Docs 319-345
319. Information Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, August 1, 1968, 7:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. VI, 8/68-9/68. Top Secret. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it and the attachments.
SUBJECT
Responses to General Taylor's Memorandum on Bombing Policy
Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford and General Wheeler have sent in the attached papers giving their views on General Taylor's memorandum to you concerning our bombing policy in North Vietnam.
You will recall that General Taylor discussed three alternatives--
1. Stop the bombing completely
2. Continue our present policy
3. Linking the level of our bombing to that of enemy violence in South Vietnam
General Taylor's memorandum is at Tab D./2/
/2/In his July 30 memorandum to the President, attached but not printed, Taylor argued that implementation of the third alternative required lifting "the geographical limitations on the bombing target system." He believed that if this policy was enacted, the following statement should be issued: "Available data indicate that in recent weeks enemy violence in South Viet-Nam, measured in attacks, terrorism, harassment, sabotage, and the resultant military and civilian loss of life on our side, has subsided slightly (or we could indicate an approximate percentage) under that of the period immediately following the President's March 31 speech. U.S. military authorities have been directed to make a comparable reduction in the sortie rates being flown against North Vietnamese military targets for the immediate future." Taylor concluded: "I think we should try the second alternative now but prepare to shift to this last one."
In brief, the two Secretaries and General Wheeler oppose linking the level of our bombing to that of enemy violence in South Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk believes it is too complicated to administer and seems to use military resources in a way that does not achieve relatively simple objectives. He defers, however, to his military colleagues on the military aspects of the suggestion. (Tab A)/3/
/3/In his July 31 memorandum to the President, attached but not printed, Rusk noted: "My concern about General Taylor's ingenious third course of action is that it is too complicated to administer and seems to me to use military resources in a way that does not achieve relatively simple objectives. It would put any bombing of North Viet-Nam on an almost purely political basis and therefore expose us to political charges that it is an obstacle to peace and ought to be eliminated." In a July 30 letter to Rusk, Taylor requested that he prepare this memorandum. (National Defense University, Maxwell Taylor Papers, Project Lull) In a memorandum for the record, August 1, Taylor described his meeting with Rusk that day, during which Rusk noted that "we should stay on our present course in Paris and give nothing away at this time" and suggested that it was "preferable to maintain the low level of military and diplomatic activity throughout August in order to avoid introducing any disturbing factor into the domestic political scene." (Ibid.)
Secretary Clifford believes the suggestion is unworkable and would be unproductive. Our bombing is now tied to the security of our own forces and should not be tied to other variables. (Tab B)/4/
/4/In his August 1 memorandum to the President, attached but not printed, Clifford concluded: "In summary, I agree with General Taylor on his recommendation that we should not now deviate from our present course. I see no reason to let present or prospective public pressures dictate our course of action. We should not allow such pressures to force us to embark on an expansion of the bombing, to a premature cessation of the bombing or to abandonment of our search for a bombing halt under circumstances where such further restraint on our part promises to bring us closer to a satisfactory settlement." In a letter to Clifford, July 30, Taylor requested that he prepare this memorandum. (National Defense University, Maxwell Taylor Papers, Project Lull) In a memorandum for the record, July 31, Taylor described his meeting with Clifford and Nitze that day. Clifford proposed that the President announce that within a week bombing would end if the DMZ was not violated, infiltration did not increase, attacks on major cities subsided, and substantive talks including the GVN began. Bombing would resume if attacks occurred or if the enemy rejected the offer. "Clifford seemed to feel that a long drawn-out negotiation without bombing is more tolerable than the maintenance of military pressure on Hanoi at the cost of high casualties," Taylor noted. (Ibid.)
General Wheeler considers the suggestion not to be in our best interests. He says that the value of having an answer to a possible charge that we fail to deescalate when the enemy does is not worth the cost in reduced military effects of our bombing, a predictable increase in friendly casualties, and the loss of our allies' confidence in the U.S. policy of steadfastly awaiting meaningful deescalation by Hanoi. (Tab C)/5/
/5/In CM-3532-68 to the President, August 1, entitled "Alternative Bombing Proposals," attached but not printed, Wheeler noted: "With respect to the three alternatives, under the current circumstances I favor the second alternative; however, insofar as that part of it which includes a major public relations campaign is concerned, I am not confident that it would be successful." In CM-3531-68 to the President, July 31, entitled "Cessation of Bombardment of North Vietnam," Wheeler argued that the halt would give the Vietnamese Communists significant military advantages while endangering U.S. and GVN forces, a stoppage would be impossible to resume, and that "free of any degree of military pressure, I conjecture that the enemy will feel even less constrained to engage speedily in productive negotiations leading to a fair and just peace." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 90)
Both Secretaries and General Wheeler come out strongly in support of our remaining on our present course in Paris as well as in Vietnam. General Taylor's memorandum makes clear that he also shares this view. (I have not given to General Taylor copies of these papers.)/6/
/6/A passage in Nitze's notes of the August 1 meeting of the Secretary of Defense's "8:30 Group" consisting of his top advisers reads: "N[itze] suggested take that part of last part of T[aylor] proposal and adapt it to our purposes. Make criteria general. We interpret as second alternative C[lifford]'s modification of H[arriman]V[ance] proposal. 7 days before announce intention & assumptions. If no objection from other side go ahead. If rejection then resume." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense Notes, 1968, 5 of 6) On August 3 Clifford discussed with the "8:30 Group" his meeting with the President the previous day at the Ranch. In his notes of the meeting, Nitze wrote: "C[lifford] conversation with P[resident]. Now had done everything necessary to implement our commitment. 1. Turned enemy back. 2. Developed ARVN. 3. Because of success, shld. recognize and find reasonable basis for disposition." The U.S. offer was summarized in the following manner: "Week after R[epublican] convention. One week later wld. stop. Assume. Ample opportunities for them to say no. If Hanoi a) rejected or b) levelled major attacks no trouble in resuming." (Ibid.)
Brom
320. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze)/1/
Washington, August 2, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Vietnam War, Courses of Action--Post Paris Talks 1968. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The time of the meeting and a list of participants have not been found.
SUBJECT
Non-Group meeting of August 1
Mr. Katzenbach opened the meeting by raising the question of what initiatives might be possible in Paris. He asked whether the Non-Group thought there would be any point in our trying to discuss with the North Vietnamese the idea of mutual withdrawal in somewhat greater detail. He suggested this might be done on the ground that if they go North rather than South there will be no reason for us to bomb.
He explained that his dread is that when the bombing stops and we get to discussing the political future of the South this puts us in the worst possible public position. We don't really know what kind of political settlement to urge and we would then be forced into the public position of balking at anything other than flat public support for the Thieu Government.
Mr. Helms voiced the view that our thinking about Paris is handicapped by the fact that we have never really thought out, as a government, what it is that we want. Mr. Katzenbach said that, for his part, he would regard the following as a satisfactory minimum settlement:
1. The North Vietnamese would get out of the South, with a minimum of cheating.
2. The North Vietnamese would get out of Laos with somewhat more cheating.
3. Cambodia would be left to struggle along by itself and probably could do so.
As for what we would give up in order to get the North Vietnamese to go along with this kind of a settlement, Mr. Katzenbach said we would be willing to take out our troops and give up our bases. He assumed, however, that we would continue to give aid to South Vietnam of both an economic and military nature.
Mr. Helms indicated his assent and said that this assumed we would let the ARVN cope with the Viet Cong. Mr. Katzenbach said they could either cope with them or make a deal with them.
Mr. Nitze said that this would be highly satisfactory from our standpoint, but that it leaves North Vietnam with nothing to show for casualties which must run about 200,000 killed-in-action, equivalent to a couple of million Americans on a proportionate basis. He asked how this could be regarded as anything but a complete victory for us. Mr. Katzenbach said that if the mutual withdrawal could be phased out slowly so as to bring us closer to 1971, when elections are to be held, the North Vietnamese might be more willing to accept some such solution.
Mr. Helms expressed the opinion that any such settlement would require creation of some sort of a supervisory commission, since otherwise there would be no way of telling whether or not, in a guerrilla war, North Vietnam was complying. Mr. Katzenbach expressed some doubt on this point, noting that a phased withdrawal would leave us with some capability to detect violations and that we would have access to such sources as prisoner interrogation.
Mr. Nitze stated that the key issue is that of how large an insurgent base the GVN can handle. The ethnic composition of this insurgent base makes relatively little difference. This fact might make the policing effort somewhat simpler.
The general consensus was that we have not spelled out to the North Vietnamese what we mean by mutual withdrawal. It was agreed that it would be useful to make it clear that we want them out, that we are prepared to get out ourselves, and that we will be able to stop the bombing if we can agree in principle on this.
There was also agreement that some continued North Vietnamese presence in Laos could be tolerated, provided it is confined to the northern part and that the Ho Chi Minh Trail is blocked.
Some difference of opinion was revealed on the question whether North Vietnam would require something more than assurance that the US is willing to give up its bases and withdraw its troops. Mr. Helms expressed some surprise, though not disagreement, at the general acceptance of the proposition that we would be willing to abandon Cam Ranh Bay and similar bases. Mr. Nitze noted that they would not be inactivated but rather turned over to the South Vietnamese. Mr. Moorsteen thought that it was quite possible that the North Vietnamese did not really believe the Americans would be willing to pull out and that they might regard this as a sufficient basis for settlement. Mr. Leonhart noted that the Manila Communique is consistent with the interpretation that US forces will withdraw only after the Viet Cong stopped fighting.
There was some discussion of the problems involved in our participation in a political settlement for the South. If the mutual withdrawal formula is inadequate, the question arises as to what we might have to agree with North Vietnam to bring pressure on the GVN to do.
The over-all conclusion that emerged was that we should seek to move the emphasis in Paris from what Mr. Nitze referred to as the "procedural point of linkage" (between our bombing and restraint by Hanoi) to the question of our mutual withdrawal, trying to be precise as to the Manila formula. Mr. Nitze remarked the possible disadvantage of "enlarging the carrot" that we dangle in Paris within days after the very tough statements in the press conferences of the President and Secretary Rusk. Everyone was in accord with the fact that little could be done, in any event, until after the Republican Convention. Mr. Bundy suggested that it was not unusual in negotiations to have public bluster and private flexibility.
There was also considerable speculation about the so-called "third offensive." Some thought this would not occur during the Convention at Miami but that it might take place later in the month in an effort to influence the result in Chicago. Others conjectured that it would not take place until September, if at all.
The procedure generally agreed upon was to try to utilize the Russians by going back to Premier Kosygin. Mr. Bundy said that the unfortunate element of our previous reply to Kosygin was a call for a "precise" explanation as to what Hanoi's response would be if we were to stop the bombing./2/
/2/See Document 269.
Mr. Bundy was asked to develop papers in which we would comment to Kosygin that we had noted the reduction in North Vietnamese activity and were interested in knowing what the purpose and meaning of this phenomenon might be. The letter could continue that the presence or absence of further attacks would be regarded by us as quite meaningful. If, for example, the present lull continues through September 1st, we would regard this as a basis for further steps on our part.
There was also comment about the difficulty North Vietnam might feel in bringing the conflict to an end, even if its leaders have given up hope of victory. In this connection, Mr. Leonhart reported a conversation he had had with a Japanese official, who observed that the Japanese had known after Saipan that they could not win. The official had remarked upon the "struggle to end the war."
Paul C. Warnke
321. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, August 2, 1968.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Maxwell Taylor Papers, Vietnam Policy 1968. Top Secret. The attached note transmitting a copy of the memorandum to Smith reads: "Brom: Please pass my report electronically to the President at the Ranch so he may have it for his reading tomorrow. M.D.T." Taylor drafted this report in his capacity as Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In his note transmitting a copy of the memorandum to the President, August 2, 8:30 p.m., Smith wrote: "Here is General Taylor's evaluation of the lull in enemy activities in South Vietnam. General Taylor plans to send you a separate paper covering recommended actions based on the conclusions he has reached. If any public use is to be made of this paper, I recommend that you do not use one sentence in the report until we have learned whether the 18,000 figure included in it is agreed within the Intelligence Community." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 8 I, 1/67-12/68, Taylor Memos--General) The notation "ps" on this covering note indicates that the President saw Taylor's memorandum; a separate notation indicates that the memorandum was received at the Ranch at 11 a.m. on August 3. The President visited his Texas ranch August 2-19. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
SUBJECT
Evaluation of the Lull in Enemy Activities in South Viet-Nam
At your luncheon on Tuesday, July 30,/2/ you asked me as Chairman of your Intelligence Board to examine the available information with regard to the so-called lull in South Viet-Nam and to determine whether, in fact, there was a significant lull and, if so, to evaluate its military and political significance.
/2/See Document 316.
In carrying out your instructions, I have discussed the points at issue with Secretaries Rusk and Clifford, Deputy Secretary Nitze, Director Helms and the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General McConnell. Also, I have obtained by cable the views of Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams which you have seen in their entirety./3/ In highly summarized form, the following are the conclusions which I have drawn from my discussions with these officials and from Bunker's most illuminating cable./4/
/3/See Document 319.
/4/In telegram 34163 from Saigon, August 1, Bunker reported that he and Abrams opposed a full cessation on the grounds that it would undermine Thieu, demonstrate weakness in the peace negotiations, provide a military advantage for the enemy, and be difficult to resume the bombing. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 90)
Is there a lull?
There has been a very significant lull in the combat activities of the enemy in South Viet-Nam. Since about mid-June, virtually all of the indicators of these combat activities have turned downward. However, concurrently there have been many indications of intense activity devoted to other forms of military activity such as the refitting, retraining, reorganizing, and repositioning of many of his units. Battle casualties are down in comparison with the first five months of 1968 but our casualties in the so-called lull are higher than in the corresponding period of 1967.
With regard to enemy political activities in South Viet-Nam, there is no detectable lull--indeed political propaganda in support of the NLF and the Alliance has increased. Efforts to proselyte by propaganda are at a high pitch but there seems to be some reduction in the organization of Liberation Committees in the countryside. In Saigon, the Alliance seems to be gaining a measure of support among some of the intelligentsia.
What is the military significance?
As to the military significance of the lull in combat activities, there is unanimity of opinion that it has been imposed upon the enemy largely by military necessity. If there were no political negotiations in progress, there would still be ample reason for the enemy to take time out to replace the severe losses of the Tet and the May 5 offensives and to assimilate the heavy influx of recruits arriving from the north during the spring and summer. Also, the heavy losses in supplies and equipment must have created logistic problems requiring a period of relative inactivity for resolution. However, the requirements for the reconstitution of units probably do not explain entirely the remarkable low level of current combat activity. It seems likely that, if he wanted, the enemy could be more aggressive now than is presently the case and, at the same time, build up his combat effectiveness.
This regeneration of combat capability is probably both for the purpose of regaining lost strength and also with the objective of developing a renewed capability for another large scale offensive some time this year. While evidence as to the possible timing of a renewed offensive is mixed, several dates have been mentioned in intelligence reports, most of them falling in the period August 3-18. By that time, the newly arrived recruits should be well integrated into their units and ready to take part in an offensive. Also, it will be convention time in the U.S., a fact which may have a bearing on enemy timing.
As to likely places for attack, recent enemy movements and dispositions may be interpreted as threats to the coastal region of I Corps from the DMZ through Danang to Quang Nai, Ban Me Thuot, Loc Ninh, Tay Ninh and Saigon. Estimates of the possible scale of the offensive vary from a country-wide, coordinated effort on the Tet pattern to a lesser offensive like the one in May or even something substantially smaller. In spite of heavy losses, the massive infiltration during the spring and summer has allowed him to raise his current North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Main and Local Force units by about 18,000 over their strength just prior to the Tet offensive. Thus, in terms of numbers, the enemy appears to be in good shape to strike a powerful blow. However, Abrams has the general initiative and, this time, there should be no possibility of a surprise.
What is the political significance?
With regard to any political motivation for the lull, there is a general feeling that there is no clear evidence to suggest that the lull is primarily for the purpose of influencing the Paris negotiations. There are too many valid military reasons to support such a view. However, there is general agreement that the enemy has the opportunity to make political virtue out of military necessity by exploiting the lull as evidence of an ostensibly sincere desire to lower the level of violence as a tacit, conciliatory gesture. He can not exploit this point officially without giving up his position on reciprocity but some Hanoi representatives in private conversations have alluded to their current restraint on the battlefield. Unfortunately, U.S. critics of our policy need no prompting and make the case for Hanoi on their own initiative.
