

1 **NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS**

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8 Report to the Secretary
9 of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

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11 on

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13 **Enhanced Protections for Uses of Health Data:**
14 A Stewardship Framework for “Secondary Uses” of Electronically Collected and
15 Transmitted Health Data

16
17
18 October 21, 2007
19

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63 Introduction

64 Purpose and Scope

65
66 The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) asked
67 the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS) to develop a conceptual
68 and policy framework to balance the benefits, sensitivities, obligations, and protections
69 of what has typically been referred to as secondary uses of health data. The need for
70 enhanced protections for uses of health data increases in importance as health care
71 moves from paper to electronic and from point-to-point data exchange to the vision of a
72 nationwide health information network (NHIN).

73
74 NCVHS is proposing these recommendations to the Secretary of Health and Human
75 Services (HHS) to advance the Nation's health and healthcare delivery system.
76 Enhanced and more widely adopted data stewardship principles and other measures
77 are needed to enable optimal uses of health data, while respecting the privacy of the
78 individuals who are the sources of those data. Particular emphasis is placed on the
79 immediate need to ensure that appropriate protections surround uses of health data for
80 quality measurement, reporting, and improvement.

81

82 *Secondary Uses of Health Data*

83
84 In addressing the ONC request, NCVHS identified concerns with the term *secondary*
85 *use*. Secondary use of health data has no standard reference. For example, some
86 consider primary uses those for direct care and all other uses secondary. Others
87 consider uses of health data for payment and healthcare operations also a primary use.
88 In addition, grouping various uses of health data under the rubric of secondary use may
89 result in treating all uses within that class the same. Different approaches may be
90 needed to afford protections for different types of uses. Finally, the term secondary use
91 carries the connotation that these uses of health data are less important than other
92 uses. As a result, NCVHS does not use the term *secondary* to describe categories of
93 uses. Instead NCVHS urges that the term be abandoned in favor of explicit description
94 of each use of health data.

95

96 Information Analysis and Organization of Report

97

98 This report includes:

99

- 100 1. **Background** – This section describes the process NCVHS undertook to hear
101 testimony and obtain input on the current state and issues related to uses of
102 health data that form the basis for the recommendations.
- 103
104 2. **Current landscape** – This section summarizes the testimony concerning the
105 current state of health data uses and identifies significant gaps in protections for

106 these uses which may be amplified as health information technology (HIT) and
107 health information exchange (HIE) become more prevalent.

108
109 3. **Observations and recommendations** – This section provides observations and
110 recommendations described within a framework of data stewardship. Initial focus
111 is on practical solutions that can be implemented today to address overall gaps in
112 accountability, transparency, individual participation and control, de-identification,
113 security safeguards and controls, and data integrity and quality. Specific attention
114 is also paid to recommendations for uses of health data that are most
115 immediately enhanced through HIT and HIE – quality measurement, reporting,
116 and improvement and research. There are also recommendations for evaluation
117 of approaches suitable to protect other and potentially unanticipated uses as the
118 transition is made to a NHIN. Finally, recommendations that may take longer to
119 implement are made for comprehensive privacy and anti-discrimination
120 legislation.

121
122 4. A **Taxonomy and Glossary of Terms** in **Appendix C** defines terms used
123 throughout this report and underscores the broader need for standardization of
124 terms describing various data stewardship approaches. For example, the terms
125 *de-identification*, *anonymization*, and *pseudonymization* are all associated with
126 protecting identity, but may be applied differently in different contexts, some of
127 which diverge from the implementation specification of de-identification or limited
128 data set according to the HIPAA Privacy Rule (§164.514(a), (b), (c), and (e)),
129 herein referred to as *HIPAA de-identification*.

130

131 **Report Background**

132

133 **NCVHS Coverage of Topic**

134

135 NCVHS has a long history of engaging public comment, analyzing issues, and making
136 recommendations to the Secretary of HHS on uses of health data from multiple
137 perspectives. In 1996, Public Law 104-191, the Health Insurance Portability and
138 Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, directed the NCVHS to be responsible generally for
139 advising the Secretary of HHS and the Congress on the status of the implementation of
140 the HIPAA Administrative Simplification provisions. Subsequently, NCVHS has issued
141 annual reports on various HIPAA compliance issues. Public Law 104-191 also directed
142 the NCVHS to "study the issues related to the adoption of uniform data standards for
143 patient medical record information and the electronic exchange of such information,"
144 which generated several sets of recommendations. NCVHS has been at the forefront of
145 promoting HIT and HIE. In 2001, NCVHS generated a report on Information for Health:
146 A Strategy for Building the National Health Information Infrastructure, specifically
147 addressing the need for a private, secure, and effective NHIN. Recommendations on
148 the Initial Functional Requirements for a NHIN were delivered to the Secretary on
149 October 30, 2006. Privacy issues within a NHIN were addressed in the NCVHS June

150 22, 2006 letter report entitled, Recommendations Regarding Privacy and Confidentiality
151 in the Nationwide Health Information Network. An update to the Privacy Letter with
152 respect to coverage of healthcare and other entities was delivered to the Secretary on
153 June 21, 2007. The NCVHS Report and Recommendations on Personal Health
154 Records and Personal Health Record Systems from February 2006 and its Letter
155 Report to the Secretary on Personal Health Record (PHR) Systems from September 9,
156 2005, describe the state of affairs with respect to such health data collection.
157

158 NCVHS has also delivered numerous reports describing uses of health data for
159 population studies and for use in quality improvement. Its Recommendations on
160 Populations Based Data Collection, delivered to the Secretary of HHS on August 23,
161 2004, and its Report on Measuring Health Care Quality in May 2004 are seminal works
162 on key issues for using health data. The Recommendation Letter on Data Linkages to
163 Improve Health Outcomes on June 21, 2007 also addressed the special issue of
164 merging data from disparate sources.
165

166 The NCVHS Web site (<http://ncvhs.hhs.gov>) provides access to all NCVHS documents
167 referenced, as well as others.
168

169 **NCVHS Process**

170
171 To enable NCVHS to make practical recommendations to facilitate uses and exchange
172 of health data for advancing the quality of the Nation's health and healthcare delivery
173 system, the Committee's ad hoc work group (see **Appendix A** for list of members)
174 received significant public comment, both in formal testimony as well as in open public
175 sessions to discuss findings and provide input into recommendations.
176

177 *Testimony*

178
179 Testimony was taken on the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)
180 request for information on data stewardship during its Committee meeting on June 21,
181 2007. NCVHS held three sets of hearings and open meetings in the Washington, DC
182 area on July 17-19, August 2-3, and October 4-5, 2007. It published a pre-decisional
183 draft document on its web site on October 19, 2007, and held an open call for public
184 comment on October 31, 2007. It received several written comments from experts
185 unable to attend these hearings. In drafting this report, NCVHS presented interim
186 findings to the American Health Information Community Consumer Empowerment Work
187 Group, September 12, Quality Work Group, October 3, and public meeting in Chicago
188 on November 13, 2007.
189

190 In all, there were 58 testifiers from provider and consumer representatives, quality
191 organizations, health information exchanges, vendors that process and use health data
192 in a variety of ways, and the research and public health communities. (Testifiers are
193 listed in **Appendix B**.) Members of the NCVHS also participated in the conference on

194 Toward a National Framework for the Secondary Use of Health Data sponsored by the
195 American Medical Informatics Association (AMIA), June 14-15, 2007.

196
197 Although time for input was very short, NCVHS is appreciative of the effort so many put
198 into contributing comments.

199 **Current Landscape**

200
201 NCVHS heard testimony that the common good for all Americans is served when health
202 data can be used to advance the quality of health and health care for the Nation. There
203 is optimism for the growing number of benefits that can be achieved through uses of
204 health data enabled by health information technology (HIT) and health information
205 exchange (HIE). NCVHS, however, also heard concerns surrounding potential harms
206 that may arise from enhanced uses of HIT and HIE. Current regulations may not fully
207 address the concerns that arise from the new uses of health data enabled by HIT and
208 HIE. There is a growing need for enhanced and more widely adopted data stewardship
209 principles and other measures to protect privacy.

210

211 **Benefits from Enhanced Uses of HIT and HIE**

212
213 *At the point of care*, HIT enhances access to information, affords patient safety alerts
214 and health maintenance reminders, and supports care management. Across the
215 continuum of care, HIE enables readily accessible information needed in an emergency,
216 and more complete information and coordination of care among referring providers and
217 for transfer of care, such as from a hospital to a long term care facility.

218
219 *For quality measurement, reporting, and improvement*, fully automated data collection
220 processes provide for more efficient access to more comprehensive databases for
221 benchmarking, as well as identification of new opportunities for improvement in care
222 delivery. The ability to mine more comprehensive databases makes knowledge
223 discovery more readily available for continuous quality improvement. HIE technologies
224 that enable virtual aggregation of data and enhanced data linkage, such as individual
225 person matching algorithms, support longitudinal data collection to improve future care
226 of an individual and quality outcomes analysis. Testifiers also described improved and
227 developing techniques available to secure data and to attach consent for use to the
228 data.

229
230 *Clinical and population research* can be strengthened. Identification and participation of
231 candidates for clinical trials across a larger geographic area enables more
232 comprehensive cohorts for testing hypotheses. Health services and other population-
233 based research is aided through the availability of large databases. As a result,
234 hypotheses can be tested or complications detected more rapidly.

