to make a deal with the Soviet Union, we don't need China for that. And it would be equally dangerous for both of us if either tried to use the other now to move against the Soviet Union.

P.M. Chou: Neither would it be favorable to the world.

Dr. Kissinger: If the assessment which we have discussed here of the possible Soviet motivation is correct, then we would be working with the threat against the potential victims and that makes no sense.

I will discuss with the Prime Minister our precise strategy toward the Soviet Union. I believe, Mr. Prime Minister, that you're extremely dangerous if one should attack your basic interests, so I don't assume that China is not going to react if one attacks your basic concerns. We have, I think . . . the reason we talk so frankly here is because confidence in our intentions has to be the key element in our relations, and we have worked very hard on this. Little tricks are very stupid in this connection. Let me say one more thing about the Middle East. First, with respect to such things as Baluchistan and other areas, if you ever have information which suggests we could do something useful, I would appreciate it if you would let us know and we would be very grateful.

P.M. Chou: Madame Bhutto will be here around the 17th and wishes to meet you.

Dr. Kissinger: I would be delighted.

P.M. Chou: And she will tell you much more about South Asia and the Subcontinent.

Dr. Kissinger: Will it be announced?

P.M. Chou: It is not necessary. She will be living in the same compound.

Dr. Kissinger: I wouldn't mind seeing her and having it announced after I return to Washington. It would be difficult to have it announced while I am here.

P.M. Chou: And President Bhutto's search of the Iraq Embassy also is a courageous act because it was very clear that the Soviet Union was behind it all. And then the Soviet Union had already had its hands in the middle of the affairs of the Pakistanis.

Dr. Kissinger: I had already planned to suggest to you that I pay a courtesy call on Madame Bhutto.

P.M. Chou: This would be very useful because now is a time when the Soviet Union is advancing full speed in that area. It is true that the oil interests in the Middle East and the Subcontinent are something that cannot be ignored, and because you have slackened, they have taken the initiative. It is a weak spot.

Dr. Kissinger: As I have pointed out to the Prime Minister, I think the Marxist theory is wrong in one aspect. (The Prime Minister sits up sharply.) Marxist theory holds that most capitalists understand what their own interests are, but in my experience, most capitalists are idiots. What we are doing now . . . (Mr. Kissinger does not finish.)

P.M. Chou: But you must know that Marx and Lenin said also that monopolistic capitalism does not always regard the nationalistic interests. They are not patriotic. You also must admit the American monopolists were this way in regard to Europe, Japan and have caused the present situation.

Dr. Kissinger: But mostly through stupidity and not design.

P.M. Chou: You can put it that way but it was because they have short-sighted interests.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. But I understand you have some capitalists on that PIA flight.

P.M. Chou: Some from your good country.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Is it true that Mr. Kendall is also coming?[9]

P.M. Chou: I don't know the name. I am not very familiar with that name.

Dr. Kissinger: We are staggered by the thought of selling Pepsi-cola to 800,000,000 Chinese. (laughter)

P.M. Chou: They are also bringing a Rockefeller from the Morgan group.

Dr. Kissinger: I will tell you who they are bringing to you when I see the list. But I must say that the thought of 800,000,000 Chinese drinking Pepsi-cola boggles my mind. (laughter)

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[9] Donald Kendall was Chief Executive Officer of Pepsi-Cola and a friend of Richard Nixon.

Dr. Kissinger: Actually, perhaps you don't know, but the eventuality you just mentioned may not be an immediate reality. However, a Canadian was knighted and went to the *London Times*.[10]

P.M. Chou: He came last year?

Dr. Kissinger: Was he prepared to serve you, Mr. Prime Minister? He does not have a low opinion of you.

P.M. Chou: He invested in Hong Kong. He said he could make money that way. At that time he was impressed that he was talking with Chinese Communists. He told me the various ways of making money. But one thing he told me was quite good. He told me, for instance, how he bought the *London Times* from someone else. And he said he wanted to keep a newspaper with the prestige of the *London Times* as a famous newspaper that did objective reporting. And he said as for all the other newspapers in his chain, he did not care about them. He would let them follow whatever made money and according to whatever region they were in. So that they would have opposite views.

Dr. Kissinger: That is true. He wants them to buy both papers.

P.M. Chou: And he told me how to make money. And his managing editor was sitting at his side, and he said that was the only paper he had that he would let lose money. And I gave him a book by Mr. Maxwell about the Sino-Indian war.[11]

Dr. Kissinger: You gave that to Alec Home, too. You are a great agent for that book. I read it after we met in July 1971 and actually they used the same tactics against you that they had used in Pakistan. The same diplomacy. The only difference was that your army was more efficient. Was it true that you repaired all the captured weapons and returned them?

P.M. Chou: Yes. And they took them. They signed a receipt. (laughter)

Dr. Kissinger: Now the second point about the Middle East is that we believe many mistakes have been made. We believe too much of the diplomacy has been public and therefore both sides have taken positions which make negotiations very difficult. Both sides have also used the opportunity to put forward positions which the other side finds impossible to accept. So what we are now attempting to do, and this is again not known by anybody, not even by Mr. Jenkins' colleagues, we have been working with my opposite number on Sadat's staff for six months and we have just now arranged to bring him to America for an official

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[10] The Canadian media magnate Roy Thomson had bought *The Times* of London in 1966.

[11] Neville Maxwell's book, *India's China War* (London: Cape, 1970), contended that India was largely to blame for the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict.

visit of just one day. That means nothing, it's just for show. But when he comes to New York we will arrange for him to disappear for two days, and I will spend that time with him in order to see if it is possible to get a solution based on Arab interests and not on the interests of an outside power, and bring about a rapid solution.

P.M. Chou: Like you disappeared to Peking?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. And no other country knows about this yet, and we may have side by side, public talks which will be a facade for the really important private talks. If you want, we will keep you informed and if you agree with what we are doing, perhaps if you want you might use your own influence. There is a chance of getting a peace settlement in the Middle East but, of course, you will judge this after you know what the positions are. With respect to the oil problem, we have created a committee in the White House composed of Secretary Shultz, Mr. Ehrlichman and myself to create a new policy toward energy, and particularly oil. We are trying to . . . (Mr. Kissinger does not finish.) At this moment all oil producers treat all the oil companies equally, with the result that the Western oil interests are financing Iraq. We want to find a policy where we can shift funds, for example from Iraq to Iran. That will be in train within the next four months. It is also for the Prime Minister's personal information—for his ears only.

P.M. Chou: And what about South Asia and the Subcontinent?

Dr. Kissinger: We are now facing a very difficult Congressional situation, not just with respect to South Asia, but generally.

P.M. Chou: You mean the pro-Indian influence is strong?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, extremely strong. And the pressures to avoid getting militarily involved are also very strong.

P.M. Chou: Perhaps it must be easy for you to do some work in Bangladesh.

Dr. Kissinger: On the military side, we will release all the military equipment for Pakistan which we have blocked, including 300 armoured personnel carriers. This will evoke violent opposition including from our own bureaucracy.

P.M. Chou: Such a tiny bit?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I am just telling you the facts.

P.M. Chou: Is it because of the large investments in India?

Dr. Kissinger: It is not an economic problem, it is essentially because of our intellectuals, newspapermen, and I must say our bureaucracy are basically pro-Indian. In the whole post-war era they have looked on India as our greatest Asian friend. Secondly, when Helms gets to Iran . . . (Mr. Kissinger does not finish.)

P.M. Chou: You mean after Chang Kai-shek got to Taiwan. Of course, otherwise Chiang Kai-shek would be number one.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Secondly, after Helms gets to Iran we will work out a means whereby we can shift some equipment from Iran to Pakistan and we will make a maximum effort in the economic field to aid Pakistan. In Bangladesh, we can be quite helpful. But we would frankly appreciate any ideas you have as to how we might be helpful.

P.M. Chou: You seem to have a large part in the UN relief.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, that is very easy.

P.M. Chou: But can you do anything to make the Indians let go of the Pakistan POW's?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, it is a great injustice and we have not been successful. We have raised it with the Indians on a number of occasions.

P.M. Chou: Both Madame Gandhi and Mujibur Rahman are both finding that Soviet pressure is becoming unbearable.

Dr. Kissinger: Both are making a major effort to move in our direction.

P.M. Chou: We can't have more contacts with them than we have at the present, because that would embarrass Pakistan too much. Madame Gandhi has made at least ten approaches, and wants to improve relations with China. And Mujibur Rahman has also tried through private channels to improve relations. It is all to get our vote in the UN—our vote which is now opposed to the unjust action to dismember Pakistan with Soviet support. The recent UN General Assembly came to a comparatively good result on that, which you had a hand in.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes.

P.M. Chou: And, finally, Yugoslavia came to feel that their dealings (with the Soviets) are too outrageous.

Dr. Kissinger: They have urged me to visit India for a discussion, but I will not do it.

P.M. Chou: We must stand up for the truth. But this is an issue we don't want to get our hands into. We want to express our attitude, which represents justice, but we feel if we enter in a situation . . . Anyhow, in the UN we will stand perhaps to the final one (to vote for the entry of Bangladesh). The only thing we are going to do is to raise our Chargé d'Affaires in India from a First Secretary to a Counselor. It is probably the only one and we . . . not included them any embassy where we have a chargé d'affaires. [*sic*]

Dr. Kissinger: We have sent an ambassador to India who talks a great deal and who is very exuberant. I cannot always guarantee what he is going to say. They are sending us a new ambassador who is very pro-Soviet. Mr. T.K. Kaul, who formerly was Permanent Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs. (laughter) And, he does not inspire overwhelming confidence. So there will be some slow improvements in our relations. We don't have your subtlety. We have not figured out how

to raise a First Secretary to a Counselor. But with our cruder mentality, it is the same intention.

P.M. Chou: It is difficult to deal with that problem.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. If they (Mr. Kissinger does not finish.)

P.M. Chou: Because quite often what they say doesn't count.

Dr. Kissinger: We want them to move from the Soviet Union, but to do so genuinely and not pretend.

P.M. Chou: We will have to wait and see.

Dr. Kissinger: That is exactly our attitude.

P.M. Chou: But you could probably do more with Bangladesh.

Dr. Kissinger: What does the Prime Minister have in mind?

P.M. Chou: They need economic assistance.

Dr. Kissinger: You want us to give more economic assistance?

P.M. Chou: The best thing to assist them with would be food, grains and those things which are most close to the people's needs, and not large construction projects. Giving them what the Soviets can't give.

Dr. Kissinger: We have a proposal of 30 million dollars for food which I have held pending discussions with you. I wanted to ask you your judgment if you thought it was better to give aid or wait for a bit.

P.M. Chou: So long as your relations with them are normal we think it would be good to do some things that are in the interest of the people of Bangladesh because India doesn't give help, and the Soviets are only interested in their own interests.

Dr. Kissinger: We'll release the $30 million next.

P.M. Chou: Does the Soviet Union have some naval ships or boats (in Bangladesh)?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. They had mine sweepers in Chittagong, but I understand they did a bad job.

P.M. Chou: Do you think they might have deliberately done a bad job in order to prolong the time? They always want to gain privileges.

Dr. Kissinger: I do not think that they have other than mine sweepers.

P.M. Chou: But they will find other ships to replace them and they will expand in that area. Then, their mine sweepers will break down and they will want to repair them. Then they will set up docks to repair various other ships. And then other naval installations can come.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no question but that they want to establish a naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

P.M. Chou: And Chittagong is one of their targets.

Dr. Kissinger: I wouldn't be surprised.

P.M. Chou: Whether or not Mujibur Rahman will accept this depends on the international arena, of course . . . and in this respect the British have not done a good job. They have not been helpful.

Dr. Kissinger: They are blind.

P.M. Chou: I told the British what you said—I didn't say it was from you—that during the war the British actions there were not very glorious. That was what you wanted me to say.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Home said you were as bad as he was. But it was still very accurate because after you told him he took it seriously. And I think he understood it.

P.M. Chou: I didn't understand what you said just now about Southeast Asia, but many of those issues are left over from Dulles. And rather than saying that your policies in Europe were influenced by Dulles, I would rather say your policies in Asia were influenced by Dulles and the time you are taking to change them is much longer than elsewhere.

Dr. Kissinger: No. We have made very dramatic changes in our relations with you.

P.M. Chou: That is true.

Dr. Kissinger: And also ending the Vietnam war was a very difficult matter.

P.M. Chou: Yes, it took four years of your President's term to do that. But the result is that perhaps the war will stop in Vietnam but the fighting in Laos and Cambodia might possibly continue for some time. But the manpower and matériel you poured in is too much.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but that is a separate problem from where we are today. We still have to deal with the situation as it exists after the settlement.

P.M. Chou: And do you think it would be so easy for the Soviet Union to reach out into Southeast Asia than to reach out in the Middle East and the South Asian Subcontinent?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think it would be so easy but I think it is their intention.

P.M. Chou: Their intentions are everywhere. Wherever you have gone they want to go.

P.M. Chou: Unless there is a vacuum. Then the people will take their place. Take, for instance, Cambodia. If you hadn't opposed Sihanouk, then the Soviets wouldn't have stepped in. If you dealt with Sihanouk, do you think it would help?

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted to talk about Southeast Asia. Do you, Mr. Prime Minister, want to do it now?

P.M. Chou: It will be all right to do it tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: I am very anxious to talk to the Prime Minister about Cambodia and Laos and what we envision about Southeast Asia and when we understand that we can talk about the concrete problems of the situation.

P.M. Chou: And we can also exchange views on the Soviet issue. I hear you also wanted to have Mr. Jenkins exchange views with our Foreign Minister.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, in the bilateral . . . We are prepared to go at whatever rate you want to go . . . depending on the obstacles. Mr. Jenkins can at least explain where we want to go. Also, we should discuss the developments in Paris. Because otherwise we will keep your Foreign Minister there for months and he can never visit San Marino. (laughter)

P.M. Chou: You said you had an initial draft you were bringing with you?

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Lord) Have we got it here? I will give it to the protocol person in the Guest House.

P.M. Chou: And you had an exchange with your Vietnamese friends.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. And they will make some counterproposals which we will have tomorrow or the day after. We have agreed that we would try to avoid controversy at the Conference, as much as possible. So we approach it in a very constructive manner. And we are trying to normalize our relations with the DRV. One of the worst problems we have, they created. They proposed the participation of the Secretary General of the United Nations.[12] (laughter) And we accepted it. We never understood why they proposed it.

P.M. Chou: When you gave them a list of the proposed participants it included Japan and Thailand. It may have included the Secretary General.

Dr. Kissinger: Absolutely not.

P.M. Chou: But you mentioned Thailand and Japan?

Dr. Kissinger: We mentioned Japan. I don't know about Thailand. In fact, we were astonished when they proposed the Secretary General and some of Mr. Jenkins' colleagues wrote papers on it. It was quite new to me. Marshall Green was practically in tears.

Dr. Kissinger: But now . . .

P.M. Chou: I would also like to make it clear that there is some ground for your work. During August, you proposed the Secretary General and the North Vietnamese didn't agree.

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[12] Kurt Waldheim.

Dr. Kissinger: Maybe. If so, we didn't mean it seriously.

P.M. Chou: At that time they wouldn't agree to Thailand and Japan, and did not mention the Secretary General, and they did not ask our opinion. And later on in relation to the guarantee we had a brief notification. All we saw was the October 26 version.

Dr. Kissinger: That was only a summary.

P.M. Chou: But you confirmed that honestly.

Dr. Kissinger: We had two choices—we could scrap it or confirm it. We had to keep Saigon from digging in too firmly and we had to tell Hanoi we would settle.

P.M. Chou: And you gave a very speedy reply too. Because you underestimated Nguyen Van Thieu. He surprised you.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but if we had not done it we would have been in a lengthy discussion with Hanoi. We thought it better to risk a fast answer rather than to get the whole situation confused. Were you surprised at the speed of the reply?

P.M. Chou: No. I appreciated it very much. In numerous documents we have also confirmed the record that you had trouble with Thieu. We saw the mischief that Thieu was bringing and we told our Vietnamese friends about it. We also told them that their attitude was not very friendly.

Dr. Kissinger: They both attacked me.

P.M. Chou: It was an attack from two sides?

Dr. Kissinger: That is right.

P.M. Chou: And it was only after the initialing of the Agreement, on his way back, that Tho told us about that, and he also told us about the issue of the Secretary General, and we thought that they hadn't thought it through.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, that is right. They admit now they didn't know what they had in mind.

P.M. Chou: I put some questions to him and found the answers unclear. We asked you for clarification. You don't find it easy to clarify either.

Dr. Kissinger: It was not our idea. In our view there are only two possibilities. One is that he would be a participant which is ridiculous because he will talk all the time, which is a bad role for the Secretary General. The other is that he be given some administrative position. And I think if he were made Executive Secretary to the Chairman of the Conference he couldn't act without his approval. And as moderator he couldn't take a position. We think this would be the best role for him consistent with his international status. Your colleagues are thinking it over, and we told them we would discuss it with you. I frankly

think they are better at revolutionary warfare than at the diplomatic negotiating table. (laughter)

(The Prime Minister exits the room momentarily.)

V.M. Chiao: On today's meeting we were thinking of issuing an item with the title "Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council and Chi Peng-fei, Minister of Foreign Affairs, held a meeting with Dr. Kissinger. The Premier of the State Council, Chou En-lai, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chi Peng-fei, and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chiao Kuan-hua, held talks this evening with Dr. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Taking part in the talks on the U.S. side were Mr. Alfred Jenkins, Mr. John Holdridge, Colonel Richard Kennedy, Mr. Winston Lord and Mrs. Bonnie Andrews. Participating on the Chinese side were Chang Wen-chin, Wang Hai-jung, Ting Yuan-hung, Tang Wen-sheng, Shen Jo-yun, Ma Chieh-hsien and Lien Cheng-pao."

Dr. Kissinger: At what time will you release it? What time is it now in America? 8:30 a.m.? So we can say the same thing. And we will do it at noon our time. You can do it whenever you wish, if that is agreeable.

(The Prime Minister returns to the room.)

P.M. Chou: Without all your staff, how could you manage all your work?

Dr. Kissinger: I would do it in one half the time. (laughter)

P.M. Chou: No, really, they are very dedicated people. So, anyway, we won't meet tomorrow morning. So if you want to go visiting in the morning, we can arrange for something. We will discuss that later.

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9. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, February 16, 1973, 2:15–6:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Chou En-lai, Premier, State Council
Chi P'eng-fei, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Wang Hai-jung, Assistant Foreign Minister

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 98, Country Files, Far East, HAK China Trip, Memcons & Reports (originals), February 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at Villa 3. All brackets are in the original.

T'ang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter
Two Notetakers

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard T. Kennedy, NSC Staff
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff
Miss Irene G. Derus, Notetaker

PM Chou: Mr. Kennedy has a sprained waist. How is it now?

Mr. Kennedy: Much better through the help of your doctors.

Dr. Kissinger: He hasn't had so much attention since he joined my staff. You're spoiling him.

PM Chou: I have read your draft. I received your draft of the Act of Paris. We haven't received the views of our Vietnamese friends yet.

Dr. Kissinger: We haven't either. They were going to give them to us either today or tomorrow.

PM Chou: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: We just had a general discussion.

PM Chou: Yes. Let us continue with the topics we discussed yesterday according to your order, but I would like to take up the topic of the Soviet Union first. It is just a restricted meeting.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I wanted to do two things with the approval of the Prime Minister. One, I wanted to make a comment about a press conference which our Secretary of State gave yesterday.[2]

PM Chou: [laughs] I have read it today, but I have not paid any attention to it because that is for just dealing with those journalists.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly. And I also wanted to talk about Soviet policy to the Prime Minister also in the context of his remarks of yesterday that we are "standing on your shoulders."[3] [Chou laughs] All I want to say about the press conference remark about Formosa is to tell you what we actually intend to do. We will withdraw five squadrons of airplanes, of C–130 airplanes, this year. They are transport planes. And the total number of men that this will involve is at least 4,500. This will cut the formal strength on Formosa by over half. We will reduce next year by at least two squadrons of F–4s.

PM Chou: That is the planes you sent in last time.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right. They will be withdrawn next year, and they will not be turned over to the Taiwanese.

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[2] The text of Secretary Rogers' news conference of February 15 is printed in Department of State *Bulletin,* March 5, 1973, pp. 249–260.

[3] See Document 8.

PM Chou: Yes, you mentioned it last time, and its nickname is "Phantom." Actually it is called F–4.

Dr. Kissinger: That's right—F–4 is the right name. "Phantom" is its nickname.

PM Chou: Why it is called "Phantom?"

Dr. Kissinger: I have no idea. I think because of its speed.

PM Chou: And the shape, too, perhaps.

Mr. Kennedy [to Mr. Kissinger]: It gets in before it can be heard.

Mr. Kissinger: Like a phantom, yes. But we will also reduce in addition to these two squadrons other units next year, but we will not know—we are studying this. We will let you know during this year what they will be. So regardless of what official statements may say, this is our firm intention and will be carried out.

PM Chou: It doesn't matter whether you carry this out sooner or later because we have already fixed our principles during our discussion.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right.

PM Chou: It is all right what the State Department would like to say in order to deal with those journalists.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, this is—however, we have told the Prime Minister on previous visits that after the end of the Vietnam War we would take specific measures on reduction of forces. And we want him to know that these are our intentions. [Chou discusses with his interpreter.]

Interpreter: The Prime Minister was reminding us that after you mentioned the component parts to be assembled by Chiang Kai-shek, this was translated into spare parts, so the Premier said how could the spare parts be put together into a single plane.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, they transferred some. Now, but I also—I am going to look into this problem when I return to the U.S. We have no intention of augmenting the military strength of Taiwan. What we want to do is to reduce our direct relationship of supplying military equipment. And I will have to—this is a matter that was decided at a period when we were all very occupied with the Vietnam war. But we want to solve the issue during this term of the President.

So now does the Prime Minister wish to discuss Soviet matters, or . . . ?

PM Chou: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you want me to talk or does the Prime Minister have something to say?

PM Chou: Shall we say a few more words on the Taiwan issue? Do you envisage that there will be a definite time limit for your aid to Taiwan, military aid? Is there going to be another contract after this contract? I don't mean that if you do this for their armed forces that it will mean a great deal. I just want to know something about it so we

can coordinate our action during our work. I can assure you that we don't mean that we are going to liberate it by the armed forces. We have no such plan at the moment.

Dr. Kissinger: But what I envisage for this and I must—he [referring to Mr. Kennedy] pointed out to me the technical ways by which we are giving aid but that is not the concern. [Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Kennedy confer.] Mr. Kennedy pointed out that we are not giving military equipment. We are selling it or giving it on some credit.

PM Chou: Yes, we imagined this.

Dr. Kissinger: But that does not change the Prime Minister's basic concern. He doesn't care about . . . I will talk frankly how we envisage the evolution. We think that over the next two years we will have a very substantial reduction of our military forces. We are even now going very slow about giving new military equipment. We do this through administrative means, not as policy measures. For example, as I told the Prime Minister yesterday we have refused the sale of two squadrons of F–4s. During that period we are prepared, depending on what the Prime Minister's preference is, to establish some more visible forms of contact between the PRC and the U.S., a Liaison Office or some trade office. We have to discuss the method. This is for two reasons. For the Taiwan reason and for the Soviet reason which we will discuss later this afternoon. In the next two years we would be prepared to move to something like the Japanese solution but we have not worked this out.

PM Chou: What is the time limit?

Dr. Kissinger: The first two years is the reduction of our forces. Then after 1974 we want to work toward full normalization and full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China before the middle of 1976.

Now we would like to keep some form of representation on Taiwan, but we haven't figured out a formula that will be mutually acceptable. And we would like to discuss with you, in the spirit of what you have always discussed with us, some understanding that the final solution will be a peaceful one. In that context we will exercise great restraint in our military supply policy. It is our intention, but I will review . . . I frankly [to Kennedy: Can we find out what contracts we have with them?] I will find out while I am here what contracts we have for the supply of military equipment and which are contemplated and then I can be absolutely—then you will know exactly. But this is the direction in which we are determined to move, and these other details are not really decisive.

PM Chou: Just now you mentioned in passing that aside from the Taiwan question you also mentioned the question of relations between our countries.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: So you still envisage there is going to be a Trade Office or a Liaison Office?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. We would prefer a Liaison Office because we could send better personnel for that.

PM Chou: Does it mean that it will cover a wider range?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, the Liaison Office could handle the things that are now being discussed in Paris plus a few political things. We believe that the very sensitive matters between us, about which no one outside the White House knows, should continue to be handled in the channel of Huang Hua and me. But if we establish a Liaison Office we would put Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Holdridge into it, and they are two friends who have worked with me and whom we trust.

PM Chou: Do you envisage that this is going to be two-way traffic, that is both sides will establish offices?

Dr. Kissinger: We would be prepared to let you establish a Liaison Office in the U.S.

PM Chou: It is easier for you to establish an office here because in name maybe it is an unofficial one, but actually it may be an official one. But our office in Washington needs to be a nonofficial one which will enjoy various diplomatic immunities. And they wouldn't be able to take part in any diplomatic activities because it would be difficult for them to do so.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, you can set up any office that you think is appropriate in Washington. We would see to it that they would enjoy diplomatic immunities. They perhaps couldn't engage in formal diplomatic activities, but they could be a convenient channel of communication to the White House.

PM Chou: So your Liaison Office would cover a wider range than trade?

Dr. Kissinger: That would be our preference, but we could also have a trade office and in fact give it liaison functions. But I think it would be more appropriate to have a Liaison Office.

PM Chou: We have envisaged both. Since Doctor has mentioned it, it can be discussed after we have reported to Chairman Mao.

Dr. Kissinger: We are prepared to do it either or both together—we are prepared to have a PRC office in the U.S., and you could give it officially a non-official character but it will have diplomatic immunities and will be treated on a diplomatic level, and we will continue whatever business you wish through that office. You could call it a trade office or a new agency, whichever you wish. But if you have other ideas, we will follow your suggestions.

PM Chou: So much for this question.

Dr. Kissinger: All right.

PM Chou: Speaking of the Soviet Union question, last time you told us something about the nuclear treaty. How is the situation now?

Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union . . . we thought that if we delayed long enough the treaty would just go away. It is a heroic posture . . . [laughter] but sometimes a necessary one.[4]

But since the end of the Vietnam war they have raised it again. You remember we put a series of questions to the Soviet Union of hypothetical cases. And I asked one hypothetical question: whether, if this treaty were signed and if the U.S. would then attack India, some third country like India which would affect the balance, whether then nuclear weapons could be used. And the Soviet Union gave us a written reply which was cautious. The first situation was what happens in case there is a war in Europe. I asked a series of hypothetical questions. I said, "What happens in case there is a war in Europe, can nuclear weapons be used?" The answer was, "Yes, but not against the territory of the Soviet Union and the United States. Only on the territory of each other's allies." But they said . . . do you want me to read what they said with respect to that situation?

PM Chou: Yes, to add to our interest.

Dr. Kissinger: Their English is not as clear as their intention. So they said "we would like to emphasize that the idea of the Treaty would be served by such a mode of actions in that presumed situation when both the USSR and the U.S. firmly proceed from the necessity to localize the use of nuclear weapons and undertake nothing that could increase the danger of our two countries mutually becoming objects of the use of nuclear weapons." In other words they should be—it is almost incomprehensible in English. It is not the fault of your interpreter. You see, in Article 3 of the treaty it says nuclear weapons can be used in defense of allies. So we asked what happens in case of an attack in Europe, of a war in Europe? Now I will read the sentence again. "We would like to emphasize that the idea of the Treaty would be served by such a mode of actions in that presumed situation"—namely a war in Europe—"when both the USSR and the U.S. firmly proceed from the necessity to localize the use of nuclear weapons and undertake nothing that could increase the danger of our two countries mutually becoming objects of the use of nuclear weapons." It is perfectly clear.

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[4] In his memoirs, Kissinger describes the diplomacy leading to the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. He states that Brezhnev first proposed a U.S.-Soviet treaty to renounce the use of nuclear weapons during Kissinger's trip to Moscow in April 1972, to which the U.S. Government responded with stalling tactics that continued into 1973. (*Years of Upheaval,* pp. 274–286)

And then they say in the next paragraph that if such a treaty is signed a war in Europe becomes much less likely. When I asked the question "what happens to allies?", to that they gave this answer.

Then I said, second, "What happens to friends who are not allies who are being attacked?" And to that they said in the same bad English: "If to assume that the USSR or the U.S. might use nuclear weapons (Middle East was mentioned as an example) also to assist states with regard to which neither the USSR nor the U.S. have direct treaty obligations, this would devalue our Treaty."

PM Chou: Does that mean that they wouldn't use . . .

Dr. Kissinger: It means nuclear weapons would not be used. Then I said the third question is: "What happens in situations where a country who is neither ally nor a friend is attacked, but whose weight would affect the balance of power in the world such as, for example, India? Can nuclear weapons then be used?" To that they said the following: "These same views and arguments of ours may be fully applied as well to a third situation, which the American side termed as seriously upsetting the global balance and to illustrate which a most hypothetical example of introduction of Soviet or U.S. troops into India was used."

I will read it again, section by section: "These same views and arguments of ours"—namely the ones applied to other areas where friends are involved—"may be fully applied as well to a third situation, which the American side termed as seriously upsetting the global balance and to illustrate which a most hypothetical example of introduction of Soviet or U.S. troops into India was used. Thus the Soviet side believes that the Treaty should exclude a possibility of using nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union and the U.S. against each other in the two situations outlined above." Colonel Kennedy is new to my diplomatic methods. He has not seen me do these things before.

PM Chou: We have got to know each other very well since we have met each other five times.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right. We have met with each other openly and honestly.

PM Chou: Not only openly but also highly confidential.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly.

PM Chou: And we mean what we have said.

Dr. Kissinger: Your word has counted, and I think so has ours and since so much . . .

PM Chou: You mean President Nixon and you yourself.

Dr. Kissinger: Our word has counted and so has your word. We have been able to count on what you have said. What I meant to say is we have had a relationship of confidence in each other.

In an attack on a friend who is not an ally, or an attack on a country who is not an ally nor a friend, but whose attack would create a change in the balance, nuclear weapons would be excluded. In other words in the case of the Middle East and the case of India, nuclear weapons could not be used under this Treaty.

PM Chou: Do you mean that you wouldn't use nuclear weapons against each other in such two cases?

Dr. Kissinger: I asked three questions: If the treaty is signed, can nuclear weapons be used in these three cases. Attack against allies. Yes, they can be used but not against the territories of the U.S. and USSR. The second case is against a friend who is not an ally, such as the Middle East. There they say they cannot be used. The third case against a country which is neither an ally nor necessarily a friend, but whose fate could affect the world balance of power, and I gave the theoretical example of India. And they said in that case nuclear weapons cannot be used. Then they asked us a question which we have never answered—we have never answered this communiqué. They have asked us what we would do if another country, for example, a U.S. ally or friend would attack an ally of the Soviet Union? They said in that case they would certainly react, but they asked us what we would do in such a case if they would react. I will read you the sentence if you are interested.

PM Chou: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: "The kind of reaction of the USSR with regard to the state that made such an attack is not to be questioned—it will be determined by the allied duty of the USSR. But a question suggests itself—how in that situation matters would stand directly between the USSR and the U.S., having in mind that the Treaty on the non-use of nuclear weapons would be in effect between them?" We have never answered this.

PM Chou: Is the word from Mr. Gromyko? Perhaps the thought belongs to Brezhnev.

Dr. Kissinger: This was given to us as a communication from Brezhnev, but we cannot tell. It was unsigned, but we were told it was for the President from Brezhnev. And the treaty was first presented to me by Brezhnev.

Now, in our government, Mr. Prime Minister, nobody knows about this except the President, myself and my staff, and this should never be discussed in any other forum.

Now the present situation is that they have again proposed this treaty and they have again—they have said they would like to sign it when Brezhnev visits the United States. And I have told them we would consider it and let them know.

Now it is perfectly clear that we cannot accept this intention and this policy, so there is no possibility whatever that we will agree to a treaty that contains an obligation not to use nuclear weapons. The only question is a tactical question for us—whether we should reject it completely or whether we should reject it evasively. For example, as we have told Ambassador Huang Hua, we were considering last fall the possibility of a draft in which we would agree to create conditions in which nuclear weapons would not be used and then to define these conditions in such a way that they would amount to the renunciation of force altogether, or to create a commission to study when these conditions will be realized. This is what we are now considering, but to assess that I would be very anxious to have your views. But to make a final judgment one must I think assess the basic strategy towards the Soviet Union because only then can the judgment be made.

So I don't know whether the Prime Minister would like to talk about this immediately or whether we should discuss the basic strategy and then come back to this, or whether he would like to express a preliminary view and then go back to it.

PM Chou: Let us continue our discussion on the strategy.

Dr. Kissinger: Should I? [Chou indicates to go ahead.]

Let me make a few observations which were suggested to me by a half-facetious question of the Prime Minister about whether we intend to stand on the shoulders of China to come closer to the Soviet Union. But since I have learned in five meetings that the Prime Minister never says anything without an intention and perhaps it is a good question, I would like to discuss it while we are discussing strategy.

It just occurred to me. We have had a very unequal relationship in one respect in that your interpreters have had to carry the entire load at every meeting. We are very grateful. [Chou laughs]

Now on the strategy with the Soviet Union—and I think we might begin with your question. There is no doubt that our relations with the Soviet Union accelerated after my visit to Peking in 1971. We expected the opposite actually. So our judgment was wrong. And therefore obviously there is merit in the fact, in the Prime Minister's suggestion that our relations with the PRC have given the Soviet Union an incentive to improve their relations with us. This is not our purpose but this has been a result. But then that in itself is irrelevant because the question is why? What are they trying to accomplish?

Now there are two theoretical possibilities. One is they generally want to bring about a relaxation of tensions in the world. If that is true, it is in our common interest and it will not be against the interests of either—I don't believe it is their intention but if they really want to bring about a relaxation of tension in the world, we would welcome it.

The second possibility is, and the evidence seems to point more in that direction, that the Soviet Union has decided that it should pursue a more flexible strategy for the following objectives: To demoralize Western Europe by creating the illusion of peace; to use American technology to overcome the imbalance between its military and economic capability; to make it more difficult for the U.S. to maintain its military capability by creating an atmosphere of détente and isolate those adversaries who are not fooled by this relaxation policy.

PM Chou: Such as China.

Dr. Kissinger: I was trying to be delicate. [Laughter] Five, to gain time to accelerate its own military preparations.

If all of this succeeds, then eventually the U.S. will be totally isolated. If they can demoralize Europe, improve their military situation, neutralize those countries which are politically opposed but are militarily too weak, then sooner or later the U.S. will be completely isolated and become the ultimate victim.

Now what is our strategy? Because I think that is important for the Prime Minister to understand so that he can separate appearance and reality. He can do it anyway, but so that he understands it more fully.

We believe that the second interpretation of Soviet intentions is by far the most probable one. Now first, very candidly, as you must know from your own reports, we have had a very difficult period domestically as a result of the war in Vietnam. So on many occasions we have had to maneuver rather than to have a frontal confrontation. But now the war in Vietnam has ended, especially if the settlement does not turn into a constant source of conflict for the U.S., we can return to the fundamental problems of our foreign policy. Even during this period, which the Prime Minister must have noticed, we have always reacted with extreme violence to direct challenges by the Soviet Union. I don't know whether the Prime Minister followed in 1970—that was before our meetings—the attempt by the Soviet Union to establish a submarine base in Cuba, and we reacted very strongly; less theatrically than President Kennedy, but very strongly, and that submarine base has never been completed. And in September 1970 during the Jordanian crisis we also reacted very sharply. And during the crisis on Berlin. I am just giving them as an example of our basic method. Our experience has been that the Soviet Union has always shied away from a military confrontation with the U.S.

But then what is our strategy? First we had to rally our own people by some conspicuous successes in foreign policy, to establish a reputation for thoughtful action. Secondly, we had to end the Vietnam war under conditions that were not considered an American disgrace. Thirdly, we want to modernize our military establishment, particularly

in the strategic forces. We will talk more about this if you want to in a separate meeting. Ultimately we want to maneuver the Soviet Union into a position where it clearly is the provocateur. Fifthly, we have to get our people used to some propositions that are entirely new to them.

Now in Europe right now there is a paradox. In Europe the psychological situation is very poor, but the moral basis as far as U.S. action is concerned is very good.

In Asia the psychological situation is very strong. I speak frankly. In China there is no problem about the willingness of defense. But for Americans to understand that maneuvers such as Czechoslovakia and China, leaving aside the much greater strength of China, affects America directly is a new idea and requires time for preparation. You haven't asked us for any of this. This is our own judgment of the situation. Our interests are determined by our own necessities.

Therefore we have to some extent cooperated in these Soviet maneuvers. But up to now we have made only two kinds of agreements with them, or three kinds: One, those that we thought were on balance unilaterally to our advantage, such as Berlin—we paid nothing for that. So, of course, we did make that agreement.[5]

PM Chou: We don't quite understand that.

Dr. Kissinger: The Berlin Agreement improved the situation for us, and it cost us nothing and those are the best agreements to make. [laughter] No one ever gets them from your Vice Minister. [laughter] Second—but that was really—they did not make that for us—that agreement was made to keep Brandt in office. The Soviet Union made this agreement for Berlin's domestic policies. It is not an international agreement.

The second type of agreement we would be prepared to make . . .

PM Chou: [Interrupting] But it can also be said that this is consistent with the Soviet policy which is meant to lull, to demoralize Western Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: It is consistent. It is very consistent.

The second kind of agreement we would make, of which there is perhaps only one, is an agreement that would be in the interest of all countries such as the limitation on strategic arms. The difficulty with that agreement is that it establishes quantitative limitations at a time when the real dangers come from qualitative improvements.

PM Chou: That is why when you were signing the agreement in Moscow where Mr. Laird said quite a lot in Washington, that is why I

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[5] The text of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, signed September 3, 1971, are printed in Department of State *Bulletin,* September 27, 1971, pp. 318–325.

was very interested in him. You said that he had talked too much, but I think there is a good point in doing it.

Dr. Kissinger: He talked too much. That doesn't mean there wasn't a good point in it.

PM Chou: This is a good point because it shows that on this point an American must speak from trust.

Dr. Kissinger: We have accelerated it. In fact, Laird said it all. We have, since the Agreement, greatly accelerated the qualitative improvements of our strategic forces.

PM Chou: On this one he has also spoken out.

Dr. Kissinger: Who has?

PM Chou: Mr. Laird. Although the Soviet Union didn't say anything about that, but Mr. Suslov as the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he said something about it.

Dr. Kissinger: About Laird?

PM Chou: No, about the position of strength to increase the military budget. Of course, the figure of the budget is furnished, but what he said, those words are true.

Dr. Kissinger: We don't pay any attention to the budget because we have very good photography of the Soviet Union.

PM Chou: But Suslov's words are true by saying they depart from the position of strength.

Dr. Kissinger: They depart?

PM Chou: They proceed.

Dr. Kissinger: They are making very major efforts in every military category. Actually the Prime Minister—one amusing anecdote on a personal basis. When we were in the Soviet Union we were discussing the problem of putting—we were putting limitations on the holes in the silos. And I also pointed to Mr. Brezhnev that even with limitations on the holes of the silos it was possible to put larger missiles into the existing holes, and Mr. Brezhnev said it was totally untrue and started drawing diagrams. He said that there were three ways of doing it, all of which are entirely impossible. In fact there are four ways of doing it, and they are using the fourth, and they are putting larger missiles into the holes. [Chou laughs]

So in almost every significant military category there are major preparations going on. I am not saying for what, but that is a fact. But we learned many things during these negotiations also because in the process of preparing for them we had to study many things in particular detail, and they're being implemented now in our new preparations.

The third type of agreement we are making is on matters that are generally useful but of no major political significance, such as environment, scientific exchange, trade within certain limitations. I admit both sides are gambling on certain trends. The Soviet Union believes that it can demoralize Western Europe and paralyze us. We believe as far as Western Europe is concerned that as long as we are present there is a wide fluctuation possible in their actual attitudes without enabling the Soviet Union to bring military pressure. And we believe that through this policy we are gaining the freedom of maneuver we need to resist in those places which are the most likely points of attack or pressure. And our judgment of the Soviet leaders is that they are brutal, but not necessarily farsighted.

Now to apply this to the nuclear treaty—our tendency therefore is not to have a direct confrontation, but to play for time. But not to give away anything of substance while we are playing for time.

Now this is our general assessment, and that is our general strategy and therefore it is in this context that we have to understand whether we are standing on your shoulders. It would be suicidal for us to participate in a policy whose ultimate objective is to isolate us. We will use certain tendencies or fears as they develop, but that will be for the objections that I have described to the Prime Minister or the goals that I have described to the Prime Minister.

Now I have given you a more candid exposition of our views than we ever have to any foreign leader or for that matter to any of our own people.

PM Chou: The European Security Conference and Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Conference moved toward this direction too.

Dr. Kissinger: Could we have a five-minute break? I want to talk to you about this because here we have a problem with the shortsightedness of our European allies. I want to discuss with you our strategy.

[The group broke briefly at 3:45 p.m., and the meeting resumed at 3:53 p.m.]

Dr. Kissinger: Now about the European Security Conference and the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction. First a few words about the history.

You have to remember that the European leaders have dealt with both of these conferences entirely from the point of view of their domestic politics. When the Soviet Union first proposed the European Security Conference many years ago, the Europeans said that they were more for it than the U.S. so that they could blame us for its not coming into being vis-à-vis their own domestic opposition. So that the principle of it became established. Then when there were some pressures in the American Congress, Senator Mansfield, who incidentally wants to come back here—we will be glad . . .

PM Chou: [Interrupting] And during the conclusion of the general elections you said he would like to come the day after the votes were cast.

Dr. Kissinger: We will be glad to send him if you promise to keep him. [Laughter] No, but it is up to you. It may be a good idea. But that is a different question.

But when Senator Mansfield proposed the reduction of American forces then the Europeans developed the thought of a force reduction conference in order to prevent us from withdrawing forces unilaterally. When we then accepted this proposition they became nervous. [Chou laughs] Then they started pushing the European Security Conference in order to kill the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Conference, and then we decided that we were getting into a never-never-land of demoralization, confusion and maneuvering and that we should tackle it head on and bring it to some concrete conclusion because it was more demoralizing to talk about it than to deal with it. It is perfectly clear what the Soviet Union wants with the European Security Conference. They want to create an impression that there is no longer any danger in Europe, and therefore they want to create an atmosphere in which the military relationships are replaced by some general European security order. Therefore, it is in our interest, one, that the Conference is as short as possible and as meaningless as possible so that nobody can claim a tremendous result was achieved. It is in the Soviet interest to give the impression that it is a great historic event. It is in our interest to have a meeting that affirms some generally desirable objectives like free travel and cultural exchange, but that cannot be used as a basis for historic transformation.

With Mutual Balanced Force Reductions the problem is exactly the opposite. If one analyses the problem of force reduction seriously one has to study the actual relationship of forces. Now any study of the actual relationship of forces seriously conducted must lead the Europeans to the realization of the extent of their danger. We are in the strange situation where if we discuss military defense with the Europeans directly they will always reject the reality of the danger and our conclusions, because they are afraid we will ask them for more money. But when we discuss force reductions they are so afraid that we will reduce our forces that they have an interest to study the danger. [Chou laughs]

When I was in Moscow last September I made a condition with Brezhnev that we would attend the European Security Conference only if they would attend the Conference on Force Reduction. And therefore whatever marginal benefit they can gain from European Security Conference we can substitute by the kind of investigation that will be produced by the Force Reduction Conference.

Now let me say a word about the actual state of these negotiations. Our biggest problem right now, to be very honest with you, is not the Soviet Union but the Europeans. What we want is a brief description of the agenda items, the European Security Conference to be as meaningless as possible, a short Conference and an exalted but meaningless conclusion. The Europeans . . . every European Foreign Minister is already rehearsing the speech he is going to give at that Conference. Every European Foreign Office has submitted an endless agenda for each session. And so that produces a certain confusion, but we can manage that.

Now with respect to the force reductions, we will work very seriously with our European allies and the real problem for that is the temptation to have some general conclusion quickly. The reality is that we must have a very careful study of the actual balance of forces so that we do not make the situation worse as a result. If we do not make this study the Soviet Union someday is going to make a very plausible sounding proposal which for whatever reason everyone will want to accept. But if we have a study of the actual balance of forces we can resist on the grounds of this. This is how we handled the SALT negotiations. If we use these negotiations intelligently, we can use them to strengthen the defense of the West rather than to weaken it. In any event any foreseeable reductions will not exceed 10 to 15 percent and will not occur before 1975. They will be marginal to the global geopolitical balance. They will be on the Soviet side—two divisions maybe [Chou laughs] and they have now . . .

PM Chou: [Interrupting] They even want to leave out the two words "mutual balanced."

Dr. Kissinger: They want to leave out the word "mutual."

PM Chou: No, they want to leave out the word "balanced."

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, "balanced," they want to leave out the word "balanced."

PM Chou: They want to leave these words out from the name of the Conference.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, because they have larger numbers so that if you have equal reductions the relative importance of the gap becomes greater. They also want to leave out Czechoslovakia now. They have already said they want to leave out Hungary, but we also got information they also want to leave out Czechoslovakia. [Laughter]

PM Chou: And to start with, Belgium and Rumania will not come to the . . .

Dr. Kissinger: [Interrupting] But there are no Soviet troops in Rumania. So this is our general approach to those two conferences. And we will keep you informed. If we have some easier means of communication, if for example, you do get some sort of office in Washington,

we can let you see our study. But we can also do it via New York and while we are here we have some material here which, if your technical experts are interested, we could discuss with you on mutual force reductions. Just to give you a feeling of how we approach it.

PM Chou: What is the possibility for the Western European countries to strengthen their own military capabilities?

Dr. Kissinger: This is not the heroic period of European leadership. We are working with the British right now to improve their nuclear capability. And there may be some possibility of the Germans improving their capability, their conventional not nuclear, and actually the German army is now certainly the largest in Europe, conventional army in Western Europe. In France, a great deal depends on the outcome of the election.

PM Chou: Has Mr. Schumann told you that Chairman Mao advised him to dig tunnels?

Dr. Kissinger: No.

PM Chou: Perhaps he doesn't believe it altogether.

Dr. Kissinger: This is too epic for him. [Chou laughs]

PM Chou: Perhaps the Maginot Line wouldn't work so they think it wasn't good for him to do so. Because they don't understand that during the time when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union the underground did play a part.

Dr. Kissinger: The French are making an effort in the nuclear field, and they have actually modernized their army fairly well. What the Europeans lack is political vision and conviction that what they do makes a difference. So they pursue very cautious policies.

PM Chou: They are nearsighted.

Dr. Kissinger: Very.

PM Chou: Let us come back to the East. Not long ago you mentioned that it would take a long time to settle the questions in Indochina and Southeast Asia. Don't you waste your energies in this region?

Dr. Kissinger: No, I think it is important, however, that the transition between the present and what will work in Southeast Asia occur gradually.

PM Chou: And the same applies to Indochina—that is a gradual . . .

Dr. Kissinger: I am talking about Indochina. When the Prime Minister talked about Southeast Asia what did he mean?

PM Chou: Including Indochina. Because when we refer to Southeast Asia we speak about it in the context of Dulles' policy, because your commitments came from his policies.

Dr. Kissinger: Our objectives in Southeast Asia are quite different from the Dulles objective. Our policy in Southeast Asia is not directed against the PRC obviously.

PM Chou: Then you will have to change the atmosphere in Southeast Asia.

Dr. Kissinger: What concretely does the Prime Minister mean so that I can respond intelligently?

PM Chou: Because SEATO still exists.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but as I said at a briefing of Senators, it is not the most vital institution which is now known to the political life of the world. The major problem in Southeast Asia now is the transition in Indochina from a war situation to a peace situation—to do it in such a way that it does not lead to the intrusion of other countries. I was interested to see, for example, that there was an article in *Izvestia* in recent days warning against economic assistance to North Vietnam. It was sent to me from Washington.

PM Chou: Thank you for your information because I hadn't noticed it.

Dr. Kissinger: It was sent to me from Washington this morning. I think it was February 6.

But with respect to Southeast Asia it is our intention to reduce our involvement gradually. But in terms of the strategy which I have outlined, it is important to remember that all the political forces in America who are opposing the philosophy which I have described, including one of your future guests, Miss McLaine, would like nothing more than a total collapse of the settlement that we negotiated. [Chou laughs]

PM Chou: I know nothing about Miss McLaine and thank you for your information.

Dr. Kissinger: I have no objection to her coming. It will be very good for her.

PM Chou: This is a matter concerning our Foreign Ministry, I know nothing about this. I had some contacts with Mrs. Jarvis from NBC.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, Mrs. Jarvis. She did a very good film. She was very active. She did a very good job. I don't know whether you were pleased with the result, but it really made a very good impression in America.

PM Chou: Yes, I was told by comments from the Foreign Ministry it is not bad.

Dr. Kissinger: It is good.

PM Chou: And the Ministry helped her find a family of three generations—that is what she said in her article. She didn't put it in that speech made to me. She knew very much how to seat herself when she met a Premier in a television interview but which was not included in the film.

Dr. Kissinger: They want to do it separately, I am sure.

PM Chou: She made a very long interview which was not included in the film. Perhaps she was excluded.

Dr. Kissinger: That is her great opportunity to become famous.

So Southeast Asia—our Southeast Asian policies will be put on a new basis, and we will try to avoid a situation where it absorbs all of our energies. On the other hand, if we should be challenged very rapidly then in order to protect the possibility of conducting a strong foreign policy, we will have to react very strongly. So if there can be a gradual evolution, as we have discussed on Taiwan, then many things are possible and we will not be actively involved. But we should have, any time the Prime Minister wishes, a longer talk on Southeast Asia.

PM Chou: Let us touch upon those major questions in Southeast Asia. As for the ending of the war in Vietnam, so far as we know both North and South Vietnam are willing to implement it. As you know the war has been going on for more than ten years and if the time period for the war against Japanese invasion is counted in, then it is a country which has carried on a war for thirty years, so they don't refrain from having the desire to realize peace. And secondly, since we have had contact with the Vietnamese friends for quite a long time, you know they have a strong character of independence. And although the country is not very large, with not a large population, they necessarily have a strong sense of self-dignity—it is a small country with a small population because compared with us their population is not very big.

Dr. Kissinger: Compared with you no population is very big.

PM Chou: But if you count in terms of 100 million then it can't be said it is a big country.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree with the Prime Minister.

PM Chou: And thirdly, they have a very strong inclination towards unity, and the first Geneva Conference bears witness to this point. And the Paris Agreement has covered all the three points. And as far as Thieu is concerned, he has a greedy personal ambition and is bound to fail. Of course, as you said, if the political evolution comes to that point you can do nothing about it, and, of course, if you talk about this to him he will be enraged, but the fact is like that. And just as if you said to the dying Chiang Kai-shek that he no longer hopes to go back to the Mainland any longer, he will also be angry. There is no way to deal with such an ally.

We can leave Chiang Kai-shek as what he is at the moment because this question is bound to be settled finally, because in principle we know each other well. So we won't be very put out about whether you withdraw your troops early or later in that place. But as far as Vietnam is concerned, the fact is that sooner or later the aid you provide will be lost eventually. It is not so easy for our Vietnamese friends to

come to see immediately that Thieu will lose all the assistance he has been given, but as long as your country and Vietnam will be able to control the situation then the war in Vietnam will be able to stop. So we think this is the best for your country and Vietnam to be the Chairman of the Conference. This is the best way because if the other side is in charge of the Conference they will not be able to bring the situation under control.

Dr. Kissinger: Which others?

PM Chou: The U.S. and DRV.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but which others cannot control?

PM Chou: For instance, if you get into the five major countries in the UN then they will get into a quarrel.

Dr. Kissinger: Particularly if your Vice Minister and Malik are there.

PM Chou: But if Mr. Gromyko goes then Minister Chi P'eng-fei will be able to deal with him.

Dr. Kissinger: I have no question.

PM Chou: And then if this question is left to the four supervisory countries it will be again a difficult question to them because they will lead again to bickering. But sometimes when it is necessary to get into some quarrel they don't do so because so long as the Soviet Union points its finger then Poland will change its position, although Poland does not listen to it completely. So the development of the world situation is changing.

And you see for the ICC in Korea it is—during the Korean War one of the members of the supervisory control on behalf of the U.S. was Sweden. This indicates how quick the psychological situation changes. But in Korea as the result of Dulles' policy there was only an armistice agreement without a peace agreement. But since both North and South Korea don't intend to engage in a fight, and since we don't intend to fight, there isn't anything happening there for the last 10 years. Of course, it is a different situation there from South Vietnam.

In South Vietnam it is the situation in which the two sides are engaged in sort of jigsaw pattern, but only the DRV and the U.S. can talk over this question. So this is the Vietnam question. If you shoulder the responsibility then the ceasefire can be realized. Of course, there are bound to be constant small conflicts. I am not very clear about the situation in Laos. Perhaps the Soviet Union has had a hand in it to a certain extent. We don't know what you learn about this. Can there be any ceasefire there in Laos?

Dr. Kissinger: We have had an understanding with Hanoi that there would be a ceasefire by the 12th—February 12th. That did not happen. Then when I was in Hanoi we made a firm understanding that

there would be a ceasefire on the 15th. That apparently has not happened, and we find that very difficult to understand.

PM Chou: Your Ambassador is very active there.