Summary
There is an enemy-initiated lull in combat activities in South Viet-Nam accompanied by an intensification of enemy military activities for the purpose of replacing losses, refitting units and creating a renewed offensive capability. That capability may be exercised at any time in a number of places.
There has never been a lessening of enemy political activities in South Viet-Nam--in fact, in this period they have increased.
The combat lull was imposed on the enemy by military necessity but, as a bonus, he has the option of exploiting it for political purposes in relation to the peace talks. There is no evidence to believe that it is a genuine signal of a desire to deescalate in order to facilitate prompt and productive talks in Paris./5/
/5/According to a memorandum to Taylor from Grover Brown, Assistant Director for Intelligence Production, Defense Intelligence Agency, and summary notes from PFIAB-CIA-DIA representatives, both dated August 1, the enemy would continue the military buildup while taking political advantage of the supposed "lull" and might refrain from a renewed offensive if the negotiations swung in his favor. (Both in National Defense University, Maxwell Taylor Papers, Project Lull) In a memorandum to Rusk entitled "North Vietnamese Links Between the Lull in the South and the Bombing of the North," August 8, Hughes noted INR's speculation that Hanoi may have intended the lull to be "a reciprocal gesture for a bombing halt" and that such a halt might pre-empt another large-scale attack. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S) An analysis of Communist political activity during the lull was transmitted to Taylor in CIA memorandum No. 0609/68, "Recent Vietnamese Communist Political Action in South Vietnam," August 1. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01580R, 266--Vietnam)
M.D.T./6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
Note: Because of the need for a prompt reply to your directive, I have not been able to consult the other members of your Intelligence Board in preparing this paper. With regard to recommendations of actions as a consequence of the conclusions of this report, I shall prepare and submit a separate paper./7/
/7/Not found.
322. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, August 3, 1968, 1300Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-August 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Harvan; Plus. Received at 9:57 a.m.
18977/Delto 550. From Harriman and Vance.
1. Yesterday afternoon we met with Amb Zorin for about one and one-half hours. Also present were Oberemko, Bogomolov and Perry./2/
/2/Rusk's comments on this meeting were transmitted in telegram 214858 to Paris, August 3. (Ibid.) The message was repeated as telegram CAP 81796 from Smith to the President, August 3. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel--Paris Delto, X, 8/1-10/68) It was further discussed in a memorandum from Smith to the President, August 3. (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 90)
2. We said that we wished to review with Ambassador Zorin where we were in the negotiations and where we were going from here. We thought it fair to say that a very definite difference had come into the talks with the North Vietnamese--perhaps due to reality or perhaps due to misunderstanding. The Hanoi representatives were making a great deal of two events, the Honolulu meeting and Secretary Rusk's July 30 press conference./3/ He asked us if there had been a change in US policy and we had said no. We said the North Vietnamese think they can say anything bellicose they want to and we will ignore it. In the Honolulu communique and in the Rusk statement we said we wanted peace, but if they wanted to fight, then we would fight. We said that we had not brought with us a list of bellicose statements by Hanoi representatives, but they were legion, including statements at the time of signing in Moscow of supply agreement with Deputy Prime Minister of DRV, by Ho Chi Minh, Giap, and others. We said that we had accepted them as nothing unusual in time of war.
/3/See Document 303 and footnote 2, Document 315.
3. We said that we wanted Amb Zorin to know that there was no change in the President's policies set forth in the March 31 speech. We said that the point of Secretary Rusk's statement was that we were ready for moves towards peace, but we had to have some indication of what Hanoi's attitude would be after a bombing cessation. We said we had to deal with realities. We said it was true that there had been a lull in the shelling of Saigon since June 21 and in military attacks generally, but at the same time there was a great increase in the forces coming from the North--last year the influx was something like 8,000 per month, but it was now about 30,000--there were more North Vietnamese units in Saigon area than ever before--the proportion of North Vietnamese soldiers in Viet Cong units was up from 25 percent to 70 percent. Therefore, while there was a certain lull, there were also continuing signals (captured documents, prisoners--including some of high rank--and defectors) that new attacks were planned against Saigon and other major cities. We said that Secretary Rusk had said that we must get some clear indication from Hanoi as to what their intentions were. We said that both the President and Secy Rusk had said that we must know what would happen if we stopped the bombing, and we must know this either directly from Hanoi or indirectly thru third parties, such as the Soviet Union.
4. We said that we hoped Zorin would convey two things to his govt. First, we need some indication directly or by third parties that Hanoi would show restraint if we stopped the bombing--in other words, is restraint or escalation their aim? Second, it would be most serious for the Paris talks if the Viet Cong carried out their third wave offensive which was being planned. We said that our talks were at a critical stage. We had hoped we could move forward with the Phase 1-Phase 2 proposals and continue along that path, but we needed evidence or direct word from Hanoi or the Soviets or someone that Hanoi was willing to show restraint.
5. We said that when we discussed our Phase 1-Phase 2 proposal with Ha Van Lau over tea at our last meeting,/4/ our impression was that the North Vietnamese were not interested in continuing the exploration of our proposal. We said that we were at a critical point in our discussions and that we had come to Zorin as the representative of a vote we believed wanted the talks to succeed in the hope that they could do something constructive.
/4/See Document 317.
6. Zorin said he had listened attentively but the picture we had drawn was very one-sided. Zorin said of course factual situation on the ground and the Paris talks were connected. But he recalled Secy Rusk saying on June 21 that the ending of shelling in Saigon and the lessening of military activities in adjacent areas would be a sufficient sign for the su to stop them bombing./5/ We said that was incorrect. We said that was the interpretation some newspapers had placed on Secy Rusk's statement but that was not what Secy Rusk said. We pointed out that Governor Harriman had said publicly that the stopping of the shelling of Saigon was "ending an escalation" which had started after March 31, and therefore, could not be considered as a restraint.
/5/See footnote 5, Document 278.
7. Zorin said he did not know exactly what words Secretary Rusk had used, but that everyone had interpreted the statement as he (Zorin) had put it. Zorin said after Secretary Rusk's statement the shelling stopped and had been stopped for about six weeks. He said that he had previously asked him whether the military lull was significant. Zorin said the real fact was that for a long time there had been no shelling; this was clear to the whole world and this was a lessening of the military activity about which the US had protested. Zorin said if the US wanted to proceed further on the road to de-escalation, it had now an excellent basis for so doing. Zorin said that the US had not lessened its military activity, but instead stepped up its bombing. He said, furthermore, that the US had had the meeting in Honolulu which seemed to everyone not a peaceful meeting, but one that showed a hardening of the US position. Zorin said the July 30 statement of Secretary Rusk further hardened the US position.
8. Zorin said that the US insisted that the initiative come from Hanoi and they must give assurances that they would be "good children," and then the US would think about cessation of bombing. In other words, the US now demanded new assurances at a time when North Vietnamese military activity had lessened and US activity had increased. These were the facts and one must see the talks against this background.
9. Zorin said the US had formulated practical proposals and had submitted them to the North Vietnamese. These were discussed and the Vietnamese asked for clarification. This clarification was given. He said he knew of his own knowledge that the North Vietnamese were further studying the proposal and wished to get additional clarification about other points, but at this very moment came the Honolulu meeting and the statement of Secretary Rusk. Zorin said that there could be no question to any objective observer that if a man negotiating a proposal is faced with new facts, he has to take those facts into consideration. Zorin said that he knew from personal conversations with the North Vietnamese that they had received the impression from these two new facts that the US had made the proposals as a diplomatic gambit, while at the same time the US was preparing new blows against North Vietnam. Zorin said that the North Vietnamese had therefore suspended consideration of the US proposals. He said, "So, instead of asking any questions as they would have done, they put off any further meeting with the US representatives." Zorin said that he could assure us that the putting off of further meetings was purposeful.
10. Zorin then referred to a US newspaper article reprinted in the August 3 "Le Monde" which said that there were less North Vietnamese troops in the South than in the first quarter 1968, but more US troops. He said that the article also stated that Hanoi had given an indication of its intentions by stopping the shelling of Saigon, and that these things together satisfied the San Antonio formula. We said that the statements in the article were incorrect and that the infiltration of North Vietnamese troops into South Vietnam was higher in June and July than in any other month, and that our estimates indicated that it would be approximately the same level in the month of August. Zorin replied that he agreed with the conclusion of the article; that now was the best time to stop the bombing. He said, in his opinion, if the US waited it would be worse; the favorable situation might cease to exist. He said an opponent was an opponent, war was war, and that any action evoked a counter-action. He said if the US increased pressure, Hanoi would do the same. He stated that now was the time to make a real effort to reverse the trend.
11. We thanked Zorin for informing us about his talks with the North Vietnamese and said that he could pass our conversation with him on to the North Vietnamese. We said that Zorin had said our statement was one-sided, but we found Zorin's analysis even more one-sided. We then went over the points made by the President in his press conference leading to the conclusion that Hanoi's intentions were to increase military activity. We said these facts annulled any signals of restraint to which Zorin referred. We said we had asked the North Vietnamese twice at the tea breaks if what they were doing represented restraint, and they refused to say so. We said that this was a critical moment and that we hoped the Soviet Government would pass the word to Hanoi that they must give some indication of their intentions. We said that if there were new attacks on Saigon and other cities in August, the situation would be even worse. We asked Zorin to pass this on and to get something done that would enable the President to carry out what he hoped to do--namely, to stop the bombing when the other side showed real restraint.
12. We said we wished to assure Zorin that our Phase 1-Phase 2 proposals were not a diplomatic gambit. We made them in all seriousness in an attempt to find a way to overcome the obstacles which confronted the two sides. We stated that the proposals still stood and that we had the authority of our government to discuss them further. We said that taking an objective view, one side said actions were louder than words, and the other side maintained some actions were louder than other actions but there had been no words. We said an interested third party that really wanted peace should try its best to bring the two together.
13. Zorin said the US did not provide the conditions for the USSR to do something, even if it wanted to. The US has worsened the situation, depriving the other side of any chance to discuss its proposals, because it threatened and demanded more and more. Zorin replied that the President had stated that "any sign" of restraint from the other side would be sufficient. We said that when the US talked of restraint, we meant real things, such as the rate of infiltration, pulling back from the DMZ, and cessation of attacks on the cities, and not simply a momentary cessation of shelling while troops were being built up for a new attack. Zorin answered that the "sign" was a cessation of shelling and reduction of other military action for six weeks. Now the US had said this was not enough; it was raising the price. We said this was an unfair statement, that Governor Harriman had made it clear on radio and television that the cessation of shelling would not be sufficient. Zorin in-sisted that the US had raised its demands--that originally it said it needed a sign and now it said it wanted a guarantee from the Soviet Union. We replied that if there were some indications of restraint, these had been belied by other indications on the ground. We said the point was that the signals were in conflict.
14. We said we wanted to again express appreciation for what Zorin had done and hoped he would pass on our statements to Moscow. We repeated that further attacks would be most serious. Zorin replied that he would transmit what we had said. He asked us to take into account what he had said and remarked that the situation as it now stands was not favorable to negotiations. It was not Hanoi that was placing obstacles in the road, but the US.
Harriman
323. Telegram From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, August 4, 1968, 0056Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. VI, 8/68-9/68. Secret; Harvan; Plus. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 8:25 a.m. The notation "ps" on the telegram indicates that the President saw it.
CAP 81812. By secure telephone from Paris, Ambassador Vance gave the following summary to the State Department of his two hour and forty-five minute private talk today with North Vietnamese delegate Lau:
North Vietnamese reaction to all six points of the Phase One-Phase Two proposal bordered on rejection of the entire concept.
Strongest objection was raised to our requirement that South Vietnamese Government participate in substantive talks to follow bilateral meetings.
Reaction was negative to four other points--restoration of the DMZ; level of forces in South Vietnam; substantive talks immediately to follow bombing halt; and no attacks on major cities. No reaction to the sixth point which offered to discuss additionally any other subject they wanted to raise.
The debate produced the fullest expression yet of Hanoi's views. There was an inconclusive discussion of mutual withdrawal of troops. The Vietnamese did not mention their current public line which alleges that we stiffened our terms in the Honolulu communique and the Rusk press conference.
There was no indication that the North Vietnamese were preparing to break off the talks but the discussion left no room for optimism that Hanoi would accept our offer. Vance is pessimistic.
Full cable report from Paris will be relayed in the morning./2/
/2/As transmitted in telegram 18992/Delto 556 from Paris, August 5. (Ibid., Harvan Chron., Vol. XVII, 8/1-7/68)
324. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, August 5, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, George Elsey Papers, Van De Mark Transcripts (1 of 2). No classification marking.
CMC at 0830 Monday 5 August '68 after spending weekend at Ranch, to Nitze, GME, Warnke, Pursley, Henkin/2/--for Goulding
/2/Daniel Z. Henkin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.
Re V.Nam--finally, Sunday p.m., CMC saw LBJ alone/3/
/3/Although Clifford was a guest of the President in Texas that weekend, no meeting between him and the President is recorded in the Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) However, Clifford's talking points for the meeting are in his handwritten notes entitled "Talks with LBJ," August 4. (Ibid., Clark Clifford Papers, Mr. Clifford's Pencilled Notes, Vietnam)
I said we have now substantially done everything it was our obligation to do:
--we have prevented subjugation
--we have turned enemy back
--we have developed ARVN
--Now we shld find basis for settlement in Paris--Now! (N. Vam army only 30% of population--They can go on & on forever but we can't! (due to domestic situation!)
I ended up by taking position we have been ready since San Antonio last Sept '67 to stop bombing if only they would talk. We shld be relaxing our attitude whereas a hardening has taken place--this is wrong direction "So I have a new approach to Paris."
I outlined my new approach--a week after Repub Convention LBJ should: 1) a TV speech program to say
--one week from today Bombing will stop
--he'll notify Hanoi
--he is prepared to have negotiations start substantive talks
--he'll answer they not take advantage
--they'll agree to demobilize
--stop firing across D.M.Z.
--stop mil. [movement across the] D.M.Z.
--a continued cessation of shelling of Saigon
If Hanoi chooses not to accept, they would say so--to the world. If they said nothing, their silence to whole world would be assent & we could stop the bombing & be ready for substantive talks.
At same time--or before--a private letter to Kosygin telling him & asking his help.
This would notify the world of our de-escalatory move.
If Hanoi
A) rejects
or B) silent & then leveled an attack
no problem in resumption of bombing. It would get full support.
!!! LBJ says he didn't agree with anything CMC had said, but it was "interesting." He then made a speech on "firmness." He'd rather lv office with a "fine military solution" than be craven.
a) However, he did say "talk to Rusk"
b) Then he asked CMC to put on paper
these 2 make CMC think there is a possibility.
CMC then refers to this morning's Harriman report on a conversation in Paris with Sov Amb Zorin. Zorin asked Harriman "what's going on?????" All well until Honolulu communique, then Rusk press conference, then LBJ's./4/ You've guessed it!!!
/4/See Document 318.
CMC says he has to agree with Zorin!
CMC further amplifies his pt. of view that it's to our advantage to get out whereas G.V.N. wants lot more time; yrs more of our money & effort.
CMC wants to reduce the level of combat--this is calculated to do that.
CMC: The President has rejected 100% out of hand the last Harriman-Vance approach--(The flaw was just private approach to Hanoi--But this puts it up to them in such a way they'd be on the spot)
Pres's offer would be public & he'd be protected by the publicity: He couldn't be privately double-crossed!
Nitze notes we are approaching the ceiling of men in V.Nam.
CMC: we can not, we must not go over the ceiling of 549,500.
Nitze: J.C.S. trying to find a gimmick of not counting invalids etc etc etc
CMC--No! Even on a temp. basis we must not go over--politically it'll be murder.
[Omitted here is discussion of potential arms control talks with the Soviet Union.]
0930 Staff meeting
CMC--"Paris is our only real hope for an early resolution of the conflict in SE Asia" & he notes in troubled tones the confusion of the past week--the alleged "hardening" of U.S. position.
Gen. Wheeler confirms solid evidence of an impending attack--although we're doing all we can to thwart & spoil forthcoming attacks. The "lull" is merely a cycle; they're making a political virtue (i.e. the lull) out of a military necessity (need to re-train & re-equip).
