South Korea Current Issues

Ambassador Hill's Speech to Korea University Journalism Alumni Society (KUJAS)

Ambassador Hill
Speech at Korea Press Center
to KUJAS (Korea University Journalism Alumni Society)

Feb 18, 2005

INTRODUCTION: Mr. Ambassador, I would like to express our sincerest thanks for accepting our invitation. We know that this is an important time for you and us. We are very pleased to have you here today. (Applause)

(KUJAS Awards Ceremony)

INTRODUCTION: Now Ambassador Hill will give us an opening speech. Please welcome Ambassador Hill. (Applause)

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well thank you, thank you very much. I want to warn you that I may actually take six minutes and not just five. First of all, it's great to be back here in the Press Center. The last time I gave a speech in the Press Center was in September and I made a very successful baseball prediction, and I know that's why so many people have come today. They want to hear my predictions for the new baseball year.

I don't want to disappoint you but it is too early to do that.

Let me say though, what a great pleasure it is to be invited today by the Korea University Alumni Journalists Association. President Keum, you have done a great job of keeping this alumni association so active and engaged. I know that this is a very big year for Korea University, it's their centennial year. I had the privilege of speaking at Korea University a few months ago. I think every graduate of Korea University should be very very proud of what the university has accomplished. If I could give President Euh some assistance on the issue of fundraising, let me tell you alumni that when you get those letters, read them carefully and be generous. (Laughter)

I know that journalism is a very tough profession. It's first of all not a profession for people who are making to look a lot of money. That's the first thing that's very clear.
Secondly, it's not a profession for people who do not want to work hard because to be a journalist is to work very hard and I can see some of that right in front of me right this minute. This also very much reminded me about yesterday when I left on a daytrip to China early in the morning and sure enough, I found journalists who found out which airplane I was getting onto and were there to get an interview. When I got back late last night, when I was very tired and not really in a mood for an interview, nonetheless I found journalists there again trying to do their jobs. So I know this sense of professionalism and dedication doesn't just happen by accident. It depends very much on the success of these journalism schools and once again I want to congratulate Korea University.

Now I know some of you are interested in what I did between those two interviews. Let me just say, I had a very, very good trip to China and it was a great opportunity to meet my counterparts in the Chinese government dealing with the Six-Party Talks.

Since I was named to be the U.S. representative to the Six-Party Talks, I've reached out to my counterparts, and going to China was part of that process. What I want to do is make clear that the United States is very dedicated to finding a diplomatic solution. We are absolutely dedicated to making this process work. If this process does not work, it will not be because we haven't, the United States hasn't, devoted enough energy to it, or enough imagination to it. Those will not be the reasons, because we will absolutely devote energy and imagination in a real sense of trying to get through this difficult problem.

I cannot tell you with certainty that this Six-Party Process is going to work. I cannot make that promise. But, I do believe that this Six-Party Process is a process that's going to bring our partnership closer together. It's going to bring the United States closer together to the ROK. It's going to bring us closer together to China, and closer together to Japan and Russia. I can assure you that this process, at the end whether it is successful or not with regard to the question of North Korea, it will be successful in bringing these partners closer together.

With respect to the North Korean nuclear issue, there is a real logic to finding a diplomatic solution. It makes sense for everybody including North Korea. The DPRK has made a big mistake to develop these nuclear programs. The threat to the DPRK comes from their inability to develop a successful economy, and these programs have cost them greatly and have contributed to their economic decline.

We will try to help them overcome this mistake. We will try to construct an agreement that will enable them to get out of the nuclear weapons business and into the business of trying to develop their economy and trying to integrate with the rest of the world, which is the only outcome that any person should want for the DPRK. But to help them, they are going to have to help themselves. The first issue they need to do is come to the table.
We look forward to them coming to the table. We will be ready. We will be prepared. We will be ready in the spirit of looking for an agreement.

So with those opening comments and, I'm afraid I have exceeded my time, I look forward to hearing your questions.