Dr. Kissinger: In Laos he is very active. We had reached a clear understanding with the Democratic Republic on Laos and obviously having reached that understanding our Ambassador would not get in the way of it. That understanding was that both sides would avoid clauses in the agreement that would be humiliating and the terms would be phrased in general language, and the DRV and we agreed on it. We even prepared joint instructions to our Ambassador and their Ambassador. Now the Pathet Lao keep calling the U.S. an aggressor and maybe it is the Soviet Union who has interfered. I can't believe your friends in North Vietnam would make an agreement with me on Monday and then break it on Thursday.

PM Chou: I am not very clear about the reasons.

Dr. Kissinger: I will make an inquiry tonight. Insofar as I know the only obstacle now is that the Pathet Lao now say the U.S. must stop the bombing, and Souvanna Phouma says it should be expressed that all bombing should stop, and we had an understanding on this in Hanoi. They did the same thing about the withdrawal of foreign forces. We want to say all foreign forces should withdraw; they want to name the U.S. separately and Thailand separately.

PM Chou: And what is the opinion of the Vietnamese side?

Dr. Kissinger: The Vietnamese side, when I was in Hanoi, agreed with us. We had no disagreement with them on these points, and therefore I am puzzled why it has not happened.

PM Chou: Yes, we also don't know very well what happened. We only know that the Soviet Ambassador is carrying on certain activities. And the Soviet Ambassador to Phnom Penh has gone back to Phnom Penh.

Dr. Kissinger: As Ambassador?

PM Chou: The Soviet Ambassador.

Dr. Kissinger: They have had a Chargé there.

PM Chou: Recently there was a Chargé there, and according to information they are going to send an Ambassador there.

Dr. Kissinger: I didn't know that.

PM Chou: That is recent information. As for the Cambodian country, why can't you accept to have negotiations with Norodom Sihanouk as head of state?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't know him as well as the Prime Minister. I understand it is a nervewracking experience. [Chou laughs]

PM Chou: Did Senator Mansfield say any words or discuss with you?

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes, Senator Mansfield is prepared to conduct negotiations with Sihanouk.

PM Chou: But unfortunately Prince Sihanouk wasn't in Peking. He was elsewhere. So your people say that after the President was elected for a second term, then Senator Mansfield would come again to China.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but he is not qualified to discuss that for us, and he would only confuse the situation. He is too emotional about this. This is not an emotional problem. I will—is the Prime Minister finished with his observation?

PM Chou: I have just raised this question and see what you have.

Dr. Kissinger: Can I make comments about Indochina in general, including Cambodia, or would you prefer that I talk about Cambodia first?

PM Chou: Either way will do.

Dr. Kissinger: I would prefer to do the general thing first. The basic problem for us is that the Agreement is kept and that the Agreement does not collapse, or if it collapses that it does not collapse quickly. This will affect our ability to conduct any effective foreign policy, and it is therefore of world interest. And therefore, we will have to defend the Agreement if it is fundamentally challenged. You have seen often enough that no matter what our press says, no matter what our Congress says, when we determine that something is vitally important, we do it.

But conversely if despite our efforts it should happen it would lead to consequences that would make it very difficult for the U.S. to be very active internationally and this may be one reason why I think the Soviet Union is now moving into a position of now undermining the Agreement. Another is to establish its position in Hanoi.

We have no direct interest in Indochina. If we can co-exist with Peking, we can certainly co-exist with Hanoi. Hanoi can never be a threat to the U.S., and we are prepared to deal with Hanoi as openly and honestly as we have dealt with you. And we have made a good beginning on my visit.

Now here is how we understand the Agreement with respect to Vietnam. Our understanding is that it should stop the military conflict, and that it should start a political process, and we will accept the political outcome, especially if it goes on over a reasonable period of time.

So it is possible for us—it seems to us also that the DRV has two choices. It can either use the Agreement as an offensive weapon in the short term and constantly use it to undermine the existing structure, or it can use it in the long term, the way we have handled our relationship, in which we both understand what will happen but in which

the situation is tranquil for a period. If they do the second, we will cooperate with them. If they do the first, we will resist them. So they have to be patient. They have to be somewhat patient.

PM Chou: And your analysis is correct, but you should take into account another element. Thieu is more afraid of the occurrence of the second situation you referred to. So Thieu is devoting all efforts to engage in all kinds of unreasonable conspiracy in violation of the Agreement, and we think you should pay attention to it.

Dr. Kissinger: We are paying attention to it. I have told the DRV that we would investigate all violations of the Agreement, and I have sent Ambassador Sullivan to look into the matter in South Vietnam.

PM Chou: And the Two-Party Joint Military Commission hasn't yet been established.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, we are going to use our maximum influence to bring it about.

PM Chou: And perhaps you have had very clear contacts with both Thieu and his special representative, Duc, his Special Adviser.

Dr. Kissinger: My secret dream is to see Duc and Xuan Thuy in a negotiation. I know him. He has the worst qualities of Harvard University and Hanoi University. On the other hand, Hanoi also has made very many, very serious violations of the Agreement. We know that they are sending in 300 tanks into South Vietnam right now.

PM Chou: Not that many. How can there be so many?

Dr. Kissinger: I assure you. We know it from our sources, not from the Vietnamese.

PM Chou: How can there be 300? It is true that they have buried some in South Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: No, they are moving them; that is a different matter. They are moving them from North Vietnam to South Vietnam which is illegal. Now how can we refuse under those conditions when they violate the Agreement? We have not done anything, but if this keeps up we will be forced to send tanks in. On one road, along Route 1068 in the western part of the DMZ, they have sent in 175 tanks which is totally prohibited by the Agreement. I have said this to them also.

PM Chou: But the number of weapons you sent to Thieu during the 100 days after October is also very great.

Dr. Kissinger: But that is a different problem; that was legal.

PM Chou: And this made Vietnam the country with the fourth largest air force.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but the Agreement prohibits the introduction of military supplies in South Vietnam. We have not sent anything else in since January 27th.

PM Chou: And how do you carry out the replacement in the future?

Dr. Kissinger: That is another problem. According to the Agreement the two sides were to agree on six points of entry for the replacement.

PM Chou: This is set down in the protocols.

Dr. Kissinger: In the protocols, but they were not mentioned. They were supposed to agree within 15 days.

PM Chou: You have read the protocol many times, whereas I have seen it once.

Dr. Kissinger: I think 15 is right, but I cannot face the humiliation when the Prime Minister is correct.

PM Chou: They have not mentioned the points of entry yet.

Dr. Kissinger: We have named three; they have not named any.

PM Chou: As to 15 days, then the date is already over. (Chinese side member confirms it is 15.)

Dr. Kissinger: 15, I know it was 15. So the 15 days is already over.

PM Chou: Because when you were in Hanoi, it was already 15 days.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right. So they say until these points are mentioned, they can bring in equipment any place, which is an interesting theory. [Chou laughs]

PM Chou: This is a new point in the protocol.

Dr. Kissinger: And we didn't bring any in. I knew what would happen.

PM Chou: But would that be that after your departure in Vietnam you leave the weapons to Vietnam? This is possible and also some military installations there. It is possible because we have been engaged in wars before so we know about it. Especially we have had dealings with Chiang Kai-shek.

Dr. Kissinger: Technically anything we leave we have turned over before January 27.

PM Chou: But it is still possible that in the documents it was signed as January 27, but actually you did it much later; that is February 10th.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, there is no sense in making—there is no doubt that for an interim period after an armistice both sides are going to engage in shady maneuvers.

PM Chou: Yes, you are fair in saying that.

Dr. Kissinger: And therefore for an interim period we can be understanding, and I talked openly with your friends in Hanoi on this subject. But if it continues, then it becomes serious.

PM Chou: Then it would be necessary to send the people from the ICCC earlier from the different places and fix the ports of entry.

Dr. Kissinger: The ports of entry must be fixed very soon. This is essential, and we will use our influence, and if anybody else can use their influence it would be very helpful. That is a very important question.

Now with respect to Vietnam our intention is to have a constructive relationship with Hanoi and to move rapidly towards normalization. And our intention is to extend economic aid without any political condition.

PM Chou: Since the Economic Joint Commission has already been announced the Soviet Union is not very satisfied with it.

Dr. Kissinger: I have been told that [pointing to a paper being held by the Chinese side]. Is this the article? I haven't read the text. I just read a summary. Actually the Prime Minister, Pham Van Dong, was astonished when we said that once we give them money for certain categories they can use it for anything within that category. He apparently wasn't used to treatment like that from other countries. [Chou laughs]

But it is important for us to be able to do this. We want the countries of Indochina to be independent. We have no other interest in that area. We don't need any bases in Indochina. But for us to be able to establish this relationship, the DRV must cooperate to some extent. If there is no ceasefire in Laos and no withdrawal of forces, how can we ask our Congress to give money? It is psychologically impossible. Article 20(b) of the Agreement says foreign forces must be withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia without any condition. And we are prepared to withdraw our forces, and we have talked to Thailand, and it will withdraw its forces. So the DRV must live up to this obligation. Now they are very close to a ceasefire in Laos, and I frankly do not understand what is delaying it. Perhaps they will conclude it today.

PM Chou: We will be able to get information every day from official sources as to whether or not it has been signed.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I will find out when I get back.

Now about Cambodia. It is obviously a very complex situation, and we have no particular interest in any one party.

PM Chou: From the very beginning you would not admit that. I refer to the coup d'etat. It was not done by the CIA. So after you examine your work, you will find how it was not done by them.

Dr. Kissinger: It was not done by them.

PM Chou: Like the situation in Laos.

Dr. Kissinger: It is a different situation.

PM Chou: Then who did it?

Dr. Kissinger: I have told the Prime Minister once before when I first learned of the coup d'etat I thought Sihanouk had done it, that he would come back after three or four days. I thought he had done it so he could show Hanoi that his troops there made the population very unhappy. That was my honest opinion.

PM Chou: Yes, you have told me about it.

Dr. Kissinger: That was my sincere conviction.

PM Chou: But I was quite skeptical about the CIA so I asked you to make a study of it.

Dr. Kissinger: I did make a study of it. Why should I lie to you today? It makes no difference today. The CIA did not do it.

PM Chou: So it was done by France?

Dr. Kissinger: It could have been done by France. It could have been done by other interests. It could even perhaps have been done independently by Saigon. But it was not done by America nor did we know about it. At that time our policy was to attempt to normalize our relations with Sihanouk, and you will remember that the Prime Minister and I exchanged some letters at that time. We have always been opposed to the presence of North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. We are opposed to that today. We think the North Vietnamese should withdraw their troops into Vietnam. We did not think they had the right to maintain troops on foreign territory.

Now we believe that there should be a political negotiation in Cambodia, and we think that all the political forces should be represented there. And that does not mean that the existing government must emerge as the dominant force, but how can we, when we recognize one government, engage in a direct negotiation with Sihanouk? This is out of the question. But if there were a ceasefire and if North Vietnamese forces were withdrawn we would encourage a political solution in which Sihanouk would play a very important role. We don't want necessarily Hanoi to dominate Laos and Cambodia, but we will not support in either of these countries, and certainly not in Cambodia, one political force against the others.

But if the war continues—first of all, if the North Vietnamese—they are violating Article 20(b) of the Agreement. Secondly, it will be almost impossible for us to go to our Congress and ask for economic support for a country that has its troops on foreign territory. It is difficult enough as long as they have troops in the South, but that we can treat as a special case. We believe a solution consistent with the dignity of Sihanouk is possible, and we have so far refused overtures from other countries that have different views. But there has to be some interruption in military activity because otherwise our Air Force will continue to be active on one side, and there is no end to it. My difficulty

in meeting with Prince Sihanouk is no reflection on Prince Sihanouk. It has to do with the situation there.

PM Chou: France has maintained relationships with both sides. And the same is true of the Soviet Union, so things have been so complicated.

Dr. Kissinger: France wants to pick up what is left over without any risk and without any investment. [Laughter]

PM Chou: Three years ago during the time of the occurrence of the Cambodian incident, the French had sent Prince Sihanouk to the Soviet Union so Lon Nol at the time took a further step to announce the overthrow of the Cambodian monarchy and to abolish the royal system. So as a result Kosygin sent Sihanouk to Peking. So in standing on the just side we should give them support. Further, Lon Nol at the time counted on us to maintain the original relationship, and Lon Nol even said that it was permissable to use Sihanouk Harbor to transport weapons to South Vietnam as was done by Sihanouk before. And prior to that Sihanouk also asked Lon Nol to be in charge of this matter—that is to transport weapons to South Vietnam, and he gained money out of that. So Lon Nol was most familiar with this matter. And now after engaging in subversive activities he wanted to directly collect the taxes so that was too unreasonable and unjust so we rejected him. During that month—more than one month, they continued their initiative—our Ambassador proved that. At the beginning he refused to let our Ambassador leave Cambodia.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I have always believed that if Sihanouk had returned to Phnom Penh rather than Moscow, he would still be King or Prime Minister.

PM Chou: And he might be arrested.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, possibly.

PM Chou: Because Lon Nol would do anything he wished to.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, we will never know this, but in any event . . .

PM Chou: Do you know Lon Nol very well?

Dr. Kissinger: Once. I didn't think he is an extremely energetic man.

PM Chou: He is half paralyzed.

Dr. Kissinger: He is actually very anxious still to establish relations with you.

PM Chou: No, we wouldn't do that with such a person. You should also not deal with such a man who carries on subversive activities against the King. It is just for you not to support India in dismantling Pakistan. On that one we stood together because you supported justice. But we think it is not very—it is not fair for you to admit Lon Nol.

Dr. Kissinger: But I think it might be possible to find an interim solution that is acceptable to both sides and I think, for example, that the Lon Nol people would be willing to negotiate with the Chief Minister of Sihanouk here. [To Mr. Lord: What is his name again?] Penn Nouth. And that might lead to an interim government which could then decide who should be Chef d'etat. This possibility has also occurred to us.

PM Chou: Would that do if you go without Lon Nol?

Dr. Kissinger: The end result could well be without Lon Nol.

PM Chou: Not only the Prime Minister of Sihanouk wouldn't engage in such a negotiation, but there is the Khmer resistance in the interior area in Cambodia.

Dr. Kissinger: What would not be acceptable?

PM Chou: To take Lon Nol . . .

Dr. Kissinger: Well, it doesn't have to be Lon Nol himself. It could be somebody from that government.

PM Chou: Have you had any contact with the Soviet Union and French on this point, or would they go to you for that?

Dr. Kissinger: No we have not talked to France at all. The Soviet Union had very vague conversations, their Ambassador with me. But I thought they were leaning more towards Lon Nol than the other side. They were certainly not leaning towards Sihanouk.

PM Chou: Because he is not so fond of Sihanouk at all.

Dr. Kissinger: But they made no concrete—because I said to the Vice Minister when he was in New York, "I want to talk to the Prime Minister." I have talked to Le Duc Tho about it, and he said he is in favor of negotiation. He said they wouldn't make the final decision in Hanoi, but, of course, you will be in direct contact with them.

PM Chou: And he told me that you said that you would go to me and talk.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right. He said to me first, that it would be best if I talked to you, and then I said I would be glad to. Le Duc Tho always has a slight problem with his time sequence.

PM Chou: So this question is quite similar to the question of the Secretary General. [Laughter] Of course, since Sihanouk is in China we cannot but tell him your opinion in our wording, but of course, we have our own position on this question.

Dr. Kissinger: We would appreciate it if he would not repeat it in newspapers and interviews. His self-discipline isn't up to Chinese standards.

PM Chou: It is impossible. He often told others what I had told him, and also some times when I hadn't told him. [Laughter] So the

word wouldn't be very clear what the Premier had actually told him. So after learning about your ideas and what we learned about it, we wouldn't tell him all about it. Perhaps he would broadcast it and it would be carried in Chinese newspapers, and it wouldn't be all right for us not to carry it in our newspapers. The freedom our *People's Daily* has given to Sihanouk is much greater than any freedom granted to any Heads of State by any country at all. General De Gaulle didn't get freedom like that when he was in Britain. He would be sure to include it in his message if he was told something.

We support his Five Point Declaration of March 23, 1970. That time you were not involved. And we also supported the declaration issued jointly by the Head of State, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister of Cambodia which was issued on January 26. And later the three other Ministers in the interior area of Cambodia also supported this declaration. This is still our position. Do you know the Five Point Declaration of March 23, 1970?[6]

Dr. Kissinger: No.

PM Chou: At that time you were not involved with it.

Dr. Kissinger: This is an extremely unusual event. None of my colleagues have ever heard me admit I didn't know something, but I will know it as soon as I can get a copy. Have you English or French copies?

PM Chou: Both.

Dr. Kissinger: Either one I can read. I have not studied it, but the major problem, frankly, is not the formal position but what evolution we foresee. And from our side we are prepared to cooperate with you, if we can find a way with him to come up with a solution consistent with his dignity.

PM Chou: You have told us your ideas, and we have learned about it, but at the moment perhaps this is not possible. We will consider it again, and next time I will tell you our ideas.

Dr. Kissinger: All right.

PM Chou: The French and the Soviet Union are indeed engaged in activities there. What about the question of the neutralization among those five countries; Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines? If this is going to be a very long discussion perhaps we should leave it until tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we should leave it until tomorrow but I have one brief point about Indochina. When I talked to the Prime Minister

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[6] After this sentence, a notation in unknown handwriting reads: "[Attached]". Both declarations are attached but not printed.

last June about the war in Vietnam, he said after the war in Vietnam ended it would help China to send its MIG–19's to Pakistan instead of Vietnam, and we hope that this will now happen.

PM Chou: We have given some to Pakistan, but we haven't given the number of the planes they want. We gave some to them last year, and we will continue to give them some this year.

Dr. Kissinger: The major concern we have is to see that there is some restraint about the importation of arms by all countries into Indochina.

PM Chou: But here there is a question, that is, Thieu is in possession of large numbers of military equipment although he may not be able to use them.

Dr. Kissinger: But we are not going to send in any additional . . .

PM Chou: But according to the Agreement the DRV will not supply any more weapons to South Vietnam, and you will not supply any more military arms to Thieu. That was laid down in the Agreement and is a joint agreement. You can only replace them piece by piece.

Dr. Kissinger: That is correct, but if there is a large influx of military equipment into the North and the overall balance changes, it will be very dangerous. It has nothing to do with the Agreement.

PM Chou: You mean supply of weapons to North Vietnam?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: But the point is the one who helped Thieu is the powerful U.S. You can supply the weapons to the South not only through points of entry, but also through air and sea and by land.

Dr. Kissinger: Not legally.

PM Chou: So legally you can supply weapons through the points of entry.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: But is it North Vietnam who supports the PRG in South Vietnam, so they can only do so through North Vietnam and only through points of entry.

Dr. Kissinger: No, we are not saying that there should be no armaments sent into North Vietnam. We recognize that some will be, but now that the war is over we believe that some restraint in the sending of armaments would contribute to the tranquilizing of the situation.

PM Chou: Tranquility is necessary. But logically how is it possible for the DRV to be in possession of such massive arms as the U.S. has, and they don't have the strongest means of transportation. They depended on those trails to transport those supplies previously. And, for instance, in the 100 days from October to January you had very inten-

sive transportation of supplies sent into South Vietnam, and the Pentagon has always been very active.

Dr. Kissinger: That was your friend Secretary Laird.

PM Chou: That is why, although I have never met Mr. Laird but I say I appreciate him, because he has always been very outspoken. As to our supplies to Vietnam, as you know, it is very limited so how can it be compared to those given to Thieu? So we are not clear about this.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I understand. I am not criticizing the past. We are talking about the future, and we think that all countries, including the U.S., should contribute to the tranquility. We will be very careful in how we define replacement, and what we replace if other countries act the same way.

PM Chou: According to the Agreement it would be legal to supply arms only through the points of entry. This is the legal way of doing things.

Dr. Kissinger: That is to the South. We are talking of the North.

PM Chou: We support this Agreement, but it is quite another matter for North Vietnam because when they need weapons the emphasis is not here in China. You know this very clearly.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but our point is they should need less weapons now than they did when a war was going on.

PM Chou: It depends how you put it. Because for ordinary weapons, they were easily worn out, but as for those sophisticated weapons, we don't have them. So this is again a matter that concerns replacement. If they really want to establish their own system they will have to engage in producing themselves, and this takes time for them.

Dr. Kissinger: I am not talking about the Agreement. I'm talking about acts of restraint and there is no formal agreement on that. I think the Prime Minister understands our general intention, and this is all I want to get across.

PM Chou: It seems that you have put these ideas—you have included this idea in the Act of Paris—your draft.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, yes.

PM Chou: I have read it. So much for today. I will continue this tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister never wastes an idea.

PM Chou: This evening there will be a banquet and you have to rest now.

[The meeting ended at 6:00 p.m.]

10. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, February 17, 1973, 2:20–6:25 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Chou En-lai, Premier, State Council
Chi P'eng-fei, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
T'ang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John H. Holdridge, NSC Senior Staff
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
Cdr. Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Mary Stifflemire, Notetaker

Dr. Kissinger: We had a very interesting morning at the Imperial City.

Chou En-lai: You have seen it before.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but I find it so fascinating I'd like to come back.

Chou En-lai: Last night I heard there was going to be a great wind, but when I got up this morning I saw it wasn't so windy.

Dr. Kissinger: It was a great morning, very clear.

Chou En-lai: But the ground is not so very even.

Dr. Kissinger: No, that is true.

Chou En-lai: But you know it is very strong. It is very durable.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Chou En-lai: Perhaps it might be stronger. The tunnels are built underneath that ground.

Dr. Kissinger: Tunnels are built?

Chou En-lai: There is one in one place under the Forbidden City, but not the place where you were. When we tore down the city wall around Peking we hadn't thought of it, but now as an afterthought if we had let it stay there it would be a very good defense work. It could also stop the radiation of atomic weapons because it has a very deep

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 98, Country Files, Far East, HAK China Trip, Memcons & Reports (originals), February 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People. All brackets are in the original.

base and also is very strong. You have been to the Great Wall so you know how the bricks are.

Dr. Kissinger: In World War II it turned out some of the old fortifications withstood bombardment more than the modern ones. In Germany, Nuremberg, the city was surrounded by a wall and the whole city was leveled, but the wall remained. That was from the Medieval period.

Chou En-lai: Yes. [Pointing to Mr. Rodman.] He is new.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, this is his first visit. He was a student of mine at Harvard University.

The Prime Minister yesterday, when we discussed that nuclear treaty, did not express his own opinion about the strategy that I outlined to him.[2]

[The Premier speaks to the young girl serving tea.]

Miss T'ang: She just went home to get married. The Premier was asking her. He is noting she is back and asking her why isn't she speaking English. You noticed her. She has always worked here. She is the tallest one. [Chou En-lai points to her.] She is slightly embarrassed. She had a very nice honeymoon, from Harbin to Shanghai. Her mother in Harbin. Her father in Shanghai.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, her father in Shanghai, so she visited them both.

Chou En-lai: This is equality.

Because this question, it seems to me, is that the Soviet Union wants to draw up something that would not be entirely public, or not made to be published. On the one hand it seems they want to have a bit of it published, but on the other hand they don't want some parts of it made public. So it seems to my mind they want to make parts of it public and parts kept secret. I don't think you will agree to that.

Dr. Kissinger: That we will not agree to.

Chou En-lai: And the part that will be made public would serve to deceive the people of the world, including the people of your two respective countries. The part that was kept secret would also be a means to continue the competition with you and to threaten those areas they wish to threaten. And also they could use the three clauses you mentioned yesterday alternately.

Dr. Kissinger: There are a number of things I can say. One, under no circumstances will we make any secret arrangements with the Soviet Union and you will be kept informed of anything that is done, and all of it will be published. Secondly, we will not accept the version that they have given us, which lends itself to the interpretation we discussed

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[2] See Document 9.

with you yesterday. And thirdly, we will not accept an obligation not to use nuclear weapons.

Chou En-lai: You would undertake the obligations, but actually when they found it necessary they would disregard all the obligations.

Dr. Kissinger: We won't accept an obligation.

Chou En-lai: None of the treaties that China concluded with them are effective. Take for instance the Sino-Soviet Alliance of Friendship and Cooperation of February 14, 1950. Recently Czechoslovakia has written an article about attacking our meeting and they said that we had precisely selected the date of the conclusion of that treaty to hold a meeting between our two sides! Actually their sources of information are quite inaccurate, because on that day you were still in Hong Kong and not in Peking. Of course, probably neither you nor we had thought we were trying to select exactly that date to meet at Peking.

Dr. Kissinger: It didn't occur to me.

Chou En-lai: We didn't either, because they got the date wrong and took the 15th for the 14th. Secondly, although we have a treaty with the Soviet Union and it hasn't expired, it is equal to nonexistent. It is for 30 years. But it is the same as if it did not exist. And our Vice Foreign Minister can also bear witness to the fact that they are very eager to enter into an agreement with us on mutual non-aggression. We think this is very absurd, because since we are allies how can we want to conclude a treaty of mutual non-aggression? It seems they have forgotten we are allies! They want to conclude a treaty on mutual non-use of armed forces including nuclear weapons and rocket units. We said that is not sincere and don't think there is any necessity. It is only for the purpose of propaganda. If they truly indeed want to end the armed conflicts along the border and really enter into negotiations about the border, the first thing would be to clarify the preliminary agreement on the border situation, but they won't agree to do that. So you can see the only motive on their side is to try to hoodwink the world. Brezhnev himself.

Dr. Kissinger: On our part we will pursue the strategy I outlined yesterday. What we may do with respect to the nuclear treaty is . . . we do not accept the treaty they have proposed to us. What we are considering now is to say that we are prepared to discuss conditions under which such a treaty would be meaningful, and we would list a whole number of conditions which would then have to be studied. We do this in part, first, to give us time for repositioning our policy, and, secondly, because some of Soviet policy has been so clumsy that if they get frustrated completely they may do something dramatic.

We have discussed this problem with only one other country, namely the British. And their analysis is the same as yours and ours, as you know. But we will never accept, first, that in the case of a So-

viet attack on Europe, Soviet territory will be immune; second, that in case of a war in the Middle East nuclear weapons cannot be used; or third, that it is possible to threaten the international balance without the risk of nuclear war.

We will keep you precisely informed through Ambassador Huang Hua. We promise that . . .

Chou En-lai: Yes, and I would like to add one word. That is, tomorrow evening Minister Chi P'eng-fei will be holding an informal dinner for you, which Ambassador Huang Hua will attend.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, that will be very nice. And we have promised them an answer during March to their new proposal. But you can be sure now that the answer will be negative. The only question we have yet to decide is whether to pursue it in a dilatory manner by making a counter-proposal which is quite different from their proposal, or whether we should reject it altogether. The practical result will be the same.

Also I have communicated to the President about our discussions with respect to bilateral relations. And he is prepared—he confirms what I already told you informally yesterday—for the establishment of an unofficial office of the PRC in Washington or any other place where you might wish to do so, and that we would give it diplomatic immunity.[3]

Chou En-lai: And I also reported to Chairman Mao about all we discussed yesterday about Taiwan and Sino-American relations. You mentioned two stages yesterday. That is, during the first stage the two sides would each establish a liaison office in the capital of the other country. And it would not be an official diplomatic organ and also would not take part in official collective diplomatic activities, but it would enjoy diplomatic immunities and it could be used to contact the other side for various business excepting those which would be transacted through the non-public channel of Ambassador Huang Hua. All other matters could be conducted through this channel. And it is our understanding that all the steps in the two stages shall be concluded within the second term of your President.

Dr. Kissinger: That is our intention.

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[3] At the bottom of a memorandum describing Kissinger's meeting with Zhou, Stephen Bull wrote, "Discussed with the President personally at 6:25 EST. President said 'OK—yes' to the portion relating to establishment of a trade office or some other PRC presence in the U.S. as is indicated on this page." (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, February 16; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 29, HAK Trip Files, Bangkok, Vientiane, Hanoi, Hong Kong, Peking, Tokyo Trip, Itinerary Como Info, Memos to Pres., February 7–20, 1973)

Chou En-lai: Of course, we can also consult each other as to the specific timing of the realization of this process—whether it could be fulfilled earlier or later.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course. It depends somewhat on developments. And we have no motive for delaying it unnecessarily.

Chou En-lai: Right. I forgot to report to the Chairman what you told me last night at the dinner—that the Japanese had suggested that they take care of Peking and you take care of Taiwan. That would be a division of work! [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: But they said they would use all their good influence in Peking on our behalf. [Laughter]

Chou En-lai: Foreign Minister Chi can also bear with me that I forgot to report that item last night.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, on the question of the liaison office, is it your intention, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your office a liaison office or to give it some other name?

Chou En-lai: I think that would be the best—"liaison office". Because the functions of that office could be wider or narrower as necessary.

Dr. Kissinger: I am sure that would be all right with us. I had understood you to say yesterday that you were thinking of calling yours a trade office, but I am sure our intention in pursuing liaison was also the one you had given.

Chou En-lai: It would be more flexible.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Chou En-lai: Because in the past in our relations with other countries we first established trade offices and then went on to normalization. Of course Japan would be a typical example. But China and the U.S. can invent another new style and form.

Dr. Kissinger: That we have already done in the China Communiqué.[4]

Chou En-lai: Yes, otherwise Tanaka would be claiming you had copied him.

Dr. Kissinger: I will have a very serious problem in Japan, how to tell something about my visit without having it in the Japanese newspapers before I report to the President. I will speak for an hour and a half without saying anything. [Laughter]

Chou En-lai: So you will know by the time you leave Peking that I will be able to give you something that you can say.

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[4] Kissinger is referring to the Shanghai Communiqué; see footnote 5, Document 1.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, we should agree what I will say, and I will tell you before I leave what I will say. Would it be the Prime Minister's idea afterwards we would be prepared to express this intention in a communiqué concluding my visit?

Chou En-lai: Yes. I think it should be put into that.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

Chou En-lai: You can draft it. [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: But I have the uneasy feeling that I will run across the Vice Minister before it is concluded.

Chou En-lai: It doesn't matter because you are a specialist in that.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right. We will draft it tonight and perhaps show it to you, discuss it tomorrow. I think it will be very appropriate. Our proposal would be then to release the communiqué on the 22nd, if that is agreeable to the Prime Minister. Our time. Because I return to Washington only on the 20th, around Noon. We need a day to make preparations, and also on the 21st the Secretary of State is testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Vietnam and we should not have this in the simultaneous announcement because it would be brought into the wrong context. Therefore if you agree I would propose the morning of the 22nd of February, our time.

Chou En-lai: We agree.

Dr. Kissinger: And then would it be the Prime Minister's idea that after these offices are established the Paris channel should be abolished?

Chou En-lai: Generally speaking it can be dis-used, but if we have some public business we want to contact each other it can also be used.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course. For public diplomatic communications we should continue to use Paris.

Chou En-lai: But the liaison office can issue visas, can't they?

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, certainly.

Chou En-lai: Okay. That would save trouble, instead of going to Paris. And it is not so convenient for someone who wants to make a journey to go through Paris and then come to China.

Dr. Kissinger: We will make very flexible arrangements. Whoever you send will be a very popular person in Washington.

Chou En-lai: [Laughs] We haven't prepared the person yet, because this is your suggestion; so we haven't yet thought up a person to send there.

Dr. Kissinger: When would you in practice establish this office?

Chou En-lai: If there is time enough, perhaps in May. Do you agree?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and we will be helpful in an informal way if you need any assistance in finding a property or any other assistance we can give you.

Chou En-lai: That will be the same on our side. And also security, we can guarantee security.

Dr. Kissinger: Any requests you make also of my colleagues and me on a personal basis will not be treated on an official basis but we will deal with this on a basis of personal friendship—to make the life of your people easier.

Chou En-lai: And on our side we shall also do the same.

Dr. Kissinger: On the legal technicalities of how these missions would operate, I will have to consult our people when I return, but we will interpret the regulations in the most flexible way and if necessary make some new ones.

Chou En-lai: And we will wait for your notification. And we think it will be best for you to first give your ideas.

Dr. Kissinger: All right.

Chou En-lai: You have too many legalities on your side. And also including communications, the means of communications, wireless and all that.

Dr. Kissinger: That is not a problem. We will give you within two weeks. The means of communications in New York are satisfactory, are they not?

Chou En-lai: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: I am certain the same thing can be done in Washington.

Chou En-lai: There are no restrictions?

Dr. Kissinger: I am speaking really without knowledge, but if there are restrictions we will abolish them.

Mr. Holdridge: Not to my knowledge.

Dr. Kissinger: We will just assure it. There are certain frequencies—we have to agree on the frequencies which you will use, but that is a technical matter. And our intention is to facilitate communication and to use these offices for many of our exchanges. [Chou nods] And we will send you what we think is needed and ideas of how many people we propose. Have you any ideas how many people you would propose to send to Washington?

Chou En-lai: None at all. Because this matter has only been discussed between my two assistants and myself with Chairman Mao and at the Central Committee Political Bureau, but in principle. There have been no details.

Dr. Kissinger: This will all be solved very easily. None of this will be a problem. We will probably send Mr. Holdridge and Mr. Jenkins among the group, because they have been participating in our discussions and they know our intentions.

Chou En-lai: So you have better conditions: on the one hand old Chinese hands and also new Chinese hands!

Dr. Kissinger: They are new friends.

Chou En-lai: Yes, new friends.

Dr. Kissinger: Then the channels we will use—simply so that we understand each other—will be as follows: for formal diplomatic exchanges we continue to use Paris.

Chou En-lai: And what you mean by formal diplomatic exchange we do not think would be very numerous.

Dr. Kissinger: Very rare if you want it to. You have on occasion made formal public protests, for which the occasion no longer exists. [Laughter] Or if there is some multilateral international event which involves us all, like sending you an invitation to this Conference, this should probably go through Paris.

Chou En-lai: For instance also, if you wanted to send us some bulky material like the ones you sent us on the private assets which would not be very conveniently immediately transferred to Peking, you could hand them over in Paris.

Dr. Kissinger: All right. Then most of what was discussed in Paris, all the matters now being discussed by Mr. Jenkins and Minister Chang, that will be handled by the liaison office.

Chou En-lai: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: The communications between the White House will continue to go through Huang Hua, or should I give that also to the liaison office?

Chou En-lai: As you deem the nature of that communication to be. Take for instance the nuclear treaty matter you just now mentioned, perhaps it would be better to have it go through the White House to Huang Hua. It would be easier to keep it secret.

Dr. Kissinger: All right.

Chou En-lai: We would envisage that the liaison office would take care of a rather large wide range of affairs. Of course it would include some confidential matters, but the majority would be public matters. And the channel between the White House and Ambassador Huang Hua would be limited to extremely confidential matters.

Dr. Kissinger: It would help us if the head of your liaison office, when confidential matters are to be discussed, would check with me first, so that I could tell him whether to put it into our official channels or whether we want to keep it in the White House. I will make arrangements for him so that he can reach me immediately. In this manner you can be certain even if it is an official channel that the White House will pay personal attention to whatever matters you send to us.

Chou En-lai: All right.

Dr. Kissinger: And that will be then a very efficient way of proceeding. This is all that I really have on the liaison office. We may consider overnight if any other technical problems occur to us that can be solved here.

Chou En-lai: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Also, as you know, we have a more complex system of government than you. When our liaison office is established here I will make certain that it is headed by somebody who has a direct relationship to the White House. Then when your side wishes to communicate something to us through our office rather than through yours, you have to tell them whether it should be sent directly to the White House or not. And we will set up communications for them for either possibility.

Chou En-lai: I understand. Since we have had a year and a half experience.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but it is a new arrangement. This is the only reason I mention it. I think this is a very significant step forward.

Chou En-lai: And our Foreign Minister was saying that officially your office would probably still have to be connected some way with our Foreign Ministry and your State Department officially. Do you think that is necessary?

Dr. Kissinger: [To Holdridge] What do you think?

Mr. Holdridge: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: In fact this will certainly be the case. I think in the initial period we should keep this vague and we should simply call them liaison offices for the whole range of our contacts. When we announce the people who are going it will be clear that many of them are diplomats.

Chou En-lai: That is, what we mean is that not only the personnel but also, besides the non-official contacts with the White House or non-public contacts with the White House, it also should have a certain organ in Peking to contact—the Foreign Ministry, also the Ministry of Foreign Trade—as well as scientific and cultural organizations.

Dr. Kissinger: It certainly should have the right to contact the State Department.

Chou En-lai: It must have some place to go to as the first step for arrangements.

Dr. Kissinger: The State Department. None else can do that.

Mr. Holdridge: That is, next it would have to go through communications with the State Department.

Dr. Kissinger: But we should also maintain the fiction that it is also dealing with the Commerce Department and with cultural groups. But certainly we would envision that the chief of your liaison office would have the right to contact the State Department, and that this would be his normal contact for routine business.

Chou En-lai: That is true.

Dr. Kissinger: And I will act as the traffic manager. [Laughter] But publicly he will be dealing principally with the State Department. And I assume that you would want our liaison man to deal with your Foreign Office.

Chou En-lai: [Nods] Yes, because it would be more convenient to have the channels concentrated. But of course through the Foreign Ministry we will arrange for your liaison office to have communications with the Foreign Trade Ministry, cultural organizations and also people's organizations—organizations similar to what you have as the National Committee on Chinese-U.S. Relations and the scientific organizations.

Dr. Kissinger: Is that what the Foreign Minister had in mind by "related to the Foreign Ministry?"

Chou En-lai: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: We will send you within two weeks more details of how we envision it. But since this is also a new experience for us you should feel free to correct it or comment on it. We will send it to you of course through Ambassador Huang Hua so it is easy for you to modify it without it becoming publicly known that you have different views. But we will make complete proposals about number of personnel, communications offices, and so forth, and legal status, and then we can easily come to an agreement. We will certainly easily agree.

I know one thing. That the Ambassador of your ally has gone home on vacation on February 8. I think he will return very quickly after February 22. [Laughter][5]

Chou En-lai: And he will have more to ask you after the communiqué.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes.

Chou En-lai: And from the beginning of your first day in Peking, their Embassy here has sent cars to patrol around the Great Hall of the People. We stopped their cars. We said, you don't have the right to patrol our Great Hall. We said it is not a race course. Small tricks and maneuvers. Quite absurd.

Dr. Kissinger: Since they have an embassy in Washington they can have no basis for an objection to a liaison office by you.

Chou En-lai: They probably will try various means and ways to do some tricks or maneuvering.

Dr. Kissinger: I have noticed the press is very critical of my visit.

Chou En-lai: You don't have to mind that. Your press also does something perhaps sometimes also a bit irritating. For instance, immediately your economic mission with North Vietnam has just been

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[5] Kissinger is referring to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin.

set up—the Soviet *Izvestia* wrote about it beforehand on the 6th of February—while the U.S. newspapers mentioned that you wanted to turn Vietnam into a Yugoslavia. Don't you think that would be irritating to Vietnam?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, it is irritating to Vietnam, and extremely stupid.

Chou En-lai: Very stupid, I agree.

Dr. Kissinger: First of all, Yugoslavia made its decisions before we gave it any economic aid. [Laughter]

Chou En-lai: So it shows that some of those reporters don't study history. They just write as they wish.

Dr. Kissinger: Our best policy towards Vietnam, in our view, Mr. Prime Minister, is to be the only superpower that has no interested motives in Indochina. If we begin to attempt to maneuver in a shortsighted way with men who have fought for independence and have made revolutions all their lives it will be totally self-defeating.

Chou En-lai: Yes, you mentioned that yesterday.

Dr. Kissinger: So that will be our policy. It is the only possible policy for us.

Chou En-lai: But as soon as those opinions were expressed the dispute broke out in your Congress on whether economic aid should be given. So it is troublemaking.

Dr. Kissinger: We will have a very difficult time in our country. What is most interesting is that our opponents during the Vietnam war, the McGovern people and the liberal community, are most opposed to economic aid now.

Chou En-lai: Indeed.

Dr. Kissinger: Because they are quite cynical. It is not very popular in America to give economic aid to a country with which we have been at war and which is still holding some of our prisoners. That is not very popular. But we will succeed in obtaining it provided that North Vietnam cooperates with us by carrying out the agreement and especially by withdrawing its troops from Laos as it has promised.

Chou En-lai: Oh, yes, there is some matter I would like to tell before I forget it. That is about the two American pilots here.[6] That is, it has been decided that since the Paris Agreement has been signed we would release those two pilots during the period of the release of prisoners from Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: Will that be announced publicly?

Chou En-lai: You can use it when you go back and meet the press.

Dr. Kissinger: Can I say it?

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[6] Major Philip Smith and Lieutenant Commander Robert Flynn; see Document 4.

Chou En-lai: And there is still one more—that is Downey. His attitude has been the best among the three because he probably knows he now has a chance to get out. But in accordance with our legal procedures, although his term has been shortened, he will have to wait until the latter part of this year. You can tell his mother he is in excellent health.

Dr. Kissinger: His mother has been quite ill. May I tell this to his mother, that he may be released in the latter part of this year?

Chou En-lai: Yes. If her situation becomes critical, you can tell us through your liaison officer, Ambassador Huang Hua. His behavior has been very good. It seems to be too good.

Dr. Kissinger: We have no means of communicating with him so we can't tell him to become a little worse.

Chou En-lai: [Laughs] But perhaps when he goes back he won't behave exactly the same as he does. It won't be too much in his interest to do so.

Dr. Kissinger: But these are gestures that are very important to the American public and will be very greatly appreciated. As I said before, Mr. Prime Minister, we recognize that Downey is in prison for reasons that are part of your legal system, and that he was correctly charged. And the President has said so publicly. So we consider this an act of compassion. With respect to the two pilots we have received many questions about them, and we will appreciate it to be able to say they will be released during the period of the release of American prisoners in Vietnam.

I told the Prime Minister two days ago that I would look into the question of military contracts for Taiwan. I would prefer to do this after I return to the U.S., because if I do it from here it is difficult to control what form the investigation takes. But I will communicate with Ambassador Huang Hua within two weeks or so after we return with regard to this.

With respect to Laos, our information is that obviously the ceasefire has still not been concluded.

Chou En-lai: So.

Dr. Kissinger: And partly because the understanding we had in Hanoi that the military arrangements should be made first and the political arrangements should follow does not seem to have been carried out by both parties. And they are now trying to negotiate a total agreement. One of the difficulties is the one I mentioned to the Prime Minister yesterday, the insistence of the Pathet Lao of singling out the U.S. and Thailand. Our position is that we should say "all bombing should stop", rather than "the U.S. and Thailand and other countries should stop".

And apparently also France is playing an excessive role, or at least an active role. [Chou nods] So we are not exactly clear, though we still think an arrangement will be made in the next few days.

Chou En-lai: We have an embassy in Vientiane but the information they give us is very various, sometimes contradictory.

Dr. Kissinger: We have the same problem.

Chou En-lai: We have the Ambassador from Phouma here. Phouma has an ambassador in Peking. The Pathet Lao don't have an ambassador. This ambassador doesn't give us much information either.

Dr. Kissinger: Phouma has told me he is very anxious to have closer relations with the PRC and we have encouraged him to do so.

Chou En-lai: We are waiting until they have settled their problem, because a premature action would not be wise. Their King is not bad either.

Dr. Kissinger: He is a very wise man.

Chou En-lai: He is patriotic and honest. Have you met him?

Dr. Kissinger: I have not met him. But I have been impressed by what I have seen him do. He only intervenes at critical moments but always in an intelligent manner.

Chou En-lai: He is the man of the type of the East. They say you stayed a bit, sat down for a while, in the Imperial Garden this morning.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Chou En-lai: He liked that garden very much, the King of Laos. When he came it was also winter and I accompanied him to the Garden and he did not want to leave.

Dr. Kissinger: May I ask the Prime Minister what the Chinese intentions are with respect to the road-building program after the settlement is achieved?

Chou En-lai: After we finish the road the project will be finished and then we will leave. And we will explain that to the Laotian Government. It was Phouma who asked us to build the road. The King wasn't opposed either. Especially the road from Phong Saly to Samneua. That is a very difficult stretch, because we have to build over the mountains.

Dr. Kissinger: The Thais are very nervous as they see these roads approaching them.

Chou En-lai: But our roads would only reach the Mekong River, and that is still a portion of Laos to that river, and it is a very long distance to Thailand. What is there to be feared? And the most difficult part actually is in the western part, south from Phong Saly east to Samneua and that is the part that Laos wants us to help them.

The main problem of Laos is the lack of the population, the lack of numbers for the population.

Dr. Kissinger: That is true, and the large size of all their neighbors.

Chou En-lai: Yes, indeed, but just to say something offhand, perhaps it would be best for Thailand to send back the part of the population that is of Laotian nationality to Laos, to help them build the road. They speak the same language.

But it was only after the Indochina issue came to our notice that we really came to know about Laos. Before that, when we were making our revolution, we did not know about that country. Although there have been many writings in our historical books about the country called the Land of Vientiane, which is literally in Chinese "the land of 10,000 elephants". And the same with Cambodia. We had very ancient contacts with Cambodia, and many Chinese emigrated there. But still, even at the end of the 40's when we are in power we didn't even know that there was Cambodia. But at that time we had known there was the United States in the world and also Mexico. We did not know there were two countries called Cambodia and Laos at that time. So you can see our knowledge was very limited, so we are not very familiar about surrounding countries.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, we are not so disturbed by the Chinese troops in northern Laos as we would be by others that we could imagine there.

Chou En-lai: And after the ceasefire the Chinese troops in that area will have no role to play, so the anti-aircraft troops will be withdrawn. Otherwise they will be useless there.

Dr. Kissinger: The fear of the Thais is that once the roads are built guerrillas will start traveling them.

Chou En-lai: But the debt that the Thais owe us is that the Chiang Kai-shek troops that retreated out of Yunnan 24 years ago have settled down—the original general who commanded those Chiang Kai-shek troops for 20 years was General _____ who retreated from _____[7] to outside Chinese borders—and since then they have stayed in Burma, Laos and Thailand in the border regions. Their main route of transportation is out of Bangkok to Taiwan. They have settled down there and acquired arms and engaged in smuggling and all other activities. They very often come back to Yunnan. And almost all the special agents we have detected in that area came in from Thailand.

Dr. Kissinger: May I mention that to them?

Chou En-lai: You can.

Dr. Kissinger: Because I have the impression that Thailand is in principle willing to improve its relationship with you, and we have no objection.

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[7] Omissions are in the original.

Chou En-lai: The greatest fear they have is the large number of overseas Chinese in their country.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Chou En-lai: And as I have mentioned before, the tradition of the Chinese abroad is to be very conservative. They always speak Chinese and even maybe now they don't speak the local language very well, and so when they meet each other they flock together. And besides, those who are laborers for instance in the rubber plantations, a lot of them do a lot of business and quite well, and also some who grow rice and grow vegetables in the outskirts of the cities. Besides those laborers a number engage in small business and thrive, and also restaurants and laundries. Very prosperously. Perhaps the laundries are getting less. Before in the U.S. they opened a number of laundries; perhaps they are nonexistent now.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't know many revolutions that were made by heads of laundries. [Laughter]

Chou En-lai: That is why! But they are very afraid of these things perhaps because of the numbers of Chinese. And so one of the first things we did to solve that issue was during the Bandung Conference[8] we proclaimed we were not in favor of dual nationality, dual citizenship. We would rather they would select one. We think it would be better for them to be citizens of the local country they have settled down in, and not that we, China, would have to tend them. And if they maintain their status as overseas Chinese, then they would have to abide by the laws and regulations of the country in which they resided. Because they have continued to speak Chinese they would also know Chinese writing, and therefore their younger generations would want to read newspapers and pamphlets from China. That would be what your President mentioned in his inaugural speech about ideological influence. But as to how many of the Maoists are really true Maoists, I really do not dare say. I told you about Mr. Reston's son, pistol in hand, claiming he was a Maoist.

Dr. Kissinger: No.

Chou En-lai: Maybe you forgot. I believe I told you something about that.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, there are many self-proclaimed Maoists in the U.S.

Chou En-lai: With arms too, because it is very easy to obtain weapons in your country.

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[8] The Bandung Conference was a meeting of Asian and African leaders held at Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955.

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister asked yesterday about the neutralization of Southeast Asia.

Chou En-lai: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we should separate the long-term evolution and the middle-term evolution from the immediate future. It is clear that the assumptions on which American policy was based in the 1950's of creating a bloc of nations to contain the monolithic Communist world, or even to contain the PRC, are no longer valid. And consequently many of the institutions that were created then, such as SEATO, have lost their vitality and much of their meaning.

Chou En-lai: And for this purpose it might be said that the institutions for that purpose in Southeast Asia are more numerous than in any other area in the world. Even you, who are a student of Southeast Asian affairs, perhaps might not be able to remember all the names they have taken. Of course, the most well-known is SEATO. But there was something typical about SEATO: Very few countries that are situated in Southeast Asia have joined it.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, a very curious phenomenon.

Chou En-lai: At that time Nehru had a famous saying. He said none of the Southeast Asian countries had joined the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but I think it is also true that now India is stretching out its hands in that direction, and therefore to create a vacuum in that direction is not necessarily desirable. I think the two countries that now want to create blocs in Southeast Asia are India and the Soviet Union.

Chou En-lai: They probably first want to have neutralization in this area and then go on to create a market for what they want, the Asian security system. And what can you do about them when they still maintain that India is a nonaligned country?

Dr. Kissinger: They want an alliance of the nonaligned.

Chou En-lai: It is a very curious thing, yes, some small alliance among the smaller nonaligned countries and then a large alliance with other large aligned countries. China is the opposite—it is a nonaligned aligned country. [Laughter] So these are two typical cases, India and China, one is the aligned nonaligned country, the other is the nonaligned aligned country. Isn't that correct?

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. But therefore, for two reasons, precipitate American withdrawal from Southeast Asia would be a disaster. It would be very popular in America. One is the point I made to the Prime Minister yesterday: The most difficult task which President Nixon has in his second term is to maintain an American responsibility for the world balance of power, or for an anti-hegemonial policy by the United States. Therefore it is not desirable for the United States to be

conducting policies which will support the isolationist element in America. This is our problem. But then I'll come to the second point. The second problem is that we believe that the combination of the Soviet Union and India might want to unify Indochina under one country and then create an Asian security system extending from Burma through Indonesia.

They have proposed it to Indonesia also. You know that India has proposed the same treaty with Indonesia that it has with the Soviet Union. [Chou nods yes] So then they link these two together.

Chou En-lai: The Soviet Union has also directly approached Burma about that. Slightly before General Ne Win paid a non-official visit to Hungary the Soviet Union approached him.

Dr. Kissinger: I didn't know that.

Chou En-lai: He rejected it. That is why he did not go to the Soviet Union. He was planning to go both to Hungary and the Soviet Union, and because of this he rejected the visit to the Soviet Union. And they also probably approached Razak of Malaysia too, when he was visiting Moscow. They probably also approached Lee Kuan Yew who also went to Moscow.

Dr. Kissinger: I will see Lee Kuan Yew very soon. He is very intelligent. Singapore is too small for his talents.

Chou En-lai: It is the problem created by Chinese blood. [Laughter] It is because the percentage of those of Chinese blood in Singapore are too numerous that makes Malaysia and Razak fear him.

Dr. Kissinger: That is why they rejected him.

Chou En-lai: Then they built Malaysia over him and around him and isolated him in the center.

Dr. Kissinger: But still he has the most dynamic state in the area.

Chou En-lai: But his production cannot support him. Their domestic production cannot support them. They rely on trade going through their country. They rely on transit trade and now they can only just lease some of their small islands around them to other countries. We have heard that the Soviet Union . . .

Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union wanted to establish a naval facility there.

Chou En-lai: Yes, because a barren island can be used to first build a factory, an oil refinery, and then used to build a dock and then used to repair boats and so on gradually developing into a naval facility.

Dr. Kissinger: Our information was they wanted to use some of the existing facilities. They wanted to lease some of the dry dock facilities. On a regular basis.

Chou En-lai: That would be the first step.

Dr. Kissinger: We prevented that.

Chou En-lai: They have already done that in Hong Kong. Hong Kong has agreed to their repairing ordinary boats but not naval vessels. But it takes them three months to repair one boat, so they maintain all around the year at least one or two naval vessels there that have their intelligence facilities on those boats. Well, now every day they can stroll around in the streets of Hong Kong. And they can also invite guests onto their ships. And they use those methods to serve their intelligence work. These are new activities on the seas which were recently invented since the Second World War.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Chou En-lai: They also use these opportunities, use the fact that Hong Kong is a free port, to buy a lot of daily necessities, especially food, and take it back with them. And they would like to take Singapore the same and make it play a greater role than Hong Kong and gradually project it into a naval base. Britain would probably know about that. They will tell you about it.

Dr. Kissinger: We know about it. Because we in cooperation stopped such an attempt about a year ago. But now that Australia has such a government of limited vision the pressures on Singapore will increase even more.

Chou En-lai: After the Conservative Party in Britain came to power they established the five-power defense arrangement, which played a role in a certain way in checking those activities. Is it now that some cracks might be opening in that arrangement?

Dr. Kissinger: The Australians are in the process of withdrawing their ground forces. But they still maintain the defense arrangements.

Chou En-lai: Yes. New Zealand is more active toward the defense arrangements.

Dr. Kissinger: The Australians may be under the illusion that you will like what they are doing.

Chou En-lai: Perhaps they may have the illusion but we haven't discussed it with them.

Dr. Kissinger: I know that.

Chou En-lai: Because when I met Mr. Whitlam more than a year ago we did not discuss it at all.

Dr. Kissinger: For all these reasons we believe it would be premature for the U.S. to withdraw, because this would only open the field for others. We have no intention of staying there, but we think it would be useful if the situation could first be stabilized. We will gradually withdraw our forces from Thailand, but we think there should not be any sudden changes because any sudden change would accelerate the impact of those countries that are now trying to create their own blocs there. But the long-term trend is clear.

