Chapter 8
The Changing Speakership
Ronald M. Peters, Jr.
Regents' Professor, Carl Albert Research and Studies Center and
Department of Political Science, University of Oklahoma
The speakership is a unique office due to its dual institutional and
partisan functions. On the one hand, the Speaker of the House is its
constitutionally designated presiding officer. As such, the Speaker has
an obligation to preserve the prerogatives and respect the integrity of
the House as a whole and of all of its Members without regard to party
affiliation. The Speaker's main parliamentary obligation is to enable
the House to perform its legislative functions. To the office is
entrusted the responsibility to facilitate the legislative process so
that the Congress can perform its constitutional role. On the other
hand, the Speaker is the leader of the majority party and is responsible
for offering political and policy direction, attending to the electoral
needs of Members of his own party, and enabling his party to gain or
retain a legislative majority so that it can press its policies into
public law.
In the 30 years since the reform movement of the early seventies, the
speakership has undergone substantial change. The evolving character of
the office has demonstrated two tendencies: a shift in emphasis from the
parliamentary role of presiding officer to the political role of party
leader, and a shift in attention from legislation to events external to
the legislative process. This change can be easily illustrated by
contrasting the way that Speaker Carl Albert (D-OK, Speaker from 1971 to
1977) and current Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-IL) allocated their time.
Albert presided over the reform movement. A protege of Speaker Sam
Rayburn (D-TX), Albert bridged the transition from the pre-reform to the
post-reform eras. He straddled the transition from the old order to the
new, but his orientation toward the speakership was distinctly
traditional. Albert was well known for a punctilious attendance on his
duties as presiding officer, recognizing Members to speak, ruling on
points of order, and so forth.\1\ He was often to be found in the chair,
and felt that it was the best place to be if one wanted to feel the
pulse of the institution, as Members knew where to find him and would
frequently come to visit with him. When not presiding, Albert was
typically to be found in his office, arriving at 7 each morning and
usually not leaving the building until the early evening. His attendance
at political functions was intermittent, and participation in
fundraising events was rare. Albert did initiate some changes consistent
with the new order. He proposed a legislative agenda, was the first to
use an ad hoc committee to process legislation, the first to utilize a
party task force to define a party position, and the first to hire a
full-time press secretary. Nonetheless, Albert recognized his obligation
to fulfill the Speaker's parliamentary role. This was clearly
illustrated in his approach to the impeachment proceedings for President
Nixon and the handling of Vice President Agnew's resignation, during
which Albert was insistent that no partisan advantage be taken.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Speaker does not preside over the Committee of the Whole House,
where most amendments to legislation are considered. He does preside
over the House itself on final consideration of legislation, unless he
chooses to name a Speaker pro tempore. Speaker Albert usually did not
name a Speaker pro tempore unless he was unable to preside for some
reason. Speaker Hastert routinely appoints Speakers pro tempore.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Speaker Hastert's schedule is fuller and his days perhaps even longer
than Albert's, but his time is spent differently. He is rarely in the
chair. Instead, his time is spent in an endless series of meetings with
members of the extended leadership group, members from various
committees working on pending legislation, various factional
organizations within the Republican conference, staff meetings to
develop legislative strategy, meetings to set strategies for upcoming
campaigns and elections, and of course, the meetings, phone calls,
receptions, and trips necessary to sustain the legislative party's
fundraising base. Whereas Speaker Albert had his primary residence in
Washington, DC, Speaker Hastert maintains his primary residency in his
Illinois district, and spends many weekends at home there.\2\ Speaker
Albert rarely traveled to campaign or to solicit campaign funds; Speaker
Hastert visits scores of legislative districts each year, and is his
legislative party's primary fundraiser. When Hastert was elected Speaker
it was anticipated that he would take a different approach to the office
than had his predecessor, Newt Gingrich (R-GA). Gingrich had offered
himself as a national leader of the Republican Party and wanted to use
the speakership as a platform for his policy positions. He was also the
field general of the Republican revolution, raising money and
campaigning for Members. Hastert, in contrast, was to be a ``man of the
House,'' returning the House to ``regular order,'' and respecting the
prerogatives of the committees. When we consider how Hastert spends his
time, however, it looks a lot more like Gingrich than like Albert.
Hastert travels often, has raised more money than Gingrich did, and is
deeply engaged in both legislative and political strategy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Jonathan Franzen, ``The Listener,'' New Yorker, Oct. 6, 2003, pp.
84-99.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
How did the speakership evolve from Albert to Hastert, and what have
been among the most important aspects of this transformation serving to
define the speakership today? To address these questions, we first
discuss the political context that defines the speakership today. Then,
we consider the changing character of the Speaker's role within the
legislative process, the ``inside game.'' Third, we characterize the
increasing external demands on the Speaker, the ``outside game.''
Fourth, we assess the relationship between the Speaker's internal and
external role in the context of what has been called the ``permanent
campaign.'' Fifth, we consider the Speaker's important relationship to
the Presidency. We conclude by considering the effect on the speakership
of political party and the personal characteristics of individual
Speakers.
The Political Context
In a stable, democratic regime the process of change often occurs so
incrementally that we do not take note of the changes until they have
already occurred. Occasionally, of course, there is a sharp break with
the past. Such was the case when the reform movement fundamentally
realigned the power structure in the House, empowering the Speaker and
diminishing to a degree the power of the committees. But we can now see
that the changing character of the speakership was not due to the
changes wrought by the reform movement as much as it was to an
underlying realignment in American politics. The reformers themselves
did not foresee this. They were liberal Democrats who wanted to break
the grip of the southern, conservative committee chairs of their own
party; but they certainly had no notion of empowering Republicans.\3\
They wanted to strengthen the speakership because this would serve their
own policy goals; but they had no desire to create a ``czar'' for the
House. The liberal Democrats believed that the majority of the American
people supported their policy positions, and that a more open and
accountable legislative body would embrace those policies; they did not
anticipate that the more open and accountable process could be accessed
by conservative Republicans whose aim was to drive them from power. But
this is in fact what happened.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Burton D. Sheppard, Rethinking Congressional Reform (New York:
Schenkman, 1985).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The realignment in the American political system that brought about
the transition from a Congress dominated by the Democrats to one that,
albeit narrowly divided, is at present under Republican control, took a
full generation to materialize. It began with the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 which, as President Johnson well understood, opened
the door to the South to the Republican Party. It was delayed for 20
years in part because the Watergate scandal enabled the Democrats to
seize and subsequently to hold a substantial number of previously
Republican districts in the elections of 1974 and 1976. It culminated in
the election of Republican House and Senate majorities in the 1994
election. By the 2000 election, the American people appeared to be about
evenly divided in their support of Democrats and Republican; but the
constitutional structure gives more square miles to the GOP, with the
Democrats piling up substantial majorities in congressional districts
that are stacked on the two coasts and in the big cities of the Midwest.
With population shifting to the South and Southwest, and with the
conversion of the South from Democratic to Republican control, the
political landscape has been radically transformed since the reform
movement in the House of Representatives. One result has been the
``homogenization'' of the two parties.\4\ Most Democrats and Republicans
now hold safe seats. As the two parties have sorted out the districts,
each party has become more ideologically homogenous. Democrats are more
solidly liberal with a small and dwindling number of conservatives;
Republicans are now more solidly conservative with a small and dwindling
number of moderates. Thus, two evenly divided congressional parties face
each other across a wider ideological chasm. There are two principal
consequences of this: first, each party must place greater emphasis on
elections in order to hold place; second, the majority party (presently
the Republicans) must gather legislative majorities from within its own
ranks since it can anticipate few, if any, crossover votes from the
minority (now the Democrats).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ David W. Rhode, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The House of Representatives was a main battleground of this partisan
realignment. Beginning with the election of 1978, a new generation of
younger, more conservative, and more confrontational Republicans came to
the House determined to bring to the House a Republican majority.\5\
Their leader was Newt Gingrich. During the eighties, Gingrich and his
allies in the ``Conservative Opportunity Society'' sought every
opportunity to challenge the Democrats--their policies, their leaders,
and their management of the House. The Republican's goal was to turn
seats held by Democrats into seats held by Republicans. This Republican
onslaught forced the Democrats to take defensive measures in both the
legislative and electoral processes. Legislatively, the Democrats sought
to use their majorities to control the House agenda in order to prevent
the Republicans from forcing floor votes on politically inspired
amendments. This greatly enhanced the role of the Speaker and the Rules
Committee as agents of party governance. Electorally, the Democrats
sought to strengthen their fundraising capacity, candidate recruitment,
and electoral strategy. As their leader, Speakers O'Neill, Wright, and
Foley became increasingly engaged in electoral activities. These
activities were not confined to a campaign season, but instead extended
through the calendar year with planning for the next election beginning
as soon as the current election was over.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Dan Balz and Ronald Brownstein, Storming the Gates (Boston: Little
Brown, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the Republican triumph in the 1994 elections, party control of
the House of Representatives has been up for grabs. The Republican 26-
seat majority was initially expanded by the recruitment of five party-
switching Democrats, but then dwindled with the elections of 1996 and
1998 to establish the very narrow Republican House majority we observe
today.\6\ In the description of Michael Barone:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ At the outset of the 108th Congress there were 229 Republicans, 205
Democrats, and 1 Independent who organized with the Democrats.