Westmoreland makes a self-confident speech about how much we know about the enemy & how we'll lick the offensive.
CMC asks why do they go into attack when we're so much better off than in Tet?
Westmoreland--"They have no choice--For morale reasons they must go on offensive."
CMC--needles Westmoreland--how does it help morale to go in & get licked?
Westmoreland no answer; Wheeler tries to help him out.
CMC--says Is it possible that they really aren't go[ing] to launch attacks--but that all enemy is doing is filling out his units? Just rebuilding to be prepared for whatever may come out of Paris?
Wheeler says reconnaissance & intelligence all pt. to an attack.
Gen. Walt #2 USMC says only victory enemy has had was psych victory here in U.S. during Tet. He's going to try to do the same again.
(GME personal view is that Tet simply woke up Am. people to facts in V. Nam that it was a lousy war we shldn't be in & that we couldn't win. I disagree that it was a psych. defeat: . . . It was a psych. awakening!)
[Omitted here is discussion of potential arms control talks with the Soviet Union.]
325. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
Washington, August 6, 1968.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01580R, 271--Vietnam Task Force. Secret. This unsigned memorandum was derived from telegram CAS 6132 from Saigon, August 6. In an August 8 covering note transmitting a copy of the memorandum to Smith, Helms wrote: "I believe the President will be interested to read this report. Would you please pouch it to him at the Ranch? For your information, and that of Walt's, George Carver returns to Washington late today and will be briefing the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board tomorrow." No record of that meeting has been found. According to attached covering notes, the memorandum was also sent to Rusk, Katzenbach, Bundy, Clifford, Nitze, and Wheeler. Carver was in Vietnam for a 2-week observation mission July 20-August 8.
SUBJECT
Some Observations on Thieu and Ky
1. The following are comments and observations by George Carver based on his meetings with President Thieu and Vice President Ky on 2 August 1968.
2. The meeting with Vice President Ky was delayed since he was in a prolonged session (subsequently described as cordial) with two Lower House deputies who had often been sharply critical of Ky. Carver noted that this session itself was a small straw in Saigon's freshening political breeze. Ky received Carver in his private office at the Palace, wearing a U.S.-style tropical worsted summer uniform without rank insignia and looking considerably older and more grave than in early 1965 when they last had met. The atmosphere was cordial and relaxed but quite correct. He said all the proper things with apparent sincerity.
3. Ky stressed the need for unity in the face of a common enemy, said nothing obviously critical of Thieu, and emphasized several times that the Thieu-Ky problem was a thing of the past. He stressed that no "nationalist" could any longer think in terms of coups or similar actions. In short, he has swallowed his pill, and though he obviously does not like its taste, he is taking it (for the time being at least) with dignity, perspective, and reasonably good humor. His vanity and desire to be appreciated, however, are still very near the surface. He beamed visibly at the suggestion that the considerable over-all progress over the past few years was due in no small part to his efforts. Ky beamed again at the suggestion that he apparently was one who recognized the need for subordinating personal to national interests. Ky seemed quite proud of the fact he had just been chosen out as a pilot in the F-5 jet; with a touch of irony, he noted that he had more time for flying since he wasn't too busy now.
4. Carver's session with Thieu was equally cordial but more formal. Thieu handles himself with quiet confidence and an increasingly sure touch. He was obviously pleased with Honolulu's outcome. He thinks more clearly about the future than most Vietnamese. Thieu noted that the struggle had long been in a primarily military phase, would eventually reach a primarily political stage, and is about to enter a transitional stage between the two. The Communists were now busily preparing for this transitional stage leading to the political struggle ahead, and we ought to do the same. Few Vietnamese display this kind of realism./2/
/2/The Department had urged Bunker to encourage Thieu to make an unofficial overture to the North Vietnamese or the NLF. (Telegram 216256 to Saigon, August 6; Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 90) In a meeting on August 7, Thieu told Bunker that he had given Bui Diem authority to establish private contacts with the North Vietnamese in Paris. (Telegram 34711 from Saigon, August 7; ibid.) In telegram 216978 to Paris and Saigon, August 7, Rusk described Thieu's response as "not having the sense of urgency we would like to see," and he directed the delegation to encourage Bui Diem to move forward and the Embassy in Saigon to press to have the additional personnel sent to Paris immediately. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-August 1968)
5. Carver noted some interesting comparison and contrast in the reactions of Ky and Thieu to certain salient points. Both strongly endorsed the need for the Vietnamese to demonstrate unity in their opposition to the Communists. It was in this context that Ky made his "no coup" comments and mentioned his overtures to opposition deputies in the interest of unity. It was in the same context that Thieu raised the necessity for him to personally provide the missing element of leadership necessary to get the "Lien Minh Alliance" off the ground./3/
/3/In telegram 34703 from Saigon, August 7, Bunker reported on a conversation with Thieu during which the pilot mechanism for the involvement of the Lien Minh in rural development was outlined: "Thieu said the program for Lien Minh had now been worked out and submitted to him. It would be tested out initially in Saigon. A committee, organized on functional lines like a cabinet, would be set up with sub-committees to study and oversee the program, making modifications as experience indicated. Once the Saigon program seemed to be progressing satisfactorily, then it would be extended out into the provinces. A program to train cadre would be developed and plans made to expand the organization since it was important that centers also be established outside the capital." (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL US-VIET S)
6. Ky readily assented to the desirability of aggressively exploiting the policy of National Reconciliation in the case of appropriate Viet Cong defectors. He said he was urging his colleagues to move with more aggressive imagination on this score. Thieu, on the other hand, was much cooler. He didn't disagree, but noted that there were "many problems" and quickly switched to a more congenial subject.
7. Ky reacted enthusiastically to the suggestion that peasant youth ought to be tapped for leadership at lower levels. Expressing vigorous assent, he expounded--with some emotion--his views on the need for a non-Communist social revolution. Thieu, on the other hand, gave pro-forma assent, but patently has little interest in any juggling of the social order and sees no need for upsetting things by attempting to do so. Once again, after polite, perfunctory agreement (in effect, acknowledging the problem without accepting the solution), Thieu quickly switched to other topics.
8. In sum, Carver observes that Thieu seems to be performing well and steadily growing in his role as President, and Ky seems to have accepted his secondary role with reasonable grace. While Thieu lacks Ky's vision, flair, and intuitive, emotional grasp of the basic social problems which constitute the seedbed of Vietnam's insurgency, Ky lacks Thieu's capacity for sustained endeavor, attention to detail, and patience. Ky may be cultivating the image of a dedicated patriot ready, waiting, and available in an hour of crisis, but this may be acceptable so long as it keeps Ky on his good behavior.4
/4/In his August 8 report on the trip, Carver concluded: "On the whole, despite the real Communist menace and emotional worries about American policy, I found the political atmosphere in Saigon at least momentarily healthier than it has been in over a decade. Vietnamese moods are mercurial, but formerly repressed or taboo thoughts and ideas--peace, settlement, even hazy notions of victory in a finite time frame--are now openly talked about. The light of day is helping to dispel at least some of their mystery for the Vietnamese. Thieu's government may be strongly liked by only a few and distrusted (in some measure) by many. It is inclined (I think dangerously but not irremediably so) to approach Vietnam's problems with the same concepts that permitted these problems to reach their present crisis proportions, but for the time being, at least, Thieu's government is governing." (Central Intelligence Agency, SAVA (Carver) Files, Job 80-R01720R, GAC Trip to Saigon)
326. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, August 8, 1968, 8:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, George Elsey Papers, Van De Mark Transcripts (1 of 2). No classification marking. Prepared by Elsey.
He [CMC] reports that late yesterday, 5:30+ he met at Rusk's with Rusk & Cy Vance/2/ (home from Paris) "I found it exceedingly interesting conference. As we got into it, I had thought we were agreed that a purpose of the meeting was to explore new avenues. I found that
/2/No other record of the meeting has been found. The brackets are in the source text.
--Harriman & Vance have concluded N VNam had rejected Phase I & Phase II approach;
--I said no, let's regard it as still open but let's look for other alternatives too.
"I sat back with increasing wonderment. I began to sense what was going on--" In a quietly assuring manner, Rusk knocked down every single new approach!
"I believe honestly that Rusk assumes there'll be no settlement & it's a mistake to . . . an approach! Every idea he is opposed to--on grounds that any new approach by us would be an indication of weakness!"
If Vance were to come back with new approaches, it would be regarded as weakness. Rusk is on limited & restricted--the operation is so tightly controlled by him. Ha Van Lau says he will not agree to any prior understanding--(before stopping bombing)./3/ Rusk says--bombing goes on until we get a firm commitment as to what they'll do. Thus, an absolute Total impasse! "The main concern I have, says Rusk, is lest they get some idea of weakness?"
/3/See Document 323.
CMC says he struggled--to get Rusk to accept some new approaches.
CMC says I firmly told him. All we are saying, despite its unsuccessful nature, all that is being suggested we keep on fighting & killing boys. --Rusk's answer--"You never can tell when 'they'll break!' & give in!"
CMC says Rusk is just following LBJ's line.
Nitze reports 2 hrs of Vance with the J.C.S. Vance reported thus far it was a failure of Phase I-Phase II--that idea was dead. What killed it was Rusk's Press conference & his linkage of all actions in Phase II with Ph. I.
J.C.S. came to conclusion that no pt. in terminating the bombing!
J.C.S. taking strong views of excellent shape we're in & so good that enemy can't make an August attack! This leads Nitze to say maybe he agrees with Rusk. If enemy is really as weak as JCS says, they must be on verge of caving in & starting negotiations to moving.
Nitze says they (Vance & J.C.S.) also talked about Domestic Support in U.S. for V.Nam war. Dom. Support--Wheeler agrees we're in trouble--other chiefs think not--all agree however that to bomb Hanoi wld. bring the roof down from U.S. pub. opinion. It will take 2 yrs. without negotiations to wind up the war.
[Omitted here is discussion of reparations from Israel for its attack on the U.S.S. Liberty in June 1967.]
327. Notes of Meeting/1/
Johnson City, Texas, August 10, 1968, 12:25 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting lasted until 1:15 p.m. Nixon and his party arrived at the Ranch at 11:59 a.m. A lunch followed this briefing after which Nixon departed. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Vance returned to Paris on August 12. The President had offered Nixon the opportunity for the meeting during a telephone conversation on August 8. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Nixon, August 8, 1968, 4:09 p.m., Tape F6807.02, PNO 21)
NOTES ON BRIEFING OF FORMER VICE PRESIDENT NIXON
AND GOVERNOR AGNEW
THOSE ATTENDING THE BRIEFING WERE
The President
Former Vice President Nixon
Secretary Rusk
CIA Director Helms
Cyrus Vance
Governor Agnew
Tom Johnson
[Omitted here is discussion of Czechoslovakia (see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XVII, Document 78) and the Middle East.]
CIA Director Helms: Vietnam--The war is at the tensest point. Lull is not hard to explain.
--Lost 128,000 men
--Needed to fill out units
--Units now coming back
--Attack could come anytime.
The primary objective is--ruination of Saigon's government.
Secretary Rusk: The offensive has been slowed by 40 [percent] of equipment being captured. They may be tired of military activity.
Nixon: Would the attacks be city attacks?
CIA Director Helms: Yes, city attacks.
[Omitted here is discussion of Latin America.]
Vance: No tangible progress on central issue.
--Some advance. We have gone to Paris.
--We have had three prisoners released. We may get more out.
Le Duc Tho is on the way back from Hanoi.
Cessation of bombing.
Public sessions--rigid and unbending.
We will stop bombing under right conditions.
Private Conversations: We have tried to come up with formula to let us stop the bombing with no public [omission in the source text].
Vance: They have refused to suggest anything at this point. They will not permit the Thieu-Ky government to sit at the table.
I arranged the original talks at a Tea Break. So far no progress.
Governor Agnew: Is there any difference between private and public talks?
Vance: There is no difference between private and public talks on substance.
Le Duc Tho--he stops at Peking and Moscow enroute to Paris./2/
/2/Tho returned to Paris from his 6-week trip on August 13.
There is possibility of discussion between third country.
Secretary Rusk: We just got a message that they could not do this until September./3/
/3/Not further identified.
Nixon: Why are they talking?
Vance: Eventually they want a solution.
Secretary Rusk: They want a solution, but on what terms?
Vance: They would like it on their basis./4/
/4/A memorandum for the record by John Walsh of S/S, August 8, described a conversation between former NSC Staff member Chester Cooper and Vance. At the request of the Humphrey campaign, Cooper informed Vance that the Vice President planned to issue a statement calling for an immediate halt to the bombing. Vance replied that his public reaction to the statement would be critical since it would interfere and damage the Paris negotiations. Cooper telephoned Vance the next day and reported that "the Vice President would be prepared to leave public life rather than to do anything that would damage our negotiating position or harm our country." The substance of this exchange was relayed to both Smith and Rusk. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET)
Nixon: We have people on our side who are constantly screwing us on propaganda. They signed an agreement in 1954 which gave them less on paper than they could have won on the battlefield.
What about China? What are they doing? Are the North Vietnamese sophisticated?
Vance: They are. They have sophistication.
Nixon: Do they still believe we have lost the war?
CIA Director Helms: The North Vietnamese are convinced they won after Dien Bien Phu.
The President: They think we believe that we lost the war. They don't think so.
Nixon: We have got to tell our people to remember that every word they write will be read by Hanoi.
Governor Agnew: How much information comes from Peking?
CIA Director Helms: Peking supports Hanoi with ammunition, munitions, food.
The President: We cannot certify how much influence on Hanoi China is.
CIA Director Helms: Ho wants their help, not their advice.
The President: I cannot tell you how much influence either Kosygin or Mao has.
The President: When we have a pause, we have a difficult time getting back.
Nixon: Who talks to the Soviets?
Secretary Rusk: We talk to Soviets in Washington and in Paris.
Nixon: Is there a shift in the Soviet attitude?
The President: The USSR suggested the 37-day pause. They can't deliver.
Secretary Rusk: The current mood is "stop the bombing".
Nixon: Any discussions with the Chinese?
Vance: No.
Nixon: Do we talk at Warsaw?
Vance: Yes.
Secretary Rusk: If Tito were reaching out to grab Greece, you would have a parallel.
Nixon: What is the Laos situation?
Secretary Rusk: There is nothing decisive.
Governor Agnew: What is the relationship between the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong? What is the degree of military deficiency before and after?
CIA Director Helms: 90% North Vietnamese now vs. 60% earlier.
Governor Agnew: This might offset qualities.
CIA Director Helms: They are not as good now as they were.
Nixon: What about Thieu's attitude? He did not object to the Viet Cong being at negotiations.
Secretary Rusk: We and the South Vietnamese would be at the table on an our-side-your-side basis, but the Viet Cong won't sit down with the Hanoi government.
The President: They have no problem making their views known.
Secretary Rusk: [omission in the source text]
Nixon: It's so much like a labor negotiation. You cannot give away the game in advance.
Secretary Rusk: In Latin America no coup has occurred in 27 years. Things are beginning to stabilize. The next Administration will see more movements in the Communist world. Mao is 75. Lots of ferment. It may evolve to non-Communist mainland.
Nixon: Why are they enamored with philosophy that even old Communism is outdated?