Chou En-lai: It seems that the countries in Southeast Asia have not entirely decided in which direction they are going to move. They have held a lot of meetings and established a lot of organizations. And recently during your visit to Hanoi they held a ministerial conference in ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations. They held a ministerial conference consisting of Thailand, Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, and they decided to send an observer group to the Paris Conference. Do you know about that?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but I don't think they are really going to do it. I think Thailand may send an observer group.

Chou En-lai: But if they conduct their activities outside the conference you can't very well obstruct them from doing so.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, no, we are not trying to stop them, and if they want to come in Paris we will certainly talk to them.

Chou En-lai: Who is taking the lead there—Indonesia or Thailand? Both?

Dr. Kissinger: We think both. Maybe Indonesia somewhat more. Foreign Minister Malik. Though Suharto is the more substantial man. Malik is more like my colleagues at Harvard. [Laughter]

Chou En-lai: Was he at Harvard?

Dr. Kissinger: No, but he is better at theory than execution.

Chou En-lai: Yes, he used to preach theory. He also had a slight Trotskyite phase.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, he had that too.

Chou En-lai: He must be in his 50's. How are the relations between the two Maliks—Soviet and Indonesian?

Dr. Kissinger: I think the relations between the Soviet Malik and the Indonesian Malik are better than the relations between Brezhnev and Suharto. I think the Indonesian Malik is quite adaptable. But I think Suharto understands the problem we have been discussing very well. When we visited Jakarta in July 1969, before we had any contact with you and we still thought of you as the greatest danger in the world, we asked Suharto what the three greatest threats to Indonesia were. He said by far the greatest is the Soviet Union, then Japan, and only in third place China, and only because of the Chinese population in Indonesia. And we were absolutely astonished at that time.

Chou En-lai: And that is why when they were suppressing the people in Indonesia they massacred quite a lot of Indonesians of Chinese origin. And therefore now when they express the desire to restore diplomatic relations with us it is going to be a very difficult step for us. They had first agreed to let us send boats to take back some Chinese from Indonesia—Chinese citizens in Indonesia—but then they stopped the shipping and sent the boats back.

Dr. Kissinger: No, they were very brutal. But now in Southeast Asia they are playing a constructive role.

Chou En-lai: Perhaps. But there are also some of their methods that others might want to ape, that is their succeeding with a military dictatorship and in brutal suppression by armed force. Thailand has been learning from that example, and the Philippines is moving toward it. Perhaps it is difficult only for Singapore not to take such a role. I believe there is still some normal activities in Singapore, parliamentary activities and so on, aren't there?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Chou En-lai: Malaysia is more of a tribal nation. And that is one of the reasons why they fear those of Chinese origin because that is one factor that can unite a portion of the people.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, it really became a state only because those nine kingdoms were all ruled by Britain. [Chou laughs] They needed a common enemy to get a sense of nationhood. They even rotate their King among the nine sultans. There is no national tradition.

Chou En-lai: So British policies in these regions very often lead to unfortunate consequences.

Dr. Kissinger: Past British policies.

Chou En-lai: Now when they want to change those policies it won't be so easy. The South Asian subcontinent is a case in point.

Dr. Kissinger: But there you have an English romantic tradition towards India. They find it very difficult to look at India as a state; they look at it more as an emotional experience. Generations of Englishmen went out to India and this affects their attitude towards India very much. During the India–Pakistan war even Alec Home, who is very intelligent, was extremely emotional and very much against us and, of course, you.

Chou En-lai: And Mountbatten, who was the final one to recognize division between Pakistan and India, also had a pro-India temperament.[9] They deliberately left the issue of Jammu and Kashmir open. You say it's emotional; it is also political. Because they left some remnants and some remaining issues to facilitate in the future the furthering of the division and the furthering of their political interest.

Dr. Kissinger: But even if this is true they are no longer strong enough to carry it out, and it is of benefit to other countries, not to Britain. Britain cannot take advantage of its own legacy.

Chou En-lai: Other people are reaping in the harvesting and gaining benefits from that. The same in the Persian Gulf.

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[9] Louis Mountbatten, First Earl Mountbatten of Burma, was the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia Theatre and, later, Viceroy of India immediately before India and Pakistan became independent.

Dr. Kissinger: We will be more active in the Persian Gulf from now on.

Chou En-lai: Yes, and as we mentioned yesterday we believe you are not paying enough attention to the area from the Persian Gulf to the South Asian Subcontinent. Perhaps also affected by your domestic public opinion.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, domestic public opinion with respect to India is very complex, as the Vice Minister remembers from when he was there.

Chou En-lai: Then do you have some kind of British romanticism in your country too? [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: It is very difficult to develop romantic feelings towards Mrs. Gandhi. [Laughter] The romantic feeling in our country is different. With the British it was imperial romanticism. Ours is a narcissistic intellectual feeling among academics who believe what Indians say about their superior mentality and who thought that India would execute their favorite economic recipes. In America the attraction of India is largely in the universities. The average American cannot stand the Indians.

But we will work with the Shah to be more active in the Persian Gulf, and we are studying the problem of naval deployment in that area, together with Britain.

Chou En-lai: Begum Bhutto is arriving this afternoon. If you have a free moment would you like to meet her tomorrow morning?

Dr. Kissinger: I will be prepared to pay a courtesy call. If we could avoid having pictures.

Chou En-lai: You can meet just inside the Guest House, the compound Guest House.

Dr. Kissinger: On a personal basis. I don't mind it being announced after she returned that I paid a courtesy call on her. When is she returning?

Chou En-lai: She will leave Shanghai on the 21st.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, after I return or after she returns, whichever you prefer.

Chou En-lai: That would be good, and we can also arrange first of all that it would not be made public.

Dr. Kissinger: So on the 20th you can say I paid a courtesy call. Say the 21st, you can say I paid a courtesy call.

Chou En-lai: That can be done.

Dr. Kissinger: That's all right. We have high regard for Pakistan. We have given in the last year over $200 million of economic assistance. We will continue and even increase this.

Chou En-lai: And this time they also took very courageous steps against Soviet subversion recently. Of course, they will also meet probably with some trouble in the two minority regions, one is Baluchistan and the other is the northwest.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, Pushtunistan. When Mrs. Gandhi was in America before the Bangladesh war she also pointed out those two areas as areas that did not really belong to Pakistan. [Laughter]

Chou En-lai: So she wants to complete the dismemberment of Pakistan.

Dr. Kissinger: I think that would certainly be her objective. I don't know whether she would start a war but she would certainly encourage movements of breaking away. The Shah is very worried about it. I don't know whether the Prime Minister has ever had the opportunity to exchange views with the Shah.

Chou En-lai: We only met the Shah by note, and the Prime Minister. We had a preliminary exchange of views. And recently our relations with Iran have been pretty good. But they cannot go too far in fear of their northern neighbor.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, they have a problem. But they understand the dangers.

Chou En-lai: So when the Empress came here the Shah went to Moscow.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but he has no illusions. We know him very well. He is a very farsighted man.

Chou En-lai: And in Southeast Asia, which do you think is taking the lead? You just mentioned Indonesia or Thailand. What do you think of the roles of Malaysia and the Philippines?

Dr. Kissinger: I think they are both domestically too weak to play a leading role. The Philippines theoretically should be able to do it but it cannot do it because of its domestic difficulties.

Chou En-lai: And except for Indonesia we only have some trade relations with those countries. And we are not in a hurry to establish diplomatic relations with them. And as you just now mentioned we would wish to see a natural development in the situation. As for the revolutionary movements in those areas, there are bound to be some, but they will not probably be maturing very quickly. That is our opinion. And in Indonesia, the situation was created by mistakes on both sides, both Sukarno and the Communist Party. That was not revolution; that was intrigue, and that inevitably led to defeat.

Dr. Kissinger: It had no objective basis.

Chou En-lai: There was no reliance on the masses.

Dr. Kissinger: It was really a sort of coup.

Chou En-lai: Actually it was a palace coup d'etat, and it was a very particular one too. Because in appearance it was a coup to depose Sukarno. Actually he was the one who instigated it. It was a very curious coup d'etat that has been seen in the world. Because we have had contacts and experiences both with the Indonesian Communist Party and Sukarno. He was one of our good friends, Bung Karno. We called him Bung Karno, which is "friend Sukarno." And the result of the event made it seem as if we were involved. Actually it was done by themselves. They had a very large delegation in Peking at the time of the coup. They were Sukarno's people, and we advised them not to return. But they insisted, and upon return they were all thrown into jail. And you can see from this that all movements that do not rely on the masses are bound to fail.

Dr. Kissinger: The thought at that time that was expressed was that the Communist Party of Indonesia thought Sukarno would not live long and that they had to seize power while he was still alive.

Chou En-lai: That was not entirely so. The situation was very complicated and up to the present time we have still not completely unraveled the inner stories of that coup d'etat. What Sukarno wanted to do was to arrest all the various generals that he was dissatisfied with.

Dr. Kissinger: That is a temptation that one often has.

Chou En-lai: [Shaking finger] One of the generals that was most vehemently opposed to Sukarno was Nasution. But Sukarno did not know he had an underground tunnel beneath his house. Sukarno sent his troops to surround Nasution's house, but then he left through the tunnel.

Dr. Kissinger: They killed Nasution's son-in-law.

Chou En-lai: When he surrounded the house. But the main thing was that he let Nasution flee. And the second point was that the one he placed the most faith in was Suharto. So these palace coups don't work. If it succeeded it would be the same as Khrushchev, who was finally deposed by the one he placed the most faith in, namely Brezhnev.

Any movement that does not rely upon the masses is no revolution. And although at that time in Indonesia there existed a large-scale mass movement, yet they did not employ that mass movement, and the masses were placed in a position in which they could only wait mutely for what was awaiting them. And the result was that the very vigorous and large-scale movement met with major defeat and a large number of the masses were massacred. And as the result Suharto learned a lesson: He wouldn't allow Nasution to grasp power, although they were the two who collaborated in the massacring and operation. Is he still alive, Nasution?

Dr. Kissinger: I think so. I think he is in retirement.

Could we take a five-minute break? And then perhaps I would like to talk briefly to the Prime Minister about Cambodia and the Paris Conference?

Chou En-lai: Fine.

[There was a brief break from 4:40–4:50 p.m.]

Dr. Kissinger: It will be a new experience to have an unofficial official non-diplomatic diplomatic office.

Mr. Holdridge: Until 1959 the British had a "negotiating representative."

Chou En-lai: Until 1954. Until the Geneva Agreement. According to the agreements we reached at Geneva, because I had a direct conversation with Sir Alec Douglas-Home about it and at that time we agreed that we can raise the level to carry the work, but the host will still be the "negotiating representative."

Dr. Kissinger: First, about Cambodia. I cannot add much to what I said yesterday. But we would be in principle prepared—after you have had an opportunity to consult with Sihanouk—to discuss with you who might be acceptable negotiators on both sides and acceptable principals in an interim government. And I repeat, we would make an effort to find a solution which is consistent with the dignity of all sides. We also believe that an interruption in military activities after the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces . . .

Chou En-lai: As for this question, as I said yesterday it is still under consideration, so I wouldn't reply today. Perhaps tomorrow I will be able to do so.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. On the Conference, we haven't heard what the Soviet view is. A second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in London who claimed he was a Southeast Asian expert called on our Embassy in London and proposed that the Secretary General should be made the Chairman. This is a very curious means of communication to us and we don't know whether to pay any attention to it. I don't understand it, because normally when the Soviet Union wants to communicate something important they communicate it directly to me. So I don't know whether this was a personal idiosyncrasy. But except for that we have heard nothing from them about the Conference.

Chou En-lai: Does that second secretary have a relationship or friendship with the Ambassador in London?

Dr. Kissinger: No. Our Ambassador in London is not one of the more intellectual members of our diplomatic corps. And he does not deal with Soviet Ambassadors; he prefers to deal with lords. Not these Lords—not this Lord [meaning Winston Lord]. [Laughter] As far as I understand, this second secretary took the initiative and claimed to be a Southeast Asian expert. But never has the Soviet Union communicated any proposals to us in this way and normally we would pay no

attention to it at all. Before the Soviet Ambassador left for vacation I told him our ideas about the Conference but they have never replied.

Our view would be to agree on as many matters as we can before the Conference, to avoid as much controversy as we can during the Conference. Therefore, I wondered to what extent we can discuss this Act we gave you. We still have not yet heard from the North Vietnamese.

Chou En-lai: The diplomatic contact you mentioned just now—of course the form was quite curious. But this matter itself isn't anything unexpected to us.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, really?

Chou En-lai: Because as you have mentioned several times, that is, perhaps in August it was you who accidentally raised the question of the joining of the Secretary General to this Conference and later it was the Vietnamese friends who proposed that the Secretary General should participate in this guarantee conference. But now none of the sides know how to deal with him [laughter], so the inevitable result must be that it must be the Soviet Union who initiated it.

Dr. Kissinger: In Hanoi you say?

Chou En-lai: The idea probably primarily was referring to the ideas coming from the Soviet Union. Because neither of us know how to deal with this question and Premier Pham Van Dong said he did not know how to deal with him.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I proposed that because they had agreed on a round table perhaps we should put the Secretary General in the middle. [Laughter]

Chou En-lai: And this proves that you did not know how to make use of his function before.

Dr. Kissinger: I must tell you honestly, Mr. Prime Minister, in August it was my judgment that the North Vietnamese had no intention of settling at that time.

Chou En-lai: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: So we may have submitted a lot of papers whose only purpose was to show that we were reasonable but where we had no expectation that an agreement would happen. It seemed pointless to speak about an international conference when we had not yet agreed to one line of the agreement. Your ally, as I told you last night at dinner, Mr. Prime Minister, has many historic qualities but a very novel negotiating procedure. For example, at a time when literally we had not agreed on one word of anything, in August and then in September, they would demand that we agree to settle by October 31. And it was in the period when nothing very serious seemed to be going on that it was possible—I have to check when I come home—that we may have put the Secretary General into some document. It is possible.

Chou En-lai: So that has provided them an opportunity. So I have this impression.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I understand.

Chou En-lai: So finally the Vietnamese comrades raised this point. Because when Tho said to me on that point there indeed were two possibilities, that you had this idea or they proposed it. But as to who would decide it—the Soviet Union. That is my arbitrary judgment.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

Chou En-lai: I could not arrive at any conclusion because both of your sides were unprepared.

Dr. Kissinger: If they had never mentioned it in the serious negotiations we would never have mentioned it. But once they mentioned it—not being in the United Nations—how could we, as a founding member of the UN, reject it?

Chou En-lai: That is why you failed to arrive at any conclusion on that point. That is why I sent you a message asking you to clarify this point, as to what capacity the Secretary General would participate, and perhaps because you were going to meet me that is why you did not give me any reply.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we sent you a reply.

Chou En-lai: But not on this point, that is, what role would the Secretary General play.

Dr. Kissinger: I sent you a reply.

Chou En-lai: And you proposed that there were to be two possibilities.

Dr. Kissinger: We said there would be two possibilities.

Chou En-lai: We gave you two messages, the first asking for clarification, and then when there was no reply we suggested that the two countries rotate. Then you replied.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, it was probably due to the fact that we had not made up our mind.

Chou En-lai: If they are aware of this, the two sides, the RVN and your side, would be able to oppose it and as a result the Soviet Union would oppose it and that would not be very good.

Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union does not know of your proposal from us.

Chou En-lai: Well, the Vietnamese friends may tell them about it.

Dr. Kissinger: We have not told them.

Chou En-lai: Therefore they might work out a new method, that is, to ask the Secretary General to be the Chairman. Because France has spread the word. France could have been the Chairman of the Conference in the capacity of the host country, but since Thieu is opposed

to them, that is perhaps why the Soviet Union wanted to bypass this point. Perhaps they wanted to support France to start with and they thought that wouldn't be so good and they wanted to ask your approval of it.

Dr. Kissinger: The DRV?

Chou En-lai: The Soviet Union.

Dr. Kissinger: They never discussed France with us.

Chou En-lai: It is only our idea that as the host country France may be Chairman of the Conference.

Dr. Kissinger: But if France is Chairman what happens to the Secretary General?

Chou En-lai: [Laughs] So therein lies the complexity of the problem!

Dr. Kissinger: From many points of view if would not be, except for the fact that the French have an unusual ability to irritate Americans. And especially the Foreign Minister.

Chou En-lai: Yes. I am not very clear about this.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, it is a question of personality, not substance. Because we agree with the Prime Minister about Pompidou. We would like to support him. And we did not react publicly when he attacked us. But France has certain possibilities. It is not acceptable to Thieu, which perhaps could be managed, but it still leaves the question of the Secretary General. The other possibility is your proposal that the U.S. and the DRV are co-chairmen. This has the difficulty that it discriminates against the two South Vietnamese parties. And unless you make the Secretary General the executive secretary of the Conference this is awkward because it is not consistent with his role to be a participant at a conference. The third possibility is to ask the four members of the Central Commission to be rotating chairmen of the Conference, and with the Secretary General as executive secretary.

Chou En-lai: It is true that Vietnam has agreed to the fact that both the DRV and the USA would be the co-chairmen of the Conference but they wouldn't agree to the Secretary General to be acting as either the executive chairman or the executive secretary.

Dr. Kissinger: They have not thought it through. They have not understood the problem and they said they would have to study it. They were also afraid that you would oppose the Secretary General in any role and they wouldn't want to do anything to offend you.

Chou En-lai: And perhaps just because of this they find it a bit difficult for them. And to start with they told both you and us that if there is any new situation they would tell you through their embassy here in Peking.

Dr. Kissinger: They told you that?

Chou En-lai: Yes, and they have told us more than what they told you. They even said they would send people here.

Dr. Kissinger: They did not tell me that.

Chou En-lai: But up to now they haven't sent any people here yet. And their Vice Foreign Minister is coming tomorrow afternoon.[10]

Dr. Kissinger: Thach?

Chou En-lai: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Does he want to talk to me?

Chou En-lai: They did not mention that. They just mentioned that Thach would be coming. Up to now we haven't been informed if there are any new views yet, about the arrangement for the Secretary General or about the draft of the Act.

Dr. Kissinger: But maybe, if you agree, it would be useful if I could talk to him while he was here. Because it might avoid a great deal of confusion.

Chou En-lai: That is true. If he comes tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: If he comes tomorrow I will see him, because if we exchange messages it will get too confusing, and we have great confidence in him. He is a very good man.

Chou En-lai: He worked with Mr. Sullivan.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but he also always sat in with Le Duc Tho. So then perhaps we cannot really discuss it until you have had a chance to talk to Thach.

Chou En-lai: One thing is the draft of the Act. Another thing is about the arrangement for the Secretary General. As for the rest, we can talk.

Dr. Kissinger: We cannot talk about the Act or the arrangement until Thach is here.

Chou En-lai: Because we don't even know what is the view of the hosts here as one of the hosts. That is the DRV. This is the problem. So we can discuss how long will the conference last, and how to host this conference, and also the question of guarantees, how it will be operated.

Dr. Kissinger: First, may I ask the Prime Minister does he mind if we send a message to the North Vietnamese saying we would be prepared to see Mr. Thach here? Or would you prefer to handle this?

Chou En-lai: No, we don't mind. Because we have told you that during your stay in Peking you can consult with them, with their Ambassador. Perhaps their Ambassador hasn't received any instructions from their country.

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[10] Nguyen Co Thach.

Dr. Kissinger: We usually contact them through Paris.

Chou En-lai: But when you first came here you also mentioned that they can also contact you here in Peking.

Dr. Kissinger: We told them they can contact us through Paris or we would be prepared to have them contact us through Peking—in which case they should put their message into English because we would have no interpreters here.

Chou En-lai: What was their reply?

Dr. Kissinger: Their reply was they might do either.

Chou En-lai: But they did not mention that after Thach came here they might contact you, so it might be a prudent way if after he has arrived here we will tell them your idea.

Dr. Kissinger: Good. So why don't you do it?

Chou En-lai: How do you envision the Paris Conference? What is your assessment?

Dr. Kissinger: We think that if there is no prior understanding on some of these issues there will be an unbelievable confusion.

Chou En-lai: Do you think it is possible that the Soviet Union might formally propose that the Secretary General would act as the Chairman of the Conference?

Dr. Kissinger: I wouldn't have thought so but the only . . . if you had asked me a week ago I would have said no. But on the evidence we have, it is now conceivable to me. But I don't see why they should do it because I don't believe that your Vietnamese friends would want that.

Chou En-lai: Because Tho has told me they have never envisioned that the Secretary General would be the Chairman of the Conference. After we have found this out, after the arrival of Thach, now we can discuss it with him.

Dr. Kissinger: He is arriving tomorrow afternoon.

Chou En-lai: The plane will be taking off at 2:00 in the afternoon so we can talk in the evening.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, they take off from Hanoi at 2:00. So they get here about 6:00.

Chou En-lai: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: I will be prepared to discuss it in the evening, and if we can come to an understanding between the PRC, the DRV and the U.S., we will then maintain that position at the Conference. [Chou nods] Our idea is that the conference should be fairly short.

Chou En-lai: From three to four days?

Dr. Kissinger: Four to five days.

Chou En-lai: At most, five?

Dr. Kissinger: Something like that. We think it should have some final declaration similar to what we have proposed to you. We think that the guarantee cannot be expressed in any other way except that the participants indicate some responsibility for restraint in the area and to exercise their influence in that direction. But we also think that the International Control Commission must report to somebody other than the parties. Otherwise the reports are sent to the culprits. So we thought that they could be sent to the Secretary General, for example, for distribution to the members of the Security Council or to some other forum.

Chou En-lai: If the guarantee would be offered by all the participating countries of the Conference plus the Secretary General, then if there should be any especially major issues cropping up then that means that it would only be set up through the holding of the Conference itself. Another Conference.

Dr. Kissinger: That is a possibility, that the Secretary General could reconvene the Conference.

Chou En-lai: Another possibility is to refer the matter to the UN Security Council. We have never thought of that. Because in that way the question would be turned to the UN and this we have never envisioned, and perhaps the Vietnamese friends would not agree to that either.

Dr. Kissinger: We would be prepared to do this, but my judgment would be that your Vietnamese friends would be more willing to have the Conference reconvened than to have the question go to the UN Security Council. But we would accept either one, whichever they prefer.

Chou En-lai: So this is the question concerning guarantee. So the purpose of your recommending the Secretary General as being the Chairman is that no matter whether the two co-chairmen would be agreeable or not, he has the right to reconvene the Conference. Then in that way he would actually act as executive chairman of the Conference.

Dr. Kissinger: That would be one possibility. Another possibility is that he could be the executive secretary of the conference and he could reconvene it only with the agreement of the two co-chairmen.

Chou En-lai: Then it is not so easy to find another secretary? [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: I think he is the most logical Secretary.

Chou En-lai: It sounds very ridiculous to us.

Dr. Kissinger: We honestly think that we should not be in this position. But we are in this position, and we believe that to have the Secretary General as one participant is the worst possible solution.

Chou En-lai: [Laughs] And still worse I think, if he participates in the Conference as a member.

Dr. Kissinger: That is what I meant.

Chou En-lai: Because he would represent the UN and would have the greater power.

Dr. Kissinger: That is why we want to get him some administrative function. My associate Lord is an expert on the United Nations and he shivers every time I speak.

Chou En-lai: And the question now is that the Secretary General is very happy at the moment, and he goes to many places to carry out his function.

Dr. Kissinger: If he had only kept his mouth shut he would have been all right. He is very actively travelling around calling attention to himself. He wants to run the economic aid program for Indochina.

Chou En-lai: And will everyone be willing to make contributions? Japan is also very actively interested in his activities. And he has also gathered many assistants and the UN Secretariat to discuss this question.

Dr. Kissinger: I heard there may be a conference in Japan on this. But I don't think your Vietnamese friends will want that. That was my impression.

Chou En-lai: I also think so. It is not a good way of doing things. Could it be that the Soviet Union is in favor of this way of doing things?

Dr. Kissinger: I could not have imagined it. It is inconsistent with the position they have always taken about the Secretary General.

Chou En-lai: That is true.

Dr. Kissinger: So I can't believe it.

Chou En-lai: But there is one reason perhaps that you should consider. That it is directed against China. Whenever they find it is necessary to isolate China then they will get together with the other members of the Security Council. But if the association is just the opposite then they will explain that they don't care for it at all.

Dr. Kissinger: That is why we will be prepared to act together with you and the DRV if it is at all possible.

Chou En-lai: It is better we must have consultation beforehand.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Chou En-lai: That is better. If it is referred to the Paris Conference then there will be no end of it.

Dr. Kissinger: There will be no end, and if you are right about the Soviet position they can drive the DRV into an extreme position, because the DRV cannot be less nationalistic than the Soviet Union. So we will never end it in five days if there is not some prior agreement. We won't even agree on a Chairman in five days. [Laughter]

Chou En-lai: What you said is correct.

Dr. Kissinger: The Foreign Minister had better be prepared for a long stay in Paris.

Chou En-lai: In that case we will have to send the Vice Foreign Minister to take his place.

Dr. Kissinger: That is our intention. If the Conference lasts beyond a week we will leave Mr. Sullivan there.

Chi P'eng-fei: We have our Ambassador in Paris, Huang Chen, and can have him stay.

Dr. Kissinger: I like him.

Chou En-lai: And then we issue an order to designate him as being Vice Foreign Minister. So this is easy to deal with.

Dr. Kissinger: If I am any judge of your Ambassador in Paris, he will get very impatient if there are too many words used. He liked to get to the point.

Chou En-lai: [Nods yes] You have an idea of establishing an organ. Now, how to establish such an organ?

Dr. Kissinger: We believe there should be some device, somebody, either the Secretary General or maybe the permanent members of the Security Council, that can receive the reports from the International Control Commission. We do not believe there should be a permanent organ that maintains a secretariat. Secondly, we are prepared to have some multilateral discussions about the reconstruction of Indochina, but we are not sure that your friends are interested in that.

Chou En-lai: Have you discussed it with the Vietnamese?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but they have not stated an opinion. They did not reject it. The way it was left was that they would do a draft of this Act and that we would then compare them.

Chou En-lai: Have they given their drafts yet?

Dr. Kissinger: No. They said Friday or Saturday. But maybe Thach is bringing it with him tomorrow.

Chou En-lai: Yes, perhaps. They told us they had reached an agreement with you on those technical issues, for instance the Conference shouldn't be lasting too long and the form of the Conference should be a round table conference.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Chou En-lai: And as for the arrangement of the participants around the table it should not be strictly in alphabetic order.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. It is so complicated. I had learned it once but I have forgotten it again.

Chou En-lai: They state also that the two parties of South Vietnam should not sit shoulder to shoulder, side by side.

Dr. Kissinger: That is true. Mr. Prime Minister, we had proposed a Pentagon table, but they rejected it. [Laughter]

Chou En-lai: Perhaps there will be again some problems for signature, for signing the document.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, there will certainly be.

Chou En-lai: There will be two ways on signing it.

Dr. Kissinger: Maybe we should sign on 13 different pages. [Laughter]

Chou En-lai: Perhaps two of them will be taken away between Tran Van Lam.

Dr. Kissinger: I know the order, but by what principle it was established I have now forgotten. But it occupied some great minds for a long time. We have also agreed that three people can sit at the table and seven can sit behind them for each delegation. And on languages—the technical things are essentially agreed to.

Chou En-lai: The French must be very satisfied with the fact that the Conference is going to be held in Paris.

Dr. Kissinger: We agreed to that, Mr. Prime Minister, to help Pompidou. We had decided not to agree to Paris.

Chou En-lai: There isn't much to be discussed about the Paris Conference. What is the number of people in each delegation?

Dr. Kissinger: Ten—three at the table and seven behind.

Chou En-lai: That is the maximum number, so it will be all right if they don't present too many people.

Dr. Kissinger: But if you have any extra places we will be glad to fill them. [Laughter] We have many bureaucrats. There are three at the table and seven behind.

Chou En-lai: So it is in the shape of radiation. [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: It is three, three, and four.

Chou En-lai: Then it is not very easy to deal with this because then people will have to sit shoulder to shoulder, elbow to elbow.

Dr. Kissinger: But we have solved all the difficult problems, so there isn't much left for the Conference to do: the seating arrangement, the shape of the table.

Chou En-lai: That is not important.

Dr. Kissinger: I know, but . . . so we would be prepared, as I said, to meet with Vice Minister Thach.

Chou En-lai: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: And we think it is very useful to have a settlement of as many issues as possible. And I repeat, we would be prepared to act in concert with you and your North Vietnamese friends if it is at

all possible, in order to avoid any attempts to isolate you. We will in no case participate in any attempt to isolate you.

Chou En-lai: And the main purpose is to let the Vietnam Agreement to take effect.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly.

Chou En-lai: This is most important. It is all right if there is any difference of opinion on one or two small minor issues.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, of course, that cannot be avoided. It is inevitable. It may even be desirable.

Chou En-lai: And there are bound to be differences.

Dr. Kissinger: Inevitably, and that is to be understood. But if a meeting can be arranged with Minister Thach I can then also give him a message about the general situation in Indochina before I go back to America.

Chou En-lai: That is good. And after I meet him tomorrow I will tell him that. So today, Mr. Jenkins and our Assistant Minister are also having a meeting in the afternoon?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. They are making good progress.[11]

Chou En-lai: We would like to fix this point, that is that the office should be dealt with on a package basis so that it must not be made too complicated. There shouldn't be too many legalities concerned. In this way this question can be quickly settled.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. But how should we do it? Should we send the delegation here, or should it be done in Paris?

Chou En-lai: It is better to have it settled in Paris. Since the two Foreign Ministers are going to meet in Paris.

Dr. Kissinger: They can settle it there.

Chou En-lai: They can meet and then this issue can be left to the two Ambassadors to settle there. It seems Mr. Rogers is going to meet Minister Chi P'eng-fei there, and this is chance for them to deal with it.

Dr. Kissinger: Good.

Chou En-lai: After you have the approval of your President.

Dr. Kissinger: I will formally check it with him but I know his views and he will almost certainly agree to it. We have discussed this often.

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[11] A memorandum of conversation of the February 17, 2:30–4:15 p.m. meeting between Zhang Wenjin and Alfred Le S. Jenkins is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 87, Country Files, Far East, PRC Counterpart Talks, 1971–1973.

Chou En-lai: Because this is the simplest and the quickest way of dealing with this issue and it is the easiest accounting for it to your people.

There is one point perhaps they haven't mentioned and I would like to add here, that is, about the blocked assets. After we have announced this perhaps there would be more people who would make claims against China, because at the moment your list is longer than ours.

Dr. Kissinger: Our list is longer than yours? Oh, what we have blocked.

Chou En-lai: You have blocked our banking deposits in your banks. And your list is longer than your deposits in our banks. Because there are people who wouldn't dare to mention it but perhaps now will dare to raise this point. So anyway we will settle this question by ourselves.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. Our intention is to deal with this comprehensively and politically, and not commercially, and only to create the basis for making progress in the field of trade and other fields. If in the negotiations there should be any extreme technical difficulties, then perhaps you will approach me through our confidential channel and I will do my best to remove them.

Chou En-lai: I guess that once the principles are laid down it wouldn't be very difficult.

Dr. Kissinger: No, but sometimes our negotiators, who don't know the spirit of our negotiations or our total approach, may want to make themselves look good by taking an intransigent position on this or that item. If you then let me know, we can certainly deal with it.

Chou En-lai: So, Mr. Jenkins will not attend the Paris Conference?

Dr. Kissinger: No, but he could come over for the meetings between the Foreign Ministers. But we will make sure that the Secretary of State knows that if there should be any difficulties they will be removed. You can count on what we have told you. It may be done in a complicated form, but it will certainly be done and be done quickly. [Chou nods]

Can I raise two other things in that connection or in connection of the subject matter of exchanges. One has to do with politicians who want to come here. Your policy of insisting that the delegation always have members of both parties is a very wise one, and we think it would be constructive to maintain it.

Chou En-lai: The last time you said it would be desirable for Mr. Mansfield to come alone.

Dr. Kissinger: You are quite right. He is very insistent on coming, and we thought we could get around the problem by sending him on some governmental mission, so it is not your invitation but our pro-

posal—our sending him. But we don't insist on that. We are prepared to tell him that he must find a companion from the other Party. That may be the easiest.

Chou En-lai: But he is quite good at keeping faith, that is he will say what he should say and not say what he should not say.

Dr. Kissinger: That is true. Except where Sihanouk is concerned. He is a little bit emotional on that subject.

Chou En-lai: And he talks a little bit excessively so that is why Sihanouk is already not too happy about it. He said Samdech Norodom Sihanouk should act as provisional head of state. But Sihanouk says he is already head of state. He did it out of good intentions but on the contrary it has led to the unhappiness on the part of Sihanouk. Senator Mansfield looks very earnest but perhaps he is not very mature politically.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I agree, and we don't want him involved in political negotiations. He can study humanitarian problems and exchanges and contacts. But he has no standing with us on political problems.

Chou En-lai: Is he still the chairman, the leader of the Democratic Party in the Senate?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, majority leader in the Senate. So it is worthwhile to keep friendly relations with him. But he is a decent man.

Chou En-lai: And Senator Scott is also not bad. He did not say much when he got back to the States. But not that other Congressman.[12]

Dr. Kissinger: Congressmen are hard to control.

Chou En-lai: Ford said I was most in favor of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and was very much in favor of having American troops stay in the Far East.

Dr. Kissinger: I know, it was not very intelligent.

Chou En-lai: And these two Congressmen are quite similar. They talked a lot.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, well, that is the risk with Congressmen. If you want to, after you have your liaison office, or even before, we will be glad to advise you, but it is of course your judgment as to whom is discussed. Somebody who wants to come and who would be very useful is Senator Jackson. He is a Democrat and he is one of the few Democrats who has a clear understanding of the Soviet problem.

Chou En-lai: Jackson. From which State is he?

Dr. Kissinger: Washington. He would be prepared to come with a Republican Senator so he would not insist on coming alone. But he is very helpful to us in getting our defense budget approved. And he has

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[12] After this sentence, a note in unknown handwriting reads: "(Jerry Ford!)"

the Prime Minister's view about the agreement to limit strategic arms. He is one of the very few Democratic Senators with a very realistic view of the world.

Chou En-lai: Among the Republican Senators, which of them are similar to him?

Dr. Kissinger: Republican Senators? Buckley of New York, the brother of the one who was here last year.[13] Goldwater, but he is not intelligent, so he is not worthwhile to have here. I will think of some by tomorrow. One other question I wanted to raise with the Prime Minister, because he raised it when we discussed the prisoners. There is one of our Navy pilots who was shot down and fell in the water near Hainan Island in 1968. His name is Lt. Dunn. We only wondered whether you had any information about him. We looked for him for two days. We wonder whether perhaps Chinese authorities looked for him or found his body or found some information about him.

Chou En-lai: On which date?

Dr. Kissinger: February 14, 1968.

Chou En-lai: That was the day of the signing of the treaty between China and the Soviet Union. [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: It was a deliberate provocation!

Chou En-lai: We will check it.

Dr. Kissinger: Good.

Chou En-lai: You tell us more clearly about the name of that person. Is he from the aircraft carrier?

Dr. Kissinger: No, he was flying from the Philippines and he was shot down.

Chou En-lai: What type of airplane?

Dr. Kissinger: We will get you the information.

Chou En-lai: And who shot down that plane?

Dr. Kissinger: The Chinese. Here, I give you my information. [Hands over biographical data on Lt. Dunn, Tab A][14] This is all the information I have. But I can get you the information. We will find out the type of plane overnight.

Chou En-lai: So the plane was shot down in air space on Hainan Island.

Mr. Holdridge: It was over your territorial waters, within the 12-mile limit. It wasn't over Hainan itself but over the waters adjacent to Hainan.

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[13] James L. Buckley, Conservative Party Senator from New York and brother of conservative pundit William F. Buckley.

[14] Attached but not printed.

Dr. Kissinger: We don't contest your actions.

[Miss T'ang reads paper to Chou En-lai.]

Chou En-lai: So according to this paper, the *Peking Review* carried that, so this can be checked up.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, we just wondered what information you had about the pilot. We are not questioning your actions.

Chou En-lai: Since the *Peking Review* has carried an article about it, then we are sure that we can check it and find out information about it.

Dr. Kissinger: We would be very grateful.

Chou En-lai: And at 7:30 this evening there is going to be a sort of concert. It will last about 1½ hours, and the Foreign Minister will be accompanying you. It is a sort of concert, and they said our orchestra is going to play . . .

Miss T'ang: Try to play . . . [Laughter]

Chou En-lai: A symphony or part of a symphony from Beethoven, Number 6.

Dr. Kissinger: The Pastoral.

Chou En-lai: It is just a Chinese saying, "trying to wield an axe before Lin Pan's door".

Miss T'ang: It means an amateur trying to perform before an expert.

Dr. Kissinger: Are there any experts here? Maybe Mrs. Stifflemire?

Chou En-lai: But in order to save time, this evening I would like to have another meeting with you to talk about our assessment on the Soviet Union. Because you asked me this question and I haven't given you the reply yet. And since you have asked quite a few questions I would also like to answer this.

Dr. Kissinger: After the concert?

Chou En-lai: When are you having your dinner, before the concert or after the concert?

Dr. Kissinger: Probably before, because my colleagues are going to go shopping.

Chou En-lai: Then that is better. Then we will have the meeting after the concert at a guest house, that building where we had a meeting yesterday. And after you get back you will be able to have a rest, about a half hour, and we will check the time. We don't know whether the concert will be prolonged or not [laughter], because I know nothing about symphony.

Dr. Kissinger: I think you are carrying hospitality to extremes on this occasion, and I want to apologize to the Chinese audience who will have to suffer through an hour and a half of Western music. Not

to speak of the Foreign Minister who will have to look interested. [Laughter] But he is a great diplomat.

Chou En-lai: Our Vice Foreign Minister knows something about music.

Dr. Kissinger: Really?

Chou En-lai: Our Assistant Minister understands music pretty well. He studied it. And he can speak German. Has he ever tried to speak German with you?

Dr. Kissinger: No.

Chou En-lai: Perhaps it is because you did not speak German to him.

Dr. Kissinger: No, he doesn't like my accent. Does the audience tonight know what it is coming for?

Chou En-lai: They know. There are quite a few number of people in the Foreign Ministry who know.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, we appreciate it very much.

[The meeting then adjourned.]

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11. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, February 17, 1973, 10:22–11:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Chou En-lai, Premier, State Council
Chi P'eng-fei, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Chang Wen-chin, Assistant Foreign Minister, Acting Director of American Pacific Affairs Department
Ting Yuan-hung
T'ang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Shen Jo-yen, Interpreter
Ma Chieh-hsien, Notetaker
Lien Cheng-pao, Notetaker

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Alfred Le S. Jenkins, Department of State

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 98, Country Files, Far East, HAK China Trip, Memcons & Reports (originals), February 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Villa 3. All brackets are in the original.

Richard T. Kennedy, NSC Staff
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
Mrs. Bonnie Andrews, Notetaker

Dr. Kissinger: We enjoyed the concert very much. [Light discussion about the concert.] It is much more tender when you play the music.

PM Chou: Well, Madame Bhutto has arrived here this afternoon. So we have told her that you would be ready to meet her tomorrow morning. You will go to her place. As for the others they might go to the Summer Palace. Only the Ambassador will remain there [for the Mrs. Bhutto meeting].

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, his brother was there when we visited. And his sister was a student of mine. She arrived in America in 1950 or '51, and she believed strongly in the independence of women, which she couldn't always realize in Pakistan. So we picked her up at the ship and took her to an amusement park called Coney Island and she went on something, I don't know if this exists here, a roller coaster, ten times in a row. Then she was sick for two days. After that we became good friends.

PM Chou: So she would have some courage.

Dr. Kissinger: Great courage.

PM Chou: So we have had a talk for three times already, including the day before yesterday, yesterday and today. We have touched upon some strategic issues. Why was it that we mentioned to the Doctor that the Europeans want to push the evil waters of the Soviet Union eastward?[2]

Because there have been historical examples. That was what happened during the two World Wars. During World War I King William fought in the West and was also in the East. The Czar at the beginning didn't intend to get into the fight. And as a result of the battle the main force and the thrust went East.

Dr. Kissinger: In World War I or II?

PM Chou: In World War I. As a result of that the revolution of 1917 occurred. Hindenburg put his forces in the East and then someone said that if he wouldn't put his main force in the East but in the West instead he would be successful. But this might not be true since later the U.S. entered the war.

And during World War II the Western world also wanted to push Hitler toward the Soviet Union and this also was a failure because he

[2] On February 15, Zhou told Kissinger, "Perhaps they [Western European leaders] want to push the ill waters of the Soviet Union in another direction—eastward." See Document 8.

put his forces in the West. This was also dangerous. But as a result the Soviet Union had an easier time. And since Hitler advanced Eastward the war had provided you an opportunity.

So the idea of going Eastward is a traditional one and now it is time for the Soviet Union to do so. Just as you said the other day, that if there was a feeling of peace in the West then the Soviet Union could use more forces in the South and in the East. But as a matter of fact the main forces are still in the East. Do you think so?

Dr. Kissinger: No. According to our calculations . . . in Europe now they have twice as many divisions in Europe as they have on your border, if you count Western Russia. If you count the divisions west of the Urals and east of the Urals it is 50–50. But there are more air forces in the West.

PM Chou: But in the West there are also the satellite countries.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. We are only counting Soviet divisions. But satellite divisions need Soviet divisions to watch them. [Laughter]

PM Chou: That is quite another matter. If the force of the satellite countries are included then it is quite a bit more.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. If you count them, then they are larger.

PM Chou: But for the forces in Western Europe, if your forces are not included then the forces are very small. So the increasing illusion of peace is something very deceptive and also very dangerous. So on this point perhaps we have shared the same view.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly.

PM Chou: But there is a difference. We have made this point publicly. It was made at Comrade Ch'iao's speech in the UN last year.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: Although the two superpowers are contending for hegemony in the world, their deception is greater and the danger is greater.

Dr. Kissinger: But do you really think we are contending for hegemony right now?

PM Chou: Because it was brought out by the objective situation, and your country which has deployed in such a situation after World War II.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but now . . .

PM Chou: And this is the reason why we praised the speech made by President Nixon on July 6, 1972 in Kansas City.[3]

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[3] Nixon's speech was actually on July 6, 1971. In it, he declared that "there are five great power centers in the world today," and that "Mainland China" was one of these centers. (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1971,* pp. 802–813)

Dr. Kissinger: I heard about the speech from the Prime Minister. I first saw the text when the Prime Minister sent it to me.

PM Chou: And during the annual convention of the Conservative Party in Britain Heath also expressed the same view in his concluding speech.

Dr. Kissinger: That was another speech to which the Prime Minister called my attention.

PM Chou: So this is the situation that was brought about by the U.S., and now it is a question of whether you drop it or not. If you drop it then the Soviet Union will come and problems will arise. And there still exist such questions but because we have differences, our views are different from yours. And we say that there is the possibility, but first one must call upon the people to awake and prevent this from happening. Otherwise how can you carry out defense? So on this issue, as you have mentioned recently, there have been two possibilities but there is only one possibility we think. As we have said in the UN, their so-called détente is false. They are talking about détente but actually they are engaged in expansion. Of course, some people might say that the period of Cold War has come again. But I don't think that will come true. Although the Soviet Union is engaged in expansion, it is afraid of fighting a nuclear war. And they are even worried that fighting with conventional weapons might lead to a nuclear war. That is why they have silly ideas like a nuclear treaty. That is why during the exchange of views the past three days here too we have the same view. So we can make some assessments on the various issues in the international arena.

That is the first point. I think that the central point is that the Soviet Union is afraid of fighting a war and it thinks it is better that you fight in some remote areas. And this has been borne out by the situation in the last few years. And in approaching the Middle East they will try their best to suppress them and not let them take action.

Dr. Kissinger: They specialize in using their armies against their allies.

PM Chou: And as you admit there do exist two blocs. As Chairman Mao says, one is firing empty guns. They introduced so many weapons and yet they can't use them.

Dr. Kissinger: In what areas?

PM Chou: Egypt. They have always said that they give the weapons to the Egyptians but that they don't know how to fight with them. Kosygin said that at the airport in 1969. And then they were fighting a war concerning the Suez Canal in 1956 against France and Britain.

Dr. Kissinger: Egypt?

PM Chou: So how can you say they can't fight a war? Because they . . . It is as if only the Vietnamese could fight a war. Of course, the Vietnamese should be respected but one can't say that only the people in one region can fight a war while people in another region can't.

So this is an essential point with regard to the Soviet Union. And it was principally because of this that their rhetoric about the situation will easily be accepted by others and deceives people. So I agree with your assessment about the second possibility. They seem that they are going toward that direction. And they have reaped some results to some extent. They worked out a communiqué on relaxation and you weren't able to object to it. And again in the UN Gromyko worked out a proposal on the non-use of force and permanent non-use of nuclear weapons. We opposed it, but the U.S. only abstained. And if you rejected it then you would have shown that you resort to force. So there were a great number of countries that voted abstention and there were only four countries left. Two on the left and two on the right. Our friend was only Albania, and South Africa and Portugal were on the right. And then the Soviet Czars talked about the left faction and the right faction.

Dr. Kissinger: We always play the bull to the Prime Minister who makes us come charging predictably. He comes to every meeting with a firm intention.

PM Chou: What does this indicate? It indicates that the deceptive nature has its market. So this is a fact. So we could not but expose them. Without that what would the situation be like? Otherwise only Portugal and South Africa would oppose them. Then what would it be like in the international arena? This indicates that to expose the deceptive nature of the Soviet Union is a very complicated struggle. And possibly that resolution was adopted and more than seventy countries were for it.

So on this point it is very important to expose the true features of the Soviet Union as being engaged in false relaxation of tension and engaged in expansion. So the first point is about their deceptive nature. And this is why in Europe there have been illusions of peace. So we say that the European Security Conference is not really a security conference but really an insecurity conference. This was spoken by Ch'iao, and is the words of Chairman Mao. And now it can be proved. What is coming out of that conference?

Dr. Kissinger: Nothing.

PM Chou: It seems the same is true of the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Conference.

Dr. Kissinger: Not exactly. We discussed this.

PM Chou: That is a strong point, that it will expose them and their advances. But the conclusion must be made very clear. Otherwise the

world will be deceived continually. And then, as a result, they will sign a treaty with you and import some goods and you wouldn't be able to reject it. And, as you said, in order to strengthen their arms preparation they will import arms technique. You said they were going to use technology in the U.S. to lessen the gap.

Dr. Kissinger: No. I will answer this in a minute. They want to use our technology to improve their economic position, not their military position. I agree with the Prime Minister that they want to improve their military position also.

PM Chou: The inevitable result would be that by improving their economic strength it would serve also to add to their military power and this would serve as a backing for their military strength. That is all that they have thought about, but how to realize that is another matter.

And the fourth point you have said is that they want to isolate China, claiming that China is war-like, and saying that China is against relaxation. And the result will be that they will surpass you. But we think that it is not easy for them to attain that goal. If they reach out their hands to the whole world then it will be in the same position as the U.S. was in before. You will be in a passive position. But the overall situation will be depending on the larger aspect of things.

So, we have covered the issues in Europe, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, Indochina, the Subcontinent, and also Southeast Asia and Japan. And they want to get an upper hand in all respects, but actually that is impossible for them.

So we must realize that it is important to expose them. That is, the strategic principle should be to expose them that they are for general expansion and for false relaxation. And for the past years we have never ceased in exposing the Soviet Union's expansionism and their false relaxation. We have done this since the Chen Pao incident in 1969.[4] And in the meeting at the Peking airport we agreed to have discussions with them to test them. But after these negotiations, after they got back, what they promised would not be realized because their leadership would not endorse it. And, what Kosygin said didn't count. Actually it was he who asked me to set forward a plan, and later he was opposed to it. They even went so far as to suggest last year that we could have a mutual non-aggression treaty with them.

Dr. Kissinger: Among Allies? [Laughter]

PM Chou: But they did not agree. They would not agree that there do exist disputed areas. In the 19th century there was a treaty that was

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[4] Chen Pao (Damansky Island) was the site of a clash during Sino-Soviet fighting at the Ussuri River in 1969.

unequal, and yet we took that treaty for the disputed areas. There do exist disputes about the areas, both in the east and the west. But they don't accept these to be disputed areas, because if they accepted, that would bring about a chain reaction.

They are so neurotic. Ch'iao was locked in a quarrel with Kuznetzov and then Minister Han Nien-long took his place and then Vice Minister Fu Haol (?)[5] took Mr. Han's place. And the negotiations have been going on for three years. Kuznetzov has been conducting another negotiation since. He does administrative work now. He is taking care of the administrative work. So the Soviet Union is so neurotic about everything. So there is a strategic consideration for these questions.

This is what I have to say.

I would like to let you know a new piece of news. Chairman Mao has invited you to a meeting. You can go with your colleague, Mr. Lord.

Dr. Kissinger: With Mr. Lord.

PM Chou: And I will go with you.

Dr. Kissinger: Now?

PM Chou: We are supposed to arrive there at 11:30. Would you like to take a rest?

Dr. Kissinger: I will leave that up to you.

PM Chou: So much for today. Now we can continue our talks tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: And I will make some comments tomorrow because you raised some very important questions.

PM Chou: Will you be able to give us a copy of the draft communiqué? Whenever you have finished it, you can give it to us.

Dr. Kissinger: We haven't finished it. Either tonight or tomorrow.

PM Chou: Tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: Fine. Should I meet you here, Mr. Prime Minister?

PM Chou: I will go to your place.

Dr. Kissinger: This is a great honor.

PM Chou: Tomorrow we can talk more deeply.

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[5] No Chinese official with the name "Fu Haol" has been identified.

12. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, February 17–18, 1973, 11:30 p.m.–1:20 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Mao Tsetung, Chairman, Politburo, Chinese Communist Party
Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council
Wang Hai-jung, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs
Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff

(At 11:00 p.m. February 17, 1973 at a meeting in a villa near the Guest House where Dr. Kissinger and his party were staying, Prime Minister Chou En-lai informed Dr. Kissinger that he and Winston Lord were invited to meet with Chairman Mao Tsetung at 11:30 p.m. that evening. He told Dr. Kissinger that he would come to the Guest House shortly to escort him to the Chairman's residence.

Dr. Kissinger and his delegation members at the meeting went back to the Guest House. Prime Minister Chou En-lai came to the Guest House at 11:20 p.m. and rode with Dr. Kissinger to Chungnahai. Mr. Chu, Deputy Director of Protocol, accompanied Mr. Lord. Prime Minister Chou En-lai escorted Dr. Kissinger into the outer room of the Guest House and then through another room to Chairman Mao's sitting room.

The Chairman was helped up from his chair by his young female attendant and came forward to greet Dr. Kissinger. Photographers took pictures. He welcomed Dr. Kissinger and Dr. Kissinger pointed out that it was almostly exactly a year ago that he had first met the Chairman. The Chairman then greeted Mr. Lord and commented that he was so young, younger than the interpreters. Mr. Lord replied that he was in any event older than the interpreters. The Chairman then motioned to the large easy chairs and the parties sat down. The photographers continued to take pictures.)

Chairman Mao (As he headed toward his chair): I don't look bad, but God has sent me an invitation.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 98, Country Files, Far East, HAK China Trip, Memcons & Reports (originals), February 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Mao's residence at Chungnahai. All brackets are in the original. A February 17 memorandum from Kissinger, sent telegraphically through Scowcroft, to Nixon recounted that the meeting with Mao "was extremely frank and cordial, but the substance is of such sensitivity that I should report it to you in person." (Ibid., HAK Trip Files, Box 29, Bangkok, Vientiane, Hanoi, Hong Kong, Peking, Tokyo Trip, Itinerary Como Info, Memos to Pres., February 7–20, 1973)

(To Mr. Lord) You are a young man.

Mr. Lord: I am getting older.

Chairman Mao: I am the oldest among those seated here.

Prime Minister Chou: I am the second oldest.

Chairman Mao: There was someone in the British Army who was opposed to the independence of your country. Field Marshal Montgomery was one of those to oppose your policy.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Chairman Mao: He opposed the Dulles policy.[2] He probably doesn't oppose you anymore. At that time, you also opposed us. We also opposed you. So we are two enemies (Laughter).

Dr. Kissinger: Two former enemies.

Chairman Mao: Now we call the relationship between ourselves a friendship.

Dr. Kissinger: That's our sentiment.

Chairman Mao: That's what I am saying.

Dr. Kissinger: I have told the Prime Minister that we speak to no other country as frankly and as openly as we do to you.

Chairman Mao (To the photographers): That's all for you.

[The photographers leave.]

But let us not speak false words or engage in trickery. We don't steal your documents. You can deliberately leave them somewhere and try us out. Nor do we engage in eavesdropping and bugging. There is no use in those small tricks. And some of the big maneuvering, there is no use to them too. I said that to your correspondent, Mr. Edgar Snow.[3] I said that your CIA is no good for major events.

Dr. Kissinger: That's absolutely true. That's been our experience.

Chairman Mao: Because when you issue an order, for example, when your President issues an order, and you want information on a certain question, then the intelligence reports come as so many snowflakes. We also have our intelligence service and it is the same with them. They do not work well (Prime Minister Chou laughs). For

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[2] This memorandum of conversation is also printed in *The Kissinger Transcripts,* edited by William Burr (pp. 86–101). In explaining Mao's comment about Field Marshal Montgomery, Burr notes that the British war hero visited China in 1960 and 1961. On that trip he met with Mao and Zhou and condemned the American policy associated with former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles of opposing recognition of Communist China.

[3] The journalist Edgar Snow wrote the book, *Red Star Over China,* that introduced Mao to an American audience during the 1930s.

instance, they didn't know about Lin Piao.[4] (Prime Minister Chou laughs) Then again they didn't know you wanted to come.