The United States at the end of the 20th century was a nation divided
down the middle. In 1996, Bill Clinton was re-elected with 49.2 percent
of the vote. That same year, Republicans held the House, as their
candidates led Democrats by 48.9 percent to 48.5 percent. In 1998,
Republicans again held onto the House, as their candidates led in the
popular vote by 48.9 percent to 47.8 percent. On November, 7, 2000--
although the final result was not known until 5 weeks later--George W.
Bush won 47.9 percent of the vote, and Al Gore won 48.4 percent. The
same day, House Republican candidates led Democrats by 49.2 percent to
47.9 percent.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Michael Barone, ``The 49 Percent Nation,'' National Journal, June 8,
2001, pp. 1710-1716.
Congressional redistricting pursuant to the 2000 census has reinforced
the current stalemate. The term limits movement reached its zenith in
the late eighties and early nineties when it appeared that the only
incumbent Members of the House likely to be defeated were under
indictment or the shadow of scandal. In 1988, only six incumbents were
defeated. The stability of incumbency provided little basis for
anticipating the Republican victory in 1994. Rapid turnover marked the
elections of 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1996. Not only were the two parties
narrowly divided, but average seniority plummeted as long-serving
Members retired or were defeated. Given the close competition for
control of the House one might have expected that a pattern of regular
turnover, incumbent vulnerability, and changes in partisan control might
have emerged. Instead, the House has become as stable as it was before,
even though it is more narrowly divided. In the 2000 redistricting,
Republicans and Democrats worked at the state and national levels to
create safe-seat districts for incumbents with the result that only a
few dozen House seats are competitive in a typical election year. In the
2002 congressional elections, 96 percent of incumbents were
reelected.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The effect of redistricting is not only to secure safe seats for
incumbents; it also has the effect of tying those incumbents to primary
election voters who are typically more partisan than general election
voters. This accentuates the partisanship in the House. Previously,
safe-seat incumbents had more leeway to vote against the leadership; now
they have less. For a recent discussion see Jeffrey Toobin, ``The Great
Election Grab,'' New Yorker, Dec. 8, 2003, pp. 63-80.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, the political context in which the speakership functions today
is defined by a stable but narrow division between the majority
Republicans and the minority Democrats. Should the Democrats succeed in
electing a majority of Members in a future election, it seems very
likely that their majority would be as narrow as that which the
Republicans now enjoy. The result is that the two parties continuously
contest power, policy, and politics. This has occasioned new roles for
the Speaker both within the House and external to it.
The Inside Game
The reform movement offered new power and influence to the Speaker.\9\
The most significant change under the rules of the House pertained to
bill referral. The Speaker was empowered, in 1975, to offer multiple and
sequential referral of bills to committees in order to facilitate
consideration of legislation that cut across the jurisdictions of the
standing committees. Committee chairs could no longer stand behind
jurisdictional claims in order to delay legislation or dictate its
terms. More important changes occurred within the rules of the
Democratic Caucus. The Speaker was given real control over the Rules
Committee, naming its chair and designating the majority members, making
it for the first time since the revolt against Speaker Cannon in 1910 a
reliable arm of the leadership. This meant that the Speaker would be
able to control terms of floor consideration for bills and could keep
legislation off of the floor entirely by denying a rule. The power of
naming Democrats to committees was transferred from the Democratic
Caucus of the Ways and Means Committee, which held this responsibility
since the days of Champ Clark and Oscar Underwood, to the party's
Steering and Policy Committee, several members of which were named by
the Speaker. The Steering and Policy Committee also made nominations to
the Democratic Caucus for committee chairs. Within the committees, a
bidding process was established for selecting subcommittee chairs,
further eroding the power of the committee chairs. These changes
dramatically strengthened the power of the Speaker vis-a-vis that of the
committees and their chairs, as the reformers intended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Sheppard, Rethinking Congressional Reform. See also Ronald M.
Peters, Jr., The American Speakership, 2d ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins, 1997), pp. 146-208.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These changes also placed demands upon the Speaker. No longer could a
Speaker sit back and allow others to decide committee assignments, chair
appointments, bill referrals, and the terms of floor consideration. Now
the Speaker had to take a hand and take a stand. Sam Rayburn had been
happy to avoid these choices because he knew that it would thrust him
into the middle of conflicts between the southern conservative and
northern liberal wings of his party. This is precisely what happened to
Tip O'Neill, Jim Wright, and Tom Foley. The initial effect of the
reforms occurred within the Democratic Caucus as the policies of the
Carter administration divided the Democrats along ideological and
regional lines.
Tip O'Neill's use of legislative task forces to forge floor majorities
was a response to the more diffuse legislative environment but also to
the underlying cleavages among Democrats. O'Neill found it necessary to
draw upon the powers of the speakership to shape the context of
legislation. The multiple referral of bills meant that compromise would
have to be brokered across committee and subcommittee jurisdictions. The
Speaker and his staff had to become involved early rather than late in
the legislative process. The Speaker's control of the Rules Committee
meant that he could shape the terms of floor consideration, including
the determination of amendments to be made in order. Structuring floor
consideration provided opportunities to negotiate compromise by enabling
some amendments and not others. The use of task forces to press for
passage of key bills or amendments provided a mechanism to push through
the compromises that had been made. Thus, the Speaker's role in the
legislative process became much more pervasive.
In addition to changes that empowered party leaders, there was also a
countertendency during this period toward greater autonomy of individual
Members. Tip O'Neill's most famous aphorism was that ``all politics is
local.'' Political science ratified this discovery when it found that if
you wanted to understand the Congress you had to understand the
relationship between Members and their districts.\10\ In the seventies,
a new breed of representatives was identified, comprised of Members who
were found to be more autonomous and more entrepreneurial, the ``new
American politician.'' \11\ The decentralization of power in the House
reflected the aspirations of such Members. Members learned to work their
districts by a range of techniques that included good old-fashioned
constituency service, pork barreling, extensive use of the frank,
regular trips to the district, occasional townhall meetings, and other
novelties such as ``representation vans,'' mobile offices that traveled
the district.\12\ These techniques were developed first by younger
Democrats elected in the post-Watergate landslides, and they enabled the
party to consolidate its control as many Democrats hung on to previously
Republican districts. This was good news for Democratic Speakers. But
other aspects of the new politics were not so good. Under the terms of
the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1974, Members could receive campaign
contributions from individuals and newly defined ``political action
committees.'' This development enabled enterprising Democrats to
establish independent and secure funding for their campaigns. The result
was that Members became less and less dependent on the political parties
and the party leadership. If all politics is local, then the tug of
constituency would pull Democrats away from centralized party positions
and make coalition-building more difficult. That was the challenge that
Tip O'Neill faced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Richard Fenno, Home Style (Boston: Little Brown, 1978); David R.
Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1974).
\11\ Burdette Loomis, The New American Politician (New York: Basic
Books, 1988).
\12\ Fenno, Home Style.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The inside game is affected by outside forces. The political terrain
fundamentally changed with the election of Ronald Reagan and a
Republican Senate in 1980. During the Carter administration, the Speaker
was asked to play offense, building majority support for Democratic
bills. Now, O'Neill was on the defensive. The House of Representatives
was the last bastion of the Democrats facing the Reagan onslaught. Faced
with the real possibility of losing the House, Speaker O'Neill sought
means of building greater discipline within the Democratic Caucus.