The apparatus is working./5/
/5/In a memorandum for the record, August 12, summarizing this briefing, Helms wrote: "Mr. Vance covered developments in then Paris peace negotiations, including details of the private talks between the Americans and the North Vietnamese. He carefully pointed out the total unwillingness of the North Vietnamese to meet across the table with the South Vietnamese Government. It came as an obvious surprise to the candidates that the North Vietnamese expect the GVN to negotiate directly with the National Liberation Front. Lack of progress in the talks was underlined, but the point was carefully made that patience might yet get something started, perhaps in the private dialogue. Mr. Nixon made it clear that he had no intention of saying or doing anything which would make the job of the American negotiators more difficult." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (Helms) Chrono, Aug.-Dec. 1968)
328. Editorial Note
On August 12, 1968, Secretary of Defense Clifford met with the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff and representatives of the services. Among the participants were Deputy Secretary Paul Nitze, Army Chief of Staff General William Westmoreland, Secretary of the Navy Paul Ignatius, Under Secretary of the Air Force Townsend Hoopes, Air Force Chief of Staff General John McConnell, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke, and Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense George Elsey. Staff Secretary R. Eugene Livesay took notes of the meeting and transcribed the parts dealing with the war in Vietnam. The first topic of discussion was the Paris negotiations:
"Mr. Clifford said it has been an interesting week as far as the negotiations in Paris. This is one subject that we comment on each week. Mr. Vance has been back and he had dinner with him which lasted way into the evening. Mr. Vance makes a logical, objective and effective negotiator. He is not discouraged. Mr. Clifford said that he sees in the papers that some people engaged in meeting their own problems place different interpretations on the way the negotiations are proceeding. Although Mr. Vance had no progress to report he states that there is a better understanding among the negotiators. Mr. Clifford said he is rather encouraged by the report that Le Duc Tho is coming back to Paris from Hanoi. He stopped briefly in Peking, and is now having an extended visit in Moscow. It seems there is a real possibility that he will arrive in Paris in time for the Wednesday negotiating session. Both Mr. Harriman and Mr. Vance feel Tho is the senior negotiator. He is a member of the Politburo and a close personal friend of Ho Chi Minh. As long as he stayed in Hanoi there was not much hope that progress would be made."
Later in the meeting, the subject of the military situation in Southeast Asia arose:
"Mr. Clifford said we get a weekly report on the military situation. We continue to get indications of the enemy activity and plans. General McConnell will give the report today in lieu of General Wheeler. General McConnell passed around maps to the group at the table. He said there was a cable in from General Abrams on Saturday concerning enemy intentions. Places where attacks are expected are noted on the maps. The map of the DMZ shows the location of 7 regiments which can attack there at any time. We do not expect any prior to 15 August or possibly up to 3 or 4 days afterwards. Intercepted communications indicate there will be country-wide attacks. The disposition of the troops, shown on the third map, indicate that they are capable of making attacks on Hue, Da Nang and Chu Lai, and two or three other locations, each with division size attacks. General McConnell then turned to the map of Saigon and said that all indications are that they will not attack Saigon at first but will delay for 3 or 4 days after initiation of the country-wide attacks.
"General McConnell said that General Abrams still continues to pound the daylights out of the enemy with B-52s, tactical fighters, artillery, etc. We are doing considerable ground reconnaissance, particularly with Air Cavalry Units and using ground follow-up after air attacks. The Defense Intelligence Agency estimates agree with those of General Abrams. General McConnell said he has prepared a memorandum to the President which outlines the whole situation which either he or Mr. Clifford can forward. He will give it to Mr. Clifford after the meeting.
"General McConnell said that in Thailand we might have an attack against Nakhon Phanon. All indications point to such an attack. The enemy has considerable forces 12-25 kms east. There are 25 Thai Security personnel, 150 Air Police, Army gunships and Air Force gun-equipped C-47s there. We have sent up one company of U.S. infantry and 30 Special Forces officers to assist.
"Last week, during 9-11 August, the allies had 15 killed (10 U.S., 1 ARVN, 4 civilians) and 97 wounded (66 U.S., 16 ARVN., 15 civilians), by allied forces. This may cause us unfavorable publicity. Mr. Clifford said he had already seen reports on this in the paper. Mr. Goulding said that each incident was reported separately but not added up as General McConnell has done.
"General McConnell said that air activity continued as usual. Over the weekend, 37 U.S. and 605 enemy were killed. There were 154 light contacts, all by small units. General Abrams has been able to move our forces around. We are flying 1,300 fixed wing airlift sorties a day which represents 3,000 tons of supplies and 13,000 troops. We continue to capture large tonnages of ammunition and food all over South Vietnam but particularly close to the DMZ, the Ashau Valley and IV Corps.
"Mr. Clifford asked if General Westmoreland had any comments. General Westmoreland said that intelligence on caches is coming mostly from ralliers. We are back in the Ashau Valley. We lost three helicopters going in. The enemy, however, has not chosen to confront our forces. They may attack with some of their units, however, we do hold the high ground. Another significant development is that our riverine forces are moving further south than ever before.
"General Westmoreland said as to the accidental firings on our own troops he feels that this is the price we pay for a one year tour of duty. This turnover requires the constant training of officers in a complex business. The accidents are basically the result of 'green' troops. He believes that our commanders overall have done a magnificent job in assimilating new arrivals. General McConnell said that these types of accidents are much less than in World War II. Mr. Clifford said he recalls several incidents from the Italian campaign. General Westmoreland said we now report publicly on such casualties; in World War II we did not report them because of censorship.
"Mr. Clifford asked General Westmoreland if he actually believed there was going to be another enemy offensive. General Westmoreland said the enemy plans to move but we believe that our fire power and maneuvers will preempt his attacks in several areas or reduce them to manageable proportions. He will attempt wide-spread initiatives. In some cases we will thwart these with B-52s. Elsewhere they will have some tactical success but with great casualties.
"General Westmoreland says another interesting recent development is the repeated public stance by President Thieu on the South Vietnamese progressively taking over more of the war, which they are capable of doing. General Westmoreland recalls that both he and Mr. Clifford talked to Thieu about this on several occasions. The fact that Thieu is making public statements is a good development. The ARVN is fighting extremely well in all Corps areas. General Westmoreland said that he had deployed a whole U.S. brigade of the 9th Division to open Highway 4 and secure it for hard-topping; he set a deadline for the ARVN to take over as of 1 August. They met this deadline. Mr. Clifford asked if they had done well since then. General Westmoreland said yes. Mr. Clifford said he thought the enemy had closed a bridge on this road. General Westmoreland said this was north of the area he is talking about.
"General Walt said that he agreed with General Westmoreland. The enemy wants to make an attack. In order for him to make an attack he has to build up his forces on the battlefield and move supplies forward. In the last two weeks he hasn't been able to do so in I Corps. In fact, the troops have actually abandoned large amounts of supplies. They could move across the DMZ. General McConnell said they had been moving divisions in North Vietnam back towards the south gradually. General Westmoreland said that he has a hunch that they will attack a location near the Rockpile area." (Johnson Library, Clark Clifford Papers, Minutes of the Secretary of Defense Staff Meetings, March-September 1968)
Additional notes of this meeting by Nitze are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Defense Department, Deputy Secretary of Defense Notes, 1968, 5 of 6.
329. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, August 14, 1968, 1807Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel--Paris Delto XI, 8/11-31/68. Secret. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 2 p.m.
CAP 81976. Herewith account of tea break in Paris this morning. As I reported by phone, the rest was rough propaganda./2/
/2/Quoted below is the text of telegram 19450/Delto 598 from Paris, August 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference, 1968-1969, Delto Chron.) The summary report of the 17th formal session at the Majestic is in telegram 19455/Delto 599 from Paris, August 14. (Ibid.)
1. We met during tea break with Thuy and Lau for about twenty minutes.
2. We inquired about Le Duc Tho and were informed that he was well but was resting after his trip.
3. We asked about the return of the seamen and said as it was an act of good will we wanted to return them in the time and manner the DRV wishes./3/
/3/See footnote 4, Document 300.
Thuy replied that the subject had been reported to Hanoi which will decide the matter in consultations in Vientiane. We said then we could relax here and Thuy replied we have other work.
4. We said that although no progress was made at last Lau/Vance meeting,/4/ we believe it would be useful to meet again. We said that we had a chance to reflect on the conversation as Lau had suggested. We did have a reaction to what had been said. Lau said you mean you will have comments on my comments. We replied yes. Lau said he thought in principle Minister Thuy would permit the meeting. Thuy said he agreed in principle but there must be something new. We asked Thuy whether he had any new suggestions on their side. Thuy replied that the DRV position had been clear from the start. The US must stop the bombing and we can then go on to other subjects.
/4/See Document 323.
5. We said at the last tea break there was talk of road blocks./5/ We said it was the job of negotiators to seek to clear out road blocks. That is difficult to do in open sessions: it is more effective in private talks.
/5/The delegation's reports on the 16th formal session were transmitted as telegrams 19131/Delto 566 and 19137/Delto 568 from Paris, both August 7. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-August 1968)
6. Thuy said that from the outset DRV had said that U.S. must unconditionally cease all bombing; on the U.S. side we have demanded reciprocity and restraint but the DRV cannot accept that and therein lies the obstacle. Thuy added that recent statements in the U.S. made the problem more complicated. We replied, maybe for you but not for us.
7. We said that we had not said that we had reached an impasse but rather a roadblock, and we should sit down and see if we can clarify the situation and reach an understanding. We noted that at the last Lau/Vance meeting Lau had said there were certain matters on which we were so far apart that he thought we could not reach an understanding.
8. We then referred to the Hien/Davidson/Holbrooke/Negroponte dinner and said we were impressed with Hien's knowledge of the U.S. although we did not necessarily agree with his conclusions./6/
/6/The dinner with Phan Hien of the DRV delegation was reported in telegram 19329/Delto 587 from Paris, August 11. (Ibid.)
9. We said that when Vance was in the U.S., he reported to and met with the President, the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and others.
10. We suggested that Lau let Vance know what a mutually convenient date would be for a further meeting. Lau said he would check his calendar./7/
/7/In telegram 223146/Todel 934 to Paris and Saigon, August 17, the Department noted its desire to have Vance concentrate on the "our side-your side" formula during his next visit with Lau. (Ibid.) Regarding the August 19 Vance-Lau meeting, see footnote 2, Document 334.
11. Thuy then inquired about the three pilots. We replied they are well and were happy to be back with their families. We said the military were satisfied with the way the pilots were returned and that we hoped that the satisfactory way this return had been handled would encourage them to release additional pilots.
330. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey/1/
August 18, 1968, 5:23 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Humphrey, August 18, 1968, 5:23 p.m., Tape F6808.01, PNO 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. The President was in Texas; Vice President Humphrey was in Boston. Prior to this call the President called Nixon and gave him virtually the same briefing. (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Nixon, August 18, 1968, 5:01 p.m., Tape 6808.01, PNO 2)
President: Hello.
Humphrey: Hello, Mr. President.
President: How are you, my friend?
Humphrey: I'm fine sir, up in Boston here today, doing a little work with the letter carriers.
President: Wonderful. I--this is not important, but I thought it was kind of significant, and you would want to know it, and I called you confidentially for that purpose. When you were here, I told you about a rather important friend of ours who's contemplating a trip. I've been notified that he will not make that trip, at least that side trip to Hanoi, the reason being that he did not get permission.
Humphrey: I see.
President: So I think it's pretty--our people think it's significant that they're not interested in doing much. They're waiting to see what happens to our convention and to our people. I think that at this time we've got one more week to go and I don't think they're paying much attention to Gene,/2/ some, but I think that they're trying to see if they can get a better deal out of Nixon than you, and it's evident that they can't, but they wouldn't let him come.
/2/Eugene McCarthy had submitted a Vietnam peace plank to the Democratic Platform Committee the previous day.
Humphrey: Yeah. Did you perchance have a chance to hear me on "Face the Nation"?/3/
/3/In this televised interview program earlier that day, Humphrey rejected much of McCarthy's peace plank and noted his strong opposition to any mechanism allowing for the introduction of a coalition government in South Vietnam.
President: I got the latter part. I didn't get the other. You sure did look good on it.
Humphrey: I thought we kind of firmed up on the Vietnam position, Mr. President.
President: I think that's awfully important and I thought that what you said--I don't think anybody can ever touch you if you'll make it clear, just one thing. What they're asking you to do is to stop the bombing of men and supplies who are going southward aggressively over the DMZ to kill my boys, your boys, our boys.
Humphrey: That's right. Yes, sir.
President: Now, we'll be anxious to stop it. We've stopped it eight times. We stopped it for 37 days. We stopped it on Buddha's birthday and when we've stopped it, what have they done? They just bring more men in, hit more cities. Now, if they was--we'd be glad to stop it again if they'd just tell us they won't kill extra men because we do stop it. We don't want that to be their gratitude. We don't want them to show their gratitude for our stopping by killing Chuck Robb/4/ and a bunch more. Now, the American people understand that and they won't ever get mad at us if we get to them. We're not getting to them. I'm not, Rusk's not, Clifford's not. Clifford touched on it just a little bit the other day. Because we don't want to get into this campaign--get the war into it. But that is it. And Rusk sent me an analysis today, you ought to get, when you get back to Washington, Rostow to give you an analysis of those seven points of McCarthy's. What is new in them is that he just proposes in effect to turn over Southeast Asia to the Communists. That's the net of it.
/4/See footnote 5, Document 261.
Humphrey: I took him on pretty hard today. I said that I thought it was rather irresponsible, and that I didn't think we--we couldn't go for an imposed coalition government. We ought not to define military tactics in a Democratic government.
President: You can't do that. You just can't do that. You just say this--which you did and which Clifford did--that you are willing and anxious and eager to stop the bombing, that we have stopped eight times, that the last time we stopped officially it was on Buddha's birthday. We stopped it--unilaterally--we stopped it, they didn't have to do anything. Now what did they do? They hit our cities and so forth. Since then, they've brought 120,000 men in. Now, they've asked us to stop it again--we're willing to stop it the ninth time.
Humphrey: Yes, sir.
President: We stopped it once for 37 days and they just built up. Now we'll stop it the ninth time provided they not use that stopping to kill a lot more Americans. Now, what you're asking them to do--they're asking me to do--is to stop bombing the men and materiels that are coming in, hand grenades and bombs and other things, stop bombing these so they can get through to hit our men. Now, we'll be willing to stop it if they won't bring them through to hit our men. Now, do you want us to let them come through to hit our men or do you want us to stop all we can? That's the question.
Humphrey: That's the net of it. Yeah.
President: Then the move's up to them. We're willing to stop the bombing. Now, they ought to address them and say, "We'll stop it but do you insist on getting through and using these grenades on our men?" You see. Thank you.
Humphrey: All right. Thank you, Mr. President. Bye now.
331. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/
Washington, August 19, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Vietnam War, Courses of Action--Post Paris Talks, 1963, 1967-1968, n.d. Secret.
Clark:
As I told you the other day, I think that your press conference hit precisely the right tone in relating the current lull to the enemy's expected third offensive./2/
/2/Clifford's August 15 speech contained, in addition to the specifics mentioned in this memorandum, a mention that bombing would end if the DRV informed the United States "that they have reduced the level of combat, and that that constitutes a de-escalatory step." See The New York Times, August 16, 1968.
I was troubled, however, by some of your remarks on the bombing.
I would agree that before March 31st the enemy had decided to increase substantially his infiltration. Furthermore, there is certainly no evidence--and I have no reason to argue--that the restriction of the bombing has had any effect whatsoever on his decision to engage in this massive infiltration effort.
However, I cannot agree that
--the restriction on the bombing has had no effect on the number of infiltrees arriving in SVN;
--the enemy will move the men and materiel they choose to; and
--if their losses go up in the process of moving, then apparently they just move more men and supplies.
In my view, we simply do not have enough information to make a net judgment of the impact of the bombing restriction on the number of infiltrees.
On the plus side, we do not know that
--the restricted bombing campaign is much less costly to us in terms of aircraft and crew losses;
--we have been killing many more trucks and a larger percentage of the trucks moving south.
On the negative side, however, we know that
--greater numbers of trucks and people than ever before are getting through;
--the elapsed time for movement of men and supplies has probably been substantially decreased because they enjoy a free ride down to 19 degrees. (A decrease in transit time, of say 30 to 50 percent, de-
creases the enemy's pipeline requirement by a corresponding amount.)
We simply do not know:
--to what extent the greater efficiency in killing trucks results from greater concentration of effort or from improved techniques of detection and attack;
--whether attacking trucks north as well as south of 19 degrees would have the net result of more or less supplies getting to the south;/3/
--how the level and rate of flow of men and supplies would be affected by attacks on targets other than trucks north of 19 degrees./3/
/3/A notation in Nitze's hand reads: "within limits we do."
The major uncertainty in any of our evaluations of the bombing is that we have no way of knowing what the enemy would really like to do. Hence, we have no way of evaluating the restraints which the bombing places on the fulfillment of his desires.
I understand--and have lived for many years now in amiable disagreement with--the argument which states that:
--enemy requirements in SVN are limited (although I personally believe the intelligence experts have consistently underestimated the magnitude of these requirements);/4/
/4/A notation in Nitze's hand reads: "30 tons-60 tons-600 tons."
