East
Asia and the United States:
Current Status and Five-Year Outlook
Conference Report
September 2000
The
views expressed in this conference summary are
those of individuals and do not represent official
US intelligence or policy positions. The NIC routinely
sponsors such unclassified conferences with outside
experts to gain knowledge and insight to sharpen
the level of debate on critical issues.
Contents
Introduction
Japanese Attitudes and Approaches
Toward
US Policies and Presence in the Region
Trends in Chinese Assessments
of the United States, 2000-2005
US-ROK Relations: Trends at the
Opening of the 21st Century
Southeast Asian Perspectives
Convergence/Divergence in Political
Interests, Values, and Policies
Economic Interests, Values, and
Policies
The Perils of Being Number 1:
East Asian Trends and
US Policies to 2025
Appendix A: Conference Schedule
Appendix B: Participants
Appendix C: References
Introduction
Southeast
Asia Map
The National
Intelligence Council and the Federal Research Division
of the Library of Congress held a one-day unclassified
conference on this topic on 17 February 2000, at the Thomas
Jefferson Building of the Library of Congress. Seven papers
by nongovernment specialists and 11 commentaries by Intelligence
Community specialists examined:
- The likely
development of greater divergence or convergence between
key East Asian states and the United States over US
policies and interests in the region.
- Whether
divergence or convergence between East Asian states
and the United States was more likely on security, economic,
or political/values questions.
- In what
ways East Asian states would be likely to collaborate
in opposition to US policies and interests.
Sixty US Intelligence
Community, other Executive Branch, congressional, and
nongovernment experts participated actively in discussions
following the formal papers and commentaries, reinforcing
the findings presented below.
Overview
Conference
participants judged that developing trends presage more
divergence between the United States and key East Asian
countries and more difficulties for US policy and interests.
This situation
will come despite continued strong regional dependence
on the US economy and general support for a continued
US military presence in the region. Acknowledging US superpower
status well into the 21st century, regional powers do
not seek to confront the United States militarily or to
cut off advantageous economic ties with the dynamic US
economy. Regional states also will continue to conform
to varying degrees with US-backed international norms
and international organizations. Meanwhile, the ability
of regional countries to work together against US policies
and interests will be offset to some degree by intraregional
rivalries (notably between China and Japan), and by diverging
interests (for example, Southeast Asian agricultural exporters
support US-backed efforts to open world farm markets while
Japan and South Korea remain strongly opposed).
Nevertheless,
growing regional resistance to US policies and interests
is likely. It will be strong and uniform in resisting
expected US unilateral actions, especially regarding political
issues and values such as human rights and democracy,
that will be seen to serve US interests at the expense
of that national sovereignty of regional states. Greater
friction will also arise as a result on an expected downturn
in the US economy, anticipated difficulties in US-China
relations, and greater debate between the United States
and Japanese and South Korean allies over military bases,
host nation support, and other alliance arrangements.
Among possible developments that could seriously worsen
the outlook for the United States, military crises over
the Taiwan Strait or power arrangements in a newly reunified
Korean peninsula are likely to polarize regional opinion,
sharply reducing support for US security policy and regional
military presence.
Determinants
East Asian policies toward the United States will be driven
strongly by the uncertain regional security environment,
the nascent revival of regional economies after the Asian
economic crisis, and trends in international politics
and norms that affect East Asian authoritarian and democratic
governments differently but underline strong regional
nationalistic pride and assertiveness.
Uncertainty
Over Regional Security Trends
After the Cold War, many in the region feared a US withdrawal.
While still present in some quarters, this concern has
been superseded by regional angst over US unilateralism--the
use of political, economic, and especially military coercion
in unexpected ways to achieve goals that in the past East
Asian observers would not have expected to warrant such
a strong US effort. The 1999 US intervention in Kosovo
reinforced this new regional view of US power and unpredictability.
Adding to uncertainty
over the regional security environment are the rise of
China as an economic and increasingly capable military
power; the implications of Japan's stagnant economy for
its regional leadership aspirations and capabilities;
and continuing uncertainty over regional hot spots in
Korea, the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and Indonesia.
In response,
all regional powers are expected to continue actively
"hedging"--using diplomacy, military preparations, and
other means to ensure that their particular interests
will be safeguarded in case the security situation should
change for the worse. Thus, conference participants noted
that they expect the United States to remain in the lead
in this regard, pursuing a policy of engagement with China
while fostering stronger alliances in Asia in case of
Sino-US confrontation. China in turn will continue to
pursue engagement with the United States but also will
strive to develop ties with Russia and others useful in
countering possible US pressure against it. Roughly similar
patterns will develop in Japan's ambivalent relationship
with China, emerging Japanese hedging efforts regarding
the alliance with the United States, South Korea's dealing
with North Korea and other powers concerned with the peninsula,
and the dealings of Southeast Asian countries with China.
While driven by regional security uncertainty, the active
hedging is expected to continue to add to it.
Economic
Recovery
The Asian economic crisis not only hit regional economies
hard but also seriously undermined social stability, challenged
the standing of political regimes whose legitimacy rests
heavily on providing economic growth, and undermined national
security. It prompted widespread popular and elite resentment
over economic globalization and US-backed IMF rescue efforts.
Nonetheless, regional governments have acknowledged the
need to accommodate these trends. Conference participants
expected these governments will continue to recognize
the importance of the US market, investment, and technology
for the economic growth of their nations. Their economic
concerns are pragmatic, focusing on the consequences of
a possible downturn in the US economy in the next few
years, Japan's continued slow growth, and possible intensified
competition between Chinese and Southeast Asian manufacturers
looking to export to the same markets.
Political
Issues and International Norms
Growing international pressures for freer flow of ideas
and information, and the concurrent development of greater
political pluralism, democracy, and respect for human
rights will continue to challenge East Asian authoritarian
regimes. They also will complicate the decision-making
processes in democratic countries like Japan that previously
had been dominated by political elites and now must take
account of a broader array of interest and opinion groups.
Conference
participants expect several regional authoritarian governments
to continue to preserve their prerogatives of power and
resist trends toward democracy. Regional states in general,
however, are likely to accommodate international trends
and norms regarding the freer flow of information, more
open markets, and common efforts to improve the environment
and fight international crime and disease. Their support
for international organizations and regional organizations
likewise probably will continue.
Implications
for the United States
Conference
participants judged that these regional security, economic,
and political trends will cause regional states to diverge
increasingly from US interests and policies in the future.
They acknowledged that the importance of these differences
for the United States will remain offset by the continuing
strong convergence of US and regional interests in two
key areas:
- Regional
states generally support a continued active US security
presence in the area. (China is likely to step up the
pace of its efforts to encourage a US withdrawal over
the longer term, while problems may develop regarding
continuing US bases, notably in Japan.)
- Regional
states want and depend on access to US markets, investment,
and technology.
Anticipated
Problems for US Interests
Security Issues. China will work
against US efforts to strengthen its position in the region.
Notably, Beijing will press against and challenge US support
for Taiwan, US efforts to build missile defenses in the
region, and US efforts to strengthen the alliance with
Japan. It probably will work against a US military presence
in Korea after reunification and will continue to support
South Korea's refusal to be part of the US theater missile
defense efforts in the region. It will seek opportunities
to work with Russia against US security interests in the
region.
Japan and
South Korea strongly support their respective alliances
with the United States and are currently cooperating closely
with Washington in trilateral efforts to deal with North
Korea. Yet, like many other US allies, both Tokyo and
Seoul chafe over the asymmetry in their alliance relationship
with the US superpower. They seek adjustments in the US
military presence that would accommodate their nationalistic
or local concerns. Hedging in response to perceived US
unilateralism and regional security unpredictability probably
will prompt them to diverge from the United States over
China and possibly North Korea.
Southeast
Asian countries see the United States as being much
less committed to Southeast Asia as opposed to Northeast
Asia, and thus their main concern is that the United States
might pull back from the region. They also become concerned
when they perceive the United States and China are moving
toward confrontation, as none of the states see their
interests well served by choosing sides between these
two key powers in such a standoff.
Economic
Issues. Support in the region is broad to resist
perceived self-serving US trade or other economic policies
in international organizations or elsewhere that infringe
on the interests of East Asian countries. Thus, President
Clinton's efforts to promote labor and environmental standards
during the Seattle WTO meeting last November found few
endorsements in the region, while many gloated over the
US embarrassment regarding the chaotic and inconclusive
meeting. Meanwhile, longstanding differences over trade
policies will persist and most likely worsen in the event
a US economic downturn reduces US willingness to absorb
large trade deficits with East Asian countries. Though
most regional governments will go along with the greater
economic opening supported by the United States, authoritarian
states like China will endeavor to curb the free flow
of information, and Japan, South Korea, and others will
try to preserve their protected agricultural sectors despite
US pressures.
Intra-Asian
trade and investment is growing again after the economic
crisis and is likely to promote more efforts at greater
Asian economic integration that exclude the United States.
Japan also can be expected to pursue more actively its
interest in Asian economic mechanisms exclusive of the
West. Japan and others will promote East Asian candidates
for international economic organizations that heretofore
were Western reserves--complicating US policy in these
instances.
Political
Issues and Values. East Asian authoritarian governments
will resist US efforts to press for greater democracy
and human rights in their countries. Such US efforts will
also receive scant support from other regional powers--even
other democracies. Their strong nationalistic sensitivities
and concern over fragile regional stability will prompt
them to eschew support for such "interventionism" except
in extreme cases.
US efforts
to promote its leadership in broader international efforts
to foster US-backed political or other norms may also
meet with resistance, even from US allies. Regional leaders
probably will tacitly welcome failures of perceived overbearing
US pressures in these areas in hopes that such comeuppance
will cause the United States to be more consultative and
collaborative in its policy toward the region.
How Will
East Asian Countries Cooperate Against the United States?
Regional support for continued close economic ties to
the United States and general support for the US military
presence will limit interest in actively working against
US policies in these areas. Moreover, regional powers
probably will continue to be at cross purposes in their
reaction to many US policies and interests. On US theater
missile defense efforts, for example, Japan will continue
support while China will strongly oppose and South Korea
probably will remain on the sidelines in the debate. Japan's
push for an Asian monetary fund and a seat on the UN Security
Council seems to complicate US leadership in Asia--a broad
Chinese objective, but they also work against China's
concurrent objective to curb Japan's regional and global
power and influence. South Korean and Japanese resistance
to US-backed liberalization of agricultural trade is opposed
by agricultural exporters in Southeast Asia.
Regional countries
are most likely to find common ground against perceived
US intervention in symbolic and political areas (for example,
human rights and labor rights) that challenge the sovereignty
and national dignity of East Asian countries. Regional
leaders and commentators also are likely to gloat over
US setbacks in other areas of perceived unilateralism,
if only in the hope that such setbacks will prompt US
policy makers to be more consultative and accommodating
of regional interests in formulating future policies.
What Could
Make Things Worse?
- A serious
US recession would very likely strengthen intransigence
on trade issues on both sides of the Pacific.
- An unmoving
US stance on military bases and related issues would
risk nationalistic backlash in Japan and perhaps South
Korea.
- Heightened
tensions in US-China relations would reduce public support
for the United States by regional countries reluctant
to choose between these two powers.
- A symbolic
but highly visible US policy initiative that fails in
the face of resistance from East Asian governments could
prompt a backlash in the United States, further reducing
US interest in working constructively with governments
in the region.