MODERATOR: Ambassador Hill just mentioned that he will do his utmost to make the Six-Party Talks a success. Now we will go to a Q&A session and each of our panelists will be giving their question to Ambassador Hill. Mr. Lee Sung Joon, will you please begin?

QUESTION: I would like to first thank you for your informative remarks. Now as you mentioned, I understand that you returned from Beijing last night and you must be very tired. Despite of that, you have come to participate in our breakfast meeting and I would like to thank you for that. Now I'm sure my colleagues will ask a lot of questions to you but my question will be very brief. When you visited China yesterday, I understand you met with Li Xiauxing and also the minister of the central liaison department of the party, Wang Jiarui and many other prominent figures in the Chinese government. Now what do you think is the real intentions of the Chinese government? You mentioned about a peaceful negotiation or reaching a peaceful agreement, your hopes for reaching a peaceful agreement. But, what do you think is the true intention of the Chinese government right now?

AMBASSADOR HILL: First of all, the nature of my visit there was to meet my counterparts. This was a first opportunity to meet them and the fact is, my first visit to Beijing. We had a very good discussion about the Six-Party Process and there was absolute agreement on the need for North Korea to come back to the process.

The Chinese authorities were very clear that they are pressing for the DPRK to come back and that they absolutely share that goal of ours. We also agreed that just bringing the DPRK back to the process doesn't really strengthen the process. It's just a starting point and not an ending point. We discussed issues that we might actually do inside the process, but, stressing the fact that we need to conduct diplomacy across a table and not through press releases.

I was very pleased with the visit. I look forward to comparing notes with my counterpart, Ambassador Song Min Soon, who coincidentally was in China on the very same day I was there.

QUESTION: Two questions sir. I would first like to thank you for participating in this event despite your busy schedule. Now, I am giving you these questions not only as the Ambassador to Korea but also as the head delegate for the Six-Party Talks. The United States has continuously emphasized the role that the ROK must play in this process because you have mentioned, the U.S. has mentioned, that the Republic of Korea would be the most directly affected country by any movements from North Korea. I think that there is a difference of perception in the nuclear capabilities of North Korea. The South Korean side, according to the South Korean intelligence agency, believes that North Korea only possesses around one or two very obsolete, not that state-of-the-art type of traditional nuclear arms, whereas the CIA believes that if North Korea has its nuclear weapons put on a taepo dong missile, then this could even reach the United States. So how does the United States assess the nuclear capability of North Korea? I'd like to hear your view as the head delegate for the Six-Party Talks. My second question is, since there is such a difference between even the top intelligence agencies of the two countries, then isn't there a gap here in information sharing? Do you agree that information sharing is not taking place smoothly?

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well, the only gap in information sharing is that, I, as a diplomat, I'm not going to discuss intelligence reports with journalists. That will be a gap. (Laughter)

Let me say that, of course, different analysts draw different conclusions as to the precise number of materials that can be used for weapons, etc. There are different conclusions about this.

But I think everybody, virtually everybody can agree that the DPRK has a nuclear weapons program and they have the intention of building nuclear weapons, if not actual success in building nuclear weapons.

I think it's pretty clear that whatever the actual quantitative difference is, that everyone agrees that having such programs is unacceptable and that those programs need to be stopped and dismantled.

I see no justification for those programs and I think, in the context of the negotiations, we can convince the DPRK side that it needs to do away with those programs.

QUESTION: Going back to your trip to China, you said that you had good talks with your Chinese counterparts. But, what is the specific role that the United States expects from the Chinese side? For example, I believe that you mentioned that China would continue to pursue persuading North Korea, but do you know what kind of a card China will use to persuade North Korea to come back to the table? What would that specific card or specific role be? Also, did you request for China to stop its support to or aid to North Korea? The second question is, there has been a lot of talk within the United States about the ROK's aid towards North Korea. For example, the issue has been linked to the Kaesong Industrial Complex or providing fertilizer has been linked to the recent declaration by North Korea that it possesses nuclear weapons. So what is the stance of the U.S. government on the ROK providing support or aid to North Korea?

