Detailed Information on the
National Nuclear Security Administration: International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation Assessment

Developing a planning process to enable the transition of responsibility for sustaining installed security upgrades at Russian sites with weapons-usable nuclear material and nuclear warheads.

Refining U.S. lifecycle cost estimates to reflect the costs to sustain MPC&A upgrades, and the cost-sharing associated with their transition to full Russian Federation responsibility.

Measure: Cumulative number of buildings with weapons-usable material secured.

Explanation:By the end of 2008, secure (rapid or comprehensive upgrades complete) approximately 210 buildings containing weapons-usable nuclear material.

Measure: Cumulative number of warhead sites with completed MPC&A upgrades.

Explanation:By the end of Calendar Year 2008, complete MPC&A upgrades at 73 warhead sites.

Measure: Cumulative metric tons of highly-enriched uranium converted to Low-Enriched Uranium.

Explanation:Approximately 17 metric tons of Russian highly-enriched uranium will be converted to low-enrichard uranium by the end of 2015.

Measure: Cumulative number of Second Line of Defense sites with nuclear detection equipment installed. (Cumulative number of Megaports completed).

Explanation:Approximately 380 border sites and up to 70 Megaports are in need of equipment to detect illicit smuggling of nuclear materials.

Measure: Cumulative number of Megaports with host country cost-sharing, resulting in decreased costs to the US program. (Estimated cost sharing value).

Explanation:By the end of FY 2013, cost share a cumulative total of 18 Megaports, with decreased cumulative costs of $83M to the U.S. program.

Measure: Cumulative number of MPC&A regulations in the development phase for the Russian Federation and FSU countries.

Explanation:Allows the INMP&C program to monitor progress on the development, enactment, implementation of a comprehensive regulatory base for MPC&A in the Russian Federation and FSU countries.

Measure: Cumulative number of buildings containing weapons usable material with completed Materials Protection Cooperation and Agreements upgrades.

Explanation:By December 2009, complete Materials Protection and Cooperation and Agreements upgrades on approximately 227 buildings containing weapons-usable nuclear material including Post Bratislava work-scope.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation (INMP&C) program has a clear purpose -- to prevent nuclear terrorism by working in Russia and other regions of concern to: 1) secure and eliminate vulnerable nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material; and 2) install detection equipment at border crossings and large seaports (called "megaports") to prevent and detect the illicit transfer of nuclear material.

Evidence: FY 2007 NNSA Congressional Budget; International FY 2008 NNSA Congressional Budget Request; National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Strategic Plan; 2006 INMP&C program Strategic Plan

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: The INMP&C program addresses a specific and existing problem, interest, or need regarding the post-Soviet security environment. The breakup of the Soviet Union created vast quantities of poorly-secured nuclear materials and warheads. The security system developed during the Soviet period was completely inadequate for the post-Soviet security environment. There have been 17 confirmed cases of weapon-usable material thefts from Russia and the former Soviet newly independent states since May 1992. These nuclear materials continue to be vulnerable to theft and diversion. The INMP&C program strategic plan and strategic forecast establish the strategy to address this problem.

Evidence: National Security Council review of 2001; repeated media, Congressional, administration and intelligence reports confirm the problem; 2006 Strategic Forecast; visits to Russian sites by INMP&C program technical experts have confirmed poor security practices

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: The INMP&C program mission is clear and focused on nuclear material security and is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private efforts. Work to secure nuclear warheads is closely coordinated with the Department of Defense (DoD) and via regular interagency meetings. The work of this program requires expertise and resources available only at the federal level (state and local governments are not equipped to address this problem). The INMP&C program subcontracts with private industry, as appropriate, because non-profit organizations do not have sufficient resources to address the magnitude of this work. The Second Line of Defense activities are coordinated with the Department of Homeland Security through its Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and the interagency working group on smuggling. The Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Homeland Security are pursuing private sector investment in detection equipment installation overseas. The DOE closely coordinates with the DoD's Defense Threat Reduction Agency on efforts to secure Russian nuclear warheads.