Among possible
developments that could seriously worsen the outlook
for the United States, military crises over the
Taiwan Strait or power arrangements in a newly reunified
Korean peninsula most likely would polarize regional
opinion, sharply reducing support for US security
policy and regional military presence.
CONTENTS
Japanese
Attitudes and Approaches
Toward US Policies and Presence
in the Region
by
Susumu Awanohara
My task here
is to examine the trends in Japanese attitudes toward
US policies and presence in the region. During 1998-99,
when I freelanced and helped a major Japanese business
publication and a premier Japanese television station,
I was struck by some preconceived notions held by editors
and directors/producers about the situation in the United
States or about American attitudes. Often the journalists
came to the United States not to find out but to have
people act out the prewritten script. These were journalists
in the mainstream, not extremists of any kind. For example,
editors of my publication once wanted me to do a "VIP
interview" (meaning it had to be with someone who is a
big name in Japan as well as in the United States) as
a US angle for a special magazine issue on China. The
interview was to demonstrate that, despite appearance
of tension and friction, the United States and China were
really good friends and were intending to establish a
condominium in the region, isolating Japan. The editors
had in mind a former secretary of state as an interviewee
but I deliberately chose a former ambassador to Japan
who I knew would patiently refute some of the editors'
notions while showing a degree of understanding as to
why President Clinton might have induced the Japanese
to acquire them.
The TV station
I was helping shot several major features on the financial
crisis that gripped the world from 1997 through 1998.
Like the editors of my publication, the TV directors and
producers came with set notions. Clearly, they were more
inclined to blame international liquidity movements--part
of the "casino capitalism" of the West--rather than the
"crony capitalism" of Asia for the Asian currency crisis.
Many TV personnel saw Western conspiracy in the Asian
crisis, although the extent of the conspiracy differed
with each individual. In the extreme, directors and producers
suspected that the US Treasury and the IMF represented
Wall Street's interests:
- Wall Street--with
its advance guard, the notorious hedge funds, leading
the way--attacked currencies/stocks of emerging Asian
economies for its own gain; the IMF, prodded by the
US Treasury, moved in to rescue not so much the emerging
governments and economies as the big US banks and investors
who would otherwise suffer losses; and in the final
cycle, vulture funds from the US swooped down to buy
up the devalued assets of the emerging economies at
bargain basement prices.
Another popular
economic theme among both the editors and directors/producers
was that the Japanese financial bubble of the late 1980s
had been touched off by the Plaza Accord of 1985, the
implication being that Japan's "lost decade" was caused--intentionally
or otherwise--by the United States. My editors subscribed
to this view but had the sense to ask former Secretary
of State James Baker to respond to such a view in another
VIP interview. (Secretary Baker did a pretty convincing
job of rebutting the allegation, while stressing that
he was a friend of Japan who coined the term "global partnership.")
What struck
me further was that Japanese "policymakers"--I include
bureaucrats and politicians in this category--had notions
quite similar to those of "opinionmakers" such as my journalistic
colleagues. This is perhaps not surprising since former
officials (notably Messrs. Hisahiko Okazaki and Yukio
Okamoto) and even incumbent officials (Taichi Sakaiya,
Ichizo Ohara, and of course, Shintaro Ishihara) are quite
active in the media as opinionmakers, and conversely,
in a new trend, some opinionmakers are becoming policymakers
(Yuriko Koike and Nobuteru Ishihara). But bureaucrats
and politicians form a group distinct from opinionmakers.
The policymakers I spoke to tended to be less forthcoming
with their honne (as opposed to tatemae)
views. So, it was only from policymakers, whom I got to
know quite well, that I heard of suspicions and conspiracy
theories about US intentions. Operating in the real world,
however, policymakers tend to be relatively pragmatic;
even when their views of the United States no longer justify
existing policy, they will take time changing that policy.
As I prepared
myself mentally for the project, I had several questions
to answer and hypotheses to test. My sense was that anti-American
or America-defying rhetoric among opinion leaders was
louder and more widespread than in the late-1970s when
I followed Japanese opinions. Is this true? And if so
why? America-defying attitude seemed more pronounced among
officials now than it was a decade or so ago. Is this
true, and does it matter? How do opinionmakers and policymakers
influence each other? If we are interested ultimately
in Japanese policy (rather than attitude), inertia among
government officials is so strong that policy will not
change easily in the short term. One notable domestic
trend is that politicians are trying to make--and succeeding
in making--greater input into policy, while the position
of bureaucrats is diminishing. How does this affect Japanese
policy generally and policy toward the United States?
Plan of the
Paper
I set out to
look for information on three groups: the general public,
opinionmakers and policymakers. For the purposes of this
paper, I will consider opinion makers and policymakers
to belong to the "elite" in contrast to the "general public"
(though there is some overlap in the two categories).
Also, the two major subgroups among policymakers are politicians
and bureaucrats as I have stated. I have not been all
that successful in gathering the information and in answering
the questions I posed for myself. But the intention was
to examine the perceptions/attitudes of the three groups
concerning the United States and US policy, focusing on
three or four topics: economics, politics (diplomacy),
security, and where relevant, culture.
To anticipate:
- Japanese
public opinion about the United States has improved
steadily since 1995.
- The opinionmakers
seem less inhibited than they were in the past, generating
a lot of revisionist history and anti-American (antiglobal)--as
well as all sorts of other--opinion.
- Policymakers,
while sharing opinionmakers' sentiments and being more
America-defiant than previously, are more pragmatic
than the other elite group, in the end trying to make
things work with the United States.
In sum, I am
reasonably optimistic in the sense that I see little chance
of a major downturn in Japanese perceptions and attitudes
toward the United States, although Washington--particularly
the Democrats--could provoke this downturn. I am pessimistic
if US expectations are higher and if the United States
is wondering if Japan would all of a sudden become a staunch
ally.
Public Opinion
After a big
dip, public opinion is on the mend. Since late 1995, when
Japanese public feelings toward the United States reached
a nadir, those feelings have recovered considerably. Responses
to key survey questions show similarity between 1999 and
years when public sentiment toward the United States was
most favorable.
In its 1995
survey on US-Japan relations (published in early 1996),
those Japanese calling relations with the US "bad" (32
percent) exceeded those characterizing it as "good" or
"very good" (23 percent) for the first time since the
Yomiuri Shimbun, with help from Gallop, started its survey
of public opinion on US-Japan relations in 1978. A graph
drawn from Yomiuri surveys over the years shows that the
curve indicating "good" has gradually declined from the
peak of 53 percent in 1984, while the curve indicating
"bad" has climbed gradually from the trough of 8.1 percent,
also in 1984 (see graph published January 2000 with the
1999 survey results). Incidentally, the view of Japan
from the United States showed similar trends of deterioration,
although they were less extreme than on the Japanese side:
Americans characterizing relations with Japan as bad were
lower in proportion to the total than Japanese feeling
negative about the relationship, while generally a higher
proportion of respondents considered the relationship
as good in the United States as in Japan. Clearly, the
Japanese have been more concerned about the bilateral
relationship than Americans were.
Commenting
on the 1995 survey, the Yomiuri identified two "gaps"
in the two nations' perceptions of the other side. One
gap was caused by Japanese self-confidence, according
to the Yomiuri. Many Japanese felt in 1995 that the United
States had been Japan's "parent," "teacher," or "big brother/sister"
in earlier postwar years but was now a "friend," "teammate,"
or most frequently, a "rival." Speaking of rivals, while
the Japanese thought that China would emerge as their
biggest economic rival, followed by the United States,
the Americans said overwhelmingly that Japan would become--or
already was--the biggest rival economically. In other
words, Japan had caught up with the United States and
had little to learn from it. The second gap was found
in the Japanese attitude towards defense, the Yomiuri
said. While the Japanese respondents wanted a reduction
of US military presence in Japan and the region, at the
same time they expressed their faith that the United States
would come to their aid in case of an attack by another
power on Japan. The Yomiuri saw this second gap as particularly
naive: "Such a selfish argument does not pass muster in
the cool and hard international community," the newspaper
commented.
In a similar
survey conducted in late 1999 and published early this
year, sentiment in the two countries about the other continued
to improve dramatically, showing remarkable resemblance
to pre-1995 conditions. Japanese thinking that bilateral
relations were good were back up to 52.2 percent, and
those Japanese thinking they were bad accounted for only
9.8 percent. Judging from these numbers, 1999 was very
much like 1984. A quick look at the 1999 questions and
answers shows that Japanese respect for the United States--its
economic as well as military might--has been restored.
Questions and answers indicate clearly that the Japanese
feel more exposed to, if not outright threatened by, hostile
or potentially hostile neighbors (notably North Korea
and China) and that they believe that the United States
would come to their aid in case of trouble with these
neighbors. Whether or not the Japanese are now willing
to pay the cost of US protection in the form of a military
presence in Japanese soil does not come out clearly in
this survey.
A brief review
of major recent events in the bilateral relations helps
to explain the contrasting survey results in 1996 and
2000, at least superficially. As the Cold War ended at
the turn of the decade and there was no longer need to
maintain the anti-Soviet stance at all cost, economic
friction between the two countries became more severe,
with accusatory words at each other escalating. The Structural
Impediments Initiative talks (under President Bush) were
tough, but Japanese negotiators still used positive gaiatsu
to fight their domestic nemeses. But the Framework talks
(under President Clinton) had few positive aspects for
the Japanese side; the Japanese argued rather successfully
that the United States wanted "managed trade" and rebuffed
US pressures. 1995 was a particularly trying year for
US-Japan relations: difficult auto talks were concluded
without making either party very happy. Led by then MITI
chief Ryutaro Hashimoto, the Japanese negotiators got
particularly tough, stiffing the US side when they thought
its demands were unreasonable (rifujin). The word
rifujin was much used by bureaucrats during this
period and beyond; it carried the connotation that in
earlier days, the Japanese side had caved in to US demands
even if they were unreasonable. The rape incident in Okinawa
involving a local schoolgirl and US servicemen stationed
in the island prefecture poured gasoline on the smoldering
relationship. In some ways it was also cathartic, however.
Improvements
began in 1996. The bilateral security treaty was reaffirmed
in a Clinton-Hashimoto summit in spring. The trimming
of the US presence in Okinawa, including the return of
the Futenma helicopter base, was announced just before
the summit and had a noticeable positive effect on public
opinion. Partly because of this focus on security ties
and partly because the major trade issues had now been
dealt with, economic issues went on the back burner.
Assessment
of US-Japan Relations
The bilateral
relations got considerable help from third parties, such
as China and North Korea. China's firing of missiles across
the Taiwan Strait in the spring of 1996 vindicated Tokyo's
move to reaffirm and strengthen security ties to the United
States. North Korea's shooting of missiles over Japan
itself naturally had an even more positive effect on Japanese
views of the alliance, although both cases left some Japanese
unhappy with Washington (either because they feared having
to take sides in the US-China conflict or because they
felt that the US response to P'yongyang's missile threat
was not sufficiently indignant). For the reasons already
alluded to, the Asian currency crisis did not bring together
the United States and Japan. In addition, Japan's proposal
to set up an Asian Monetary Fund provoked a US reaction
similar to one against Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohamad's notion of an East Asian Economic Grouping. President
Clinton's China trip in 1998 was a big minus in the Japanese
mind. The US President termed China a strategic partner
and, together with Chinese leader Jiang
Zemin, chastised Japan for its economic missteps.