--enemy inputs to meet these requirements are relatively small in comparison with their total requirements and in any event are easily supplied by outside sources without cost to NVN;/5/
/5/A notation in Nitze's hand reads: "why in disagreement."
--therefore, it is an easy matter for the enemy to budget for whatever level of effort he desires in the south.
There is a fundamental fallacy in this notion that the enemy has necessarily achieved what he desires.
In any real war, the net thrust in the field results from a balancing of all the factors rather than from the subordination of all else to a single absolute priority. This rule holds for every war of which I know, in my own experience or from history. In government--even totalitarian government--there is never an absolute priority. In this case the enemy's activity must be considered against a background of the total constraints upon him. Hanoi has to budget not just for its activities in SVN but for its total war effort: feeding, clothing and housing their people; air defense; repair; recruitment and training.
For example, I do not doubt for a moment that the enemy would have wished to mount an even larger offensive at Tet. In their current efforts to get ready for a third crack at us, I do not doubt that they would want to put in as much as they could against us to make this effort decisive.
Therefore, I must conclude that there were effective constraints on the enemy's level of effort at Tet just as there are constraints which affect his third offensive.
The major constraint acting against him is, of course, our forces and allied forces in the field in the south. One of the other constraints has been and remains our bombing of the north.
You will find that arguments which begin with the notion that the enemy is putting in all he "chooses to" shift--at a certain point--to: in any case, "bombing is not decisive." Of course it is not decisive. But our action in SVN has not been decisive yet either. No one constraint is, in itself, decisive. Our task is to build all those constraints to the point where he decides to accept as his best realistic option what we mean by an honorable peace.
The bombing is, then, simply one of the constraints operating against the enemy. Any reduction of our bombing effort enables him to increase the weight of his effort against us in the field.
One way to put the question is this: If we stop bombing, would Hanoi cancel the shipment of supplies to the south or send fewer men?
The answer obviously is no. With the battle in its present intense and perhaps critical stage, Hanoi is trying to get the maximum possible impact within limits set by all its constraints.
In any case, Clark, that is my reaction to: "they will move the men and material that they choose to". Life and war are just not like that.
Walt
332. Editorial Note
Maintaining the Nation's stand in Vietnam was the primary topic of President Johnson's speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars organization in Detroit on August 19, 1968. The President laid out the components of the peace that he was seeking in Southeast Asia: reinstitution of the demilitarized zone, removal of foreign forces from Laos and the implementation of the Geneva Accords of 1962, withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam subsequent to the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces, and self-determination in South Vietnam in accordance with its constitutional framework. Following a specific reference to his March 31 withdrawal speech, Johnson noted: "We have made a reasonable offer and we have taken first a major step. That offer has not been accepted. This administration does not intend to move further until it has good reason to believe that the other side intends seriously to join us in de-escalating the war and moving seriously toward peace. We are willing to take chances for peace, but we cannot make foolhardy gestures for which your fighting men will pay the price by giving their lives." In an allusion to the impending third enemy offensive of 1968, Johnson added: "So, my friends, let's not be hoodwinked. Let's not be misled. In short, our people and their people must understand one thing: We are not going to stop the bombing just to give them a chance to step up their bloodbath." For the full text of the speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pages 896-903.
As a result of this speech, members of the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris for the first time personally attacked President Johnson during and after the formal negotiating session held on August 28. An analysis of their reaction to the President's stiffened policy is in Intelligence Note No. 688 from Thomas Hughes of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to Secretary of State Rusk, August 30. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET)
333. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, August 20, 1968, 2:05-2:36 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking.
NOTES ON PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH TUESDAY LUNCHEON GROUP
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Ambassador Ball
General Westmoreland
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
The President: We need to check the problems of troops in Chicago if riots develop at time of convention.
General Westmoreland: We have worked out detailed plans on contingency basis.
The President: Mayor Daley is calling up troops (National Guard) today.
Secretary Clifford: We have had a group working on this for some weeks. All hell could break loose.
The President: What about 3rd wave?
CIA Director Helms: The enemy is in position to have 3rd wave. It will probably come out like measles in next ten days to two weeks.
The President: We really don't know?
CIA Director Helms: Yes.
General Westmoreland: Attacks are associated with major offensive in Northern I Corps and III Corps near Saigon. This is a prelude to a general offensive. I expect it about the 24th or 25th at the beginning of the convention./2/
/2/The second of the "mini-Tet" offensives started with minor battles in the delta region and in the northern provinces beginning on August 18 and intensified over the next several weeks. On August 22 Saigon was the target of VC rocket attacks. The peak of the offensive occurred during the final week of August; it continued into mid-September.
Secretary Clifford: They can go either way. They are ready.
Secretary Rusk: I am not sure what their military men believe they are capable of doing. They may be allergic to these political orders.
Walt Rostow: I honestly don't know what they will do.
General Westmoreland: I think their attacks are diversionary.
Walt Rostow: There was a low rate of infiltrators this month. This possibly indicates they will keep the forces in place.
Secretary Rusk: They brought in replacements beforehand.
Walt Rostow: My mind is more open than a few days ago.
General Westmoreland: The capability is there. We have pre-
empted much of their attacks.
General Westmoreland: The South Vietnamese are stronger.
[Omitted here is discussion of strategic missile talks and the situation in the Middle East.]
The President: Can Hanoi move until they see who is nominated and what his views are?
Secretary Rusk: We will not get a movement before the convention.
Secretary Clifford: I see nothing to suggest they will attach significance to the convention.
Secretary Rusk: Vance got the impression that this is a holding action at Paris.
The President: Will they seriously negotiate before the convention?
Secretary Clifford: I agree they will not.
Ambassador Ball: I agree.
The President: Is Ball crying over there about his instructions?
Secretary Rusk: I would not think so.
Secretary Clifford: What reaction did we get from Averell Harriman on your Press Conference?/3/
/3/See Document 332.
Secretary Rusk: "I hope we would not undermine the March 31 statement."
The President: The Pope was turned down by Hanoi./4/
/4/In an August 18 letter to the President, the Pope noted that although he had planned to visit both North Vietnam and South Vietnam in order to bring about peace, his overture had been rejected by the DRV. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Pope Paul VI) In telegram CAP 82324 to the President in Texas, August 31, Rostow noted that he, Clifford, and Rusk had come down against using the Pope as a channel for communication with the DRV because it would undercut both the Paris delegation and the Soviets. (Ibid.) Both are printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XII, Documents 311 and 312.
/5/See Document 342.
What about the Norway thing?/5/
Secretary Rusk: They feel the Paris talks are too direct and too publicized.
Ambassador Ball: McCarthy has a fundamental shift in his position. He wants an interim coalition to prepare for election.
Secretary Rusk: Tonight's meeting with the Platform Committee will raise question on the Middle East, ABM, USS Liberty.
General Westmoreland: We are bombing trucks laden with war materiel.
The President: The Christian Science Monitor said today that the greatest number of infiltrators got through in the period when we were doing the most bombing below the 20th.
334. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, August 21, 1968, 1403Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-August 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Harvan; Plus. Received at 10:26 a.m. The delegation's reports on the 18th formal session are in telegrams 19705/Delto 636 and 19708/Delto 637 from Paris, both August 21. (Ibid.)
19703/Delto 635. From Harriman and Vance.
1. Today's tea break, although short, was one of the most interesting we have had. Thuy, Tho and Lau sat with us.
2. After some light conversation, we touched on the Czech situation and Tho observed that each country has its own way of settling its problems.
3. Tho said that the Viet-Nam problem must be solved by us here. We replied that we agreed.
4. We remarked that we wished to apologize for accusing Thuy of making no constructive proposals. We said he had made one constructive proposal--that we meet only once a week. After good-natured laughter by Tho, et al., we said we hoped in the future there would be reason to meet more frequently. Governor Harriman said as he had mentioned previously we would like to invite Tho and Thuy to have a meal or private meeting with us at any time.
5. Thuy replied that he had said to us both that it is normal to have both private and plenary meetings, but it is results which count. Thuy said Lau had told him about Lau/Vance meetings and Thuy's preliminary analysis is that we have offered nothing new toward peaceful settlement.
6. Thuy stated that we had said that the DRV offered no constructive proposals. The DRV has made its proposal on cessation of bombing, which is realistic and it has not been realized. Thuy said we had suggested today more private meetings and Thuy would like more time to study what Vance had said in private meetings and hoped we would study what they had said.
7. We remarked that although nothing tangible had come of Lau/Vance talks, we thought the talks were useful./2/
/2/In telegram 19629/Delto 627 from Paris, August 19, Vance reported on his fourth private meeting with Lau, which occurred that day. Lau noted that he would not discuss details of the Phase 1-Phase 2 peace proposal until the bombing ceased unconditionally and he rejected GVN participation in the substantive talks. He did, however, want Vance to report on his recent meetings in Washington. Vance informed him that "the President wants to know what would happen if all bombing stopped" and that other American leaders shared similar concerns. Lau did note that negotiations on Phase 2 and other matters would move forward after the complete bombing halt. (Ibid.)
8. Tho said that comrade Thuy had expressed his views of private talks suggested by Harriman. However, he would like to think it over and let us know his answer in due course. Tho commented that any negotiation includes both official and private meetings. The important thing, however, is that one should come to the conversations with good will and seriousness. That is the only way to get results.
Comment: We both felt that Tho took over conversation at this point as Thuy was being too negative.
9. Tho added that Thuy and he had stated repeatedly that the DRV came to Paris with serious intent and good will. Tho said their demand for cessation of bombing was serious and only after that could we settle other questions.
10. We said we were glad to hear their views on private talks. On cessation of bombing, President Johnson had stated our position and you have stated your position. We said, as we previously had said, it is the function of negotiators to discuss these matters frankly to see if the roadblocks can be removed.
11. Thuy replied that roadblocks can be removed but bombing destroys the road and the traffic can't move because the cars fall in the hole. We replied bombing only makes holes in the road but doesn't build roadblock that we here must remove. Thuy smiled and repeated that cars fall in the holes created by the bombing.
12. The atmosphere of the conversation was relaxed. Tho was more forthcoming than Thuy.
Harriman
335. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Trueheart) to the Deputy Director (Denney) and Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes)/1/
Washington, August 21, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, East Asia Country File, Vietnam 1968. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Recent Covert Action Against North Vietnam
Maritime Operations
During recent months an average of between 15 and 20 missions have been carried out by Vietnamese-manned PTF's below the 20th parallel. About a third of these missions have involved landings by rubber boats either on Tiger Island or on beaches south of Thanh Hoa. Prisoners have been taken on these over-the-beach operations and during the seizure and inspection of North Vietnamese fishing junks.
There are indications that the North Vietnamese are slowly developing a defense of sorts against PTF raids. An increasing number of reports have been received, largely as a result of the interrogation of prisoners taken in North Vietnam, that the North Vietnamese Navy is equipping fishing junks with automatic weapons and explosives and is training their crews to defend the fishing fleets.
The most recent example of the North Vietnamese attempts to retaliate against the PTF's occurred on August 7. Three PTF's came upon some 35 fishing junks just above the 19th parallel. PTF's, in searching the junks, unwittingly came upon an armed craft. When one of its crewmen had been taken aboard a PTF he was discovered to have a hand grenade in his possession. While he was being disarmed the crew of the junk sprang into action, killing two PTF crew members by rifle fire. Another junk crew member obviously on a suicide mission, scrambled aboard the PTF with explosives strapped to his body. He was killed before he could set off the explosives. At this point four additional junks opened fire on the PTF with small arms and mortars. Coastal defense guns also commenced firing. The PTF's then circled around the armed junks, firing on them until they sank. Nine military personnel and 2 civilians were captured and 12 killed on the enemy side. Two PTF crew men were killed and 6 wounded. Mortars fired from the armed junks opened up holes in the PTF decking. Some 200 rounds were fired by coastal defense guns, the closest rounds landing some 50 meters from the scene of the engagement.
Despite the failure of this particular attempt by the North Vietnamese to retaliate against the PTF's, further North Vietnamese attacks are likely. Additional armed junks are reported, sometimes in numbers as high as 40, below the 20th parallel. Previous small scale attacks occurred in December 1967 and July 1968.
In-Place Teams
On August 7, 1968 Hanoi radio announced the capture of a 12 man "Spy Commando" group. This group has been identified by MASCO as the team "Easy" which infiltrated North Vietnam by parachute on August 10, 1963. While it is not clear when the team came under Hanoi's control, it has been evident for the last few months that the team has been "doubled." It is possible that Hanoi decided to announce capture of the team as a means of demonstrating lack of faith on the part of the US in entering peace negotiations. At the same time the announcement would demonstrate to the North Vietnamese public the regime's efficiency in capturing an infiltration group. Hanoi's announcement may also have been hastened by an order given to the team in late spring to begin moving toward a landing zone from which 4 of the team members could be exfiltrated.
It is possible that Hanoi will make further announcements of the capture of such teams since there is some evidence that others of the remaining 6 infiltrated groups above the 20th parallel maybe doubled.
Approximately 4 "Strata" teams are in North Vietnam to conduct road watch activities North of the DMZ along the Laos-North Vietnam border at all times. These teams are infiltrated and exfiltrated by helicopter./2/
/2/The specific activities of the MACV Special Operations Group teams are discussed in an April 29 memorandum from Trueheart to Hughes. (Ibid.)
Psychological Activities
Black radio operations have now been expanded to a total of 14 hours per day on two frequencies; white radio activities are carried on for two hours daily while gray transmitters broadcast six hours per day in Cantonese and 20 hours in Vietnamese. In addition, airborne transmitters over the Gulf of Tonkin broadcast for 3-1/2 hours daily, usually repeating black radio broadcasts. Each of these broadcasts is carried on two different frequencies./3/
/3/The initial proposal for these operations was discussed initially at a joint INR-CIA meeting on June 13. (Memorandum from Trueheart to Hughes, Denney, and Deputy Director for Research Allan Evans, June 18; ibid.)
The success of those broadcasts devoted to the notional Sacred Sword Patriotic League (SSPL) is attested by a report (based on an interrogation) that, early in July, 17 Catholic men and women put to sea from Nghe An Province in the hope that they would be captured by SSPL boats, as they call the PTF's. At the 30 fathom curve they met 2 US warships (destroyers?). The warships gave the Vietnamese food but would not take them aboard. They sailed about until their food gave out in the hope that they would encounter PTF's. Some wanted to commit suicide rather than to return to North Vietnam. However, they were deterred by the women aboard who reminded them that since they were Catholic they would not go to heaven if they committed suicide. On their return to Nghe An the leaders of the group were arrested and have not been heard of since./4/
/4/This report is now being checked with the 7th Fleet. [Footnote in the source text.]
Among other psychological activities, more than 100 letters are mailed in third countries to North Vietnam every month. Some one and a half million leaflets are distributed over North Vietnam, along with some three to five hundred news letters. Over a thousand fixed frequency radios and several hundred rice bowls, the latter bearing the symbol of the SSPL, are given to fishermen on junks stopped and searched by the PTF's.
Intelligence Reports
Approximately 100 intelligence reports are prepared and distributed every month, some from in-place teams, but the bulk from captives taken off junks. Several junk captives are being used as agents. They are tasked to discover certain information, return to North Vietnam by boat (as do all captives) and are taken again at some later time at which they furnish the information required.
336. Memorandum for Personal Files/1/
Paris, August 22, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Johnson, Lyndon 1968-69. Personal; Secret.
I believe that the failure of the President to stop all bombing of North Viet-Nam in late July or early August (as we recommended) is an historic tragedy of possibly wide consequences. It is my belief, weighing all the evidence, that Hanoi would have been preempted from a new widespread attack--particularly in the DMZ area and on Saigon. (Even Xuan Thuy is quoted as saying to a French reporter "Why doesn't President Johnson try us out? If we fail to respond, he can start bombing again.") If the bombing of North Viet-Nam had been stopped, we would then have satisfied the Soviet leaders and could have been in the midst of discussion on how to proceed from here. President Johnson's trip to the Soviet Union would have been publicly laid on. Nuclear restraint talks would perhaps have been more active, and other bilateral matters might have been more active, and other bilateral matters might have been in process of opening up.