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well, first of all, I think that anyone who knows any history at all knows the special circumstances that the ROK has with respect to the DPRK. It's not for me as a foreign diplomat to lecture the ROK on what it should do with its neighbor the DPRK. What we do need to do is to coordinate our approaches and to make sure that the DPRK does not try to exploit any differences among any of the partners in the Six-Party Process.

I think the Six-Party Process is a very broad platform on which a number of structures and approaches can be put together. We don't have to have identical actions but we do have to have coordinated actions. Now, China also has a rather special relationship with the DPRK and that is a relationship that, in our view, can be used to help encourage the DPRK to be serious about the negotiating process. We are very satisfied that we share the same goals that China shares and repeatedly, my Chinese (counterparts) yesterday made very clear that they are absolutely dedicated to having a Korean Peninsula free of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons programs.

My flower keeps falling out of my pocket. I don't know if that's symbolic or what? (Laughter)

But really, as I said earlier, I really think this Six-Party Process has a lot of potential, not only for solving this difficult issue in front of us but, ultimately, for bringing us closer together and for helping us maybe construct structures in the future that will serve the region very well.

For those people who've worried so much about the various formats - "Should it be bilateral talks? Should it be four countries? Should it be three countries? Should it be five countries?" - I think it's pretty clear the Six-Party Process is quite capable of handling all kinds of formats. Format is not our problem.

QUESTION: I feel that it is quite unfortunate that your tenure here as Ambassador to Korea will be so short but, I do expect that you will play a very important role when you go back to the United States so we have high hopes for you. When you first arrived to Korea, I asked you who was your favorite ambassador previously for American Ambassador to Korea and you said Habib and Gregg. But if you contribute to leading the Six-Party Talks to a successful conclusion, then I think that you will be recognized as the most favorite U.S. Ambassador to Korea by the Koreans. (Applause)

We look at this statement released by the North Korean Foreign Ministry and I believe that it has in it the North Koreans' determination to pursue a true give-and-take with the second Bush Administration. Now during the third round of Six-Party Talks in June, the United States presented a very specific proposal to North Korea. But, to bring back North Korea to the table, to the talks, is there any intention on the U.S. side to make that proposal a little more realistic, a little more creative?

AMBASSADOR HILL: I think it was a pretty comprehensive proposal and it seems to me the next step would be for the DPRK to tell us what they like about it and tell us what they don't like about it. So, I would think the sequence of events would be that they would sit down at the table and say, well, we've read your proposal and we would like a little more detail on this point. Then we would respond with some more detail or some explanation. I think that would be a more fruitful approach than to have a situation where we are guessing what it is they want in order to come to the table and then we end up negotiating with ourselves essentially.

I'm sorry to sound so boring and technical and maybe even like a lawyer on this, but that's really what this is about. They should read our proposal, come to the table, and tell us what they think about it.

QUESTION: (first part of question is cut off) … But if it refuses, then what will you do? Will you use force?

AMBASSADOR HILL: Thank you for those earlier comments by the way. (Laughter)
They were very kind but I somehow knew they would be followed by tough questions.
Look, I'm not going to speculate. I think the Six-Party Process is the way to go and I hope the North Koreans will see it that way and figure out how to come back to it as soon as possible.

AMBASSADOR HILL: It makes sense for us and believe me, it makes sense for them.