Furthermore, concurring with the Chinese, Clinton decided
not to stop in Japan before or after his long stay in
China. In 1999, the Diet passed bills needed to implement
the new guidelines of US-Japan security relationship.
We now return
to the 1999 survey to summarize what the Japanese public
is thinking of the United States and its policies in the
economic, political, and security spheres.
Economy
The US economy will remain strong (51.7 percent) or will
get even stronger (25.5 percent), the Japanese public
thinks. But somewhat more Japanese (55.7 percent) than
Americans (52.8 percent) are afraid that the US stock
market will fall in the near future. (My sense has been
that among Japanese elites, the expectation of a US stock
market crash is even stronger than among the general public.)
Politics
The United States will retain its superpower status and
will remain the world's leader. (The survey was not detailed
enough to capture the growing sense among the elites that
the United States no longer transcends its narrow interests
to lead.) The United States is the most trustworthy foreign
nation (43.9 percent). The United States had the highest
score, whereas only 15 percent of Americans trusted Japan
the most, with Japan coming in the 7th place, after Canada,
Britain, Australia, and others. The United States will
remain the most important country for Japan, both politically
and economically.
Security
Korean Peninsula (78.6 percent), China/Taiwan (25.1 percent)
and Russia (18.6 percent) pose a military threat to Japan.
In particular, North Korea's Taepo Dong missile is dangerous
for Japan (86.7 percent). If Japan is attacked, the United
States will come to its aid (77.3 percent). Against this,
66.9 percent of American respondents said that in case
of an attack on Japan, the United States should provide
help.
All in all,
Japanese feelings appear favorable towards the United
States. But as they are at historic highs, so they are
unlikely to get much better.
Opinionmakers
"Opinionmakers are all over the map," said an academic
I spoke to during a recent trip to Japan. The opinionmakers
are saying anything they like, breaking all sorts of taboos,
but, more likely than not, only to shock and provoke others.
Often the proponents are not willing to stake a lot to
turn their ideas into reality. The lifting of taboos seems
to have accelerated with the criticism not only of politicians
but also of bureaucrats, particularly Ministry of Finance
bureaucrats--the cream of the crop in an earlier age.
There is no more inhibition about attacking anybody. Nothing
is sacred (except maybe the imperial family to some Japanese).
Does anything
anybody says matter? Does it have a bearing on Japanese
policy? Some experts I interviewed said "No" and "No."
They felt there was no pattern or meaning. As one of them
explained:
Opinionmakers
have always said that America is arrogant, overbearing,
etc. and that Japan should have a mind and a policy of
its own, although the decibel level may be higher today.
But policymakers operate in a world that is quite separate
from that of opinion makers so there is not much point
in studying the views of the latter. Policymakers--even
one that were firebrands as opinionmakers--become realistic
and say we must work it out with the Americans.
Other experts
are less dismissive of the views of opinionmakers.
They feel that there are some patterns in what opinionmakers
say, and these are connected to both what the public
is feeling/thinking and what the policymakers feel,
think, and ultimately do. But I did not come across
interesting and convincing views on how these elements
are structurally connected. One observer thought
that a major change, or "discontinuity," is taking
place before our eyes, and that the multitude of
revisionist books and Democrat leader Yukio
Hatoyama calling for constitutional revision
are signals of this. Citing John Dower's new book
Embracing Defeat, this observer recalled
that there had been a major discontinuity of Japanese
attitude--a sudden leap from the wartime repulsion
towards America to the embracing of everything American--after
their defeat in 1945. Could what we are witnessing
be a correction of this "embrace," and if so, should
the United States respond in some way?
The pattern
that some experts see is that there is the big middle
(bigger than it used to be), and the left and the right.
This is not a great surprise (and may not even be the
most interesting framework to analyze Japanese opinions
today). The middle has grown and the left has shrunk after
the virtual disappearance of the Socialist Party, while
the right is active and noisy albeit lacking in common
themes and unity. (The term right is probably much too
general, but I am not familiar enough with people and
groups that tend to come under this heading to offer more
precise typology and analysis).
Whereas until
a decade ago the center of gravity of opinionmakers was
in the left and the LDP government was to the right of
(a vaguely defined) center, today the government and its
supporters among opinionmakers (say, the Yomiuri Shimbun)
seem to be part of a bloated center, taking criticism
from the left and the right. On the left you have the
traditional left--the communists and the socialists--and
the liberals (Asahi Shimbun). The left has a sense of
crisis that there is a general societal drift toward the
right, that the political center is moving toward the
right (as exemplified by passage of laws on the national
anthem, on eavesdropping, on the new US-Japan guidelines).
Major Leftist fears are that the recent rewriting of the
security treaty--particularly provisions on Japan's response
to regional contingencies--will drag Japan into America's
wars in the region, and that rewriting of the constitution
by the Japanese in the near future would put the country
on a warlike path once again.
While the left
is fighting a rear-guard action, the right is on the offensive.
The right is made up of not only the Sankei Shimbun and
its commentators, but of all sorts of other groups--the
Bungei Shunju group, particularly the opinion journal
Shokun, and Sapio of Shogakukan. There are also individual
writers who would be classified under the right. In terms
of substance, the right ranges from pro-American/proalliance
elements to anti-American/proindependence elements. Proindependence
does not necessarily mean anti-American, although in fact
it often does. Generally, resentment at American hubris
is not limited to the right or, for that matter, to Japan.
Resentment also stems from persistent Asian reminders
of past Japanese wrongdoing, and a desire to determine
Japan's own course. In doing so, there is at least a desire
to be rational, not emotional--a sense that Japan should
pursue its own national interests, that may (or may not)
coincide with US interests but are at any rate defined
by the Japanese themselves. "Japan is in search of a capitalism
with Japanese characteristics," as one writer put it.
The younger generation generally has little sense of debt
to the United States, which translated into the acquiescence
of older generations to American demands and whims because
"we owed them" even when the United States was seen as
making unreasonable demands. One commentator captured
these trends when he pointed out that the Japanese today
were more interested in kokueki (national interests)
than in giri (obligation).
I could not
read enough pieces by opinionmakers to attempt a genuine
survey of the vast collection of opinions (a la Ken Pyle
or Mike Mochizuki). What follows are my impressions of
a small sampling of current opinion. I have taken some
samples from Nihon no Ronten 2000 (Japanese Debates
2000) published by the Bungei Shunju group. The perceptions
of opinion makers about and attitudes to economic, political,
security, and other issues are listed below.
Economy
On the strength of American economy, there is a whole
spectrum of opinion; there is little unique in the Japanese
analysis, but the Japanese tend to focus on the US current
account deficit and the "illusion of the dollar," predicting
an end to the robust GDP growth and the stockmarket boom
based on the wealth effect. Another popular theme is the
tension between globalization (which to many is really
Americanization) and national institutions and practices
in Japan and Asia generally. While some champion global
standards, many demand room for national variances. Some
even hope and predict that nativist reaction would defeat
hegemonic dominance of global (that is, American) standards.
Politics
"Neo-nationalists" on the right such as Kanji Nishio are
busy revising history, "removing distortions." From the
little I have read/heard, the alleged distortions are
found in the more negative accounts of facts and Japanese
intentions and positive accounts of the intentions of
others in mainstream history books. Denying that the Nanking
massacre happened is part of removing distortions. Another
theme of neo-nationalists is Japan's continuing subservience
to the United States for which the domestic political
establishment (more than the United States) is lambasted.
General constitutional revision--not just of Article 9
but of the entire basic law--is seen as a necessary step
toward independence. China is a popular theme. US-Japan
and US-China relations make a zero-sum game, so China's
gain is Japan's loss and vice versa.
Security
The taboo on criticizing China or North Korea has been
lifted (basically the left's pacifist argument has been
blown away by China and North Korea's actions) so the
debate has shifted to the right. The defense debate now
centers on whether the new guidelines of US-Japan security
ties are useful for Japan or only increases the danger
of Japan being embroiled in America's wars; whether or
not Japanese participation in the development of TMD is
a good idea; whether or not the concept of participating
in regional contingencies is constitutional; and whether
or not the constitution should be revised for national
security (and other) reasons.
There is little
direct anti-Americanism in the security debate. The left
no longer argues that US imperialism is trying to dominate
the world on behalf of monopoly capital. I'm not sure
whether there is raw anti-Americanism on the right such
as we had from Jun Eto-- who died recently. Perhaps, Susumu
Nishibe demonstrates his anti-Americanism when he mocks
the United States for thinking foolishly that "American
justice is universal justice." Nishibe finds the single-minded
American pursuit of deregulation and competition undescribably
vulgar.
Other
A major debate on "the private" and "the public" was touched
off by a comic book On Wars by cartoonist Yoshinori
Kobayashi, which I have not had time to study. Kobayashi
argued that the private has become dominant in the postwar
period; people now reject the notion of the public, particularly
the notion that the public IS the State. He affirms the
public impulse--which is associated with patriotism--that
he says exists in each individual along with the private
impulse. Kobayashi's book provoked virulent reactions
from the left as well as others who saw it as rationalization/justification
of the Second World War. Some new material here may affect
Japanese attitudes toward the United States and Asia.
Mikie Kiyoi
of the Foreign Ministry became a celebrity through her
attacks on foreign journalists who don't bother to study
the Japanese language and misreport Japan with impunity,
taking advantage of the fact that "indulgence, swallowing
insults and bearing pain are virtues, while complaining
and blaming others is juvenile" in Japan. She strikes
a chord with Japanese opinion leaders as well as the public
who think that Japan is misunderstood, or misrepresented
deliberately. The neo-nationalist slogan iubeki kotowaiu
(saying to the world what needs to be said) from a while
back is still strongly supported in some quarters. Kiyoi
is in solidarity with a group of private Japanese citizens
living in New York who compiled a volume criticizing Japan
coverage by the New York Times's Nick Kristoff
and Sheryl WuDunn.
Policymakers
By policymakers I mean politicians and bureaucrats. Further,
I have in mind policymakers who have some dealings with
the United States. So, our policymakers are constrained
by the realities of the US-Japan relationship while at
the same time having a degree of direct input into Japanese
policy toward the United States. At one level, the policymakers
may have abstract ideas about American power, traits,
or culture, but on another level, they are dealing with
practical issues that involve the United States. The latter
makes policymakers more pragmatic/realistic as a group
than the opinionmakers. (I have not done enough work to
distinguish politicians from bureaucrats. Clearly, power
to formulate and implement policies is shifting from bureaucrats
to politicians--albeit slowly--and questions arise: how
do the two groups differ in their views of America and
the world, and how does the power shift influence the
policy outcome? I'm afraid I do not have enough data to
answer these questions at this point.)
To understand
the trends in Japanese policymakers' attitudes, I have
tried to engage those I was interviewing for another purpose
(that is, discussing the state of the Japanese economy
as well as fiscal and monetary policies for Medley Global
Advisers) on questions concerning US-Japan relations.
My interviews were mostly with economic officials (from
the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of International Trade
and Industry, the Economic Planning Agency, and the Bank
of Japan) and LDP officials who have an interest in economic
issues. I saw some Foreign Ministry officials but no one
from the Japan Defense Agency.