I read two articles in 1969. One of your Directors of your China desk in the State Department wrote an article later published in a Japanese newspaper.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think I read that.

Prime Minister Chou: I hadn't mentioned it to you before.

Dr. Kissinger: No.

Chairman Mao: Your business was done well. You've been flying everywhere. Are you a swallow or a pigeon? (Laughter) And the Vietnamese issue can be counted as basically settled.

Dr. Kissinger: That is our feeling. We must now have a transitional period toward tranquility.

Chairman Mao: Yes, that's right.

Dr. Kissinger: The basic issues are settled.

Chairman Mao: We also say in the same situation (gesturing with his hand) that's what your President said when he was sitting here, that each side has its own means and acted out of its own necessity. That resulted in the two countries acting hand-in-hand.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, we both face the same danger. We may have to use different methods sometimes but for the same objectives.

Chairman Mao: That would be good. So long as the objectives are the same, we would not harm you nor would you harm us. And we can work together to commonly deal with a bastard. (Laughter)

Actually it would be that sometime we want to criticize you for a while and you want to criticize us for a while. That, your President said, is the ideological influence. You say, away with you Communists. We say, away with you imperialists. Sometimes we say things like that. It would not do not to do that.

Dr. Kissinger: I think both of us must be true to our principles. And in fact it would confuse the situation if we spoke the same language. I have told the Prime Minister that in Europe you, because of your principles, can speak more firmly than we can, strangely enough.

Chairman Mao: As for you, in Europe and Japan, we hope that you will cooperate with each other. As for some things it is alright to quarrel and bicker about, but fundamental cooperation is needed.

Dr. Kissinger: As between you and us, even if we sometimes criticize each other, we will coordinate our actions with you, and we would

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[4] Lin Biao, PRC Minister of Defense from 1959 to September 1971, allegedly plotted to assassinate Mao.

never participate in a policy to isolate you. As for Japan and Europe, we agree that we should cooperate on all essential matters with them. Europe has very weak leadership right now.

Chairman Mao: They don't unite with each other.

Dr. Kissinger: They don't unite, and they don't take farsighted views. When they are confronted with a danger they hope it will go away without effort.

Prime Minister Chou: I told Dr. Kissinger you [the U.S.] should still help Pompidou.[5]

Chairman Mao: Yes indeed.

Dr. Kissinger: We are doing our utmost, and we will do more.

Chairman Mao: (Gesturing with his hands) Now Mr. Pompidou is being threatened. It is the Socialist Party and the Communist Party putting their strength against him.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and they have united.

Chairman Mao: (Pointing at Dr. Kissinger) They are uniting and the Soviet Union wants the Communist Party to get into office. I don't like their Communist party, just like I don't like your Communist party. I like you, but not your Communist party. (Laughter)

In the West you always historically had a policy, for example, in both World Wars you always began by pushing Germany to fight against Russia.

Dr. Kissinger: But it is not our policy to push Russia to fight against China, because the danger to us of a war in China is as great as a war in Europe.

Chairman Mao: (Before Dr. Kissinger's remarks are translated, he makes remarks in Chinese and counts on his fingers. Miss Tang then translates Dr. Kissinger's remarks and after that Chairman Mao's remarks.)

What I wanted to say is whether or not you are now pushing West Germany to make peace with Russia and then push Russia eastward. I suspect the whole of the West has such an idea, that is to push Russia eastward, mainly against us and also Japan. Also probably towards you, in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean.

Dr. Kissinger: We did not favor this policy. We preferred the German opposition party which did not pursue this policy. (Chairman Mao, smoking a cigar, offers cigars to Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Lord who decline.)

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[5] France held a general election on March 4 and 11. The coalition associated with French President Georges Pompidou maintained a majority in the National Assembly.

Chairman Mao: Yes, that's our feeling. We are also in favor of the opposition party in Germany.

Dr. Kissinger: They conducted themselves very stupidly.

Chairman Mao: Yes, they were defeated. The whole of Europe is thinking only of peace.

Prime Minister Chou: The illusions of peace created by their leaders.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but we will do our best to strengthen European defenses and keep our armies in Europe.

Chairman Mao: That would be very good.

Dr. Kissinger: We have no plan for any large reduction of our forces in Europe for the next four years (Chairman Mao turns to Prime Minister Chou).

Prime Minister Chou: In talking about reducing your troops, you mean only at the most 10 to 15 percent.

Dr. Kissinger: That is exactly correct.

Chairman Mao: What is the number of American troops in Europe? They are probably mostly rocket units.

Prime Minister Chou: There are between 300–350,000 including the Mediterranean.

Chairman Mao: That probably does not include the Navy.

Dr. Kissinger: It does not include the Navy. There are about 275,000 in Central Europe. That does not include the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

Chairman Mao: And your troop deployment to Asia and the Pacific Ocean is too scattered. You have them in Korea. I heard the number is about 300,000.

Dr. Kissinger: About 40,000.

Chairman Mao: And from 8 to 9,000 with Chiang Kai-shek.

Prime Minister Chou: In Taiwan.

Chairman Mao: Then it is said that there are two groups in Japan, 40,000 in Okinawa and 20 to 30,000 in Japan proper. I don't know how many there are in the Philippines. Now you have remaining in Vietnam a bit over 10,000.

Dr. Kissinger: But they will all be withdrawn.

Chairman Mao: Yes, and I heard that you have 40,000 in Thailand.

Dr. Kissinger: That is correct. But all the units the Chairman mentioned are mostly air force units and therefore they probably cannot be measured by the number of personnel.

Chairman Mao: You also have ground forces, for instance, in South Korea.

Dr. Kissinger: In South Korea we have ground forces.

Chairman Mao: That was all begun by Truman and Acheson. So this time you held a memorial service for Truman and we didn't go. (Laughter)

Dr. Kissinger: When you have a liaison office in Washington it will be more possible in the future.

Prime Minister Chou: You've held all these memorial services, both for Truman and Johnson (Chairman Mao and Prime Minister Chou laugh).

It seems to me that your voice is hoarse today. You should have a day's rest tomorrow. Why do you want to continue to talk so much?

Dr. Kissinger: Because it is very important that you and we understand what we are going to do and to coordinate our actions, and therefore we always tell the Prime Minister what our plans are in various areas of the world so that you can understand the individual moves when they are made.

Chairman Mao: Yes. When you pass through Japan, you should perhaps talk a bit more with them. You only talked with them for one day and that isn't very good for their face.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, we wanted this trip's emphasis to be on the talks in Peking, and I will take a separate trip to Tokyo.

Chairman Mao: Good. And also make clear to them.

You know the Japanese feelings towards the Soviet Union are not so very good.

Dr. Kissinger: They are very ambivalent.

Chairman Mao: (Gesturing with his hand) In a word, during the Second World War, Prime Minister Tanaka told our Premier, what the Soviet Union did was that upon seeing a person about to hang himself, they immediately took the chair from under his feet.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Chairman Mao: It could be said that they didn't fire a single shot and yet they were able to grab so many places (Prime Minister Chou chuckles). They grabbed the People's Republic of Mongolia. They grabbed half of Sinkiang. It was called a sphere of influence. And Manchukuo, on the northeast, was also called their sphere of influence.

Dr. Kissinger: And they took all the industry out of it.

Chairman Mao: Yes. And they grabbed also the islands of Sakhalin and the Kuriles Island. (Chairman Mao and Prime Minister Chou discuss among themselves.) Sakhalin is the southern part of the Kuriles Island. I will look it up in the dictionary to see what its Chinese translation is.

Dr. Kissinger: The Japanese are tempted by the economic possibilities in Russia.

Chairman Mao: (Nodding yes) They want to grab something there.

Dr. Kissinger: But we will encourage closer ties between Japan and ourselves, and also we welcome their relationship with the People's Republic.

Chairman Mao: We also believe that rather than Japan having closer relations with the Soviet Union, we would rather that they would better their relations with you. That would be better.

Dr. Kissinger: It would be very dangerous if Japan and the Soviet Union formed closer political relations.

Chairman Mao: That doesn't seem likely.

Prime Minister Chou: The prospects are not too good.

Chairman Mao: We can also do some work there.

Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union has made overtures but the Japanese have not responded. They have invited Ohira to go to Moscow.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, this year, the second half.

Dr. Kissinger: This year.

Prime Minister Chou: And it seems on this question that Ohira has a clearer idea of the Soviet Union than others. But there are some not so clear in their understanding as their Foreign Minister.

Dr. Kissinger: That is correct.

Prime Minister Chou: That is also the bureaucracy as you term it.

Dr. Kissinger: We are prepared to exchange information with you on these matters.

Prime Minister Chou: (To Chairman Mao) We have decided besides establishing a liaison office in each capital to maintain the contact between Huang Hua and the White House.

Chairman Mao: (To Prime Minister Chou) Where is the stress?

Prime Minister Chou: The liaison office will handle the general public exchanges. For confidential and urgent matters not covered by the liaison office we will use the channel of Ambassador Huang Hua.

Chairman Mao: Huang Hua has met an ill fate (Prime Minister Chou laughs). He was doing very well in your place and immediately upon his return to Shanghai, he twisted his back.

Dr. Kissinger: We will find a doctor for him when he returns.

Chairman Mao: Yes. (Prime Minister Chou laughs). He seemed more safe in your place. Immediately upon his return to Shanghai he collapsed.

From the atmosphere with which your President received our acrobatic troupe, I thought that the Vietnamese issue was going to be settled.

There were some rumors that said that you were about to collapse (laughter). And the women folk seated here were all dissatisfied with that (laughter, especially pronounced among the women). They said if the Doctor is going to collapse, we would be out of work.

Dr. Kissinger: Not only in China.

Chairman Mao: Yes, and the whole line would collapse like dominos.

Dr. Kissinger: Those were just journalists' speculation.

Chairman Mao: Only speculation?

Dr. Kissinger: Only speculation.

Chairman Mao: No ground whatsoever?

Dr. Kissinger: No ground whatsoever. In fact the opposite was true. We have now been able to place our men into all key positions.

Chairman Mao: (Nodding yes) Your President is now saying that you are proposing something as if you were moving the Great Wall from China to the United States, that is, trade barriers.

Dr. Kissinger: What we want to do is lower barriers.

Chairman Mao: To lower them? Then you were doing that just to frighten people. You are saying that you are going to raise tariffs and non-tariff barriers and maybe you do that to intimidate Europe and Japan.

Dr. Kissinger: Partly. We are proposing a trade bill which gives both the power to raise and lower barriers, in order to get it passed through Congress. We must create the impression that we might increase barriers. We want executive authority to do it without Congressional approval, but if we ask Congress to reduce barriers they would refuse. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.) And this is why we are asking for executive authority to move in either direction.

Chairman Mao: What if they don't give it to you?

Dr. Kissinger: We think they will give it to us. It will be a difficult battle, but we are quite certain we will win. We are proposing it also in such general language that we can remove discrimination that still exists towards the People's Republic.

Chairman Mao: The trade between our two countries at present is very pitiful. It is gradually increasing. You know China is a very poor country. We don't have much. What we have in excess is women. (Laughter)

Dr. Kissinger: There are no quotas for those or tariffs.

Chairman Mao: So if you want them we can give a few of those to you, some tens of thousands. (Laughter)

Prime Minister Chou: Of course, on a voluntary basis.

Chairmain Mao: Let them go to your place. They will create disasters. That way you can lessen our burdens. (Laughter)

Dr. Kissinger: Our interest in trade with China is not commercial. It is to establish a relationship that is necessary for the political relations we both have.

Chairman Mao: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: That is the spirit with which we are conducting our discussions.

Chairman Mao: I once had a discussion with a foreign friend. (The interpreters hold a discussion with Chairman Mao.) I said that we should draw a horizontal line—the U.S.–Japan–Pakistan–Iran (Chairman Mao coughs badly.)–Turkey and Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: We have a very similar conception. You may have read in a newspaper that Mr. Helms has been moved to Iran, and there was a great deal of speculation how this affected my position. In fact we sent Helms to Iran to take care of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and the Persian Gulf, because of his experience in his previous position and we needed a reliable man in that spot who understands the more complex matters that are needed to be done. (Chairman Mao lights his cigar again.) We will give him authority to deal with all of these countries, although this will not be publicly announced.

Chairman Mao: As for such matters we do not understand very much your affairs in the United States. There are a lot of things we don't know very well. For example, your domestic affairs, we don't understand them. There are also many things about foreign policy that we don't understand either. Perhaps in your future four years we might be able to learn a bit.

Dr. Kissinger: I told the Prime Minister that you have a more direct, maybe a more heroic mode of action than we do. We have to use sometimes more complicated methods because of our domestic situation. (Chairman Mao queries about the translation and Miss Tang repeats "mode of action.") But on our fundamental objectives we will act very decisively and without regard to public opinion. So if a real danger develops or hegemonial intentions become active, we will certainly resist them wherever they appear. And as the President said to the Chairman, in our own interests, not as a kindness to anyone else.

Chairman Mao: (Laughing) Those are honest words.

Dr. Kissinger: This is our position.

Chairman Mao: Do you want our Chinese women? We can give you ten million. (Laughter, particularly among the women.)

Dr. Kissinger: The Chairman is improving his offer.

Chairman Mao: By doing so we can let them flood your country with disaster and therefore impair your interests. In our country we have too many women, and they have a way of doing things. They give birth to children and our children are too many. (Laughter)

Dr. Kissinger: It is such a novel proposition, we will have to study it.

Chairman Mao: You can set up a committee to study the issue. That is how your visit to China is settling the population question. (Laughter)

Dr. Kissinger: We will study utilization and allocation.

Chairman Mao: If we ask them to go I think they would be willing.

Prime Minister Chou: Not necessarily.

Chairman Mao: That's because of their feudal ideas, big nation chauvinism.

Dr. Kissinger: We are certainly willing to receive them.

Chairman Mao: The Chinese are very alien-excluding.

For instance, in your country you can let in so many nationalities, yet in China how many foreigners do you see?

Prime Minister Chou: Very few.

Dr. Kissinger: Very few.

Chairman Mao: You have about 600,000 Chinese in the United States. We probably don't even have 60 Americans here. I would like to study the problem. I don't know the reason.

Miss Tang: Mr. Lord's wife is Chinese.

Chairman Mao: Oh?

Mr. Lord: Yes.

Chairman Mao: I studied the problem. I don't know why the Chinese never like foreigners. There are no Indians perhaps. As for the Japanese, they are not very numerous either; compared to others there are quite a few and some are married and settled down.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course, your experience with foreigners has not been all that fortunate.

Chairman Mao: Yes, perhaps that is some reason for that.

Yes, in the past hundred years, mainly the eight powers, and later it was Japan during the Boxer Revolution. For thirteen years Japan occupied China, they occupied the major part of China; and in the past the allied forces, the invading foreigners, not only occupied Chinese territory, they also asked China for indemnity.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and extraterritorial rights.

Chairman Mao: Now in our relations with Japan, we haven't asked them for indemnity and that would add to the burden of the people. It would be difficult to calculate all the indemnity. No accountant would be able to do it.

And only in this way can we move from hostility to relaxation in relations between peoples. And it will be more difficult to settle rela-

tions of hostility between the Japanese and Chinese peoples than between us and you.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. There is no feeling of hostility of American people at all toward the Chinese people. On the contrary. Between us right now there is only essentially a juridical problem. (Chairman Mao nods agreement.) Which we will solve in the next years. But there is a strong community of interest which is operating immediately.

Chairman Mao: Is that so?

Dr. Kissinger: Between China and the U.S.

Chairman Mao: What do you mean by community of interest? On Taiwan?

Dr. Kissinger: In relation to other countries that may have intentions.

Prime Minister Chou: You mean the Soviet Union?

Dr. Kissinger: I mean the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: Miss Shen understood you.

Chairman Mao: (Looking toward Miss Shen.) The Chinese have a good command of English. (To Prime Minister Chou.) Who is she?

Prime Minister Chou: Miss Shen Jo-yun.

Chairman Mao: Girls. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.) Today I have been uttering some nonsense for which I will have to beg the pardon of the women of China.

Dr. Kissinger: It sounded very attractive to the Americans present. (Chairman Mao and the girls laugh.)

Chairman Mao: If we are going to establish a liaison office in your country do you want Miss Shen or Miss Tang?

Dr. Kissinger: We will deal with that through the channel of Huang Hua. (Laughter)

Chairman Mao: Our interpreters are truly too few.

Dr. Kissinger: But they have done a remarkable job, the interpreters we have met.

Chairman Mao: The interpreters you have met and our present interpreters who are doing most of the work are now in their twenties and thirties. If they grow too old they don't do interpretation so well.

Prime Minister Chou: We should send some abroad.

Chairman Mao: We will send children at such a height (indicating with his hands), not too old.

Dr. Kissinger: We will be prepared to establish exchange programs where you can send students to America.

Chairman Mao: And if among a hundred persons there are ten who are successful learning the language well, then that would be a

remarkable success. And if among them a few dozens don't want to come back, for example, some girls who want to stay in the United States, no matter. Because you do not exclude foreigners like Chinese. In the past the Chinese went abroad and they didn't want to learn the local language. (Looking toward Miss Tang) Her grandparents refused to learn English.[6] They are so obstinate. You know Chinese are very obstinate and conservative. Many of the older generation overseas Chinese don't speak the local language. But they are getting better, the younger generation.

Dr. Kissinger: In America, all, or the vast majority, speak English.

Prime Minister Chou: That is the younger people. The first generation ones don't learn the local language. There was an old overseas Chinese who came back to China after living abroad. She was old and died in Peking in the 1950s when she was in her nineties. She was a member of our People's Government. She didn't speak a word of English. She was Cantonese, extremely conservative.

Dr. Kissinger: Chinese culture is so particular that it is difficult to assimilate other cultures.

Chairman Mao: Chinese language is not bad, but the Chinese characters are not good.

Prime Minister Chou: They are very difficult to learn.

Chairman Mao: And there are many contradictions between the oral and written language because the oral language is monosyllabic while the written language develops from symbols. We do not use the alphabet.

Dr. Kissinger: There are some attempts to use an alphabet I am told.

Prime Minister Chou: First we must standardize the oral language.

Chairman Mao: (Gestures with his hand and points to his books.) But if the Soviet Union would throw its bombs and kill all those over 30 who are Chinese, that would solve the problem for us. Because the old people like me can't learn Chinese. We read Chinese. The majority of my books are Chinese. There are very few dictionaries over there. All the other books are in Chinese.

Dr. Kissinger: Is the Chairman learning English now?

Chairman Mao: I have heard that I am studying it. Those are rumors on the outside. I don't heed them. They are false. I know a few English letters. I don't know the grammar.

Miss Tang: The Chairman invented an English word.

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[6] Tang Wen-sheng (Nancy Tang) was born in the United States.

Chairman Mao: Yes, I invented the English term "paper tiger."

Dr. Kissinger: "Paper tiger." Yes, that was all about us. (Laughter)

Chairman Mao: But you are a German from Germany. But your Germany now has met with an ill fate, because in two wars it has been defeated.

Dr. Kissinger: It attempted too much, beyond its abilities and resources.

Chairman Mao: Yes, and it also scattered its forces in war. For example, in its attack against the Soviet Union. If it is going to attack, it should attack in one place, but they separated their troops into three routes. It began in June but then by the winter they couldn't stand it because it was too cold. What is the reason for the Europeans fear of the cold?

Dr. Kissinger: The Germans were not prepared for a long war. Actually they did not mobilize their whole forces until 1943. I agree with the Chairman that if they had concentrated on one front they would almost certainly have won. They were only ten kilometers from Moscow even by dispersing their forces. (Chairman Mao relights his cigar.)

Chairman Mao: They shouldn't have attacked Moscow or Kiev. They should have taken Leningrad as a first step. Another error in policy was they didn't cross the sea after Dunkirk.

Dr. Kissinger: After Dunkirk.

Chairman Mao: They were entirely unprepared.

Dr. Kissinger: And Hitler was a romantic. He had a strange liking for England.

Chairman Mao: Oh? Then why didn't they go there? Because the British at that time were completely without troops.

Dr. Kissinger: If they were able to cross the channel into Britain . . . I think they had only one division in all of England.

Prime Minister Chou: Is that so?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: Also Sir Anthony Eden told us in Germany at that time that a Minister in the Army of Churchill's Government said at that time if Hitler had crossed the channel they would have had no forces. They had withdrawn all their forces back. When they were preparing for the German crossing, Churchill had no arms. He could only organize police to defend the coast. If they crossed they would not be able to defend.

Dr. Kissinger: It also shows what a courageous man can do because Churchill created by his personality much more strength than they possessed.

Chairman Mao: Actually by that time they couldn't hold.

Prime Minister Chou: So Hitler carried some romantic feelings about Britain?

Dr. Kissinger: I think he was a maniac, but he did have some feelings about Britain.

Chairman Mao: I believe Hitler was from the Rhine area?

Dr. Kissinger: Austria.

Prime Minister Chou: He was a soldier in the First World War.

Dr. Kissinger: He was in the German Army, but he was a native of Austria.

Prime Minister Chou: From the Danube.

Dr. Kissinger: He conducted strategy artistically rather than strategically. He did it by intuition. He had no overall plan.

Chairman Mao: Then why did the German troops heed him so much?

Dr. Kissinger: Probably because the Germans are somewhat romantic people and because he must have had a very strong personality.

Chairman Mao: Mainly because during the First World War the German nation was humiliated.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, that was a very important factor.

Chairman Mao: If there are Russians going to attack China, I can tell you today that our way of conducting a war will be guerrilla war and protracted war. We will let them go wherever they want. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.) They want to come to the Yellow River tributaries. That would be good, very good. (Laughter) And if they go further to the Yangtse River tributaries, that would not be bad either.

Dr. Kissinger: But if they use bombs and do not send armies? (Laughter)

Chairman Mao: What should we do? Perhaps you can organize a committee to study the problem. We'll let them beat us up and they will lose any resources. They say they are socialists. We are also socialists and that will be socialists attacking socialists.

Dr. Kissinger: If they attack China, we would certainly oppose them for our own reasons.

Chairman Mao: But your people are not awakened, and Europe and you would think that it would be a fine thing if it were that the ill water would flow toward China.

Dr. Kissinger: What Europe thinks I am not able to judge. They cannot do anything anyway. They are basically irrelevant. (In the midst of this Chairman Mao toasts Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Lord with tea.) What we think is that if the Soviet Union overruns China, this would dislocate the security of all other countries and will lead to our own isolation.

Chairman Mao: (Laughing) How will that happen? How would that be?

Because since in being bogged down in Vietnam you met so many difficulties, do you think they would feel good if they were bogged down in China?

Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union?

Miss Tang: The Soviet Union.

Chairman Mao: And then you can let them get bogged down in China, for half a year, or one, or two, or three, or four years. And then you can poke your finger at the Soviet back. And your slogan then will be for peace, that is you must bring down Socialist imperialism for the sake of peace. And perhaps you can begin to help them in doing business, saying whatever you need we will help against China.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, it is really very important that we understand each other's motives. We will never knowingly cooperate in an attack on China.

Chairman Mao: (Interrupting) No, that's not so. Your aim in doing that would be to bring the Soviet Union down.

Dr. Kissinger: That's a very dangerous thing. (Laughter)

Chairman Mao: (Using both hands for gestures) The goal of the Soviet Union is to occupy both Europe and Asia, the two continents.

Dr. Kissinger: We want to discourage a Soviet attack, not defeat it. We want to prevent it. (Prime Minister Chou looks at his watch.)

Chairman Mao: As for things, matters, in the world, it is hard to say. We would rather think about things this way. We think this way the world would be better.

Dr. Kissinger: Which way?

Chairman Mao: That is that they would attack China and be defeated. We must think of the worst eventuality.

Dr. Kissinger: That is your necessity. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.)

Chairman Mao: We have so many women in our country that don't know how to fight.

Miss Tang: Not necessarily. There are women's detachments.

Chairman Mao: They are only on stage. In reality if there is a fight you would flee very quickly and run into underground shelters.

Miss Wang: If the minutes of this talk were made public, it would incur the public wrath on behalf of half the population.

Chairman Mao: That is half of the population of China.

Prime Minister Chou: First of all, it wouldn't pass the Foreign Ministry.

Chairman Mao: We can call this a secret meeting. (Chinese laughter) Should our meeting today be public, or kept secret?

Dr. Kissinger: It's up to you. I am prepared to make it public if you wish.

Chairman Mao: What is your idea? Is it better to have it public or secret?

Dr. Kissinger: I think it is probably better to make it public.

Chairman Mao: Then the words we say about women today shall be made nonexistent. (Laughter)

Dr. Kissinger: We will remove them from the record. (Laughter) We will start studying this proposal when I get back.

Chairman Mao: You know, the Chinese have a scheme to harm the United States, that is, to send ten million women to the United States and impair its interests by increasing its population.

Dr. Kissinger: The Chairman has fixed the idea so much in my mind that I'll certainly use it at my next press conference. (Laughter)

Chairman Mao: That would be all right with me. I'm not afraid of anything. Anyway, God has sent me an invitation.

Dr. Kissinger: I really find the Chairman in better health this year than last year.

Chairman Mao: Yes, I am better than last year.

[The photographers entered the room.]

They are attacking us. (The Chairman then gets up without assistance to say goodbye to the Americans.)

Please give my warm regards to President Nixon. Also to Mrs. Nixon. I was not able to meet her and Secretary Rogers. I must apologize.

Dr. Kissinger: I will certainly do that.

Prime Minister Chou: We will send you a press release in one hour.

(Chairman Mao escorts Dr. Kissinger into the outer room where he says goodbye to Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Lord. Prime Minister Chou then escorts Dr. Kissinger to his waiting car.)

13. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, February 18, 1973, 2:43–7:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Chou En-lai, Premier, State Council
Chi P'eng-fei, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Chang Wen-chin, Assistant Foreign Minister, Acting Director of American Pacific Affairs Department
Wang Hai-jung, Assistant Foreign Minister
T'ang Wen-sheng, interpreter
Shen Jo-yun, interpreter
Two Chinese notetakers

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard T. Kennedy, NSC Staff
Alfred Le S. Jenkins, Department of State
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Miss Irene G. Derus, Notetaker

The group was greeted by the Prime Minister and proceeded to the room where the meeting was held.

PM Chou: We were just now counting the years, and I find when I was your age we were just liberating Peking. I was saying that you have very high spirits, full of energy, while I am on the decline.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand that means now you only work 18 hours a day.

PM Chou: It might not be entirely 18 hours. When I was your age that was more or less the case. So you now probably want to exceed me and work 20 hours a day.

Mr. Jenkins: He uses his staff for that. [laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: I said, Mr. Prime Minister, you instill a revolutionary spirit in my staff. They are dissatisfied with their condition. Colonel Kennedy and Mr. Rodman have never had so much attention since they joined my staff since they fell ill here.

PM Chou: But you have been very fair in bringing three secretaries this time so they can take it, at least. After you gain experience you are able to improve your work; that is the same with anyone. So would you like to begin first?

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 98, Country Files, Far East, HAK China Trip, Memcons & Reports (originals), February 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Great Hall of the People. All brackets are in the original.

Dr. Kissinger: I have a number of items. But first a technical one, and then I want to make a few comments on what the Prime Minister said last evening.

First, the practical question about the Liaison Office: Our intention would be to staff it with people who have worked with us on these trips so that they understand the basic approach that we are following. Like for example Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Holdridge. Now, we don't know what your intention was as to the kind of person you wanted to send to Washington, but we can adjust the rank of our people by giving them a higher rank for the purpose of their being here if this makes it possible for you to send somebody more experienced, if that is what your desire is.

PM Chou: I agree with your opinion that those who would be working in the Liaison Office should be more or less familiar with the exchanges we have had over the year and a half. Otherwise they wouldn't be able to pick up the thread.

Dr. Kissinger: That is our thinking. So if we don't send a well-known personality, that is not a reflection on the importance we attach to it, but rather the opposite.

PM Chou: We would fully understand that. It is no question.

Dr. Kissinger: But if for some reason you have a preference in that direction, it would be helpful to hear it so we can take it into account.

PM Chou: No, we are fully in agreement of sending the two colleagues you just now mentioned, Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Holdridge. But we have difficulty on our side because it is very difficult for us to find any "old Washington hands." We don't have any. [laughter] We could find the oldest one, that would be Dr. Wellington Koo. Do you know him?[2]

Dr. Kissinger: I don't know him. I know who he is. We must arrange a secret trip for some Chinese delegation so they can get experience in Washington.

PM Chou: If necessary.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, after I have discussed it with the President, in a very few weeks we will make some suggestion.

PM Chou: I would like to turn to another piece of news. That is, Vice Minister Thach will be arriving in Peking rather late. He won't be here before 7 o'clock this evening. I will be meeting with him, with the Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister, when you are having dinner with our Foreign Minister, and after that meeting I will contact you.

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[2] Wellington Koo (1887–1985) was a diplomat for the Republic of China who served as a delegate to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and to the 1946 conference that founded the United Nations, and as an Ambassador to France, Great Britain, and the United States.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I will be prepared to meet him.

PM Chou: You must be prepared to meet rather late into the morning.

Dr. Kissinger: That is the usual—that has happened to me once before when I came here!

PM Chou: That was October.

Dr. Kissinger: October, 1971. No, I will be prepared to do that and I think it would be useful if we could meet. Our basic intention, as I told you, Mr. Prime Minister, towards North Vietnam—though conditions are different—is to move towards normalization with the same sincerity as we did after July 1971 towards the People's Republic.

PM Chou: Yes, you have mentioned that twice here.

Dr. Kissinger: Now perhaps I could make a few comments about the observations of the Prime Minister last night.

PM Chou: I was preparing originally to elaborate more on the issue last night, but as the Chairman asked to see you, I cut myself short. And anyhow I knew the Chairman would explain it in clearer terms. But anyway I will be prepared to hear you.

Dr. Kissinger: Would the Prime Minister like to say more?

PM Chou: No, I stop myself last night.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand very well what the Prime Minister was saying, and I of course paid great attention to what the Chairman was saying in elaboration. They are the important issues of our period. Because if we understand each other's purposes with respect to this issue then we can settle the practical questions. But if we doubt each other's motives, then it will be difficult to settle these issues, and then there will also be the danger that each of us, in order to anticipate the other, takes steps to the disadvantage of everyone. [Chou nods yes.]

So let me first make a comment about the historical facts which the Prime Minister mentioned at the beginning. And I make it not for academic reasons but to draw a different lesson from the Prime Minister. Actually in World War I—it is a problem that had always fascinated me so I have studied it in great detail—in the first months of World War I the vast bulk of the German Army was in the West and not in the East.

PM Chou: For the first months.

Dr. Kissinger: For the first two months. Hindenburg defeated the Russians with 200,000 troops because the Russians were stupid. Which was not the only time in their history!

PM Chou: Yes, but Hindenburg became famous due to that.

Dr. Kissinger: That is true. Later on, the balance changed. In World War II what happened was that Stalin pushed the Germans toward the West.

PM Chou: Originally Western Europe had hoped that Germany would go eastwards.

Dr. Kissinger: Western Europe.

PM Chou: At Munich.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, at Munich. Western Europe had very superficial leaders. They didn't have the courage to pursue any policy towards a conclusion. Once they had done Munich it made no sense to fight for Poland. But that is a different issue. And I don't blame Stalin, because from his point of view he gained himself the essential time.

PM Chou: But there was one weak point, that they were not sufficiently prepared.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right.

PM Chou: They did make preparations but they were not entirely sufficient. And in Zhukov's memoirs he also touched upon this. Have you read this?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. And they deployed their forces too far forward.

PM Chou: Also scattered in three directions.

Dr. Kissinger: So, but the basic point that I want to make is not to debate history but to say the lessons of both wars are that once a big war starts its consequences are unpredictable, and a country which encourages a big war in the hope that it can calculate its consequences is likely to produce a disaster for itself. The Germans had made very careful plans in World War I, and they had exercised them for 30 years, but when the war . . .

PM Chou: You mean after the Pact of Berlin?

Dr. Kissinger: World War I—1914—the Schlieffen Plan.

PM Chou: You mean after the Treaty of Berlin.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, after 1878, yes, that's right. But they had exercised the Schlieffen Plan every year after 1893, for 21 years, and they had calculated everything except the psychological strain on a commander under battle conditions. So they thought they were starting a 6-months war and they wound up with a 4-year war. Not one European leader in 1914, if he had known what the world would look like in 1918, would have gone to war. And nor would Hitler in 1939.

Let us apply it to the current situation, these observations. If one analyzes the problem of pushing the Soviet Union toward the East, or maybe you trying to push it towards the West . . .

PM Chou: [laughing] We wouldn't have the strength to push them to the West! We can only make preparations for their coming into China.

Dr. Kissinger: There are three motives, or three causes, that could produce this. One is that we want the Soviet Union to defeat China. The second, much more subtle one, is the one the Chairman mentioned

last night, that we don't want the Soviet Union to defeat China but we want China to exhaust the Soviet Union and have a stalemate. And the third possibility, which the Prime Minister delicately alluded to, is that we could produce this result through incompetence, not through intention. So that the objective result despite our intentions or policies might so demoralize the West and other countries that the Soviet Union feels free to attack somebody else even though we don't want this.

Now let me deal with each of these points.

The first possibility, that we want the Soviet Union to defeat China. If this were to happen, I am assuming from history that Japan would end up on the side that looks stronger to Japan. That has always been the case. If China were to be defeated, Japan would join the Soviet Union. Europe would become like Finland, and the United States would be completely isolated. So whether the Soviet Union defeats China first or Europe first, the consequences for us will be the same. So this can never be our policy.

Now let us take the second case, that the Soviet Union attacks China and we do not discourage this because we think China cannot be defeated and then perhaps both communist countries will exhaust each other. I believe, and the President believes, that, first of all, the chance of a war between the Soviet Union and China would have cataclysmic effects in the world regardless of the outcome. With very unpredictable consequences. But if the Soviet Union should succeed in gaining even the kind of control Japan acquired in the '30s and '40s, many of the same consequences that I described earlier would also happen. India would certainly not be idle. We do not know what temptations Japan would encounter in this new circumstance. And the U.S. would be forced either into a position of demonstrated impotence and irrelevance to the rest of the world or into a series of delicate and extremely complex decisions.

I am speaking very honestly with you, Mr. Prime Minister.

But if a situation would arise in which the Soviet military move would be exhausted or stalemated, and if the Soviet Union encounters some of the difficulties you mentioned we encountered in Vietnam, then given the nature of the Soviet system, the consequences could be very unpredictable. And they might then break out of their dilemma in some other direction. And we might then have the situation of World War I or World War II, on a greater scale, with the Soviet Union in the position of Germany. So if a war occurs between the Soviet Union and China as a result of our action, it will be the result of misjudgment by us, not the result of a deliberate policy.

Now this is a point that the Prime Minister has made and that I take very seriously because there is a great deal of merit in this. There is a danger that the Soviet Union might succeed in creating such a false

atmosphere of relaxation that it feels free to turn all its energies in one direction, and that the West and the U.S. disarm themselves morally and psychologically, and this despite our intention. This is a real danger. [Chou nods.]

While this is theoretically correct, let us analyze it by region, and let me explain to you what we think we are doing and why we are doing it.

We do not believe that we are likely to disarm China psychologically, so let me talk about Western Europe, where the principal difficulty occurs. Even before my trip to Peking, and even before the Soviet Union began its present relaxation policy, our West European allies made very little effort in defense. On the contrary. Indeed, under the pressure of their Communist parties, and even worse, of those intellectuals who listened to the communists without having their discipline, they adopted the view that every crisis was the result of America's policy and the only danger of war was American intransigence, not Soviet. So every European leader was in the happy position that when he needed some cheap popularity he could come to Washington and recommend détente, secure in the knowledge that we would refuse him. [laughter] In the spring of 1971 a European leader came to Washington to lecture us again about our intransigent policy and I said to him, "You had better enjoy this trip, because very soon you will be in a position where you will have to be very careful what you recommend because we might accept it." [laughter]

So if you compare the defense efforts of the Europeans before 1971 with after 1971, it is actually higher today. Now, how is this paradox to be explained? Until 1971 the Europeans wanted to make sure that if there was a war—they had exactly the opposite view of Brezhnev in his communication to us—they wanted to make sure it would devastate the U.S. but not devastate Europe. So they made just enough of an effort to induce us to keep our forces there but never enough of an effort so that we could actually defend Europe in Europe.

Now why have we acted as we have since 1971? Partly because of Vietnam. I will be very honest with you; we couldn't have two crises simultaneously. But even if it had not been for Vietnam we would have acted the same way for a while.

PM Chou: I don't quite understand.

Dr. Kissinger: That is what I want to explain. We wanted to give those forces in Europe that were in favor of defense a greater freedom of maneuver, and for that reason we had to dissociate ourselves somewhat from Europe, strangely enough. Because as long as we were overwhelmingly dominant in Europe, there was no incentive for the Europeans to do anything for themselves. So we have always respected President de Gaulle, for example, and we now respect President Pom-

pidou; they are more difficult than some other governments but they encourage national pride and therefore national willingness to defend themselves.

Now, our policy of relaxation with the Soviet Union has forced the Europeans to examine the requirements of their own situation. Whenever we have asked the Europeans to spend more money for defense, they told us there was no danger. Now that we are discussing the reduction of forces in Europe they are telling us the danger is so great that our forces cannot be moved.

PM Chou: Even Switzerland.

Dr. Kissinger: Even Switzerland, but the Swiss at least defend themselves.

PM Chou: Although they are a neutral country they also admit there is danger.

Dr. Kissinger: That's right.

PM Chou: Yes, and when I spoke to a Swiss they also admit the fact that the Soviet Union was the danger to Europe, and that if a nuclear war would break out that war would not know any boundaries and it would not distinguish between the front and the rear and it would abolish the difference between a neutral and allied country.

Dr. Kissinger: No question. And the Austrian government, which is also neutral technically, has all its military dispositions facing the east. They are not very much, but still whatever they have is facing the east. I had a long discussion with a member of the Austrian General Staff a few years ago, just before taking this office. They have no plan at all for defense against the West.

So our purpose with the Mutual Force Reduction Conference is twofold: One, pedagogical toward the Europeans, to force them to examine their military problem, in a framework in which they cannot avoid it, rather than in a budgetary framework where they will never face it. And secondly, to prevent our Congress, particularly Senator Mansfield, from cutting our forces unilaterally by claiming first that while negotiations are going on there can be no cuts.

So we have the paradox that our policy, in my view, actually strengthens the West.

Now I agree with you on the European Security Conference. I have nothing good to say about that. That was imposed on us by our allies and the only thing to do with it is to finish it quickly with a minimum of rhetoric.

But let me say we greatly welcome what you have been saying to European leaders. You cannot say it strongly enough for our taste, and we will never contradict you. We think it is a very positive contribution. Now the major . . .

PM Chou: And perhaps precisely because of that, the West German Foreign Minister Mr. Scheel sent their original Ambassador in your country to our country because he followed the Adenauer line, but that line might not be exactly his.

Dr. Kissinger: I know Pauls very well. He is a good man.

PM Chou: We have agreed.

Dr. Kissinger: He is the best man they could have sent. And he will be emotionally on your side. Scheel is not the strongest foreign minister of which history informs us.

PM Chou: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Now I want to tell the Prime Minister that the President and, therefore I, shall now pay very personal attention to European policy.

PM Chou: Yes, it was proclaimed by your President that this year would be the year of Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: We will attempt to develop in the next six months a common economic and military policy and then to have a summit meeting between the President and the major European leaders to develop a kind of Charter for our relationship. And we will ask Japan to participate in the economic aspects of this. So, we hope that we can counteract some of the dangers that you have described. But we will, as I have told you, make some maneuvers with the Soviet Union, in the interest of gaining time. But that will be in the direction of what I have described, and there will not be any secret understandings or discussions. Well, there will be secret discussions but no secret understandings.

Now let me turn to the Southern area. This has two parts, the Middle East and the area described yesterday evening—Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and through Southeast Asia. They are connected but not identical.

In the Middle East the problem is this: that the Soviet Union has attempted to perform mischief but has not been willing to run any risks. So it has tried to maximize its influence but without any constructive outcome. Now you and we have, I believe, a difference on the Middle East because we stand for the preservation of Israel. But let us leave this aside for the time being. Because we want a settlement. Now I want to inform the Prime Minister, I have already tried . . .

PM Chou: And in your basic policy what do you envisage about Palestine, the Palestinian people?

Dr. Kissinger: The future of the Palestinian people will have to be part of a general settlement.

PM Chou: But now the Jewish people are increasing. The inflow of the Jewish people is increasing into that area.

Dr. Kissinger: Many from the Soviet Union.

PM Chou: That is what I meant. In particular the Soviet Union. It is quite unreasonable, including those from the Soviet Union who have gone to Israel to assist Israel. Among them are some of the Jewish nationality who have been to Egypt to assist in the construction of the Aswan Dam and also especially those who have experience in constructing military installations, they have also gone into Israel.

Dr. Kissinger: I didn't know that.

PM Chou: Soviet authorities say in regard to that that it is the freedom of the people. And for a Socialist country to say that. And if Egypt agrees, we would like to make this public. It is terrible.

Dr. Kissinger: On the future of the Palestinian people . . . Incidentally, Mr. Prime Minister, if Mr. Jenkins reports this conversation to his colleagues, Harvard University will soon have a new professor. [Chou laughs.]

Mr. Jenkins: It's very possible.

Dr. Kissinger: No, I have Mr. Jenkins here because I have confidence in him. I want him to hear what our policy is since we don't tell him unless he is here with you.

Our view on the Palestinian refugees is that the practical solution is to establish the principle that they can return, but to have an understanding that in fact only a certain small percentage of them will return, but that the Israeli Government will make a contribution to resettling them in other parts including in that part of Palestine which remains Arab.

PM Chou: Do you think you can help me investigate on the information I just now gave you?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I have never heard it.

PM Chou: It is very terrible to hear.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't know whether it is true. I have never heard it, but that doesn't prove anything.

PM Chou: Of course it is also a public matter that they have trade relations with Israel—the Soviet Union.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: They said that is the normal state of affairs.

Dr. Kissinger: I said what I did because I do not want any misapprehension on the part of the Prime Minister. We cannot join you in any policy that would have to do with the dismemberment of Israel, but we can join you on any policy that would reduce Soviet influence and help establish a stable peace. And perhaps if you know what we are doing you can perhaps encourage it.

PM Chou: How can Israel be destroyed? It is impossible. But anyway it must be said that the establishment of such a country in such a

manner is a very curious and peculiar phenomenon to be witnessed since the First and Second World War.

Dr. Kissinger: That is a different question.

PM Chou: To which the Soviet Union also gave its full favor. At that time the Soviet Union was against the Arabs.

Dr. Kissinger: Most of the arms came at that time from Czechoslovakia.

PM Chou: And the Soviets just can't stand any mention of the matter. Even in their movies they gave a very bad . . .

Dr. Kissinger: In their?

PM Chou: In their movies they gave a very bad display. Even in the Soviet films of the Arab world they show the Arabs very badly. But at the same time the Soviet Union treats very badly the Jews in their country.

Dr. Kissinger: Very badly.

PM Chou: So what they want to do is establish a state and then push the Jews out of their own country. That is what they are continuing to do.

Dr. Kissinger: Whatever the motives, it is conceivable that their purpose is to create a situation of turmoil so they can then create bases, as in Iraq and Syria.

Now, I want to give the Prime Minister some information which we have not given to our own government and also therefore not to any foreign government. I mentioned it briefly the other day. We have been in contact with—that is the White House has been in contact with Egypt for the last five months, of the sort of exchange that you and we had prior to my first trip here. Very careful. And we have now used a pretext to invite the person who has the same position . . .

PM Chou: But on the very day you told me of that, I think on the 15th, we saw in the Lebanon newspapers approximately the same story saying that the United States had contacts with Ismail.[3]

Dr. Kissinger: Particularly because the Arabs can't keep any secrets. But there are so many rumors that no one believes it any more.

PM Chou: We hope it will be that way.

Dr. Kissinger: For this reason, what we have done—we first wanted to bring Ismail secretly to the U.S. We thought this would never work, so we are bringing him for official meetings with Mr. Jenkins' colleagues for one day. And then we will make him disappear and I will have two days of secret meetings with him. Is that what was in the Lebanon newspaper?

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[3] Ismail Fahmi was the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1973 until 1977.

PM Chou: Not so detailed. They only said you had contacts with Ismail.

Dr. Kissinger: I personally?

PM Chou: They said that you were going to hold secret talks with Mr. Ismail in Paris.

Dr. Kissinger: That is certainly nonsense. They have been saying I will have secret talks with Heykal and with Zayyat. I am now having so many secret talks with Arabs that I can now have secret talks and no one will believe it. But what is important is not whether the talks can be kept secret—but I frankly believe we have to announce it after the event, since they aren't emotionally capable of keeping a secret. What is more important is the attitude in which they will be conducted. And what we have said to them is that we will talk to Egypt as long as it speaks for itself and not for some other country, and that afterwards it should follow its own national purposes. And they have now given us a very long reply, of which the key point is—I will just read the key paragraph: "If Egypt thinks that there is a good solution that meets at least the minimum requirements of its people and the people of the area, it will go ahead with it and will not allow it to be vetoed by anybody. Only in this way can the problem be settled so that both we and you are helped." And then they say they look forward to the discussions. These conversations begin next Sunday and Monday. Just as your Foreign Minister gives his opening remarks in Paris. [laughter]

PM Chou: We hope it will also be the final statement! [laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: We will keep you informed. And we are also talking to Jordan. But we think Egypt should settle first because if Jordan settles first I think your Vice Foreign Minister will agree it will create more turmoil in that area.

PM Chou: Indeed and they are those with the least secrecy.

Dr. Kissinger: Jordanians?

PM Chou: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: It is hard to choose among Arabs. Now the third area—Turkey, Iran and then through Southeast Asia—that is the most difficult part. But I agree with what was said last evening and we will address this problem very seriously. I had a serious talk with Begum Bhutto this morning, and I spoke to her in the sense I have spoken to you.

So all of this long explanation is to make clear: Yes, we will pursue a policy of relaxation, but we will not pay a real price in weakening the possibility of resistance, at least not consciously, and we believe not in reality. I have spoken at such length only so that the Prime Minister genuinely understands how we see the international environment and also so that he sees what our major intentions are.

In fact, I think the greatest danger is that the Soviet Union will become so frustrated that it will do something rash. When I notice how nervous they are about my visit here, it indicates that they do not feel that they are gaining ground. They should not think that moving in any direction, south or east, will leave the United States disinterested. And for that we need some time to prepare the ground.

But this is our genuine strategy.

PM Chou: Your general relations with Turkey are all right.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, they are good. Turkey has a difficult domestic situation but that does not affect us.

PM Chou: The Soviet Union will also try to make use of that.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: But anyway you have military strength there and they are part of NATO.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, we have some air force there. And the Turks are fairly immune to the Soviet Union because they have had historical experience with both Russia and the Soviet Union.

PM Chou: The same with Iran.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right. Turkey and Iran, especially Iran, are in good condition now, and that is why when Mr. Helms gets in Iran we can take a more general view of the situation.

PM Chou: Besides bases in Japan, does your 7th Fleet also have any other bases in the Indian Ocean?

Dr. Kissinger: We have, of course, a base in the Philippines, Subic Bay. And we are developing a small station on Diego Garcia.

PM Chou: In the previous British area.

Dr. Kissinger: And we have a station in Bahrein. And we will review the whole question of deployments in the Indian Ocean. But with nuclear carriers the bases are not that important.

PM Chou: The Soviet Union doesn't pay attention to that. They just nose in everywhere. They also have developed quite a fishing industry in the Indian Ocean. [laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: And they help their fishermen by equipping their trawlers with the best electronic equipment.

PM Chou: That is also a kind of fishing but a different kind of fish. [laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: But our naval strength, Mr. Prime Minister, is far superior to that of the Soviet Union, even though the Soviet Union is gaining. There is no relation between the two strengths. In every analysis we have made, in the Mediterranean, for example, we have always assumed that the 6th Fleet could wipe out the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean completely. And in September of 1970 when we moved

our aircraft carriers into the Eastern Mediterranean—they are usually in the Western Mediterranean; we moved two carriers into the Eastern Mediterranean during the Syrian-Jordanian crisis and doubled them—the Soviet fleet headed for the ports. But the Soviet navy is effective to threaten other countries that do not have large navies, and in the Indian Ocean and Africa and in the Middle East where we are not present, they can be very effective.

PM Chou: That is where the problem lies.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly. So I recognize the problem you mentioned. The Shah, for example, has exactly the same feeling that the Prime Minister has. And he is also concerned with the Indian Navy, the Shah.

PM Chou: Navy?

Dr. Kissinger: Navy.

PM Chou: Is the Indian navy equipped with Soviet equipment?

Dr. Kissinger: Largely. They have some . . .

PM Chou: They have already replaced the British equipment then.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, they have an old British aircraft carrier but all of their new equipment comes from the Soviet Union. They are getting four Soviet submarines and five patrol destroyers this year from the Soviet Union. All their new equipment is either Soviet or built in India.

PM Chou: And about those assembled in India, are they done by Soviet technique or by technique left over from the British?

Dr. Kissinger: No, Soviet models.

PM Chou: So that is one of the reasons why Pakistan is complaining to you—because the Soviet Union is supplying the Indians so quickly and so amply.

Dr. Kissinger: They are right. We have a very difficult Congressional situation.

PM Chou: You well know that the equipment we give to Pakistan is ordinary army equipment and mainly light weapons.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: Secondly, we gave them some air force equipment, for instance a kind of MIG–19 that we have made ourselves, that was slightly improved on the basis of Soviet kind. Those are some of the fighters we have given them, and the total number was slightly better than 130. We don't have the capability now to provide them with naval equipment. So if you could give them besides army equipment, also naval equipment, and besides giving them some assistance on the ground and in the air, if you could give them some assistance on the seas it would also be of good use. And the fighting ability of the MIG–21s are not so very great. MIG–23s are better.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, that was the experience in the India/Pakistan War. Actually your MIG–19s are better.

On the military side, Mr. Prime Minister, we face bureaucratic problems and Congressional problems. And the two are related, because every time we give an order to the bureaucracy they leak it to the Congress. There are some things we can do from the White House, but a military supply program cannot be done on a personal scale.

PM Chou: Can the Pentagon also—does the Pentagon also leak secrets?

Dr. Kissinger: Oh yes. When your Liaison Office is established we will give them a little education. This is why we are so concerned with keeping our contacts in the White House. We never leak.

PM Chou: Yes, and that is why Chairman Mao mentioned yesterday that we have too little knowledge about your country. Perhaps with a four-year study we might be able to learn it.

Dr. Kissinger: He also made some other promises of which I will remind him. [laughter]

PM Chou: But we are not planning to put that into effect.

Dr. Kissinger: You don't have to start with a maximum program. You can have a pilot program.

PM Chou: But it must be on a voluntary basis. No one will respond. Perhaps very few. Madam Shen [Jo-yun] said to you last night there would be none but I think that is not very satisfactory, so I will say only a very few. I believe the intellectual overseas Chinese family in the U.S. would be only now in the tens of thousands, and to my knowledge many children of those families, no matter whether sons or daughters, have married Americans. And therefore they have already become American citizens, which enables them to be more qualified to run for the President than you.

Dr. Kissinger: So is Miss T'ang.

PM Chou: So this is one of the difficulties we are facing, that is that you cannot keep your military assistance entirely secret.

Dr. Kissinger: We cannot keep military assistance secret at all, because it has to have Congressional approval. During the war we did some illegal things by transferring equipment from a few countries to Pakistan.

PM Chou: But too few in number, and very painstakingly.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree, and at enormous personal risk.

PM Chou: And then finally the records of certain meetings that you held were also made public. Those are some of the difficulties you come up with.

Dr. Kissinger: There are some embassies in Africa that are now staffed with new personnel since those leaks. But that is quite true.

That was a very difficult period. But we cannot give military assistance secretly; it will inevitably become public.

So what we have to do is reestablish some categories. We will reestablish sending spare parts for existing equipment. We will release equipment that has already been contracted for. We will do that in the next four to six weeks. And we will make a major effort to see what can be done through third countries.

PM Chou: You have a very peculiar Congress, that can at once propose to withdraw your troops from Indochina immediately and unconditionally, but yet on the contrary in the 100 days since October last year they also did their utmost to mobilize all forces to give military assistance to Nguyen Van Thieu from countries that did not need keeping them.

Dr. Kissinger: That was something else. That was not Congress.

PM Chou: Then why was that made possible?

Dr. Kissinger: That was made possible because there existed authorization from Congress already to do this over a two-year period, and we simply delivered two years of equipment in a three months period. That had already been approved by Congress. But it is true Congress did approve this. It is peculiar.

PM Chou: It is also what the Pentagon is in favor of.

Dr. Kissinger: It depends on the area. There is no main policy.

PM Chou: So if you deal with them area by area as you mentioned in the beginning, as you dealt with the discussion today from an area to area basis, then that would be holding up time.

Dr. Kissinger: We will, particularly in the light of my discussion last night, I will review this whole problem with the President and we will see what can be done in this axis which was discussed yesterday.

Mr. Jenkins: May I have one brief word? To borrow a Shakespearean phrase, I would like to make insurance doubly sure on one point. I didn't hear Miss T'ang translate when Mr. Kissinger said he had confidence in me. I want that in the record. I am looking forward to a possibility which will become a reality.

PM Chou: She translated that. And I can also assure you that Dr. Kissinger's confidence in you has left a very deep impression on me. Of course the main confidence is from your President too.