235

236 *Disease control and prevention* can be more accurate, complete, and rapidly accessible
237 when new sources of data, fully automated data collection processes, and improved
238 data linkage capabilities exist.

239 **Concerns about the Potential for Harm Raised by HIT and HIE**

240
241 *Erosion of trust* in the healthcare system may occur when there is a divergence
242 between what the individual reasonably expects health data to be used for and when
243 uses are made for other purposes without the knowledge and permission of the
244 individual. Individuals who are the recipients of the care process appear to have a high
245 degree of trust in their providers. There also appears to be a high degree of trust in
246 public health from the perspective of protecting against disease outbreaks; and in health
247 research when accompanied by informed consent. Trust erodes and privacy concerns
248 may increase, however, when uses of health data are made for other less widely
249 recognized purposes. In addition, when health data are sold – even when used to
250 ensure the sustainability of the business model for enhanced uses of HIT or when the
251 data are de-identified – there are heightened concerns.

252
253 *Compromises to health care* may result when individuals fail to seek treatment or
254 choose to withhold information that could impact decisions about treatment because
255 they do not understand how their data may be used, or they may distrust the ability of
256 their identity to be protected, particularly when they consider the information especially
257 sensitive. HIT can afford greater protections, but these must be diligently applied and
258 made known to individuals.

259
260 *Discrimination and personal embarrassment* may be amplified as there is enhanced
261 ability to automate health data collection, compile longitudinal data, re-identify data that
262 have been de-identified, and to share data through HIE. There have long been
263 legitimate concerns that personal health information is used in making decisions that
264 adversely affect the individual, such as in employment, benefits coverage, or
265 acceptance for loans or mortgages.

267 **Need for Additional Clarity in HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules**

268
269 Public Law 104-191 called for federal privacy legislation that ideally would have
270 extended privacy requirements to all entrusted with personal health information. Without
271 such legislation, however, the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules cover only health care
272 payers, clearinghouses, and providers who electronically transmit financial and
273 administrative transactions (i.e., covered entities), and by contract the business
274 associates of covered entities. Testimony to NCVHS describes several areas of
275 omissions in the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules as the transition is made to HIE,

276 and confusion among covered entities on how to carry out some of the requirements in
277 light of new uses of health data enabled by HIT and HIE.¹

278
279 Covered entities are held accountable for protecting individually identifiable health
280 information which they maintain and/or transmit to others – described in HIPAA as
281 *protected health information* (PHI). Covered entities do not include organizations and
282 their agents who may also perform functions involving protected health information on
283 behalf of a covered entity. As such, the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules require
284 these organizations to have business associate contracts or other arrangements with
285 covered entities to apply the protections afforded by these Rules. The intent is to
286 establish a chain of trust from the covered entity to the business associate and beyond.
287 A particular challenge is that the farther removed the use is from the covered entity, the
288 weaker is the ability to monitor the intent of the contractual obligations of health data
289 protection.

290
291 Another challenge is that the HIPAA Privacy Rule only addresses identifiable protected
292 health information. Once protected health information is de-identified according to the
293 HIPAA definition of de-identification, it falls outside of the jurisdiction of the HIPAA
294 Privacy and Security Rules. There is neither accountability nor transparency back to
295 either the covered entity or the individual concerning use of these HIPAA de-identified
296 data.

297
298 Finally, a growing number of uses of identifiable *personal health information* (i.e.,
299 individually identifiable health information not maintained or transmitted by a covered
300 entity) fall outside of the HIPAA chain of trust (or other regulations, such as those over
301 research on human subjects). An example is when individuals supply personal health
302 information to personal health record (PHR) web sites not sponsored by covered
303 entities or business associates. There will be increasing challenges with respect to
304 HIPAA and chain of trust as hybrid PHRs, in which both covered entity-supplied and
305 individual-supplied health data are collected, become more widely used.

306

307 **Increasing Role of Health Data Stewardship**

308
309 There is an increasing need to adopt enhanced data stewardship principles by all
310 entities that have access to health data, independent of HIPAA covered entity status.
311 When an individual provides personal health information to anyone else, in any manner
312 (e.g., in person or online), the information is provided in confidence and with implicit
313 trust that the information will not be used in unintended ways. The American Medical
314 Informatics Association (AMIA) states that data stewardship “encompasses the
315 responsibilities and accountabilities associated with managing, collecting, viewing,
316 storing, sharing, disclosing, or otherwise making use of personal health information.”
317 Further, AMIA notes that “principles of data stewardship apply to all the personnel,

¹ Linda Dimitropoulos, PhD, RTI International; William J. O’Byrne, New Jersey e-HIT; and Steve Posnack, ONC, Testimony on the Health Information Security and Privacy Collaboration (HISPC) Report of June 30, 2007, July 17, 2007

318 systems, and processes engaging in health information storage and exchange within
319 and across organizations.”

320
321 Views concerning a national health data stewardship entity have been sought by the
322 Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), based on principles
323 recommended by AQA for performance of clinician-level quality measurement. An RFI
324 issued on June 4, 2007 requested information about creating a “public/private entity that
325 will set uniform operating rules and standards for sharing and aggregating public and
326 private sector data on quality and efficiency; offer guidance on implementation of such
327 national operating rules and standards; and provide a framework for collecting,
328 aggregating, and analyzing data, to afford means of more effective oversight of
329 healthcare data analyses and reporting in the United States.” Although the need to
330 create a data stewardship entity is outside the scope of the recommendations in this
331 report, early responses were important to understand. A dichotomy was observed:
332 Some respondents interpreted that a data stewardship entity would serve, itself, as
333 database and to which respondents were highly adverse. Other respondents indicated
334 that an entity that would provide guiding principles for good stewardship was very much
335 needed, but would need to be a pristine and completely neutral body if put in the
336 position of arbitrating good stewardship.²

337
338 NCVHS heard that when *any* organization that is responsible for making use of personal
339 health information, i.e., when serving as a data steward, is trusted, there is greater
340 acceptance of the use of the health data. This is the case independent of HIPAA
341 covered entity status. Trust was observed to be something that an organization earned
342 over time through acting as a responsible data steward. Trust may be enhanced
343 through transparency and affording appropriate rights to individuals on how their health
344 data may be used.

345
346 *For example, the Northern New England Cardiovascular Disease Study Group has*
347 *a comprehensive approach to providing (HIPAA quality assessment and research*
348 *institutional review board) oversight for the collection of data, reporting outcomes,*
349 *providing services to clinicians and institutions, and engaging individuals in their*
350 *cardiac surgery decision making, such as through “prediction pocket cards” used to*
351 *predict surgical risk, but which also serves as a good setting for informed consent.*
352 *As a result of the many efforts taken to ensure transparency, there is a spirit of*
353 *trust among clinicians, even across competing settings, and by individuals who*
354 *have a clear picture of how their health data are used.*

355
356 NCVHS observes that the HIPAA Privacy Rule, despite being broad in definition and not
357 anticipating every future use, provides an initial set of data stewardship principles for
358 uses of health data. As new uses of health data are made in a new world of HIT and
359 HIE, these principles need review and enhancement. Improving data stewardship is an
360 important premise for building transparency and trust throughout all entities that may

² National Health Data Stewardship, Request for Information, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, *Federal Register*, Vol. 72, No. 106, Monday, June 4, 2007.

361 use health data for any purpose; and in particular to ensure that individuals are informed
 362 about uses of their health data which they may not anticipate.

363
 364 However, it was also observed that transparency and trust have limits to their
 365 effectiveness and should not be substitutes for other measures. For example, the
 366 HIPAA notice of privacy practices (NPP) is a means to provide transparency, but does
 367 not achieve its purpose if it is not read or understood by individuals. Clarifying the
 368 language of a NPP or taking time to explain its contents, while beneficial, will not fully
 369 address trust issues.

370
 371 A Health Data Stewardship Framework may aid potential users contemplating a specific
 372 use of health data to analyze the use and determine appropriate data stewardship
 373 approaches. In general, a framework is a conceptual structure used to solve a complex
 374 issue or outline possible courses of action. Achieving the benefits of health data uses
 375 while reducing the potential for harms presents a complex issue among a myriad of
 376 uses and users of health data. No single work can identify all uses and users, let alone
 377 anticipate all potential new uses and users. The Health Data Stewardship Framework
 378 depicted below builds upon the Taxonomy of the American Medical Informatics
 379 Association (AMIA); Connecting for Health Common Framework Privacy Principles from
 380 the Markle Foundation; and the cancer Biomedical Informatics Grid (caBIG™)
 381 Framework for Data Sharing Terms and Conditions.

382
 383 **Health Data Stewardship Framework**
 384

Existing Data Stewardship Factors						
User status with respect to Federal/State legal/regulatory requirements (e.g., HIPAA covered entity or business associate, public health or other organization permitted personal health data by law, researcher covered by regulation, organization covered by FTC, other, none):						
Status of data (e.g., protected health information, HIPAA de-identified health data, personal health information):						
Benefit/Risk Analysis of Intended Use						
Intended use of data:						
Individual & Societal Benefits from Intended Use of Data:				Potential Risk for Harms from Intended Use of the Data:		
Data Stewardship Approaches						
Accountability/Chain of Trust	Transparency	Individual Participation & Control	HIPAA De-identification	Security Safeguards & Controls	Oversight of Data Uses	Data Integrity & Quality

385

386 **Specific Uses of Health Data**

387 *Uses of Health Data for Treatment, Payment, and Healthcare Operations*

388

389 The HIPAA Privacy Rule permits covered entities to use and disclose protected health
390 information without authorization from the individual when providing access to the
391 individual; for treatment, payment, and healthcare operations (TPO); incident to an
392 otherwise permitted or required use or disclosure, provided the covered entity has taken
393 adequate safeguards; and when required by law, public health, and for certain other
394 uses within prescribed limitations.^{3, 4} (State laws which are more stringent may require
395 authorization for some uses or disclosures.)