Following these
meetings, I conclude tentatively that, for now, policymakers
are more or less satisfied with the bilateral relationship,
and no major changes in policy are likely in the near
term. In the microeconomic sphere, Japanese trade negotiators
have become tougher, refusing to give in to "unreasonable"
US demands, while in macroeconomics, there is the nagging
suspicion that US demands on Japan or the positions the
United States takes in international negotiations are
a lot more self-serving than they purport to be. Yet,
the Japanese admire (often grudgingly) the US economic
performance and lament their own. The strong sense Japanese
policymakers had some years ago that they had discovered/invented
an alternative model of economic development and of capitalism
has taken a beating through domestic and Asian economic
difficulties. But some say it will be back, particularly
now that the Asian crisis economies are recovering quickly.
Policymakers'
attitudes in political and security areas have perhaps
changed less than in the economic areas. My assumption
(without having interviewed extensively) is that those
dealing with North America and security are still at the
mainstream of the Foreign Ministry (though the "Asia school"
of the ministry is apparently rising) and that this mainstream
remains close and favorably disposed to Washington, despite
a feeling that the Clinton administration has treated
Japan shabbily. In this connection, news that Rust Demming
at State and Kurt Campbell at Defense--Japan's best friends
in the current administration and a good combo--are leaving
the US Government is received with great concern in some
policy circles.
Policymakers'
perceptions about and attitudes toward economic, political,
security, and other issues are presented below.
Economy
In microeconomic (or sectoral trade) negotiations, there
was a clear shift between Prime Ministers Kiichi
Miyazawa and Morihiro Hosokawa. The Miyazawa-Clinton
summit in July 1993 followed the traditional pattern:
the Japanese gave in at the end although they thought
US demands were unreasonable; the summit was the culmination
of a cycle of talks; there were ambiguities in the agreement
language so that each side could interpret it in its own
way, up to a point. The Hosokawa-Clinton summit in February
1994 was in stark contrast with the earlier summit: the
talks broke down because the two sides agreed to disagree
(for Japan it was a major departure from the past pattern
in that it did not bend and was willing accept failure
of highest level talks); Japan took the moral high ground,
accusing the US side of pushing "managed trade." The auto
talks that ended in June 1995, led by then MITI chief
Hashimoto (under Prime Minister Murayama), was another
landmark. The Japanese appealed successfully to world
opinion (notably the WTO and Asian countries afraid that
if Japan caved, the United States would attack them next)
that the United States was forcing "managed trade" and
"quantitative targets" in the talks and refused to bend.
Japanese agencies that feel the brunt of micro pressures
are of course resentful. A recent complaint is that the
US Government, and in particular USTR and Commerce, has
become an agent of specific US companies, extracting concession
for these companies.
In addition,
many Japanese officials acknowledge their deliberate use
of US gaiatsu in mircoeconomic areas in removing
domestic microeconomic barriers. In particular, MOF and
EPA, which are more concerned about macro policies, tend
to use US pressure to overcome domestic resistance (to,
say, the big stores law or equalization of tax on farm
and residential land) which they cannot handle by themselves.
There is a cost to using foreign pressure, however, in
the form of strained bilateral relations. The Foreign
Ministry tends to worry about such costs. Some at the
ministry even feel that Japanese economic officials are
resisting US pressure/advice only because it comes from
the Americans and that there will be a backlash against
Japanese trade negotiators' rude treatment of their US
counterparts.
While welcoming
US pressures on macroeconomic issues, MOF and EPA tend
to resent macroeconomic pressures by the United States,
perhaps because they are at the receiving end of such
pressure but also because officials honestly think that
the US pressure is misplaced. Many officials argue that
macro pressures are sometimes really for US interests
and not good for Japan. The Plaza accord is often mentioned
as an example of how the United States made Japan reflate
(to counteract the deflationary effects of a higher yen),
while it neglected to do its own homework of reducing
the budget deficit and raising the saving rate. The bubble
was thus created, many say. The recent pressure from Treasury
Secretary Summers to boost Japan's GDP growth from the
current 1 percent or less to 3 percent is seen in similar
light: Summers wants Japan to do the heavy lifting while
the United States seeks to pull off a triple soft landing
of the economy, the stockmarket, and the dollar, and avert
a crisis.
As the Asian
crisis economies recover--some of them quickly--some Japanese
officials are feeling that the crisis governments had
been wrongly blamed for "crony capitalism" (because the
crisis was precipitated more by the uncontrolled flow
of global speculative capital than by "corruption" and
"relationship-based finance"), and that the Asian Monetary
Fund idea--of demonstrating a determination to protect
currencies under assault with a huge reserve of funds
(as the United States had indeed done for Mexico in the
mid-1990s)--was essentially correct. According to one
American scholar, Japanese are asking: "Why can't we have
a capitalism which is not the same as American capitalism?
Why can't we do it our way? Japanese--and other Asians--want
to pursue the legitimate alternative way." This sentiment
is amplified when the United States fails (or appears
to fail) to lead and acts in parochial and self-serving
ways--a la Seattle WTO, or as in the case of the CTBT.
Politics
My sense is that the United States has its best friends
in the Foreign Ministry, friends who are convinced that
the two countries share goals and even values in dealing
with bilateral as well as regional/global issues. But
just as it is not enough for foreign governments to convince
the US State Department alone, ignoring other departments
and the Congress, the United States will need to send
messages not just to the Foreign Ministry but increasingly
to nonfriendly Kasumiga-seki mandarins and Japanese politicians.
Although the United States may welcome the powershift
from bureaucrats to politicians, in specific instances
the pragmatism of bureaucrats that support US interests
may come to be missed if politicians act in a different
way.
On China and
"Japan passing," Japanese officials closest to the State
and Defense departments (that is, the Foreign Ministry
and the JDA) have heard the US administration's repeated
assurances but that is not the same thing as convincing
the Japanese opinionmakers or the public, or Japanese
politicians. Fear of a US-China condominium has existed
and was unnecessarily intensified by President Clinton's
refusal to stop in Tokyo at the time of his China visit.
On whether Japan would take the lead in establishing/fortifying
Asian organizations excluding the United States such as
ASEAN+3, and the Asian Monetary Fund and its variants,
I think it is possible particularly after the Seattle
WTO. But internal constraints on such organizations are
so great that the United States should not overreact.
The coming constitutional debate should be watched, especially
because it is not just about Article 9 but about the very
origin of the basic law; the Japanese are coming to a
consensus (although the left is resisting) that Japanese
did not write the constitution, and that they need a document
written by themselves. The taboo on constitutional revision
has been lifted decisively by Democrat leader Hatoyama's
advocacy of this cause.
Security
In a general sense, policymakers are moving toward Japan
as a normal nation, but there are nuances even within
the conservative establishment (for example, between Ichiro
Ozawa and Koichi Kato).
As earlier
suggested, North Korea's Taepo Dong missile launch increased
the Japanese sense of insecurity and their support for
the alliance (more specifically, for the guidelines legislation
and TMD participation). But at the same time, many Japanese
felt that the United States was not sufficiently concerned
about the threat from North Korea, which raised the further
question of whether the United States was a reliable ally
and would come to Japan's aid if it were attacked. But
the contradictory attitude that the Yomiuri lamented in
1996 is still prevalent: Japan wants-- expects--US protection
but wants the US presence to decline and is threatening
to cut Host-Nation Support, which they deliberately call
omoiyari yosan (compassion budget). Against this
background, Okinawa and the bases will remain an issue--real
and potentially explosive--in coming years. In case Democrats
prevail in the coming election (which appears less and
less likely in early 2000 as Hatoyama stumbles along),
there could be a major shift in Japanese attitude toward
"alliance without bases," a more autonomous, inward-looking
Japanese defense posture.
Other
"Will America continue to lead?" many officials asked.
If America is too blatantly parochial and/or self-serving
as in Seattle (the Japanese have heard the view that President
Clinton was willing to sacrifice multilateral negotiations
to help Vice President Al Gore in his bid to succeed him),
it will lose credibility as a hegemon. "You can command
confidence and respect only when you are seen as transcending
your own interests to act in the general interest," one
economic official said.
Is attitudinal
change related to a generational shift in Japan? One economic
official commented: "The cabinet-level people are in their
60s and above--they're the ones that experienced defeat
and would follow the US lead even when they think Americans
are unreasonable and selfish. Our generation, in the 50s
or late 40s, are similar, but slightly more assertive,
wanting to make Americans understand in cases differences
develop. Many of the elite had a good experience studying/working
in the United States and have positive feelings about
the United States. We sense that younger people are much
cooler towards the United States and are more assertive
of Japan's own national interests, etc. They don't have
a sense of debt."
Conclusion
Conditions surrounding the bilateral relationship are
favorable, as compared to several years ago, and Japanese
perceptions of and attitude toward the United States are
generally benign.
The sense is
that in the next year or two, there won't be major changes
in Japanese attitudes or major surprises in Japanese policy.
Major domestic events coming up in the next year or two
include:
- The G-7
summit in Okinawa (with slight risk of it becoming Seattle
II).
- The lower
house election sometime before late October this year
(low risk of Democratic victory).
- The move
of Futemma base to Nago and accompanying issues.
- The upper
house election next year.
- The constitutional
debate taking several years.
External events
that may impact on US-Japan relations include:
- China/Taiwan
conflagration.
- More North
Korean provocation against Japan.
- Korean unification.
Domestic events
are not likely to have a major influence on the bilateral
relationship with the possible exception of the constitutional
debate. External events may be more significant and although
some of these events may in fact work to strengthen US-Japan
ties, they also could alienate the allies from each other.
And because they are external, the United States and Japan
will have less control over these events.
Although the
bilateral relationship looks stable--implying that no
surprising improvement or deterioration from the US point
of view is likely--the United States may wish to listen
carefully to the opinionmakers to see if there are important
messages amidst the cacophony. The United States also
may want to ponder whether it is necessary to talk to
Japanese politicians more as they gain influence in policy
formulation and implementation (although US diplomats
have done a much better job of touching all the bases
than have Japanese diplomats). Another topic of study
is how generational shift changes Japanese perceptions
and attitudes. The "postwar" period is ending in that
those of a generation which does not remember the war
or the impact of the war are coming into positions of
responsibility.
Finally,
the US side should ponder the fact that Japanese
perceptions and attitudes are related to US perceptions,
attitudes, and actions. The Japanese policymakers
have not developed a fondness for the Clinton administration
and particularly on the political-security side,
demonstrate a great nostalgia for American individuals
who dealt with Japan and Asia during earlier Republican
administrations. This is an American as well as
a Japanese problem.
CONTENTS
Trends
in Chinese Assessments
of the United States, 2000-2005
by
Bonnie S. Glaser
No country
presents such vexing contradictions for China as the United
States. The maintenance of good Sino-American relations
is indispensable for China's continued economic growth.
Without sustained high levels of US direct investment
and an open US market for Chinese goods, China's aspiration
to become a middle-level developed country by 2050 will
be difficult, if not impossible, to realize. The preservation
of a favorable security environment for China and the
achievement of reunification with Taiwan also are, in
part, contingent on the state of Chinese ties with the
United States.
Yet, at the
opening of the 21st century, Beijing is uncertain about
the feasibility of securing a stable Sino-US relationship.
Chinese leaders harbor strong suspicions about US intentions
globally as well as toward China. The Chinese fear that
Washington is determined to prevent the rise of a strong
China that could pose a challenge to American supremacy
in the new century. They also worry about US resolve to
spread American values and transform China and other remaining
socialist and authoritarian governments into Western-style
democracies. Beijing is especially uneasy about the advent
of an extremely imbalanced global pattern of power in
which America's might vastly outstrips other nations and
provides the United States with the unilateral means to
advance its interests as it sees fit. Chinese complaints
are targeted at fundamental American foreign and defense
policies such as post-Cold War NATO strategy, the deepening
of security ties to Japan and plans to develop and deploy
missile defense systems on the continental United States
as well as around China's periphery to protect American
forward-deployed forces and possibly American friends
and allies in Asia from ballistic missile threats.