Dr. Kissinger: I think the Prime Minister uses an interpreter only to gain time to think out his answers even better. He understands English very well. [laughter]

PM Chou: No, no, no, I don't understand all of it, but I understand most of the parts that I pay attention to.

[The meeting broke briefly, from 4:18 to 4:40 p.m.]

PM Chou: I would first of all like to thank you for what you said just now about strategy, because I believe that this is relevant not just to the present day but also to future developments. I think that the three different kinds of analyses you gave us actually are one. Why is that? Because I think that if in the first case it was thought that China would be easily attacked and would collapse the moment it was attacked, then there would have been no reason in favor of the improvement of relations between China and the United States.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly.

PM Chou: Because we would be equal to Czechoslovakia, and it would not be worth it for you to spend so much time and energy in this. And the second and third points are two sides of one thing, because you know you stress on the prevention of certain events and therefore you stress the third danger, and therefore you attach importance to the danger I described yesterday; that is, you attach importance to lessening and even finally eliminating that danger. But neither do you exclude that some day the Soviet Union might embark on an adventure because of their unlimited ambition and imprudently launch a nuclear war. That is why we must be prepared for the worst. That was the portent that Chairman Mao mentioned to you; that is, to make—to timely envision that the Soviet Union might one day go mad, and not to consider that inconceivable, and therefore we must be prepared for the worst.

And I mentioned yesterday the proof of that, that we have concretized our principle of being prepared against war, and against natural disasters. The people have a phrase, "to dig tunnels deep, to store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony." The interpreter didn't remember the third phrase correctly, which shows her tendency to big-nation chauvinism. [laughter] We are educating the people along these lines, "to dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony." But the interpreter just now made it into a long sentence, which shows big-nation chauvinism, which must be criticized!

The first sentence shows a means of preparedness against war. Of course it is a defensive preparedness, but this prevention must be implemented in all the major and small cities of the country. Because the experience of the Second World War, and also the experience of the Vietnam war, have proved that the underground works have proven that they have been useful in preserving effectives and that they can be linked together and coordinated in battle and that they can withstand bombing. As for storing grain everywhere, that principle—as you just now mentioned, the digging of tunnels is sometimes not quite conceivable to some in Western Europe—that is the same case with to store grain everywhere. Many countries don't find it conceivable to do that. And the natural disasters in the Soviet Union last year proved that after 50 years of construction their agriculture did not pass the test and as a result the First Vice Premier of the Council of Ministers was

sacrificed—Polyansky. He was one whom Khrushchev appreciated and Brezhnev especially praised, and his division with Kosygin was that he was in charge of agriculture. One year of natural disasters had reduced the Soviet Union to such a state, so what would they do if the natural disasters would continue for a few more years? And that also was a great lesson to Japan.

Because if there truly is going to be a big war and any country is going to enter into that great war, then if they have no food then how are they going to fight? Our natural disasters last year also put a test to us, but it proved that our grain reserves were much better than before. But we still have to make efforts. The 1972 harvest was 4% less than the 1971 harvest. That was 10 million tons less of grain; 4% of our harvest was 10 million tons. And the year before, 1971, our grain output was 250 million tons. Last year we imported about 5 million tons of grain but we also exported around 3 million. Our imports include some through your country through third countries. Actually we didn't mean to cancel the first purchase of grain—I think there was a one-million-ton purchase. The first one we cancelled but because of the propaganda in the press which compared us and put us on the same par as the Soviet Union; we felt we had to cancel that.

Dr. Kissinger: What was that?

PM Chou: The first deal was through the French businesses. The second time they kept quiet but it was still through a third country. I think in the future there will be no need to go through a third country. We can do it directly. So I think . . . But in importing grain we have two main purposes. One is to adjust the various varieties, and the second is to get more grain reserves. Because many of the countries that need our supply of grain eat rice—Vietnam, Korea, Ceylon, Cuba and African countries. But now, because of Soviet purchases, the price of wheat is going up. It is not like in the old days when we could exchange one ton of rice for two tons of wheat.

No matter what, we have to have such preparations. If not, how could we be prepared against a war?

Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet crop is likely to be very bad again this year. They had very little snow.

PM Chou: So it seems that perhaps Polyansky will perhaps lose his status in the Politburo and as a Minister too.

Dr. Kissinger: They have already dismissed Matskevich and . . .

PM Chou: And put Polyansky in.[4]

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

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[4] Dmitry Stepanovich Polyansky replaced Vladimir Matskevich as Soviet Minister of Agriculture in 1973.

PM Chou: He will probably have to go, too. But with material preparations alone, if the mental preparations are not sufficient, then one can still not be fully prepared against war. With only material preparations and the wrong mental preparations, then the preparations will be incorrect. Therefore we have to stress "never to seek hegemony". We not only put that into our joint communiqué, and also the joint statement issued with Japan, but we are also educating our people at home that they should stress the fact that we should never seek hegemony. Because the good point of the aggression likely to come from the north to China is that this can enhance our national self-confidence. And the half century of Japanese aggression in the past also has educated the Chinese people and awakened their confidence.

But another side of the picture is that the objective fact of the largeness of the Chinese nation and Chinese area easily create a tendency to nationalistic sentiments and big-nation chauvinism. Because if there are too strong nationalist feelings, then one will cease to learn from others; one will seal oneself in and believe one is the best or will cease to learn from the strong points of others. For instance, one will cease to speak or to learn the language of others. Because there are so many people who can speak Chinese and speak it among themselves, they find it very easy to live and don't have to learn foreign languages. For instance, in your country you have Chinatowns.

Dr. Kissinger: Still? Yes.

PM Chou: They are very conservative. They stick together.

Dr. Kissinger: New York and San Francisco.

PM Chou: Other countries don't seem to have that happen—they stick together.

Dr. Kissinger: They are the most law abiding parts of the cities, too.

PM Chou: Not necessarily.

Dr. Kissinger: Seriously, the crime statistics are less in the Chinese areas than anywhere else. I am serious. It is true. I am not being polite.

PM Chou: We have heard from other people in the United States that since 1965 when you lifted the quota for immigrants from Hong Kong, since then the crime rate has gone up because they have begun street fighting.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't know.

Mr. Jenkins: More recently, but for a long time it was traditional that the Chinese community was the most peaceful.

PM Chou: [To Winston Lord] Is your wife Cantonese?

Mr. Lord: From Shanghai.

Dr. Kissinger: A very strong lady.

PM Chou: Strong lady. With a vast population it is easy to project big-nation chauvinism feeling especially toward smaller bordering

countries. So on the one hand we must develop the spirit of resisting the tide, resisting erroneous things, no matter how strong they may be. One must not fear them at all. On the other hand we must be modest and prudent and to treat the people of all countries no matter big or small, equally and the same. Because others always have strong points and one must learn from the strong points of others to correct our own shortcomings. But in what way can one create such a spirit and temper the people in such a matter? That would be through exchanges. Through exchanges the people will temper themselves.

Take, for instance, the relations between our two countries since the ping-pong teams—only less than two years, and still through the increasing exchanges we have learned more of each other and begun to understand each other's strong points and weak points. And in this way one can give play to one's good habits and lessen the bad habits. That is the same with Japan. Since Liberation we have never ceased exchanges between the Chinese and Japanese people, and therefore with regard to the aspects that we have had contact with, we have been able to increase understanding. As to those aspects which we do not have contact with, there is still quite a large amount of prejudice.

Therefore, we must, in our preparation against war, we must be prepared against surprise attacks. Although at the beginning—it might not be very probable at the very beginning that there shall be major attacks, but there always is this possibility. A good thing to us, a relatively good phenomenon recently in the recent two years is that there has been an increasing number of foreign friends to visit China. And generally speaking they all understand that China is not a country that wants to commit aggression abroad. China is opposed to aggression. The impression they have got is that China is not a warlike or aggressive nation. But at the same time we must maintain constant preparations against all eventualities, because we must always be prepared against some surprise incident in case something happens. In Chinese, "We must be prepared against one case in ten thousand." It is, as you have said, that other countries might not be prepared for such sudden incidents, might not have envisaged such a possibility. Of course, with more contacts and exchanges, gradually this matter will become understood.

But what if the attack comes early? That is why Chairman Mao said that we can fight for one year, or two years, and gradually the world will come to understand and the voices of reproach against the Soviet Union will be raised higher. But we must be prepared to withstand that attack; we must be prepared to make it so that they will be able to come in but not go out. One case might be as you envisage, that they will not send their forces in but will just throw bombs; that is, to wage an undeclared war. We must be prepared to withstand that; that is, we must be prepared to resist after the bombing. So that is why the Chairman said we must be able to stand for one year, two years, three

years, four years or five years—to withstand the attack until that time so that the people in the world will come to understand the situation. That is why Chairman Mao said that you might make some moves at that time from their back—you might poke them in the back. Of course that is the worst eventuality.

Dr. Kissinger: That is very probable, that we would do that.

PM Chou: And it can be only in this way that we will be able to maintain our self-confidence and also gain the mutual assistance of others. With regard to the world there are bound to be some twists and turns, and some events that we are not prepared for, and there also might be a few countries who would like to fish in troubled waters. I discussed with you the possibility that there might be some come from the east or from the southwest. But we must be prepared—even in that eventuality, we must be able to resist and to wipe them out. Because then if they do not come into our territory and just continue the bombing, then by that time the whole world would be against them and we could not maintain the position of only defending our own land and not attack. Of course Chairman Mao put it in a more subtle way. He asked you to organize a committee to study that problem.

So with regard to this problem you have said that you think it is best to prevent the event before it happens. Of course that would be good if it can be done. And that will call for joint efforts, that is, to envisage all aspects. But if we ourselves did not make own preparations ourselves, that would not be right. Of course there is the possibility that if we are prepared they would not dare to come, or anyway they will have to think a bit.

Therefore in the future four years which you mentioned, it is most essential to do more work.

Our views on Western Europe are almost the same. Even the Nordic countries, although they might have said some things about you in the Scandinavian countries, they still are vigilant against the Soviet Union.

Dr. Kissinger: Even Sweden.

PM Chou: Even Finland.

Dr. Kissinger: Even more Finland.

PM Chou: They are the victim.

Dr. Kissinger: Finland is morally the strongest of the Scandinavian countries.

PM Chou: They resist. They wouldn't agree to submit. Don't you remember the battle of 1939? Tammersing lost very badly in the battle there. He broke his leg and lost his arm. And the Soviets would find themselves in an even colder place there; they would have dropped into an ice hole. That was the result of being too proud and arrogant.

They thought that they could take Finland by moving only a finger. That is one of the greatest lessons of arrogance and pride.

At that time, exactly that time, I was in the Soviet Union treating my elbow. I didn't get my elbow fixed but I learned quite a lesson about that. At the beginning the Soviet Union was extremely arrogant. Kuusinen had already become an "excellency" [laughter] and he was preparing to go to Finland to become its Chairman. So after its major defeat he came back and became "Comrade Kuusinen." You could see the change in the newspapers. It seemed to be a joke on him. But finally a part of it was carved out—Karelia—and then he went there to become the "Chairman". He was a good man but he was incapable.

So it still seems possible to gradually rid the European people of their illusions about peace, but that will take some time. So we think it is all right to hold some security conferences and mutual force reduction meetings in Europe, because it will serve to educate them. Because some truth will be told to them at those conferences. We will not play that role. The Soviet Union is saying that we are now the most warlike because we are even opposed to a security conference. Actually we are saying you can hold it if you want but it won't be of any consequence.

Take for instance the Geneva Disarmament Conference: It has also been going on endlessly and the more they disarm the more the armaments increase! So we have been outside, but coordinating with those inside. Britain seems to understand that point now. They now said that they understand our not taking part. Before they wanted everyone to enter the Conference and fight inside, but to go inside and quarrel sometimes is not necessary. The British now agree that we can remain outside. But sometimes you have to go inside and fight. For instance, the United Nations.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, many delegations of professors from the U.S. might urge you to join these things. But we understand your point of view. They are not being sent by us. [laughter]

PM Chou: It doesn't matter. As soon as they open that subject we can take the opportunity to make propaganda against them. I have already taken the lead in doing that, and now the Foreign Minister can do the rest of the work. I won't spend my time doing that. But there are some American friends to whom it is easy to convey the notion; there are some who are more naive.

The second is Japan, because we have already discussed France. We don't have to say any more about that.

Dr. Kissinger: We are in complete agreement with you.

PM Chou: As for Japan, we have, and still hold, the view that Japan is at a crossroads. From the point of security they cannot leave you now. Although generally speaking in our propaganda we are not, and

we truly are not, in favor of a transition from Dulles' Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. We are not in favor of that. But proceeding from the present situation, out of consideration of the present situation, we have not touched on that matter when we established relations with Japan.

Dr. Kissinger: We are well aware of that.

PM Chou: So when certain correspondents clamor that I am in support of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty I just ignore that. Let them go on. The Soviet Vice Foreign Minister approached our Vice Foreign Minister and asked for clarifications on that point, but we paid no attention to him. We said, "You have been cursing us enough."

But Japan, due to its economic development, will inevitably also bring with it an ideology of military expansion that is objective. And about this point I believe I mentioned at the very beginning of our discussions that it is you who have fattened up the Japanese. Of course in the beginning perhaps you did that in order to prevent what you thought to be the expansion of communism.

Dr. Kissinger: And China.

PM Chou: Not only China but in Dulles' time he viewed both China and the Soviet Union as a monolith. But if that was truly so, then you should have not let Japan expand economically so unrestrictedly. But that is an objective development that does not heed the will of man. That is, there are sudden expansions of such. The foundation was laid after the Second World War. There was the fact also that you had thrown atom bombs on Japan and therefore you wanted to create a better impression on the Japanese people and did not ask indemnities. And I believe the expenses of your occupation troops in Japan were mainly provided by yourself, and you also encouraged the support of your investments and techniques to Japan.

Dr. Kissinger: And we gave aid. I forget what the amount was but it was very substantial, several billion.

PM Chou: At the same time as the Marshall Plan.

Dr. Kissinger: Japan wasn't part of the Marshall Plan. Japan received a separate program.

PM Chou: At the same time?

Dr. Kissinger: It started a little later but it overlapped in the '50s.

PM Chou: In addition they gained a lot, and you should say they made money, out of the wars in the East. They profited out of the Chinese Civil War because of the transportation of your assistance to Chiang Kai-shek, which had to go through them. Then the Korean War, three years, then the Indochina War. You fattened them up. [laughter] How could you have foreseen that? Of course, in our point of view that is a matter of system. But we don't have to answer about that philosophical problem now. We can concentrate on matters of practical interest to the people.

What Japan now has is only an attempt, an ambition, but they want to gain more independence out of this development. Like when a young man grows up he wants more freedom. But if it has restraint of its spirit, that is different, if it has a spirit of restraint it would be better. But its economic base doesn't allow it to restrain itself; it will compel it to develop. But it is true indeed that the various countries in Asia and the Pacific Ocean have learned their lesson about the economic development abroad of Japan, and therefore their great fear of it. That is why Suharto said to you he thought the second major threat was Japan. That was due to the lessons of the Pacific. Japan itself cannot be said to be completely ignorant of that. They have enough of the spirit of self-criticism to see that if they do not obey a spirit of restraint in their economic development they will become "economic animals." I heard those very words from monopoly capitalists. Was that a term that was given to them by the people in Asia or is it their own coin?

Dr. Kissinger: I think it is their own coinage.

PM Chou: It is in this very room that I met them and I heard from their own mouths these words.

Dr. Kissinger: Have you ever seen them put the principle in practice?

PM Chou: No.

Dr. Kissinger: They're like my colleagues, good in theory but not in practice.

PM Chou: Including your student [Nakasone]?[5]

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, especially my student.

PM Chou: So where do you think a way out lies? There is a way out but they refuse to take it. So that is why they now are trying to find ways out for the expansion of their investments abroad, and that is why Siberia holds such an attraction for them—natural gas, oil, timber—because in this way they can develop their war supply material in case of danger. Can't you cooperate with them in that?

Dr. Kissinger: We can cooperate with them. Especially in the gas project.

PM Chou: I believe they also want to develop the oil fields. The Tyumen oil project.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, that is the one where they want us to participate 50 percent.

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[5] Kissinger taught Japanese Minister of International Trade and Industry Yasuhiro Nakasone during a summer school program at Harvard.

PM Chou: A good thing that would come out of that would be mutual restraint on each other. They were afraid that we would oppose it. We said we didn't care. We said that was something for you to decide. Of course the way they have done things is due to ambivalence.

Dr. Kissinger: Everything you tell them they will tell the next party.

PM Chou: It doesn't matter. You see we are very large-minded. We don't care. We let them say what they want. Even if they made it public it wouldn't be of much use to others. But we think you should give consideration to trying to win over Japan. But your student also said something that is in accordance with reality. Before we established diplomatic relations we had relations with him. Our correspondent had a meeting with him and he also mentioned the five powers that your President mentioned. But when we mentioned that your President had mentioned the five powers, Mr. Nakasone said that the strength of Japan was an imaginary strength, because they relied on foreign countries for their raw materials and their markets. We can accept that sentence, but the question was about the conclusion he drew . . . The facts he mentioned were correct, but we don't know what way out he imagined. And he came for his visit recently and when we talked to him about it, it seems he still is not quite decided about that. Perhaps it is unfair to blame him for that because they are in such a situation.

Because the Soviet Union is quite attractive to them, especially because of the three things I mentioned just now—oil, gas and timber—and it is perhaps not good to oppose them. It might on the contrary have bad results. Because you are qualified to cooperate in that.

Of course we will also say other things to them too. For instance, the words of Tanaka that the Chairman told you yesterday about the Soviet Union: When someone is about to hang himself, they will bring a chair. Various leaders of Japan have said similar things. For instance, we support their recovery of their northern islands. But the Soviet Union puts up a ferocious front.

It is difficult to blame them because they have to rely on foreign countries for both their raw materials and their markets. And therefore their economic basis is not complete. And their present capability of self-defense is also limited, and if they are going to develop their capability of self-defense, internationally it probably would not be allowed, and domestically they would probably meet with great opposition. And that brings us back to what we discussed one-and-a-half years ago about the danger of the resurgence of Japanese militarism. I think now you would agree to that. But if they insist on embarking on that road, then what could we do about that? We should try to harness the trend and try to administer them into the best channels. The slogan of the Socialist Party is "No armed forces."

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: I asked the Chairman of the Socialist Party, "Do you think you would be able to gain many votes from people by such a slogan?" It wouldn't be possible to rule with such a slogan either, but they don't change it. So Japan's politics is very complex, but it is due to their environment. But we believe no matter what, work should be done with Japan to prevent Japan's being won over by the Soviet Union and to be used to threaten the world.

And now to come back to the Middle East. We oppose the situation in the Middle East. We are not simply opposed to Israel, or singly. The existence of Israel is now a fact. But before they give up the territory they have come by by aggression, we cannot establish diplomatic relations with them. That is a principle. But the present situation there is one of no war, no peace.

Dr. Kissinger: That's Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk! [laughter]

PM Chou: But it is also a situation in turmoil which is more favorable towards the Soviet Union. It is also a turbulent situation. Take for instance the Arabs—they also claim socialism. There are a lot of socialisms. Now especially Mr. Qaddafi claims to be a socialist. You know he doesn't have relations with us?

Dr. Kissinger: No.

PM Chou: He has relations with Chiang Kai-shek.

Dr. Kissinger: I didn't know that. He wants to buy Malta. [laughter]

PM Chou: Yes, we know. [laughter] He is another expansionist. He says, "I have money in my pocket," and the Soviet Union is making use of that money. They are reaching into his pockets through Egypt and Syria and they are raising the price of their arms. The Soviet diplomats openly say to the Egyptians, "You have money, because Qaddafi will give you the money." You probably also buy Libyan oil, don't you?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, it is one of the things we have to change.

PM Chou: So the Middle East issue.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. He is buying Malta with our money. [laughter] And Iraq is using our money to make revolution.

PM Chou: They are not only buying Malta, they are sending your money to the Soviet Union.

Dr. Kissinger: Indirectly we did.

PM Chou: The issue of the Middle East is complex indeed. I acquired all this knowledge from Mr. Mintoff. He is the one who enlightened us in the beginning, but of course now we are getting it from other sources. You just now mentioned that Iraq was using your money to make revolution. In the final analysis they will use it to revolutionize themselves. You know the Socialist ruling party in Syria. What are they called?

Dr. Kissinger: Ba'ath.

PM Chou: Yes, Ba'ath. You know, the Ba'ath party in Iraq when they came into power they massacred a large number of followers of Kassem.

Dr. Kissinger: Including him.

PM Chou: So their present maneuvers there will not be able to be prolonged. Things will change. Of course there are quite a number of Soviet officers that are going to Iraq and Syria now, but those two countries are not very harmonious either.

And therefore with regard to the Middle East issue, our principle is to settle the issue in a manner that will be in the interests of all the Arab people including the Palestinian people. If you wish to inform us in the future of future developments it is all right with us, but I must say beforehand that we do not have the capability of doing anything here. The only thing we can do is give expressions to our opinion.

Dr. Kissinger: We will just inform you for your own information. We do not expect you to do anything.

PM Chou: And we have also openly told our Arab friends that since the Soviet Union is dominating that area it would do no good for us to go into that area. It would only increase the trouble in that area, and their burden.

The Soviet Union is making use of the Middle East issue to expand into the Subcontinent and the Indian Ocean. How are your relations with Sri Lanka?

Dr. Kissinger: Quiet.

PM Chou: Better now?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, a little better, and we are prepared to improve them further. Mrs. Bandaranaike has some domestic trouble, and India keeps bringing pressure on her. But in principle we are prepared to improve our relations and go as far as she is willing to go. I will make sure she understands this. But if you talk to her people we have no objection if you say this is your impression.

PM Chou: So there are two—one to the north and another to the south of India—that dare to stand up and resist India. In the north and in the south. Do you have diplomatic relations with Bhutan?

Dr. Kissinger: No.

PM Chou: Is it because India doesn't allow that?

Dr. Kissinger: India won't permit anyone to have diplomatic relations with Bhutan. India controls the foreign relations of Bhutan.

PM Chou: Maybe like Ukraine.

Dr. Kissinger: Like Ukraine. They want Bhutan in the UN but they don't want anyone to have diplomatic relations.

PM Chou: They also have their Byelorussia—Sikkim.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: Since the Soviet Union and India are now allied to each other they copy each other.

Dr. Kissinger: Also, there is an American girl who is Queen of Sikkim.

PM Chou: We saw her.

Dr. Kissinger: Here?

PM Chou: No, when we went to visit Nehru. Is it the original one that married the King in the 50s?

Dr. Kissinger: That is right. She keeps using her prayer beads and sifting her beads all the time. She has become more Buddhist than the population. She makes me so nervous I always avoid seeing her.

PM Chou: In 1956 there was a very interesting incident when I was in India. Mr. Nehru invited me to a kind of fashion show dinner party and he had a lot of ladies there in various costumes, and among the guests he invited was the King of Sikkim and his American queen. The portrait of her was like you just now described. It makes others easily nervous. But in 1957 on my way back to China from the Soviet Union and Poland I also stopped in India. The scene then was different—another story. Nehru invited me to a tea party in his garden and among the guests were people in costume. There were two Tibetan lamas, and there suddenly appeared a female lama. Do you know who she was?

Dr. Kissinger: Madame Binh?

PM Chou: Madame Gandhi. [laughter] She was dressed up entirely in Tibetan costume. That was something that Nehru was capable of doing. I am not among those that go in for memoir-writing.

Dr. Kissinger: It is a pity.

PM Chou: So perhaps we can ask you to write it in your memoirs since you have it now in your minutes. [laughter] I was speechless confronted with such a situation. It was impossible for me to say anything.

But because Nehru insistently wanted to seize hold of Kashmir and Jammu, during the interval of the first Geneva Conference, 1954, I went to visit India. It was my first visit, and in that visit Nehru kept on asking me if I knew where he came from. Then he told me he was from Kashmir, which therefore proved Kashmir was Indian territory!

And he insisted on getting me to visit Kashmir, and I resisted him. But Khrushchev was very obedient and he visited that territory; it was also during his first visit to India, in 1955.

So that is what is called politics. But in our view it is only intrigue, small tricks. It is not open and above-board political activity. India

cannot be considered a small country but still stoops to such tricks. A small country could perhaps win at doing such things, though perhaps some small nations would have more backbone than that. You are not so familiar with Nehru?

Dr. Kissinger: I met him once.

PM Chou: Only once.

Dr. Kissinger: But I must say that until well into the 1960's I had always accepted the view that in the Sino-Indian War you had attacked. It was not until I visit India in 1962 and talked to Khrishna Menon that I suddenly realized they had been bringing pressure on you. I have never been an admirer of Indian policy.

PM Chou: So you hold a minority opinion among the upper strata of the U.S.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: Now there are two other matters I would like to discuss with you. One is Cambodia. Because it seems this time during this visit it will be difficult to make further progress. We know your documents in English and French. We gave you already the 5-point statement of March 23, 1970, and also the January 26, 1973,[6] but we should further give you the January 23 one of the three Vice Ministers of the Royal Government of National Union in the interior part of Cambodia. And we are in agreement with Vietnam in respecting the position of the Front of National Union of Cambodia and also the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia. Our tendency would be that you should cease your involvement in that area. Of course you would say in reply that other parties should also stop their involvement.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right.

PM Chou: If it was purely a civil war the matter would be relatively more simple. Of course it wouldn't be easy to immediately confine it to a civil war. The situation would be like China in the past. Of course it is not possible to hope for Cambodia entirely copying the previous China situation. But one thing can be done, that is, we can talk in various ways to make your intention known to the various responsible sides in the National United Front of Cambodia. Because the National United Front of Cambodia is not composed of only one party; it also is composed of the left, the middle and the right. Of course, Samdech Norodom Sihanouk wishes to be in a central position, as is the King of Laos and Prime Minister Phouma. They actually now have two leading persons; one is the head of state, the other is the Prime

[6] The Chinese Government gave these documents to the United States at a meeting two days earlier. See footnote 6, Document 9.

Minister, Penn Nouth. Of course in the interior the strength of the left is larger. And we also believe that differences will also occur in the Lon Nol clique.

France is also active, and so is the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is also attempting to fabricate their own Red Khmer but they can't find many people. But it might in the future appear. So, in the future, if there is some information you would like to give us in this respect, we can also give you some too. But it would only be information. It would not be—we have not yet reached the stage where we could provide any views or suggestions.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

PM Chou: And we would like to take very prudent steps, because we wish to see the final goal of Cambodia realized; that is, its peace, independence, unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Dr. Kissinger: We completely agree with these objectives.

PM Chou: But we will still have to wait and see in which way these objectives can be realized. And you know, and Samdech Norodom Sihanouk also knows, that we would never want to turn Samdech Norodom Sihanouk into someone who would heed to our beck and call. If we did that, that would be like hegemony. Many of the views he expresses in our *People's Daily* are not necessarily our views, but we give him complete freedom. Although he has written songs about nostalgia about China—in Peking he wrote a very good poem about China being his second motherland—and although he is writing such poems we do not cherish illusions. I was going to try to persuade him not to try and publish the second song. I advised him to use "homeland" because "motherland" was too excessive. He insisted on "motherland." We must be prepared for the day when he says it doesn't count! Anyway it was all written by him; it has nothing to do with us. Of course he is now saying I am one of his best friends, that I am one of his best friends, "as Mr. Mansfield is." It doesn't matter. That is only personal relations. He is still the Head of State of the Buddhist State of Cambodia. So we still have to wait and see the developments of that issue.

So if we wish to see Southeast Asia develop along the lines of peace and neutrality and not enter a Soviet Asian security system, then Cambodia would be an exemplar country.

Dr. Kissinger: We are in complete agreement with that objective. And we have the same difficulty determining in exactly which direction to put our influence.

PM Chou: We still have to study that problem.

Dr. Kissinger: We are prepared to exchange information. It would be kept in strictest confidence. And we also believe . . .

PM Chou: Anyway I believe you to a certain degree answered me, when I said about the fact that Lon Nol will not do. I do not mean that the forces that he represents do not count.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand that. But before one can act on that, one has to have some idea of the alternative. I also agree that if it can become a Cambodian civil war rather than a foreign war, that would be the first step toward realizing these objectives.

PM Chou: We understand the directions. We understand our respective orientations. Because it is impossible for Cambodia to become completely red now. If that were attempted, it would result in even greater problems. It should be settled by the United Front, on the basis of the policy I just now mentioned; that is, independence, peace, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity.

Dr. Kissinger: Those principles we agree with, and we now have to find some framework for achieving them in a way that takes account of all the real forces.

PM Chou: So, one we agree.

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister had a second issue.

PM Chou: So I would like to stop here about this issue and go on. That is the Korean issue.

Dr. Kissinger: I was hoping the Prime Minister might forget about it. I nearly got out of here all right. [laughter] I have already crossed it out of my book. [laughter]

PM Chou: No, it won't be crossed out. You know it hasn't been easy for that area to have remained without any major incident during these 20 years. You know there is only an armistice there. Dulles broke up the 1954 Geneva Conference discussion about Korea. It seems in retrospect that was very good. That was the only time that we looked into each other's eyes. We were seated opposite each other at a round table in a room that was about one-quarter of this one. That was the only time he stared at me and I stared at him. That was when he made the decision that the Korean question was not to be discussed, and that was the final time, and after that he left Geneva and left it to his assistant Mr. Smith to deal with us. It seems in retrospect there were good points in that. That means we are not fettered, and the result has been that the two sides have maintained the desire to maintain a status of peace there.

It has been 15 years since our volunteers withdrew from Korea; your troops have remained there until the present day. Now there are these few issues that need to be solved. Because in principle there will be a day when your troops will be totally withdrawn and therefore it is not incorrect for the DPRK to put forward that principle. Because we have indeed left Korea 15 years ago, and the Korean army has neither

Chinese nor Soviet military advisers. The Soviet Union is now trying to exert pressure on them but the Koreans resist them. Of course, it has to have some relations and exchanges with the Soviet Union. It was, I believe, precisely yesterday that they were celebrating the 70th birthday of Brezhnev and sent him telegrams of congratulations. Both our Vietnamese friends and Kim Il-sung sent a greeting to Brezhnev yesterday. But that was the very day that Chairman Mao Tse-tung sent his regards to President Nixon. So the Soviet Union probably will be making great fuss about that. [laughter] It is entirely coincidental.

Dr. Kissinger: A coincidence.

PM Chou: And it was only this morning when I read the news that I saw this happened. We hadn't calculated it before. We gave the news at 4 o'clock in the morning then it was released. How could I know he turned 70 yesterday? And Chairman Mao has still less regard for such matters; he is highly opposed to birthday celebrating. You probably didn't premeditate that.

Dr. Kissinger: No, I didn't know I was meeting Chairman Mao.

PM Chou: Perhaps your President will have to telegram something.

Dr. Kissinger: Actually Brezhnev sent birthday greetings to President Nixon. I have just made a note to see if we sent any. Normally I am told.

PM Chou: We couldn't care less if you sent him a telegram out of courtesy.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't know whether we did or not. I doubt that we did.

PM Chou: It doesn't matter.

Dr. Kissinger: But I am not sure. I will have to check.

PM Chou: Because we couldn't care less about such matters.

As for the Korean issue, you said the year before last and last year that probably this year you would abolish UNCURK. How do you envisage this?

Dr. Kissinger: We envisage that we can get UNCURK abolished probably in the second half of this year. We will talk first to the South Koreans to see whether they are willing to propose it. If not, we will talk to some of the other members.

PM Chou: Yes, it would be best if they did it.

Dr. Kissinger: That is what we will try to bring about.

PM Chou: So if you can give us that promise then, we will do our best to avoid the issue becoming acute.

Dr. Kissinger: I am almost certain. Let me confirm it within the next few weeks. It has that much time.

Miss T'ang: What has that much time?

Dr. Kissinger: I mean it has that much time to let you know definitely. I am almost certain we can do it. I want to check to see if there are any complications I cannot predict, but I am almost certain. Say, by the middle of March we will confirm it. I know the President agrees with it. I have to study the mechanics of how to do it.

PM Chou: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: I am almost certain we can do it.

PM Chou: That is one thing. The second point is the gradual troop withdrawal. We believe that is a reasonable request on the part of Korea. We know that you are anyway going to gradually withdraw your troops from Korea, and during that period you want to increase the self-confidence of the South Koreans to make sure they are going to be able to defend themselves.

Dr. Kissinger: That is correct.

PM Chou: Anyway, there is no one who is going to commit aggression against them. But one thing that must be guarded against is that the Japanese should not be able to force themselves on them.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, we have an understanding on that. And that understanding is maintained. That makes it important that the withdrawal be gradual and not sudden.

PM Chou: The principle that you should withdraw your troops is a principle that neither the Korean people nor the Democratic People's Republic of Korea can change. But the fact that the troop withdrawal will be gradual and Japan should not be allowed to enter into that area is something that we have also told our Korean friends and that is something that they must understand.

Dr. Kissinger: On the principle of withdrawal we have an understanding, and the principle that Japanese forces will not enter the territory of South Korea we maintain. On withdrawal we will be able to give better understanding of the direction in which we are moving within the next year.

Miss T'ang: You mean in 1973, 12 months?

Dr. Kissinger: By this time next year.

PM Chou: Next year? When I talked with Nakasone I asked him whether it was true or not that when he was in charge of defense he had sent military men in civilian costume into South Korea, and he denied it. I didn't tell him you had admitted it was true.

Dr. Kissinger: We gave you that information.

PM Chou: You proved it. I said the Koreans don't have a good impression of the Japanese. He said, that's true. Many Koreans are pro-Japanese, and were trained by the Japanese.

Dr. Kissinger: Their President was trained by the Japanese.

PM Chou: And the third point is that you are giving the South Koreans some military equipment and changing some of it too. As for the 40,000 American troops which will be withdrawn, will they also go back into Korea with modern weapons—the troops from South Vietnam?

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, the troops from South Vietnam. The Prime Minister has too much experience with ceasefires. And I don't want to be in the position of Nakasone. About half will go back to the U.S. and about half will leave their weapons there and receive new weapons in Korea. The Prime Minister knows it already. [laughter] But the equipment was transferred legally before January 27. [laughter]

PM Chou: I don't care much for that deadline, January 27th.

Dr. Kissinger: This is why I do not express as much moral outrage now as I will in two months about their tanks moving South.

PM Chou: It would be impossible two months hence. The important thing now is for the Commission of Control and Supervision to go as quickly as possible to their posts.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

PM Chou: It is also ridiculous that the Two-Party Commission should continue to hold its meetings in Paris and not be able to go to their own country, to Saigon.

Dr. Kissinger: What is the matter is that Chapter VI is so complicated that it can be understood only by the one or two people who have drafted it. I am sure Minister Thach probably understands it. The people who met in Paris is not the Two-Party Commission, but the political discussions. The Two-Party Commission has not yet been formed, but that is no great tragedy because it will automatically appear when the Four-Party Commission is disbanded, then the Two-Party Commission will remain.

PM Chou: There are also protocols to the Agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, for the Two-Party Commission, yes, that is true. The Four-Party Commission protocol exists.

PM Chou: Both exist?

Dr. Kissinger: No, the Four-Party one. After it ceases then the two parties will agree on their own protocol. But we will strongly support the Two-Party Commission. On the other hand, the PRG has refused to name points of entry, and as I told the Prime Minister they take the astounding view that in the absence of points of entry the frontiers are open. I would have thought they are closed. That we cannot accept for a long time.

PM Chou: The complexities, it is really something to have to go through all your documents. [laughter] But this time it is somewhat better. As Chairman Mao said after, it is not bad to have reached a basic settlement, because it doesn't seem that Nguyen Van Thieu is

likely to act like Chiang Kai-shek in disrupting the Agreement entirely in half a year.

Dr. Kissinger: We would strongly oppose it.

PM Chou: Because then, with Chiang Kai-shek, the U.S. was in a position of a mediator; it was the chairman of the three-man committee, but also had a veto. I heard that the veto was an invention of Marshall when the allies got together in the Second World War. On military actions between the Soviet Union, Britain and the U.S. That was when Marshall invented it. Is that so?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think so.

PM Chou: Of course, later on it was used in negotiation.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think we ever tried to veto military action. I will look it up.

PM Chou: Have you studied to do some research on it? Then it showed up in the UN. That is what Marshall told me, and he prided himself very much in that. That was when Mr. Chang Wen-chin was the interpreter when I met Marshall in Chungking.[7]

Dr. Kissinger: That might have been the problem, the interpretation. [laughter]

PM Chou: That was what he said during the first encounter with me. Of course, that might not have been merely the allied armed forces but the allied powers in Tehran. Maybe it came from Tehran.

Dr. Kissinger: That is possible. But we never knew about Soviet actions until they started them. The Soviet Union never told us ahead of time what they planned to do.

PM Chou: You mean military action.

Dr. Kissinger: Military action.

PM Chou: But the military orders issued on the Western front were indeed very long.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, very bureaucratic.

PM Chou: The ones about the landing, Marshall told me, were hundreds of thousands and maybe millions of words long. And I asked him, "How did you read it, Mr. Chief of Staff?" He said, "I read only the outline." So sometimes one must be practical and use the bureaucracy.

Dr. Kissinger: One must shortcut the bureaucracy.

PM Chou: And another thing in South Korea, what they are doing now—they are doing their utmost to establish a dictatorship and suppress the people and leave them with no freedom at all. They orig-

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[7] President Truman sent General George C. Marshall to China in 1945 to negotiate a coalition government between the Communists and the Nationalists. Marshall returned to the United States in 1947.

inally had a constitution, now they suppress it. Actually the present dialogue is only an initial contact between the two sides, and how is it possible to fundamentally change a system by initial contact? And even if a confederation was established between two states of different social systems it would only be outward appearance, and it would not be possible to immediately obliterate the differences. The only thing that could be done is to give the people the kind of hope that in the future unity would be achieved, and it would add to the atmosphere of national harmony. But they are greatly afraid of that.

Dr. Kissinger: The South Koreans?

PM Chou: Pak Chung Hee. Because they lack self-confidence. We don't know how strong your influence is there.

Dr. Kissinger: We support these negotiations and at every opportunity exert our influence. But is it your impression that South Korea is the principal obstacle now?

PM Chou: Yes, they do in several instances create a bit of trouble. For instance, they might suddenly arrest a group of people. And they are deeply afraid there might be some inner turmoil, because in the lower strata of their country, in the lower ranks of the political parties, there is a desire to achieve more democracy, which they have done away with. They have abolished the Parliament and they proclaim a new constitution in which the President would be for life. It shows a lack of self-confidence. In our view it will be impossible to completely change a system in one stroke.

I might tell you an interesting matter. That is, the written language of North and South Korea are different.

Dr. Kissinger: I think you are thinking of Vietnam.

PM Chou: It is a very curious situation.

Dr. Kissinger: The written language is different?

PM Chou: In North Korea they implemented a reform of the written language. Because before, the Korean written language used square characters, like Chinese. But now North Korea has made a reform of their written language. They are now using symbols. It has not been completely Latinized, but they are using different symbols for the sounds.

Each symbol is the sound for a square and then the various squares are put together to produce the sound. In North Korea there is not a single Chinese character in their language. But South Korea uses Chinese characters the same as we do, but it is classical Chinese. It is likely your highly refined gentleman from your State Department.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Freeman.

PM Chou: Who is quite literary in his spoken Chinese. So you see in that same land even the written language is different. And therefore the present matter of conducting affairs in South Korea is to rely on

foreign forces. So if you don't pay too much attention they will allow the Japanese economic forces to enter that area. Although indeed the relations between Japan and Korea are deeper than ours, because they have been for 50 years a colony of Japan.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. When the Prime Minister said that if UNCURK was abolished this year we could avoid difficulties, did he mean we could avoid a debate in the UN?

PM Chou: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: On that basis I think we can do it.

PM Chou: And South Korea should be made to understand that the abolishment of UNCURK should not impair their self-confidence, that is, if they are able to manage their part of the country well. There is only one aspect in which the two Koreas are united, and that is in sports. They are quite strong in sports. In the Olympics they sent a joint team. They are very strong in some matters. So that shows that the people desire unity.

Dr. Kissinger: Football. On the political talks, Mr. Prime Minister, we strongly encourage them. We are told by the South Koreans that the North Koreans are the obstacle; you tell us the South Koreans are the obstacle. Perhaps we should exchange some information. If you tell us the concrete issues that are creating difficulty we will know where to use our influence.

PM Chou: There is another area, that is the Military Armistice Commission that is standing in between them.

Dr. Kissinger: In Panmunjom.

PM Chou: I think they call it now the Ceasefire Committee. On the South Korean side you are the main participant and they are the deputy.

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister taught me that in October, 1971. I hadn't done my homework. [laughter]

PM Chou: On our side the main representative is that of the armed forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the representative of the Chinese People's Volunteers is only the deputy. And the supervisors on behalf of your side are Switzerland and Sweden, and on our side Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you want to trade Sweden for Czechoslovakia? [laughter]

PM Chou: We have no interest at all in that committee, but we often play host to them because the four members of the committee often like to pay a tourist visit to Peking.

Dr. Kissinger: That I can understand.

PM Chou: Because they have nothing to do there and they are stationed on either side, and every two years they have to change their personnel. It has been going on for 20 years now.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, and then each group comes to Peking.

Chi P'eng-fei: I don't know the details, but the Premier was saying they all come to Peking and spend their vacation here.

Dr. Kissinger: They work too hard.

PM Chou: Not hard at all. They didn't work hard. They are overtired.

So there are two more points. One is the communiqué. You have given us a draft. We have just glanced over it and we believe it generally acceptable. Of course we have to report to our Political Bureau and to the Chairman, so I will contact you later in the night. And the second point is that after I meet Minister Thach about the Paris Conference I will contact you.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I will be available and it makes no difference how late it is.

PM Chou: So it is easy for you. Now you can have your supper. I still have a lot of work. I have to meet Madame Bhutto, Mr. Thach, and then you.

Dr. Kissinger: May I ask what time should we release the communiqué?

PM Chou: You said the morning of the 22nd.

Dr. Kissinger: What time? 10:00 or 11:00—do you have a preference?

PM Chou: It makes no difference.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we prefer 11:00.

PM Chou: That would be our midnight. It doesn't mater. It is the same to us. It will be in the next day's newspaper.

Dr. Kissinger: May I ask the Prime Minister what I can tell the Japanese? [laughter]

PM Chou: You can tell them what is in the communiqué.

Dr. Kissinger: That is the absolute maximum I would tell them. [laughter] There is no possibility that I will tell them more. I am trying to figure out a way to tell them less.

PM Chou: You can say for instance that both our sides expressed appreciation about the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan and that we believed this was in the interests of peoples of the three countries and the other people in Asia and the Pacific Ocean.

Dr. Kissinger: I will certainly say that. Let me suggest this about the Liaison Office. I will say only that we agreed to establish some form of contact and we will still exchange messages about what it is. But then you should not tell them any more.

PM Chou: We won't say anything.

Dr. Kissinger: Our view about Japan is—I didn't tell the Prime Minister—we agree with his analysis, and the dangers. Why we didn't

foresee the consequence of its industrial growth is an interesting historical question, which we should discuss sometime. But I believe the biggest danger is that if the Japanese are torn between too many conflicting pressures from too many sides they will become more and more nationalistic. Therefore on our side we will not encourage them into an anti-Chinese direction. We are trying to influence them to develop relations, and if you on your side encourage them in the direction you expressed, I think this is the best thing we can jointly do at this point.

PM Chou: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: One other general point, and then I would like to make one very minor suggestion about the communiqué. I agreed with the Prime Minister's initial statement about the necessity of being prepared for the worst, and I wanted to say that if despite our intentions the situation which Chairman Mao described yesterday should come to pass, it would be the aim of this Administration to develop our policy in such a way that we can take the measures which Chairman Mao foresaw.[8] [Chou nods.]

Thirdly, in the communiqué, I have noticed we said we "agreed on a program for expanded scientific, educational and cultural exchanges." We don't mention trade. I think we should mention trade. We should say "of expanding trade as well as scientific, cultural and other exchanges."

PM Chou: "They agreed on a concrete program for expanding scientific, cultural, trade or other exchanges."

Dr. Kissinger: Right, and "details will be announced as they are settled," or we can just leave that sentence out. Let us just drop the whole sentence. [Chou nods yes.]

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: I thought you had made a decision not to mention trade!

Dr. Kissinger: When foreigners try to analyze another's foreign policy they never leave room for incompetence. They always think it is by design.

I don't know whether I told the Prime Minister: we analyzed after the Shanghai Communiqué was published your Chinese version, and we found that in every ambiguous case you resolved the issue slightly in our favor. It was a very gentlemanly procedure.

If you can let us have the Chinese text when we have agreed on it, to take back with us. You will let us know tonight?

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[8] Mao raised the possibility of a Soviet attack on China. See Document 12.

PM Chou: We don't want you to have to leave too late tomorrow. That will make your arrival in Tokyo even later, which will not be in accordance with the suggestions of the Chairman.

Dr. Kissinger: I have extended my stay in Tokyo even longer after the suggestions of the Chairman. I am staying until after lunch.

PM Chou: Are you going to the teahouses?

Dr. Kissinger: They are giving a dinner for me tomorrow night, and then the next day where I have lunch I don't know yet.

PM Chou: You probably appreciate the Japanese teahouses.

Dr. Kissinger: I prefer Chinese food. I like Japanese food. My difficulty is sitting on the floor. I suffer so much sitting on the floor that I forget what I am being fed. I once stayed in a Japanese hotel where I was the only Western guest, and no matter what I said they took my pants and pressed them. They pressed my pants 10 times a day. [laughter]

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14. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, February 19, 1973, 12:35–2:20 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Chou En-lai, Premier, State Council
Chi P'eng-fei, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Chang Wen-chin, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs
Wang Hai-jung, Assistant to Minister of Foreign Affairs
T'ang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
Commander Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Mary Stifflemire, Notetaker

PM Chou: First of all, a final question. Would that be all right?

Dr. Kissinger: Please.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 98, Country Files, Far East, HAK China Trip, Memcons & Reports (originals), February 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in Guest House #3. All brackets are in the original.

PM Chou: That is the communiqué.[2] We have only two points of revision. Are you ready?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: The first point is in the first paragraph, before the word "President," we have added the word, "U.S." [See U.S. draft in Tab A.]

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes. I might want to leave some ambiguity. To give the President an ecumenical role. [Laughter]

PM Chou: Then paragraph 3, the last sentence. I have changed the sentence, "They hoped that the progress that has been made during this period will be beneficial to the people of their two countries."

Dr. Kissinger: How about, "they expressed confidence"? "Hope" makes it look as if there is some doubt about it.

PM Chou: "They held."

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, "they held." That is fine. Can you give this to us?

Miss Shen: "They held that the progress that has been made during this period will be beneficial to the people of their two countries." We can give you a copy.

Dr. Kissinger: Then we will take the copy. Oh, you have underlined it.

PM Chou: Yes. And I underlined another sentence which is at paragraph 6. [Hands over Chinese draft at Tab B.][3]

Dr. Kissinger: You want to substitute "relaxation of tensions" for "peace"?

PM Chou: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Fine.

PM Chou: Only three points then.

Dr. Kissinger: I have a change, which I think isn't important. In the second—oh, are you finished?

PM Chou: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: In the second paragraph, where it says "they held extensive conversations" I like the word "wide-ranging" in your announcement yesterday. "Wide-ranging" has a fuller meaning.

PM Chou: It is the same as "extensive." So you want "wide-ranging." The Chinese word is the same.

Dr. Kissinger: Which do you think is better? Then we say "wide-ranging."

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[2] Attached but not printed at Tab A is the draft communiqué. For the published communiqué, see Department of State *Bulletin,* March 19, 1973, p. 313.

[3] Attached but not printed.

PM Chou: Fine. We don't have to change our Chinese version.

Minister Chang: Just like the Vietnamese. [Laughter]

PM Chou: As the Doctor has said this afternoon, our changes are all in your favor. That is, he referred to the communiqué, the Shanghai Communiqué; when they were ambiguous they were all slightly in your favor.

Dr. Kissinger: In Chinese, we found that whenever you had two [possible] words, you always picked the one we would have slightly preferred had we been given the choice. We really were very impressed with that, and I always looked for an opportunity to tell you. They changed no substance but . . .

PM Chou: No substance. We have already got a Chinese copy of the communiqué. The Chinese version. I will read to you the original text. The draft communiqué sent to us from the U.S. side at 8:00 in the morning on February 18 was revised and adopted by our Political Bureau on the evening of the 18th. And we hadn't had the last sentence. Just now the Chairman phoned us and said that he agrees to it. So our formalities are finished.

The date is not there. We need a date. The 22nd.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, the date. The 22nd, Washington time. It will be 23rd for you in the morning.

PM Chou: No, midnight. So it should be at 24 hours.

Dr. Kissinger: We will do it at 11:00 a.m.

PM Chou: It should still be counted as the 22nd.

Dr. Kissinger: The 22nd is fine.

PM Chou: It seems too difficult to put the place here, so we will just leave the place out. Without Peking. Just February 22, 1973. Without the place.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, fine. [Chou hands over Chinese text, Tab C.][4]

PM Chou: So we have finished this piece of our work. So I have completed my work very quick. Now let us discuss the Paris Conference.

Dr. Kissinger: May I go through a few very quick items?

PM Chou: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: I would like to let Mr. Ziegler say tomorrow that I made a courtesy call on Mrs. Bhutto. [Chou nods] Because if we wait three days it sounds very mysterious.

PM Chou: That is good.

Dr. Kissinger: And he will just say I made a courtesy call.

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[4] Attached but not printed.

PM Chou: She told me so and she is satisfied with it.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, she told you. But I told her we would say it on the 21st, but on reconsideration it is better to do it tomorrow, the 19th, our time.

PM Chou: That is the morning of your time?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. He won't write it. He will just, at his morning press conference, confirm our meetings and he will say, "In addition Mr. Kissinger paid a courtesy call on Mrs. Bhutto."

According to our records, the type of airplane that was shot down near Hainan with Lt. Dunn was an A–1.

PM Chou: According to our records, it was an A–1H.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, A–1H.

PM Chou: But for our information it was an A–1H. Perhaps we haven't made it clear.

Dr. Kissinger: That is correct. It is a special type.

PM Chou: It took place on the 14th of February, and we searched for it for three or four days by naval ships but nothing has been found. There were no remains or no bodies found. We think that anyway the plane was shot down and he was also shot down. To make it more specific, it is something like this: "Concerning the U.S. search for the U.S. pilot Lt. Dunn."

Dr. Kissinger: This is an official report.

PM Chou: "Point one: On the morning of February 14, 1968, at 10:41, fighters under the Air Force of our South Sea Fleet downed and damaged two U.S. aircraft. And the type of the planes were A–1H." We are not sure whether it is "1" or "I."

Dr. Kissinger: A–1H.

PM Chou: "After intruding into our air space, one of the planes dropped into the sea about 20 kilometers away from Lohui, Wan-ning County, Hainan Island. Our South Sea fleet sent escort boats for searching which lasted three or four days, but they did not find anything. A U.S. destroyer ship has also carried out search operations on the abovementioned sea area." The aforementioned material was provided by our General Office of the Chief of Staff.

There is another material here: "On February 15, 1968, the U.S. Defense Department issued an announcement saying that the U.S. aircraft inadvertently intruded five kilometers over Hainan Island. One of them was downed by a Communist MIG plane. On the 5th of March of the same year, in the Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial talks, we set forth to the U.S. side saying that two A–1H type attackers of the Navy of the United States intruded into the air space over our Hainan Island, and one of them was downed and one of which was damaged. And we also served serious warning for this." That is the records we had during the War-

saw Talks. And later on March 6 and June 15 of the same year the U.S. side had on many occasions inquired about the whereabouts of Lt. Dunn. Then on November 15 we formally replied to the U.S. side, saying that there was no result after searching. This is the material provided by the Foreign Ministry.

These two materials provided similar information as you mentioned, Doctor. Do you want any written information from us?

Dr. Kissinger: Not for our reasons, perhaps for the families concerned. We are satisfied with your oral explanation.

PM Chou: Well, so then we will work out a document to be sent to you, to facilitate your work. It is a kind of memorandum so that you can account for it to the families. [Aide-mémoire later given to U.S. side, Tab D][5]

Dr. Kissinger: We will give it to the family and we will confirm to the family that this coincides exactly with our own information and that we consider this a satisfactory explanation. And of course we recognize that our plane had no right to be over Hainan Island to begin with.

PM Chou: And you also mentioned that the plane inadvertently flew into our territory.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: According to your information it was just because of the climate that the machine had broken down.

Dr. Kissinger: We will confirm all of this to the family. So there will be no public discussion.

PM Chou: And another point related to that. There was a fishing boat of ours that was sunk last year. Many were killed and 12 were missing. Some of the fishermen were retrieved and after that an American naval ship signaled to our boats that they had personnel to hand over.

Dr. Kissinger: That we had prisoners?

PM Chou: That you had wounded personnel you wanted to hand over to us. At that time our ships did not dare to reply, so it went without response. This occurred twice.

Dr. Kissinger: Can you give me the date and the location?

PM Chou: Yes. Would you help us to investigate?

Dr. Kissinger: Of course. We will send you a written report within a week.

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[5] Attached but not printed.

Minister Chang: We will give you a written report and then you can check the question. We will give you a document, a memo; we will give you some material.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course. If you can give us the date and the location and what you know about the type of the American ship, we will take immediate action.

PM Chou: Thank you.