QUESTION: I would like to ask the following questions which are somewhat related to the previous question. Since the armistice was signed in 1953, North Korea has continuously tried to have direct talks with the United States, leaving out the ROK and other countries. Now this is perhaps North Korea's way to try to make the armistice into a peace treaty so that it will conclude the war on the Korean Peninsula. My thought is perhaps North Korea had agreed to participate in Six-Party Talks before because it wanted to use it as a way to get the United States to hold direct talks. But recently North Korea declared that it will indefinitely suspend its participation in the talks and also declared that it possesses nuclear weapons. My first question is, what is the view by the U.S. government on the true intentions of North Korea? How does the U.S. government assess true intentions? That is the first question. The second question is, North Korea has continuously been leaking information that it still wants direct talks with the United States. Now, if that is why it had not directly demanded that the Six-Party Talks would be dismantled forever. So the second question is, after the February announcement by North Korea, were there any under the table talks between the United States and North Korea? Third question is, during his State of the Union Address, President Bush mentioned just one sentence about North Korea saying that he wished a peaceful resolution of the situation, which is quite different from his first term. Has there been a change in the U.S. government's policy towards North Korea?

AMBASSADOR HILL: First of all, with respect to direct talks, we've had discussions from time to time with the North Koreans. I'm sure we'll have discussions in the future but we are not going to have those discussions in a way that could undermine the Six-Party Process. Nuclear weapons programs are not just our problem, they're everybody's problem.

I know there is a sense among some analysts that somehow the North Koreans feel that the Six-Party Process results in too many countries being against North Korea. In fact, I think the whole world would like to see North Korea give up those nuclear weapons programs. So my point is, it's not the Six-Party Process that has isolated North Korea. It's North Korea's own policies that have isolated North Korea.

As for North Korea's true intentions, look I'm not a psychiatrist, I'm just a negotiator. I think there's a real logic to these negotiations. I think it's as important to North Korea as it is to the rest of us because holding nuclear weapons is a dead-end for North Korea. They cannot make progress if they continue on this road.

One other comment on the format. I understand when you don't make progress on substance, everybody focuses on the format, but I really want to emphasize that I don't think we have a problem with format. We have a very broad platform in this Six-Party Process and that platform should enable us to handle whatever format we need to get this problem solved.

The longer the DPRK stays out of this process, the more united we become in our understanding that the problem here is the DPRK, not us.

QUESTION: Three questions. Despite the February 10th declaration by the DPRK, the ROK government said that it will consider continuing its humanitarian aid to North Korea and the most imminent question would be what would happen to the fertilizers? It seems that the ROK government wants to continue to provide that. However, we have heard that Undersecretary Wolfowitz had requested that South Korea not send the fertilizers, so can you verify this? The second question is, the United States is trying to continuously persuade North Korea to come back to the table but people are wondering what will happen if North Korea continuously stubbornly refuses and does actually indefinitely stay away from the talks. Does the United States have any alternative plan if that scenario takes place? The third question is, people are also wondering, if there is a deadline for the U.S., when will the U.S. continue to persuade North Korea and do you have a deadline for stopping?

AMBASSADOR HILL: I think I'm going to have to disappoint you here on all three questions. I said earlier that the Republic of Korea has some special responsibilities and some special circumstances toward the Korean people in the DPRK. I'm certainly not going to be giving advice to the Republic of Korea when they receive requests for fertilizer. Again, I think it's very important that we coordinate various initiatives and we coordinate our approaches to the DPRK. I can tell you we are coordinating very, very well between the United States and the ROK.

Now on your second question about the sort of hypothetical circumstance, what if the North Koreans don't come to the table? Obviously we'll have to look at the circumstances and evaluate where we are, but I don't like respond to hypothetical questions like that.

And the same with the question of the deadline, I really don't want to get into a deadline. I think what we want to do right now is to get going on the talks and see where we can go. I'm just trying to maximize our chances to reach a negotiated settlement. If you find sometimes my answers to your questions not adequate in terms of my specificity, please bear in mind I'm simply trying to enhance the prospects for success of the Six-Party Process.

QUESTION: Because you are answering our questions very carefully, we could think that perhaps your answers are a little bit, perhaps not enough, but still we do understand your position. My question will be very brief. Recently, President Roh Moo Hyun mentioned that North Korea's possession of nuclear programs or weapons could be understood, might be understood, as could be understandable, as its way to obtain self-defense capabilities. Can you understand that kind of remark by the Korean president?