Although debates
in China are ongoing about US foreign policy and intentions
toward China, the parameters of those debates have narrowed
substantially over the past year. There is now greater
agreement among Chinese America specialists than previously
existed in their analysis of the overall international
situation as well as specific elements such as US strategy
and objectives toward China. Minority positions are still
held, but they seem to carry little weight in the policymaking
process. Thus, this paper presents primarily mainstream
perspectives on the United States, which currently dominate
the formulation of Chinese policy.
The task of
predicting how Chinese attitudes toward the US policy
and presence in the Asia-Pacific region will change over
the next five years is a challenging one. This situation
is in part because Chinese assessments of the United States
and its intentions toward China are primarily reactive,
and US policies as well as other external events influencing
Beijing's estimates in the next five years cannot be predicted
with certainty. We can forecast with a degree of confidence,
however, that Chinese ambivalence about American power
will endure. Moreover, Chinese suspicions about US intentions
toward China probably will not be significantly assuaged
and may even intensify during this period. This paper
attempts to present current circumstances and trends in
Chinese evaluations of US policy and identify key variables
that may influence Chinese attitudes and approaches toward
the United States between 2000 and 2005. The conclusion
draws implications for Chinese foreign policy and US interests.
Current
Trends in Chinese Attitudes Toward
the United States
Chinese assessments
of US policy and presence in the Asia-Pacific region flow
from Beijing's estimates of US comprehensive national
power relative to other major states, US global strategy
and economic role, and American intentions toward China.
Therefore, analysis of Chinese estimates of these broad,
yet fundamental issues must precede consideration of their
evaluation of US regionally based policies. Chinese perspectives
on the US-Japan alliance, US policy toward Taiwan, the
regional security architecture, and the Korean Peninsula
are presented in turn.
US Reign
as Sole Superpower
After the events of 1999, China reached the conclusion
that the United States will continue to occupy the position
of sole superpower in a global pattern of one superpower
and several major powers for at least the next two decades.(1)
Beijing had hoped that this power structure, which emerged
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, would be short-lived
and be supplanted by a multipolar pattern of power in
which a core group of countries that are relatively equal
in comprehensive national strength would engage in bounded
competition and cooperation, effectively checking the
ambitions of any single power. The prevailing imbalance
of power is objectionable to China because it provides
the US with an opportunity to advance a global security
and ideological agenda that benefits American and broader
Western interests. In Chinese parlance, the US can pursue
"power politics and hegemony." At the same time, China's
room to maneuver and its ability to defend its own interests
are severely constrained in a unipolar international system.
A multipolar global pattern that the Chinese hope will
provide greater opportunities to promote and defend Chinese
interests is expected to take shape gradually, but little
progress is expected before 2005.
During the
next five years, and even for several decades, as the
world transitions from a bipolar to a multipolar power
structure, the Chinese forecast that China will lag significantly
behind the United States in key indexes of power, including
economic, technological, scientific and military might.
Chinese analyses of the bases of US strength stress the
critical importance of America's lead in the development
and application of high technology and predict that the
US technological edge will enable a further consolidation
of the US advantage over other powers. Two specialists
on the American economy at the China Institute of Contemporary
International Relations, which writes annual assessments
of the international situation and the global balance
of power for the Chinese leadership, forecast "the US
will take the lead to enter the information world and
keep its absolute superiority in developing the knowledge
economy."(2)
They and other Chinese experts emphasize the links between
technological prowess, economic strength, and military
power. Comparative assessments of the technological and
economic level of potential competitors have convinced
most Chinese analysts that no power is likely to rival
the US position in the early part of the 21st century.
US Global
Strategy and Intentions
The main strategic objective of the United States, from
China's perspective, is to exploit the opportunity presented
by its unprecedented favorable global position to further
consolidate American supremacy and shape the world according
to US interests and values. The United States is frequently
described by Chinese analysts as in pursuit of a strategy
of global "hegemony" and absolute superiority over potential
rival states. US plans to deploy a national missile defense
(NMD) system are viewed as an integral part of this strategy,
aimed at preventing other powers from having a reliable
retaliatory capability against a US first strike. PLA
officers reject the US contention that concern about a
missile launch by North Korea is the driving force behind
consideration of the C-3 system, the more ambitious of
two NMD configurations under deliberation, which envisions
the emplacement of 200-250 interceptors in Alaska and
North Dakota. They insist that Washington's true goal
is to degrade or nullify China's nuclear deterrent.
The NATO military
operation in Kosovo in 1999 alarmed Beijing--even before
the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade--because
it demonstrated US willingness to circumvent the United
Nations and employ military force to intervene in the
internal affairs of other nations to advance American
strategic aims. The military intervention also represented
a test of NATO's "new strategic concept," which the Chinese
view as intended to globalize NATO's role. The purported
Clinton doctrine of "new interventionism" has been widely
criticized by China for putting issues of human rights
above state sovereignty.
During the
Kosovo war and in its immediate aftermath, many Chinese
feared that the United States might use similar means
to interfere in states on China's periphery or even on
the Chinese mainland. The possibility of US military intervention
in North Korea, the South China Sea, and in the Taiwan
Strait was judged to be greater than in the past. Active
American interference in Tibet and Xinjiang also was considered
more likely, although most Chinese researchers expected
that the US would rely on political means to stir up ethnic
unrest, for example, rather than use military force to
meddle in Chinese minority areas. Subsequent US decisions
to limit its involvement in East Timor and refrain from
intervention in Chechnya, along with US reassurances that
Kosovo was not a model for future US intervention abroad,
alleviated the urgency of Chinese concerns, but did not
eliminate them completely. The Chinese remain wary of
what they see as an increased proclivity of the US to
rely on military means to advance American interests.
More fundamentally,
however, the Kosovo war served as a catalyst for a reassessment
in China of US global strategy and intentions. The United
States could no longer be depicted as a relatively benign
world policeman whose policies in many areas served to
promote regional and international stability--a view that
was not universally accepted, but was actively promoted
by an influential group of Chinese think tank experts
and officials as the rationale for building a constructive
strategic partnership with the United States. Instead,
the US came to be seen by the majority as a destabilizing
and unpredictable hegemon determined to use all possible
means to pursue its interests and spread Western values
with impunity.
US Economic
Role and Power
Beijing recognizes that the global economy is a major
factor that increasingly influences China's security.
The Chinese are acutely aware that the United States is
the primary engine propelling the world economy forward.
Sustained strength in the US economy is essential for
China's economic growth as well as for the continuing
recovery of Asian states from the financial crisis. Chinese
economists worry that a major correction in US financial
markets or a broader US economic downturn could have a
devastating impact on China's economic modernization strategy.(3)
Despite rhetorical statements declaring a need to diversify
Chinese markets and expand domestic demand, Beijing remains
exceedingly dependent on US markets to absorb its exports.
The decision to make far reaching concessions to Washington
in the bilateral negotiations on China's accession to
the World Trade Organization signifies the judgment by
Chinese leaders that economic globalization is inevitable
and that although the process carries inherent risks,
China will benefit from joining the globalization trend.(4)
Chinese attitudes
toward US economic power are obviously ambivalent, however.
Chinese analysts of international affairs (in contrast
to Chinese economists) especially emphasize that US economic
strength has provided the foundation for stepped-up American
political and military intervention. They worry that sustained
US economic growth and its dominant position in scientific
and technological development will encourage the United
States to rely on unilateral means to achieve its global
ambitions.(5)
Military researchers point out that the expanding US economy
has provided ample funds to support a continued increase
in the US military budget. Some predict that the United
States will take advantage of the weakening of the economic
strength of many Asian countries to enhance American economic
influence over the region.(6)
US Intentions
Toward China
Since the Clinton administration set out its strategy
of comprehensive engagement toward China in 1993, American
strategy and intentions toward Beijing have been hotly
debated topics among Chinese experts and officials. The
events of 1999, most notably the accidental bombing of
the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, have resulted in a narrowing
of previously wide differences on this issue and produced
a virtual consensus that the United States is striving
to contain, constrain or otherwise check China. A leading
analyst of American affairs noted privately in October
1999 that there is widespread acceptance in China that
"the containment factor" is a prominent component in US
policy toward China.
In accordance
with America's global strategic ambitions, the United
States is viewed as being determined to prevent China
from challenging its preeminent position regionally and
globally. Many in China contend that the United States
seeks to slow the growth of China's economic power as
well as its development of science and technology to ensure
that Chinese military weapons and capabilities continue
to lag far behind those of the United States. Another
US objective identified by Chinese is to promote democracy
and the rule of law in China, which many believe extends
to a desire to undermine Communist Party rule. Perpetuating
the separation of Taiwan from the mainland is also considered
to be an important goal of US strategy. The official characterization
of US intentions by senior Chinese leaders and in official
documents as aimed at "Westernizing," "splitting" and
"weakening" China apparently now are widely accepted.
US efforts
to improve relations with states on China's periphery
are interpreted by many in Beijing as intended to better
position Washington for strategic competition with China
in the future. The strengthening of the US-Japan military
alliance, including the new Defense Guidelines, recently
fortified US military arrangements with several Southeast
Asian states as well as with Central Asian states bordering
China, and US plans to deploy theater missile defense
(TMD) systems in the region are cited by Chinese experts
as evidence of a US strategic design to encircle China.
Discussion of possible inclusion of Taiwan in a "regionwide"
US defense missile system on China's periphery also has
intensified Chinese suspicions that the United States
views China as likely to emerge as a strategic adversary
in the next century.
A small number
of liberal-minded, Western-educated Chinese experts view
Washington's objectives in pursuing relations with Beijing
as relatively benign and even in China's long-term national
interests. For example, US goals of opening up the Chinese
economy, promoting democracy and the rule of law in China,
and encouraging Chinese adherence to global norms on everything
from nuclear nonproliferation to military transparency
to human rights are considered by these individuals as
prodding Beijing to make policy choices that are difficult
but essential for China's attainment of its aim of enhancing
Chinese comprehensive national power in the new century.
Even these experts are worried, however, that unprecedented
US global power and its impatience for change in Chinese
internal and external policies could result in increased
US pressure on China that could have destabilizing consequences
for Sino-American relations as well as regional and global
stability. Many also are anxious about the dangerous mix
of a continued trend toward independence in Taiwan, growing
nationalistic fervor in China in support of the use of
military force to prevent permanent separation of the
island from the mainland, and increasingly resolute US
determination to defend Taiwan from a Chinese military
attack.
US-Japan
Alliance
Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance are undergoing
a sea change.(7)
In the past, Beijing judged that, on balance, the presence
of American forces in Japan and the US nuclear umbrella
over Japan benefited China by: effectively checking Japan's
ambitions for regional hegemony; restraining the buildup
of an independent Japanese military capability and limiting
Japan's ability to project military power; and providing
reassurance to other Asian states that worried about China's
growing economic, political, and military power. In the
early 1990s, China even feared that economic friction
between Washington and Tokyo could spill over into the
security realm and cause a rupture of the alliance, triggering
Japanese rearmament.