396

397 ○ *Treatment* means the provision, coordination, or management of health care and
398 related services by one or more health care providers, including the coordination
399 or management of health care by a provider with a third party; consultation
400 between providers relating to an individual; or the referral of an individual for
401 health care from one provider to another.

402

403 ○ *Payment* refers to the activities undertaken by a health plan to determine
404 coverage and provision of benefits under the plan and to obtain or provide
405 reimbursement for the provision of health care.

406

407 ○ *Healthcare operations* encompass quality assessment, competency review,
408 health benefits processes, compliance activities, business planning, and general
409 administrative activities.⁵

410

411 A common theme that NCVHS heard in testimony related to the broad scope of some
412 aspects of the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules. Testifiers observed that HIPAA may
413 serve well enough in providing data stewardship guidance for the “treatment and
414 payment” processes of care delivery, but the area of “healthcare operations” was
415 observed to be broad in scope and not well-understood by individuals. It was noted that
416 trust may factor more heavily than laws and regulations with respect to individuals and
417 their privacy concerns. The further a use of health data is from the point of care, the less
418 transparency there may be and the less individuals may trust the ability of their health
419 data to be protected.

420 *Uses of Health Data for Quality Measurement, Reporting, and Improvement*

421

422 The definition of quality assessment and improvement activities, included in the HIPAA
423 Privacy Rule under healthcare operations, includes “outcomes evaluation and
424 development of clinical guidelines, provided that the obtaining of generalizable

³ HIPAA Privacy Rule, §164.512 Uses and disclosures for which an authorization or opportunity to agree or object is not required.

⁴ HIPAA Privacy Rule, §164.514 Other requirements relating to uses and disclosures of protected health information (e) Limited data set, (f) Fundraising, and (g) Underwriting and related purposes.

⁵ HIPAA Privacy Rule, §164.501 Definitions.

425 knowledge is not the primary purpose of any studies resulting from such activities;
426 population-based activities relating to improving health or reducing health care costs,
427 protocol development, case management and care coordination, contacting of health
428 care providers and patients with information about treatment alternatives; and related
429 functions that do not include treatment” (§164.501).

430
431 *Benefits* of quality measurement and reporting include “better safety, effectiveness,
432 patient-centeredness, timeliness, efficiency, and equity”⁶ – the six aims for quality
433 improvement specified in the IOM *Quality Chasm* report. Individuals can make more
434 informed decisions about their care when quality is accurately reported. Providers can
435 improve the quality of care delivered when they understand the current status of the
436 care being provided and have access to evidence-based protocols. Payers can assure
437 greater value through pay for quality and other mechanisms. Purchasers of care can
438 ensure they are receiving value when they have access to accurate quality reporting.

439
440 *Challenges* in uses of health data for quality measurement, reporting, and improvement
441 include that uses of health data for quality improvement are not well-known or
442 understood by individuals. Furthermore, linking health data about individuals
443 longitudinally, across multiple settings, and from multiple sources must be accurate to
444 ensure meaningful outcomes, and must protect privacy. If an organization chooses to
445 enhance protection of the health data by applying various forms of identity protection,
446 such as pseudonymization, it should be aware that the increased amount of detailed
447 person-level information available makes it more likely that some individuals could be
448 identified. A burdensome process of identity protection, however, can result in not
449 performing the linking, and not achieving the benefits anticipated.

450
451 *Organizations that link health data have an important place in promoting quality health*
452 *care but must not violate the trust of individuals and providers.* For example, pharmacy
453 benefits managers (PBMs), that may be covered entities or business associates,
454 compiled medication histories for individuals impacted by the hurricane disasters of
455 2005 and provided an important public service. Today, such medication histories are
456 being used to support medication reconciliation activities in compliance with The Joint
457 Commission standards across provider settings. However, there are organizations who
458 acquire health data by direct access through the systems they sell to HIPAA covered
459 entities or by buying HIPAA de-identified data. Some of these organizations use the
460 data to support quality purposes; but others may link the data to provider databases to
461 market to providers, or use the data to target marketing to a circumscribed population
462 likely to include a target group of individuals.

463

464 *Uses of Health Data in Research*

465
466 Variation in research regulations across different federal entities was also identified by
467 testifiers as being potentially problematic. How health data may be used in research

⁶ Institute of Medicine, *Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century*,
Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2001, p. 43

468 varies among the HIPAA Privacy Rule, the Federal Policy for Protection of Human
469 Subjects (45 CFR 46, a.k.a. The Common Rule), the Food and Drug Administration
470 (FDA) Protection of Human Subjects Regulations (21 CFR 50 and 56), and the
471 Protection of Human Subjects of Research in the Veterans Health Administration (VA)
472 Regulations (38 CFR 16). The result can be confusion on the part of both individuals
473 and researchers. An example cited was where an individual may be asked to participate
474 in a research project sponsored by the VA and another project under the FDA
475 jurisdiction, each with somewhat different requirements that may result in confusion
476 about the two projects' needs for privacy protections.

477
478 *Using data collected for quality improvement that evolves into a research study may*
479 *violate the HIPAA Privacy Rule, and yet be of profound importance to the health of the*
480 *Nation. A quality assessment study is defined under the HIPAA Privacy Rule as*
481 *healthcare operations and does not require an authorization from the individual.*
482 *However, use of protected health information for research either requires an*
483 *authorization or a waiver of authorization from a privacy board, or an Institutional*
484 *Review Board (IRB) when research is supported by federal funds. As value-based*
485 *purchasing increases in prevalence and providers want to understand their own data*
486 *better, the likelihood of compiling more comprehensive databases for immediate quality*
487 *measurement and improvement increases. Such work initiated as part of performance*
488 *improvement increasingly results in interesting, reportable findings that can improve*
489 *quality of care for a larger population. How to distinguish a quality activity from a*
490 *research study, and how to evolve the use of the data from quality into research, were*
491 *issues cited by both provider and payer testifiers.*

492 *Uses of Health Data for Public Health*

493
494 Public health databases are used for surveillance and to compile registries, such as in
495 support of cancer treatment and to track immunization. Such uses are authorized by
496 state and local law, and permitted under HIPAA. Yet surveillance is extending in scope,
497 such as to collect Hemoglobin A1c values with the intent to contact individuals directly
498 about potential improvements in diabetes management (e.g., New York). Testimony
499 indicated that the transparency of such uses is variable. Most individuals are unaware of
500 required reporting; others are aware to the extent that they may see a caregiver under a
501 false name to avoid consequences of reporting. Public health data collected directly by
502 the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) are obtained using a variety of
503 mechanisms. Included are health statistical data obtained from surveys, which may be
504 conducted under an IRB process or with the consent of the individual responding to the
505 survey. These data may be released to others only through strict data release
506 agreements or as statistically de-identified datasets. CDC is starting nationwide data
507 collection efforts, such as BioSense, that involve contractual agreements similar to
508 HIPAA business associate contracts. Such efforts utilize new data sources and are
509 enabled by fully automated data collection processes and enhanced data linkage
510 capabilities. However, and despite new and better techniques to protect data, such
511 large databases may present unanticipated issues or concerns for public health
512 activities.

513

514 **Increasing Concerns over Sale of Health Data**

515

516 An increasing concern surrounding uses of health data is that relating to the sale of
517 health data where financial benefit accrues to other than the individual who is the
518 source of the data. HIPAA requires an authorization for any use by covered entities of
519 protected health information for marketing except if the communication is face-to-face
520 by the covered entity to an individual or if it is in the form of a promotional gift of nominal
521 value provided by the covered entity (§164.508(a)(3)(i)). HIPAA also specifies that if
522 marketing involves direct or indirect remuneration to the covered entity from a third
523 party, the authorization must state that such remuneration is involved
524 (§164.508(a)(3)(ii)).

525

526 There are not these same protections for organizations who may de-identify protected
527 health information and sell it, or that are outside of HIPAA covered entity status that
528 may collect identifiable personal health information. There is certainly a need for
529 sustainable business models for research and development of HIT, for HIE and a NHIN
530 to serve the public good, for personal health records, and other such purposes.
531 However, when the uses are unknown or unanticipated by the individual, a lack of trust
532 arises and the potential for resultant harms to the individual and society increase.