These factors might have weighed in the balance to help the more cautious viewpoint in the Soviet councils to prevail against the intervention in Czechoslovakia. This may seem far fetched but it certainly looked as if the Kremlin leaders were divided and couldn't agree for some weeks. If they had been involved all out on a new tack with the U.S., it is difficult to believe they would have thrown that all down the drain. Whereas instead, the image of Johnson looked rigid re Viet-Nam, and this did not give much hope to early U.S. moves. In fact, it seems that the decision to invade Czechoslovakia was made at the last minute as Johnson was invited to Moscow only a few days before their action, and it was almost announced the morning of the invasion./2/
/2/The summit was cancelled by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20. The President and his advisers discussed the relationship of the invasion to Vietnam on August 22. (Notes of the Cabinet Meeting, August 22; Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings) The summary and full transcript of this latter meeting are ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
W. Averell Harriman/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
337. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Abrams) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Saigon, August 23, 1968, 1304Z.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, 1968 Secretary of Defense Files, VIET 092.2. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to Wheeler, McCain, Bunker, and General George Brown, Commander, 7th Air Force. General Wheeler's office distributed copies to, among others, Clifford, Nitze, Rusk, and Helms.
MAC 11409. The questions you have posed come at a very important time./2/ We are convinced that the enemy has determined to make, over the next days and weeks, the maximum military effort of which he is capable at this time. Because the bombing over the North Vietnamese Panhandle is so linked to the military effort he can make in South Vietnam, I am happy that you have posed the questions and that I can address them now.
/2/These questions were transmitted in CAP 82092 from Rostow, August 23. (Ibid.) In an August 19 memorandum to Clifford, Rostow argued that Hanoi would increase significantly its southward infiltration if the United States halted the bombing. (Johnson Library, Alain Enthoven Papers, Bombing of North Vietnam) In critiquing Rostow's assertion in a memorandum to Nitze, August 22, Enthoven, noting that the bombing did not impair the NVA/VC in the South from receiving adequate supplies and reinforcements, instead argued that North Vietnam would reduce its infiltration in accordance with a reduction in its attritional losses after an end to the bombing campaign. (Ibid.)
Question 1: What is the effect of our current bombing operations in North Vietnam?
Several effects are of importance. One is the destruction of materiel itself. We believe we are now destroying or damaging approximately 15 per cent of the trucks believed to be moving into South Vietnam. This amounts to an average of 90 trucks per week. Second, and of greater importance, is the reduction we have caused in the number of trucks moving. While other factors may also be at work, it is our conviction that the air interdiction program in the North Vietnam Panhandle has been the primary agent which has reduced trucks detected from a level of 1000 a day in mid-July to between 150 and 200 a day at the present time. A third effect is to prevent the enemy from massing artillery and air defense means in the area to the north of the DMZ form which they can attack our forces. Further, we interfere with his ability to concentrate forces and supplies for sudden attacks through the DMZ against our units. There are, of course, other effects such as pinning down many thousands of essential air defense and LOC support forces.
Question 2: What would be the military effect of a cessation of the bombing?
Again, there are several important effects. First, military materiel (much of it POL and ammunition, as fires and secondary explosions testify) would be able to reach the DMZ or the borders of Laos unimpeded. We believe the current attrition from truck destruction alone, not to mention truck park storage areas, is running several hundred tons per week on the average in the NVN Panhandle. Second, the truck flow could be expected to return to a level of 1,000 a day or even higher within as little as a week. If we take average truck loading at 3-1/2 tons, we are talking about an increase, repeat increase, in southward movement which could amount to 1,500 tons per day or more. Next, the enemy would be able to mass artillery, air defense means, and ground units freely north of the DMZ for use against our forces. He could deploy his air force into areas north of 17 degrees from which to threaten or attack our forces and installations throughout much of South Vietnam. He would be able to reopen his railroad as far south as Vinh and subsequently to Dong Hoi. He would thereby free additional numbers of trucks to support his forces in the south. Finally, freed from interdiction north of 17 degrees, the enemy could move reinforcements to the DMZ by truck or rail thus drastically shortening transit time.
Question 3: Since March 31 what is the average number of trucks destroyed and trucks damaged per week? What is the average number of trucks sighted in the Panhandle per week? We are aware of the difficulties, but what is your best estimate of the total number of trucks (sighted and unsighted) that flow through the Panhandle each week and the proportion of this total that we are now getting?
As indicated above, we are currently averaging about 90 trucks destroyed and damaged per week since 31 March. The average number of trucks detected in the Panhandle per week has been 1300. Our best estimate of total number flowing into the Panhandle each week during that period is 620. We estimate that we are destroying or damaging 15 per cent of these. I would like to emphasize however that, as indicated above, we believe the major impact of our bombing effort is found in the reduction of truck flow, rather than in the numbers actually destroyed.
Question 4: What is the estimate of military casualties we inflict on the enemy each week in the bombing of North Vietnam?
The military casualties resulting from our bombing efforts are obviously extremely difficult to estimate with any confidence. Destroyed and damaged trucks probably account for some 200 casualties (KIA and WIA) weekly. Also, nearly one-half of the 235 weekly road interdictions we are averaging occur at night when road crews are present. There are undoubtedly substantial casualties among road repair/maintenance crews and also among air defense crews, but any estimate would be extremely speculative. A figure of 5 to 10 thousand per month does not seem unreasonable. However, military casualties in North Vietnam are not, in my judgment, the most significant measure of the effectiveness of our bombing. As indicated above, its major effects lie in reducing the weight of effort that can be directed against our forces.
Question 5: Is there any possibility of your providing for the President even an approximate estimate of the additional casualties we would take if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam?
During the period May through July this year we have been sustaining in the fighting in I Corps losses amounting to an average of 240 killed in action each week. Approximately 70 percent of these have been U.S. The intensity of enemy action, i.e. the scale and duration of combat in which his units are involved, is a direct determinant of the magnitude of our losses. Assuming that the cessation of bombing would be reflected in a several-fold increase in his logistic capability to support combat, and in the intensity of combat, we would have to expect a several-fold increase in U.S. and allied casualties in I Corps. With the bombing authority now in effect, I am able with forces available to limit the enemy's capability in South Vietnam by interdicting his roads and destroying substantial amounts of his munitions and supplies before they reach South Vietnam. In addition, I am able to suppress his artillery and air defense north of the Ben Hai so that our positions just south of the DMZ are secure. If the bombing in North Vietnam now authorized were to be suspended, the enemy, in 10 days to two weeks, could develop a capability in the DMZ area in terms of scale, intensity and duration of combat on the order of five times what he now has. If he should develop this, it would, in my judgment, make our positions in northern Quang Tri to include Dong Ha and the Cua Viet untenable. I cannot agree to place our forces at the risk which the enemy's capability would then pose.3
/3/In an August 23 memorandum to Rusk, Bundy criticized the facts and conclusions that Abrams reached in his telegram. First, the reduction in numbers of trucks moving southward was likely related to heavy flooding. Second, in the event of a bombing halt, it was not likely that the DRV could increase the flow of tonnage by an additional 1,500 tons per day. Third, casualty rates far exceeded any past predictions by the CIA. Fourth, Bundy doubted that the enemy could multiply his logistical capabilities by a factor of five and would hesitate to increase his capability since bombing would resume if such an increase was detected. "I find these responses a highly exaggerated and tendentious presentation," Bundy concluded. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 192, Dean Rusk White House Correspondence, PR-Hold-Vietnam-FE) Similar criticisms of the supposed factual errors and logical fallacies in Abrams' response are in memoranda from Warnke to Clifford, all dated August 29. (Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, 1968 Secretary of Defense Files, VIET 092.2) In an undated memorandum to Wheeler, Clifford also was critical of Abrams' telegram. (Johnson Library, Alain Enthoven Papers, Bombing in North Vietnam) Warnke's analysis of both Rostow's memorandum and Abrams' telegram are in an August 30 memorandum to Clifford. (Ibid.)
338. Editorial Note
From 1:07 p.m. to 3:06 p.m. on August 23, 1968, President Johnson, his foreign policy advisers, and key Executive Branch officials, including Secretary of Defense Clifford, Secretary of State Rusk, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Wheeler, and Army Chief of Staff Westmoreland, met with the bipartisan leaders of Congress in order to brief them on world developments. While the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was the major topic of discussion (see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XVII, Document 85), the subject of Vietnam was also addressed:
"Secretary Rusk then gave a summary of developments in Viet Nam.
"The President called on General Westmoreland for his views. He reported that one of the chief worries was the possibility of a third general offensive by the enemy. At the Tet offensive a new psychological victory was achieved, but the communists suffered a very severe military defeat. He likened the Tet offensive from the standpoint of the American troops to the Battle of the Bulge. To the Vietnamese this was their Pearl Harbor. This woke them up like nothing else had before and in this sense it was a blessing in disguise. This created a political atmosphere that permitted national mobilization, the drafting of 18 and 19 year old youngsters which traditionally had not been done in Vietnamese society. It permitted us to weed the men from the boys among the officer, non-commissioned officer ranks and the poor ones released. It gave confidence to the ARVN because they fought bravely and well in general, and it gave them that confidence that they needed which has served them well since that time. It also served to accelerate the modernization of our men with better weapons. He then gave a brief summary as to what might be expected in the future.
"The President then called on Secretary Rusk to give his concluding observations on the situation in Vietnam.
"The President said that he wanted to make one observation before the meeting concluded. He said as follows:
"'Because you are confronted with and because we are deeply concerned with the welfare of our men and our country and the lives of our men who are committed to our custody, I just thought I'd share with you just one paragraph from a cable I have received from General Abrams:
[Omitted here is the text of Abrams' answer to Question 5 in his telegram MAC 11409, Document 337.]
"The President continued:
"'So that's a sample of what the responsible career Commander in the field has to say about some of the plans that are proposed and the Commander-in-Chief has to constantly bear these recommendations in mind in making these judgments.'" (Summary of Meeting in the Cabinet Room, August 23; Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room)
339. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the President's Counsel (Murphy)/1/
August 26, 1968, 8:04 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Murphy, August 26, 1968, 8:04 a.m., Tape F6808.01, PNO 10-12. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. The President was in Texas; Murphy was at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. According to notes of message to Johnson transmitted by telephone at 12:31 a.m. on August 25, Humphrey noted: "We're doing well on the platform. I've been keeping a watch on it." (Ibid.) Rusk's assessment of the platform is in telegram CAP 82062 from Rostow to the President, August 18. (Ibid., National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, McCarthy Platform--1968) Another critique of the minority plank by Wheeler was transmitted to the President in telegram CAP 82215, August 28. (Ibid., White House Central Files, Conference Files, NB 19/CO 312, Vietnam, Situation in, January 1968)
Jones: I have missed this part. You say you have been working on something?
Murphy: I have been working on this thing with Hale Boggs and he has come up with some language that seems to me to be all right, and the Vice President will go along with it. Hale would like to personally tell you what the language is. In this language "to stop all bombing of North Vietnam unless this action would endanger the lives of our troops"--/2/
/2/A draft speech for the President to deliver at Chicago by Rusk and Presidential speechwriter Horace Busby was transmitted in telegram WH 82068 from Rostow to the President, August 18. (Ibid., National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Speech Draft--President's Address to the Democratic Convention) Rostow's revisions are in his telegram WH 82076 to the President, August 19. (Ibid.) A finalized version of the speech was sent to Deputy Special Counsel Larry Levison from Califano in telegram LBJWH 8259, August 27. (Ibid.) Numerous other drafts and modifications of the speech are ibid.
[Jones passed the telephone to the President.]
President: Charlie, it does. We got that positively. Let's don't mislead and deceive people. I had rather be a poor peasant and wear a wooden shoe than be out on the door by myself.
Murphy: In that case, well--
President: The "unless" is no goddamn meaningful. We know it. Read Abrams' wire/3/ in front of you. He says it does.
/3/Document 337.
Murphy: Well, in that case, the language would not call for the bombing to be stopped.
President: Well, that's right. But why do you want to imply that you are going to stop it? You're just saying to Hanoi something that it would take me a year to explain and then they'd say I am running away from it.
Murphy: I suppose one consideration is it's a really critical situation here at the convention and it looks like the chairman of the platform committee who is sitting here might not be able to go to his platform committee except with a disagreement between the President and the Vice President. He thinks that would be a terrible situation.
President: Well, the President is not going to agree to stop all of the bombing, Charlie. Period. Now I just hate to say it; I am just like you. I had rather vote for Nixon than to kill my boys.
Murphy: Well, I am with you, but I don't think we can sell that. Now, Hale is here and he would like to--
President: I don't want to get into that because I don't want to talk to anybody at the convention. I don't care what they would like to do.
Murphy: All right, sir.
President: I just positively don't want to do it and I think you had better say you are talking to Jim Jones. That is why I asked you to go out there. If I had wanted to negotiate with each one of these individuals, I would go out there. I just can't do it. But I would say to them--if they won't go for the language that we suggested, which I think puts Hanoi off bad enough, then they have to go on their own responsibility, which I will not accept./4/
/4/The President was not so definite in a telephone conversation with Postmaster General Marvin Watson that day at 10:39 a.m. He noted: "I wouldn't let anybody else know it because you tell somebody within the delegation, they'll go tell some Texas reporter and it'll be around. So we can't tell anybody. But I would tell Daley that's what we want to do and that's what we plan to do, and that's what you're going to recommend to him, and you believe that if you tell me that he wants me and you want me and both of you say that there's no danger and both of you say that there'd be a hell of a demonstration for me, you believe I'll do it, but you can't say, but you believe I will. And that you want him to be in a position to say that he invited me but hasn't talked to me and hasn't been in communication with me, where he can honestly say it." In this same conversation, Watson and the President discussed a possible draft of Senator Edward Kennedy and whether the President would address the convention. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Watson, August 26, 1968, 10:39 a.m., Tape 6808.02, PNO 5-6)
[The President then put Jones on the line to speak to Boggs. In the ensuing conversation, they discussed the language of the platform on Vietnam. Boggs expressed his concern over the likelihood of open disagreement between the President and the Vice President on this issue. Boggs also objected to the conditionality of the President's preferred statement, especially the phrase, "This action should take into account a positive response from Hanoi." He noted that the convention would break up over the inclusion of this formulation. Boggs expressed concern about presiding over something that would result in a three-way split among Johnson, Humphrey, and the doves, which he characterized as "utter pandemonium." Jones then asked for Murphy and handed the telephone back to the President.]