Whereas during the Carter administration O'Neill had occasionally let
the chips fall where they may, he could not take that risk when faced
with Republican proposals. The Republicans were to hold the Presidency
for 12 years. For 6 of those years, the House of Representatives was the
only branch of the government controlled by the Democrats. Reaganism
would be stopped there or not at all.
The implication for the Speaker's management of the House was twofold:
on the one hand, control of the House agenda was now critically
important; on the other hand, the balance of power now lay with the
southern Democrats who had organized into the ``Conservative Democratic
Forum.'' O'Neill had to reach out to these conservatives while still
maintaining the support of liberals in opposition to the Reagan
proposals. During the first year of the Reagan administration Tip
O'Neill lost these battles as the southerners, shaky in their districts,
jumped ship to support Reagan. Thereafter, O'Neill was more successful
in holding the caucus together behind Democratic alternatives. He always
lost some Democratic votes, but was able to hold a sufficient majority
of the party on several key votes. Examples include 1981 votes on the
Voting Rights Act Extension and on the Labor/Health and Human Services
Appropriation bill, and 1982 votes on emergency housing aid, Medicare
funding, and an override of President Reagan's veto of a supplemental
appropriations bill.
The techniques that he used were not by then new but were used to new
effect. An example is the use of the Rules Committee to structure floor
debate. During the Carter administration O'Neill was less concerned with
losing votes than with politically inspired Republican amendments
designed to force Democrats on the record on controversial issues. Now,
he had to worry that Republicans might carry comprehensive substitute
amendments or motions to recommit bills to committee with instructions,
another method of substituting Democratic bills with Republican bills.
Thus, in the early eighties the House Rules Committee, led by
Congressman Richard Bolling (D-MO) introduced the use of ``King of the
Hill'' rules by which the House would consider a series of comprehensive
budget proposals, including bills offered by liberal Democrats, by
conservative Democrats, by the Congressional Black Caucus, and by the
Republicans, along with the bill proposed by the House Budget Committee
on behalf of the leadership. The last bill to pass was to be adopted
even if it had fewer votes than a previously considered proposal.
Naturally, the leadership bill was voted on last. This strategy aimed to
give as many Democrats as possible a vote to take home and a vote that
really counted, leaving the Republicans to cavil about the process.
Stringent control of process was the key device. The Democrats had
increasing recourse to modified rules that limited the number and nature
of amendments that could be offered. They sought to prevent Republicans
from offering competitive proposals or amendments that were designed to
force Democrats from conservative districts to cast hard votes. But
their main goal was to develop legislative alternatives that could
gather support across the party spectrum. This became more important
after the 1986 elections returned the Democrats to power in the Senate.
Now, the Democrats could force the action by passing party bills that
Presidents Reagan and Bush would have to sign or veto. While Republican
Senators could still mount filibusters, the Democrats had more leeway to
craft bills that could command majorities in both houses of Congress.
This created a need for even broader intra-party communications. The
response of Speakers O'Neill and Wright was to preside over the
development of an elaborate organizational system that included an
expanded Steering and Policy Committee, an enlarged whip organization,
more extensive use of task forces, and new efforts to utilize the
Democratic Caucus as an avenue for policy development and intra-party
dialog. These collaborative venues and mechanisms aimed to build
consensus among Democrats in order to enact Democratic legislation.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Peters, The American Speakership, pp. 209-286; Barbara Sinclair,
Majority Party Leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); Barbara Sinclair,
``Tip O'Neill and Contemporary House Leadership,'' in Roger H. Davidson,
Susan Webb Hammond, and Raymond W. Smock, eds., Masters of the House:
Congressional Leadership Over Two Centuries (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1998), pp. 289-318.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The culmination of these trends occurred in the 100th Congress under
the leadership of Speaker Jim Wright.\14\ This Congress was among the
most productive in recent American history, and its agenda was set and
driven by Speaker Wright and Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-
ME). In the House, Wright used all of the tools that had evolved under
Speaker O'Neill, but did so with more determination and insistence.
Wright set the policy agenda, gave direction to committees, set
deadlines for committee consideration of bills, and used the tools of
floor control to ramrod bills to passage. Using this legislative
juggernaut (and the fact that the Democrats were in some cases spreading
benefits to Republican districts), the Democrats pushed to enactment a
number of bills with bipartisan support. Many House Republicans chafed
under the Democratic thumb, equally resentful at the Democrats and at
President Bush for his unwillingness to stand up for conservative
principles. Bush signed an extension of the Civil Rights Act as well as
major environmental bills that included provisions that many Republicans
opposed. Many perceived his worst offense was reneging on his pledge
against new taxes as part of the budget negotiations of 1990. House
Republicans initially balked, thus repudiating their own President.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ John Barry, The Ambition and the Power (New York: Viking Press,
1989); Barbara Sinclair, ``The Emergence of Strong Leadership in the
U.S. House of Representatives,'' Journal of Politics, vol. 54, no. 3,
Aug. 1993, pp. 657-683.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A key moment for Speaker Wright occurred in October 1987 when the
House was considering the budget for the fiscal year already underway.
The stock market had plunged and there was an atmosphere of panic on
Wall Street if not in Washington. Wright felt that it was imperative
that Congress act to adopt a budget. However, when the Speaker lost the
vote on the ``rule'' from the Rules Committee making the deficit
reduction bill in order for consideration, he employed a rare tactic
that would permit another ``rule'' to be taken up on the same day
without having to obtain the required two-thirds vote. (The rule book of
the House requires ``rules'' to lay over one day before they can be
considered on the floor unless that requirement is waived by a two-
thirds vote of the House.) Wright took the extraordinary step of
declaring the current legislative day adjourned, and declaring a new
legislative day in session. He then called for a new vote on the second
rule, which was adopted by the House. When, again, the Democrats were
one vote short, Wright held the vote open until a vote was changed. When
the voting board showed a majority for the Democrats, Wright declared
the vote over.
This episode played into the image of Wright as a heavy-handed
politician that many Republicans were trying to convey to the public
with their relentless assault on his ethics. And no doubt Wright's
actions were extraordinary and unusual. But this episode offers only a
dramatic example of an underlying tendency toward the use of procedural
control that had evolved since the reform movement and certainly
throughout the eighties. Wright used his formal powers to control
legislative procedure and used his influence to pressure Members to
support the party position. Wright's specific actions were sometimes
controversial, but the principle underlying them was not: the Speaker
was responsible for the party's agenda.
With Wright's resignation in 1989, Tom Foley (D-WA) became Speaker.
Foley was well suited to the challenges facing him in two respects.
First, he was a seasoned product of the new leadership, richly
experienced in the techniques of intra-party coalition building that had
evolved under O'Neill and Wright. Second, he took very seriously his
obligation, as Speaker, to restore a sense of comity across party lines.
Wright's resignation, however, only served to whet Gingrich's appetite,
and the Republican attacks on the Democrats' administration of the House
continued. Internally, the Republicans challenged Democratic management
of the House bank, restaurant, and post office. Externally, they called
for term limits. Foley sought to defend the House against these
institutional attacks, arguing that the vast majority of Members were
serious, competent, and ethical. Foley also opposed term limits on
constitutional grounds.
The Democrats might have survived the 1994 elections were it not for
key strategic decisions made early in the Clinton administration.
Congressional reform had been an issue during the 1992 campaign, and new
Democratic Members elected that year pressed the leadership to pursue an
internal reform agenda. Speaker Foley and other party leaders looked
back on the experience of the seventies and drew two lessons: reform is
always divisive and the failure to govern is usually fatal. During the
first half of the seventies the Democrats fought each other over reform
issues. During the second half of the seventies, they fought with the
Carter administration over policy issues such as health care cost
control. The chosen path now was to put reform on the rear burner in
order to unite behind an economic program in support of the Clinton
administration. This strategy led the Democrats to a major tax increase
in 1993 that passed with no Republican votes, and led the Democrats away
from any effort to address the internal reforms demanded by Republicans
and the new Democrats.
This contributed to the election of a Republican majority in 1994 and
a new Speaker in the 104th Congress, Newt Gingrich. It immediately
became clear that the Republicans intended to manage the internal
administrative and legislative affairs of the House very differently
than had the Democrats. With respect to administration, Speaker Gingrich
sought to professionalize and, where possible, privatize management. He
took control of the Office of House Administrator, which had been
created by the Democrats in the wake of the scandals at the House bank,
restaurant, and post office. This led to a tussle with the House
Administration Committee, the venue for Member control of administrative
process. Gingrich initially won this battle and was able to implement a
series of major administrative reforms, including the elimination of the
Office of Doorkeeper and the professionalization of the Office of
Sergeant at Arms. Eventually, Gingrich's hand-chosen administrator came
under attack by the House Administration Committee, and was fired. The
House Administration Committee reasserted its prerogatives.
