Delivery System - Annex B

2.1 Al Samud Program

In 1993, Iraq began developing liquid-propellant ballistic missiles. The program began as the Ababil-100 liquid-propellant missile program, which later became known as the Al Samud. This missile was based on SA-2 and Scud technology and manufacturing techniques; it was monitored closely by the UN. Research and development continued until 2001 when the program was terminated and replaced by the Al Samud II.

Figure 3. Al Samud short diagram.
Figure 4. Al Samud long diagram.

*Parameters are known to be inconsistent.

2.2 Al Samud Static Test Data

Figure 5. Al Samud Flight tests (1997-2000).

Figure 6. Al Samud flight tests (2001).

2.4 Al Samud II Static Test Data

2.5 Al Samud II Flight Test Data

Figure 7. Al Samud II flight tests.

2.6 Al Samud II Missile Material Balance

ISG believes that a complete material balance for the Al Samud II missile may not be possible due to various factors. Documentary data indicating the total number of missiles produced have not been recovered by ISG and the disposition of the missiles is unknown. However, a very good estimate of the total number produced can be achieved based on the knowledge that the Iraqis had a production rate goal of 10 per month, according to an official in Iraq’s missile program. This rate varied month to month due to availability of parts. The missile began production in late 2001 with the first 10 being delivered to the Army in December 2001. Assuming these production figures were maintained between December 2001 and December 2002, ISG believes a likely total of 130 Al Samud II missiles may have been produced during this period. According to a former senior official at Al Karamah, Iraq produced approximately 20 missiles during the first quarter of 2003. Another source claimed that, after UNMOVIC inspectors departed the country in March 2003, Iraq was able to assemble about 4 Al Samud missiles from remaining parts, which had been placed in mobile trucks to avoid destruction. These 24, in addition to the 130 previously mentioned, yield a total of 150 Al Samud II missiles produced.

According to multiple sources, Iraq expended up to 27 missiles during experimental tests (flight and static tests). Beginning 1 March 2003, UNMOVIC began a destruction program, which accounted for 72 missiles destroyed. ISG have obtained information given in Table 6, which shows serial numbers associated with 62 of the 72 missiles destroyed. However, the dates of destruction do not appear to correlate to those dates provided by the UNMOVIC spokesman during the period of destruction. According to reporting, Iraq launched five Al Samud II missiles during OIF. Table 7 details some of the additional al Samud subsystems destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision. Coalition forces may have been responsible for the destruction and recovery of up to 15 missiles based on available data. According to a foreign government service, two Al Samud II missiles were taken to Iran.ISG has not been able to confirm this claim. Taking these figures into account, ISG has developed possible scenarios for material balance for the Al Samud II missile given in Table 6.

The Liquid Fuels Committee (LFC)

2.7 Liquid-Propellant Material Balance

Closure of the material balance for liquid propellants is extremely difficult because of the amount of regeneration due to the effects of aging on propellants. The records kept concerning regeneration do not make reference to the sources of fresh material acquired in the regeneration process. Instead, they provide only an input-output picture.

The Liquid Fuels Committee (LFC) was initiated in August of 2000 to analyze performance capabilities for various propellants, research techniques for producing candidate chemical propellants or their pre-cursors, and study synthesis routes and manufacturing capabilities of various companies. Through studies of companies and capabilities, the LFC awarded contracts to companies to begin manufacturing. The projected production capabilities were 50 tons/yr of Di-methyl amine (DMA), 20 tons/yr of DETA, 50 tons/yr of TEA, and 50 tons/yr of xylidine. Schematics of liquid-propellant production and research are shown in Figures 8 and 9. This production when combined with the imported quantities of propellant far surpassed the requirements of the Al Samud II program. A schematic materiel balance of the liquid propellant used for the Al Samud II program is shown below in Figures 10 through Figure 12, with the production or sources along the top, above the total and consumption along the bottom of each table.

Figure 8. Liquid-propellant production.

Figure 9. Liquid-propellant research.

Figure 10. Oxidizer materiel balance (1995-2003).

Figure 11. Fuel materiel balance (1995-2003). 

Figure 12. High-energy propellant materiel balance (1995-2003).