President: Charlie, we are not going to write the platform from down here. These are responsible men. Humphrey says to me that he does not favor "stop the bombing." If he tells the truth, he ought to stay with it. If he doesn't, he ought to go on his own. Now it's that simple. We do not favor any words that say "stop the bombing." Let's make that clear and repeat it over and over again. We do not favor any words that say we are ready to stop the bombing. We think that signals Hanoi that the convention has ordered the commander in chief to stop the bombing. That's number 1. We think it plays politics with the war, number 2. We think it puts a bunch of draft-dodgers and pacifists who've never seen a uniform in charge of telling us that we can't bomb the people until they get out of the DMZ or even then where they can run over our men. So we do not favor anything that says "stop the bombing." Now, is that clear? Now, if they've got to have that language to satisfy their pacifists, the language ought to say what they mean. Now, the language that Dean Rusk and the [National] Security Council people and the President would not find it necessary to just get out and denounce, although they might not accept it or follow it, but just might not have to split off from, would be language that says this: "stop all bombing of North Vietnam when this action would not endanger the lives of our troops in the field." Now that would mean--what we mean by that is this: the President would determine when, the [National] Security Council would determine when--the Vice President's a member of it--the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State would determine when. Those policy decisions are made in Washington. But we could never stop the bombing if we thought by so doing we would have a bloodbath, and no son-of-a-bitch ought to ask us to. Now that's number 1. Now that's all we're saying. Now then, if you want to go further, I don't see any need to go further at all, but if you want to go further, you could say this action--what action--stopping the bombing--this action should take into account a positive response from Hanoi, or if you want to say a response from Hanoi. Now, we're not going to just take this action unilaterally, as I said on March 31st. We've taken unilateral action at those two big cities because that would not endanger the lives of our men. But if I move it right down to the DMZ, where they can come through day and night instead of only at night, where they can come bumper to bumper, a thousand trucks a week were coming in July 15, we've got them down to 150 now, but if we stopped the bombing a thousand would start immediately next week. Now Abrams said it would increase their strength five-fold. Now he said when they increase their strength five-fold he has to pull out of the northern I Corps area. That means Chuck Robb and every damn one of them get run over. They've got to retreat. Now these fools who don't know anything about it cannot tell us that we've got to retreat, because we're not going to do it. Now if we have to be against the platform and say that we're a bunch of idiots, and that we can't have a Republican platform, we can't even stand for the Democratic war as strong as Nixon does, why then we have to just say so, and let them write what they want to. But this business about its timing indicates that they are determined to stop the bombing and then the timing is a matter that they want me to hurry up on but they give me a week or so. So the word "timing" ought to be out of there, just whatever they say. Now we can't do anything on "the prospect of the dream." We did 90 percent of it and said that if you'll match any of it, we'll take further steps. But when they put "the prospect" in there, they just say I ought to take this action on hope. Now, I just can't do that. And I think that we ought to say to them, that if its 30-30-30 [split between the positions of the President, the Vice President, and the antiwar Democrats], if Hale resigns, all these other things, there's not any of them is as important as killing a bunch of men. Now, we're just now going to kill the men, and now we're going to say so when that platform's over with. Now, if you give me the language which I'm going to say, I'll give it to you and you can take it down and let Jim see it--wait a minute--give me that [to Jones]--you get you a pencil now and take this down--if we have a speech, Charlie, this is what we're going to say, and this is going to be the President's position. There's no use in agreeing to something today and unwriting it tomorrow night: "This country's pledge to freedom is written in the treaties that we Democrats and Republicans have concluded by solemn constitutional process. They link our safety to the safety of allies in this hemisphere, across the Atlantic, and on the western rim of the Pacific. They were made to prevent World War III and to protect the vital national interests of the United States. There could be no greater disservice to peace than to let those who might become adversaries think that these treaties might not mean what they say. Our fidelity is written in the blood that our sons have shed on battlefields in Korea and Vietnam, for where we had to fight to stop aggression before it led to World War III, we did fight. I know there are well-intentioned people who want to stop our bombing in Vietnam regardless of the consequences. No American wants peace more than I. Hanoi knows that I am prepared to stop the bombing--I have stopped it eight times. Today, four-fifths of North Vietnam is free from bombing, although every square mile of South Vietnam is subject to bombing with rockets and mortars. Need I remind you that the President is commander in chief. Those who carry the burden of the battlefield tell me that stopping the bombing of North Vietnam would increase several-fold the enemy's capabilities at the DMZ and that such action would immediately require allied forces to withdraw from important strategic areas of I Corps. That is why I have said we cannot substantially increase the dangers to our own men by this unilateral action and why we need some response from Hanoi."
[The President then noted that the Vice President had told him that he agreed with what the President had said at the August 18 VFW speech. The President added: "We are not going to change our position because I've got 550,000 men that are there, and I'm not going to do either of two things. One, I'm not going to substantially increase their capability and two, I'm not going to order my men to retreat." He concluded with additional criticism of the Humphrey Vietnam plank.]/4/
/4/The vote for the pro-administration Vietnam plank on August 28 was 1,576 in favor and 1,041 opposed. In a telephone conversation with Humphrey at 4:40 p.m. that day, the President informed him that while he could have come to Chicago, he had decided against it because Humphrey was "doing a good job" on the Vietnam plank. He suggested that the Vice President allow word of the President's support for him leak out. (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Humphrey, August 27, 1968, 4:40 p.m., Tape 6808.03, PNO 3) Humphrey accepted the nomination on August 29. During a telephone conversation with the Vice President that day, Johnson recommended a number of prospective running mates for Humphrey. (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Humphrey, August 29, 1968, 10:41 a.m., Tape 6808.03, PNO 4)
340. Editorial Note
On August 26, 1968, Secretary of Defense Clifford met with Department of Defense staff and service representatives for the weekly Secretary of Defense staff meeting. Among the participants were Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle Wheeler, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense George Elsey, Secretary of the Navy Paul Ignatius, Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown, Army Chief of Staff General William Westmoreland, Air Force Chief of Staff General John McConnell, Marine Corps Commandant General Leonard Chapman, and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas Moorer. Staff Secretary R. Eugene Livesay took notes of the meeting and wrote a summary of the major topics discussed. The participants first discussed events in Vietnam and Southeast Asia during the preceding week:
"Mr. Clifford said it has been a full week and it will be well to go back and review it. Activity in Southeast Asia picked up perceptively. As General Abrams has been warning us and we in turn have been alerting the American public it may be that the enemy's third offensive has started. Mr. Clifford, however, believes it is too early to reach this conclusion. General Abrams feels it has been started. The activity has been mainly in the I and III Corps. Casualties are up substantially. The usual Thursday announcement this week may show our casualties twice that of the preceding week. Another indicator shows a great degree of participation by the ARVN in repelling the attacks. ARVN casualties are also up substantially and will be much higher than ours.
"He sees a reason to delay his own personal decision on whether or not the enemy's third offensive has started. There is some possibility that General Abrams' 'spoiling' operations might be successful, and he would like to give General Abrams every opportunity to abort this offensive. An enemy third offensive would have the effect of being generally inimical to our interests. It could have an adverse effect on negotiations in Paris, particularly if the enemy escalates and we are forced to escalate. If the enemy is determined to start the third wave offensive then we would have to face up to it. Later on he would like General Wheeler and General Westmoreland to comment on this activity.
"Mr. Clifford said that last Monday the President spoke to the Convention of Veterans of Foreign Wars in Detroit, Michigan. It was a stern speech. The President reiterated his attitude that Hanoi has to take some action before he takes further deescalatory steps."
Later in the meeting, a general discussion of the military situation in Southeast Asia occurred:
"Mr. Clifford said this has been an important week in Southeast Asia. It may augur for serious developments ahead. He would like for General Wheeler followed by General Westmoreland to comment.
"General Wheeler said that in North Vietnam the enemy continues to rehabilitate the lines of communications and other facilities, including various commercial installations (e.g. cement plants). Movement of enemy troops and supplies to the South is at a high level. Yesterday there was a dog fight between 2 F-4s and 2 MIG 21s, although none of the aircraft were damaged. Infiltration is at a high rate. In July 1968 we identified 18,700 enemy moving south. The total from 31 March-31 July 1968 is between 100,000 and 110,000. Mr. Clifford asked if the July figure is less or more than June. General Wheeler said a little more. In March 1968 they moved 28,000; April-37,700; May-30,000; June-16,900; and July-18,700. Supply movements to support the additional people and the step up in military activity are substantial.
"There has been a perceptive step up this past week in operations country-wide in South Vietnam. Activity has been particularly heavy around DaNang and Chu Lai in I Corps and Tay Ninh in III Corps. The enemy is also pushing toward Saigon. There was considerable activity in the Duc Lap Special Forces camp but the enemy is now retreating from this engagement into Cambodia. Enemy agents and documents appear to confirm that the third offensive has started. General Abrams had previously noted that the enemy plans included attacks on outlying installations initially. These attacks were to draw U.S. and ARVN forces from important target areas to give the enemy a greater chance of success when the third wave attacks start. General Wheeler said he thinks the evidence of step up in activity is highlighted by casualties. This past week 323 U.S. were killed, nearly twice as many South Vietnamese--594, and around 5,000 Viet Cong/North Vietnamese, the highest since May 1968 for the enemy. Furthermore, there was considerable fighting over the weekend. Yesterday we lost 50 men killed, the South Vietnamese 120, and the enemy 928. There is no slackening off by the enemy. In fact, his activity is showing a steady climb. We have not discussed this publicly. We find it is better for the newsmen to discover this increased activity by themselves and apparently they are. We can anticipate a continued rise of enemy activity in the next several days. When they will be able to attack major objectives we are not sure.
"Mr. Clifford asked why the shelling of Saigon only lasted one day. General Wheeler said that he thinks that they were able to sneak in and set up a position but our quick reaction forced them out right away. General Westmoreland said he would agree. Saigon defenses have never been in better shape. This is partly because the South Vietnamese have put a single officer in command. At the time of the Tet offensive General Vien had to take command of the defense of Saigon. Only an officer of his stature was able to control General Loan who was in charge of the police. During the May offensive General Khang was in command of the Saigon defense. General Loan cooperated with him because they were friends. President Thieu was not happy with this arrangement but he needed to get his ducks lined up before making a change. Fate intervened and when General Loan was wounded, an overall commander was put in charge of both South Vietnamese military and the South Vietnamese police for the defense of Saigon. The cohesiveness of these forces has been improved. Among other actions taken is a decision that he, General Westmoreland, made about a year ago to have all of the watch towers being manufactured sent to the Saigon area. The watch towers contain starlight scopes, radios, and are manned by personnel using high power field glasses. From these towers they are able to triangulate on enemy fire. The towers are tied into the fire direction center for counter fire. The fact that we were able to react quickly to the recent firings isn't to suggest that they won't try to do it again.
"As to whether the third wave offensive has started or not, General Westmoreland feels that it has. He sees it as a sustained effort and we may not see a greatly increased tempo over that apparent now. He does believe there will be some increase. Some intelligence indicates it will last until 10 September. They will try to infiltrate cities with sapper units and their objective will be to destroy communications, such as blowing bridges. They are hitting the outposts which allows them to operate with impunity and to hide the movement of supplies. They are trying to win a tactical victory for the headlines it will bring. They will also attempt to have us divert resources from the high priority areas. Another purpose in hitting outposts is that when our forces concentrate to meet these attacks they can move supplies through areas away from the outpost. He thinks the attack on Duc Lap Special Forces camp was for this purpose. It is in a remote area and manned by CIDG personnel. They brought considerable forces against the camp and blew a bridge on the only route. We reinforced the camp with Army infantry battalions and used tactical air to put back the attack. A political reason for this attack against the Special Forces camp was to attract the native tribesmen (Montagnards) to their side. Their chief leader (Y-B'ham Enoi) recently visited Saigon to work with the Saigon Government on better arrangements between the FULRO movement and the Saigon government. The enemy is trying to impress these tribes with the feeling that the enemy is going to win and this would stop the growing rapport between Saigon and FULRO.
"General Westmoreland said the Achilles Heel of the enemy is logistics. Logistics governs their ability to sustain their offensive. This stresses the importance of their lines of communications. He thinks we are in a sound posture. Our mobility, flexibility and firepower allows us to shift our forces readily and concentrate firepower. It is also interesting to see some of the recent high kill ratios. For example, in one engagement 215 enemy were killed vs. 7 friendly. In another area 436 enemy were killed in two days.
"General Westmoreland said in summary he believes that the third wave offensive has started, but General Abrams' counter-actions have kept it to a low order detonation. He sees a sustained enemy effort, with some step-up in the tempo." (Johnson Library, Clark Clifford Papers, Minutes of Secretary of Defense Staff Meetings, March-September 1968)
341. Editorial Note
At 11:15 a.m. on August 27, 1968, President Johnson received a telephone call from Senator Everett Dirksen. Subsequent to discussion of the President's health and the Democratic National Convention, the following conversation ensued:
"Dirksen: Are you any closer to going out there to that convention?
"President: No, no. I haven't made any plans to go and rather doubt that I will. I don't know. I might change my mind, but I haven't made any plans to go and I don't know what I can contribute. I think they'll have a big knock-down drag-out with the pacifists and the fellows that Hanoi has been working on. But it looks like the vote has been pretty good. They took Kennedy and McCarthy and McGovern, and they wrapped all their doves together, and they couldn't get but 30 votes.
"Dirksen: What's the late word from Paris?
"President: Nothing. They're waiting to see if they can have a better deal with anybody that they select. They know that they can't get a better one from me. They know they can't get a better one from Nixon. So they're trying to play this other side. I can tell you this--this would ruin us if it got out, but to show you their attitude--the Pope sent his man over and he came to the Ranch and he wanted to propose that he go from Bogota to Hanoi and then to Saigon and that he would say to them that we would stop the bombing if they would do certain things. We told him that we'd be enthusiastically for his doing that and that we'd do anything that was reasonable. See, he was very pleased, and went back. The next--a few days ago, he came and said that they wouldn't let him into Hanoi--they just told him to go to hell. At the proper time, I think, after we get the conventions out of the way, he might let that leak out. It would be a mistake if he didn't--if he did--if we did, but I think that that pretty well reflects their present attitude. They're hoping that somebody that'll insist on a coalition government or somebody that'll insist on stopping the bombing."
The President then urged Dirksen to "let out" word of the government's estimate that infiltration would increase five-fold if the bombing halted. Discussion of other political issues followed. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Dirksen, August 27, 1968, 11:15 a.m., Tape F6808.02, PNO 7; this transcript prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian)
342. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency (Carver) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/
Washington, August 29, 1968.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, SAVA (Carver) Files, Job 80-R1720R, GAC Chrono, June 1968-August 1968. Secret; Sensitive.
SUBJECT
A Vietnam Hunch
1. I have a strong visceral hunch, unsupported by evidence, that our friends in Hanoi are contemplating some major move--either military, political or both--within the next few days.
2. There are two small straws in the wind which precipitated this feeling. One is the quadrille currently being danced in Oslo in conjunction with the Ohio exercise. As you may recall, on 2 July the Norwegian Charge in Peking was sought out by the North Vietnamese Ambassador (Loan) who used the pretext of delivering a memo on the Geneva Accords but was obviously fishing for an invitation to Oslo, ostensibly because Hanoi was dissatisfied with Paris and interested in opening other channels./2/ This overture has gone through various permutations, the net result of which is that the DRV Ambassador in East Germany is supposed to go to Oslo to talk to the Norwegian Foreign Minister and the Norwegians have arranged (through Harriman and the Department) for a U.S. briefing officer (Dan Davidson) to be taking a vacation in Oslo at the time of the North Vietnamese Ambassador's visit. The most interesting feature of this exercise has been the scheduling, which was on the verge of being set about three weeks ago when the North Vietnamese suddenly pushed it back to mid-September. It is now set for 20 September./3/
/2/See footnote 3, Document 291.
/3/The delegation in Paris became involved after Harriman and Vance encouraged the contact. (Telegram 18302/Delto 487 from Paris, July 22; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET OHIO) Ngo Minh Loan, DRV Ambassador to China, indicated his wish to have a DRV diplomat, first himself and then Ambassador to the Soviet Union Nguyen Chan, meet with Norwegian officials in Oslo at the same time an American representative would be there. (Telegram 216977 to Oslo, Paris, and Saigon, August 7; telegram 19233/Delto 576 from Paris, August 8; telegram 216977 to Paris, August 8; telegram 217164 to Paris, August 8; telegram 5992 from Oslo, August 9; telegram 218776 to Oslo and Paris, August 9; telegram 218055 to Paris, August 9; and telegram 218821 to Paris, Oslo, Saigon, Moscow, and Kathmandu, August 9; all ibid.; and telegram CAP 81918 from Smith to the President, August 9; Johnson Library, President's Appointment File--Diary Backup, August 1968) Harriman suggested and the Department agreed to send Davidson to Oslo in order to receive a briefing from the Norwegian Government on the talks with Chan. (Telegram 18825/Delto 537 from Paris, July 31; telegram 212498 to Paris, July 31; and telegram 18855 from Paris, August 1; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET OHIO) During the course of the Ohio contact, Loan stated that the DRV was not satisfied with the course of the Paris talks and desired to establish contacts in other venues such as Norway. INR noted that the DRV likely pursued this initiative to pre-empt retaliation resulting from their third offensive. (Memorandum from Hughes to Rusk, September 6; ibid.) Further documentation on the contact is ibid., S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, OHIO (DID).