With respect to legislation, Gingrich and his leadership circle were
determined to make sure that, under Republican control, the committees
would be subordinated to the party leadership. They placed a three-term
limit on service as committee chair and a four-term limit on the
speakership. Term limits greatly enhance the power of the Speaker
relative to the committee chairs. Speaker Gingrich also assumed the
power to appoint several committee chairs, abandoning seniority in some
important instances, and approved some of their senior staff. Proxy
voting in committees, which had been an important resource for
Democratic chairs, was abolished. With the committee system firmly in
control, he nonetheless proceeded to bypass the committees entirely in
moving key elements of the Republican Contract with America. Ad hoc task
forces were appointed to develop legislation. These task forces
sometimes worked in cooperation with lobbyists. The Democrats, members
of the committees but not of the task forces, were essentially cut out
of the legislative process.
Gingrich's conception of the speakership was essentially
parliamentary, although he conflated the role of Speaker and Prime
Minister. Under the British Constitution, the Speaker of the House of
Commons is thoroughly non-partisan. Those appointed Speaker remove
themselves from partisan politics not just during their tenure in
office, but permanently. They fulfill what we have here termed the
``constitutional'' function of presiding officer. Party leadership is
left to the Prime Minister who, when supported by a majority of party
members, is able to dominate the legislative process. The Prime Minister
also serves as Chief Executive. In a parliamentary system, there is
greater party discipline and bills are more likely to be passed along
party lines. Gingrich, as Speaker, saw himself as the leader of the
congressional party and as a national political leader for the
Republicans. As discussed further below, he sought to stand toe-to-toe
with the Presidency. With respect to internal House governance, he
sought to gather the strings of power in his own hands. Surrounded by a
rather narrow leadership circle (the Speaker's advisory group), he
sought to dictate strategy and in some cases the terms of legislation.
This is not to say that he was not consultative; the task forces,
extensive communications operation, and extended leadership staff
structure, along with the weekly meetings of the Republican conference,
provided ample opportunity for Member input. But Gingrich did not want
to be constrained by an autonomous committee structure.
The momentum generated by the 1994 election and the novelty of the
Republican takeover of the House sustained this powerful leadership
regime through the 104th Congress even as Gingrich came under attack by
the Democrats for violations of House ethics rules. As Gingrich's
position eroded, his various leadership mantras (listen, learn, help,
lead) appeared less salient to the needs of Republican Members.
Gingrich's leadership became increasingly problematical for many
Republicans. The 73 new Republicans elected in 1994 were very
conservative, and thought that the Speaker was too accommodating. More
senior Members thought that he was too overbearing. In July 1997 a coup
attempt was aborted. The committee chairs became restive, insisting on
their prerogatives. After the Republicans lost 8 seats in the 1998
election, 1 of them, Appropriations Committee Chair Robert Livingston
(R-LA), announced his candidacy for Speaker. Gingrich withdrew from the
contest and announced his planned resignation from the House. Then, in a
surprising development, Livingston himself resigned. In a crisis, the
Republicans turned to Chief Deputy Whip Dennis Hastert of Illinois as
their new Speaker.
Hastert wanted to return the House to ``regular order,'' by which he
meant that the committees would resume their legislative functions. This
led some to an impression that Hastert was more like Foley, if not
Albert. Others suggested that Republican Whip Tom DeLay was the more
influential member of the Republican leadership team. With DeLay's
election as majority leader in the 108th Congress, he has been widely
regarded as exercising more influence than previous majority leaders,
possibly suggesting a relationship between Hastert and DeLay similar to
that of Speaker Champ Clark and Majority Leader Oscar Underwood. This
perception of DeLay's power often comes from the Democratic side of the
aisle. It is important to focus on the role that Speaker Hastert
actually plays. The speakership remains more powerful under him than it
was under any of his Democratic predecessors. While Hastert is not in
the dominating position that Gingrich, for a time, was, he is not
vulnerable to the kind of internal dissension that eventually brought
Gingrich down. He is very popular among Members. Hastert decided to make
term limits for committee chairs stick and then, at the outset of the
108th Congress, his members voted to remove term limits on the
speakership. It seems plain that the Republicans are satisfied with his
leadership. A reasonable depiction of the Republican leadership under
Hastert would characterize the Speaker and his subordinate leaders as
playing different but complementary roles. As Speaker, Hastert is the
glue that holds the Republicans together. He plays a listening,
conciliating role similar to Democratic Speakers such as Tip O'Neill and
Tom Foley. In the inside game, he is the dealmaker and the closer. Tom
DeLay's role is rather different. As whip, he counted the votes and
rallied the troops. As majority leader, he presses for policies
supported by the conservative majority in the Republican conference.\15\
These party leaders appear to be doing about what their job descriptions
require.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ DeLay is also very active in promoting and enlarging the Republican
majority through fundraising and redistricting efforts, important
aspects of the outside game discussed below. See Richard E. Cohen, ``The
Evolution of Tom DeLay,'' National Journal, Nov. 15, 2003, pp. 3478-
3486.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under Hastert's leadership, the Republicans have sought to develop
legislation that almost all Republicans support, and then to ram that
legislation through on the House floor. Initially, the Republicans
sought to avoid using restrictive rules for floor consideration of
bills, but they eventually faced the reality of their situation. With a
narrow majority, party bills have to be protected on the floor against
divisive amendments. The result is that Speaker Hastert has had strained
relations with the Democratic leadership. Democratic Floor Leader
Richard Gephardt did not get along with Speaker Gingrich and it was
anticipated that his relationship with Speaker Hastert would be better.
This anticipation ignored the underlying political reality. The
Democrats want to win back the House and to do so they have to go on the
offensive. This is a lesson they learned from Newt Gingrich. Speaker
Hastert wants to protect his legislative majority and will use the
powers of the speakership toward that end. This has contributed to a
decline in comity in the House observable over the past two decades. It
seems likely to endure so long as the House is relatively closely
divided. The new Democratic floor leader, Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), is moved
by the same imperatives as her predecessor. Perhaps the best that can be
hoped for during this season of heavy political maneuvering is that
Members and party leaders will find a way to depersonalize the fight and
restore to the House its most important tradition, the respect that
Members should have for each other as representatives of their
constituents, the American people. That Speaker Hastert is personally
well-liked by many Democrats is helpful.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Jonathan Franzen, ``The Listener,'' New Yorker, Oct. 6, 2003, pp.
84-99.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The imperatives of the legislative process, however, make it difficult
for the majority and minority parties to work together. Speaker Hastert
has defined his institutional obligation to the minority by two
criteria: the Speaker should rely on the nonpartisan recommendations of
the House Parliamentarians in making rulings from the chair; and the
minority party by rule is entitled to offer a motion to recommit with
instructions. Beyond this, it is the Speaker's obligation to pass
legislation.\17\ When in passing the 2003 Medicare reform bill Hastert
held the vote on final passage open for almost 3 hours (normally votes
consume 15 minutes) in order to round up enough Republican votes to pass
the bill, he was, in his words, ``getting the job done.'' Democrats
alleged abuse of power and fundamental unfairness. Speaker Hastert here
faced a dilemma that defines the speakership today. Any modifications in
the Medicare bill that might have attracted more Democratic votes would
have cost more Republican votes, and any changes that might have
attracted more Republican votes would have lost sufficient Democratic
votes to defeat the bill. The choice was to pass the bill or not to pass
the bill. Hastert defines his obligation as passing legislation. In
this, his attitude is identical to that of his Republican and Democratic
predecessors.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ See Speaker Hastert's comments printed in this volume.
\18\ When asked to define the job of Speaker, John W. McCormack (D-MA)
said that it was the Speaker's job to marshal majorities to pass
legislation on the House floor. Interview with author, July 1979.