The signing
of the Joint Declaration on the Alliance for the 21st
Century by President Bill Clinton and Prime
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in April 1996 and the subsequent
process of revising the Defense Guidelines governing wartime
US-Japan cooperation prompted a heated debate in China
about the US-Japan alliance and its impact on Chinese
security interests. The Chinese suspect that the primary
motive behind efforts by Tokyo and Washington to reinvigorate
the security treaty and expand its area of coverage is
a desire to counter the rise of Chinese power. In addition,
the provision in the new guidelines that allows for US
and Japanese forces to jointly respond to undefined emergencies
in the Far East has heightened Chinese concern that the
US and Japanese militaries will buttress their capabilities
to respond with force in the event that Beijing seeks
to militarily intimidate or take over Taiwan.
China is increasingly
skeptical about the role of the alliance in restricting
Japan's acquisition of power projection forces. Chinese
military and civilian analysts contend that the security
treaty provides Japan with a cover to develop a broad
range of military capabilities, and many forecast that
Japan will eventually sever itself from the United States
and pursue its security interests on its own. Instead
of serving as a check on Japanese regional ambitions,
the alliance is now viewed as accelerating Japan's development
into a "normal" country that shoulders greater responsibility
for regional security, a trend that China finds worrisome.
The Chinese also maintain that modification of the Defense
Guidelines to allow for regional wartime cooperation between
American and Japanese forces has stimulated support in
Japan for revising the Peace Constitution to include the
right of "collective self-defense." Revision of Japan's
constitution would mark a major watershed in Japanese
post-World War II history and probably would have extremely
negative consequences for Sino-Japanese relations.
US Policy
Toward Taiwan
From Beijing's perspective, a positive consequence of
China's 1995 and 1996 missile firings across the Taiwan
Strait following Lee
Teng-hui's visit to Cornell University was the recognition
at high levels of the US Government that China's threats
to use force to thwart Taiwan independence had to be taken
seriously. Some, although not all, subsequent American
policies toward Taipei have been seen as mindful of the
dangerous potential that new steps toward independence
could have for cross-strait stability. The Clinton administration's
swift response to Lee Teng-hui's 9 July 1999 call for
cross-strait relations to be conducted on a "special state-to-state"
basis was widely praised by Chinese officials and institute
analysts. The Chinese especially appreciated President
Clinton's private assurances to Jiang
Zemin regarding US policy, both in his phone call
to the Chinese president and in the September meeting
of the leaders in Auckland, New Zealand. Chinese officials
were pleased by Clinton's statement that Lee Teng-hui
had created difficulties for both the United States and
China, which suggested that Washington shared Beijing's
assessment of Lee as a "troublemaker." Public affirmations
by American officials that US policy is based on the three
Sino-US communiques, the three no's (no support for Taiwan
independence, no two-China policy, or no Taiwan membership
in international organizations that require sovereignty
as a condition for joining) and the acknowledgment that
there exists only one China were welcomed by Beijing as
signals of Washington's dissatisfaction with Lee's action.
The subsequent unprecedented decision by the United States
to oppose Taipei's bid to enter the UN was also widely
applauded as signaling Taiwan that the US would not countenance
actions by either side that had a destabilizing influence
on cross-strait security.
Although the
Chinese found these US policy steps reassuring, resentment
in China is nevertheless growing over US policy toward
Taiwan, especially sales of advanced weaponry and assistance
to the Taiwan military to enhance its fighting capability,
which the Chinese view as boosting the confidence of Taiwan
independence advocates and inhibiting progress toward
reunification. The announcement of the approval of a $550
million arms sale package to Taipei soon after Lee Teng-hui's
July 9th statement was sharply criticized by Chinese officials
and institute researchers who cited the sale as evidence
of Washington's duplicitous policy. US Congressional backing
for the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which, if it
becomes law, would further strengthen ties between the
US and Taiwan militaries, is also worrisome to Beijing
because of its potential to embolden independence supporters
in Taiwan.(8)
Most Chinese
analysts and officials are convinced that the US near-term
objective is to preserve the cross-Strait status quo and
its long-term aim is to prevent reunification of the Mainland
and Taiwan. Return of the island to Chinese control, Chinese
researchers maintain, would provide economic and strategic
advantages to Beijing while weakening the American position
and thus, they claim, is strongly opposed by the United
States.(9)
Most Chinese contend that the sole reason that the United
States does not support de jure independence for
the island is that it would trigger a PRC military response
and likely lead to a Sino-US military clash that could
quickly escalate.
Chinese officials
and institute analysts complain that while Beijing has
curtailed its sales of missiles and nuclear-related technology
to satisfy US security concerns in the Persian Gulf, Washington
has failed to even engage in a meaningful dialogue about
how to address Chinese concerns about American arms sales
to Taiwan. To pressure Washington to impose limits on
its weapons transfers to Taiwan, Chinese officials are
attempting to establish linkage between their demands
and China's future cooperation with Washington on countering
proliferation. Some PLA researchers privately have hinted
that Beijing may renege on its bilateral arms control
commitments with the United States if Washington sells
specific weapons systems to Taiwan, especially theater
missile defense systems.(10)
Underlying
Chinese concerns about US transfers of theater missile
defense systems to Taiwan, including lower-tier systems
such as advanced the Patriot or PAC-3, is their conviction
that such systems will require early warning surveillance
for cueing purposes from US satellites or even a US force
presence on Taiwan.(11)
To China, therefore, transfer of missile defense to Taipei
signals closer C3I cooperation between the American and
Taiwan militaries. Chinese officials say that such sales
will be perceived in Beijing as a restoration of the US-Taiwan
Defense Treaty and thus a violation of the terms of diplomatic
normalization between the US and China.(12)
American intention behind enhancing Taipei's ability to
defend against Chinese ballistic missiles is suspect because
such actions run counter to the Clinton administration
position that the United States does not support Taiwan
independence. From Beijing's perspective, the deployment
of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) against Taiwan
is necessary to deter Taipei from taking the separatist
path. US provision of missile defense systems to Taiwan
is considered likely to further embolden proindependence
advocates on the island by giving them hope that they
can defend the island against an attack by Chinese missiles.
Sales of new missile defense systems to Taiwan will also
increase the confidence of separatists that the United
States will come to Taiwan's aid even if Taipei is the
provocateur, the Chinese claim.
Regional
Security Architecture
China is increasingly dissatisfied with the prevailing
security structure in the Asia-Pacific region that is
founded on a system of bilateral US alliances and military
relationships with states in the region. With the end
of the Soviet threat and rising suspicion in the United
States as well as in Japan and elsewhere about Chinese
intentions, US-led security arrangements are seen by many
in Beijing as oriented toward restraining the exercise
of Chinese power. China opposes military alliances as
"Cold War relics" and claims that US initiatives over
the past few years to reinvigorate its bilateral alliances
have added to regional instability.
In place of
the existing security architecture, China has proposed
a new security concept for the region.(13)
This vision of a post-Cold War Asian security order was
authoritatively outlined in China's July 1998 Defense
White Paper. The key features of China's new security
concept are the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,
open and nondiscriminatory trade practices, and multilateral
dialogue to promote mutual trust and understanding. On
the latter point, China favors multilateral discussions
that enable all sides to air their views, but absent consensus,
does not obligate the participants to a specific course
of action. In building bilateral relationships, Beijing
is also promoting a new model of "strategic partnerships"
that it is forging with key regional and global nations
as well as important political-economic organizations,
such as ASEAN as an alternative to US alliance relationships,
which the Chinese insist are aimed at third parties.
In addition
to setting out its new security concept in selected official
documents and leadership speeches, Beijing is promoting
its new model of security through bilateral discussions
with scholars and officials in the region as well as in
multilateral security forums such as the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security Cooperation in
the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). Beyond these low-key efforts,
however, so far there appears to be no comprehensive strategy
for realizing China's vision. This situation is partly
because there is no sympathetic audience in Asia for policies
directed at weakening US alliances. Even more important
is that Chinese leaders have decided not to adopt a directly
confrontational stance toward the United States on this
issue. They are satisfied at present to have put the United
States and other regional states on notice that China
is dissatisfied with current security arrangements, while
promoting a discussion of alternatives that could better
provide for regional peace and stability in the future.
Nevertheless, China's new security concept is a clear
sign that Beijing is increasingly uncomfortable with the
United States as the preeminent power in its own neighborhood.
Korean Peninsula
Chinese perspectives on US policy toward the Korean Peninsula
also are in flux.(14)
Beijing shares broad US policy objectives on the Korean
Peninsula of averting military conflict, maintaining a
nuclear-weapons-free peninsula and promoting a process
of stable change. China does not always support US measures
to achieve these objectives, however, and, until recently,
has been quite critical of US policy toward North Korea.
The adoption by the Clinton administration of the recommendations
put forward by former Defense Secretary William Perry
in 1999 are viewed by China as a welcome shift from an
approach that relied heavily on sticks while offering
few carrots to a policy that emphasizes dialogue and provides
P'yongyang with more positive incentives. The partial
lifting of the half-century-old economic sanctions on
North Korea by President Clinton was roundly praised by
Beijing.(15)
China is nevertheless
ambivalent about the prospect of normalization of relations
between Washington and P'yongyang. On the one hand, Beijing
has long hoped for the completion of "cross recognition"
on the Korean Peninsula that began with China's establishment
of diplomatic ties with South Korea in 1992 as an important
step in the process of easing North-South tensions. On
the other hand, however, Beijing is increasingly wary
of the possible negative impact on Chinese security interests
of a robust US influence on the Korean Peninsula that
may soon include P'yong yang. This concern, along with
a desire to advance its strategic interests, probably
underlies China's increasingly active posture toward the
Korean Peninsula--including a mid-January 2000 visit to
Seoul by Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian.
The NATO military
operation in Kosovo has heightened Chinese fears of US
military strikes on North Korea to eliminate any potential
nuclear weapons program and set back P'yongyang's plans
to develop and deploy long-range ballistic missiles. China's
opposition to nuclear weapons on the peninsula may not
extend to the North's development of a conventional missile
capability that may effectively deter the United States
from launching an attack similar to that which was carried
out against the former Yugoslavia. This may be the first
clear signal that Beijing views its interests as potentially
diverging from American interests on the peninsula. As
the situation evolves on the Korean Peninsula, the Chinese
expect greater Sino-American competition for influence
and will likely continue to seek to maximize their position
by strengthening relations with both the North and the
South.
China has in
principle opposed the deployment of any country's troops
outside its own territory, but in practice has tacitly
accepted the presence of American forces on the Korea
Peninsula. As a process of change takes shape on the peninsula,
however, Beijing is putting the United States and regional
states on notice that it hopes US ground forces will not
remain indefinitely. The Chinese Ambassador to Seoul,
Wu Dawei, stated in an interview last December that China
wants "involved parties to settle the issue of US military
presence in Northeast Asia at an appropriate time."(16)
Beijing increasingly views the presence of US forces on
the peninsula as contrary to Chinese interests and is
already probably seeking to persuade the South Koreans
that future security on the peninsula can be ensured without
the deployment of American ground troops in Korea. A minority
view in China holds that the presence of US troops would
serve as a buffer against possible escalating tension
between a reunified Korea and Japan, but this view is
not likely to hold sway amidst deepening Chinese suspicions
of US intentions to check the growth of Beijing's power
and influence on the peninsula and elsewhere in the region.