Dr. Kissinger: One other final thing. I will probably have a press conference when we present this communiqué. I will not add much to the communiqué but I will do it in conciliatory language. Most questions will concern the liaison office. I will say it has no diplomatic status, and it will handle . . . But we will arrange immunities as a courtesy for both sides. They will ask me about the title of the head of it. We will just say we will call him Chief of the Liaison Office. Or Chief of the Liaison Mission.

PM Chou: Just now you said "Mission."

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, it will be "Office." Chief of the Liaison Office.

PM Chou: Chief of the Liaison Office.

Dr. Kissinger: Right.

PM Chou: Chief, and the others will be members who . . .

Dr. Kissinger: And the others will be "members."

I will certainly be asked many questions about Chairman Mao. I think it might be helpful if you permitted me to say that I thought he was in very good health. They will ask me. I won't volunteer it. Otherwise I will make no comment beyond what is in your announcement.

PM Chou: [Nods] We will give you both the television and also the movie film.

Dr. Kissinger: That will be very nice. And we are free to release that?

PM Chou: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: We will release that tomorrow or the day after. If I am asked about Taiwan, about the forces on Taiwan, I will say we will study this problem in terms of the tensions in the area and when we have anything to do we will say it. We have no immediate decision. Because our plan is to start the movement I mentioned to you in July. But that will be done. I just wanted you to know what I would say, and if you have any objections I will modify it. May we tell the groups to which you agreed such as the Philadelphia Orchestra, that in principle it is agreed?

PM Chou: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: And I may mention that at the press conference, as an example? I may mention the two prisoners that you will release.

[Chou nods] And I will say that will be within the time period of the other releases. [Chou nods] And if I am asked about Downey I will say we discussed this in terms of an act of compassion by your government and you said you would take it under consideration. Or can I say more?

PM Chou: If you want to say more about it then you can say that in the latter half of this year we will consider this question.

Dr. Kissinger: That you will review it in the second half of this year.

PM Chou: That will be understood.

Dr. Kissinger: Those are the items that I have for the press conference. I will not tell the Japanese about the liaison office or about the specifics of the program. I will say we decided to establish some contacts and we will still exchange some messages. [Chou nods] That way it will not become public.

So now, if the Prime Minister wants to discuss the Paris Conference . . .

PM Chou: You are finished?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: About the Paris Conference. Vice Minister Thach has come to exchange views with us. Since he has not permission to meet Dr. Kissinger, so he will not meet you.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

PM Chou: And the second point is about the Paris Conference. You have already reached some agreements on certain points and this is just the same as we have agreed on.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: This is just the same as we have agreed on. That is, 12 countries will be the official members of the Conference, that is, they will sign. And the Secretary General of the United Nations will not sign the document. Then it is up to you to carry out consultations. How did you put it?

Dr. Kissinger: I was not clear that this had been agreed upon, but there could have been some exchanges during the week. It would be amazing. Did Thach think it was agreed upon in Hanoi?

PM Chou: He said that the Secretary General will not sign the document but he can make speeches, send messages of congratulations, and so on.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, you are right. I don't think this was agreed upon about the Secretary General not signing. We do not think this was agreed upon. This is Hanoi's proposal.

PM Chou: So it is not yet decided?

Dr. Kissinger: No, it depends partly on the status of the Secretary General at the Conference. [Chou laughs] If he is executive secretary or something like that, it would be easy. If he is a participant it would be more difficult. [Chou laughs]

PM Chou: It is a matter that concerns your two sides. Because you have sent out the same invitation letters.

Dr. Kissinger: We avoided the answer to this question.

PM Chou: But in the letter there is the name of the Secretary General. His name is mentioned. Is that right?

Dr. Kissinger: That is right, but that is because he is invited by his position, not because of his personality. [Laughter] Or he would never get there.

PM Chou: That is why we have always asked you to clarify his position. That is why you mentioned that it would be better if he would be given sort of a function.

Dr. Kissinger: I would too think that. What do your Vietnamese friends think now?

PM Chou: I won't be able to make him appear about this time. I haven't met him yet.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, Thach.

PM Chou: Because he arrived very late and they haven't worked out their document yet. So only after I have studied the document can I meet him. That is why we had a meeting among ourselves to talk about our own affairs.

Dr. Kissinger: Can you express a view on your own?

PM Chou: If you ask my opinion.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, personally.

PM Chou: That is the opinion of the China side, we especially are not in favor of it.

Dr. Kissinger: Of what?

PM Chou: The participation by the Secretary General in the Conference. [Laughter] If we are asked to vote, since we can't vote against it we cannot but abstain. If we are asked to vote, since we cannot use the veto, so we cannot but abstain. But the difficult part . . .

Dr. Kissinger: But what are you thinking of vetoing now? I am not absolutely sure, Mr. Prime Minister, what you would veto if you had the chance. [Laughter]

PM Chou: Since you two host countries have invited him and he is included in the list, so how can we veto it? So you have to put us in a very embarrassing position. [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: He is still travelling around the world planning his participation.

PM Chou: And he has got a very extensive plan.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, he is in charge of economic rehabilitation and peacekeeping. [Laughter]

PM Chou: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: The concrete issue is, since he has been invited, would you oppose his being given an administrative function in the Conference which would remove him as a participant?

PM Chou: We can make our decision only after you two host countries have consulted among yourselves.

Dr. Kissinger: But your allies have apparently still not clarified their minds.

PM Chou: That is true.

Dr. Kissinger: We are waiting for them. You can tell them that we would like to have some understanding with them before the Conference. We really don't want a public controversy with them or you.

PM Chou: But there is one point which is definite. That is, he cannot act as the Chairman, the single Chairman of the Conference.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand that. Now I don't believe it can happen but if the Soviet Union should propose this, which I do not believe, it would put us into a very difficult position. I don't think they will do it but we have absolutely no information about Soviet intentions.

PM Chou: Well, there is one secretary who has gone to your Ambassador in London.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but that is incomprehensible. Normally they send their ambassador in Washington, who is on vacation—but after yesterday I think he will be coming back soon. Normally they send him in with their considerations, at least to the White House.

PM Chou: And after you get back if you meet him and you know about their views, then if you find it is necessary to let us know, we can be informed of it.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. We will send a message tonight to their Chargé. Or we will send it tomorrow, after we have left here, because it will be better to send it from Tokyo. So that they can have an answer for me when I get back. And we will let you know in any event what the answer is. But unless the Soviet Union proposes it we will try to come to an understanding this week with the DRV to an alternative. If we come to an understanding this week with the DRV we will maintain it at the Conference no matter what is proposed by the others. I think then you will not accept the chairmanship but you might accept the Secretary General as the executive secretary of the Conference under the chairmanship of some other group. Provided the Democratic Republic of Vietnam agrees?

PM Chou: That means both the U.S. and the DRV agree.

Dr. Kissinger: Both sides agree.

PM Chou: If both of your two sides agree to it then we will abstain.

Dr. Kissinger: [Laughs] I understand.

PM Chou: Because we are simply opposed to that man taking part in the Conference. When I reported this to the Political Bureau at a meeting, they all laughed. They said, "what is the use of asking him to participate in the Conference?" [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: That is a great mystery.

PM Chou: I said that you were going to cut a hole in the middle of the table and place him there. Finally you were going to find out how it came that he was participating in the Conference.

Dr. Kissinger: I think it is as I said when the Prime Minister and I discussed this: We may well have put him into some document in August when we weren't paying attention and did not think it was a serious negotiation. Then the other side put him into a document and we had no basis for opposing it. So we had always believed that they made the first proposal but I must check it. It is possible that in August we gave them some document in which we mentioned that.

PM Chou: The second point is you have given us a draft, and after their draft has arrived then we will compare this to our draft and make a study. Then only can we let you know our opinion. They have never given us their draft. I am sure we will get it soon. Only after we have studied it can we raise our view.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

PM Chou: We believe it would not be very easy to include in this document the word "restraint," because it is very difficult to put it in a very appropriate way because the conditions for all the 12 countries are different. The situations are different. And it would be better if we say we "firmly guarantee" that the Paris Agreement will be implemented. If there should be any serious problems arising then we would look into the problems. This is our common commitment. I have just told you our idea. As to how to put it into wording, that is another matter.

Dr. Kissinger: We will definitely let you have our reaction before the end of the week. Maybe by Wednesday American time. I will work with Ambassador Sullivan on the plane home.

PM Chou: Today is Sunday.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: That means the 21st.

Dr. Kissinger: I hope to be able to get a cable off to you by Tuesday night Washington time. Your thought, if I understand it clearly, is that rather than "restraint" it should say all parties will do their utmost to bring about implementation of the Agreement, and will do what if it

isn't being implemented? What was the Prime Minister's phrase—"make arrangements," or "discuss," "look into it"? Can you give me the text? "Look into it if there are any serious problems"? [Chou nods] Let me see whether we can phrase something that expresses that thought.

PM Chou: But there might be various forms to say exchange of views or exchange messages by correspondence. But the biggest problem is to reconvene the Conference. Unless the situation is very serious.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we say "create conditions to further the implementation of the Agreement"?

PM Chou: Too general.

Dr. Kissinger: What is more specific then?

PM Chou: "Make effort."

Dr. Kissinger: All right. The Prime Minister was speaking of reconvening the Conference.

PM Chou: That is when there is any very serious problem arising. We won't do it if this is not mentioned at all.

Dr. Kissinger: It should be mentioned that it can be reconvened. But who can reconvene it?

PM Chou: If you ask my view, then I would say that the two chairmen, that is the United States and the DRV. And of course you might ask what would happen if there is no result coming out of it, that is, if you can't come to an agreement. I just speak in physical terms: on this side there will be six votes, and the other side six. So if 1 to 1 there is no settlement, and 6 to 6 there still will be no settlement.

Dr. Kissinger: No it will be 5½ to 6½ because France will be on both sides. [Laughter]

PM Chou: If that is the case it will be easier. Otherwise the Secretary General will appear again and strike the gavel!

Dr. Kissinger: But we of course propose that the Secretary General should have the right to reconvene the Conference.

PM Chou: That will indicate that the UN will be in charge of it then. That would be the problem. And you wouldn't surely agree to that.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we could be persuaded.

PM Chou: But we would not agree to that.

Dr. Kissinger: It is not to us a question of principle.

PM Chou: Yes. If this is referred to the United Nations, the five big countries would then again be involved.

Dr. Kissinger: But we are there already anyway.

PM Chou: Then the situation will appear that there will be 12 countries plus one person. [Laughter] So we always find that this matter is very curious.

Dr. Kissinger: The other problem is, to whom the International Commission reports.

PM Chou: They can report to the two chairmen.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but the two chairmen are parties that are being investigated. The International Commission will report to the culprits. There are two possibilities that have occurred to me. No, three. One is, it could report to the Secretary General. If the U.S. and the DRV are co-chairmen it could conceivably report to them. You understand we have not yet agreed to the co-chairmen idea. We are considering it very seriously. The third possibility is that the Commission reports to the permanent members of the Security Council.

PM Chou: That means the five big countries. Then you have returned to this point.

Dr. Kissinger: These would be three theoretical possibilities. It would not be possible to keep Canada part of the Commission if the Commission reports only to itself.

PM Chou: Yes, they have expressed this view. We have read their public statement.

Dr. Kissinger: And it is also possible that the Commission reports to every member of the Conference. That means everyone except itself because four of the members of the Conference are the Commission. It would be the Security Council plus the three Vietnamese parties really. Plus the Secretary General. [Laughter]

PM Chou: And he would appear again.

Dr. Kissinger: That we are doomed to have happen one way or another. Mr. Lord's mother has been very active in the United Nations. We will hide these discussions from her. He joined my staff as the expert on the UN. He handled the UN. He says he is not an expert but he handled it. [Laughter] Does the Chinese side have any preferences on this subject?

PM Chou: Our preference is that this matter should not be referred to the UN, because from the very beginning the UN has never been in charge of this matter. Since you have signed a peace agreement, why should it be referred to the UN again? And besides, you ought to hope that the ceasefire agreement will be genuinely implemented. If it can be genuinely implemented, then the United States will not be involved again in the armed conflict in Vietnam, and the South Vietnamese people will be left to settle their own problems themselves. Of course, the time may not be as short as was laid down in the Agreement. It might be longer. That is to say, the ICC has another responsibility, that is to supervise the election. This is a very important point and this has been laid down. And this is confined to South Vietnam; it does not mean the unification of Vietnam. Because unification of Vietnam will take an

even longer time. So there is going to be three steps: For the first stage, the troops will be withdrawn and the war will be ended and the prisoners will be returned. And at the second stage both sides will work out a plan for general elections. And for the final stage reunification will be realized. So since the Agreement has been signed it is hoped that it will be implemented, and it would not be good for the UN to intervene.

Take for instance the Middle East question. Although there was a resolution adopted in the UN, it could never be implemented, and among the five permanent members of the Security Council there would always be one that would express their disagreement. If you two countries, that is the U.S. and Vietnam, that is the DRV, would be able to create a situation in which you maintain a normal relationship, that is something that is most worthwhile to support.

Dr. Kissinger: That will be our effort. But it means also they have to cooperate.

PM Chou: Yes. If things are moving towards this direction, that is more hopeful. It would be not beneficial if the quarrel will be going on endlessly. Any more points?

Dr. Kissinger: I think the next step should be that we consider the remarks the Prime Minister has made and we will send him a reply by Wednesday. Some methods of dealing with them, some suggestions. We will also ask the Soviet side what their ideas are, and as soon as we have received an answer—if we receive an answer—we will let you know.

PM Chou: Good.

Dr. Kissinger: One other thing. At the Conference—it is difficult for us to run all the details of the Conference from Washington. If at the Conference something happens that raises concern, if you communicate with me directly I will do my best to attend to it. Because our discussions will not be known in detail to the participants. [Chou nods yes] So that will not mean we are going back on any word we have given. I can't foresee any concrete case now, but it could happen.

PM Chou: Yes. Since our Foreign Minister is going, perhaps he will meet with some new problems. And if there is any we will let you know.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, if they develop. It is hard for me to control the relationship with the Soviet Union and all the other nations at the Conference. But if you get in touch with us, we will give the necessary instructions if it should arise. But I will speak to Ambassador Sullivan before, and we will probably be able to avoid it.

PM Chou: [Laughs] There are complexities in it. Because the four parties directly concerned are already very complicated, and on top of

that there will be another four and then another four. And then you have found another one. [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: I took forward to the meetings between the Foreign Minister and the Secretary General.

PM Chou: Their meetings will be very easy for them to discuss because we have already built foundations for them. The problem doesn't lie between the U.S. and China but at the Conference.

Dr. Kissinger: No, you mean between the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister. Yes, that will be easy. I meant the Secretary General.

Minister Chi P'eng-fei: Oh, yes. I have met him before.

Dr. Kissinger: No one has yet broken the news to the Secretary General.

PM Chou: He is quite different from Hammarskjold.[6] You knew him?

Dr. Kissinger: I did not know him.

PM Chou: He died quite early. He was quite capable.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I know Waldheim.

PM Chou: He was picked quite accidentally because it was difficult to find anyone.

Dr. Kissinger: And not because he was thought to be a very farsighted personality.

PM Chou: He was elected just because people were in a helpless state.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: But anyway at a certain time the forum in the UN is still necessary. But it would be very dangerous if you would use it constantly.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: Are there are other points? You said that you would like to talk about your problems in your own country. Your domestic problems.

Dr. Kissinger: I have substantially explained the situation to the Prime Minister indirectly. We have reorganized the State Department by putting our own men into the number 2, 3 and 4 positions. Deputy Secretary Rush, and Porter the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and Casey the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. So some of the

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[6] Dag Hammarskjöld was Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1953 to 1961.

difficulties we encountered in previous years can now be avoided. And we will give them some greater responsibility for our affairs. We still envision a transition later on.

So as I pointed out to the Prime Minister when we discussed the operation of the liaison office, it would be best if they would check with us to determine in which channel they should go. I will set up, when your chief arrives, a relationship between him and Deputy Secretary of State Rush. And then we can tell you in which channel to put it. And once your liaison office exists then this will operate very smoothly. Either Rush or Porter, I haven't decided yet. But either one you can then count on, once I have talked to the chief of your office. And if you can instruct him in that sense, that would be helpful.

PM Chou: After we have picked the chief of our office we will let you know in advance.

Dr. Kissinger: That was the major thing, and since it is the beginning of an Administration other political considerations are just newspaper speculations at this point.

PM Chou: There are too many comments and discussions in the U.S. press.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: Of course Japan ranks first, and the second place should be given to the United States.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, it is terrible, and then they report each other's stories. You remember when we were here with the President last year, they all reported that at the second banquet there was great tension between you and the President and a terrible deadlock in the drafting of the communiqué. [Laughter] It was all total nonsense. And then they interpreted the communiqué in terms of their previous reporting. [Laughter]

PM Chou: It is hard to blame them, since there are so many people who have to work and there are so many papers that have to be published.

Dr. Kissinger: But they don't make any analysis; they only look for some immediately sensational news.

PM Chou: Perhaps this phenomenon can also be found in Europe, but we haven't paid attention to that area. In France there is also similar phenomena.

Dr. Kissinger: In France, somewhat, but not as intense as in the U.S. You see, in Washington there is only one industry, that is government, and indeed social life consists of government officials and journalists. And the journalists go to the dinner parties to watch what is happening among the officials. [Chou laughs] It is not like London

or Paris where there are other occupations. So it has a very curious atmosphere, as the chief of your mission will discover. As I told the Chairman yesterday, during the transition from after the election there was much speculation that friends of mine were being removed from the government. It was all nonsense. I have explained to you why Helms was moved, and that was done by us, and the other case that was mentioned had a personality problem with the President; he just did not get along with him. No change was made that did not go through normal procedures, but the press kept speculating about a purge and we could not stop them.

PM Chou: Yes. Even when you did not meet the President but phoned him, there would be some kind of speculation about that. [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: Since we have a confidential relationship, I want to tell the Prime Minister what really happened on that day. The President was in Camp David.

PM Chou: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: And I had gone to see him and we had completed our discussion on Friday. That is very confidential. So on Saturday he was all alone in Camp David and he got bored and a little lonely. So he came back to Washington. So Ziegler, in order to have some explanation for his returning to Washington which was on a weekend, said he came back to consult with me—which was total nonsense. [Chou laughs] And actually he and I did talk on the telephone several times that day on social things, but personal matters, not about business. So Ziegler stupidly said the President and Dr. Kissinger spoke on the phone to each other. [Laughter] But that was the true story of why the President came back and why there was no formal meeting. There was nothing to talk about! I had been in Camp David the day before and it was all settled and he came back on the spur of the moment. [Chou laughs] So these speculations were totally ridiculous at the time.

PM Chou: They have nothing to do.

Dr. Kissinger: They have nothing to do.

PM Chou: And since they have nothing to do they want to write a news report for the issue.

Dr. Kissinger: And sometimes quite frankly it is our fault, because the President is very reluctant ever to give the impression that he is doing nothing. So if he is in Florida or resting, they will say he has talked to me. [Chou laughs] Then if there is somebody who is not very quick they will say he talked to me on the telephone. So then the press says, "Aha, he talked on the telephone. There must be some trouble!" So this is really—it was total nonsense at that time.

PM Chou: I would like to put a new question to you. Did you mention that the Governor of your New York State is coming for a visit—wishes to go?

Dr. Kissinger: No, but I think he would like to come, yes. The Vice Foreign Minister has met him. If I can speak candidly to the Prime Minister, David Rockefeller is of course the man who is most active in the economic field, but the Rockefeller family usually does things as a unit, and of the Rockefellers Nelson is the one with the greatest imagination.

PM Chou: That is the Governor of the State.

Dr. Kissinger: But they are both very worthwhile people. And I think they would both like to come.

PM Chou: In that case it is not necessary for them to come on a bipartisan basis because as a Governor of the State he is independent. It is different from the Senators or Congressmen. If there are people from the Congress of course this is different, but the Governor is different from Congress.

Dr. Kissinger: Jackson would like to come with Buckley. Buckley's brother was here and he wrote very unfavorable articles. But I think you will find that Senator Buckley's interpretation of the nature of the international danger is almost identical to yours.

PM Chou: So he is different from his brother?

Dr. Kissinger: He is less artistic. His brother is a bit more emotional.

PM Chou: Is it because that during his stay here we did not give him a very good reception? That is why he did not have a very good impression of us?

Dr. Kissinger: No. He did not understand the nature of what we were doing, both of us. His mind was still in the Dulles era.

PM Chou: So he is very fond of art?

Dr. Kissinger: No, he is a mind that operates more emotionally. As a psychological type.

PM Chou: Is he a columnist?

Dr. Kissinger: William Buckley is a columnist, yes.

PM Chou: He wrote a lot after he got back?

Dr. Kissinger: What he wrote was more critical of President Nixon than of China. We have since calmed him down. He hasn't said anything in the last year. He objected to the President quoting from Chairman Mao on American television. He was not so critical of China.

PM Chou: [Laughs] So he joined us while we visited at some cities.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. He was in Hangchow I think.

PM Chou: But that time when we were in Shanghai and Hangchow you were kept busy with the documents. Perhaps you did not meet him then.

Dr. Kissinger: I did not meet any of the press while I was here.

PM Chou: At the press conference in China you did meet them.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but I am at my most effective when I can supplement my press conference with individual tutorials.

PM Chou: Tutorials?

Dr. Kissinger: Tutorials means seminars.

PM Chou: [Laughs] Oh.

Dr. Kissinger: When I say nothing to them individually they think they are getting exclusive information.

PM Chou: [Laughs] So your secret is no longer a secret. [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but the Assistant Minister pointed out today your secret wasn't secret either, but your opponents never could do anything about it.

PM Chou: He just said it off-handedly. You can't say it that way. Anything else?

Dr. Kissinger: May we thank your interpreters for their excellent and devoted performance? We would like to thank you, Mr. Prime Minister, and your colleagues for the reception we received and for what we believe was very important work.

PM Chou: This time we have very extensive and deep-going talks. And we look forward—we will have to assess all possibilities—but we consider the orientation clear.

Dr. Kissinger: We considered the orientation settled.

PM Chou: That is true. We will have to anticipate all kinds of possibilities. In that way we won't be blinded. Otherwise we will be caught unaware if there should be anything arising unexpectedly.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. And this is why we should regularly exchange information and ideas. We will certainly do it on our side.

PM Chou: That is why the Chairman asked you whether you will be coming again this year, and you said it is probable you will come by the end of this year.

Dr. Kissinger: I think it might be appropriate if we do it.

PM Chou: According to need.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I agree. The latter part.

PM Chou: Your colleagues also kept us company. We thank them for that. These two are new friends?

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Rodman is a new friend.

PM Chou: I am told he is your student.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I made him rewrite his thesis 15 times.

PM Chou: He is the youngest in your group?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: How old are you?

Mr. Rodman: 29.

[The meeting then ended. The Premier and his colleagues joined Dr. Kissinger's party in walking most of the way back to the Guest House at which the American delegation resided.]

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15. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, February 21, 1973.

Nixon: Let me ask you one other thing about the China position. I like the two names you suggest, but here is something if you well realize, where we have Bruce—

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: I wonder if we couldn't offer it to Bruce.

Kissinger: I'll have to check it with the Chinese whether they want someone quite that visible. But I—

Nixon: See my point?

Kissinger: But our minds have really been working very similarly.

[Omitted here is discussion of a congressional reception.]

Kissinger: Our minds have been working exactly the same wavelength. I was thinking after I left China why not let in Bruce, and—

Nixon: Well I think we do want to [unclear]. And maybe they may not like that.

Kissinger: And we could still have Holdridge—

Nixon: Holdridge—look, Holdridge [unclear] it will work, but Bruce has such class. And he would know, and he has such judgment. And it would be a hell of a bipartisan stroke.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 859–32. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger in the Oval Office between 11:33 a.m. and 12:04 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

Kissinger: And, of course, they love old men.

Nixon: Well, listen. You understand another thing, it's a bipartisan stroke; he's a Democrat. You know? He's the only establishment Democrat I know that supported us. Do you know any other?

Kissinger: No. And we could have the two others. If we had Bruce, Jenkins and Holdridge we would have one powerhouse team.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: I'd like Holdridge because I'd like to get rid of him. That's no reflection on him. He'd be good there but I need a somewhat more intellectual type here now.

Nixon: But you see, we want to keep it—Bruce will play our game; he'll keep it out of the State Department channels. Everybody of course would want to go. But we must not let this go to a career man. We must not.

Kissinger: Mr. President, if you send a career man there, you might as well—you're better off not having it.

Nixon: But they won't understand the game.

[Omitted here is discussion of Cyrus Vance and Clark Clifford.]

Nixon: I think the program of working with the Chinese can have great possibilities.

Kissinger: But that really has to be done by you and me.

Nixon: Alone!

Kissinger: Alone.

Nixon: Alone. Alone.

Kissinger: This is too dangerous.

Nixon: You know I was thinking that—

Kissinger: But you know, it's amazing, I thought exactly the same thing about David Bruce as you did.

[Omitted here is discussion of the timing of President Nixon's call to William Downey.][2]

[2] Nixon was preparing to call William Downey, the brother of John Downey, with the news that John would probably be released soon.

16. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, February 21, 1973, 6 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

James C. H. Shen, Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of China
Mr. Hengli Chen, Counselor, Embassy of the Republic of China
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC

SUBJECT

Mr. Kissinger's Remarks to Ambassador Shen Concerning U.S. Relations with the PRC and the ROC

After a few preliminary remarks between Ambassador Shen and Mr. Kissinger concerning the tiring nature of Mr. Kissinger's recent trip, Mr. Kissinger said that, first, he wanted to show the Ambassador the Joint U.S.–PRC Communiqué which was to be issued the following day.[2] He assumed, of course, that the Ambassador would keep the Communiqué confidential. After Ambassador Shen had read it, he, Mr. Kissinger, could then answer any questions about our general policy.

Ambassador Shen quickly scanned the text of the Joint Communiqué, and then asked what the diplomatic level of the liaison offices would be. Mr. Kissinger explained that the liaison offices would be non-diplomatic, and that there would therefore be no diplomatic level. The senior man's title would be chief of the liaison office, and he would not be at the ambassadorial level. For several reasons we had not wanted to call the offices "trade offices." What we had done was to more or less abolish the Paris channel; however, if we had a diplomatic note to present, for example, a protest, this couldn't be handled by the liaison office. The liaison office would handle exchange and trade matters, and other things of a non-diplomatic nature.

Mr. Kissinger wanted to emphasize two things: first, the liaison offices would not have any effect on our recognition of Taiwan, and secondly, he wanted to make it absolutely clear that he didn't anticipate any other steps in this direction for the foreseeable future.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI, Aug 1972–Oct 24, 1973. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office from 6:05 until 6:25 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) Holdridge sent this memorandum of conversation to Kissinger under a March 1 covering letter. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI, Aug 1972–Oct 24, 1973) On February 20, Froebe sent Kissinger talking points for this meeting. (Ibid.)

[2] See footnote 2, Document 14.

Ambassador Shen wanted to know how this matter had come up—was it at the initiative of the U.S. Government? Mr. Kissinger recalled that when the President had been in Peking he had said we were willing to do this, but they wouldn't agree so long as an ROC Embassy was in Washington and we maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Now, however, they had withdrawn this objection. When asked by Ambassador Shen why they had done so, Mr. Kissinger conjectured that it was due to fear of Russia. This was only conjecture, though.

Mr. Kissinger went on to say that the chief of the PRC liaison office in Washington would not be part of the diplomatic corps—there would be no presentation of credentials, and the office could not fly the flag. "But, could he conduct business with the Government through the State Department?" Ambassador Shen asked. Mr. Kissinger replied that we hadn't worked out the details yet, but obviously the PRC representatives could conduct business with Government agencies. It was interesting that the PRC was willing to go this far while the U.S. was still maintaining diplomatic relations with the ROC.

Ambassador Shen raised the question of the size of the liaison offices. Mr. Kissinger indicated that this had to be worked out, but that a staff of between five and ten might be envisaged. We might send around four people plus a supporting staff. When asked by Ambassador Shen how soon this might be, Mr. Kissinger expressed the view that it would not be too soon, but probably would take place in three or four months. Ambassador Shen wondered what the position of the liaison office might be comparable to—minister, consul general, or chargé? Mr. Kissinger indicated that the liaison officer would not be put on the diplomatic list, and so he didn't see how this individual would be comparable to anything at all. If, for example, the President gave a reception for the diplomatic corps, the liaison officer wouldn't be invited, because he had no diplomatic status. But, Ambassador Shen pressed, would he have diplomatic immunities and privileges? Mr. Kissinger replied, yes, very probably. Ambassador Shen asked if he would be able to use codes, and Mr. Kissinger answered affirmatively. Ambassador Shen then remarked that this would be an embassy without the name of it. Mr. Kissinger demurred saying that he did not think so.

Ambassador Shen commented that the Joint Communiqué impressed him as being strikingly brief and touched upon just this one point of the liaison offices. Was there anything else which Mr. Kissinger cared to tell him? Mr. Kissinger declared that there was nothing else to say. Some more exchanges had been agreed upon—we would send the Philadelphia Orchestra to Peking and they would send some physicists here, etc. There was literally nothing more, and this had exhausted the discussions.

Mr. Kissinger added that he had read in the newspapers that we were going to reduce our forces on Taiwan, but this was ridiculous. The subject had come up more in the way that they had to state for the record rather than as a part of the negotiations, and not as a part of the regular discussions. As to what we would do with our forces on Taiwan, we wouldn't even look at the problem until after our withdrawal from Vietnam, and then only in connection with our forces supporting Vietnam. We did not expect to remove any combat forces.

When Ambassador Shen stated that there were no U.S. combat forces on Taiwan as such, Mr. Kissinger responded by citing Air Force units. Of course, there were also intelligence units on Taiwan. In any event, we would work within the framework of the forces moved in since March 30 of last year.

Mr. Kissinger said it was his personal view that what we were doing had to be looked at in historical perspective, because what happened on the Mainland after the departure of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai was hard to foresee. At this, Ambassador Shen remarked that Mr. Kissinger had spent some time with Mao Tse-tung—how had he seemed? Had his physical condition changed? Mr. Kissinger replied that while Mao had seemed all right, the Chinese were smart, but not that smart.

Continuing, Ambassador Shen asked Mr. Kissinger if he had been able to get any feeling for the situation on the Mainland. Mr. Kissinger then spoke of the great Chinese culture and of the magnificant quality of the Chinese to make one feel at ease. The situation in China was much different from that in Russia, and the Chinese atmosphere did not seem to be a Communist atmosphere. What the real internal situation was, he didn't know, but for the last two years he had always dealt with the same people: Chou En-lai and others around him.

Ambassador Shen wondered if Mr. Kissinger had seen Yeh Chien-ying, to which Mr. Kissinger responded affirmatively. When asked by the Ambassador if Yeh was in control of the PRC armed forces, Mr. Kissinger said that according to our information, the answer was to some extent yes and to some extent no. Our information was not obtained from our impressions of Peking, which on the surface looked very good. However, information from the provinces suggested that many of them were not under firm government control. The situation was very complicated for the Chinese leaders, and he personally did not know how they proposed to handle the succession problem.

Ambassador Shen commented that he had thought the Chinese had everything worked out in connection with the succession. What about Yao Wen-wuan, who had been mentioned by Chou En-lai? To this, Mr. Kissinger remarked that no person designated as a successor to Mao had ever survived.

Changing the subject, Ambassador Shen asked if there had been any discussion in Peking of an increase in trade. Mr. Kissinger indicated that there had been such a discussion in the context of what had been said in the Shanghai Joint Communiqué. The discussion had been in general terms only, and the Chinese had said that they didn't want credit loans, but wanted to pay for what they ordered in hard currency. Ambassador Shen speculated on the size of the PRC's specie reserve, and then raised the question of Most Favored Nation treatment for the PRC. Had they asked for MFN treatment? Mr. Kissinger replied that they were not eligible for MFN right now, but they had said that they did want it. Ambassador Shen asked, was this within the President's power to grant, or was Congressional approval required? Mr. Kissinger explained that MFN could not be granted without Congressional approval, although it would not be needed if the future new trade bill passed. Congressional approval was not needed by the President to grant credit loans.

Ambassador Shen turned the conversation to the question of Sino-Soviet relations, and wondered if the PRC fear of the Soviets was genuine. Was the situation serious, and if so, how serious? To a statement from Mr. Kissinger that he thought the Chinese fear of the Soviets was genuine, Ambassador Shen raised the possibility that it might be overblown. Mr. Kissinger reiterated that, while he didn't know for sure, the people in Peking felt that the threat was serious enough. He did not believe that they were doing what they were with respect to the U.S. because they liked him personally. Ambassador Shen expressed some doubts, but noted that of course he had not been there. It was at least possible, though, that they were simply going through the motions of showing great admiration—everything they did was for a purpose. Mr. Kissinger agreed, but added that we did everything we had done, at least for the time being, for mutual self-interest.

Ambassador Shen wanted to know if any other matters had been discussed in Peking. What about the 12-nation conference? Mr. Kissinger agreed that there had, in fact, been some discussions on this question. Ambassador Shen wondered whether there had been any reservations expressed with respect to the position of the U.N. Secretary General, to which Mr. Kissinger indicated that there indeed had been some reservations but did not elaborate further.

Ambassador Shen then asked how Mr. Kissinger's talks in Japan had gone. Mr. Kissinger said that after their (the Japanese) "very generous behavior" toward Taiwan, they had become very solicitous of Taiwan's position in relation to the PRC. He had told them that we had not been the ones to betray Taiwan, they had—we were not breaking diplomatic relations.

Mr. Kissinger observed that the Japanese Government was in trouble. Ambassador Shen expressed the view that the Japanese Government was not in trouble which would cost it too much. Mr. Kissinger

said that he didn't know about this. Most of the people with whom he had talked felt that Tanaka would not serve out his full three years. At any rate, the Japanese now showed great interest in Taiwan's future. Ambassador Shen was surprised at this, and felt that any such attitude on the part of the Japanese must have been an after-thought. According to Mr. Kissinger, the Japanese liked to play the game with Taiwan's chips because this didn't cost them anything.

Ambassador Shen questioned Mr. Kissinger as to the latter's next visit to Peking, and Mr. Kissinger declared that he had no present plans for another visit. To a question as to whether we had picked the staff yet for the U.S. liaison office in Peking, Mr. Kissinger indicated that we had not really made a judgment on this matter.

At this point Ambassador Shen produced some pictures of himself standing next to Mr. Kissinger, and asked Mr. Kissinger to sign one for him. Ambassador Shen jokingly said that he would include this picture in his book if he were to write one.

Ambassador Shen called attention to the fact that Mr. Kissinger had spent 20 hours talking to the people in Peking. What had gone on in all this time? Mr. Kissinger explained that most of the conversation had consisted of a review of the world and of the individual exchange programs we had with the PRC. Strangely enough, there had been no more than one-half hour on Taiwan. They had said that they could not accept our presence, and we had stayed within the confines of what we had said in the Shanghai Communiqué.

Ambassador Shen asked what they (the PRC) wanted the ROC to do. Mr. Kissinger's response was: "negotiate." When Ambassador Shen asked if they were serious, Mr. Kissinger said that they were indeed serious. At social events they had said that they didn't want to change the social system on Taiwan, they just wanted to maintain the principle that it was part of China. The question of Taiwan's social system was separate from that of maintaining the integrity of China. They had repeatedly said that they wouldn't use force against Taiwan and therefore the question of U.S. troops defending Taiwan would not arise because there would be no use of force. Nevertheless, we had no illusions, and remembered what they had said about us four years ago. They could change again. But we believed that they wanted talks they always said that they admired and respected Chiang Kai-shek for one thing: he had always wanted to maintain the unity of China.

Ambassador Shen asked if the PRC has asked the President to mediate or to play any other role. Mr. Kissinger said no, but he was sure that if we were asked we would be willing to listen; we weren't asked, though, and would not take the initiative in any future which he, Mr. Kissinger, could see. At this, Ambassador Shen asked how far in the future Mr. Kissinger could see. Mr. Kissinger remarked that he had told the Ambassador last year that nothing would happen until now. Looking

forward the same would be the case until 1974, which was all which he could foresee at this time. Nothing would happen in this period.

Ambassador Shen queried Mr. Kissinger as to whether he had any opinion of the way that the Chinese on Taiwan had been conducting themselves. Mr. Kissinger replied that he had a very high opinion of them on this score. They had behaved with great dignity and skill. We had no complaints. Ambassador Shen agreed that Taiwan had not caused the U.S. any difficulties. Mr. Kissinger declared that if personal feelings had entered in, the talks would have been different. Ambassador Shen's people had behaved with nobility, and we had no complaints.

Ambassador Shen stated that the ROC was gratified over the agreement on co-production of F–5s, which had now been signed. There were now just a couple of other small matters about which he would like to ask. The first was the situation of three over-aged destroyers which were to be transferred to the ROC—he had heard that this matter was in the hands of the White House. Mr. Kissinger noted that he had not heard of this but would look into it.[3]

Continuing, Ambassador Shen referred to another co-production product, that of fast PT boats. He understood that there was some hitch in obtaining agreement on this. Mr. Kissinger again indicated that he had not seen anything of this matter.[4] He emphasized that our general trend was to maintain all of our relationships with Taiwan, and to be helpful where we could.

Ambassador Shen expressed some misgivings to Mr. Kissinger as to what would happen when he, Ambassador Shen, faced a representative from Peking. Mr. Kissinger said that this would not happen for several months yet and referred earlier to what he had said about the non-diplomatic status of Peking's liaison office. Ambassador Shen nevertheless felt that Taipei would look upon it as an embassy without a name. Mr. Kissinger disagreed, saying that it could not do everything while the ROC had an embassy here. This certainly proved that Japan had paid too hard a price in return for its normalization of relations with Peking. He had said this to Tanaka, and to Sato as well. Sato had agreed.

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[3] The request for the destroyer transfer was then working its way through the Department of Defense and had not yet reached the White House. (Memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, March 1; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI, Aug 1972–Oct 24, 1973) Kissinger approved the destroyer transfer on March 27. (Memorandum from Kissinger to Laird; ibid.)

[4] At the time of this conversation, the Department of State was in the process of responding to a request from the Office of Management and Budget to finance patrol boat co-production. (Ibid.)

17. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, February 27, 1973.

SUBJECT

My Asian Trip

My trip to Bangkok, Vientiane, Hanoi, Peking, and Tokyo was timely.

We have just concluded a Vietnam settlement: I was able to tell ally and adversary alike that you will insist on strict implementation of the Agreement, maintain forces in the region to deter violation, and key economic aid to compliance.

The war continued in Laos and Cambodia: I stressed the need for early ceasefires and North Vietnamese withdrawals. The conversations on Laos served to hasten the ceasefire; the ones on Cambodia may lead to a negotiating process, but the many forces at play make this problem especially difficult.

This is the start of your second term: I expressed your determination to maintain a strong world leadership role the next four years. This message not only reassured our friends but also remains the key element in our developing relations with Peking. With the Chinese we are now entering into a positive new relationship of greatly expanded bilateral contacts and tacit cooperation in our global approach. With the North Vietnamese we may have laid the foundation for better relations; we have at least made clear that they must choose between restraint, reconciliation and reconstruction on the one hand and cheating and confrontation on the other.

Following are the highlights of each of my stops.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to China that was excised by the NSC staff.]

China

I had twenty hours of talks with Chou and almost two with Mao in addition to several informal hours with Chou and other Chinese leaders. Following within the framework which your trip clearly established, these talks were exceedingly frank and cordial. With the

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, Far East, Box 98, HAK China Trip, Memcons & Reports (originals), February 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. There are no markings on the memorandum indicating that Nixon saw it.

Vietnam settlement behind us, the reception was the warmest and easiest ever. The conversations made clear that the Chinese are bent on accelerating our relationship. This was reflected outwardly as well in innumerable ways. My meeting with Mao was splashed across the top half of the *People's Daily* and a film on our trip ran for twelve minutes on national television. Guards saluted us for the first time as we entered the Great Hall and our Guest House. Our plane taxied right up to the terminal, etc., etc.

I will send you separate memoranda on the atmospherics and substantive discussions in Peking.[2] Following are the main conclusions.

We are now in the extraordinary situation that, with the exception of the United Kingdom, *the PRC might well be closest to us in its global perceptions.* No other world leaders have the sweep and imagination of Mao and Chou nor the capacity and will to pursue a long range policy. Our ideologies and views of history clash, but objective factors induce tacit cooperation for at least several years. If the Soviet danger fades and/or China becomes stronger over a period of time, the Chinese could follow an antagonistic policy with the same single-mindedness. For now, however, they need us, and their course is set.

Peking has chosen normalization because of our strength. It is precisely your assertion of a responsible American world role and taking strong measures when necessary that has convinced the PRC that the U.S. is a useful counterweight to the Soviet menace. Indeed, we have come full circle since July 1971. In my first trip to Peking I was treated to dissertations by Chou on our "stretching out our hands" around the world like the Soviet Union. It is true that Chinese perceptions had already evolved to the point that American imperialism was largely in the past while the Soviet variety was in full bloom. But the Chinese emphasis was nevertheless on American withdrawals from Asia; the Japan-U.S. military ties were at a minimum unhelpful; we were told to get out of Korea; there was considerable attention to Taiwan; there was almost no interest in Europe; and the U.S. might be capable of colluding with the USSR, Japan and India to carve up China.

We have come a very long way. The watershed clearly was your discussions with Mao and Chou when you stamped your personal imprint on our course. Substantial manifestation of our shared world view

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[2] See Document 18. On March 2, Kissinger also sent Nixon a memorandum on the "Atmospherics of My Trip to Peking." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 98, Country Files, Far East, HAK China Trip, Memcons & Reports (originals), February 1973) Kissinger's report on his meeting with Mao, February 24, is also ibid.

showed up in my subsequent June visit, as you will recall, but the Vietnam war still inhibited Chinese moves. On this trip the floodgates opened. Mao and Chou were obsessed by Moscow's intentions. With Vietnam out of the way as an obstacle and age closing in, they spoke with complete candor and an extreme cordiality which was reflected in every facet of our reception.

The contrast of their views with July 1971 was remarkable. Rather than being scolded for our *global presence* we were scolded for not doing enough to counter Soviet pressures. Mao said our forces were spread too thin. Chou complained that we were too slow and too slack in such areas as the Persian Gulf, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. For example, he urged us to give military aid to Pakistan, grant economic aid to Bangladesh, improve relations with Sri Lanka (Ceylon) and Nepal, etc. in order to oppose Moscow and its agent, New Delhi. I assured the Chinese of your determination to maintain a strong foreign policy and our willingness to undertake some of the specific steps he recommended.

Mao and Chou also urged us in work more closely with *Japan.* Our view that the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty serves to brake Japanese militarism has now been accepted. I was told that I should be spending more than one day consulting with Japanese leaders. I responded that we intended to continue our close relationship with Tokyo and favored improvement of Chinese-Japanese relations.

Even on *Indochina,* where our formal positions inevitably differ, we share a common interest in independent states rather than dominance by Hanoi as an agent of the Soviet Union. I stressed this general theme and the need for restraint by all parties. We were prepared to normalize relations with Hanoi but only if it honored its obligations and was prepared to pursue its objectives through political evolution. I think Chou clearly understands our requirements in this regard, and Peking can have no interest in Hanoi's risking renewed confrontation with us. As for the need for Chinese restraint in military shipments, Chou pointed to the much more dominant Soviet aid role, but I think we can expect some Chinese moderation.

I also emphasized the need for an early ceasefire in Laos and direct negotiations among the Cambodians. The Chinese approach remained essentially hands-off. However, Chou clearly favored an early end to hostilities in Laos, and promised them to pull out Chinese anti-aircraft and withdraw their road-building teams when the road is completed. On Cambodia, he introduced some cynical remarks about Sihanouk. There is a definite cooling off in their relationship though Chou made a pro forma pitch for me to talk to Sihanouk which I rejected. He agreed to study my suggestion that Lon Nol's government talk directly to Sihanouk's representatives, and we agreed

to keep each other informed on Cambodia through our New York channel.

Our talks on the International Conference were inconclusive and not very encouraging. The PRC will follow Hanoi's lead which means they will favor a brief, anodyne Conference which would do little concrete to guarantee the Vietnam settlement and would avoid Laos and Cambodia.

Chou expressed their desire for a stable *Southeast Asian region* in general made up of independent countries. It was up to the people of those countries to bring about revolution. Not even lip service was paid to PRC support of such efforts. Here—as elsewhere around the globe—Peking finds it more important to counter Soviet and Indian designs.

Chou didn't mention *Korea* until the very end of our discussions. He made only a pro forma pitch for gradual U.S. withdrawal. There was virtually no discussion of *Taiwan* and only then at my initiative. When I outlined your intentions on troop withdrawals, Chou shrugged this off, saying the timing was a matter of indifference to them.

Europe is now a major concern to Peking. A series of European leaders have visited China and the PRC Foreign Minister is undertaking a tour there. The Chinese are worried that Europe is being beguiled by the Soviet-sponsored illusions of peace and will thus cease to be a factor in the global balance. Chou contrasted Europe's growing economic strength with its military weakness. In short, the Chinese see a false détente in the region freeing the Russians' Western flank and "pushing the ill waters of the Soviet Union eastward."

I emphasized that we had no illusions about Soviet motives in Europe. We would try to keep the European Security Conference brief and meaningless. We would use MBFR to educate our allies about the military threat and need for vigilance, as well as to fend off Congressional pressures for unilateral American withdrawals. Any MBFR reductions would not be before 1975 and not exceed 10–15%. We would encourage European political and security unity. And we welcomed Chinese education of Europe's short-sighted leadership.

Finally, Mao and Chou, though they sounded warnings about our dealings with the Soviet Union, clearly dismissed any American designs on China and urged closer *U.S.-PRC relations.* Thus, in addition to encouraging a vigorous U.S. international presence, they were anxious to step up our bilateral relationship in every field. They not only accepted our proposal for an American liaison office in Peking, they proposed one of their own in Washington. These non-diplomatic offices will be established by May. Mao and Chou urged greater trade between us. They agreed to a large, specific, and two-way program of exchanges in the scientific, cultural and other fields. They pointed up the need for increased travel and the learning of English. These posi-

tive steps were reflected in our Joint Communiqué.[3] Typically, they accepted our draft almost verbatim; with most countries there would have been at least some haggling, even if the document was generally acceptable. In addition, Chou informed me that the two American pilots captured while on Vietnam-related missions will be released within the 60-day period of the Vietnam Agreement; and Downey, the CIA agent, will be set free the latter part of this year.

Against this background, the following elements are essential in our policy toward the PRC:

—*We must continue being meticulous in our bilateral dealings.* Our practice of keeping Peking informed of major policy developments has clearly paid off. We have shown a consistent willingness to take PRC views into account and act in parallel where possible. This approach has helped to gain Peking's confidence and to slacken it now would erode this precious commodity.

—*We need to institutionalize our relationship.* As explained above, this trip produced significant advances in this respect. The liaison offices and accelerated trade and exchanges will provide visible evidence of our growing ties which others will have to take into account. They also serve to accustom our two peoples to full-scale relations and lay a foundation that should survive the departure of China's aging leadership and a new American Administration four years hence.

—*We must continue to play a strong world role, especially in Asia.* A weak or passive America is of no use to the PRC. Mao and Chou have clearly been impressed with your strong policies and willingness to take tough decisions despite domestic pressures. If the Chinese see us turn inward or lose our will, they will cast about for other ways to deal with the threat of the "new czars." In that case they might as well emphasize ideology.

—*We need to be very careful in our policies toward Moscow and New Delhi.* These are now the two principal threats for Peking; faced with almost total isolation a couple of years ago, the PRC has opted for normalization with us and Tokyo. Mao and Chou both voiced suspicion that, whether or not by design, we could contribute to pressures on China. Therefore while we should not be paralyzed in our Soviet and India policies—and indeed with Moscow we have very important business—we will need to be deliberate and keep the PRC informed.

Our reception and conversations on this trip convince me that *the PRC has firmly set its course:* explicitly toward normalization and tacitly as ally. They are ready to move quickly—with the Soviet threat

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[3] See footnote 2, Document 14.

growing, the Vietnam war over, and age crowding the Chinese leadership. If we proceed carefully and observe elements such as those listed above, we are now launched on a totally new relationship that should last through your second Administration.

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18. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, March 2, 1973.

SUBJECT

My Trip to China

Overview

Separate reports have given you the substantive highlights and atmosphere of my visit to the People's Republic of China, plus a complete rundown of my conversation with Chairman Mao.[2] This will give you a more detailed account of my talks with the Chinese and place them in the context of our developing relationship.

I spent twenty hours in formal meetings with Chou, almost two hours with Mao, and several more hours with Chou and other Chinese officials at banquets and on sightseeing tours.[3] This included talks with Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying, Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, and Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua. These talks were the freest and most candid, and our reception the most cordial and public-oriented, of any of my visits. This was due to a combination of factors:

—The Vietnam settlement;

—our meticulous handling of the Chinese and fulfillment of our undertakings since July 1971;

—the growing Chinese preoccupation with the Soviet threat;

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 98, Country Files, Far East, HAK China Trip, Memcons & Reports (originals), February 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. There are no markings on the memorandum indicating that Nixon saw it.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 17.

[3] See Documents 8–14. All memoranda of conversation of Kissinger's meetings of February 15–19 are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 98, Country Files, Far East, HAK China Trip, Memcons & Reports (originals), February 1973.

—the shadow of advancing age of the PRC leaders;

—the consequent urge to accelerate the normalization and institutionalization of our bilateral relationship; and

—the fact that we are now familiar interlocutors after five trips and literally hundreds of hours of talks in Peking and New York.

Evolution of Our Relationship

The progression of our relationship in the past twenty months is remarkable. I believe it is one of your most striking successes in foreign policy. If we continue to handle it carefully, it should continue to pay dividends—in relaxing tensions in Asia, in furthering relations with Moscow, and generally in building a structure of peace.

When you sent me to China in July 1971 we had almost no idea what to expect as we penetrated twenty years of accumulated isolation, distrust and enmity. Since then we have progressed faster and further than anyone would have predicted, or the rest of the world realizes. *For in plain terms we have now become tacit allies.* The evolution has gone as follows:

—*When you took office* there was total lack of diplomatic communication between our two governments, no personal or commercial interchange between our two peoples, mutual public recrimination, and clashing world views.

—*In the first two and a half years of your Administration,* we put out private feelers through third countries, took unilateral public steps in such fields as trade and passports in order to send signals, and pointed our rhetoric toward a new relationship. This resulted in agreement in principle that you would meet the Chinese leaders and my secret exploratory trip of July 1971.

—*My July 1971 trip* reestablished direct communications, confirmed your trip to Peking and suggested that the PRC was ready to move toward normalization. On the other hand, Chou presented his quota of rhetoric and our policies clashed on most major issues.

—*In October 1971* we established the framework for your trip, including the outlines of the joint communiqué. The Taiwan issue remained hanging in the communiqué, however, and our policies continued to conflict in many areas.

—*Your February 1972 visit* was the watershed. It stamped your and Mao's personal imprints on the move toward normalization. The Shanghai Communiqué contained joint principles in international affairs, finessed the Taiwan problem through mutual and ambiguous compromise, set in motion bilateral trade and exchanges, established the public Paris channel, and accelerated the private New York channel. However, as the communiqué publicly, and your conversations

privately demonstrated, we were improving our relations *despite* different world outlooks.

—*My June 1972 trip* marked substantial evolution toward our views in the Chinese private positions on international issues. But the Vietnam war continued to inhibit the Chinese, and publicly all we could register was a modest increase in exchanges and trade.

—*On this trip in February 1973,* the flood gates opened privately and publicly for the reasons stated. The Chinese leaders are among the very few in the world with a global and longer term perspective—and it now parallels ours in many important respects. In such areas as the Soviet Union, Europe, South Asia and even Japan we have similar outlooks. In others, like Indochina and Korea, we each back our allies but share an interest in independent states and relaxed tensions. And on Taiwan we have reached a clear modus vivendi—on our part, continued, concrete evolution toward full relations with all its implications; and on their part, patience and a pragmatism reflected most vividly in the coming side-by-side presence of a GRC Embassy and a PRC Liaison Office. On the bilateral plane, it is full speed ahead on trade and exchanges. As for public relations, the Chinese have long since singled out the USSR for attack and have shown increasing cordiality in their public contacts with us.

Following are the main points of my talks with the Chinese, topic by topic.

Soviet Union

The Soviet Union dominated our conversations. In 1971 there were somewhat guarded references by the Chinese to Soviet designs, but they ritualistically linked the U.S. and the USSR as the two superpowers seeking hegemony. By the time of your visit the Chinese leaders were quite candid about the Soviet menace but stayed away from extended discussion. By last June the Soviet Union had become one of the two major topics in my conversations, the other one being Indochina. On this trip it was the centerpiece and completely permeated our talks. The Chinese views generally surfaced in the regional discussion and are detailed later in this report. Following are the more general observations.

Chou raised the USSR in our first meeting and kept coming back to it. He called a special meeting the night of February 17 to discuss this subject and at the end of his presentation he announced my meeting with Mao, where again it was a major topic. We discussed it at length the next day as well. In literally every region of the world the Chinese see the Soviet hand at play. As you will see in the area discussions below, Mao and Chou urged us to counter the Russians everywhere—to work closely with our allies in Europe and Japan, and to take more positive action to prevent the Soviets filling vacuums or spreading their influence in areas like the Middle East, Persian Gulf, Near East, South Asia and Indian Ocean.

In our first meeting, after my opening statement, Chou asked me in effect whether we thought the world was moving toward peace or war. I said that there were some positive developments, but we were not naive about potential dangers, such as the intensive Soviet military buildup. I made clear that we had major business to do with Moscow, but we were under no illusions about its possible motivations. We would continue our policy of keeping the Chinese fully informed and not concluding any agreements that could be directed against Peking.