Evidence: National Security Council review of Russian and Non-Russian Nonproliferation programs; "U.S. Policy on Improving Nuclear Material Security in Russia and other Newly Independent States" Presidential Decision Directive-41 of September 1995; interagency policy coordinating committee meetings, warhead security working group; the DOE/DoD Joint Task Force

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: The incorporation of sound program management techniques into the INMP&C program design ensures that it remains free of major flaws that would limit its effectiveness or efficiency. Monthly performance measurement and reporting against defined cost and schedule milestones help to ensure the program's continued efficiency. Technical and external risks that could adversely impact the projects have been identified and risk mitigation strategies are in place and are actively managed. The INMP&C program is structured for optimal efficiency. It is organized into offices and projects that correspond with specific partner organizations in Russia, and the program's financial reporting system reflects that structure. The INMP&C program has developed a clear set of criteria that optimizes cost-effectiveness.

Evidence: 2006 INMP&C program Strategic Plan; Guidelines for Material Protection, Control and Accounting Upgrades at Russian Facilities Revision 3, June 2005; Life-Cycle Cost and Schedule Estimate, February 2007; Government Accountability Office reports; National Security Council review of nonproliferation programs

Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?

Explanation: Program resources are targeted to those efforts that directly support program objectives and goals, while proper project management ensures that objectives are accomplished on schedule and within budget. As part of the work authorization process, Annual Operating Plans are created that identify the scope, schedule and funding for each work element as well as the project/task managers responsible for the work, project participants, and expected results. The program employs multi-layered management techniques (progress reporting through regularized contact between U.S. technical teams and country site representatives; monthly reporting of costs; tracking of project schedules and deliverables) to ensure that resources reach the intended recipients and are used to achieve the program's objective. Also, internal program reviews and independent audits conducted by the Technical Survey Team and the new Insider Threat Review Group ensure resources are aligned properly.

Evidence: NNSA Strategic Planning Guidance; National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction; 2006 INMP&C program Strategic Plan; Basic Ordering Agreements; Project Work Plans; Annual Reviews; INMP&C program Project Management Document Revision 9, June 2006; Technical Survey Team reports; Insider Threat Review Group reports

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: The program has six specific long-term measures to meaningfully assess progress toward achieving the program's purpose. They are: (1) complete MPC&A upgardes at approximately 227 buildings in Russia/FSU containing weapons-usable nuclear material; (2) secure 73 Russian nuclear warhead sites; (3) convert 17 metric tons of Russian highly-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium; (4) prevent and detect the illicit transfer of nuclear material by installing detection equipment at over 380 border crossings and up to 75 large seaports; (5) place in the development phase a cumulative total of 185 MPC&A regulations for the Russian Federation and FSU countries and;(6) acheive host country cost sharing with a cumulative total of 18 countries in the Megaports program with decreased cumulative costs of approx. $83M to the program.

Evidence: DOE Strategic Plan; NNSA Strategic Plan; 2006 INMP&C program Strategic Plan; Life-Cycle Cost and Schedule Estimate February 2007; FY 2008 NNSA Congressional Budget Request; Programming, Planning, Budgeting and Execution process; Joint Action Plan between the United States and the Russian Federation

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: The INMP&C program has ambitious but realistic timeframes for these long-term measures. These targets and timeframes are ambitious given the technical and political challenges of working in over 20 countries, the voluntary nature of international participation in program activities, and the difficulties present with having very short construction seasons in Russia. In fulfillment of the agreement between the U.S. and Russian Presidents at the Bratislava Summit in 2005, the INMP&C program accelerated the original schedules for the completion of security upgrades at Russian Navy warhead sites by two years (from 2008 to 2006) and also accelerated the completion of security upgrades at buildings containing weapons usable nuclear material by two years (from 2010 to 2008). The INMP&C's program current targets and timeframes are: (1) complete MPC&A upgardes at approximately 227 buildings containing weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia/FSU by the end of 2009; (2) secure 73 Russian nuclear warhead sites by the end of 2008; (3) convert 17 metric tons of Russian highly-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium by 2015; (4) prevent and detect the illicit transfer of nuclear material by installing detection equipment at over 380 border crossings and over 30 large seaports by the end of 2013; (5) place in the development phase a cumulative total of 185 MPC&A regulations for the Russian Federation and FSU countriesby the end of FY 2012 and;(6) acheive host country cost sharing with a cumulative total of 18 countries in the Megaports program by the end of FY 2013 resulting in decreased cumualtive costs to the program of approx. $83M.