Variables
Affecting China's Views of the
United States, 2000-2005
Numerous variables
will shape Chinese attitudes toward the United States
in the coming five years. To narrow the field to a few
key variables, some assumptions have been made. First,
there are not likely to be any major changes in the global
balance of power in this period. The United States will
remain the sole superpower and will preserve its advantages
in economic, technological, political, and military measures
of strength. China will continue to lag far behind the
United States in all major indexes of power.
Second, the
probability that China will experience social upheaval
and systemic political change in the next five years is
extremely low.(17)
Thus, domestic variables and their potential impact on
China's posture toward the United States will not be considered
in great detail. The trigger of domestic change in China,
however, the manner in which it unfolds, and the outcome
all would affect Beijing's perspectives on the United
States. Suspicion among Chinese leaders that the United
States is behind social unrest or separatist activities
in China would undoubtedly increase Chinese paranoia about
US intent to undermine the regime and supplant communism
with democracy in China. This situation consequently would
lead to a hardening of Chinese attitudes toward American
policies in the region. A systemic political change that
produced a more liberal regime could have either a positive
or a negative effect on Chinese views of the United States
and its regional policies. A more democratic government
could be in conflict with the United States over China's
continued determination to bring Taiwan under national
sovereignty, enhance Chinese military capabilities, and
eliminate US force presence in the region even as it pledged
greater transparency militarily and promised to uphold
higher standards of human rights.
Taiwan's
Uncertain Future
To the Chinese leadership, US policy toward Taiwan has
a more immediate and critical impact on Chinese interests
than US global strategy or other policies in the region.
How the United States handles the Taiwan issue is judged
by Beijing to be a litmus test of Washington's intentions
toward China. If the United States is seen as willing
to put Sino-American relations at risk by crossing redlines
set by Beijing--including sales of specific weapons and
support for further steps by Taiwan toward independence--this
assessment will guide future Chinese policy toward the
United States and may lead to the judgment that a Sino-US
military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait is inevitable.
Despite the growing realization in Beijing that the United
States does not control decision making in Taipei, the
Chinese maintain that US policy--especially through its
arms sales to Taiwan and its commitments to defend the
island from Chinese attack--encourages Taiwan to resist
entering into a serious dialogue with the mainland to
work out arrangements for reunification.
There are many
uncertainties regarding Taiwan and the likely evolution
of Chinese attitudes toward US handling of the Taiwan
issue. In March of this year, Taiwan will elect a new
president who, over time, will chart a new course for
the island that has continuities as well as discontinuities
with the policies pursued by Taiwan's current president
Lee
Teng-hui. If this transition of power is followed
by a commitment by the new government to preserving the
status quo, easing cross-strait tensions, including a
slowing of the arms buildup across the strait and a resumption
of dialogue between Taipei and Beijing, then Chinese concerns
about US backing for Taiwan independence may diminish.
An agreement on terminating hostilities in the strait
and the opening of political talks between Beijing and
Taipei could remove the Taiwan issue as an obstacle to
further progress in Sino-American relations under the
condition that Beijing judges that Washington is not seeking
to block a cross-strait solution.
Alternatively,
Taipei's new government could prove to be resolutely determined
to pursue independence. The holding of a national referendum
on Taiwan's future status or a revision of the constitution
to legalize the island's separateness from the mainland
and existence as a sovereign, independent state are examples
of steps that Taipei could take that would be viewed as
extremely provocative in Beijing. Washington's response
to such steps by Taipei would be critical in China's deliberations
over an appropriate policy response. In a dangerous variant
of this scenario, China could conclude that Taiwan is
moving toward independence with tacit or even overt US
backing. Should this occur, Beijing may opt to use force
against the island sooner rather than later, and a Sino-US
military confrontation could ensue that holds the potential
to quickly escalate to a major war beyond the Taiwan Strait.
Between these
extremes is a scenario that differs little from the situation
that has prevailed in the past five years. The new Taiwan
Government may well follow a path similar to that set
by Lee Teng-hui. This would include efforts to enhance
Taiwan's participation in international organizations
and other steps to raise its international status. Dialogue
with the PRC may be resumed, but Taipei may resist discussing
the terms of political reunification with the mainland.
The new Taiwan president could rhetorically renounce the
goal of separation, while taking incremental measures
that appear to the PRC to be aimed at the eventual objective
of independence. In this case, China's approach toward
Taiwan probably would harden, and Beijing would step up
pressure on Washington to set limits on its arms sales
to the island. At the same time, China might reduce or
even halt its cooperation with the United States on curbing
global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
missiles. Beijing would remain suspicious of the US role
and American intentions, but probably would refrain from
using force against Taiwan. Sino-American relations would
continue the current pattern of cooperation and competition
amid mutual suspicion. China could also take a more proactive
stance against the presence of US forces in the region
and seek to more assertively persuade other states in
the region of the need to create new security arrangements
for the Asia-Pacific.
US Global
and Regional Policies
The way the US exercises its power over the next five
years will have a pivotal impact on Chinese attitudes
and policies toward the United States. Recurring intervention
abroad with military force to advance American objectives,
especially without UN approval, will be viewed with alarm
by Beijing. In the aftermath of NATO's military operation
in Kosovo, Chinese institute experts remain divided over
whether Kosovo will be used as a model for future US policy
in Europe and especially in Asia. A pattern of US armed
intervention in geographical regions that are not critical
to Chinese interests probably would result in rhetorical
condemnation and greater unwillingness to cooperate with
the United States on issues of low priority for Beijing.
US military intervention on China's periphery could provoke
a stronger Chinese response, including alignment with
Russia and other willing powers to constrain US behavior.
The outcome
of the 2000 presidential elections in the United States
may result in tactical shifts in US foreign policy and
particularly in Washington's approach to dealing with
Beijing that will influence Chinese attitudes and policy
toward the United States. For example, foreign policy
advisers to Republican presidential candidate George W.
Bush advocate placing greater emphasis on building and
sustaining coalitions and alliances with those who share
core American values.(18)
In Asia, Robert Zoellick calls for Japan, the United States,
Korea, and Australia to forge closer defense ties and
for Japan's forces to be "more closely integrated to support
the US military in Asia."(19)
The incumbent Democratic administration also has indicated
a desire to expand security access arrangements with Singapore
and with other ASEAN states.(20)
Depending on other American regional and global policies,
Beijing may well perceive such efforts as part of a US
strategy of encirclement aimed at checking the growth
of Chinese power.
A Republican
administration decision to abandon the objective of building
a constructive strategic partnership between the US and
China that was agreed upon by Presidents Clinton and Jiang
Zemin in 1997--as suggested by some presidential candidates
and their advisers--would further reduce Beijing's confidence
that a stable relationship with the United States is attainable.
Even more alarming to Chinese leaders would be a retraction
of the Clinton administration's "three no's" commitment.(21)
Deployment
Decision on National Missile Defense System
In June 2000, the Clinton administration is planning to
make a decision on deployment of an NMD system to protect
the continental United States. Barring technological difficulties
or an economic downturn that forces choices in resource
allocation, the United States is likely to proceed with
NMD deployment. Two configurations are under consideration.
The C-1 system would consist of a single NMD site, most
probably Alaska, with approximately 100 interceptors that
would have the potential to intercept China's current
arsenal of about 20 ICBMs. This system could be deployed
as early as 2005. The C-3 system envisions the deployment
of 200 to 250 interceptors in two sites, Alaska and North
Dakota. This system could be effective against a larger
number of ICBMs and could be deployed by 2011. In either
case, to preserve roughly the same nuclear balance that
exists between China and the US today, the Chinese would
have to substantially increase the number of their ICBMs
by the planned deployment date.
Whichever system
the Clinton administration chooses, the decision to go
forward with deployment of an NMD system will have profound
implications for China's attitudes toward the United States.
Although China's strategic forces have long been vulnerable
to a US first strike, Beijing now is concerned more about
the US threat than in the past and judges a Sino-American
military confrontation to be possible in the future. Any
NMD system probably will feed Chinese paranoia about US
intentions and lead Beijing to conclude that the United
States seeks to deprive China of a survivable second-strike
capability. Even a determination to deploy fewer than
100 interceptors in the C-1 system will not convince the
Chinese that the priority US concern is a missile attack
from North Korea or Iran because they will assume that
the system would ultimately expand to greater numbers
of interceptors designed to negate their strategic deterrent.
The Chinese will consider NMD deployment as representing
a dangerous shift in US defense strategy away from a doctrine
based on mutually assured destruction to one based on
pursuit of US strategic superiority.
The US decision
to field a national missile defense system will coincide
with ongoing Chinese plans to modernize its strategic
nuclear forces, but will no doubt affect the trajectory
of those plans. China is likely to build and deploy a
mobile, solid-fueled, strategic missile force with penetration
aids and other countermeasures that is large enough to
deny the United States a certain first-strike capability
against Chinese strategic forces. In sizing its new force,
a debate is likely to ensue over whether to deploy MIRVed
warheads and, more fundamentally, over whether a nuclear
doctrine of minimum deterrence is still sufficient to
meet China's security needs in the new security environment.
If the United
States fails to reach agreement with Russia on amending
the ABM Treaty to allow for deployment of NMD systems
and opts to unilaterally abrogate the treaty, Chinese
concern about US unilateralism also will increase. This
condition will spur Beijing to cooperate more closely
with Moscow against American interests.
Evolving
Plans on Theater Missile Defense Systems
A decision on deployment of theater missile defense systems
is not expected until 2007. Once the United States proceeds
with NMD deployment, however, the Chinese will assume,
probably correctly, that deployment of upper-tier TMD
systems will proceed on schedule. Over the next five years,
prior to a final determination on deployment, discussion
in the United States and in the region of the pros and
cons of transferring upper-tier TMD systems to Taiwan
is likely to heat up and may significantly influence Chinese
assessments of US intentions as well as American policies
and presence in the Asia-Pacific. Sales to Taiwan in this
period of weapon systems that degrade the ability of China
to threaten Taiwan with ballistic missiles will no doubt
elicit sharp rhetorical and policy responses from Beijing.
Chinese officials are currently warning the US against
the transfer to Taiwan of upgraded Patriot missile batteries
known as PAC-3s, destroyers equipped with the Aegis battle
management system, and long-range early warning radar.
Ultimately,
the impact of TMD deployment on Chinese attitudes will
depend on the deployment sites chosen and on Beijing's
assessment of the strategic purpose of the TMD systems
deployed. A decision to deploy upper-tier TMD systems
on Taiwan soil or on ships owned and operated by the Taiwan
military is likely to have a deep impact on Chinese assessments
of US intentions on the Taiwan issue and provoke a series
of negative responses from Beijing, toward both Washington
and Taipei. Retaliatory measures by China could range
from suspension of some or all Sino-US military exchanges
and a halt to cooperation in arms control and nonproliferation
efforts to breaking diplomatic relations with the United
States. The likelihood of Chinese use of force against
Taiwan would be high.
A decision
by Washington not to substantially upgrade Taiwan's ability
to defend against Chinese ballistic missiles, including
a determination to forgo the transfer of upper-tier TMDs
to Taiwan, probably would have a favorable impact on Chinese
attitudes toward the United States. Beijing is not likely
to strongly object to the deployment of upper-tier TMD
systems, both land based and sea based, that remain under
US operational control as long as the defense of Taiwan
is not an explicitly enunciated goal.(22)
The possibility that such systems could be used to defend
Taiwan in the event of a military confrontation with the
mainland is perceived by China to be in conformity with
the long-standing US policy of "strategic ambiguity."