A scheduled meeting between Chan and the Norwegians for August 15 was cancelled. Loan notified them that Chan could come to Norway no sooner than sometime in the next month, and a meeting was scheduled for September 20. (Telegrams 5997 from Oslo and 218915 to Paris, both August 10; telegram 220574 to Paris, August 14; telegram 221207 to Oslo, Paris, and Saigon, August 14; telegram 221310 to Oslo, Paris, and Norway, August 15; telegram 6141 from Oslo, August 20; telegram 224140 to Paris, August 20; telegram 224590 to Oslo, Paris, Saigon, and Moscow, August 20; and telegram 6222 from Oslo, August 26; all ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET OHIO)
3. The other straw in the wind is Thuy's comment to Harriman and Vance at the 28 August tea break. Harriman and Vance said they hoped Thuy and Le Duc Tho could soon get together with them informally over dinner. Harriman's house was offered as the locale. Thuy answered that September 2 was the DRV National Day and they would be very busy until then. After September 2 the North Vietnamese would give an answer to the invitation./4/
/4/Reports by the delegation on the 19th formal session were transmitted in telegrams 20029/Delto 653 and 20036/Delto 657 from Paris, both August 28. (Ibid., A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-August 1968)
4. This is all pretty tenuous but the date juggling in Oslo and Paris hits me as more than coincidental. I am possibly hyper-sensitized by what happened just before Tet in the Buttercup operation. As you will remember, Buttercup/1 suddenly became unavailable and was not even able to attend the courier's briefing because of the press of other business./5/ Had we read these tea leaves right, we would have been alerted to the fact that something was in the wind. I have that same sort of hunch now. The North Vietnamese may be planning nothing more than an attempt against Saigon, for which numerous warning signs are already up. They may simply hope that this time enough confusion will be caused and popular demonstrations mounted to alter the political atmospherics and, hence, not wish to engage in much serious discussion anywhere until they have made their try.
/5/See Document 6.
5. If my hypothesis has any validity, something along these lines (i.e., a Saigon attack) is the most logical explanation. There is always the possibility, however, of something more dramatic such as an NLF call (sufficiently endorsed by Hanoi) for an immediate, unpoliced, in-place cease fire. In any event, I intend to ensure that my colleagues remain particularly alert and watchful during the next few days.
George A. Carver, Jr.
343. Editorial Note
In August 1968 Ambassador Bunker requested covert financial support of President Thieu's efforts to assist the development of a newly-established political organization that aspired to become a broadly-based group with mass appeal, the National Alliance for Social Revolution, colloquially referred to by the Vietnamese as the Lien Minh. In September the 303 Committee authorized the first allotment of what would become $725,000 of funding, pending further review of the entire program. Only half of the authorized total was passed in increments to Thieu during the period September 1968-March 1969. With this funding, the Thieu government established the Lien Minh in its principal base in Saigon and particularly the Cholon area, formed committees in several provinces, and began cadre training. Initially an organization comprised of six political parties, the Lien Minh drew its membership from Ky's National Salvation Front, Thieu's Free Democratic Forces, and the Congress of Vietnamese Trade Unions, South Vietnam's largest labor federation.
344. Memorandum for the 303 Committee/1/
Washington, August 29, 1968.
/1/Source: National Security Council, 303 Committee Files, Vietnam, 1965-1969. Secret; Eyes Only. A typed note reads: "Approved by the 303 Committee on 3 September 1968. Final approval to be obtained from the Secretaries of State & Defense and from HA."
SUBJECT
Proposal for Financial Support of Government of Vietnam-Sponsored Political Front in South Vietnam
1. Summary
Political activity in South Vietnam over the last 12 months has resulted in the emergence of political leaders and groupings, in and out of the Government, some of whom are now united in the realization of the need to develop a viable political mechanism to compete with the National Liberation Front (NLF). These elements, with the support of President Nguyen Van Thieu, have organized the "National Alliance for Social Revolution", known in Vietnamese as the "Lien Minh". As the result of recent conversations with President Thieu, in which Thieu has thrown his weight behind this Alliance, Ambassador Bunker now proposes that the U.S. Government covertly finance the Lien Minh with the sum of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to be spent in increments over the remainder of the FY 1969 [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]./2/
/2/See Document 343. In telegram CAS 375 from Saigon, August 26, Bunker wrote: "I believe the total funds required for Lien Minh will be substantially greater than we had at first anticipated. While President Thieu states that his other commitments prevent him from supporting Lien Minh financially, I believe that once the program demonstrates its capabilities, the Vietnamese can be brought to realize that their financial participation will be necessary and desirable. I shall actively encourage President Thieu in this direction. In the meantime, I strongly recommend that the 303 Committee endorse full financial support for this activity. A tentative Lien Minh budget calls for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for the four-month September-December 1968 period. I believe a more realistic total figure for this period to be [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and recommend that the 303 Committee authorize this amount and a similar rate of support for the final two quarters of FY 69. We here will move ahead as aggressively as possible to tighten up the planning which has already taken place, and to the extent we are able and deem wise, will do what can be done to insure that costs do not become excessive in terms of results achieved." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 VIET S) In CAS 374 from Saigon, August 26, [text not declassified]: "At present our intention is to concentrate our support in developing Lien Minh's organizational infrastructure." Thieu would receive [text not declassified] of previously authorized funds that week while the balance of the [text not declassified] programmed for political action would be disbursed very soon as well. An additional [text not declassified] would be requested promptly to finance activities for the rest of 1968 and an additional [text not declassified] for the balance of FY 1969. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, East Asia Country File, Vietnam (Lien Minh) 1968) Carver's assessment of the request outlined in these two telegrams is in his August 27 memorandum to Helms. (Central Intelligence Agency, SAVA (Carver) Files, Job 80-R01720R, GAC Chrono, January 1968-August 1968) In a memorandum to Helms, August 29, Carver provided a more detailed assessment. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Meetings with the President, July-December 1968 [2]) Trueheart assessed the request in an August 26 memorandum to Hughes. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, EAP General Files, EA Weekly Meetings, 1968)
2. Problem
On 1 December 1967, the 303 Committee approved a proposal to provide [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to support individual assembly members and nascent political parties in Vietnam. This action reflected awareness by both President Thieu and the US Mission of the lack of an effective political force to compete with the NLF in South Vietnam. Since that time, President Thieu has achieved the coalescence of three political groupings which offers some hope of becoming a political bulwark for the existing government, a potentially significant competitor to the NLF, and a vehicle for manifesting the extent to which the Vietnamese are united in their opposition to Communist rule. The three groupings are Tran Van Don's National Salvation Front (NSF), Tran Quoc Buu's CVT-Hoa Hao Farmer Worker Association (CVT/FWA), and Nguyen Van Huong's Free Democratic Forces (FDF)./3/ The amalgamation of these elements into a significant front capable of attracting additional political support depends upon a variety of factors including:
/3/In a July 26 memorandum to George Denney, Deputy Director of INR, Donald S. Macdonald, then INR Deputy Director for Coordination, noted: "In October 1967 some [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was spent to aid Revolutionary Dai Viet and CVT (labor) candidates for the Assembly. Prior to this the 303 Committee had in August approved the expenditure of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in FY 68 for the creation of a left wing political group which would serve as an alternative to the National Liberation Front, particularly for any high ranking defectors from the latter organization. There is no evidence to suggest that this program has ever been fully implemented." (Ibid., East Asia Country File, Vietnam 1968)
(a) the ability to crystallize and channel political emotions;
(b) a political and social program which is attractive to the population of South Vietnam;
(c) effective political organization; and
(d) demonstrated performance.
Needed first is sufficient financial support for organizational and cadre training purposes. Ambassador Bunker has been authorized to make available to President Thieu [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as previously cleared by the 303 Committee and is now asking the 303 Committee to authorize the passage of an additional [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for the remainder of FY 1969.
3. Factors Bearing on the Problem
a. Origin of the Requirement--This specific proposal was initiated by Ambassador Bunker in a telegram to the Department of State and CIA dated 26 August 1968. It relates to the requirement initially proposed by Ambassador Bunker in November 1967, and approved by the 303 Committee on 1 December 1967, to organize a mass political movement in Vietnam.
b. Relationship to Previous 303 Committee Actions--On 1 December 1967, the Committee approved a proposal to give Ambassador Bunker discretionary authority to stimulate and encourage the evolution of Vietnamese political groups and authorized [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for this purpose.
c. Operational Objective--Our objective is to create a pro-government political front in South Vietnam which is capable of involving and engaging the interest of Vietnamese in the political life of their country, of encouraging unity by providing a vehicle for the concrete expression of widespread opposition to Communist rule, of attracting the political support of all non-Communist political parties in South Vietnam and, in the process, to become an effective competitor to pro-Communist organizations in South Vietnam.
d. Proposal
(1) It is proposed that Ambassador Bunker be given discretionary authority to provide financial assistance to President Nguyen Van Thieu, for support of the Lien Minh, in the following amounts:
U.S. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for the period September-December 1968.
U.S. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for the period January-June 1969.
(2) A total sum of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (of which [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] requires approval of the Committee at this time) would be passed to President Thieu throughout FY 69 in increments and would be used by him to finance the organization of the basic Lien Minh structure and training of political cadre. Ambassador Bunker says that President Thieu sees the Lien Minh as "a political instrumentality which will permit the people to identify more closely with the Government, and would provide a magnet for rallying nationalist sentiment to confront the Communists in the political area in the not too distant future." President Thieu intends to develop a program to permit Vietnamese women to participate in Lien Minh and plans to use the organization as a catalyst for self-help activities. (Note: Although President Thieu was informed that American financial assistance was considered "seed money" and that a larger GVN contribution was expected, the President emphasized his limited financial assets and said that he hoped the Americans "would provide most of the Lien Minh finances.")
(3) [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] working under the Ambassador's direction, would pass funds directly to President Thieu and provide advice and assistance in the use of those funds. The President has appointed one of his key senior advisors as his designee with whom [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to work on the organization (but not the funding) of Lien Minh.
e. Risks Involved
While risks are certainly involved in this endeavor, on balance they do not appear excessive. There should be no direct evidence of U.S. funding. Funds are to be passed only to President Thieu who would be unlikely to divulge their origin. Our Embassy reporting already indicates that Lien Minh insiders are assuming GVN funding of the organization. As the funds are put to use, allegations of U.S. backing are also likely to be made by Thieu's political opposition but in today's Vietnam this sort of comment is not unusual and in fact would tend to contradict more dangerous and widespread charges of U.S. intentions to "sell out" the GVN. Alleged use of GVN funds could lead to charges of corruption against Lien Minh supporters but such allegations would be manageable as the organization becomes a useful and constructive link between the government and the people. Incremental funding, which permits some leverage over the shape and substance of the organizations, should assist in moving Lien Minh toward the intended constructive role and thereby minimize such criticism. Further, as the organization gains momentum it can logically be the recipient of legitimate community development funds. Finally our own intensive [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] coverage of the GVN political scene should give us a constant reading on the risk factor and allow time for remedial steps if it grows to critical proportions./4/
/4/In telegram 38284 from Saigon, September 20, Bunker reported Thieu's statement that "he is not in a hurry to call for general support for the Lien Minh" in order to have adequate time to find the right people to lead the organization and to avoid the appearance of creating a personal political party. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 13 VIET S)
f. Support Required from Other Agencies
None.
g. Timing of the Operation
[1 line of source text not declassified] Ambassador Bunker's direction when it is endorsed by the 303 Committee.
4. Coordination
a. U.S. Departments and Agencies--This proposal was discussed with Assistant Secretary Bundy and Mr. Rostow on 26 August 1968, and they have approved in principle.
b. U.S. Ambassador
Ambassador Bunker initiated this proposal to the Department of State and the CIA on 26 August 1968.
c. Host Country
President Nguyen Van Thieu has solicited U.S. financial and advisory support for this operation.
5. Recommendation
In the national interest, discretionary authority is requested for the Ambassador to spend U.S. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for support and development of Lien Minh and its projects for the remainder of FY 1969. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would be expected to report periodically to the 303 Committee on the actions taken and funds expended in implementation of this proposal. While additional funds are likely to be necessary beyond FY 1969 every effort will be made to obtain legitimate alternative funds from Vietnamese sources or, at least, to encourage the Vietnamese to raise on their own funds sufficient to mask the American contribution and give the Vietnamese a sense of having a direct personal stake in, commitment to and identification with this activity./5/
/5/A memorandum for the record, September 5, by Peter Jessup of the 303 Committee staff, recorded the minutes of the 303 Committee's meeting of September 3. According to this memorandum, during the meeting Bundy "made a few comments in support of 'getting something moving in a direction considered vital.' He said there were admitted risks but pointed out we were dealing with people we trust, with professional talent, and that putting all the eggs in Thieu's basket was preferable to a separate funding of factional groups." Both Rostow and Nitze agreed with the recommendation subject to higher-level approval. The Committee approved the measure. (National Security Council, 303 Committee Minutes, 1968) However, Clifford expressed reservations about the scheme and it was not immediately approved. (Memorandum for the Record, October 3; ibid.) The Bureau of the Budget was unwilling to release the funds without Clifford's approval. (Memorandum for the Record by Bohlen, October 9; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, East Asia Country File, Vietnam (Lien Minh) 1968) Although a decision on the dispersal of full program funds was put off until the next administration came into office and until Thieu came up with a firm proposal, on November 25 Rusk, with the concurrence of President-elect Richard Nixon's transition representative Robert Murphy, authorized Bunker to dispense an additional [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for the Lien Minh as a stop-gap measure. (Memorandum from Bundy to Rusk, November 25; ibid.)
345. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey/1/
August 31, 1968, 10:18 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Humphrey, August 31, 1968, 10:18 a.m., Tape F6809.01, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. The President was in Texas. He spoke with Nixon at 9:30 a.m. and with Rusk at 9:55 a.m. prior to calling Humphrey. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) In a conversation with the Vice President 2 days earlier, the President made the following remarks: "The best thing we can do together is try to get you peace before November. Now, you have laid the groundwork with the platform. Be careful, don't say anything, it runs away from it. But let us then go into Hanoi and say, 'Now, goddammit, you're not going to get anything better from Humphrey. He's going to be worse. Let's get peace.' You wrap that up, you'll have a landslide." (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Humphrey, August 29, 1968, 10:41 a.m., Tape 6808.03, PNO 4-5) Humphrey had accepted the Presidential nomination of the Democratic Party on August 29.
Humphrey: I think you'll find that on our Vietnam situation that the platform resolution is not only supported but--I met with the Newsweek and Time people, and that bothered me. I said I thought that the biggest contribution made to the campaign was both that Mr. Nixon and myself both say that our positions on Vietnam were so close together that the enemy should understand that the President receives our combined support and that the foreign policy on Southeast Asia was not going to be, as far as Vietnam is concerned, a matter of public debate or of public differences. And I think that we can somewhere along the line get that kind of thing out, maybe together./2/
/2/During a telephone call from Harriman in Paris, Bill Moyers, a former Presidential aide, noted: "There won't be any change in policy here for awhile. The platform plank is in accordance with the President's wishes." In response to Harriman's question as to why he had not tried to arrange a compromise, Moyers replied: "Some of us did. We went to the VP and suggested a compromise between the minority report and the majority report, but they were not interested in a compromise. It seems to me, Governor, that the Humphrey forces had decided that they were going to take their stand as close as they can to Nixon in the belief that no one can cut back from the Left. Nixon is not going to get any support from the Doves, so he thinks he is not going to make the war an issue but campaign as close as he can to the Nixon position." (Memorandum of telephone conversation, August 31; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Subject File, Elections, Campaign--1968, General) In a congratulatory note to Humphrey written that day, Harriman offered to return to Washington and meet with Humphrey and his advisers in order to provide as much assistance as possible to the Vice President's campaign. (Letter from Harriman to Humphrey, August 31; ibid., Humphrey, Hubert H., 1963-1968)
President: I had suggested to Rusk--we had talked about the possibility, when we could, of maybe getting a joint statement from Humphrey and Nixon to Harriman to say to Hanoi that you better get on with the business of making peace without killing a lot of extra people, your own, you're losing them by the thousands, and a good many of ours that you've stepped up the last few days. You just must not count on this political year division. We're going to be united at the water's edge, and I'm authorized by both the Vice President and Nixon to say to you that there's going to be no division that you can exploit between now and this election. We think that a carefully worded statement of two or three sentences that Harriman could say to them quietly without a threat might save a lot of lives. If they harden, as they're appearing to do, nobody can tell, the date's now September the 2nd, then we must harden. We've got to meet it.
Humphrey: Well, I think that'd be helpful. I really do. I think it'd do away with any kind of trepidation. I think that if somebody'd like to quietly take the initiative on it and get it done.
President: Well, I'll have Rusk talk to his people and get a couple of sentences up and I'll be talking to both of you.
Humphrey: I think that would be very, very good for us.
President: I'll be talking to both of you a little later.
Humphrey: All right, sir.
President: Okay.
Humphrey: Thank you. Bye bye.
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