The Outside Game
Even as House Speakers have come to play a much more central role in
the legislative process, they have also become much more actively
engaged in the electoral process. When Carl Albert was Speaker, the
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee held one major fundraising
event each year. Political action committees did not exist.\19\ While
the Speaker and other party leaders would from time to time attend
fundraisers on behalf of Members, these usually took the form of
receptions held in Washington and raised relatively small amounts of
money. Speakers had long gone on the campaign trail on behalf of
Members. In the 19th century this was called ``the canvas'' and Speakers
would go ``canvassing'' on behalf of Members in the 2 months immediately
prior to the election. As Speaker, Albert campaigned in Member districts
during the runup to the election, but the number of such appearances was
limited.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Robin Kolodny, Pursuing Majorities (Norman, OK: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Speaker O'Neill was more broadly engaged. He selected Tony Coehlo (D-
CA) to head the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and brought
that position into the inner leadership circle. Coehlo's charge was to
dramatically enhance the congressional party's fundraising base by
bringing in more contributions from corporate and special interest
political action committees. O'Neill permitted Coehlo to schedule him
for party fundraisers and, during the campaign season, for political
appearances on behalf of Democratic candidates in competitive districts.
Still, O'Neill's electoral activities were relatively modest in
comparison to that of subsequent Speakers. In order to understand the
dynamic, it is necessary to shift focus from O'Neill as Speaker to Jim
Wright, his majority leader.
Tip O'Neill had become Speaker before the effects of the Campaign
Finance Reform Act of 1974 were fully experienced. He never had a
leadership PAC and he did not need one. Leadership PACs were developed
by Members who aspired to become Speaker. Through them, the majority
leader, party whip, or key committee chairs could build constituencies
among Members by providing campaign contributions. While Tip O'Neill
preoccupied himself with the legislative battles in Washington, Jim
Wright was seeking to build support within the Democratic Caucus. He
campaigned on behalf of hundreds of Democratic candidates during his 10
years as majority leader. His activities established a norm for
subordinate party leaders that carried into the speakership itself.
Fundraising became a year-round activity. Under Coehlo's influence, the
party leadership took a more active hand in recruiting candidates.
Wright was as, or more, active in this respect as was O'Neill. Wright
knew that when O'Neill retired he might well face opposition in his bid
to become Speaker by rivals such as John Dingell (D-MI) and Dan
Rostenkowski (D-IL), two powerful committee chairmen. Press reports
openly discussed the rivalry between these aspirants. Wright had won the
majority leadership by a single vote in 1976, and he appears to have
concluded that the best means of ensuring his election as Speaker was by
holding more chits among Members. Thus, his fundraising and campaign
activities served his own interest as well as that of the party.
Since the eighties it has become customary for party leaders to
develop their own fundraising PACs alongside their fundraising efforts
on behalf of the Congressional Campaign Committees and individual
Members. These efforts create centrifugal force. Each aspirant to higher
leadership position seeks to build a constituency of Members who will
support a later candidacy. The results can be telling. When the
Democrats first made the choice of their whip an elected position in
organizing the 100th Congress in 1987, Congressman Coehlo was chosen due
primarily to his fundraising activities. He had become an independent
operator within the Democratic leadership group. After the Republican
victory in the 1994 elections, Speaker Gingrich appeared to be in a
position to dictate the terms of party organization. His preferred
choice for GOP whip was a long-time ally, Congressman Robert Walker (R-
PA). Walker was challenged by Congressman DeLay, and DeLay won a closely
contested election. Among the main reasons for DeLay's election as whip
was the investment he had made through his PAC in the campaigns of
numerous Republican challengers. These new Members recognized an
obligation and a relationship to DeLay.\20\ As whip, DeLay was
instrumental in supporting Dennis Hastert's election as Speaker. DeLay
built an unprecedented power base that later led to his election as
Republican floor leader.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ DeLay claimed that 54 of 73 freshmen Republicans voted to make him
whip. Hedrick Smith, The Unelected: The Lobbies, PBS Video, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By all accounts, however, it was Newt Gingrich who transformed
expectations for party leaders, especially the Speaker, in party
fundraising. The tale of Newt Gingrich's rise to the speakership has
been well told.\21\ In leading the Republicans to the promised land
Gingrich recruited and trained candidates, articulated a GOP message,
organized the party apparatus, and campaigned actively. He also raised
money, and lots of it. When Tony Coehlo was raising money for the
Democrats in the mideighties, total spending on House races came to
around $204 million. When the Republicans took the House in 1994, the
figure was $371 million. By 2000, it had risen to over $550 million.\22\
Since 1994, the Speaker has been the most important fundraiser for the
Republicans. Furthermore, the Republican leadership now expects
committee chairs to contribute to the campaigns of Members and
candidates in closely contested districts.\23\ The Speaker, then, is
soliciting even more money than he may raise directly. Gingrich had the
reputation as fundraiser par excellence. But the Speaker's role as
leading party fundraiser is endemic to the office and not a product of
the person. Speaker Hastert was not generally known to be deeply
involved in fundraising during his years as chief deputy whip; but as
Speaker, he has raised more money than did Speaker Gingrich.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Balz and Brownstein, Storming the Gates; David Maraniss, Tell Newt
to Shut Up (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
\22\ Campaign Finance Institute, Web site, http://
www.cfinst.orgstudiesvitaltables3-8.htm.
\23\ On the relationship between campaign fundraising and committee
chair appointments, see Paul R. Brewer and Christopher J. Deering,
``Interest Groups, Campaign Fundraising, and Committee Chair Selection:
House Republicans Play Musical Chairs,'' in Paul S. Herrnson, Ronald G.
Shaiko, and Clyde Wilcox, eds., The Interest Group Connection:
Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington (New York:
Chatham House Publishers, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Speaker's fundraising role has one very specific consequence: he
is asked to travel a great deal. Over a 2-year election cycle, the
Speaker will appear in most, if not all, Republican districts. Today,
the Speaker's obligation to elect and maintain his party's majority
makes it imperative that he travel to districts for fundraising events
and that he campaign on behalf of candidates in closely contested
districts. These obligations, of course, take him away from the Capitol
on a regular basis. While a Speaker will always give precedence to
critical legislative matters, he now may be less able to provide a full-
time leadership presence on Capitol Hill. Speaker Gingrich had hoped to
impose a system of delegated responsibility that would free him to be a
national leader and issue articulator while often leaving legislative
mechanics to subalterns. He was surprised in June 1997 when subordinate
leaders included a politically inspired provision to prevent any future
shutdown of the Federal Government on an emergency flood relief bill
that he supported.\24\ The following month, a group of ``renegade''
Members supported by some members of the leadership group sought to oust
him while he was out of town. It appears that Gingrich had allowed
himself to become too removed from the sentiments of his Members
including his most trusted allies. While Speaker Hastert also relies on
the extended leadership group to facilitate the legislative process, he
is consistently involved in negotiating intra-party agreements. He keeps
his finger on the pulse of the House. Sam Rayburn used to say that if a
Speaker could not feel the mood of the House he was lost. While Hastert
seeks to foster his relationships with Members, he still finds it
necessary to balance his internal and external role, a task made more
difficult by electoral demands.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1997, vol. 53 (Washington:
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1998), pp. 1-14--1-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One aspect of the Speaker's external role is media relations.\25\ As
mentioned, Speaker Albert was the first Speaker to appoint a formal
press secretary. He named a relatively junior member of the staff whose
function was to respond to press inquiries. Speaker O'Neill elevated the
prominence of the press secretary's role in proportion to his own rising
public profile. O'Neill wanted a press secretary who would be in regular
touch with key members of the press corps, a competent spinner who was
adept in presenting the Democratic position and in articulating
O'Neill's own perspective. He settled upon Chris Matthews, later of
``Hardball'' fame. Since then, all Speakers have had press secretaries
who have served in this capacity. Within the extended leadership group,
the focus was on projecting the party ``message'' in contrast to that of
Republican administrations. Under O'Neill, message development was
assigned to the leadership and staff of the Democratic Caucus, but all
members of the extended leadership group participated in defining and
projecting the party's themes. Under Speakers Wright and Foley, the
message function was further elaborated and institutionalized. Each
Speaker had a press secretary responsible for handling the media.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Douglas B. Harris, ``The Rise of the Public Speakership,''
Political Science Quarterly, vol. 113, Summer 1998, pp. 193-211.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In this, as in other respects, the external function of the
speakership took a quantum leap when the Republicans came to power.\26\
Whereas the Democrats had delegated message development to a caucus
working group and the Speaker's press secretary functioned primarily in
support of his media relations, the Republicans sought to systematically
integrate message development and media relations. The Speaker's press
secretary led a staff with responsibility to coordinate message and
media. Each Republican Member designated a communications director. The
Republican conference, like the Democratic Caucus, was given the
outreach function. It included the development of a sophisticated
polling capacity, a state-of-the-art Web site, and an extensive talk
radio initiative. Speaker Gingrich's press secretary, Tony Blankley, was
a sophisticated Washington insider, well connected to the national press
corps. Under his leadership, the Speaker's press relations reached its
zenith and found its limits. For in spite of the greater degree of
organization and more expansive efforts, the House Republicans continued
to lose ground in the public relations battle with the Clinton
administration. In part, this was simply due to unequal resources and
organizational capability. Even though more robust than at any previous
time, the House communications and media operation still paled in
comparison to the scope and sophistication of the White House
Communications Office. The former consisted of a press secretary with a
small staff working in cooperation with over 220 Members who were all
independent operators. The White House had an around-the-clock
communications operation staffed in shifts that was prepared to offer a
Presidential response on any issue within a half-hour. And too, in spite
of Speaker Gingrich's high public visibility, it is the President who
has the bully pulpit and not the Speaker.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Some observers stress the continuity between the Democratic and
Republican Speakers of the post-reform era. See Barbara Sinclair,
Legislators, Leading, and Lawmaking (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1995); Sinclair, ``Transformational Leader or Faithful
Agent? Principal-Agent Theory and House Majority Party Leadership.''
Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. XXIV, no. 3, Aug. 1999, pp. 421-449.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Republican effort under Speaker Gingrich might have been more
productive had Speaker Gingrich better appreciated the risks inherent in
the high public profile that he sought. History demonstrates that
Speakers often become famous at their own risk. In the late 19th
century, Speakers such as James G. Blaine (R-ME) and Thomas Brackett
Reed (R-ME) were dominating figures embroiled in regular controversy.
Blaine came under an investigation for his financial dealings. Reed was
not tainted by scandal but his assertion of the powers of the chair (and
his acerbic wit) made him a ripe target for the Democrats. Uncle Joe
Cannon, of course, represented the apotheosis of the partisan
speakership at the turn of the century and became a campaign issue in
the 1910 elections. From Cannon to O'Neill, no Speaker attained any
great degree of public recognition, much less notoriety. It was said
that Sam Rayburn could walk down most streets in Washington without
being recognized. All of this changed when Tip O'Neill became the
Nation's leading elected Democrat and therefore the primary opponent of
President Ronald Reagan. O'Neill became a symbol of Democratic
liberalism, an icon on the left, but viewed as a relic by the right.
Republicans ran campaign advertisements against him in 1982 and baited
him on the floor in 1985, but it was all to no avail. Speaker O'Neill's
public approval ratings exceeded those of Ronald Reagan when he left
office and he had succeeded in preserving the heart of the welfare state
against the Reagan onslaught.
His Democratic successors had less luck. During the 100th Congress,
Speaker Jim Wright drove the legislative process and moved to
consolidate his power. Recognizing the threat, the Republicans, led by
Newt Gingrich, charged Wright with violating House ethics rules. In June
1989 Wright resigned the speakership and his House seat rather than put
the House through the agony of a floor vote on the ethics charges. His
successor, Tom Foley, was not vulnerable to ethics complaints, but had
opposed a term limits proposition in his home State of Washington. The
Republicans accused Speaker Foley of opposing his own constituents and
funneled money to his opponent in the 1994 elections. Foley lost his
House seat and the Democrats lost their majority in the House and in the
Senate.
Newt Gingrich certainly was aware that two consecutive Speakers had
been dethroned; he, after all, had been part of those efforts. He made
Wright's and Foley's leadership of the House campaign issues and painted
the two Speakers as symbols of what was wrong with the House under
Democratic control. He could not have been surprised, then, when the
Democrats, led by Whip David Bonior (D-MI), chose to repay him in kind,
lodging over 80 ethics charges against the Speaker. The ethics battle
was fought out over the course of the 104th Congress, and culminated
when Gingrich agreed to accept a censure and financial penalty for
having provided false information to the Committee on Standards of
Official Conduct [Ethics Committee]. The resolution of the ethics
charges did not alleviate the pressure on the Speaker. President Clinton
had won a square off with congressional Republicans over the government
shutdowns of late 1995 and early 1996, and during his Presidential
campaign he associated Gingrich and Republican Presidential candidate
Robert Dole with putatively reactionary policies. Speaker Hastert has
maintained a much lower profile than had Speaker Gingrich. He was
largely unknown to the general public when he became Speaker and remains
relatively unknown even now. Hastert's lower visibility represents a
strategic choice. He has had ample opportunity to observe the fates of
his three immediate predecessors, and has yet managed to lead his party
to victory in both the 2000 and 2002 elections. Given the effects of
redistricting, some believe the Republican majority may be secure for
years to come. The Democrats will, of course, strive to win enough seats
to dislodge the Republicans from power. But they are likely to make
little progress by attacking Hastert. The Speaker is popular among those
who know him, and little known otherwise. Amiability and a sense of
personal decency will perhaps enable him to avoid becoming a symbol of
the larger political conflict. Under Speaker Hastert, the communication
operation has centered in the Republican conference and its extended
staff. The Speaker's press secretary, John Feehery, functions more in
the role of Chris Matthews, providing interface between the Speaker and
the press corps. Since Hastert has deliberately chosen a more low
profile role than had Gingrich (or, for that matter O'Neill), Feehery's
role is to make sure that the press knows what Hastert wants it to know
about the Speaker's legislative and political activities. Since the
election of George W. Bush, message coordination with the White House
has become a key component of congressional Republican strategy. The
goal has been to echo, and not drown, the Presidential message.
The Speaker and the President
The relationship between the Speaker and the President has been
historically significant. The U.S. Constitution refers to five officers
of the Federal Government: the President, Vice President, Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, President of the Senate (a position filled by the
Vice President), and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. By
statute, the Speaker stands second in line to the Presidency, and
Speaker Albert twice was first in line, a ``heartbeat away'' from the
Oval Office. Sam Rayburn used to say that he had served under no
President but had served with seven. Actually, Rayburn always
demonstrated deference to the Presidents with whom he served. His ties
to Roosevelt and Truman were particularly close, but Rayburn and Senate
Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson (D-TX) chose to work cooperatively with
President Eisenhower rather than to seek confrontation with him. In
part, this reflected the fact that Rayburn and Johnson straddled the
divide between southern conservative and northern liberal Democrats; but
it also revealed Rayburn's sense of the constitutional obligation of the
Speaker to make the government work. With the election of Richard Nixon,
cooperation between House Speakers and Presidents of the opposite party
ended, and relations between Speakers and Presidents of their own party
has been sometimes strained.
Much of this is explained by the political context. When the Speaker
and the President are of the same party, there will be an incentive to
cooperate, amply demonstrated today by the relationship between Speaker
Hastert and President Bush. Bush relies on the House Republican majority
to set the table for dealings with the more recalcitrant Senate. But
these relations can be strained nonetheless, as witness the experience
of Tip O'Neill and Jimmy Carter. The Speaker at times has a greater
incentive to protect his Members than to support the President, and if
Presidential initiatives put Members at risk, the Speaker might oppose
them. Otherwise, electoral catastrophe may ensue, as apparently happened
when Speaker Foley placed support of the Clinton economic and health
plans above the need to address political and institutional reform.
When the Speaker and the President are political opponents, then most
incentives lead to conflict. The two leaders will differ
philosophically, have different and opposing political constituencies
and party interests, and clashing institutional obligations. The
impeachment proceedings against Presidents Nixon and Clinton suggest the
extremes to which this conflict may be carried, but these are simply the
most obvious manifestations of the underlying tendency. Historically,
only a few Speakers have actually sought to place themselves on a par
with the Presidency. Henry Clay was a national leader during his entire
career as House Speaker and Senator, and as Speaker did not take a back
seat to Presidents Madison and Monroe. Uncle Joe Cannon was perfectly
willing to oppose progressive legislation proposed by President Theodore
Roosevelt, although the number of progressive laws enacted during
Roosevelt's administration testifies that Cannon did not always
obstruct. Most recently, Speaker Gingrich brought to office a very high
expectation of the Speaker's role.\27\ During the 104th Congress, he was
characterized as the most important policymaker in the government. After
Congress completed work on the elements of the Contract with America,
(enacted in fewer than 100 days in symbolic emulation of the New Deal
and Great Society), Gingrich went on national television to speak to the
American people. At a meeting in New Hampshire he conducted a joint
press conference with President Clinton and the two men shook hands over
a pledge to press for lobby and campaign finance reform. Gingrich's
aspirations came a cropper when the Republican Congress mishandled the
budget negotiations with the White House.\28\ Clinton proved that the
Presidency had a louder megaphone than the Speaker of the House. Public
opinion sided with Clinton and Gingrich's approval ratings plummeted,
never to recover. Clinton rebounded from the low point of the 1994
election to win easy reelection in 1996. He survived the Republican
attempt to impeach him, and left office with high public approval
ratings. This record suggests that Speakers need to be very careful when
they take on Presidents. The Speaker can articulate issues and give a
face to the loyal opposition; but the resources available to the
speakership appear to be insufficient to win in a sustained battle with
the White House.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Elizabeth Drew, Showdown: The Struggle Between the Gingrich
Congress and the Clinton White House (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1996).