533

534 *Example: An individual may benefit from a provider using an EHR. In turn, the*
535 *provider may be able to afford the individual that benefit through using an EHR that*
536 *is subsidized through the use of advertising. But when the EHR vendor mines the*
537 *data to supply the advertising to the provider, or to sell directly to the individual, or*
538 *to sell information to a third party for other uses, the individual's trust in the provider*
539 *erodes and concerns about privacy increase.*

540

541 **Observations and Recommendations**

542

543 ***Currently, the health industry relies upon the HIPAA construct of covered entities***
544 ***and business associates to protect health data. The following observations and***
545 ***recommendations call for a transformation, in which the focus is on enhanced***
546 ***protections for all uses of health data by all users, independent of whether an***
547 ***organization is covered under HIPAA. NCVHS believes that data stewardship***
548 ***principles should be applied to all organizations that have access to personal***
549 ***health data. Data stewardship includes: accountability, transparency, individual***
550 ***participation and control, de-identification, security safeguards and controls,***
551 ***oversight of data uses, and data integrity and quality measures. The***
552 ***recommendations, however, also recognize the circumstances under which data***
553 ***stewardship principles apply and where there may need to be other actions.***

554

555 ***HHS has a variety of means to achieve enhanced protections for uses of health***
556 ***data. These include issuance of guidance, such as the HIPAA Security Guidance***

557 ***distributed by CMS on December 28, 2006; requirements for Federal agency***
558 ***adoption; inclusion of requirements in contractor rules; through incentives; in***
559 ***Conditions of Participation rules; and other processes in addition to***
560 ***recommending new legislation and issuing new regulations. The***
561 ***recommendations that follow urge adoption by whatever means is most***
562 ***expeditious and will promote the broadest possible adoption, including those***
563 ***which will most influence organizations not covered by HIPAA.***

564
565 ***NCVHS commits to monitoring the usefulness of this guidance and offering***
566 ***further recommendations as may be needed.***
567

568 **1. Observations and Recommendations on Principles of Data Stewardship for**
569 **Accountability and Chain of Trust within HIPAA**

570
571 *HIPAA Covered Entities*
572

573 The HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules only apply directly to health care payers,
574 clearinghouses, and providers who electronically transmit health information in
575 connection with transactions for which HHS has standards. The protections afforded by
576 the Privacy and Security Rules apply only indirectly to other organizations that may
577 have access to protected health information when received by or on behalf of a covered
578 entity.

579
580 *Business Associates and Their Agents*
581

582 The HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules permit covered entities to enter into a contract or
583 other arrangement with organizations not covered under HIPAA but which support the
584 work of the covered entity. The business associate contract must establish the
585 permitted and required uses and disclosures of information by the business associate,
586 and essentially binds the business associate to the data stewardship principles of the
587 HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules. The covered entity may permit the business
588 associate to use and disclose protected health information for the proper management
589 and administration of the business associate and to provide data aggregation services
590 relating to the healthcare operations of the covered entity. The provisions in the HIPAA
591 Privacy and Security Rules describe that the contract must be able to be terminated by
592 the covered entity if there is a material breach or violation of the business associate's
593 obligation under the contract. (§164.504(e) and §164.314(a))
594

595 In practice, an explicit enumeration of what data the business associate will use or how
596 it intends to use the data is often not included in business associate contracts. Many
597 business associate contracts are vague on what the business associate can do with
598 protected health information. Consequently, this opens up an individual's data to uses
599 that the individual does not anticipate and for which the individual may or may not be in
600 agreement.
601

602 Business associate contracts require business associates to report “any use or
603 disclosure of the information not provided for by its contract of which it becomes aware”
604 (§164.504(e)(2)(ii)(c)). However, business associate contracts do not require periodic
605 review or renewal. Since the description of permitted uses and disclosures is broad, the
606 covered entity may be unaware of uses and disclosures the business associate is
607 making of health data as these change over time.

608
609 *For example, a business associate may collect data for the purpose of aggregating*
610 *data for provider accreditation activities. The covered entity, however, may not be*
611 *aware until after the fact that the business associate plans to set up a web site for*
612 *public reporting of provider-specific reporting of chronic disease benchmarks.*
613

614 Business associates are also permitted to utilize agents in support of their work with
615 covered entities. Business associates must ensure that any agents, including a
616 subcontractor, to whom it provides protected health information . . . agrees to the same
617 restrictions and conditions that apply to the business associate” (§164.504(e)(2)(ii)(D)),
618 or in the case of the Security Rule “ensure that any agent, including a subcontractor, to
619 whom it provides such information agrees to implement reasonable and appropriate
620 safeguards to protect it ((§164.314(a)(2)(i)(B)). Business associates are not explicitly
621 required to have a business associate contract with their agents that enumerate uses of
622 data, and they are not required to identify the agents to the covered entity. As a result,
623 there is no opportunity for the covered entity to monitor health data usage by agents of
624 business associates.

625
626 *For example, an EHR vendor that has a business associate contract with a*
627 *covered entity may use a third party application service provider (ASP) to host the*
628 *covered entity’s EHR data at a remote location. The agent of the business*
629 *associate, however, may de-identify the data and sell it to a health products supply*
630 *company that links it to provider data and hence is able to target marketing to*
631 *individuals in specific geographic regions, without the covered entity being aware of*
632 *the use, object to the use, or describe such use to individuals it serves.*
633

634 *Organizations Not Covered by HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules*

635
636 Protections afforded by HIPAA only extend to covered entities and through contractual
637 arrangements to their business associates the agents of the business associates. This
638 leaves many organizations outside of the protections afforded by HIPAA:

- 639 ○ *Providers who do not file claims electronically* are not covered entities. NCVHS
640 has learned that a number of providers are not covered by HIPAA, either
641 because they do not submit electronic claims or receive payment directly from
642 individual, or they are providers that create records covered by the Family
643 Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) which are explicitly excluded from
644 the definition of protected health information.⁷
645

⁷ NCVHS Letter to the Secretary of HHS on Update to Privacy Laws and Regulations Required to Accommodate NHIN Data Sharing Practices, June 21, 2007

646
647 ○ *Companies providing data transmission services* who need to access the data
648 being transmitted in order to conduct the transmission may or may not be
649 business associates. If such transmissions are likened to an envelope, many of
650 these companies only transmit data via routing information on the outside of the
651 envelope. The response to a Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) posted on the
652 HHS Office for Civil Rights (OCR) web site, observes that “the Privacy Rule does
653 not require a covered entity to enter into business associate contracts with
654 organizations, such as the US Postal Service, certain private couriers and their
655 electronic equivalents that act merely as conduits for protected health
656 information.” A conduit is described as “an organization that transports
657 information but does not access it other than on a random or infrequent basis as
658 necessary for the performance of the transportation services or as required by
659 law.” The response to the FAQ goes on to note that “since no disclosure is
660 intended by the covered entity, and the probability of exposure of any particular
661 protected health information to a conduit is very small, a conduit is not a business
662 associate of the covered entity.”
663

664 However, there are some companies who provide transmission services which
665 do need access to the contents of the envelope. Examples might include e-
666 prescribing gateways that may need to convert a prescription transaction from
667 one version of the NCPDP standard to another, or from the electronic transaction
668 to a fax. Banks are increasingly gaining access to explanations of benefits as
669 they process electronic funds transfers. Some of these companies recognize
670 themselves as business associates or are required by the covered entity with
671 whom they do business to have business associate contracts. In other cases,
672 however, the company may originally not have been a business associate, but
673 over time the level of access may increase.
674

675 *For example, an e-prescribing gateway that only initially transmitted data*
676 *between providers and pharmacies as a conduit may become a business*
677 *associate when it is asked to follow a provider’s specific routing instructions*
678 *based on drug type for prescription refill requests.*
679

680 ○ *Personal health record services* that are not part of covered entities are
681 increasing in number. Many, though not all, are offered via web sites. The
682 Congress has not enacted any law requiring privacy policies on web sites,
683 however, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has broad authority under the
684 Federal Trade Commission Act to bring enforcement actions against those
685 engaging in “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”⁸ The
686 FTC can use this authority to prosecute companies that mishandle consumers’
687 personal information. An increasing number of states are following the lead of the
688 California Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) that requires the operator of
689 any web site that collects “personally identifiable information” from California
690 residents to post a privacy policy. In California, violators are subject to an

⁸ Privacy Policies Increasing in Importance, Willcox & Savage P.C., April 2006

691 injunction and/or a civil penalty of \$2,500 for each infraction. Private actions can
692 also be brought under this statute.

693
694 ○ *Other companies with no relationship to covered entities*, such as life insurers,
695 employers, schools, and others, also collect individually identifiable health data
696 and are not regulated by HIPAA. While individuals may voluntarily choose to
697 participate in such data collection, therein providing an implicit consent for data
698 collection, there are concerns as to whether individuals are aware of how the
699 data may be used. As personal devices that collect health data and automatically
700 transmit it electronically to web sites become more prevalent, concerns about
701 how the data are used are increasing.

702
703 *For example, an employee posting health information to an employer*
704 *wellness program web site may be unaware that the data are used by the*
705 *employer to design insurance benefit packages.*

706
707 **1.1 Recommendation on business associate contract provisions:** HHS should
708 take applicable means to ensure that covered entities specify the limits of health
709 data use in their business associate contracts. In addition, HHS should apply these
710 means to limit uses of health data in their own contracts. Covered entities should
711 specify in their business associate contracts:

712
713 1.1.1 **terms that explicitly limit what identifiable health data may be used**
714 **and for what purposes, by both the business associate and by any**
715 **agents with whom the business associate may contract.** This allows
716 the covered entity to describe such uses to individuals and monitor any
717 potential changes over time.

718
719 1.1.2 **terms that specifically limit what uses may be made of HIPAA de-**
720 **identified data and to whom HIPAA de-identified data are supplied.**
721 This allows the covered entity to describe such uses to individuals and
722 monitor any potential changes over time.