Chou pointed to developments in Europe and said perhaps we sought to "push the ill waters of the Soviet Union eastward." He also cited our diversion of fighters from Taiwan to South Vietnam last fall in Enhance Plus[4] as an example of our taking advantage of Peking; somewhat out of context, he said that this showed that we might be standing on Chinese shoulders to reach out toward the Soviet Union.

The next day I purposely detailed our proposed force reductions on Taiwan and then made a more sweeping analysis of our policy toward the Soviet Union. I said that the nature of our relationship meant that we had to pursue a more complicated policy than the PRC which could oppose the Soviet Union outright on issues. We were making several agreements with Moscow, but we would not let these constrain us in the event that our interests were jeopardized. I pointed out that the USSR could follow one of two courses. If they truly wanted peace, we would welcome that course, and the agreements we were making might contribute to that end. If, however, as seemed more likely, they were bent on a more threatening road, we had shown in the past that we would react strongly if our interests were jeopardized. In any event, I emphasized, we would maintain strong defenses and improve our strategic forces so long as the Soviet buildup continued. And on issues of direct concern to Peking we would take Chinese interests into account, such as on the Soviet initiative on a nuclear understanding, where we have been fighting a delaying action ever since last spring.

Chou and then Mao, however, both replayed the theme that we might be helping the Soviet Union, whether or not purposely. Whereas we saw two possibilities, i.e. that the Soviet Union would either pursue a peaceful or a menacing course, the Chinese saw only the latter. They were spreading their influence everywhere with the help of their satellites, like India, and were out to isolate the Chinese. The "new czars" were neurotic and omnipresent. It was the Chinese duty to try and expose their designs wherever possible, however lonely their efforts in a world enamored with false détente.

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[4] "Enhance Plus" was an effort by the United States to expand and improve the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam before the peace agreement came into effect. It lasted from October 23 to December 12, 1972. See also footnote 3, Document 73.

Mao even went so far as to suggest that we might like to see the Russians bogged down in an attack on China; after wearing themselves out for a couple of years, we would then "poke a finger" in Moscow's back. I rejoined that we believe that a war between the two Communist giants was likely to be uncontrollable and have unfortunate consequences for everyone. We therefore wished to prevent such a conflict, not take advantage of it.

Given Mao's and Chou's skeptical comments on this issue, I treated it at considerable length the day after my meeting with the Chairman. I said there were three hypothetical U.S. motives in a policy that contributed to pressures on the PRC from the USSR. First, we might want the Soviet Union to defeat China. I stressed emphatically that whether Moscow defeated China or Europe first, the consequences for us would be the same; we would be isolated and the ultimate target. Thus this could never be our policy.

The second possible motive was the one Mao mentioned—our wish for a stalemated Moscow attack on Peking, so as to exhaust the Soviet Union. I pointed out that even partial Soviet dominance of China could have many of the consequences of the first option. In any event, such a major conflict would have unpredictable consequences. The Soviet Union might take rash actions if they were stymied as the Chairman claimed we had been in Vietnam. And we would be forced either to demonstrate our impotence and irrelevance, or make a series of extremely complex decisions.

The third possibility was that we might contribute to a war between China and the Soviet Union through misjudgment rather than policy. This I recognized as a danger despite our intentions. I then analyzed at length our policy around the world, with emphasis on Europe, to demonstrate that we plan to maintain our defense, continue a responsible international role, and work closely with our allies. In short, while seeking relaxation with Moscow, we would also ensure that if it did not choose a peaceful course we and our friends would be in a position to resist and defend our national interests. And I made it evident that we would consider aggression against China as involving our own national security.

It is not at all clear that we have fully allayed Chinese suspicions. While they have nowhere else to go in the short term, they will certainly watch our Soviet moves with wariness, and take out insurance with Japan and Europe.

Europe

Europe is now a major preoccupation of the Chinese leaders. Since my June trip there has been a series of high-level visitors from European capitals to Peking. The Chinese believe that Europe is becoming

demoralized and sapped of its strength through the illusions of peace fostered by the Soviet Union. Such a fake détente, most evident in Ostpolitik but also spreading elsewhere, is not only deceptive but dangerous in the Chinese view. They see these European developments as adding to the Soviet pressures against China. The atmospherics of events like the European Security Conference and the possible concrete results of events like the MBFR negotiations free the Soviet western flank so that Moscow can concentrate on its Chinese flank. Both Mao and Chou suggested that we were cooperating in this enterprise and thus, whether or not inadvertently, contributing to the pressures on them.

The Chinese have contempt for the Communist parties of Europe, which are generally Moscow-dominated, and favor the Conservatives over the Socialist and Labor parties. This is most evident in France where the Mitterand challenge to Pompidou causes Peking great concern. Mao told Pompidou to maintain strong ties with the U.S. The Chinese are also worried about German weakness and were anxious to hear why the Christian Democrats had lost the election there. The British seem the most level-headed to them.

In general, Chou pointed out, Europe has grown strong economically but weak militarily, in direct contrast to the Soviet Union whose military strength continues to increase but whose mismanagement has caused serious economic problems. The latter, however, can be eased by U.S. and European trade and credits.

Mao and Chou both stressed the need for us to maintain close ties with Europe. As in the case of Japan, we should not let trade barriers and other frictions disrupt our political bonds. Mao included Europe in the anti-Soviet axis that he urged across the world, together with Japan, the U.S., Iran, Pakistan and Turkey.

In response I emphasized the top priority that we give to our European allies. You plan to concentrate greatly during the coming months on our political, economic and security relations with Europe with a view toward a high-level conference once we had coordinated a general strategy. We had no illusions about Soviet intentions in Europe, and we would conduct our policy so as not to render allied defense vulnerable. The European Security Conference had been foisted upon us by our allies, and we were forced to go through with it. Our only choice was to make it as brief and as meaningless as possible. On the other hand, I said that the MBFR talks were useful, not only to deter Congressional pressures for unilateral American troop reductions in Europe but also to educate our European allies about the military threat posed by Soviet forces. I assured Chou that there would be no reductions before 1975 and these in any event would not exceed 10 to 15%. We would encourage European political and security unit, and we welcome Chinese education of Europe's shortsighted leadership.

South Asia

Mao and Chou made clear that in addition to the Soviet Union's Eastward pressures, the other major threat was hegemonial drives toward the South. In their view Soviet designs include a variety of maneuvers directed along the whole axis running from the Middle East through the Near East, South Asia and the Indian Ocean.

In South Asia, the Chinese believe India remains Moscow's principal agent; their distrust of New Delhi remains as potent as ever. When we first began talking directly to the Chinese twenty months ago Chou cited four potential enemies—the Soviet Union, the United States, Japan, and India. The PRC has now decided to improve relations with us and Japan, reassured that we are not colluding with the Soviet Union. This leaves two enemies in its pantheon, Moscow and New Delhi.

Chou displayed a particular contempt for the Indians and a personal dislike for Indian leaders. He related several cynical and disdainful anecdotes about Prime Ministers Nehru and Gandhi. The Indians have been pressing Peking for improved relations, and the reestablishment of embassies in both capitals. Chou related that Peking had responded with a typical Chinese ploy—they raised their chargé d'affaires in New Delhi from first secretary to counsellor!

As evidence of the Moscow–New Delhi alliance Chou pointed to those two countries' attempt to dismember Pakistan by encouraging dissident movements in Baluchistan and Pushtunistan and the fact that most of the Indian Navy is becoming Russian-built. He did not demur when I suggested that New Delhi was seeking to expand its influence in Indochina as well.

As in other areas of the world the Chinese urged an active U.S. foreign policy to counter their enemies' designs. Chou suggested the following:

—I should see Mrs. Bhutto while I was in Peking.

—We should increase our military aid to Pakistan. China had given it some assistance, but it was up to us to take the lead for Peking's capability was limited.

—We should better our relations not only with Sri Lanka (Ceylon) and Nepal but also with the Indian protectorates of Bhutan and Sikkim.

—We should provide Bangladesh with humanitarian assistance and establish some influence there to counter New Delhi. Peking would be willing to do so as well at some point, but couldn't move so long as the emotional issue of Pakistani prisoners held by Bangladesh was not resolved.

—He asked about our bases in the Indian Ocean.

In response I stated that our policies toward South Asia were still in parallel. We would go slow in any improvement of relations with

New Delhi and would keep the PRC informed. With regard to Pakistan, I assured Chou that we would resume our pre-war policy of providing spare parts for equipment it already possessed; that we would release military equipment that Pakistan had already contracted for, including 300 APC's; and that we would work vigorously with third countries like Iran and Turkey to encourage them to provide military assistance to Pakistan which was awkward for us because of our Congressional problems. We would also maintain, perhaps increase, our $200 million in economic aid. As you know, I paid a courtesy call on Mrs. Bhutto while I was in Peking, during which I stressed our continued support and friendship for Pakistan.

On Bangladesh, I informed Chou that we had been holding up $30 million in food assistance until we had elicited Chinese views, but that we would now move immediately to release this. On Sri Lanka, we were prepared to improve our relations at whatever pace Madame Bandaranaike desired. As for the Indian Ocean, we would review our naval deployments in that region, suggesting that we would maintain a meaningful presence. I emphasized that in any event our naval strength was far superior to that of the Soviet Union.

The Near and Middle East

In past trips, the Chinese leaders have shown only passing interest in this region. Now it is an area of great concern, subject to Soviet southward pressures. As in South Asia, Chou claimed that here too we were too slack in our efforts and should do more to counter Soviet designs. Mao explicitly included Iran and Turkey as well as Pakistan in the friendly axis that he suggested we shape; Chou urged us to be more active in the Persian Gulf and queried me on Iran and Turkey specifically.

I replied that the Shah of Iran was a very farsighted leader, and that we considered him a pivotal ally. For this reason we were sending Helms to be Ambassador, not only to step up our efforts with Iran but to organize a more active and cooperative American role with other friendly countries in the Near East and Persian Gulf regions. I reassured Chou that our relations remain good with Turkey, but pointed out that it had domestic problems. Chou commented that the Soviet Union was trying to take advantage of these.

Chou also showed significant interest in the Middle East for the first time, again because of Soviet efforts which he cited in such places as Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Libya. He cited the discovery of Soviet arms in the Iraqi Embassy in Pakistan as evidence of the interlocking web of Soviet designs throughout the entire axis. He made clear that China fully supported the Arabs in their efforts to regain all lost territories and solve the plight of the Palestinian refugees. When I forcefully pointed out that we were committed to the survival of Israel, he acknowledged that Israel could not be destroyed and that its existence

was now a fact. He said that PRC relations with Israel were not possible until it gave up its territorial aggression.

Despite our opposing views he clearly looked with favor on our continuing presence in the Middle East to counter the Soviets. The Chinese, he said, were unable to do much in that area except to try to expose Soviet designs. I filled him in on my upcoming talks with Ismail and said that we were prepared to deal with the Arab countries on the basis of their own interests, so long as these were distinct from Moscow's. He agreed with us that we should try to reach a settlement with Egypt before Jordan. He welcomed my suggestion that we keep him posted on any significant developments in our negotiations on the Middle East.

Indochina and Southeast Asia

The Chinese held up agreeing to my visit until the Vietnam settlement was completed. In turn the ceasefire in Vietnam paved the way for the success of my trip to the PRC. Mao and Chou welcomed the settlement, with the Chairman pointing out that we had done "good work" and getting my confirmation that the basic issues were settled.

I said that we would, of course, strictly implement the Agreement but I emphasized that we expected Hanoi to do the same. I described my trip to Hanoi and underlined the two choices for Hanoi which we saw. The first was to use the Agreement as an offensive weapon, pressuring us and the GVN and seeking their Indochina objectives through violations. I made clear that this would mean confrontation with us and obviously no possibility of economic assistance. Hanoi's other choice was to use the Agreement as an instrument of conciliation as we wish to do. This would allow us to move towards normalization of relations and economic reconstruction which we considered in our own interests.

I also stressed the need for restraint in Indochina, not only by the DRV but also by major outside powers. When I specifically mentioned limits on military assistance, Chou was ambiguous, saying that the Soviet Union was the dominant supplier and China only supplied small arms. I believe, however, that we can expect some moderation on the Chinese part.

My corollary emphasis was on the need for a gradual evolution in Indochina and a period of tranquility. Mao and Chou seemed to recognize this, although their basic posture is that Indochina problems are up to the individual countries themselves. We agreed that we shared an interest in there being independent states in the region, to alleviate the threat of a Soviet and Indian-dominated Indochina.

While I was in Peking, the Laos ceasefire was still not pinned down. I pointed out the urgent need to cease hostilities there and be-

gin North Vietnamese withdrawals. Chou indicated that they would welcome a settlement in Laos, although he maintained a hands-off attitude on the pending issues. He assured me that as soon as there was a ceasefire their anti-aircraft units would withdraw from Laos and that once the Chinese road was completed they would withdraw their engineer teams as well. I indicated that Souvanna Phouma, who had requested me to raise the issue of the Chinese road, was prepared for better relations with Peking. Chou seemed receptive, and noted his respect for the King of Laos.

We both agreed that Cambodia presented a more complex problem because of the many factions involved. I rejected Chou's rather pro forma request that I talk to Sihanouk. I stated that Lon Nol's government was a major factor and that Sihanouk's representatives should speak to him. As in Laos I emphasized the importance of the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops as stipulated in the Vietnam Agreement. I said that our objectives were to bring about a ceasefire and North Vietnamese withdrawal and direct contacts between the various factions. Chou agreed that the situation would be more manageable if the conflict became a purely civil war. He made some cynical remarks about Sihanouk; I believe their alliance has cooled somewhat. He said he would think over my proposal that representatives of Lon Nol and Sihanouk get together, and he agreed that we should exchange views on Cambodia on a continuing basis.

At Bangkok's request I brought up the subject of Chinese support of the insurgency in Thailand. Chou denied PRC involvement, saying that revolutions were the responsibility of the indigenous peoples. He pointed out that some Chinese Nationalist troops were still left in Thailand and often crossed over into Chinese territory. When I noted Thai nervousness about the Chinese road in Laos, he assured me that the road would stop at the Mekong Valley, way short of Thai territory, so there was no cause for Bangkok concern.

Chou also indicated an interest in other countries in Southeast Asia, and we briefly touched on them. He gave only lip service to revolutionary movements—the peoples themselves must accomplish this task, and it seemed that revolutionary movements were not maturing quickly in the region. He echoed his approach of June when he called for a neutral and stable region; clearly he is concerned here as elsewhere about Moscow and New Delhi influence. I made clear that if there were sudden changes in the situation in the region we might have to react, but otherwise we were prepared for a gradual evolution and genuine independence and neutrality for the countries of the region over the longer term.

We also discussed the International Conference. The basic Chinese position was to back whatever the DRV wanted; they clearly were

reluctant to get out in front. Thus they were for a short conference which was free of recrimination and endorsed the Vietnam Agreement, but treated Laos and Cambodia only in the context of the Agreement. Chou would not be drawn out on other issues, such as continuing authority for ceasefire reports and chairmanship of the Conference, leaving that up to Hanoi. We continued to keep in touch with Peking in the period before the Conference and during the Conference itself.

Japan

The Chinese have done a major turnabout in their attitude toward Japan and the U.S. in the last 20 months. Chou's approach this time continued the marked evolution which I noticed last June. From Peking's perspective in 1971 Japan was one of the potential large powers that might help to carve up China. It had been fattened economically by the U.S. and was now threatening to expand its militarism throughout the region, in such areas as Taiwan and Korea. Both publicly and privately China used to oppose the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

Although Chou still urged us to keep Japan out of Taiwan and Korea and noted the continuing threat of Japanese militarism, the Chinese now clearly consider Japan as an incipient ally along with ourselves to counter Soviet and Indian designs. Publicly this has been reflected in Tanaka's visit to the Mainland, PRC-Japan establishment of diplomatic relations, and (since my visit) Chou's expressed desire to visit Japan.

Privately, the change in their attitude is even more marked. Chou stated that Japan is at a crossroads; having grown up it wants its freedom. He now acknowledges that our Security Treaty is a brake on Japanese expansionism and militarism; he pointed out that Peking had not attacked the Treaty in any way in recent months in their dealings with Japan, despite its original opposition to it. Since we had fattened Japan and still had great influence with Tokyo, he suggested that we had a great responsibility to restrain it. He urged the closest U.S.-Japanese cooperation generally and mentioned development of Siberian resources specifically. He said that work should be done with Japan to win it over and prevent the situation where the Soviet Union became its ally instead of the U.S., for this would be a threat to the world.

Mao said that it was a mistake for me to spend only one day in Tokyo on my way home and that I should take more time with our ally. He wanted to make sure that trade and other frictions with Tokyo (as well as with Europe) would not mar our fundamental cooperation. He cited the U.S. and Japan, together with Europe and the friendly Near East countries, as the axis to be formed to oppose the Soviet Union.

In response I noted our similarity of approach and stressed the restraining factor of our Security Treaty. I assured both Mao and Chou

that you put the highest value on our relations with Japan, as well as with our European allies, and we would be working hard to foster this relationship. I acknowledged Chinese restraint in dealing with the Japanese and cautioned that any attempt to compete for Tokyo's allegiance could end up encouraging resurgent Japanese nationalism through conflicting pressures. Accordingly, we favored improvement in PRC-Japanese relations and expected reciprocal treatment from Peking.

Korea

While this had been a significant area of interest in our past conversations and there had been much speculation that Chou would raise Korea this time as a prime topic, it did not come up until the very end of my trip. In his final tour d'horizon Chou repeated, with somewhat less emphasis, past Chinese views on the Korean Peninsula. He called for the abolition of both UNCURK and the United Nations Command, said that our forces should be withdrawn, and favored relaxation of tensions and reunification between the two Koreas. At the same time he made it clear that the Chinese were prepared for a gradual evolution in the situation. He informed me that they had been telling Pyongyang in effect to be patient with gradual U.S. withdrawals and reunification, and that the North Koreans were beginning to understand. He stressed that we should make sure that as we left Korea, Japan did not send its own forces to replace us.

I said that we were prepared to consider abolishing UNCURK—we would check with our South Korean allies and let Peking know in a few weeks—in exchange for his pledge that Peking would defuse the Korean issue, specifically in the next UN General Assembly debate. I indicated that we would entertain a gradual withdrawal of troops over time but made clear that this was in the context of the Nixon Doctrine[5] and a strengthening of South Korean defenses. Chou did not demur. In fact, given gradual withdrawal and gradual reunification and the keeping out of Japan, he was quite sure that "no one will commit aggression" in the Korean Peninsula.

Taiwan

Purposely I brought up the issue of Taiwan at the very outset of our conversations. I reaffirmed the principles that you had outlined to Chou concerning our formula on China and Taiwan in the Shanghai Communiqué; our disassociation from any Taiwan independence movement; our discouragement of the Japanese moving into Taiwan;

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[5] According to the Nixon Doctrine, the origin of which can be traced to a July 25, 1969, informal background briefing on Guam that Nixon gave to reporters, the United States would stand by its commitments but encourage Asian nations to take responsibility for their own security. See *Foreign Relations,* 1969–1976, vol. I, Document 29.

our support for any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue; and our intention to seek normalization of relations with Peking. I also promised to give Chou a specific schedule of the reduction of some of our forces on Taiwan now that the Vietnam war was over.

Chou was more concerned about our military assistance to Taiwan, which he said should be phased out over time, and our providing Taiwan with the ability to produce its own F–5 airplanes. As noted above, he also complained that in diverting F–4's from Taiwan to South Vietnam during Enhance Plus last fall, we were taking advantage of China, and this was an example of standing on China's shoulders to reach out toward the Soviet Union.

In our second meeting, before giving Chou a long analysis of our policy toward the Soviet Union in reaction to his comment, I gave him a specific schedule for the reduction of our Taiwan forces. I told him that we would withdraw five air force squadrons, or about half of our 9,000 military personnel on Taiwan, during the coming year. I also said that we would withdraw at least two squadrons of F–4's during the following year and would look at other military units carefully.[6] Chou professed disinterest in a specific timetable for withdrawal, saying that the important thing was the principle had already been established. He returned to our military aid policy which I said we would review. He assured me that Peking had no intention to liberate Taiwan by armed force.[7]

In response to this latter comment I reaffirmed our intention to move toward normalization of relations. This set up the eventual deal for an exchange of liaison offices in each other's capital. I also told Chou that we would be prepared to move after the 1974 elections toward something like the Japanese solution with regard to diplomatic relations and before mid-1976, we were prepared to establish full diplomatic relations. I added that we would want to keep some form of representation on Taiwan but I was sure that we could find some mutually acceptable formula. He agreed with this approach.

Bilateral Relations

The public manifestations of the discussions with the Chinese are reflected in the substantial progress in our bilateral relations. The factors I have cited impelled the Chinese to move forward faster than we

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[6] The figures cited by Kissinger were most likely based on those he received in a February 6 memorandum from Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 98, Country Files, Far East, HAK China Trip, Memcons & Reports (originals), February 1973)

[7] After this sentence, a notation in unknown handwriting reads: "not so clear cut." Zhou remarked on February 16, "I can assure you that we don't mean that we are going to liberate it [Taiwan] by the armed forces. We have no such plan at the moment." See Document 9.

anticipated. The most dramatic development was the establishment of liaison offices in each other's capitals. We had expected them to agree to a trade, or perhaps liaison, office in Peking, but Chou quickly raised the question of their having an office in the United States. This contrasts their consistent policy of not having a significant mission in the same capital as an Ambassador from the Republic of China. And these offices, which as you know may well be at Ambassadorial rank, and will enjoy diplomatic immunity and privileges, will be closely equivalent to Embassies in everything but name. Yet Chou never mentioned the GRC Embassy or our diplomatic relations. This is the best proof of Chinese eagerness to institutionalize our relationship. It reflects our approach, which I reiterated at the very first meeting, that we need greatly to increase our contacts and to get our peoples used to U.S.-Chinese exchanges and cooperation.

The counterpart meetings we held on exchanges and trade went very smoothly.[8] The Chinese were prepared with a whole series of specific programs which they were ready to approve in various scientific, cultural and other fields. In contrast to the past, they put as much emphasis on our groups going to China as on their groups coming here. They are ready to invite more Senators and Congressmen. They also expressed interest in increased bilateral trade and readily agreed to our approach of a political package deal of a lump sum exchange between private claims against them and blocked PRC assets. Since then Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei have launched this negotiation in Paris.[9]

Both Mao and Chou went to considerable length to show their interest in trade, exchanges, and the liaison offices. They supplemented this with a desire to increase the knowledge of English in their country and the number of Americans residing in China. They agreed to the release of the two captured American pilots within the same time period as the release of other prisoners under the Vietnam Agreement, and Chou clearly indicated that Downey's case would be reviewed favorably in the second half of this year. They also cooperated in providing information on Lieutenant Dunn, a pilot who has been missing in action since 1968 near Hainan Island. Unfortunately no new facts turned up in this case, and his death now seems confirmed. We have provided this information to Mrs. Dunn.

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[8] Memoranda of conversation of these talks are at National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 87, Country Files, Far East, PRC Counterpart Talks, 1971–1973.

[9] In a memorandum to Kissinger, March 9, 1973, Theodore Eliot reported that the PRC "has agreed to settle U.S. private claims through an assignment of blocked Chinese assets to the U.S. Government for use in compensating American claimants." (Ibid., Box 527, Country Files, Far East, People's Republic of China, Vol. 7, May, 1973–Jul 9, 1973)

All these steps were taken against the background of your approach to the PRC which I emphasized. We see a strong and independent China as being clearly in our interest and the interest of world peace. We would consider an attack on China as an ultimate threat to our own national security. We therefore would not encourage nor try to take advantage of any attack on China from other countries. Indeed we would develop our global policies in the way that Chairman Mao had indicated would be needed to counter possible hegemonial designs.

Problems

The current trend therefore is positive, but there are no grounds for complacency. There are at least two areas which have substantial potential for trouble in our relationship:

—*Our dealings with the Soviet Union.* To date the Soviet factor has been the main leverage in our dealings with the PRC. At the same time—and contrary to the predictions of almost all Soviet experts—our opening to Peking has paid us substantial dividends with Moscow as well. With conscientious attention to both capitals we should be able to continue to have our mao tai and drink our vodka too. Peking, after all, assuming continued hostility with the USSR, has no real alternative to us as a counterweight (despite its recent reaching out to Japan and Western Europe as insurance). And Moscow needs us in such areas as Europe and economics.

But this is nevertheless a difficult balancing act that will increasingly face us with hard choices. Mao and Chou both suggested that, inadvertently or not, our Soviet policies could increase the pressures on China. It was even intimated that we might favor a Sino-Soviet conflict, so as to bog down the Soviet Union and weaken it for our own attack. A cutting edge is the Soviet initiative on a nuclear understanding. One of Moscow's motives is certainly to embarrass us in our relations with Peking, since they know their initiative is anathema to Peking. We have fought a delaying action on this issue for almost a year now, but Brezhnev is apt to push it to a head in conjunction with his visit here. To satisfy him and not dissatisfy Chou at the same time will be a challenge. Other concrete awkward areas in our triangular relationship include European security policies and the granting of credits to Moscow.

—*The coming change in Chinese leadership.* Mao is in his 80s and has received an "invitation" from "God." Chou is 75 and has just publicly noted the need for new leadership soon in his country. They obviously control PRC policy now, but it is not at all clear that they can assure continuity in their policy lines. The Lin Piao affair was obviously a major challenge and may have been a close thing. They have not man-

aged to fill many key party and military posts since then. Mao constantly referred to the difficulties posed by women in China, undoubtedly a reference to his wife who represents the challenge from the left. All of this is reflected in Chinese eagerness to institutionalize our relationship, even if it means bending the sacred "one China" policy to do it.

We know little about power relationships in the PRC and even less about the succession problem. We can only assume—both from the above indices and because of the objective choices facing China—that substantial opposition to present policies exist and that this includes foreign policy. There are undoubtedly those who favor accommodation with Moscow over Washington for example. Thus, before the present dynasty passes from the scene, we must strengthen bilateral ties, get our two peoples used to a closer relationship, and reach out to more layers of Chinese leadership so as to strengthen the advocates of an opening to America.

There are two other potential problems, but these would seem to be more manageable and under our control:

—*The need for a strong American world role.* We are useless to Peking as a counterweight to Moscow if we withdraw from the world, lower our defenses, or play a passive international game. Mao and Chou urged a more aggressive American presence—countering Soviet designs in various areas, keeping close ties with our allies, maintaining our defense posture. If the Chinese became convinced that we were heeding the inward impulses of voluble sectors of Congress, the public and the press, we would undoubtedly witness a sharp turn in Peking's attitude. You and I have, of course, assured the PRC leaders privately, as well as proclaiming publicly, our intentions to maintain a responsible international role. So long as you are President, Peking should certainly be convinced that we will be a crucial factor in the world balance.

—*The issue of Taiwan.* The Chinese have been farsighted and patient on this question. Their willingness to ease our predicament is now most dramatically shown in their setting up a liaison office in Washington while we maintain diplomatic relations with the GRC. On the other hand, we have largely bought their public reasonableness with your own private assurances—to normalize fully our relations by 1976 and to withdraw our forces from Taiwan now that the Vietnam War is over. Taiwan is a problem we should be able to control, both internationally and domestically, as we continue to add to the handwriting on the wall and condition our audiences. However, we should be under no illusions that our final step will be anything but painful—there are few friends as decent as our allies on Taiwan.

19. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge and Mark Linton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, March 8, 1973.

SUBJECT

Message to the PRC Regarding Textile Export Restraints

In August, 1972, we provided the People's Republic of China with an explanation of the Long-Term Textile Agreement (LTA) and informed PRC authorities via the Paris channel that the U.S. may find it necessary to request that they restrain exports of certain categories of cotton textiles to the U.S. (See this message at Tab B).[2] PRC exports of textiles to the U.S. have not reached a level sufficient to warrant such a request. The Department of State has prepared a memorandum for transmission through the Paris channel to inform the PRC that we will in the near future request that exports of four categories of textiles be restrained.[3]

Article 4 of the LTA provides for the negotiation of bilateral agreements regulating trade in cotton textiles, and the U.S. currently has 31 such agreements. Articles 3 and 6(c) permit the U.S. to act unilaterally to restrain textile imports. PRC exports of cotton textiles to the U.S. in the 12 months ending January 31, 1973 grew to an equivalent of more than 16 million square yards. These exports are in several categories well over the levels at which we have initiated restraint agreements with other countries. Considerations of equity for traditional suppliers as well as the need to avoid disruption of our domestic markets make it necessary to take steps to regulate our textile imports from the PRC. Since PRC textile exports are continuing to grow rapidly, we should transmit the State memorandum to the PRC soon. All concerned agencies have cleared this memorandum. CIEP concurs.[4]

Recommendation: That you approve the transmittal to the PRC representatives in Paris of the memorandum at Tab A.[5]

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 526, Country Files, Far East, People's Republic of China, Vol. 6, Jan–Apr 1973. Secret. Sent for action.

[2] Attached but not printed. The Long Term Agreement on Cotton Textiles, established in 1962, set guidelines for negotiated quotas between cotton importers and exporters.

[3] On February 8, Edward R. Cheney of the Fibers and Textiles Division in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs sent this memorandum to Hormats. It is attached at Tab A but not printed.

[4] Cheney noted that his draft was "cleared by the Departments of State, Commerce, Labor and the Treasury."

[5] Kissinger initialed the Approve option.

20. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, March 12, 1973.

Kissinger: The Chinese have agreed that you can announce—[2]

Nixon: Thursday?

Kissinger: Thursday. Now that we've told them that you're going to do it, they've sort of [unclear]—

Nixon: Oh, sure. Well, I [unclear]—

Kissinger: I don't think—if you don't have a press conference it would make it too high if you just step out—we should tell them ahead of time—as long—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: I did tell them that you would make the announcement.

Nixon: [unclear] Sure. We'll work it out. They won't notice the difference.

Kissinger: We've got a good play out of this Downey thing.[3]

Nixon: Yeah.

[Omitted here is a discussion of the Vietnamese ceasefire.]

Kissinger: My view is we have to make the Japanese inability to choose work for us. We should suck them into Siberia, we should suck them into Southeast Asia for the reason that the more they frighten others, the better it is for us vis-à-vis China.

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: Again, I wouldn't say this publicly, but we must prevent the Japanese from tying up with any one other country. The great danger is that they'll choose China, and that their resources and Chinese intelligence are going to do to us in Asia what the Common Market may do to us in Europe. That's why it—one reason we must lean a little bit towards China wherever we can. On the other hand, we should tie the Japanese to us where we can, but one good guarantee—

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 876–4. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger in the Oval Office between 9:30 and 10:29 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

[2] Kissinger is most likely referring to China's approval of the announcement that David Bruce would head the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing. On March 15, President Nixon announced Bruce's appointment as Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office. For text of the news conference, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1974,* pp. 202–213.

[3] On March 12, China released John Downey. See footnote 2, Document 15.

that's why I am not against having the Japanese active in North Vietnam. If they're active in North Vietnam, the Chinese get worried. If they're active in Siberia, the Chinese get worried. If they're active in China, the Russians get worried. It is in our interests to have the Japanese 10% overextended.

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: I know that's a cynical approach but that way they are always a little bit off-balance. And since it is impossible to make conceptual deals with the Japanese. Now I think the deal we made with Mao and Chou is going to last for 3–5 years. We don't have to maneuver the Chinese through every little device because they understand that. I don't know whether you've signed these letters—[4]

Nixon: No. I want to put some writing on it. I'll have them by [unclear].

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the Soviet Union and North Vietnam.]

Nixon: China is bigger than ending the war. Russia [unclear] is bigger than ending the war. The war was going to end. It's a question of how, and the war [unclear]. Now the China and Russia angle—even as big as those things are, we don't look at those as ends in themselves, which many of the jackasses in the press think. They think it's great we've gone to China, we've shaken hands and everything is going to be hunky-dory. It's not going to be hunky-dory; it's going to be tough titties. So now, now that we have come this far, the real game is how do you build on these great initiatives.

[Omitted here is a discussion of Nixon's view of revolutionaries.]

Kissinger: I think, incidentally, Mr. President, that after the Russians are here I ought to go for two days to Peking to brief them.

Nixon: Oh, of course.

Kissinger: And on that occasion—

Nixon: I understand—

Kissinger: Tell Chou En-lai he should come here, and that then you come back.

Nixon: Where would he go? The UN?

Kissinger: He can come for the UN and then he comes and visits his liaison mission here.

Nixon: Will we give a dinner?

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[4] On March 8, Kissinger gave Nixon draft letters to Mao and Zhou, which Nixon had not yet approved or signed. The letters are printed as Documents 21 and 22.

Kissinger: Oh, yeah. I'm sure that's what's going to happen.

Nixon: Yeah, I think you should tell him that.

[Omitted here is a discussion of the timing of the upcoming Soviet summit.]

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21. Letter From President Nixon to Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong[1]

Washington, March 16, 1973.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Dr. Kissinger has reported to me fully on his most recent visit to the People's Republic of China and especially his conversation with you.

Let me first express my appreciation for your gracious gesture of receiving Dr. Kissinger. This was evidence to the world of the major progress we have made in our relations and underscored our joint determination to continue on the path toward full normalization. I am grateful for your kind message to me which was also specified in the announcement of the meeting.

Your frank and wide-ranging discussion with Dr. Kissinger was a very positive elaboration of our own talks a year ago which I recall with great warmth. I wish to reaffirm all the basic principles that Dr. Kissinger expressed to you on my behalf. The integrity of China is a fundamental element in American foreign policy. We believe that the viability and independence of your country is in the U.S. national interest and the interest of world peace. Our international approach will reflect this view.

While our two countries will continue to have differences, it is clear from Dr. Kissinger's talks with you and Prime Minister Chou En-lai that we increasingly share common views about the world situation. We take great satisfaction in the progress of our dialogue and the specific steps that are now being taken to accelerate the normalization of our relations.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 94, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, January 1–April 14, 1973. No classification marking. The President received this letter for his approval and signature under a March 8 covering memorandum from Kissinger. (Ibid.) Lord gave it to Chuang Yen, Deputy PRC Representative to the United Nations, on March 17, during a meeting at the PRC Mission to the United Nations. (Ibid.)

I think we can look back on this recent period with a genuine sense of accomplishment. Our joint task now is to continue advancing on the course we have well established. This will be the firm policy of the United States.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon[2]

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[2] Nixon added the following handwritten postscript: "Our common dangers and our common interests have drawn our two nations together at this critical juncture in history. I intend to do everything I can to see that nothing drives us apart during my service as President. RN"

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22. Letter From President Nixon to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai[1]

Washington, March 16, 1973.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

You have my gratitude for once again receiving Dr. Kissinger and his party with extreme courtesy, thoughtfulness, and cordiality. In listening to the personal accounts of his visit to the People's Republic of China, I recalled with warm pleasure my own journey there a year ago. Let me also take this occasion to thank you for the exquisite vase that was presented to me.

I have heard and read Dr. Kissinger's detailed accounts of his discussions with Chairman Mao and yourself with great interest and satisfaction. It was clear to me last year during my own talks that, differences notwithstanding, our two governments have parallel views on important aspects of the international situation. These most recent conversations demonstrate that we have continued to make substantial progress. It is inevitable—even useful—that our approaches to world problems will not be identical; each country must adhere to its principles. But it is also evident that we have reached mutual understanding in many areas and that we share many principles as well. The latter, of course, found expression in the Shanghai Communiqué which was so forcefully reaffirmed in the joint announcement after Dr. Kissinger's trip.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 94, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, January 1–April 14, 1973. No classification marking. The President received this letter for his approval and signature under a March 8 covering letter from Kissinger. (Ibid.) Lord gave it to Chuang Yen, Deputy PRC Representative to the United Nations during a March 17 meeting at the PRC Mission to the United Nations. (Ibid.)

The advancement in our dialogue has been accompanied by concrete progress in our bilateral relations. In my January 3 letter to you[2] I noted the headway that had already been made. With the achievement of a Vietnam settlement and as a result of Dr. Kissinger's trip, there will now be substantial acceleration in the fields of trade and exchanges. This will serve further to enrich understanding between our peoples and bring tangible benefits to both countries. We are especially pleased that Liaison Offices will be established in our two capitals. This step will not only facilitate our bilateral programs and communication but also holds important symbolic value.

The normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China remains basic to our policy. We will pursue it with as much dedication in my second term as we did in my first. I wish to reaffirm all the undertakings that Dr. Kissinger conveyed to you, and I am writing separately to Chairman Mao in the same vein.

With my best personal wishes.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon[3]

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[2] Tab A, Document 1.

[3] Nixon added the following handwritten postscript: "I am convinced that our new relationship has contributed enormously to the cause of security for our two nations and to peace in the world. I look forward to working with you over the next four years toward further guaranteeing these objectives. RN"

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23. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon[1]

Washington, March 16, 1973.

SUBJECT

Department of State Analysis of China's Troubled Domestic Political Situation

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 526, Country Files, Far East, People's Republic of China, Vol. 6, Jan–Apr 1973. Secret; Noforn Attachment. Sent for information. Holdridge sent this memorandum to Kissinger on January 29; Kissinger initialed it and passed it on to Nixon. (Ibid.) According to the attached correspondence profile, Nixon saw it on March 29.

At Tab A is an analysis of current political conditions in the People's Republic of China prepared by the Department of State, which Secretary Rogers has sent to you.[2] This analysis seems to embody the view most prevalent in the government that there is a continuing and tenuous political balance between Communist Party and military officials in the wake of the Lin Piao affair of September 1971. The State paper emphasizes the following points:

—There is a continuing effort by Party leaders to downgrade the power of the military in political affairs. This power was built up by Lin Piao and his followers during the Cultural Revolution. The civilian leaders now find the military reluctant to relinquish their authority, even in the wake of Lin's death while fleeing toward the Soviet Union.

—The central leadership in Peking is finding it difficult to recentralize power. There is considerable instability in personnel assignments in the provinces, suggesting continuing efforts to remove local and provincial leaders not responsive to Peking.

—The national leadership remains in a state of precarious balance, with continuing inability to reach consensus on new personnel assignments. There is still no Defense Minister; less than half of the state ministries have appointed ministers in command; and only 12 of the 25 Party politburo members are active.

—China gives all appearances of a country in an unresolved succession crisis. While officials stress that there is "collective leadership," it is anticipated that the death of Mao Tse-tung and/or Chou En-lai could lead to considerable instability as political institutions are still fragile four years after the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution.[3]

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[2] Dated January 8, attached but not printed.

[3] The President underlined "death of Mao Tse-tung and/or Chou En-lai" and wrote, "K—what is your analysis as to what we can expect in the event?—What should our contingency be?" On March 29, Scowcroft asked Holdridge to prepare a response to the President. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 526, Country Files, Far East, People's Republic of China, Vol. 6, Jan–Apr 1973) According to the White House correspondence profile attached to Rogers' memorandum, this request was instead fulfilled by other analyses of the Chinese political situation that reached the NSC.

24. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, March 29, 1973, 11:05 a.m.–noon.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador David Bruce, Chief-designate of US Liaison Office in Peking
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
Alfred leS. Jenkins, Deputy-designate of US Liaison Office
John H. Holdridge, Deputy-designate of US Liaison Office
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

Dr. Kissinger: David, I thought we could just review what the group is going to do there and what our concept is in setting this thing up.

Basically, the idea of the Liaison Office escalated. As you know, Al and John, between them, were with me on every trip, and between them they have sat in on every conversation of major substance on every trip. The Liaison Office started really as something primarily for conducting the business of the Paris Embassy, with political things conducted by me and Ambassador Huang Hua in New York. Now with the level of representation on both sides it is something different.

Incidentally, Al, your colleagues don't know this yet, but the Chinese are sending Huang Chen, their Ambassador to France and also a member of their Central Committee. They are also sending the chief of their protocol department, Han Hsu. There will be an announcement tomorrow. So at this point I see no point on continuing our contact in New York. You should confirm, Al, when you are there [with the advance party], that we can do this. You should repeat that Ambassador Bruce knows everything, and has the President's full confidence, and that I can talk to the Ambassador here.

Will you get to see the Prime Minister? You should try to see him, or at least Ch'iao Kuan-hua. Don't do it at a level lower than Ch'iao. I think you should have one substantive talk with a restricted group—in fact, just you. Can you manage that?

Mr. Jenkins: Yes. That will be no problem, especially with the group I have with me on this trip.

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 94, Country Files, East Asia, China Exchange January 1–April 14, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in Kissinger's office in the White House. All brackets are in the original. On March 26, Kissinger received talking points for this meeting from Holdridge. (Ibid., Box 526, Country Files, Far East, People's Republic of China, Vol. VI, Jan–Apr 1973)

Dr. Kissinger: Tell them: one, that you have been asked by me on behalf of the President to reaffirm everything I said to the Prime Minister. Needless to say, in preparation for the Soviet Summit there will be more intensive consultations with the Soviet Union, but they will be kept fully informed. There will be no surprises, and everything will be fully consistent with the strategy the Prime Minister and I agreed upon.

Ambassador Bruce: When is the Soviet Summit?

Dr. Kissinger: June 18. This is known only in the White House.

Tell them that we will let them know about the details, but our strategy is to gain the time without making substantive concessions—to gain the time we need to prepare our public opinion for closer relations with the People's Republic, to lay the basis for other measures if they become essential. Say that nothing new has happened since Mr. Lord dealt with their Ambassador on my behalf, but that we will give them the details as they develop and we will keep them fully informed on anything that should develop before doing anything.

On Vietnam, we realize that history will not stop in Vietnam, but it is also impossible for the United States to tolerate flagrant violations of the Agreement that we signed. The violations have been flagrant and the justifications have been insulting. We know all the equipment they are sending; to say that they are civilian goods is insulting to our intelligence. Tell them that there is a time for everything.

Secondly, we never asked them to slow down their military supply while the war was on, because we realize they have their principles. But to keep pouring in military supplies at a time when there is supposed to be peace cannot be considered a friendly act. You can assure them that we are strictly sticking to the replacement provisions, and if there are any questions about it we would be glad to give them a list of what we are sending into South Vietnam on a monthly basis, for their private information. In fact, we will do this.

Ambassador Bruce: Are they pouring equipment into North Vietnam, or are the North Vietnamese bringing down equipment they have already accumulated?

Mr. Kissinger: We don't really know. If it is only what they have already accumulated, then we are in good shape, because they will not launch an offensive unless there is a pipeline. We have good assurances from the Soviets that they are sending no more military equipment. But we won't tell the Chinese, at least at this level. Ambassador Bruce can do this.

We will start withdrawing the squadrons from Formosa in July as we have told them.[2]

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[2] See footnote 6, Document 18.

Tell them also that we will be seeing Brandt, Pompidou and Andreotti this spring, and we will inform them about these meetings. These meetings will be in the interest of the strategy of Western cohesion that we talked about.

Tell them also that I will be taking Ambassador Bruce with me to New York to meet Ambassador Huang Hua, for a general discussion. [To Ambassador Bruce] I will take you in early April when we get back.

Al, make sure that I have a back channel to Ambassador Bruce. Do you have a CIA man on the trip?

Mr. Jenkins: No, we don't.

Mr. Holdridge: You saw the memo we did and sent over last night.[3] The CIA is being squeezed out. There is no CIA man in the Liaison Office.

Dr. Kissinger: That is impossible. There must be one Agency representative and one communicator. I will take care of it with the Chinese. David can raise it with the Chinese and explain the reason for it. They will welcome it. We will deal with them completely openly.

Mr. Jenkins: On reporting this meeting I have . . .

Dr. Kissinger: Don't report it. Or report it just to me.

Mr. Jenkins: We won't have a channel yet. I will be busy with so many things, I don't know if I can come back.

Dr. Kissinger: We have got to know what happened before the Ambassador goes. David?

Ambassador Bruce: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Why don't you plan on coming back.

Mr. Jenkins: All right.

Dr. Kissinger: We need a channel. I have got to be able to report to you out there on my conversation with Huang Chen. Or else you will be in an impossible position. You will end up like the Paris channel.

Mr. Jenkins: You will tell them that there will be dual communications?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I will tell them there will be dual communications. They will welcome that. We will tell them that there will be one intelligence man in the Embassy and that he won't do anything that David won't discuss with them. He can't do anything they won't know about anyway. If they want him walled up in the Liaison Office, that's okay. But there has to be an Agency man so there can be an Agency communicator.

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[3] Memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, March 28. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 526, Country Files, Far East, People's Republic of China, Vol. 6, Jan–Apr 1973)

[At this point Dr. Kissinger telephoned James Schlesinger[4] to say that we wanted an Agency man in the Liaison Office and that he would be there on condition that he did literally nothing that was not cleared by both Ambassador Bruce and Dr. Kissinger. If the CIA would abide by these rules, we would tell the Chinese who the man was and what his job was. This was an unusual procedure, but we had always found with the Chinese that total honesty was the best policy. Dr. Kissinger explained that he would handle the bureaucratics of it.]

We have just got to have all the communicators CIA people, or at least a dual system. How do we do this?

Mr. Jenkins: Porter is handling this at the Department. You will handle it?

Dr. Kissinger: I will take care of it with Porter before you leave. Do you agree with this, David?

Ambassador Bruce: Absolutely. Now the other messages, routine messages on the administrative details, will be coming out through Hong Kong?

Mr. Jenkins: Yes, that is our understanding. These can go through State channels, can't they?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, Al, you know the fraternity over there. Your effectiveness with the Chinese depends totally on your being a White House man. I know the bureaucracy will want to assert its own interest. Anything you can tactfully suggest to your colleagues as your own idea will make it much easier.

Mr. Jenkins: Should I tell Chiao that we are having a special channel?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, he will welcome it.

Mr. Jenkins: Should I mention this only if they raise it, or should I volunteer it?

Dr. Kissinger: You should raise it. They should understand from the beginning that Ambassador Bruce is the President's man.

Ambassador Bruce: If you have only CIA communicators, there will be a lot of traffic to State.

Mr. Holdridge: That's no problem. The communicators can send stuff to State with a different code. They just send it with a different addressee.

Dr. Kissinger: Alternatively, if they want State communicators we would have to set up special facilities.

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[4] A transcript of the March 29 telephone conversation between Kissinger and Schlesinger, 11:35 a.m. is ibid., Kissinger Transcripts, Telcons, closed, National Security, Box 2, 1973, 28–31 March.

Ambassador Bruce: The other would be much simpler.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Mr. Jenkins: A couple of things I want to mention. Privileges and immunities. Am I to nail this down while I am there?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, if you can.

Mr. Jenkins: Travel restrictions. They normally restrict diplomats to within 12 miles of Peking, except for the Ming Tombs. Occasionally they allow visits to other cities like Canton, Shanghai and Tientsin. What should we do?

Dr. Kissinger: Tell them that we have to put on them the same restrictions we put on the Soviets, but you can tell them that we won't enforce them. And ask them what they will do for you. We will just give them blanket exceptions.

Mr. Jenkins: We will tell them we plan not to enforce the restrictions.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, just tell them what we propose to do. I am sure they will be forthcoming if we don't press them.

Mr. Jenkins: Some people in my shop have the idea that the Ambassador should present a Moon Rock when he goes over there. I think it's a silly idea this late.

Dr. Kissinger: It's already been done! We did it in July 1971.

Mr. Jenkins: That takes care of that.

Dr. Kissinger: Don't tell them it's already been done, just tell them we won't do it.

Mr. Jenkins: Right.

Dr. Kissinger: On personnel, the Ambassador wants Nick Platt as his assistant. We favor that. My requirement is—of course anything that Ambassador Bruce wants, he can do—but to have it as disciplined an organization as possible. We can't have people running around trying to improve the world, or writing private letters.

Mr. Jenkins: It's a well-disciplined group. There should be no problem.

Mr. Holdridge: It's my old Hong Kong Consulate General staff reconstituted. They all used to work for me.

Mr. Jenkins: Because of the servant problem there, the Ambassador will need an Aide to handle these things, a young man. We have a boy named McKinley whom Graham Martin recommended. Martin wanted to take him to Saigon, but China was the boy's area, so he suggested that Ambassador Bruce should have him.

Dr. Kissinger: That's all right. Incidentally, I see a lot of mention in the traffic about putting us in the diplomatic enclave. I think, one, that they might want to do better by us, and two, they can use the fact

of the Liaison Office as an excuse to do something better for us. So there is no reason for us to propose the diplomatic enclave.

Mr. Jenkins: No. In fact, they might even give us our old compound back.

Dr. Kissinger: It is inconceivable that they would accept someone of the distinction of Ambassador Bruce and not treat us better. They had a chance to turn down this level of representation. When we suggested Ambassador Bruce, we also asked if they would not prefer a lesser level of representation. They had two weeks to mull it over.

Ambassador Bruce: As to my personal requirements, I can say for myself and Evangeline that we don't care at all what the living conditions are. Don't let them tell you that because I am an old man I need a soft bed and special conditions.

[At this point, Mr. Kissinger took a call on the secure line from Mr. Schlesinger.][5]

Dr. Kissinger: Schlesinger says the problem is that if there are both State and CIA communicators there, the State communicators will know the volume of the traffic through the other channel. And the volume will be greater in the special channel than in the State channel. Therefore, we will need CIA communicators—if you agree.

Ambassador Bruce: I agree, yes. It's easier.

Dr. Kissinger: We will just insist on it.

Ambassador Bruce: What is the time difference with Peking?

Mr. Jenkins: 13 hours.

Dr. Kissinger: Except in the summer, when it is 12. It works very well.

We can send you messages in the evening our time; you will receive them in the morning and then reply to us in time for morning here.

They may or may not want us in the diplomatic compound. I would leave it to them. They have never failed us on technical arrangements.

Mr. Holdridge: If we don't ask them, they will have more leeway.

Dr. Kissinger: Al, on their visit here, tell them that anything we can do for their advance party to make it more comfortable for them we will do. As I already told the Prime Minister, they can make requests in two categories—one, to the US Government, and two, to their old friends on a personal basis. Both will be dealt with as a matter of priority.

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[5] No record of the call has been found.

We have already told them that they can send people down from New York in advance of the advance party, if they wish. Can we pay their expenses?

Mr. Jenkins: We've never done this.

Dr. Kissinger: Will they make you pay your expenses?

Mr. Jenkins: I don't know. They may put me up in the Peking Hotel.

Dr. Kissinger: Let us know. If they make you pay, then we will make the Chinese pay. If not, we will know what to do. We will just get the money, maybe from the Agency.

Mr. Jenkins: I will just mention it parenthetically, in a regular cable. I will just say that they have asked me to stay as their guest. If I don't mention anything like this, you will know that I paid my expenses.

Dr. Kissinger: When their advance party comes, can your colleagues avoid it becoming a circus?

Mr. Jenkins: I won't be here!

Mr. Holdridge: I can handle that.

Dr. Kissinger: Han Hsu is heading their advance team.

Okay. [To Mr. Rodman] Make sure we send a message to them to tell them that we will be setting up a direct White House channel, and that I have asked Mr. Jenkins to bring one substantive message.

[At that point the meeting ended. Ambassador Bruce departed. Dr. Kissinger then brought Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Holdridge back into his office and repeated to them that the effectiveness of the Liaison Office depended on its being a reliable channel for the White House. If Mr. Jenkins had any problem setting up a secure channel, the White House would just have to bypass the Peking Liaison Office. It would be easier bureaucratically if Mr. Jenkins could get this done by making his own suggestions rather than having it be the result of White House suggestions.]

25. Memorandum From Richard H. Solomon of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, April 2, 1973.

SUBJECT

Peking's Current Campaign to Recover Taiwan, and Options for the U.S.

In view of the now heightened pace of U.S.–PRC normalization, I have undertaken an analysis of recent developments which indicate Peking's desire to rapidly open negotiations with Taipei. The analysis, at Tab A,[2] reaches the following conclusions:

—The PRC is increasing its pressures on the Nationalist government to come to a negotiated solution regarding the future status of the island. Peking is proceeding at four levels of activity;

—Sustaining efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally.
—Heightening the visibility of its media appeals for reunification.
—Actively cultivating overseas Chinese, who will stimulate opinion trends on the island for reunification.
—Moving rapidly toward normalization with the U.S. in order to "elbow aside" Washington's relationship with Taipei.

—On Taiwan, the Nationalist leadership appears to have made a smooth transition from Chiang Kai-shek's leadership to that of his son Chiang Ching-kuo. However, there is increasing uncertainty about what policy the ROC should adopt toward Peking and the U.S. Individuals in the leadership have begun making informal appeals for greater candor on the part of the White House about its intentions regarding the PRC and ROC. There appears to be a growing public mood of fatalism on Taiwan about the likely prospect of some form of reconciliation between Taipei and Peking.

—In these circumstances, the U.S. has essentially three options regarding the uncertain prospect of negotiations between the two Chinese capitals: do nothing; attempt to stimulate talks; or play a more subtle catalyzing role without directly intermediating in negotiations. The virtues of the latter posture are explored in the analysis.

—The study concludes by noting that in the period ahead it would be useful to have more systematic periodic assessments of public opin-

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 526, Country Files, Far East, People's Republic of China, Vol. 6, Jan–Apr 1973. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

[2] Undated, attached but not printed.

ion and leadership trends on Taiwan regarding the future status of the island. Because of the sensitivity of this issue, however, you may wish to do nothing out of the ordinary in this regard.

Recommendation:

That you authorize more systematic and periodic assessments of public opinion and leadership trends on Taiwan regarding the island's future status.

—Do nothing at this time.

—Request CIA to undertake such an effort.[3]

—Request that we prepare for you other "outside the system" alternatives to such an effort.