\28\ In his remarks at the Congressional Research Service/Carl Albert
Center Conference on the Speakership, former White House Chief of Staff
Leon Panetta offered the budget negotiations of 1995 and 1996 as an
example of mistaken political judgment by the House leadership. In
response, Speaker Gingrich argued that by closing down parts of the
government House Republicans had shown resolve that was reassuring to
the financial markets. There is little doubt that public opinion favored
the administration in this conflict. The remarks of Mr. Panetta and Mr.
Gingrich appear in this volume. For an analysis similar to Mr.
Panetta's, see Ronald M. Peters, Jr. and Craig A. Williams, ``The Demise
of Newt Gingrich as a Transformational Leader,'' Organizational
Dynamics, vol. 30, no. 3, 2002, pp. 257-268.
\29\ That Tip O'Neill was successful in fighting a rear-guard action
against Reagan is a conspicuous exception to the generalization that
Speakers will usually lose battles with Presidents, and was certainly
related to O'Neill's favorable public image. For a perspective on the
relationship between Presidents and Speakers, see Jim Wright, Balance of
Power: Presidents and Congress from the Era of McCarthy to the Age of
Gingrich (Atlanta: Turner Publishing Company, 1996).
The Permanent Campaign
The inside game and the outside game are related. Recently, political
scientists have used the term ``permanent campaign'' to describe this
now extended period of close division in the Congress and intense
competition for control of the House and the Senate.\30\ In
understanding the evolving role of the speakership, it is important not
only to understand the role that the Speaker plays in the campaign
process (a ``permanent'' one to be sure), but, as or more important, how
the pressure of electoral politics has reshaped the legislative
environment and altered the Speaker's internal role. Previously, we
described that role and stressed the greater involvement of the Speaker
in the legislative process. The Speaker has become more systematically
involved in all aspects of legislation at every lawmaking stage. In the
context of the permanent campaign, however, we stress the strategic
implications of the Speaker's role and how that has affected the House
and the speakership.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Norman J. Ornstein and Thomas F. Mann, eds., The Permanent Campaign
and its Future (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The permanent campaign is fought over political terrain as narrowly
divided as any in American history. This has evident effects on the
Speaker's role. Sam Rayburn used to say that it was never good to have
more than 269 Democrats in the House.\31\ He felt that an extraordinary
majority made it more difficult to pass bills because Members would feel
more free to defect. Rayburn was certainly aware of the challenges posed
by a very narrow majority as well, but the very narrowness of the
majority may create an incentive for Members to support the leadership.
Between 1931 and 1994, when the Democrats were in the majority for all
but 4 years, their leaders often forged bipartisan coalitions, picking
up some votes from moderate Republicans while tolerating defections from
some conservative Democrats. With the House very narrowly divided, a
small number of defectors can defeat a bill unless there are offsetting
defections from the other side. The permanent campaign, however, offers
an incentive for the minority to rally in opposition in order to create
campaign issues. Furthermore, the homogenization of the parties has made
it less likely that many Members of either party will have a natural
inclination to vote with the other side. Since most Members are safe in
their districts, many could, in principle, defect and survive. But the
minority party leadership will go to extraordinary lengths to persuade
Members to stand by the party position because it will enhance the
prospect of winning control in the next election. That, at least, has
been a discernible pattern for the Democrats since 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ I have this from Rayburn's long-time assistant, D.B. Hardeman. Of
course, the Democrats already had all of the southern seats and so
Members in excess of 269 would come from northern districts and increase
liberal pressure on Rayburn.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The result is that the Republicans have had to build majorities from
within their own ranks. To do so, they have had to utilize all the tools
available to a majority. These include agenda control (deciding what
bills will come to the floor), legislative control (determining what
those bills will contain), procedural control (determining the timing
and rules under which bills will be considered), and membership control
(efforts to ensure that bills can pass with Republican votes alone). As
this pattern suggests, the first and most important strategic decisions
address the nature and substance of legislation. It appears that these
decisions are now made in substantial part based on political
calculation. When, for example, the Democrats pushed for enactment of a
prescription drug bill or a patients' bill of rights, the Republicans
found it in their interest to offer counterproposals. In doing so, they
searched for bills around which their Members could cohere. When the
Republican majority pushed tax cuts, the Democrats sought alternatives
that their Members could support. In this connection, the narrow
majority can be a blessing, since it offers its own incentive for
Members to vote with the party. The quid pro quo is often this: the
leadership structures legislation and the legislative process to give
Members bills they can support; the Members vote for the leadership
proposals provided that their political needs are somewhere addressed.
This is an old formula. With a narrow majority, however, it can lead to
poor legislation.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ When the majority party has a substantial majority, it can pass
legislation even when a number of party members defect due to district
pressure. With a narrow majority the party leadership has to structure
either the legislation, the legislative process, or both so as to bring
aboard almost every member. It may, therefore, include provisions that
it does not really want in the bill and thus legislation can become less
coherent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
And that is the real disadvantage of a government as narrowly divided
as this one is. In a parliamentary regime, with an expectation of party
discipline, the governing party can shape legislation according to its
principles even with a narrow majority. In a presidential system marked
by the separation of powers, the majority party must often place
political consideration above policy substance. The results can be
diluted policy, policy incrementalism, symbolic framing of issues, and
in many cases a failure to act altogether. In addition, the permanent
campaign has affected the legislative milieu. Public discourse has been
coarsened. Ad hominem attacks undermine reasoned debate. Comity, that
ancient norm, has eroded. Fixing these problems is not easy to do,
because both congressional Republicans and congressional Democrats are
so closely tied to their party's base voters and major interest-group
supporters that neither can easily break free. Believing themselves to
be in the right, most Members may not even contemplate the need. But it
is an obligation of the Speaker to remind Members on both sides of the
aisle to do their duty.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ It is difficult for a Speaker to establish comity when he actively
campaigns against incumbent Members of the opposite party. Democratic
Speakers from Rayburn to Foley were very reluctant to do so, and in fact
almost never did. This was due in part to the fact that they usually
enjoyed safe margins in the House, and in part to the fact that the most
vulnerable Republicans were precisely those who were most likely to vote
with the Democrats on key votes. However, there was also a norm at play.
The Speaker, as presiding officer, may choose not to campaign against a
Member on whose motions he would have to rule. Republican Speakers
Gingrich and Hastert both have campaigned against incumbent Democrats.
Personality and Party Culture
This analysis of the contemporary speakership has sought to be
generic, addressing trends and forces affecting all modern Speakers and
both political parties. We must recognize, however, the great impact
that personality and party culture have in shaping individual
speakerships. These effects may seem idiosyncratic and thus beyond the
reach of theory; but any attempt to build theory must at least take them
into account. They are easy to demonstrate.
Consider Democratic Speakers Carl Albert, Tip O'Neill, Jim Wright, and
Tom Foley.\34\ All of these Speakers presided over the reformed House,
and there are many similarities in the way that they did it. All sought
to build legislative coalitions, foster more open and participatory
intra-party processes, establish better media relations, promote more
effective control over the floor, set a policy agenda, and so forth. We
observe a steady evolution from Albert to Foley in which various
leadership techniques are initiated and perfected. Yet any attempt to
evaluate the performance of these Speakers would lead directly to an
assessment of their respective personal characteristics and political
personas. Albert was a dedicated institutionalist who preferred a more
private and lower profile role as Speaker. Some felt that he would have
been better served by a more aggressive posture, but he did not think
that is what a Speaker should do. It is far from clear that a more
assertive Speaker would have presided as effectively over the tumult of
legislative reform, Watergate/impeachment, Vietnam, and civil rights as
Albert did. O'Neill took to the public aspects of the speakership like a
duck to water. He reveled in the limelight, filled the camera, and made
himself into a political icon. Yet although he appeared more forceful,
he was rarely more assertive than Albert had been. He was a strong
supporter of the committee system and defended several senior committee
chairs who were deposed by the caucus. One of O'Neill's greatest talents
lay in the appearance of power. He was the master of what Jimmy Breslin
called ``blue smoke and mirrors.'' \35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ In addition to their remarks published in this volume, these
Speakers speak for themselves in Ronald M. Peters, Jr., ed., The Speaker
(Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995).