723
724 1.1.3 **that there must exist a contract or other agreement, equivalent to the**
725 **business associate contract as described above, between the**
726 **business associate and all of its agents**, including agents of agents.
727 This assures a chain of trust from the covered entity through all
728 organizations that may have access to identifiable or HIPAA de-identified
729 health data. It also enables the covered entity to be able to describe uses
730 of health data made by agents to individuals and monitor any potential
731 changes over time.

732
733 1.1.4 **that any organization that specifies it will use de-identified data at**
734 **the individual person-level for a specified purpose will ensure that**
735 **the de-identification process follows the HIPAA requirements for de-**
736 **identification.**

- 737
738 **1.2 Recommendation on attestation of business associate contract compliance:**
739 HHS should take applicable means, such as issuing guidance and incorporating in
740 their own requirements, to ensure that covered entities use an attestation process
741 which includes that (a) business associates must provide an annual attestation to
742 the covered entity that their actions remain consistent with the permitted uses, (b)
743 all agents have been properly engaged by the business associates, and (c) the
744 business associate and its agents are in compliance with all other applicable
745 provisions of the business associate contract. In the event of any changes in uses
746 or agents, the business associate contract must be amended.
747
- 748 **1.3 Recommendation on entities providing data transmission functions:** HHS
749 should provide guidance that clarifies that any company providing data
750 transmission of protected health information and who requires access to the
751 protected health information in order to conduct the transmission is a business
752 associate and must be bound by the requirements for business associates. This
753 does not apply to routing instructions external to the protected health information
754 content of the transmission.
755
- 756 **1.4 Recommendation on FTC privacy policy support:** HHS should urge the Federal
757 Trade Commission (FTC) to utilize their full authority to ensure that (1.) privacy
758 policies on web sites collecting personal health information fully inform users of the
759 uses that will be made of their personal health information and (2.) the companies
760 do not engage in misleading advertising or other deceptive trade practices.
761 Further, when more inclusive Federal privacy legislation may be enacted, these
762 web sites must be included. HHS should then collaborate with the FTC to promote
763 harmonization of regulations covering these organizations to ensure consistent
764 privacy protection.
765

766 **2. Observations and Recommendations on Principles of Data Stewardship for**
767 **Transparency**

768
769 The primary means by which HIPAA covered entities provide transparency today is
770 through distribution of a notice of privacy practices (NPP), which is intended to explain
771 to individuals how their protected health information may be used and disclosed.
772 Providers who have a direct treatment relationship with an individual must make a good
773 faith effort to have the individual acknowledge receipt of the NPP. As a result, the NPP
774 is often referenced as a “HIPAA consent,” when it is only an informational document
775 advising individuals about the covered entity’s information policies and procedures. In
776 addition, the NPP is frequently long, difficult to read, and is only required to provide
777 examples of uses and disclosures. A NPP is not required to describe potential uses of
778 de-identified data.

779
780 Related to the NPP, the HIPAA Privacy Rule provides a series of privacy rights,
781 including the right to request privacy protection by means of a restriction or confidential

782 communications, right of access, right to amend, and right to an accounting of
783 disclosures. All of these rights have some limitations which the covered entity may apply
784 to protect the health information that serves as its business records. For example,
785 individuals may be denied the ability to amend information not created by the covered
786 entity, yet if this information carries erroneous information that has led to medical
787 identity theft, the information may be perpetuated in other organizations' information
788 systems.

789
790 Because of the limitations inherent in the NPP and its rights, and the extensive network
791 of business associates and their agents that many covered entities use, the NPP is not
792 serving well in alerting individuals to all potential uses of their health data or clarity
793 surrounding how they may exercise control over uses of their health data. NCVHS
794 heard testimony about several projects focusing on the need for transparency in
795 communication about personal information. Findings from these projects revealed a
796 number of insights:

797
798 *For example, in a consumer research project for developing privacy notices*
799 *performed for six federal agencies, it was found that the point of a disclosure form*
800 *is not to lead people to a conclusion or particular action, but to give them*
801 *information to make an informed decision – based on their own values.*⁹

802
803 *Another example from a risk communication specialist discussed advice for*
804 *medical institutions concerning concerns about misunderstanding or misuse of*
805 *information released to persons or the public, indicating that the remedy for*
806 *misunderstanding is always more information, not less.*¹⁰

807
808 *A “lay person’s” perspective observed that most individuals do not know about the*
809 *use of their personal health information; that physicians are often worried about*
810 *these uses; and that transparency would lead to investment in increasing*
811 *involvement and engagement by individuals in their health care.*¹¹

812
813 **2.1 Recommendation on Transparency:** HHS should issue guidance to covered
814 entities and all other organizations responsible for managing, collecting, viewing,
815 storing, sharing, disclosing, or otherwise making use of personal health
816 information, whether identified or de-identified, to ensure that individuals have the
817 opportunity to be informed about all potential uses of their health data that might
818 not reasonably be anticipated to flow from the individual’s disclosure of health
819 information. Transparency should be achieved through:

820
821 **2.1.1 enhancements to the NPP:** HHS should issue guidance to covered
822 entities on enhancing the HIPAA notice of privacy practices (NPP) to
823 clarify uses of health data and to make the acknowledgement of receipt a
824 more meaningful process. As an initial step, HHS should issue guidance

⁹ Susan Kleimann, PhD, Kleimann Communication Group, Inc., Testimony, August 23, 2007

¹⁰ Peter M. Sandman, Written Testimony, August 8, 2007

¹¹ Sharon F. terry, Genetic Alliance, Testimony, August 2, 2007

825 on writing model notices in plain language and offer other tools to enhance
826 understanding of the NPP.

827
828 **2.1.2 making information available about the specific uses and users of**
829 **protected health information:** HHS should issue guidance to covered
830 entities to incorporate reference in the NPP that information, updated
831 annually via the business associate contract attestation process, about
832 how protected health information is used by business associates and their
833 agents is available on the covered entity's web site and upon request.

834
835 **2.1.3 making information available about the specific nature of protected**
836 **health information disclosed to other organizations, such as public**
837 **health:** HHS should issue guidance to covered entities to incorporate
838 reference in the NPP that information about what protected health
839 information is disclosed to other organizations, such as to public health, is
840 available on the covered entity's web site and upon request.

841
842 **2.1.4 ensuring that there is the ability by the individual who is a victim of**
843 **medical identity theft to have errors corrected:** HHS should issue
844 guidance to covered entities that individuals should be permitted to correct
845 errors relating to medical identity theft in information that is incorporated
846 into their designated record set but that was not created by the covered
847 entity. This assures that errors are not perpetuated and transmitted to
848 others when such information may be disclosed to other treating providers
849 as permitted by the HIPAA Privacy Rule.

850
851 **2.2 Recommendation for education on uses of health data:** HHS should develop
852 and maintain a multi-faceted national education initiative that would enhance
853 transparency regarding uses of health data in an understandable and culturally
854 sensitive manner. The initiative should involve all relevant HHS agencies.
855 Educational activities should be appropriately integrated into Federal agencies'
856 respective programs, policies and practices, as well as directly targeted to public
857 and professional audiences. Various educational modalities should be included in
858 NHIN trial implementations and other federally-sponsored demonstrations.

859
860 **3. Observations and Recommendations on Principles of Data Stewardship for**
861 **Individual Participation and Control over Personal Health Data**

862
863 The NCVHS Privacy Letter of June 22, 2006 observes that providers should have the
864 right to maintain health data in any medium. It notes, however, that it may be
865 appropriate to permit individuals to opt into or out of certain other uses of health data.
866 For example, it may be suitable for individuals to opt out of direct disease management
867 interventions by health plans. Testimony was heard from a health information exchange
868 in which individuals were asked to opt into contributing data to a provide-oriented

869 outcomes analysis and benchmarking data warehouse. They found that a high
870 percentage (94 percent) of individuals opted in, with variation by specialty of providers.¹²

871
872 Testifiers to the NCVHS were particularly concerned about uses of individuals' health
873 data which would be unanticipated by the individual. When individuals perceive benefit
874 to themselves, trust is greater than when there is no perceived benefit or when there is
875 benefit that accrues solely to someone else.

876
877 Testimony also identified a number of new and innovative approaches to manage
878 individual consent with respect to health data uses. These include health record banking
879 models, consent metadata, and federated consent registries. While these processes are
880 new and need testing, they may provide a suitable way for consent to follow data.

881
882 **3.1 Recommendation on obtaining consent for of identifiable personal health**
883 **data:** HHS should take applicable means to assure that uses or disclosures of
884 identifiable personal health information held by any organization not covered by
885 HIPAA and that are outside of HIPAA permissible uses or disclosures must obtain
886 an authorization from the individual. See also Recommendation 9.1.

887
888 **3.2 Recommendation on consent management:** HHS should include in its NHIN
889 trial implementations and other federally-sponsored demonstrations the
890 evaluation of various new technologies that afford the ability for individuals to
891 exercise control over disclosures of their personal health information. The
892 evaluation of consent management should include determining to what data
893 sharing scenarios consent would provide optimal protection while assuring the
894 benefits of health data uses.

895
896 **4. Observations and Recommendations on Principles of Data Stewardship for De-**
897 **Identification**

898
899 The HIPAA Privacy Rule applies only to protected health information. Therefore, the
900 Privacy Rule permits use of de-identified data without individual authorization. It permits
901 either a safe harbor or statistical approach to de-identification. De-identification removes
902 the data from the protection of HIPAA requirements. Uses of de-identified data by any
903 organization are not required to be tracked in any way.

