Protecting People and the EnvironmentUNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
ACCESSION #: 9808170270
RG and E
ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION o 89 EAST AVENUE,
ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649-0001
AREA CODE 776-546-2700
ROBERT C. MECREDY
Vice President
Nuclear Operation
August 12, 1998
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Facsimile Number 301-816-5151
Telephone Number 301-816-5100
Subject: Initial Notification of 10 CFR Part 21 Defect
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
Docket No. 50-244
In accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance,
Section 21 (d) (3) (i), which requires "Initial notification by facsimile",
the enclosed initial notification is provided. Written notification, in
accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, Section 21 (d) (3) (ii), will be provided
by September 11, 1998.
Very truly yours,
Robert C. Mecredy
Enclosures
Terry A. White
Manager, Operations
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
1503 Lake Road
Ontario, N.Y. 14519
Phone: (716) 771-3667
Fax: (716) 771-3901
email: Terry_White@dgmail.rge.com
Page 1
10CFR21 INITIAL FACSIMILE NOTIFICATION
I. NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL INFORMING THE COMMISSION:
NAME: Robert C. Mecredy
Vice President Nuclear Operations Group
ADDRESS: Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation
89 East Avenue
Rochester, New York 14649
II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE FACILITY, THE ACTIVITY, OR THE BASIC
COMPONENT SUPPLIED FOR SUCH FACILITY WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR
CONTAINS A DEFECT:
The facility is the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. The basic
component is a Westinghouse DB-75 circuit breaker. This component was
installed in a Class 1E Safety Related Bus. The breaker is the 'B'
Diesel Generator Supply breaker to Bus 16 (Safety Related Bus).
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE FIRM CONSTRUCTING THE FACILITY OR SUPPLYING
THE BASIC COMPONENT WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR CONTAINS A DEFECT:
The breaker is manufactured by:
Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Nuclear Services Integrated Division
Box 78
Pittsburgh, PA 15230-0078
IV. NATURE OF THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY AND THE SAFETY HAZARD
WHICH IS CREATED OR COULD BE CREATED BY SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURE TO
COMPLY:
The DB-75 breaker was retrofitted with an AMPTECTOR solid state trip
unit per Westinghouse instruction I.B. 33-850-6 that instructed the
technician to remove all tripper bar tabs from the tripper bar.
Subsequently the instruction bulletin was revised to specifically
leave the center tripper bar tab installed. There were no
notifications to the plant to reinstall the center tripper bar tabs on
previously modified breakers. The absence of the center tripper bar
tab allowed two tripper bar bushings to fall from their housing and is
believed to, over time, bend the tripper bar so that it would not
fully reset. The failure of the tripper bar to fully reset caused
intermittent failure to close on the DB-75 'B' Diesel generator supply
breaker to Safety Related Bus 16. With the identified deficiency in
the 'B' Diesel Generator supply breaker it is possible that a single
failure could render both safety trains incapable of performing their
safety functions (buses 14 and 16). This deficiency constitutes a
substantial safety hazard.
V. THE DATE ON WHICH THE INFORMATION OF SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURE TO
COMPLY WAS OBTAINED:
The information was obtained on July 27, 1998 after discussions with
Westinghouse representatives. The missing tripper bar tabs were
discovered March 25, 1998 during troubleshooting of the latest
failure. The method of notification by the vendor was not determined
until July 27, 1998.
VI. IN THE CASE OF A BASIC COMPONENT WHICH CONTAINS A DEFECT OR FAILS
TO COMPLY, THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ALL SUCH COMPONENTS IN USE
AT, SUPPLIED FOR, OR BEING SUPPLIED FOR GINNA STATION:
There are six Westinghouse DB-75 breakers installed at Ginna in
safeguards busses 14 and 16. There is also one Safety Related spare
breaker. The Bus 14 and 16 Safety Related bus feeds and the two (2)
bus tie breakers between Buses 14 and 16 were correctly modified per
the revised instructions. The original Spare DB-75 breaker was also
correctly modified prior to being installed into the 'A' Diesel
Generator supply breaker position.
Between 3/85 and 2/88 the 'B' Diesel Generator supply breaker was
installed with the incorrect modification. In 2/88 the DB-75 breaker
installed in the 'A' Diesel Generator supply breaker on Bus 14, was
incorrectly modified in the same manner as the 'B' Diesel Generator
supply breaker. Between 2/88 and 5/96 both Diesel Generator output
breakers to Bus 14 and 16 were installed with incorrect modifications.