[3] Kissinger initialed the Approve option.

26. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, April 7, 1973.

SUBJECT

Security Assistance, Taiwan

Our security assistance program for Taiwan has changed during the last few years as grant MAP decreased and FMS credits assumed more importance. At the end of FY 73, grants for MAP *equipment* will end, though we will continue to pay for training and supply operations costs on prior year MAP programs. In addition, in FY 73–74, there are sizable special grants resulting from our commitment to F–5E coassembly on Taiwan deriving from the GRC's help during Enhance Plus. The table below reflects the changing nature of these programs and itemizes the major military credit sales programs.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 94, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, May 16–June 13, 1973. Secret. Sent for information.

	Fiscal Years ($ million)				
	72	73	74	75	76
Enhance Plus grant	—	18	28	—	—
MAP	11	10	5.8**	5.8**	.5
FMS Credit	45	44	65	135	124
—F–5E coassembly	—	(5)	(23)	(69)	(61)
—Helo coproduction	(9)	(7)	(7)	(11)*	(10)*
—Trucks	(12)	(3)	(6)*	(5)*	(5)*
—Patrol Boats	—	(4)*	(8)*	(6)*	(12)*
—Hawk bns.	—	—	—	(17)*	(14)*
Total Grants and FMS	56	72	99	141	125

* Not yet approved.

** 5.3 for supply operations, .5 for grant training.

You will note that though matériel grants are phasing out, total assistance has increased through FMS credits. This is consistent with Taiwan's continually improving economy, our commitment to the GRC, and the self-sufficiency aspects of the Nixon Doctrine.

	Fiscal Years ($ million)				
	72	73	74	75	76
Grant Matériel	3	1.5	0	0	0
Credit Sales	45	44	65	135	124
Cash Sales	46	49	*	*	*
Total	94	94.5	65*	135*	124*

* Cash sales unknown for FY 74–76

27. Memorandum From Winston Lord of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Military Assistant (Scowcroft)[1]

Washington, April 16, 1973.

SUBJECT

Brief Highlights of New York Meeting

Our Liaison Office

HAK introduced Bruce, said he had complete trust of the President. [*2½ lines not declassified*] When HAK asked Huang if they agree that the New York channel will dissolve and we will use the Liaison Offices, Huang said Peking was still studying this. HAK said that we had heard that Jenkins was pressing for American newsmen to be admitted to Peking for the opening of the office; he assured Huang we had no special interest in this and that it was entirely up to the Chinese.

Chinese Liaison Office

Huang read out their understandings on their office and HAK confirmed that all were okay. They will hoist national flag and put out emblem; they won't join the Diplomatic Corps or participate in any functions which involve the Chinese Nationalists; they will maintain contact with countries with whom they have diplomatic relations; while technically they will be under the same travel restrictions as the Soviets, in practice they will be free to go where they want.

HAK told Huang that Solomon was our man to greet their advance party and would respond to all requests. While technical arrangements would be up to the State Department, substantive matters should be discussed first at the White House. HAK wants to see Han Hsu Wednesday morning; invites the top three guys to lunch Friday; and Bruce will give a dinner for entire delegation Friday night. We will be in daily touch with the advance party and in addition, the New York Mission can send people down here if they wish.

Indochina

HAK was very starchy on North Vietnamese violations and handed over all messages on this subject to and from the North

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 94, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, April 15–May 15, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. A memorandum of conversation of the meeting, which took place at China's UN Mission, is ibid.

Vietnamese since the ones I gave the Chinese in my meeting.[2] He also explained our position on Cambodia. Huang responded quite moderately and claimed he was speaking personally. HAK at one point indicated that discussions would be acceptable with Sihanouk's representative—the way he put it suggested that it might be the United States talking to them rather than the Cambodian Government but he was fuzzy on this and earlier said that negotiations had to be among the Cambodians. Huang particularly directed our attention to the various public statements made by Sihanouk recently. [*Comment:* I will round these up and we will have a closer look at them though I doubt they hold anything promising.][3]

Soviet Union

HAK gave the standard line on ESC, MBFR, SALT and bilateral matters. On MBFR, he reaffirmed that cuts would be no more than 10% and that we would make some suggestions to our allies, but not to the Soviets before this fall. He promised the Chinese a look at our proposals when they are firmer.

On SALT, he mentioned the recent comprehensive Soviet proposal and promised to send a summary tomorrow (Tuesday). [*Comment:* I will follow up with Sonnenfeldt–Hyland and get a summary by midday.] He also promised to send them a copy of our counterproposal on SALT which he said should be completed in about 10 days.

On the Nuclear Treaty,[4] he gave the usual line about watering this down and said that we were awaiting a Soviet proposal following up our rejection of the last draft we gave the Chinese. He said that we don't make proposals but rather get them from the Soviet Union. He promised to give the Chinese a copy of the next Soviet proposal (by messenger because of sensitivity).[5] [*Comment:* In short, he is keeping the Chinese about two or three laps behind.] He indicated we might reach an agreement at the summit but not without prior consultations with the Chinese. He reaffirmed that we would never incur an obligation not to use nuclear weapons nor aim at third countries.

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[2] Lord complained to the Chinese Government about North Vietnamese violations during a March 17 meeting with Chuang Yen, Deputy PRC UN Representative. (Memorandum of conversation, March 17; ibid., January 1–April 14, 1973)

[3] These and all subsequent brackets are in the original.

[4] The "Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War," signed on June 22, committed both countries to consult with the other in order to avoid the risk of a nuclear war.

[5] On April 24, an American messenger gave the new Soviet draft to Chinese officials in New York. (Memorandum for the record by McManis, April 25; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 94, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, April 15–May 15, 1973)

Korea–UNCURK

HAK said that we could agree to a two-step process of first adjourning sine die and then having the UN abolish the organization. In return we would expect delineation of the entire Korean item from the Assembly debate.[6] Huang indicated their unhappiness over our alleged backsliding, both because of our two-stage approach (even though it would be this year presumably) and because we want to postpone the entire Korean debate item.

Miscellaneous

In response to their number two guy's inquiry to me, HAK said that we had authorized American firms to investigate the possibilities to develop oil in Siberia with Japan but had given no financial guarantees as yet.

HAK filled Huang in on the various foreign visitors coming to Washington. On behalf of the President, he said that if Prime Minister Chou En-lai were to visit the UN this fall, he would be welcome in Washington. He didn't have to go to the UN, HAK added, but this might be a convenient method.

HAK asked the Chinese to get Eugene Ormandy off his back.[7]

Huang asked what the implication was in the President's recent letter to Chairman Mao about our interest in Chinese viability and independence.[8] HAK replied we consider this in our own interest and did not ask reciprocity.

Huang offered to give Bruce a farewell dinner, but Bruce graciously declined because of a full schedule until his departure on about May 1. Huang then offered to host a dinner the first time Bruce comes back for consultations.

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[6] During an April 9 telephone conversation at 5:58 p.m., Rush advised Kissinger to make this offer to the PRC Government. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telcons, Box 19–2 [March–April 1973])

[7] In September 1973, the Philadelphia Orchestra, conducted by Eugene Ormandy, visited the People's Republic of China.

[8] See Document 21.

28. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

I–22420/73 Washington, April 17, 1973, 3:30–4:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

Courtesy Call by Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, Chief of the Liaison Office in Peking

PARTICIPANTS

Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Department of State, Chief Peking Liaison Office—David K. E. Bruce
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA/EAPA)—Dennis J. Doolin
Director, East Asia & Pacific Region (ISA)—RADM Thomas J. Bigley
Department of State, Acting Director, People's Republic of China and Mongolian Affairs—Roger W. Sullivan
Assistant for People's Republic of China (ISA)—Robert L. Vandegrift

Ambassador Bruce said he and Mr. Holdridge would leave for Peking about 1 May and that he hoped to get settled early since the Chinese were cooperating very well with Mr. Jenkins in the preliminary arrangements for quarters and other housekeeping chores.

Mr. Eagleburger explained that DOD had a much stricter interpretation of the Shanghai Communiqué and harder view of the Taiwan situation than State and that it would probably be a long time before all U.S. forces were withdrawn from Taiwan. Mr. Doolin stated that most of the personnel stationed there were assigned to regionally oriented security assignments not connected with the defense of Taiwan. RADM Bigley explained that the men attached to the C–130 units on Taiwan were related in part to Southeast Asian commitments and could gradually be transferred elsewhere as tensions in Indochina diminished. Mr. Sullivan stated that State and DOD views on the issue of U.S. forces on Taiwan were now much closer since the establishment of the Liaison Offices had made it clear that this issue was no longer an obstacle to PRC normalization moves with the U.S.

In regard to Chinese language fluency, Ambassador Bruce stated he possessed no ability whatsoever but that everyone on his staff was competent. After a general discussion of the great differences between Chinese dialects and the great difficulty the Chinese themselves had in understanding the local dialects of their leaders, Mr. Sullivan said

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[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–76–117, China, 333, April 23, 1973. Secret. The memorandum of conversation was prepared by Robert L. Vandegrift and approved by Dennis Doolin. The meeting was held in Lawrence Eagleburger's office.

the State Department has no one who can understand the Hunan dialect spoken by Mao. Even the discussions President Nixon had with Mao, not to mention the other U.S. officials, were completely incomprehensible to the Americans. Translations were made by Chou En-lai or a Chinese interpreter and it was not possible to verify the accuracy of the translation even to subject, let alone inflections and nuances. As a result, no one at State really is certain what Mao said or whether he was coherent. Mr. Doolin and the Ambassador then discussed the realities of one's interpreter taking liberties with both what and how he translates without the principal even being aware of the change.

Mr. Eagleburger assured Ambassador Bruce that DOD had no plans to complicate his mission by pushing for a Defense Attaché Office in Peking. Mr. Doolin pointed out there was no advantage to have a DAO while current PRC surveillance and travel restrictions remained in force, but that the PRC might at some point make some initiatives along this time.

Ambassador Bruce then asked for and received the latest DOD analysis of the Chinese military capabilities, their science and technology efforts, and their present relations with the USSR from Mr. Doolin and RADM Bigley. Ambassador Bruce also raised questions on Soviet naval capabilities which RADM Bigley answered.

The meeting concluded with a general discussion which included Chinese archives and libraries, a book the Ambassador had written on President Lincoln, stories concerning prominent personalities he had known, and some of his personal experiences in the Foreign Service.

29. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers, Secretary of Defense Richardson, Secretary of the Treasury Shultz, Secretary of Agriculture Butz, and Secretary of Commerce Dent[1]

Washington, April 24, 1973.

SUBJECT

Coordinating USG Contacts with the Liaison Office of the People's Republic of China

The People's Republic of China is now in the process of establishing a Liaison Office in Washington which will open for business some time in early May. This will provide all agencies of the U.S. Government a more ready contact point with Chinese authorities as the process of normalization of Sino-American relations proceeds.

Given the still sensitive stage of our relations with the People's Republic, however, the President has requested that all contacts with the PRC's Washington Liaison Office be coordinated with the National Security Council and the Department of State.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 526, Country Files, Far East, People's Republic of China, Vol. 6, Jan–Apr 1973. Secret. A copy of this memorandum was sent to the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, Peter Flanigan. Kissinger approved the memorandum after receiving it under an April 16 covering memorandum from Holdridge. (Ibid.) On May 16, Kissinger sent it to all department and agency heads. (Ibid., Box 527, Country Files, Far East, People's Republic of China, Vol. 7, May, 1973–Jul 9, 1973)

30. Conversation Between President Nixon and the Chief-Designate of the Liaison Office in China (Bruce)[1]

Washington, May 3, 1973.

[Omitted here is Nixon and Bruce's meeting with reporters.]

Nixon: Well, the great thing for you, as you know, substantively, probably not a great deal will happen for a while.

Bruce: Yes.

Nixon: But the most important thing about this is the symbolism. I mean, symbolism sometimes is not important, but now it is enormously important.

Bruce: The fact that—

Nixon: The fact that you are there. Let me tell you one thing that I particularly would like to see. I know that the social world is a total pain in the [neck], but to the extent that you can, if you could get around, and have your colleagues get around and give us an evaluation of the people on the way up who are there now.

Bruce: Yes. Yes.

Nixon: You've got to understand, Mao will soon be leaving; Chou En-lai is in his 70s but he's as vigorous as can be—terrific. You're going to really like him, you'll like them both. Chou En-lai is an amazing man. But on the other hand, except for some men in their 30s—late 30s and 40s—I don't see much coming up. And I think, you know, you can do that. Look around, see who the power is. That's one thing that would be very important for us to know. Isn't it?

Bruce: Well, I think it is, yes. Because if they have sort of a collegial [unclear]—

Nixon: The Russians have quite a few in their shop that you know might come along.

Bruce: Yes.

Nixon: And you know, an interesting thing, the Russians too [unclear], so pretty soon we know in four or five years there's going to be change there. But there will be a change in China. And the world changes. Well, there's that. Then, of course, the just, you know, your sense of the country, its people. I mean, I'm really, really more interested in that than

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 911–9. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon spoke with Bruce in the Oval Office from 9:48 until 10:12 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

I am in the routine cables, "Well, today we did this, or that, or the other thing. We signed an agreement." You know, this is how we grow figs.

Bruce: Exactly.

Nixon: Huh?

Bruce: Yes.

Nixon: Don't you agree?

Bruce: I do agree.

Nixon: We're trying to see what this great—I mean, we've got to get along with this one-fourth of all people in the world. The ablest people in the world in my opinion—potentially. We've got to get along with them. It's no problem for the next 5 years, the next 20 years, but it's the critical problem of our age.

Bruce: Yes, I think it is.

Nixon: The other thing is, if you could, constantly of course, whenever you're talking, they've very subtle—and they're not like the Russians, who, of course slobber at flattery and all that sort of thing. But you should let them know how—two things: one, from a personal standpoint how much I appreciated the welcome while we were there. Second, we look forward to some time returning. Third, I would very much hope that Chou En-lai will see his way clear to come here to the UN.

Bruce: Yes.

Nixon: Or something. I'd like to take him here, and it can be worked out in a proper way. And fourth, and I think this is the most important, that I look upon the Chinese-American relationship as really the key to peace in the world. Always have in the back of your mind without playing it too obviously, the fact that the only thing that makes the Russian game go is the Chinese game. Always have in the back of your mind that if you say anything pro-Russian, [unclear]. Always have in the back of your mind that the Russians are their deadly enemies. And they know it, and we know it. And that we will stand by them.

Bruce: Yes.

Nixon: And that's the commitment that I have made. I have.

Bruce: Yes.

Nixon: How we do it, I don't know. But that's what keeps. Because David, what is probably in our time maybe that big collision could occur, and collisions even between enemies these days will involve all nations of the world, they're that big. So we want to avoid that too. But my point is the Chinese must be reassured they have one heck of a friend here. They hate the Indians, as you know.

Bruce: Yes.

Nixon: Well, they don't hate them as much as they have contempt for them. They think that India is becoming a, you know, a sort of satellite of Russia. And of course the Japanese, they have a fear and respect for them as well. So with the Japanese, sort of say the right thing in terms of we want to get along with Japan and the rest. And it's very important that we have our, that we maintain our, in other words the shield there, because otherwise Japan goes into business for itself and that's not in our interest. And the other point that they're fairly interested in, looking at the world scene, another point, apart from the fact they'll go through the usual jazz [unclear] keeping revolutions in mind. That's fine. What they do in Africa I don't care anymore. But Europe. They don't want us to get out of Europe. Because they realize as long as the Russians have a tie down in Europe, that—you see what I mean?

Bruce: Oh, I do.

Nixon: So some of our well-intentioned Congressmen go over there and reassure them, "Oh, look, we're going to get out of Asia. We're going to get out of Japan, we're trying to reduce our forces in Europe." Well, that for the Chinese scares them to death.

Bruce: Well, I was struck by the conversations that you've had, and how they came back to the necessity about preserving forces in Europe. They were very pro-NATO for their own reasons. It was interesting.

Nixon: Absolutely.

Bruce: Well, I've got all those points in mind. Those conversations that you had there I've read. I must say they really are quite [unclear] fascinating to read.

Nixon: Yeah. You're one of the few in the country who's read them.

Bruce: I'd forgotten—but I do think they're absolutely fascinating.

Nixon: Yeah. A lot of history was made there.

Bruce: It was indeed. I think probably the most significant history, diplomatic history, of our time. No question about it. And I don't see anything, which could really ruin it in the time being. Without any hesitation I can tell you I always thought the preservation of good relations should have sort of ordinary courtesies and what not in the beginning, it'll probably be all business, but you try and get to know as many people as possible. [unclear]

Nixon: Let them think that we are strong, respected, and we're not going to be pushed around by the Russians or anybody else. Middle East—we have no answer there, as you know.

Bruce: I know.

Nixon: They haven't either. But I think the great irony is that today the United States of all nations is China's most important friend. [laughter] Romania? Tanzania? Albania?

[unclear exchange]

Bruce: That's pretty good stuff.

Nixon: My point is, with that in mind—would you like a little coffee?

Bruce: No, I wouldn't like some. I just had some.

Nixon: Oh, fine. I'll have a little, just a cup.

Bruce: But this is a most fascinating development, I think.

Nixon: It sure is.

Bruce: We must replace the policies that have become so embedded almost in the American consciousness that nobody in particular complained about it, and nobody intended [unclear].

Nixon: Look, for 20 years, do you know, we were sort of—now look, I'm supposed to be the number one Red-baiter in the country. I have earned that reputation for what you know very well. Had we just continued the policy of just a silent confrontation and almost non-communication with the PRC—

Bruce: Yes.

Nixon: In the end we would reap a nuclear war. No question.

Bruce: Yes. Yes.

Nixon: We just had to breakthrough.

Bruce: Yeah.

Nixon: Also, as I said, it was so important to the Russian game.

Bruce: Terribly important.

Nixon: Yeah.

Bruce: Terribly important.

Nixon: Yeah.

Bruce: It must have [unclear]. How about does one explain to the Chinese that we want to preserve a relationship that has great importance to us, a meaningful relationship with Russia? The Chinese are undoubtedly our favorites between the two. But—

Nixon: The Russians are saying: Now look, this is very important. That Nixon is having another meeting with Brezhnev. There's going to be a lot of reasons for having that meeting. The important thing there to remember is that Russia and the United States are superpowers. That our interests do rub together in the Mideast and in Europe, particularly. That their rubbing together is a danger that is almost unbelievably great, and that under these circumstances we feel what we have to do is try to limit that danger as much as we can through communication. But, on the other hand, we do not consider putting it quite bluntly as between the two. We consider the Soviet, because of its power and of its long history of expansionism, we consider it more of a danger that we have to deal with than we do China, which has a longer history of, frankly, defense. Now, I think a little of that is well

worth saying. In other words—and also I'd be very blunt about it. Just say you've had a long talk with the President and there's no illusions—our systems are different. They're better Communists than the Russians are today. But we want to get back to our national interest. And the President considers—he's a man of the Pacific. He considers that China and America have a hell of a lot more in common than Russia and America, and that is the God's truth.

Bruce: Yes, that's true.

Nixon: And that therefore, looking at the historical process, I want to work toward that direction. And I think that's what we have to do. But the Chinese-American relationship can be the great lynchpin of peace in the world.

Bruce: Well, I'll tell you that after you've talked to Brezhnev, the Chinese will be filled in rather completely.

Nixon: Totally. I've instructed, I'll have, of course we'll be in touch with you, but we'll probably have Kissinger go over again. Incidentally, I want to tell you one thing. Normally on these visits when he goes, this is very important, he has sometimes met alone. So far. But in this instance, I want you to feel, David, that you are basically, not the State Department's ambassador, you are the President's, and I want you to be in on everything. You see what I mean? You've got to remember that we cannot—there's parts of these games that we don't want to go to the bureaucracy. It's no lack of confidence in Bill or any of the others. But you know how it is. So will you have this in mind, please?

Bruce: I will, Mr. President. I certainly will. Because the security of the State Department is, in my mind, non-existent.

Nixon: It's non-existent.

Bruce: [unclear]

Nixon: That's right.

Bruce: No, I think that I understand that part of the [unclear]. And I think the back channel can be used [unclear]

Nixon: Well, I want to use the backchannel. And also, when Henry gets over there to do the briefings. I think it's very important that you be with him.

Bruce: Well, I would like that.

Nixon: So that you can, you know, get the feel of the thing too.

Bruce: Yes, I think it would be on that occasion, good. They offered when they came to Paris in connection with the Vietnam peace talks taking me to secret meetings. And I was very indisposed to do it. I think it would have been a great mistake. I never would have been able to—

Nixon: Oh, yes. When you were there?

Bruce: Yes. But I think with China it's probably a different thing.

Nixon: Well, in China [unclear]. I'll see that it's done.

Bruce: All right, sir. I've only got one other thing, which I have not [unclear]—because they are behind the times with what's going on. This Cambodia thing, I wonder if it's possible to settle.

Nixon: I wish it were. We're willing to settle; China can have it. Whether they can still get that [unclear] Sihanouk back in I don't know. We don't care. The Cambodians don't want it at the moment. What ideas did you have? I mean, anything we can do—God, Cambodia is a terrible, terrible place.

[Omitted here is further discussion of Cambodia and South Vietnam.]

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31. Memorandum From Robert D. Hormats and Richard H. Solomon of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, May 3, 1973.

SUBJECT

Textiles and PRC

As you know, the Chinese recently responded to our March 22 memorandum on cotton textiles by indicating that it was unreasonable for us to ask them to restrain textile exports when such products were at a low level of importation and represented China's most important export to the U.S.[2] We responded (see the cable at Tab A) by indicating that the U.S. has no intention of discriminating against the PRC, but it does have equity obligations to other trading partners.[3] We said that our memorandum was intended to identify a problem which is developing—not to ask for PRC to take any action at this time—and that questions involved should be discussed in Washington after the PRC liaison office is established.

The *Chinese position* on this is understandable in light of the fact that PRC textile exports to the U.S. are in fact at a relatively low level—

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 527, Country Files, Far East, People's Republic of China, Vol. 7, May–Jul 9, 1973. Secret. Sent for action.

[2] Regarding the March 22 memorandum, see Document 19. Telegram 10468 from Paris, April 14, conveyed the Chinese response. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973)

[3] Tab A, telegram 75300 to Paris, April 21, is attached but not printed.

16 million square yards—compared with much higher levels of Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, and Thailand, etc. Moreover, China has purchased substantial amounts of U.S. products—about $90 million worth in 1972—while only exporting about half as much to the U.S. Thus, if the PRC is to move toward a trade balance, it believes increases in textile exports to the U.S. are necessary and should be permitted.

From *our point of view,* however, we have restrained cotton textile imports from other nations (many of whom are close to us politically). Some of these nations have already inquired as to why we have not restrained textiles from the PRC. Moreover, domestic textile producers have expressed concern to us that the U.S. Government's attempt to improve relations with the PRC will be at the expense of their interests. Thus, we continue to feel that it is necessary to work out some arrangement with the PRC which would limit imports to a reasonable level.

The *amount* at which we limit imports is a tricky issue. Under the Long-Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles (LTA)—an agreement to which we and most textile exporting nations subscribe—there is a set formula which would determine this number based on how much was exported by the PRC in the period before restraints were imposed. If utilized *now* that formula would lead to a restraint level unacceptably low to the Chinese. If we were to waive the formula and agree to imports at a level substantially higher than that permitted under it, all other members of the agreement would complain.

The best way to handle this problem would be to discuss quietly with PRC representatives the issues we face but to delay on *formally* notifying them that we want them to restrain their textile imports until a sufficient base has been established so that the LTA formula would give them a high restraint level. In this way, although we would be neglecting our other trading partners by permitting the Chinese to import unreasonably large amounts of cotton textiles without applying the LTA, we could, once we do apply the LTA, adhere to its formula. From the PRC point of view, their exports next year would then be limited at a level sufficiently higher than they would be if we applied the formula today, and in subsequent years their textile exports could grow by a certain percentage about the 1974 base number.

Recommendation:

That we hold off on making any representations to the PRC on textiles until their mission in Washington is fully established and PRC textile exports have reached a substantially higher level.[4]

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[4] Kissinger initialed the Approve option. According to an attached correspondence file, he approved the recommendation on May 25.

32. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, May 15, 1973, 10:20–11:00 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
Han Hsu, Deputy Chief of the PRC Liaison Office
Chien Ta-yung, Official of the PRC Liaison Office
Chi Chiao Chu, Official of the PRC Liaison Office
Mr. Kuo, Official of the PRC Mission to the United Nations

[Before Dr. Kissinger arrived, Mr. Lord and the Chinese held informal conversation. Mr. Lord asked them if everything was going well and said that he had heard they had narrowed down their choices for a residence for their Liaison Office to a couple of places. The Chinese responded that things were going smoothly and confirmed that they had narrowed down their choices. Mr. Lord hoped they had some chance for sightseeing and relaxation, and Ambassador Han replied that they had not had to work too hard. They had been sightseeing on two occasions. Mr. Lord welcomed Mr. Kuo from New York and asked him if it was his first time to Washington. Mr. Kuo said that it was and that he had come on short notice just for a couple of days.

Mr. Kuo said that he had heard about Mr. Lord's departure from the staff from the newspapers. Mr. Lord confirmed this, and he noted that he had talked to Mrs. Shih about this and earlier to members of the Liaison Office. Mr. Lord reviewed the reasons for his leaving, namely, rest, reflection, recharge his batteries, and see more of his family. He reiterated that he would stay in the Washington area and hoped to see the Chinese on a personal basis. He said that he might be back in government some day, perhaps working for Dr. Kissinger, but that he needed to take a break at this point. If he did come back, he would then be all the more efficient. The Chinese repeated their regrets that Mr. Lord was leaving and their hope to see him on a private basis and inquired about his replacement. Mr. Lord responded that the staff was being somewhat reorganized and Dr. Kissinger was bringing in some good new people, but that in any event there would be continuity. He cited Messrs. Howe (temporarily), Rodman, and Solomon.

After ten minutes Dr. Kissinger arrived and the meeting began.]

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 94, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, April 15–May 15, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Map Room of the White House. All brackets are in the original.

Dr. Kissinger: I'm sorry I'm late. I was with the President, and I could not get away. How is your search for housing progressing?

Ambassador Han: There's been some slight progress. The Skyline place has been ruled out.

Dr. Kissinger: You mean the one in Southwest?

Ambassador Han: Yes. The Ramada Inn is not bad.

Dr. Kissinger: Where is that?

Mr. Chi and Mr. Lord: Thomas Circle, on 14th Street.

Dr. Kissinger: Does it have some grounds?

Ambassador Han: There's a larger area than in the Embassy Row Apartments. There's a big swimming pool.

Dr. Kissinger: I will come for a swim. Has there been any progress in finding a residence?

Ambassador Han: No.

Dr. Kissinger: First, you are concentrating on finding an office and then the residence. I'm eager for your cook to arrive. (Laughter)

Ambassador Han: We are also hoping for an early arrival.

Dr. Kissinger: I am sure of that.

I appreciate your agreeing to see me here, Mr. Ambassador. It is very difficult for me to go to New York since I'm leaving tomorrow for Paris. I wanted the Prime Minister to have an account of our meeting. (Mr. Lord indicated to Dr. Kissinger while this was being translated that the Chinese wished to keep the meeting secret. They had told Mr. Lord this as they were walking from their car to the Map Room.) We can keep this meeting secret very easily. The entrance at this point of the White House is not known to the press. If you are seen, we will say that it concerned preparations for housing and technical things. But there is no possibility that it will be seen.

Ambassador Han: Our hope is that this meeting will be, as previous meetings, kept secret.

Dr. Kissinger: You can be sure that from our side there will be no discussion of it. Just on the one chance in a thousand that someone sees you drive out—this has never happened before—we will just say this is a routine visit connected with technical arrangements for housing. There's no possibility. I'm just protecting against the possible chance. I use this room for meetings when I do not want them to become known.

Let me talk about my visit to Moscow and my general impressions.[2] I spent four days in Zavidovo, which is the hunting lodge of

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[2] Kissinger visited the Soviet Union May 4–9.

the Politburo. Most of my time was in conversations with General Secretary Brezhnev. First I'll talk to you about matters that concern the United States and the Soviet Union. Then let me talk about what we said concerning China. And then let me tell you what our policy is, because it is important that Peking and Washington understand each other completely.

First let me talk to you about the various drafts of the nuclear proposals that the Soviet Union has made to us. (He pulls out his folder.) We've given you every previous draft, and I have attached the last draft that the Soviet Union gave us, and where it stands now after discussion there. (Dr. Kissinger writes an addition on one of the attachments that he is about to hand over.)

Let me explain what we are trying to do. If we want to establish a condominium with the Soviet Union, we don't need a treaty. We've had many offers to that effect. If we want to gang up with China against the Soviet Union we don't need to make any arrangements, as I will explain to you later. What we are trying to do first of all is to gain some time. Secondly, to establish a legal obligation as between us and the Soviet Union that requires the Soviet Union to consult with us before taking any military acts, so if they do take any military actions without consulting us, they will have taken unilateral acts which gives us the basis for common action, which we do not now possess with regard to third countries. So what we have done in our discussions, which are not yet finally completed, is first of all to insist that any obligation that applies between us and the Soviet Union applies also between the Soviet Union and third countries. Secondly, that the objective of not using nuclear weapons can be realized only if there's a renunciation of the use of any force. Thirdly, any consultations that occur between us and the Soviet Union are confined to those cases where the two countries might go to war against each other or they might threaten a war against a third country. Thirdly (*sic*) where it says in the draft that nothing should impair existing agreements, etc., the Soviet Union wanted only to say when there are treaties and formal agreements, and we insisted that it should include "other appropriate instruments" such as letters and communiqués.

Ambassador Han: That's the fourth point.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Ambassador Han: Nothing should impair . . . ?

Dr. Kissinger: (reading from the draft treaty) "Nothing in this agreement shall affect or impair the obligations undertaken by the United States and the Soviet Union toward their allies or other countries in treaties, agreements, and other appropriate instruments."

We have prepared a document on where this now stands with our explanation of what it means, for whatever views you want to express.

There are three basic objectives. First, to gain time. Secondly, to force the Soviet Union if it engages in military actions to do so out of a posture of peace rather than an atmosphere of tension. Thirdly, it gives us legal obligations for our position in case of countries where we don't have formal arrangements. (He hands over the annotated current draft and the previous version that the Chinese had seen, attached at Tab A).[3]

Mr. Chi: The second principle concerned . . . could you kindly repeat this?

Dr. Kissinger: We want to make sure that when the Soviet Union attacks it will be from a posture of relaxation of tension immediately to war, rather than from a prolonged period of tension which confuses the issue.

Of course, no one knows we are giving you this. The single-spaced part is our comment.

While talking on this subject, let me mention a discussion with Mr. Brezhnev that concerned China. Brezhnev took me hunting one day, which is a sport I have never engaged in (the Chinese smile). In fact he went hunting, and I just walked along. In the Soviet Union one hunts from the stand in the trees with the animals below, so it is not excessively dangerous. After the shooting was over Brezhnev had a picnic lunch brought in, and it was just he and I and one interpreter. In this conversation he expressed his extremely limited admiration of China. (Laughter from the Chinese.) And he is a somewhat less disciplined and controlled leader than your Prime Minister. That is not new. That has been done before.

But then he said the Soviet Union and the United States had a joint obligation to prevent China from becoming a big nuclear power. And he said, "do you consider China an ally?" I said, "no, we don't consider it an ally—we consider it a friend." He said, "well you can have any friends you want, but you and we should be partners"—he meant Moscow and Washington. He repeated again that we have a joint responsibility to prevent China from becoming a nuclear power. And I said we recognize no such joint responsibility. That was it, in effect. The rest was simply tirades about China which there is no sense in repeating—things like big power chauvinism, and as soon as you are strong enough you will also turn on us. That sort of thing, immaterial.

Then on the last day, I flew from that lodge to Moscow just to stop at our Embassy for 15 minutes, and I was accompanied by Dobrynin, their Ambassador here. He said that Brezhnev had asked him to make

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[3] Attached but not printed.

sure that I understood that the conversation at the hunting stand was meant to be serious and not a social conversation. He said he wanted to know whether there existed a formal agreement between the People's Republic and the United States. I said there didn't exist any agreement, but there existed appropriate instruments which we took from this draft, and that in any event we will be guided by our national interest—which we had expressed in the President's Annual Report.[4]

These were all the conversations which concerned China . . . except every time we mentioned third countries here, Gromyko would say that we were acting as the lawyer for China. Our views remain exactly as expressed by me to the Chairman and the Prime Minister, and by the President in his letters to the Chairman and the Prime Minister.[5] We continue to believe that it should be the objectives of both our governments to continue to accelerate normalization to the point where it becomes clear that we have a stake in the strength and independence of the People's Republic.

I would be prepared, if the Prime Minister wanted, to come to Peking in August after the summit here in order to make a visit. It wouldn't have to be as long as previous visits because we've had basic talks. Maybe two days, or two or three days. If the Prime Minister—we mentioned this in New York once—were considering a visit to the United Nations, we would, of course, give him a very warm reception here in Washington, or if he would come only to Washington. Then we could announce that in the summer. But we could think of other measures to symbolize this.

I have a self-interest in this anyway because if those two things happen, Winston Lord would certainly come back from vacation. So you should also consider it from this wide perspective.

This is the general perspective. I also want to tell you that even though there are many changes in the staff, such as the departure of Winston Lord, there are also some compensations like the return of General Haig to the White House. And you can count on the continuity of our policy that we have been pursuing.

Those are the most important things from Moscow. Now I want to tell you a few minor things.

With respect to SALT, we do not foresee an agreement this year on anything except general principles. (To Lord) Did we give them our latest proposal?

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[4] Nixon submitted the Fourth Annual Report on U.S. Foreign Policy to Congress on May 3. For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1973*, pp. 348–518.

[5] See Documents 21 and 22.

Mr. Lord (to Kissinger): We gave them the Soviet proposal.

Dr. Kissinger: By the end of this week we will give you our proposal, so you know what is being discussed in Geneva.[6] We are working on this proposal this week. From my conversations in Moscow it's quite clear that there will be no concrete agreement except on general principles, and those principles are not yet worked out. When they are, we will show them to you. They will not be distinguished by excessive precision.

On MBFR there was practically no discussion except for the timing of negotiations later this year. We will also give you a summary of the position we are discussing with our allies. We have not yet discussed it with the Soviet Union. We will do that next week.

We are also preparing for the Summit a number of bilateral agreements of the same sort as last year—agricultural research, oceanography, cultural exchange, civil aviation.

On the economic side, it was simply another reiteration by the Soviet leaders of their need for long term credits.

Again, we want to repeat that anything we are prepared to do with the Soviet Union we are prepared to do with the People's Republic. And conversely, we may be prepared to do things with the People's Republic that we are not prepared to do with the Soviet Union.

Those are the major things I discussed in the Soviet Union.

As to the visit of Brezhnev, he will be here eight days.[7] He will spend five probably in Washington and two in Los Angeles or San Clemente. We haven't decided yet on some place in between, it may be Key Biscayne, it may be Detroit—he is crazy about automobiles.

You know I'm going to Paris on Thursday[8] to meet with—I can't call him Special Advisor anymore, he's the Deputy Prime Minister now (Laughter). Again I want to repeat what I've said to Ambassador Huang Hua and the Prime Minister, that it is really in the interest of all countries to bring about an observance of the ceasefire.

Let me say one thing about all the domestic excitement you find in the United States at this point. Once you are here for some time you will see that there are always fits of hysteria descending on Washington in which people talk about nothing else. And six months later it's

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[6] On May 17, Lord reported, "The summary of our SALT proposal is going to the Chinese today." (Memorandum from Lord to Scowcroft; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 94, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, May 16–June 13, 1973)

[7] Leonid Brezhnev visited the United States June 16–25.

[8] May 17.

difficult to remember exactly all the details of the controversy. The conduct of foreign policy is unaffected, and may in fact be even slightly strengthened in some fields, because many of our opponents may even want to show how responsible they are. It will become clear within the next two months that control of foreign policy in the government is being strengthened.

So the lines laid down in the conversations in February in Peking were fixed and will be pursued with vigor, and I would not let the noise here in Washington be too distracting.

On Korea we would like to give you an answer in two weeks. Frankly I have not had time to prepare an adequate answer.[9]

Cotton textiles. You sent us a note. We've asked the agencies not to pursue this subject until your Ambassador comes here.[10] We have certain legal obligations imposed on us by the Congress. I can tell you now that if our relations are ever impaired it will not be because of cotton textiles. [laughter] This is an issue that will be easily settled.

I don't know whether the Ambassador has anything. [The Chinese discuss among themselves.]

Ambassador Han: I have two things I would like to take up with Dr. Kissinger. The first thing is that the day before yesterday, on the 13th, there was a demonstration here against us in which, according to reports, they burned the national flag.

Dr. Kissinger: We regret this deeply. It is inexcusable. We will do the maximum permitted under law to prevent this. We cannot prevent demonstrations in authorized places. We will do our best to minimize these incidents. And when we can physically stop them, we will, of course, stop them. I know I express the view of the President and the whole U.S. Government when I speak of our regret over this incident.

Ambassador Han: Another thing—this is a minor matter. The American columnist, Mr. Marquis W. Childs, he is in Peking now, and he told our people that Dr. Kissinger suggested that he call on the Premier.

Dr. Kissinger: I'm a great admirer of the Premier and therefore I always think it is of benefit for someone to see him. I think Marquis Childs is basically so well disposed toward China and so eager to be helpful that it might be in your interest if the Prime Minister saw him. He will certainly write very favorably, and is socially well-connected

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[9] According to Kissinger's briefing to the President of this meeting with Chinese diplomats, "just before you left for Moscow, the Chinese asked us for our scenario on abolishing UNCURK in two steps during the latter half of this year, and we said that we would respond to their inquiry later." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 94, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, April 15–May 15, 1973)

[10] See Document 31.

so that what he brings back will be very positive. But except for this I have no personal interest. If the Prime Minister is too busy it would not be considered a personal affront to me. (There is discussion among the Chinese.)

Ambassador Han: About keeping this meeting secret from the press. If in the one of a dozen possibilities we were seen as you mentioned . . .

Dr. Kissinger: I won't say anything. I will deny that I saw you.

Ambassador Han: . . . We will say that it was an ordinary call and in addition to an ordinary call we will say that we expressed our regret over the incident on the 13th.

Dr. Kissinger: That is fine. That is all right. We should not look for an opportunity to say anything. (laughter) There is practically no chance of your being seen. (To Mr. Lord) Correct?

Mr. Lord: That's right.

Dr. Kissinger: I'm glad to see my old friend (Mr. Kuo). I hope the Ambassador will come here.

Mr. Kuo: I came on very short notice.

Dr. Kissinger: I know about the system—we will work it out.

Mr. Chi: Mr. Solomon and Mr. Romberg are working this out.

[There was some more light talk during which Dr. Kissinger said that U.S. policy wouldn't change with Mr. Lord's absence although it would be less efficient. He was counting on Mr. Lord's getting bored on the outside and also on the good sense of his Chinese wife.]

Dr. Kissinger: I saw that Ambassador Bruce arrived yesterday. We need to expand our office since 10,000 Americans want to work there. [laughter]

You still don't know when your Ambassador arrives?

Ambassador Han: There is still no news. As soon as we do know, we will let you know. Mr. Solomon asked Mr. Chi whether the Ambassador might come while you are in Paris. [Dr. Kissinger indicates puzzlement.]

Ambassador Han: We have no news. He was just wondering if the Ambassador might come while you were away.

Dr. Kissinger: Whenever he does come he will be highly welcomed. Of course, the President will see him very soon after his arrival.

Ambassador Han: We are looking forward to that.

Dr. Kissinger: It is always a pleasure to see our friends. I will leave first and separately so that you can leave more discreetly.

[There were then cordial farewells. Mr. Lord checked to make sure that there were no people around to notice the Chinese departure. There was a brief discussion in which Mr. Lord told the Chinese that they

should contact Mr. Lord the next day or two, and after that, Mr. Howe. Mr. Lord again indicated he was looking forward to seeing the Chinese on a personal basis. He asked Mr. Kuo to give his warm regards to Ambassador Huang Hua and Mrs. Shih in New York. There were then very warm farewells as Mr. Lord escorted the Chinese to their limousine waiting at the diplomatic entrance.]

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33. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, May 18, 1973.

PARTICIPANTS

Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Foreign Minister
Huang Chen, Chief, PRCLO
Chu Ch'uan-hsien, Acting Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Department of Protocol
Lin P'ing, Director of the Department of American and Oceanian Affairs, MFA
T'ang Wen-sheng, MFA Interpreter
Shen Jo-yun, Notetaker
Lien Cheng-pao, Notetaker

David K. E. Bruce, Chief, U.S. Liaison Office
Alfred le S. Jenkins, Deputy Chief, U.S. Liaison Office
John H. Holdridge, Deputy Chief, U.S. Liaison Office
Nicholas Platt, Chief, Political Section, U.S. Liaison Office

Introduction

Premier Chou began the conversation by asking whether Ambassador Bruce had met Ambassador Huang Chen prior to coming to China. Ambassador Bruce replied that he had not had the opportunity. Although Ambassador Huang had been in Paris while he was there, his own work had been concentrated on the negotiations with the North Vietnamese.

Ambassador Bruce told Premier Chou what a great pleasure it was to meet him, and assured the Premier that he, Chou, had a great num-

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 527, Country Files, Far East, People's Republic of China, Vol. 7, May, 1973–Jul 9, 1973. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Great Hall of People. The USLO sent this memorandum of conversation as an attachment to airgram 9 from Beijing, May 21. The USLO also sent a cable reporting the substance of this conversation. (Telegram 121 from Beijing, May 19, 0500Z; ibid.)

ber of admirers in the United States. Premier Chou asked after President Nixon's health, and Ambassador Bruce replied that the President was in excellent health, unaffected by certain domestic difficulties. Chou replied that such domestic difficulties frequently arise in the course of American political life.

Sino-U.S. Negotiations

Premier Chou then asked after Dr. Kissinger, commenting that he was a very busy man and remembering with a smile that he had once been able to disappear for a few days on a mission of which even the CIA was unaware. Ambassador Bruce answered that Kissinger's first trip to Peking was one of the best kept secrets in the history of international relations, as was the decision to establish Liaison Offices in the two capitals. The negotiations, he continued, were carried on in the grand manner, quietly, in a way quite different from any other negotiations.

Premier Chou replied with satisfaction that outside observers could not believe the fact of the Sino-U.S. negotiations because, prisoners of old attitudes and behavior patterns, they could not imagine relations between the two countries could develop so quickly. He believed that the secrecy was essential, because major policy changes require careful preparations and prior consideration. Ambassador Bruce replied that in the United States there was a tendency and an ambition in the press and the media to attempt to formulate foreign policy. The Premier agreed, adding that Congress was also influenced by the media at times. Sometimes unwisely, Ambassador Bruce interjected.

Premier Chou said that the Chinese Government paid great attention to the world press, particularly in the United States and Japan. The two internal reference digests published and circulated each day within the Chinese Government stressed articles from the U.S. press first, Japanese materials next, and then articles from Europe. Soviet press materials received the least attention because they were so repetitious and abusive.

Columnists

Premier Chou said that the journalist Marquis Childs had requested an interview, and asked Ambassador Bruce's advice. Marquis Childs had been a friend for 25 years, the Ambassador replied, which prejudiced his view, but he knew Childs to be trustworthy and intelligent.[2] Premier Chou said that he had heard some of Childs' views were the same as those of columnist Joseph Alsop. Ambassador Bruce replied

[2] Marquis Childs visited China later in the month and wrote two columns about his conversations with Zhou. ("A Conversation With Chou En-lai," *The Washington Post*, May 25, p. A31; "Talking With Chou En-lai," ibid., May 26, p. A19)

that there were marked differences between the two writers. Premier Chou then said the PRC had invited Walter Lippmann to visit but had heard that his health was poor and that he used a pacemaker for his heart. Ambassador Bruce said that a visit to China would be a very happy thing for Lippmann at his age and at the end of a distinguished writing career. Lippmann was an exceptionally intelligent observer, an old friend in every sense and perhaps the most admired columnist in America in a profession noted for jealousy. Lippmann has strong personal convictions and has been wrong from time to time, but this was a fault we all shared, the Ambassador concluded. Strong convictions were a good thing, Chou replied. Ambassador Bruce ventured that it would be rather difficult to converse with Mr. Lippmann because he was very deaf. Chou replied that the interpreter would simply have to shout. Ambassador Bruce replied that if Lippmann had a pacemaker for his heart, he could probably install a hearing aid for his ear. On balance, however, Chou said, he thought it would be difficult for Lippmann to make the trip, and doubtful that he would come.

"Your ears are very keen, Mr. Ambassador," Chou said. "They hear what they want to hear, sir," Ambassador Bruce replied. There followed a brief discussion on accents around the room involving the other members of the two delegations.

The Shanghai Communiqué

Premier Chou then asked Ambassador Bruce his plans for mission activities. Ambassador Bruce replied that he was prepared to discuss any substantive questions of mutual interest. Chou replied that if Ambassador Bruce had any ideas or views to put forward he should contact Vice Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua. It was Ch'iao who had finalized the Shanghai Communiqué. Ambassador Bruce said he understood it had taken a long time to finish the Communiqué. Chou replied that though agreement in principle had been reached during Kissinger's trip in October 1971, differences over wording continued to exist until February of 1972 in Shanghai. Since the Communiqué had been formulated in such a careful and painstaking way, we should exert vigorous efforts to implement it. Ambassador Bruce agreed that the Communiqué was a document of great importance.

Premier Chou said that the Communiqué represented a new style for such documents in that it stated the different positions of both sides, then listed areas of agreement. Ambassador Bruce replied that this was an excellent innovation. He had grown weary of reading empty communiqués which simply said that talks between the two sides had been carried on in a friendly atmosphere and then ended. At international conferences he had attended during his younger days, he had found it ridiculous that the final communiqués had been drafted and approved before the meetings began. Chou replied that the standard com-

muniqués were empty documents not designed for implementation, but that we had done it differently and very earnestly. It was important and necessary, he continued, that the common points agreed on in the Shanghai Communiqué be carried out speedily.

Indochina

Chou then spoke of Indochina, hoping Dr. Kissinger would succeed in his negotiations with Le Duc Tho at Paris. Ambassador Bruce assured Chou that no one desired success in this endeavor more than the President. Chou observed that "to drag out" the negotiations would have a bad effect on the general situation and on mutual progress on other issues. Ambassador Bruce agreed that the issues must be settled so that the Governments concerned could move to other problems. Chou mentioned the problem Viet-Nam had already posed for satisfactory PRC–U.S. relations, a matter which he had frequently called to Dr. Kissinger's attention.

He then asked Ambassador Bruce to tell the President that "the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam ardently wish to comply with all the clauses of the Agreement. It is necessary for the situation in the South to stabilize before the political negotiations can proceed. The North must also have time to recover."

Cambodia

Shifting the conversation to Cambodia, Chou said that the only way to find a solution was for the parties concerned to implement fully all the subsidiary clauses of Article 20.[3] Ambassador Bruce replied that the United States Government is thoroughly in accord and feels an overwhelming necessity to bring the issue to a close. He knew personally that the President is devoted to this purpose. Chou hoped that Dr. Kissinger's talks in Paris would find a way to settle the Cambodian problem. If this was not possible then "we should discuss the issue later." Although our stands are different, he continued, we share the hope for a peaceful, independent and neutral Cambodia. Ambassador Bruce replied that all countries involved share this goal. "More peaceful, neutral and independent than ever before," the Premier added. Though some countries may say they support this goal, they do not always act this way, he continued.

Chou expressed concern that the Cambodian issue might be submerged due to President Nixon's concentration on summit meetings with Pompidou and Brezhnev during June. Ambassador Bruce assured

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[3] Article 20 of the Paris Peace Accords, signed on January 27, addressed military activities in Cambodia and Laos.

the Premier that the June meetings would not detract from the primacy that the President ascribed to the achievement of a settlement in Indochina. Chou then noted that Ambassador Huang would leave Peking May 25 and arrive in Washington by June 1. He invited the Ambassador to pass to Ch'iao Kuan-hua ideas the U.S. might wish to convey before then. Any further Chinese ideas would be passed by Huang Chen in Washington.

The Premier then asked whether Ambassador Bruce had ever met Prince Sihanouk. Ambassador Bruce replied that he had not. Chou said that he had considered Sihanouk's visit to Angkor a courageous and marvelous act. He went with his wife only and had no forces to protect him. Premier Chou was convinced that Sihanouk was the only person who could unify Cambodia and cited in support of this position the views of Senator Mansfield, and the Sirik Matak *New York Times* interview predicting that Sihanouk would win over Lon Nol in a referendum.[4] In an aside, Chou complained that the *New York Times* had recently carried an advertisement favoring the Chiang Government in Taiwan[5] which the PRC had formally protested. The reply which the PRC had received was that the *New York Times* printed "everything". Ambassador Bruce reminded Premier Chou that the *Times'* motto was "all the news that's fit to print", but they sometimes exercised bad judgment in the interpretation of the motto.

Chou told Ambassador Bruce that he had received the mistaken impression that Senator Mansfield was being designated by the U.S. Administration to mediate the Cambodia issue last year. Ambassador Bruce replied that under the American system members of Congress could not mediate on behalf of the Executive Branch. Private citizens were sometimes given special appointments to handle international problems, but never members of the Legislature. Members of the Congress have the freedom to express themselves "at any length", to block the Executive by refusing to appropriate funds, and to appeal to the public. But the primacy of the Executive Branch in foreign policy is guaranteed by the Constitution. The President can veto legislation but the Senate can override his veto with a two-thirds majority. Conflicts between the Executive and Legislative branches on foreign policy matters, Ambassador Bruce continued, have led in the past to some tragic mistakes. He cited Woodrow Wilson's experience with the Senate over the Fourteen Points as evidence. Chou En-lai noted that both he and Ambassador Bruce were in middle school when that happened.

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[4] See "Ousted Cambodian Premier Speaks Out," *The New York Times,* March 24.

[5] See the advertisement "Foreign Trade of the Republic of China Surpasses That of Chinese Mainland," ibid., January 21.

Ambassador Bruce asked the Premier whether Prince Sihanouk had reported any damage to the temples of Angkor Wat. While there had been some minor damage, Chou replied, the temples were largely intact. The films and movies Prince Sihanouk had brought back proved this. Prince Sihanouk, he continued, is an artist at heart. He had shown Chou some beautiful shots that the Prince had taken at dawn in Angkor with his wife in the foreground.

The conversation ended with further expressions of welcome on Chou's part, a brief discussion of the weather, and a final invitation for Ambassador Bruce to contact Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua on any questions.

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34. Memorandum for the President's File by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, May 30, 1973, 9:15–9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

The President's Meeting with Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief of PRC Liaison Office in Washington

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Ambassador Huang Chen
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

The President greeted Ambassador Huang Chen. The Ambassador said he wanted to thank the President for the friendly reception. He brought with him best wishes from Mr. and Mrs. Mao, and Mr. and Mrs. Chou En-lai. The President thanked him, and said he wanted the Ambassador to convey his personal messages to Chairman Mao and to Premier Chou En-lai.

Dr. Kissinger had had sensitive talks with the Chairman and the Premier, the President noted, especially as the Brezhnev talks might

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[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 94, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, May 16–June 13, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. A tape of this conversation, which took place in the Oval Office, is ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation No. 930–7. Nixon saw talking points prepared on May 29 by Kissinger prior to the meeting. (Ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 94, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, May 16–June 13, 1973)

affect third parties. Dr. Kissinger had told Huang Chen we were prepared to reach an understanding about consultations. His statements reflected U.S. policy. If the Premier and Chairman Mao approved, we were prepared to make a more formal understanding on these points.[2]

Our commitment to better relations with the PRC was made, the President stressed. People who knew the President well knew that his commitment, when made, was solid. Good relations with the People's Republic of China were in the self-interest of the United States. Our self-interest required an independent and strong China. It was a cornerstone of U.S. policy to see that action was taken for the strength of China. A meeting was coming up with Brezhnev; the important thing was that there would be eight days of conversations.[3] But nothing would be agreed to that in any way would be detrimental to the People's Republic of China. The President had talked to Dr. Kissinger and instructed him to keep the Ambassador fully informed.

The other point the President wished to make to the Ambassador concerned the Southeast Asian situation. The Vietnam peace agreement removed a major irritant in our relations. But there was one outstanding problem, that is Cambodia. He could not emphasize too much the importance of reaching a settlement in Cambodia similar to that in Laos. Now China played a very important role. It would be a tragedy if we allowed Cambodia to flare up and reopen the conflict all over Indochina. The President wanted to emphasize that the United States was not committed to any one man. But there could not be peace at the point of a gun—on either side. We wanted a settlement that let the warring elements live together. Over a period of time the Cambodian people could determine which is better for their future. The highest priority, the President reiterated, was to work out some sort of peace agreement in Cambodia.[4]

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[2] On May 27, Huang Hua gave Kissinger a note that asserted that the latest Soviet draft of the "Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War" was unacceptable because it "still aims at the establishment of U.S.-Soviet nuclear hegemony over the world." (Ibid.) Two days later, during a meeting that began at 6 p.m., Kissinger told Huang Zhen, "We would be prepared to consider some joint declaration that neither of us will engage in any negotiation against the other or that neither of us will join in any agreement without consultation with the other." (Ibid.)

[3] Brezhnev arrived in the United States on June 16 and the summit began on June 18.

[4] During their meeting on May 27, Kissinger told Huang Hua of the U.S. determination to stabilize the situation in Cambodia. (Memorandum of conversation, May 27, 10:00–11:15 a.m.; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 94, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, May 16–June 13, 1973)