904
905 In addition, applications of HIPAA's safe harbor definition of de-identification often
906 remove only the 17 data elements in the definition and ignore the requirement to
907 remove "any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code, except as
908 permitted" (§164.514(b)(2)(i)(R)). One testifier indicated that removal of the 17 data
909 elements specified in HIPAA may result in a small ability to re-identify an individual.¹³

¹² Micky Tripathi, PhD, MPP, Massachusetts eHealth Collaborative, Testimony, August 23, 2007.

¹³ In testimony on August 23, 2007, Latanya Sweeney, PhD, Carnegie-Mellon University, described a 0.04% chance of re-identifying data when de-identified by removal of the 17 data elements in the HIPAA

910
911 Other forms of identity protection, such as anonymization, masking, etc. (see **Appendix**
912 **C: Taxonomy/ Glossary of Terms**), have also been adopted by certain entities – whether
913 to remove the data from the protection of HIPAA or to enhance the protection beyond
914 what is required. For example, covered entities are permitted to disclose protected
915 health information for public health purposes. Because public health departments are
916 very sensitive to the data they hold, they may use an approach called pseudonymization
917 to protect the identity of the data yet enable re-identification when authorized. Other
918 organizations, however, may be using de-identification techniques that are not
919 consistent with the HIPAA requirements and pose a risk to personal privacy.

920
921 Finally, use of HIPAA de-identified data may not only pose risk to individuals but to
922 providers. For example, testimony from the Prescription Project raised concerns about
923 potential conflicts of interest in the medical profession created by pharmaceutical
924 marketing conducted through data-mining of physician prescribing records.

925
926 **4.1 Recommendation on de-identification:** HHS should issue guidance to covered
927 entities that clarifies that the HIPAA definition of de-identification (by the complete
928 safe harbor definition or statistical method) is the only permitted means to de-
929 identify protected health information. Furthermore, HHS should issue guidance on
930 the specific threshold of statistical de-identification that ensures information is
931 rendered not individually identifiable.

932
933 **4.2 Recommendation on allowable uses of HIPAA de-identified data without**
934 **authorization:** HHS should define allowable uses of HIPAA de-identified data,
935 and provide guidance to covered entities regarding what uses of HIPAA de-
936 identified data are not permitted without authorization by the individual so that
937 covered entities may be guided in development of their business associate
938 contracts. See also Recommendation 1.1.2.

939
940 **4.3 Recommendation on sale of de-identified data:** HHS should examine the
941 issues surrounding sale of de-identified data and propose guidelines that address
942 best data stewardship practices. NCVHS will conduct hearings to assist in
943 determining how to structure these guidelines.

944
945 **5. Observations and Recommendations on Principles of Data Stewardship for**
946 **Security Safeguards and Controls**

947
948 The HIPAA Privacy Rule describes implementation specifications for minimum
949 necessary uses of protected health information, including the identification of persons or
950 classes of persons in its workforce who need access to protected health information to
951 carry out their duties, and for each person or class of persons the category or

safe harbor definition of de-identification when compared to voter registration records for a confined population.

952 categories of protected health information to which access is needed, and any
953 conditions appropriate to such access (§164.514(d)(s)(A) and (B)).

954
955 The HIPAA Security Rule affords the administrative and technical safeguards to support
956 minimum necessary uses and disclosures. Administrative safeguards include access
957 authorization in which policies and procedures must describe how access to electronic
958 protected health information may be granted, for example, to a workstation, transaction,
959 program, process, or other mechanism (§164.308(a)(4)(ii)(B)). Technical safeguards
960 require implementation of technical policies and procedures for electronic information
961 systems that maintain electronic protected health information to allow access only to
962 those persons or software programs that have been granted access rights as specified
963 in §164.308(a)(4). This requirement for access controls includes emergency access
964 procedures, commonly referred to in the industry as “break-the-glass” mechanisms that
965 enable necessary access in an emergency, often accompanied by the means to quickly
966 annotate a rationale for the access and with generation of a special audit trail.

967
968 Testifiers to NCVHS reported that utilization of such technology and others, such as
969 digital signature using X.509 certificate and non-repudiation for person or entity
970 authentication are technologies available and being used successfully in some
971 implementations.¹⁴ It was also observed that not all covered entities deploy such
972 technology. For example, several hospitals recently adopted a “zero-tolerance policy”
973 on confidentiality, including use of computer programs to identify suspicious cases, and
974 found significant reduction in employees disciplined for privacy violations.¹⁵

975
976 **5.1 Recommendation on technical data security management approaches:** HHS
977 should issue guidance to covered entities to promote use of technical security
978 measures to reduce unauthorized access, and to ensure that their business
979 associates and agents are fully compliant with the HIPAA Security Rule
980 authorization, access, authentication, and audit control requirements.

981
982 **6. Observations and Recommendations on Principles of Data Stewardship for**
983 **Data Integrity and Quality**

984
985 HIT and HIE can aid in comprehensive data collection and sharing, but data integrity,
986 uniformity of definition, and validity must be assured. Just because data are available
987 electronically, does not mean that the data are accurate or are reliably captured or
988 processed. As enhanced uses of health data are enabled by the creation of larger, more
989 comprehensive databases, with the potential for linkage of personal health information
990 to acquire longitudinal views, data integrity and quality become essential for meaningful
991 uses of the health data.

992

¹⁴ Assaf Halevy, dbMotion, August 23, 2007

¹⁵ Minnesota Facilities Target Unauthorized Employee EHR Access, *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, July 19, 2007.

993 *For example, during hearings on NHIN functional requirements, NCVHS heard*
994 *testimony describing the multiple ways Hemoglobin A1c may be referenced (e.g.,*
995 *Hb A1c, Hg A1c, A1C, GHb) and the issues this causes in managing laboratory*
996 *processes and reporting results.*

997
998 Furthermore, erroneous assumptions about accurate data may be made during
999 aggregation resulting in misinformation.

1000
1001 *For example, while it is important to know that everyone who is diabetic has had a*
1002 *Hemoglobin A1c measured; it is not accurate to assume that everyone having had*
1003 *a Hemoglobin A1c test is a diabetic.*

1004
1005 **6.1 Recommendation on data integrity and quality:** HHS data stewardship
1006 guidance should include that data captured, aggregated, and analyzed for quality
1007 measurement, reporting, and improvement follow rules and guidelines that
1008 ensure the precision and reliability of quality measures. See NCVHS
1009 recommendations on quality September 26, 2007.

1010

1011 **7. Observations and Recommendations on Oversight for Specific Uses of Health** 1012 **Data**

1013
1014 *Uses of Health Data for Quality Measurement, Reporting, and Improvement:*

1015
1016 As identified in the HIPAA definition of quality assessment and improvement activities
1017 within healthcare operations, uses of health data for quality activities may be many and
1018 varied. The HIPAA Privacy Rule accounts for the fact that many such uses might not
1019 have been able to be anticipated at the time of the writing of the Rule. It allows for
1020 “related functions that do not include treatment” to be covered under the definition.

1021
1022 In addition, HIPAA defines an organized health care arrangement (OHCA) that supports
1023 the sharing of health data for quality assessment purposes. An OHCA is defined in
1024 HIPAA as a clinically integrated care setting in which individuals typically receive health
1025 care from more than one health care provider; an organized system of health care in
1026 which more than one covered entity participates in utilization review, quality
1027 assessment, or payment activities; and various configurations of group health plans that
1028 share the same sponsor or participants (§160.103).

1029
1030 NCVHS was asked by ONC to consider whether there were or should be boundaries
1031 around what quality activities are included in HIPAA’s definition of healthcare operations
1032 and which may be outside of that definition and may call for greater choice by
1033 individuals whose data are included.

1034
1035 Several testifiers observed that they had instituted oversight processes to ensure that
1036 quality assessment activities were, indeed, those described by HIPAA. Previously cited

1037 was the Northern New England Cardiovascular Disease Study that might be described
1038 as an OHCA under HIPAA and provides regular quality assessment oversight.
1039

1040 Several recent articles also describe the state of affairs in quality improvement. O’Kane
1041 raises issues with traditional approaches to quality assurance. She observes that “most
1042 management structures do not support integrated quality management” that would
1043 enhance accountability for quality, and describes the need for a quality oversight
1044 process by a responsible structure accountable to senior management and the
1045 governance of the institution for all quality improvement activities. O’Kane further notes
1046 that oversight “will not only protect patients from ad hoc or poorly conceived QI projects,
1047 it will also ensure that the institution has a vigorous and strategic agenda to improve the
1048 quality of its care.”¹⁶ Dubler and others argue that “if the data are adequately protected
1049 to address issues of individual privacy, individual informed consent should, in general,
1050 not be required.” They also observe that a process of “informed participation,” which
1051 they define as a process in “which institutions design quality improvement interventions
1052 and educate and engage patients about their obligations to help improve quality” will
1053 “allow the vast majority of quality improvement projects to go forward without triggering
1054 [a research-like informed consent process].”¹⁷
1055

1056 **7.1 Recommendation on protecting data for quality measurement, reporting,**
1057 **and improvement:** HHS should issue guidance to covered entities that health
1058 data uses for quality measurement, reporting, and improvement:
1059

1060 **7.1.1 are within the scope of healthcare operations** when conducted by
1061 covered entities or their business associates, and under the
1062 accountability and data stewardship principles of HIPAA.
1063

1064 **7.1.2 when conducted across covered entities within an organized health**
1065 **care arrangement** as defined by HIPAA, are within the scope of the
1066 HIPAA definition of healthcare operations, although the covered entities
1067 should assess any heightened risk of potential harm to individuals
1068 through such use of HIE and take measures to further protect the data,
1069 such as through pseudonymization.
1070

1071 **7.1.3 should have a proactive oversight process** to ensure there is
1072 compliance with HIPAA in uses of health data for quality measurement,
1073 reporting, and improvement that would be accountable to senior
1074 management and the governance of the institution. Where it is
1075 determined through a risk/benefit analysis that there is heightened risk to
1076 individuals from the quality reporting process, the oversight process
1077 should recommend extra precautionary measures to protect the
1078 individuals.
1079

¹⁶ O’Kane, Margaret, “Do Patients Need to be Protected from Quality Improvement?” 2007.

