DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 20, 1994


MEMORANDUM FOR:       G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director

COPIES:               Board Members

FROM:                 J. Kent Fortenberry

SUBJECT:              Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant Interim Actions

1.  Purpose:  This report summarizes interim actions being pursued at the
    Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant.  This information is based on a
    facility visit conducted by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
    (DNFSB) technical staff (Fortenberry, Grover, and Gubanc) on October 5-
    6, 1994, which also included a visit to the K-East Basin.

2.  Summary:  The Plutonium Finishing Plant is awaiting results of an
    Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to decide future actions at the
    facility.  In the interim, actions are being taken to address immediate
    safety concerns and to improve the facility condition.  Safety concerns
    being addressed include stabilizing and repackaging reactive plutonium-
    bearing material, reducing operator exposure, and verifying container
    integrity of highly corrosive plutonium solutions.  Facility condition
    improvements being pursued include reducing contamination areas,
    increasing available glovebox storage capacity, and improving cleanliness
    and appearance.  These interim actions provide an additional benefit of
    helping to maintain proficiency, morale, and general facility readiness.

    Except for the Plutonium Reclamation Facility canyon and most of the
    gloveboxes, the Plutonium Finishing Plant appeared clean and well kept. 
    Discussion with operators confirmed a sense of pride and ownership in the
    facility.  The interim actions being pursued at the Plutonium Finishing
    Plant can be contrasted with the K-East Basin, where there is little
    evidence of efforts to improve the facility condition and readiness while
    waiting for future actions to be identified. 

    A significant interim action being pursued at the Plutonium Finishing
    Plant is the thermal stabilization of plutonium-bearing sludge and
    residue.  Attachment I describes this activity.  Specific technical staff
    observations concerning this sludge stabilization process are included as
    Attachment II. 

3.  Background:  The Department of Energy (DOE) had intended to restart
    portions of the Plutonium Finishing Plant to stabilize the large inventory
    of plutonium bearing materials (solutions, sludge, scrap,  etc.). 
    However, public input into this proposed stabilization campaign convinced
    the DOE to change its plans and to prepare an Environmental Impact
    Statement (EIS) to consider potential future actions.  This EIS is due to
    be completed in August 1995.

4.  Discussion:  Because of the decision to perform an EIS, the Plutonium
    Finishing Plant was faced with a significant delay in cleanup activities. 
    Rather than wait idly for the EIS record of decision, several interim
    actions were developed to address immediate safety issues and to improve
    the facility condition.  These interim activities are using existing
    resources in planning, engineering and conducting various nuclear
    materials handling activities.  Some of the interim actions are identified
    below.

    Aqueous solutions used during a recent training run (about 1500 liters of
    less than 1 gram/liter plutonium nitrate - 475 grams Pu total) were
    diluted and transferred to the Tank Farms.  Disposal of this solution
    reduced the possibility of leakage, operator exposure, equipment
    degradation due to corrosion, and operator surveillance requirements.

    Organic solutions used during a recent training run (about 250 liters)
    were packaged and sent to the central waste complex.  Disposal of this
    solution reduced corrosion of equipment and the possibility of leakage.

    Twenty-seven 10-liter containers of highly corrosive plutonium-bearing
    chloride-fluoride solutions were x-rayed to confirm inner container
    integrity.  Preparations are nearly complete for transferring this
    material to the Plutonium Process Support Laboratory for testing.  This
    testing will be used to develop processing alternatives for remaining
    plutonium and uranium nitrate solutions.

    Portions of the facility have been cleaned and decontaminated.  The duct
    level rooms and the tunnel areas have been cleaned of loose smearable
    contamination and reduced from a Surface Contamination Area (SCA) to a
    Radiological Controlled Area (RCA).  Plutonium bearing duct work is being
    removed to reduce radiation exposure to plant personnel, to reduce the
    inventory of seismically dispersible plutonium, and to prepare certain
    areas for decontamination and decommissioning.

    Low plutonium content sludge has been cemented and transferred to the
    central waste complex.  This reduced the number of sludge items and freed
    storage space for future cleanup activities.  In addition, high plutonium
    content sludge will be stabilized in a furnace and then placed in vault
    storage.  Attachment I discusses this sludge stabilization activity in
    more detail.

5.  Future Staff Actions:  The DNFSB technical staff will continue to follow
    activities at the Plutonium Finishing Plant, including the high-plutonium
    content sludge stabilization.  DOE's record of decision from the EIS will
    of course influence future staff actions.