In 5/96 the spare DB-75 breaker, 96-04, was installed in the 'A'
Diesel Generator supply breaker position. Breaker 96-04 was modified
correctly per the current revision of the installation instructions.
Although the potential for failure. existed, the breakers were tested
with regular surveillance tests to prove operability and the failure
mechanism is of the nature that degrades over time. The missing
tripper bar tab would not immediately fail the breaker upon removal.
VII. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION WHICH HAS BEEN, IS BEING, OR WILL BE TAKEN;
THE NAME OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
ACTION; AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT HAS BEEN OR WILL BE TAKEN TO
COMPLETE THE ACTION:
All DB-75 breakers were inspected at the point the missing @enter
tripper bar tab was discovered. Maintenance personnel installed
center tripper bar tabs on the 'B' Diesel Generator supply breaker and
Spare breaker, previously installed in the 'A' Diesel Generator supply
breaker position. Nuclear engineering is performing a vendor document
review which is in its final stages. The review will verify all
breakers are properly configured per applicable vendor documentation.
The results of the review is being incorporated into maintenance
procedures. All corrective actions are scheduled to be completed by
December 31, 1998.
VIII. ANY ADVICE RELATED TO THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY ABOUT THE
FACILITY, ACTIVITY, OR BASIC COMPONENT THAT HAS BEEN, IS BEING,
OR WILL BE GIVEN To PURCHASERS OR LICENSEES:
The tripper bar tab installation is verified by visual inspection,
possible with the breaker in service. An industry notification was
distributed at the time the tripper bar tab was discovered to be
improperly modified.
POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 34632
FACILITY: GINNA REGION: 1 NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/12/98
UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: NY NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:10 [ET]
RX TYPE: [1] W-2-LP EVENT DATE: 07/27/98
EVENT TIME: 12:00[EDT]
NRC NOTIFIED BY: BOB MECREDY LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/12/98
HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE
NOTIFICATIONS
EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE
10 CFR SECTION: DAVID SILK, R1 RDO
CDEG 21.21(c)(3)(i) DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE
EDWARD McALPINE, R2 RDO
MARK RING, R3 RDO
GARY SANBORN, R4 RDO
VERN HODGE NRR
UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE
1 N Y 100 POWER OPERATION 100 POWER OPERATION
EVENT TEXT
10CFR21 - WESTINGHOUSE DB-75 CIRCUIT BREAKERS WITH MISSING TRIPPER BAR TABS
THERE ARE SIX WESTINGHOUSE DB-75 CIRCUIT BREAKERS INSTALLED AT GINNA IN
SAFEGUARDS BUSES #14 AND #16 AND ONE UNINSTALLED SAFETY RELATED SPARE.
ON 03/25/98, DURING TROUBLESHOOTING ACTIVITIES, THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED
THAT THE CENTER TRIPPER BAR TABS WERE MISSING FROM A WESTINGHOUSE DB-75
CIRCUIT BREAKER INSTALLED IN THE 'B' EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG)
SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER TO THE CLASS 1E SAFETY RELATED BUS #16 AT GINNA.
PRIOR TO 03/25/98, GINNA MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS HAD RETROFITTED THE 'B'
EDG DB-75 SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER WITH AN AMPTECTOR SOLID STATE TRIP UNIT
PER WESTINGHOUSE INSTRUCTION I.B. 33-850-6 THAT INSTRUCTED THE TECHNICIANS
TO REMOVE ALL TRIPPER BAR TABS FROM THE TRIPPER BAR. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE
WESTINGHOUSE INSTRUCTION BULLETIN WAS REVISED TO SPECIFICALLY LEAVE THE
CENTER TRIPPER BAR TAB INSTALLED. THERE WERE NO WESTINGHOUSE
NOTIFICATIONS
TO GINNA TO REINSTALL THE CENTER TRIPPER BAR TABS ON PREVIOUSLY MODIFIED
DB-75 CIRCUIT BREAKERS.