¹⁷ Dubler, Nancy, Jeffrey Blustein, Rohit Bhalla, David Bernard, “Informed Participation: An Alternative Ethical Process for Including Patients in Quality-Improvement Projects,” 2007.

1080 *Uses of Health Data for Research*

1081
1082 The Common Rule (45 CFR 46) defines research as “a systematic investigation,
1083 including research development, testing and evaluation, designed to develop or
1084 contribute to generalizable knowledge.” While federally funded research studies on
1085 human subjects requires approval by an institutional review board (IRB) and an
1086 informed consent to “opt in” to participating in the research project, NCVHS heard
1087 testimony that there is variation in regulations addressing human research protections
1088 across the HIPAA Privacy Rule, the Common Rule, the FDA regulations (21 CFR 50
1089 and 56), and the VA regulations (38 CFR 16). In addition, the Common Rule does not
1090 apply to human subjects’ research when not supported by federal funds, being
1091 conducted in contemplation of a submission to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
1092 or conducted by an institution that has signed a multiple program assurance with the
1093 Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP). Representatives from the OHRP
1094 indicated to NCVHS that work was being done on clarifying the elements contained in
1095 the definition of research and that there is a Trans-HHS Taskforce on Harmonization of
1096 Ethical and Legal Policies Related to the Use of Human Specimens and Data in
1097 Research (HELPS) composed of representatives from NIH, FDA, OCR, OHRP, CDC,
1098 and others focused on harmonizing regulations under the jurisdiction of HHS.

1099
1100 NCVHS heard from many testifiers that quality activities are sometimes difficult to
1101 distinguish from research, and that some quality activities may evolve into research
1102 studies. It was observed that the “line between quality improvement and clinical
1103 research is relatively permeable, and it is sometimes difficult to determine with precision
1104 whether a project should be considered quality improvement or research, especially
1105 when a quality study may utilize techniques of randomization and prospective
1106 intervention with the support of electronic databases.”¹⁸ Testimony to NCVHS described
1107 a full spectrum of how organizations addressed the quality/research conundrum, from
1108 requesting annual IRB review of quality studies to giving individuals the opportunity to
1109 opt-out of using their data in research studies conducting retrospective review of data.

1110
1111 Good quality improvement activities share important characteristics with research,
1112 especially with respect to their ethical underpinnings. Lumpkin observes that basic
1113 principles of biomedical ethics, including respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-
1114 maleficence, and justice relate to all aspects of HIPAA TPO, and equally in quality,
1115 public health, and research uses of health data.¹⁹

1116
1117 There are also important differences between quality and research. The University of
1118 Texas M. D. Anderson Cancer Center notes that working definitions of quality
1119 improvement and research and methods of supervising and providing ethical oversight
1120 for quality improvement projects, including posting descriptions on their web, have
1121 actually evolved the inherent value of quality improvement. At M. D. Anderson,
1122 organizational leaders and IRB chairs use an informal triage process to decide which

¹⁸ E. Bellin and N.N. Dubler, “The Quality Improvement-Research Divide and the Need for External Oversight,” *American Journal of Public Health*, 91(9)(2001): 1512-17.

¹⁹ Lumpkin, John R., MD, MPH, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Testimony on August 1, 2007.

1123 projects should be considered quality improvement and which should be considered
1124 research. The federal definition of research [45 CFR 46] is sometimes applied to quality
1125 improvement projects.²⁰

1126
1127 Another group that has grappled with the distinction between research and quality is the
1128 Center for Health Studies at Group Health Cooperative (GHC) in Seattle. GHC observes
1129 that distinguishing between quality and research in some situations is very difficult,
1130 noting that “determining whether an analysis of health data is “systematic” or
1131 “generalizable,” and therefore considered research, is complicated and subjective.”²¹
1132 They also observe that researchers strive to work collaboratively. The result is often that
1133 confusing or ambiguous regulations are negotiated within an organization, where it
1134 would be helpful to have a recognized national resource that could provide authoritative
1135 answers to regulatory questions. GHC utilizes a decision tree framework to guide its
1136 internal activities in determining when an activity is not research, when there is overlap,
1137 and when an activity is research

1138
1139 **7.2 Recommendation on harmonizing research regulations:** HHS should promote
1140 harmonization of research regulations within HHS and with other Departments
1141 that oversee regulations on human research protections to ensure consistent
1142 privacy and human subject protection.

1143
1144 **7.3 Recommendation for quality/research guidance:** HHS should encourage the
1145 Office of Human Research Protections (OHRP) in compiling its clarifying work on
1146 the research definition to continue to work collaboratively with the Office of Civil
1147 Rights (OCR) and to leverage the tools starting to be used in the industry to aid in
1148 distinguishing how requirements apply to uses of health data for quality and
1149 research, especially as questions relating to distinctions between research and
1150 quality uses of health data under the HIPAA healthcare operations definition
1151 arise.

1152
1153 **7.4 Recommendation for wide dissemination of quality/research guidance:** HHS
1154 should encourage the Office of Human Research Protections (OHRP) in
1155 compiling its clarifying work on the definition of research to widely disseminate
1156 the results. Limiting such dissemination only to the research community can limit
1157 its usefulness for providers, payers, and others who may not consider themselves
1158 researchers, but who may become engaged in quality work that ultimately falls
1159 within the scope of research on human subjects.

1160
1161 **7.5 Recommendation for means to transition quality activities into research**
1162 **when appropriate:** HHS should support OHRP and OCR collaboration so that
1163 important findings from a quality study can be appropriately evolved into research
1164 when appropriate and that the HIPAA Privacy Rule provisions for authorization or

²⁰ Holm, Margaret J., et al, “Quality Improvement or Research: Defining and Supervising QI at the University of Texas M. D. Anderson Cancer Center, 2007.

²¹ Immanuel, Virginia, Karin Johnson, Barbara Young, Gene Hart, Center for Health Studies, Group Health Cooperative, Seattle, Written Testimony, July 31, 2007.

1165 waiver of authorization by a Privacy Board or Institutional Review Board are not
1166 violated.
1167

1168 **8. Observations and Recommendations on Transitioning to a NHIN**

1169
1170 NCVHS observes that many uses of health data contemplated to be supported by a
1171 NHIN are being made today in the context of point-to-point communications, often
1172 between covered entities, their business associates and agents, and with individual
1173 recipients of care delivery services. At this time, a definition of a NHIN and how it will be
1174 used has not reached sufficient maturity to dictate how individual choice over uses of
1175 health data within a NHIN should or could be exercised.
1176

1177 **8.1 Recommendation on choice within a NHIN:** HHS should continue to pursue
1178 further definition of a NHIN and its uses, and concurrently study how to balance
1179 the benefits of health data uses as development of a NHIN progresses with the
1180 concerns expressed about potential for harms. Trial implementations and other
1181 federally-sponsored demonstrations should include:
1182

1183 **8.1.1 evaluation of how individual choice might best be applied,** including
1184 evaluation of the costs and benefits of educating individuals, explaining
1185 and offering consent options, and ensuring transparency.
1186

1187 **8.1.2. evaluation of enhanced oversight and data stewardship principles**
1188 on various uses of health data, especially as more comprehensive
1189 databases may be compiled by non-HIPAA covered entities spawned by
1190 a NHIN.
1191

1192 **8.1.3 evaluation of de-identification techniques** to determine their
1193 effectiveness to protect identity and not enable re-identification when not
1194 intended.
1195

1196 **8.1.4 evaluation of and continued maturity of chain of trust mechanisms**
1197 to determine the impact on business associate relationships and ensure
1198 transparency between covered entities and business associates and their
1199 agents.
1200

1201 **8.1.5 evaluation of educational modalities** to determine the most effective
1202 messages and media for various target audiences.
1203

1204 **8.1.6 evaluation of appropriate safeguards needed to ensure that there is**
1205 **no unintended harm to individuals as de-identified data may be sold**
1206 **to support** the possible business models of a NHIN.
1207

1208 8.1.7 **evaluation of guidance that may be issued for covered entities to use**
1209 **or disclose protected health information in the least identifiable form**
1210 **consistent with the intended use.**

1211
1212 8.2 **Recommendation on adopting functional requirements for a NHIN to**
1213 **support data stewardship:** HHS should require NHIN trial implementations and
1214 other federally-sponsored demonstrations to adopt the functional requirements
1215 described by the NCVHS in its report to the Secretary of October 30, 2006,
1216 especially with respect to certifying participants, as well as to ensure that the
1217 principles of good stewardship outlined in these recommendations are fully
1218 adopted.
1219

1220 **9. Observations and Recommendations on Privacy Legislation**

1221
1222 Testimony indicates that there is a continuum of users of health data – from those with a
1223 close nexus with the delivery of care for the individual (i.e., individual care recipients,
1224 providers, and payers) to those that are very far removed from the individual-provider-
1225 payer relationship (e.g., data mining companies that track health-related web sites).
1226 Testimony also identified that, while the HIPAA Privacy and Security regulations
1227 address protections as health data are used close to the nexus of care delivery, the
1228 farther removed from care delivery, the less protection, if any, is afforded. The lack of
1229 adequate protections across all uses of health data can result in serious harms to
1230 individuals and ultimately the quality of health and health care in the Nation.