Evidence: Joint Statement of the Presidents Made at Bratislava, Slovakia, February 2005; DOE Strategic Plan; NNSA Strategic Plan; 2006 INMP&C program Strategic Plan; Life-Cycle Cost and Schedule Estimate, Feb. 2007; FY 2008 NNSA Congressional Budget Request; Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation process

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: The INMP&C program has a limited number of specific annual measures to meaningfully assess progress towards achieving the program's long-term goals. For FY 2008 they are: (1) complete MPC&A upgrades at an 61 additional buildings containing weapons usable material in Russia ; (2) secure an additional 6 warhead sites; (3) convert an additional 1.2 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium; (4) complete installation of radiation detection equipment at an additional 54 sites including 3 large seaports; and (5) have a total of 5 countries under the Megaports program with decreased costs of approx. $24M to the program.

Evidence: Life-Cycle Cost and Schedule Estimate, Feb. 2007; FY 2008 NNSA Congressional Budget Request; Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation process

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: The INMP&C program has detailed and ambitious annual milestones and deliverables. The milestones and deliverables are documented in life cycle cost plans and project work plans. The INMP&C program updates the program baseline (Life-Cycle Cost and Schedule Estimate) each year. In addition, the program uses an automated, web accessible database called the Metrics Information Management System to track and report the current status and progress against performance baselines. The Metrics Information Management System allows for a more consistent level of life cycle cost planning and baseline development.

Evidence: Life-Cycle Cost and Schedule Estimate, Feb. 2007; FY 2008 NNSA Congressional Budget Request

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: All partner agencies, DOE laboratories, and U.S. and Russian subcontractors commit to annual and long-term goals by means of: (1) international agreements, (2) development and implementation of the Life-Cycle cost and Schedule Estimates; (3) development of Project Work Plans, and (4) execution of contracts that reflect INMP&C program upgrades criteria. Program goals are discussed and agreed upon during the semi-annual joint coordinating committee meetings among DOE, the Russian Federation Agency for Atomic Energy, and the Russian Ministry of Defense. In addition to these high-level measures, there are day-to-day mechanisms in place to ensure that program goals are effectively communicated and committed to by all partners. These measures include monthly project team meetings, bi-weekly teleconferences, in progress reviews, and policy directives.

Evidence: Life-Cycle Cost and Schedule Estimate Feb. 2007; Project Work Plans; Contracts and Statements of Work; U.S.-Russia INMP&C program Agreement; Bratislava summit statement; U.S./Russian INMP&C program Cooperation Joint Action Plan; Joint Coordinating Group meetings with Russia

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: The INMP&C program has established an independent evaluation group called the Technical Survey Team which conducts annual reviews of all projects against the program's performance criteria. The program has also established an insider threat review group to focus independent experts on auditing strategies to resolve this critical threat on a site-by-site basis. In addition, over the past several years a number of independent external reviews of the INMP&C program have been conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), the DOE Office of Inspector General, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, the National Security Council, and the National Academy of Sciences.

Evidence: Technical Survey Team reports; GAO reports; DOE Office of Inspector General reports; Secretary of Energy Advisory Board reports; National Security Council recommendation, December 2001; National Academy of Sciences reports; Insider Threat Review Group reports

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: Budget requests are explicitly tied to accomplishment of annual and long-term performance goals. The INMP&C program is managed using long-term performance goals with annual targets that cascade from the NNSA strategic plan, and also link to supporting milestones, deliverables, and the budgets for program performers. Performance measures are the framework for resource allocation decisions made in the annual Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation process. Annually, the NNSA performance-planning-budgeting decisions are documented in the Administrator's Final Recommendation and used to develop the budget requests. Expected cost savings as a result of efficiencies have been factored into the budget estimates. Program and financial performance for each measure is monitored and assessed during the budget execution/evaluation phase. The DOE's accounting system reports all direct and indirect costs of the INMP&C program. The cost for NNSA Federal employees who execute the program is carried in a separate NNSA program direction account, as required by Congress.

Evidence: FY 2008 NNSA Congressional Budget Request/NNSA Future Years National Security Plan; NNSA Budget guidance documents located on the NNSA website; NNSA FY 2006 and FY 2007 Program Decision Memoranda; and FY 2008 Administrator's Final Recommendation

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: The INMP&C program has corrected strategic planning deficiencies as identified by the U.S. GAO report "Department of Energy Has Made Limited Progress In Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Seaports" (March 2005). In their report, the GAO recommended that the INMP&C program develop a comprehensive long-term plan to guide the future efforts of its program to secure large seaports (the Megaports Initiative). The INMP&C program had maintained all of the elements identified by the GAO in three separate planning documents. In January 2006, the information in these documents was consolidated into a single, comprehensive, long-term plan for the Megaports Initiative.