AMBASSADOR HILL: I understand why you're asking that. (Laughter) Let me say that the United States and the ROK have a very fundamental agreement on the fact that these nuclear weapons programs in the DPRK are unacceptable.
QUESTION: You seem to be a true diplomat as you are showing us your ability to pass through a minefield without stepping on any mines. My question is about the U.S. and ROK special measures agreement, the contributions. Now in the mid and long-term perspective, the United States has set to plan to increase the South Korean's contribution to 75% of the total, but this year alone, the U.S. has asked for South Korea to pay $770 million dollars. However, the financial burden might be too big for South Korea, as it is involved in a number of issues such as dispatching troops to Iraq and the relocation of the Yongsan garrison and also the LLP. Don't you believe that this request by the U.S. side is a little too excessive? The contributions a little too much?

AMBASSADOR HILL: My understanding is these negotiations are ongoing. I don't think it's appropriate to discuss ongoing negotiations. I am sure that the two delegations will find a mutually acceptable arrangement that will be an arrangement both sides will feel meets their interests. But thank you for asking me a question that is not related to the Six-Party Talks. (Laughter)

QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you very much for this opportunity. I am the visiting professor at Korea University and the former KBS-Washington bureau chief. I ask this question. If North Korea eventually would not come back to the Six-Party Talks, and also eventually not abandon the nuclear ambitions, as one of the options against this North Korean attitude, can you consider the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons within South Korea? As many as the number of the North Korean nuclear weapons? Instead of South Korean, South Korea's own nuclear development of deterrence of the North Korean nuclear weapons?

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well, let me say that is an extremely hypothetical question.
Really, it's a question I must say that I have really not thought about. Please bear in mind I'm just a simple negotiator trying to get through a tough negotiation here.

QUESTION: I'm Professor Ahn Yin Hay at the International Studies Department of Korea University. Now as you returned from Beijing just last night, I returned after one year of a study course at Beijing University just last week. I think that when we think about the influence China could have on North Korea, we have to separately regard China's ability or determination as a separate issue. Now the South Korean Ambassador to China once said that there are 15 roads or railroads that connects China to North Korea. He had said just think what would happen if we blocked three of them? What would happen? Is China considering this significant, or the special relationship that China has with North Korea, I think that China's ability or China's determination or intentions in this process are another separate matter that we have to look into, focus on separately. My question here would be, what do you think is the will and capability of the Chinese?

AMBASSADOR HILL: First of all, I think it's an excellent question to ask the Chinese government. In my discussions yesterday with the Chinese representative, he was very clear that we share the goal, first of all, we share support for the Six-Party format. Secondly, we share the goals of the Six-Party format.

We also agreed that all of us, all five of the participants who are now attending the process, should do everything they can to encourage the sixth, that is the DPRK, to return to the process. Some countries have more leverage than others with the DPRK, but every country should do everything they can to bring them back to the talks, and not necessarily rewarding them for coming back to the talks, or convincing them to come back to the talks.

MODERATOR: Finally, Korea University journalists, United States Ambassador to Korea Christopher R. Hill, thanks to you for your noble efforts for promoting the Korean-United States friendly relations and peace in Northeast Asia and around the world as well as expressing our respect for your speech and amicable discussion and our breakfast meeting today. We invite you to become an honorary member of the Korea University Journalist Alumni Society, February 18, 2005.

(Applause)

MODERATOR: Now let's hear a few comments from Ambassador Hill about today's meeting and ceremony.

AMBASSADOR HILL: There's nothing more I can tell you. (Laughter) Except that I do have to get back to the Embassy because I haven't been there in a couple of days and my desk is full of papers. I have a lot of work to do there.

Let me just say, it has been a great honor, truly a great honor to be here today to share this occasion with Korea University Alumni Association, Journalism School. You do great work. The Korean press is about as active and busy and energetic as I've ever seen any press corps anywhere in the world. I think Korea University can take some credit for that. (Applause)