1231
1232 NCVHS has previously made several sets of recommendations setting the broad
1233 context for privacy improvement, including that privacy and confidentiality rules should
1234 apply to all individuals and entities that create, compile, store, transmit, or use personal
1235 health information in any form and in any setting, including employers, insurers,
1236 financial institutions, commercial data providers, application service providers, and
1237 schools.
1238

1239 Finally, there is the need to address variations in state laws with respect to privacy.
1240 While it is important to identify best practices and states may be in the best position to
1241 test various practices, disparate laws across states make it costly and difficult for
1242 covered entities to comply with all nuances of the laws when data are exchanged
1243 across state boundaries.

1244
1245 9.1 **Recommendation on federal privacy legislation:** HHS should work with other
1246 federal agencies and the Congress:

1247
1248 9.1.1 **for more inclusive, federal privacy legislation** so that all individuals and
1249 entities that use and disclose individually identifiable health information are
1250 covered by the data stewardship principles, including a range of entities not
1251 currently covered by HIPAA. NCVHS recommendations of June 22, 2006
1252 reference that “privacy and confidentiality rules [should] apply to all

1253 individuals and entities that create, compile, store, transmit, or use
1254 personal health information in any form and in any setting, including
1255 employers, insurers, financial institutions, commercial data providers,
1256 application service providers, and schools.” To clarify, commercial data
1257 providers should include commercial vendors of personal health record
1258 services.

1259
1260 **9.1.2 on expanding the definition of covered entity under HIPAA:** *In the*
1261 *absence of comprehensive privacy legislation,* HHS should advocate for
1262 more limited legislation that expands the definition of covered entity under
1263 HIPAA from its focus on financial and administrative transactions to cover
1264 any entity that manages, collects, views, stores, shares, discloses, or
1265 otherwise makes use of personal health information.

1266
1267 **9.2 Recommendation on anti-discrimination legislation/regulation:** HHS should
1268 work with other federal agencies and the Congress for legislative or regulatory
1269 measures designed to eliminate or reduce as much as possible the potential
1270 discriminatory effects of misuse of health data (see also NCVHS Privacy Letter,
1271 June 22, 2006). This includes strengthening laws making it illegal for employers
1272 to discriminate in hiring, promotion, discharge, or other terms and conditions of
1273 employment unless the individual, with or without reasonable accommodation, is
1274 unable to perform the essential functions of the job.

1275
1276 **9.3 Recommendation on state data restriction laws:** HHS should support the work
1277 of the Health Information Security and Privacy Collaboration (HISPC) that would
1278 guide harmonization among state laws where applicable and pinpoint where
1279 states have made explicit differences. HHS should support a state law mapping
1280 repository that clarifies where states differ and which aspects of state laws are
1281 more stringent than HIPAA.

1282
1283

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1437
1438
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1440
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1442

1443 **Appendix C: Taxonomy/Glossary of Terms**

1444
1445 This taxonomy, with a glossary of terms (*under development*), identifies and defines
1446 terms used by testifiers (and in collateral documents) in discussion of uses of health
1447 data. Its purpose is to provide guidance to the reader of this report as well as to inform
1448 the development of its recommendations. The structure of the Taxonomy/Glossary of
1449 Terms is generally consistent with the “Secondary Uses and Re-uses of Healthcare
1450 Data: Taxonomy for Policy Formulation and Planning” (a.k.a., AMIA Taxonomy)
1451 developed by the American Medical Informatics Association (AMIA). However, there are
1452 both similarities and differences between the two documents that are important to note:

- 1453
- 1454 • The NCVHS Taxonomy/Glossary of Terms is intended to inform the
1455 recommendations included herein and to help provide guidance in determining
1456 suitable data stewardship approaches for various uses of health data by the entity
1457 having jurisdiction over the use.
1458
 - 1459 • The AMIA taxonomy is intended to be used as a “resource in developing plans
1460 and policies related to secondary uses of healthcare data.” The AMIA taxonomy
1461 attempts to provide a categorization of health data uses that could be described
1462 by various attributes of the uses and therefore relate policy statements to the
1463 particular use.
1464
 - 1465 • Neither the AMIA Taxonomy nor the NCVHS framework attempts to be inclusive
1466 of all categories or classes of uses or users of health data nor all attributes of the
1467 uses of health data for policy purposes.
1468
 - 1469 • The NCVHS Taxonomy/Glossary of Terms includes annotated definitions to
1470 guide the reader of the report as well as to promote adoption of standard
1471 terminology associated with uses of health data.
1472

1473 **Taxonomy/Glossary of Terms Structure**

1474
1475 *Needs description*

1476 **Taxonomy and Terms**

1477
1478 Terms Used to Describe Status of Information
1479 Individually identifiable health information (IIHI), as defined by HIPAA
1480 Protected health information (PHI), as defined by HIPAA
1481 Personal health information, as commonly used
1482
1483 Terms Used to Describe Oversight of IIHI
1484 Covered entity compliance with HIPAA
1485 Business associate contract/agreement

- 1486 Agent of business associate
- 1487 Researcher compliance with regulations
- 1488 Data use agreement, as defined by HIPAA
- 1489 “HIPAA compliant” (when used by vendors)
- 1490 Data Ownership
- 1491 Data stewardship
- 1492
- 1493 Terms Used to Describe Identity Protection (of Individual Patient/Clinician; Entity)
- 1494
- 1495 De-Identification, as defined by HIPAA using statistical and scientific principles and
- 1496 methods for rendering information not individually identifiable
- 1497 De-Identification, as defined by HIPAA safe harbor
- 1498 Limited Data Set (HIPAA for Public Health, Research, or Health Care Operations)
- 1499 Non-identifiable/un-identifiable
- 1500 Anonymization (Public Health)
- 1501 Pseudonymization (Public Health)
- 1502 Irreversible Pseudonymization
- 1503 Linked data with protected key
- 1504 Re-identifiable
- 1505 Aggregation (Quality)
- 1506 Information vs. Data (Markle)
- 1507 Masking
- 1508 Encryption
- 1509 One-way Hash
- 1510
- 1511 Terms Used to Describe Permission to Access/Use/Disclose
- 1512
- 1513 Authorization (HIPAA Privacy)
- 1514 Authorization (HIPAA Security)
- 1515 Consent (HIPAA permits but does not require)
- 1516 Consent (Common Rule required for Research)
- 1517 Consent (Informed for Procedures)
- 1518 Opt In
- 1519 Opt Out (also HIPAA Opportunity to Agree or Object; Right Request for Restrictions)
- 1520 De-authorization
- 1521 IRB approval; IRB waiver
- 1522
- 1523 Terms Used to Describe Uses of Data
- 1524 Primary
- 1525 Secondary (AMIA Taxonomy Sources of Secondary Data; IOM [1991] Uses and Users)
- 1526 Tertiary, Quaternary
- 1527 Non-Clinical Use
- 1528
- 1529 Terms Used to Describe Transparency
- 1530 HIPAA Notice of Privacy Practices (often confused with consent)
- 1531

- 1532 Terms Used to Describe Accountability
- 1533 Sanctions
- 1534 Civil Penalties
- 1535 Criminal Penalties
- 1536
- 1537 Terms used to Describe Health Information Repositories
- 1538 Medical record
- 1539 Health record
- 1540 Legal health record (AHIMA)
- 1541 Electronic health record
- 1542 Personal health record
- 1543 Continuity of care record; (ASTM CCR) + clinical document architecture (HL7 CDA) =
- 1544 continuity of care document (CCD)
- 1545 Clinical data repository
- 1546 Clinical data warehouse
- 1547
- 1548 Terms Used to Describe Exchange of Health Information
- 1549 **ONC:**
- 1550 Health information exchange
- 1551 Nationwide health information network
- 1552 Nationwide health information network health information exchange (NHIE)
- 1553 Health information service provider (HSP)
- 1554 **NCVHS:**
- 1555 National health information infrastructure
- 1556
- 1557 Data access (in some cases view only; in other cases obtaining an image of data; in still
- 1558 other cases obtaining the data in processable form)
- 1559 Data sharing
- 1560 Data use
- 1561 Data disclosure
- 1562 Data request
- 1563
- 1564 Terms Used to Describe Circumstances that Raise Policy Issues (AMIA)/Trust (NCVHS)
- 1565 Financial Gain from Use
- 1566
- 1567 Quality
- 1568
- 1569 The Institute of Medicine (IOM) report on Performance Measurement: Accelerating
- 1570 Improvement (2006) defines *quality* as “the degree to which health services for
- 1571 individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are
- 1572 consistent with current professional knowledge.” This report also describes *performance*
- 1573 *measures for quality* as inclusive of patient perspectives on care, clinical quality, and
- 1574 patient outcomes.
- 1575