Evidence: Megaports Initiative Program Plan 2006; National Security Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction; DOE and NNSA Strategic Plans; INMP&C program Strategic Plan

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: The INMP&C program regularly collects timely and credible performance information. At least once a year, all project data is integrated to update the program's short- and long-term plans to improve performance. The program: (1) meets bi-annually with all Russian government partners to track progress and performance; (2) has project level discussions with foreign partners that occur on a more frequent basis; (3) collects and updates cost and deliverable information at the project level based on input from laboratories, private contractors, and host country facilities on a monthly basis; (4) ensures each project receives an independent annual review; and (5) reports progress against annual performance target baselines quarterly to the DOE internal performance tracking system for inclusion in the annual Performance and Accountability Report.

Evidence: U.S.-Russian INMP&C program Joint Coordinating Committee Record of Meeting, Life-Cycle Cost and Schedule Estimate, Feb. 2007; monthly cost reports; Project Work Plans; Technical Survey Team reports; program reviews

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: Federal managers are held accountable for meeting performance targets, cost and schedule through their annual performance appraisals. Contractors are held accountable as their performance on the INMP&C program goals is factored into their annual award fee. Federal managers take past performance of contractors and national laboratories into account when follow-on funding decisions are made. The INMP&C program has established specific performance standards for program partner governments to ensure their contributions help achieve program goals.

Evidence: Federal manager performance appraisals; Laboratory performance appraisals; award fees; Project Management Document Revision 9, June 2006; Guidelines for Material Protection, Control and Accounting Upgrades at Russian Facilities, Dec. 2006; Life-Cycle Cost and Schedule Estimate, Feb. 2007

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner, spent for the intended purpose and accurately reported?

Explanation: The INMP&C program funding is allocated at the start of the fiscal year and as needed throughout the fiscal year via the NNSA Approved Funding Program. Funds are then matched to work requirements outlined in the project implementation plans. Expenditures and commitments are tracked monthly, and any unspent funds are carefully managed through the DOE financial reporting system. The level of unspent funds in any given month has typically been less than 10% of the program's budget. The INMP&C program subcontracts about 50% of its funds to Russian nuclear facilities and private vendors. These recipients require extra oversight to ensure that program funds are being spent for their intended purpose. This oversight is accomplished through frequent visits by U.S. experts to Russian sites in order to validate the proper use of program funds, as well as to conduct performance tests of completed security systems.

Evidence: Financial plans; NNSA Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation process; monthly cost reports; Project Work Plans; reviews of contracts and statements of work; travel reports; performance test results; photographs

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: The INMP&C program uses its Program Management Information System to track costs and schedules, and evaluates this data to achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program implementation. The INMP&C program has used incentive based contracting to accelerate security upgrades at sites. In addition, the program has developed several procedures to ensure effective program execution. These include establishing security upgrades criteria to foster common contracting practices, establishing benchmarked and controlled costs, executing blanket equipment contracts with Russian vendors to ensure consistent pricing and reduce the number of contract negotiations, and monitoring of contractor performance. The INMP&C program negotiates low overhead rates from national labs through a comparative analysis.

Evidence: NNSA Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation process; GAO reports; National Security Council reviews; contracts and statements of work; INMP&C program Project Management Document Revision 9, June 2006; INMP&C program contracts policy; and Guidelines for Material Protection, Control and Accounting Upgrades at Russian Facilities, Dec. 2006

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: The INMP&C program collaborates and coordinates closely with: (1) the DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction program, (2) the State Department; (3) the Department of Homeland Security (specifically the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and U.S. Customs and Border Control); (4) the National Security Council, (5) international partners in Russia and other former Soviet states, (6) the International Atomic Energy Agency, and (7) countries in which large seaports are receiving security upgrades. These collaborations are effective because they minimize duplication of effort across agencies and ensure that resources are leveraged to achieve the best result. For example, INMP&C program and the Departments of Homeland Security and State have built a strong, effective relationship and closely coordinate on the planning and implementation of their respective programs. The broad extent of coordination between the INMP&Cs program Megaports Initiative and the Department of Homeland Security's Container Security Initiative is evident in the 20 joint outreach missions and port assessments that have been undertaken, the joint implementing agreements that have been signed, and ongoing efforts to identify additional opportunities to jointly implement both programs.