\35\ Jimmy Breslin, How the Good Guys Finally Won (New York: Viking
Press, 1975).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jim Wright enjoyed power and he wanted to drive the House toward his
preferred policies. He rolled over Democratic committees, House
Republicans and the Reagan White House in the 100th Congress, became
involved on foreign policy matters respecting Nicaragua, and
demonstrated the assertiveness that Tip O'Neill appeared to have but
rarely used. Yet just for this reason, Wright made himself anathema to
the Republicans, angered many Democrats, and caused some to regard him
as a political liability. There is nothing in contemporary legislative
theory that can explain Wright's assertiveness; it was simply the
product of his character. Tom Foley proceeded differently, but not
because the nature of the speakership required it of him. To be sure,
Foley had been an operator in the Democratic regime for two decades, and
had been a key negotiator for Speakers O'Neill and Wright. But when he
became Speaker, this experience is not what defined his orientation
toward the job. Foley had come to the House in 1964 and was the first
Speaker never to have served with Sam Rayburn. But like Rayburn, he had
a keen appreciation of the traditions and institutions of the House and
he saw it as his role to defend them.
The contrast between Speakers Gingrich and Hastert is evident.
Gingrich saw himself as a great party leader, a modern Disraeli. He had
been a college professor, and he loved to profess his views. He loved
conflict and controversy, and where he could not find these at hand he
often created them. Hastert is a former high school teacher and
wrestling coach. He is experienced and talented in working with people
face to face. He had been an ideal chief deputy whip, and in that
capacity had developed strong personal relationships with Members. He
was often the one to work out the deal to win a wavering Member's vote.
When Speaker Gingrich sought to impose what was in effect a new
institutional order on the House he was acting consistently with his
values, beliefs, and personal ambitions. When Speaker Hastert sought to
return the House to regular order, he was doing likewise. These two
Speakers, both Republican, were as different from each other as their
Democratic predecessors had differed from each other, and the
differences defined their speakerships as much as any underlying
similarities deriving from the institutional context in which they
served, certainly as any biographer or historian would write about it.
But the Democratic and Republican Speakers differed across party lines
as well. Party culture is not easy to define.\36\ Institutional culture
generally refers to a persistent pattern of attitudes and relationships
giving definition to organizational behavior. It is undeniably the case
that Republican speakerships have demonstrated a centralizing tendency
while Democratic speakerships have characteristically been more
decentralized. Institutional and party effects are interrelated. Thus,
during the late 19th century when parties were strong, both Democratic
and Republican Speakers were more powerful than those who served during
the mid-20th century when the committees were ascendent. Still,
Republican Speakers of the partisan era, such as James G. Blaine, Thomas
Brackett Reed, and Joe Cannon were more powerful than their Democratic
counterparts, such as Samuel Randall (PA), John Carlisle (KY), and
Charles Crisp (GA); and during the era of committee dominance Joe Martin
was on occasion more assertive than Sam Rayburn. As we compare the
Democrats under Albert, O'Neill, Wright and Foley, with the Republicans
under Gingrich and Hastert, it is plain that the GOP leadership is
usually more forceful than the Democratic leadership. While all aspects
of the speakership that Gingrich first created have not been sustained
by the Republicans, others have. The Republican Speakers do not simply
behave like their Democratic predecessors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Jo Freeman, ``The Political Cultures of the Democratic and
Republican Parties,'' Political Science Quarterly, vol. 101, no. 3,
1986, pp. 327-356.
Conclusion
Four forces shape the speakership today. The first is political
context, now defined by the narrow division of power between the two
major parties as sometimes affected by a division in partisan control of
our nationally elective institutions. The second is institutional
context: the post-reform House as substantially modified by the
Republicans. The third is party culture, differentiating Democratic and
Republican regimes. The fourth is the character and political persona of
individual Speakers. We cannot now anticipate who might rise to the
speakership in the future, or in what specific circumstances future
Speakers will serve. The path to the speakership has usually been
through the ranks of subordinate party leadership positions. The
advantage of this farm system is that it brings to the speakership
Members who are richly experienced in party leadership; its disadvantage
can be that Speakers are so molded by their prior experience that they
may find it hard to adapt to the changing circumstances in which they
are called upon to lead.
We may ask how might the speakership evolve if Republicans maintain
control in the near future? Most observers have by now concluded that
Newt Gingrich's parliamentary model is ill-suited to the American
constitutional regime. Under Speaker Hastert, the Republicans have
developed a more nuanced party apparatus in which the Speaker plays the
pivotal, if not always the most visible role. The party machinery
usually runs smoothly in the hands of the floor leader, whip, and other
members of the leadership team. In challenging circumstances, the
leadership is usually able to carry its bills on the floor. The
committees now perform their traditional functions, although they do not
function as autonomously from the leadership as had been the case with
the Democrats. Underlying the Republicans' cohesiveness is the basic
homogeneity of the Republican conference. This arises from similar
constituencies and shared ideology.\37\ Their world view sometimes
appears unleavened by conflicting voices from within their
constituencies or from across the aisle. It is an essential principle of
American democracy that representative institutions ``refine and enlarge
the public view by passing it through the medium of their chosen
representatives,'' as Madison put it in Federalist No. 10. This cannot
occur if only some views are brought into consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ To be sure, there are fissures within the Republican conference
arising from matters of policy, constituency, or even ideology. But
these fissures, even though they may generate intense feelings, take
place within a relatively narrow range compared to the historical
diversity that has marked the Democratic Party.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
And what if the Democrats resume control? On the one hand, the party
has learned lessons from its sojourn in the wilderness. They have had
time to contemplate the causes of their defeat in 1994, the challenges
they have faced in trying to regain it, and the methods by which the
Republicans have solidified their narrow majority. The Democrats have
been far more cohesive in the minority than they ever were in the
majority. A future Democratic majority might be narrow, and arguably
would require the same approach to intra-party coalition building that
the Republicans have taken. A strong party leadership would be required.
On the other hand, Democrats are not as cohesive as Republicans,
reflecting the more diverse nature of their constituencies. A sufficient
number of seasoned Democrats remains to give rebirth to a more
autonomous committee structure. Democrats remember that the committee
system is a source of power and influence that served them well for 60
years in maintaining control of the House. It is a rare Democrat who
will say that the party would retain term limits on committee chairs.
Democrats might have more difficulty in maintaining cohesion than the
Republicans have, and may be less willing to cede power to the central
party leadership. That, at least, would be consistent with their
historical practices and party culture.
Whichever party is in power, the key to a successful speakership can
be read in the historical record. Speakers must find a way to balance
their institutional and partisan responsibilities. To create this
balance, it is important that they exercise sufficient power to command
the attention and respect of Members. At the same time, they must be
perceived to be fair. It has proven most useful for Speakers to buffer
their partisan role. Historically, there are two models though which
this can be achieved, one centered in the committees and one centered in
the party leadership apparatus. During the era of committee dominance,
the power of the Speaker was mediated by that of the committee chairs.
During the past 30 years, the power of the Speaker has meshed with an
elaborated party leadership structure. Speakers who have sought to
dominate the committees and the party leadership structure have not
fared well. Speakers who have given the committees and the leadership
structure some lead have been better able to fulfill their dual roles.
The speakership will, in the years ahead, be more central to the House
of Representatives than at any time since the turn of the 20th century.
Speakers will be called upon to offer partisan leadership both within
the Chamber and externally. They will broker deals, raise money,
campaign for Members, define policy positions, and seek to enforce party
discipline. And they must do this without losing sight of their
constitutional role and responsibility. The speakership was created long
ago in England, when the Commons selected one from among them to ``speak
for the Commons'' in Parliament. The Speaker of the U.S. House of
Representatives has the obligation to ``speak for the House'' as well.
All of it.