THE ABSENCE OF THE CENTER TRIPPER BAR TAB ALLOWED TWO TRIPPER BAR
BUSHINGS
TO FALL FROM THEIR HOUSING AND IS BELIEVED TO, OVER TIME, BEND THE TRIPPER
BAR SO THAT IT WOULD NOT FULLY RESET. THE FAILURE OF THE TRIPPER BAR TO
FULLY RESET CAUSED THE INTERMITTENT FAILURE TO CLOSE ON THE DB-75 'B' EDG
SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER TO BUS #16.
WITH THE IDENTIFIED DEFICIENCY IN THE 'B' EDG SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER, IT IS
POSSIBLE THAT A SINGLE FAILURE COULD RENDER BOTH SAFETY TRAINS INCAPABLE
OF
PERFORMING THEIR SAFETY FUNCTIONS (BUSES #14 AND #16).
(Continued on next page)
FACILITY: GINNA PAGE # 2 OF EVENT NUMBER: 34632
THIS DEFICIENCY CONSTITUTES A SUBSTANTIAL SAFETY HAZARD.
BETWEEN MAR 85 AND FEB 88, THE DB-75 'B' EDG SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS
INSTALLED WITH THE INCORRECT MODIFICATION. IN FEB 88, THE DB-75 CIRCUIT
BREAKER INSTALLED IN THE 'A' EDG SUPPLY BREAKER ON BUS #14 WAS INCORRECTLY
MODIFIED IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE 'B' EDG SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER. BETWEEN
FEB 88 AND MAY 96, BOTH EDG OUTPUT CIRCUIT BREAKERS TO BUSES #14 AND #16
WERE INSTALLED WITH THE INCORRECT MODIFICATIONS.
IN MAY 96, THE ORIGINAL SPARE DB-75 CIRCUIT BREAKER, #96-04, WAS INSTALLED
IN THE 'A' EDG SUPPLY BREAKER POSITION. CIRCUIT BREAKER #96-04 HAD BEEN
MODIFIED CORRECTLY PER THE CURRENT REVISION OF THE WESTINGHOUSE
INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO BEING INSTALLED INTO THE 'A' EDG SUPPLY
CIRCUIT BREAKER POSITION.
ON 03/25/98, THE LICENSEE INSPECTED ALL WESTINGHOUSE DB-75 CIRCUIT BREAKERS
AT GINNA. PLANT MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS INSTALLED CENTER TRIPPER BAR TABS
ON THE 'B' EDG SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER AND THE SPARE CIRCUIT BREAKER,
PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED IN THE 'A' EDG SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER POSITION. THE
DB-75 CIRCUIT BREAKERS ON BUSES #14 AND #16 AND THE TWO BUS TIE CIRCUIT
BREAKERS BETWEEN BUSES #14 AND #16 HAD BEEN CORRECTLY MODIFIED PER THE
REVISED WESTINGHOUSE INSTRUCTIONS.
ALTHOUGH THE POTENTIAL FOR FAILURE EXISTED AT GINNA, THE WESTINGHOUSE
DB-75
CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE TESTED WITH REGULAR SURVEILLANCE TESTS TO PROVE
OPERABILITY AND THE FAILURE MECHANISM IS OF THE NATURE THAT DEGRADES
OVER
TIME. THE MISSING TRIPPER BAR TAB WOULD NOT IMMEDIATELY FAIL THE CIRCUIT
BREAKER UPON REMOVAL.
LICENSEE NUCLEAR ENGINEERING PERSONNEL ARE PERFORMING A VENDOR
DOCUMENT
REVIEW TO VERIFY THAT ALL WESTINGHOUSE DB-75 CIRCUIT BREAKERS ARE
PROPERLY
CONFIGURED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE VENDOR DOCUMENTATION. ALL
LICENSEE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE SCHEDULED TO BE COMPLETED BY 12/31/98.
ON 03/25/98, THE LICENSEE DISTRIBUTED A NOTIFICATION OF THIS CONDITION TO
INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES. THE CENTER TRIPPER BAR TAB INSTALLATION CAN BE
VERIFIED BY VISUAL INSPECTION, POSSIBLY WHILE THE CIRCUIT BREAKER IS IN
SERVICE.
SPECIFIC INFORMATION FOR THIS REPORT WAS OBTAINED DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH
WESTINGHOUSE REPRESENTATIVES ON 07/27/98.
THE LICENSEE PLANS TO SUBMIT A WRITTEN 10CFR21 REPORT OF THIS CONDITION TO
THE NRC BY 09/11/98.
*** END OF DOCUMENT ***