Evidence: Interagency coordination meetings and memoranda of understanding; international agreements and protocols, contracts, and statements of work, National Security Council warhead security guidelines, Joint Coordination Group record of meeting; Memorandum of Understanding between the DOE and the Department of Homeland Security

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: The INMP&C program uses strong financial management practices which is implemented by DOE financial management policies, procedures and practices that meet all statutory requirements. The DOE provides accounting services for the NNSA, and its financial management processes are free of material internal control weaknesses. The INMP&C program staff reviews accounting reports on a monthly basis to monitor obligations and costs for all programs/projects and sites.

Evidence: DOE Financial Management Orders; Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation guidance documents; INMP&C program Project Work Plans; monthly cost report; INMP&C program website; INMP&C program Joint Action Plan; INMP&C program strategic plan and sustainability strategy

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: The INMP&C program has taken steps to address its management deficiencies. For example, the rapid expansion of work to secure large seaports under the Megaports Initiative created a human resources deficit which the program addressed by augmenting its federal workforce. Systems and procedures to control program costs and obligations, schedules, and performance have been developed and are in place. The program has a well-developed, web-based financial/project management system called Program Management Information System as well as longstanding internal project management guidance that is regularly updated. The INMP&C program also conducts annual program reviews to identify and correct potential management deficiencies.

Evidence: NNSA Strategic Plan; Annual Program Reviews; Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation process; INMP&C program Work Plans; monthly cost reports; INMP&C program website; GAO reports; National Security Council reviews; INMP&C program staffing plan; INMP&C program Project Management Document, Rev. 9 (June 2006)

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: The INMP&C program has demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals. As of the end of FY 2006, the INMP&C program had secured 175 buildings containing weapons usable nuclear material; secured 39 of the 39 Russian Navy nuclear warhead sites; 11 of 25 Russian Strategic Rocket Forces sites; converted a total of 8.4 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium; and installed radiation detection equipment at a total of 104 sites including 6 large seaports.

Evidence: Feb. 2008 Future Year National Security Plan; FY 2008 NNSA Congressional Budget Request; DOE internal metrics reporting system (Joule system)

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: The INMP&C program has to a large extent, consistently achieved its annual performance targets. Throughout the year, program and project managers document on a quarterly basis their progress toward the achievement of these annual targets. The annual DOE Performance and Accountability Report documents the final status of the achievement of all DOE performance targets. In FY 2004, the INMP&C program achieved 5 of 7 annual performance targets; in FY 2005 it achieved 3 of 5, and in FY 2006 it achieved 3 of 5.

Evidence: Feb. 2008 Future Year National Security Plan, FY 2008 NNSA Congressional Budget Request; DOE internal metrics reporting system (Joule system)

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: The INMP&C program has demonstrated improved efficiencies and cost effectiveness. Over the past several years, the INMP&C program has continued to increase funds spent on security upgrades in Russia while simultaneously decreasing costs for U.S. laboratory oversight, travel, and procurement rates. An example of this increase is demonstrated by the percentage of funds spent in Russia, which has increased from approximately 50% in FY 2001 to 65% in FY 2006, therefore decreasing costs for U.S. laboratory oversight, travel, and procurement rates.

Evidence: Annual Report to Congress on Russia and Newly Independent States Program Funding for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (FY 2001-FY 2006)

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: The performance of this program compares favorably to other programs with similar purpose and goals. In 2001, the INMP&C program was reviewed for cost effectiveness by the National Security Council along with all other U.S.-Russian nonproliferation programs. The INMP&C program received a high rating in the review, and was recommended to receive additional funding in order to accelerate schedules. A further example of the high competency and performance of this program was demonstrated in spring of 2002, when the Department of State program which maintains radiation detection equipment at strategic transit and border sites was transferred to the DOE in order to remedy program deficiencies identified by the GAO.

Evidence: National Security Council recommendations, December 2001; GAO reports

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: Independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results. Several external audits have expressed favorable reviews. A 2006 audit conducted by the U.S. GAO found that "[the Department of Energy] (DOE) and [the Department of Defense] (DOD) have made significant progress in helping Russia and other countries improve security at vulnerable sites housing weapons-usable nuclear material and nuclear warheads."

Evidence: Independent review commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Reduction Initiative entitled "Securing the Bomb 2006"; U.S. GAO Report (GAO-07-404), February 2007