China's sole urgent concern regarding the deployment of
upper-tier TMD systems under Japanese control is the prospect
that they could be used to shield Taiwan from a missile
attack. A decision by Tokyo to procure such systems will
intensify Chinese concerns about the US-Japan alliance,
especially if the threat from North Korean missiles has
been effectively eliminated.
An Indian
Nuclear Deterrent With Tacit US Backing
If securing Indian membership in the CTBT and NPT become
US policy priorities, China will be concerned that Washington
may be willing to agree to Indian deployment of nuclear
weapons in exchange for New Delhi's signing on to those
arms control treaties. Since India conducted a series
of nuclear tests in May 1998, Beijing has worried that
the United States tacitly supports an Indian nuclear deterrent
against China. Flight testing of the Agni II medium-range
ballistic missile in April 1999 further heightened Chinese
fears. US acquiescence to India's desire to deploy a nuclear
deterrent would inflame Chinese suspicions that the US
is concerned about a future threat from China and is pursuing
a strategy of encirclement and containment.
Change on
the Korean Peninsula and US Force Presence
Any analysis of changes in the Asia-Pacific security environment
over the next five years must consider the possibility
of a radical change in the standoff between North and
South Korea. Scenarios of change include economic collapse
or political disintegration in the North, reconciliation
between P'yongyang and Seoul, and military conflict initiated
by the North out of desperation. However change occurs,
the emergence of a verifiable peace on the Korean Peninsula
probably will be a catalyst for the restructuring of US
forces in the region. In the United States, a debate probably
would ensue over the threats to American interests in
East Asia and the purpose of US forward-deployed forces.
The explicit question will be raised regarding whether
American forces should be forward deployed in East Asia
to counter a potential threat from China. The outcome
of this debate and the resulting decisions made on the
restructuring of US forces in the region will have a decisive
impact on Chinese estimates of US intentions and the prospects
for achieving a stable and cooperative relationship with
the United States.
Assuming that
Beijing's concerns about US strategy and intentions have
not been assuaged, the Chinese probably would respond
to the new situation in Korea by pressing Seoul to insist
on the removal of American ground forces from the peninsula.
If Beijing became convinced that the United States was
pursuing a strategy of military containment of China,
the Chinese leadership could opt to take an assertive
stance against the presence of US military forces in Japan
as well and could press for an end to US alliances with
both South Korea and Japan. Moreover, China might seize
upon this opportunity to promote a regionwide reassessment
of the prevailing security architecture and its suitability
to the new strategic environment.
The stance
that Beijing adopts toward American regional force deployments
over the next five years will be influenced somewhat by
the views of other states in the region. If Asian states
continue to value the US presence as a regional balancer
and a guarantor of open maritime lines of communication
through the South China Sea, then Beijing will be reluctant
to assertively contest the continued presence of US forces.
Another factor is the attitude of regional states, including
China, toward the possible remilitarization of Japan and
the US role in thwarting that outcome. If current trends
continue, concerns about a greater Japanese security role
among regional states may diminish, and support may increase
for a reduction of American forces provided that Japan
remains anchored in the security alliance with the United
States.
Chinese
Leaders' Confidence in China's Future
Another key
variable that will shape Chinese attitudes toward the
United States in the coming five years is the confidence
that Chinese leaders have about China itself--the Chinese
economy, political and social stability, and China's evolving
position relative to other powers. To the degree that
Chinese leaders feel secure about their continued rule,
are not worried about threats from within, and are optimistic
about China's future ability to narrow the gap in comprehensive
national power between their country and the other leading
powers, they will very likely be less paranoid about US
intentions toward China and the dangers of a sole superpower
world.
US Economic
Recession
A downturn in the US economy, especially if coincident
with weakness in the Japanese and European economies,
could have a devastating impact on China's economic growth
plans. Reductions in US capital investment in China, as
well as purchases from China, could slow Chinese growth.
Many economists forecast that within the next five years,
there will be a major correction in US financial markets
that could reverberate globally and there could possibly
be a broader US economic recession. The subsequent increase
in unemployment rates in the United States and rising
trade deficits probably would lead to new trade tensions
with China.
An economic
recession in the United States could affect Chinese attitudes
toward the United States in several ways. First, Chinese
leaders would be concerned primarily about the concrete
negative effects of a slowdown in US economic growth on
the Chinese economy, and their worries about potential
uses of American power in ways that could be harmful to
Chinese interests probably would recede. Second, China
probably would revise downward its estimates of American
power and US ability to achieve its purported global "hegemonic"
ambitions. If the West European and Japanese economies
experienced a simultaneous upward turn, the Chinese would
judge that the pace of development of a multipolar world
was accelerating, and their apprehension about the United
States remaining the sole superpower for many decades
would further diminish.
Conclusion
Implications
for Chinese Policy and US Interests
The accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade
and the NATO military operation in Kosovo crystallized
in the minds of Chinese leaders the potential dangers
of a unipolar world in which the United States has a commanding
lead over other major states in all crucial indexes of
comprehensive national power. In the wake of the Kosovo
operation, Beijing's wariness of US global strategic aims
and American intentions toward China has increased considerably.
China's estimate that the US will continue to occupy the
position of sole superpower for at least the next two
decades strengthens the imperative for Beijing of maintaining
normal and stable Sino-US relations. At the same time,
however, the Chinese expect that unprecedented US strength
and Washington's perceived determination to check China's
emergence as a great power that could challenge America's
leading position will make achieving a steadier Sino-US
relationship more difficult. In addition, the possibility
of a Sino-US military confrontation over Taiwan is looming
larger in the estimation of many Chinese institute experts
and probably in the minds of Chinese leaders.
Chinese attitudes
and policies toward the United States will be influenced
considerably by the variables outlined in this paper.
Barring fundamental changes in American global and regional
strategy or the global balance of power, China's suspicions
of the United States probably will grow, not diminish,
over the next five years. US policy toward Taiwan will
be a litmus test for Beijing of broader American intentions
toward China, especially US policy responses to any steps
by Taipei to legalize the island's existence as a sovereign,
independent state; US decisions regarding the transfer
to Taiwan of more capable theater missile defense systems;
and the development of C3I ties between the American and
Taiwan military that would increase the likelihood of
rapid American involvement in combat across the Taiwan
Strait.
Continued high
levels of distrust of the United States and worries about
a potentially hostile security environment for China are
certain to have significant implications for Chinese foreign
policy and, in turn, for American interests. Beijing may
conclude that it is necessary to devote greater resources
toward defending Chinese security interests against newly
emerging post-Cold War threats and enhancing Chinese leverage
to cope with them. Accelerated military modernization,
closer alignment with Russia against the US, active opposition
to US forward-deployed forces in East Asia, renewed proliferation
activity, stepped-up obstructionism in the UN, and increased
cultivation of Third World clients are just some of the
policy choices that Beijing could make.
Unless and
until Chinese leaders conclude that US policy poses an
urgent threat to core Chinese national interests, however,
they are unlikely to alter their policy of seeking to
peacefully manage differences between the two countries
and develop a stable relationship with the United States.
Beijing will be disinclined to adopt a confrontational
international posture toward the United States over the
next five years because doing so would put in jeopardy
China's economic development, political stability, and
in turn, the survival of the Communist regime. We should
nevertheless expect that China will be less accommodating
than in the past to American concerns about Chinese policies
domestically as well as internationally. Moreover, Beijing
is likely to be more reluctant to cooperate with Washington
on issues where Chinese vital interests are not at stake
and the prospect for a divergence of American and Chinese
interests exists. For example, in areas like the Persian
Gulf, South Asia, and the Middle East, where the Chinese
have worked together with the United States for the primary
purpose of promoting better Sino-American ties, Beijing
may no longer be willing to moderate its behavior to please
the United States. Chinese cooperation on halting proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction probably will be slowed,
and Beijing is likely to seek points of leverage to press
the United States to address its concerns about American
policy toward Taiwan.
Additional
tactical adjustments in Chinese foreign policy are probable
and, in fact, have already begun to be implemented. To
shore up Chinese security in its own neighborhood as a
hedge against the possibility of intensified competition
with the United States in the future, Beijing is seeking
to reinforce relations with states on its periphery, including
Russia, India, Vietnam, North Korea, and the bordering
Central Asian nations. This policy will continue as Beijing
attempts to increase its influence in the region and position
itself to defend its interests more effectively in the
future.
In an
effort to curb American power and promote the trend
of a multipolar world, China is likely to strengthen
its relations with the other major global poles:
Russia, Japan, and Western Europe. On issues where
the Chinese perceive their core national security
interests to be endangered, such as the deployment
of theater and national missile defenses, Beijing
is likely to cooperate more actively with other
nations than in the past to constrain the actions
of the United States. China, however, is unlikely
to lead any such effort or seek to forge an anti-American
alliance with other countries. In the United Nations,
we also can expect that Beijing will selectively
work bilaterally and multilaterally in response
to global events with the larger goal of limiting
US ability to act unilaterally.
CONTENTS
US-ROK
Relations: Trends at the
Opening of the 21st Century
by
Scott Snyder
Introduction
With the dawn
of a new millennium, the burdens of history that have
weighed so heavily on South Korean aspirations during
the past century have at least momentarily been set aside
in favor of hope for the future and new resolution to
set aright those past difficulties that have led to failure
or disappointment. Downtown Seoul at least has been scrubbed
down and stands shiny and bright with hopeful determination.
Mammoth exhortations for a new millennium in which dreams
will be fulfilled hang from corporate buildings of businesses
rising from an economic crisis that only two years ago
were darkened and sobered by fear and failure. Such hope
and determination to meet the future were likewise hyperbolically
expressed in the first American State of the Union address
of the millennium. The tone of heady optimism extends
to the US-ROK relationship, at least if one accepts UC-Berkeley
Professor Emeritus Robert A. Scalapino's firsthand assessment
over more than half a century of observation and analysis
that "the US-ROK relationship is more promising than it
has been at any time in the recent past."
Despite deserved
positive reflection on the achievements of common purpose
and shared interests reflected in the current US-ROK relationship,
there are also many harbingers of change that may either
sustain or dramatically weaken the relationship at a time
of uncertainty and transition in the Northeast Asian security
environment. Likewise, economic globalization poses new
challenges that will provide simultaneous opportunities
for both common purpose and potential conflict in the
relationship. Perhaps most interesting and complex of
all, a variety of demographic, social, and cultural trends
are influencing public attitudes and introducing new factors
that will affect how South Koreans and Americans see each
other. The increasing complexity and apparent contradictions
inherent in managing such a relationship between the United
States and South Korea will introduce new, unpredictable
elements into what has in the past been a relationship
with a remarkably consistent and durable foundation of
shared purpose, despite occasionally dramatic episodes
of apparent disagreement and frustration. Perhaps more
importantly, it remains unclear whether the social perspectives
of the younger generation will sustain a positive US-Korea
relationship or whether the final outcome of the transition-in-process
to a post-Cold War structure for managing Northeast Asian
political and security relationships will challenge the
relative consistency, stability, and strength that has
characterized the US-ROK relationship in past decades.
Trends
in US-ROK Political and Security Relations
For five decades
since the outbreak of the Korean war, the common security
threat from North Korea has remained the dominant focus
of US-ROK relations. The US-ROK alliance itself came about
as a result of North Korean aggression and remains fixed
on deterrence against any renewed threat. With the end
of the Cold War, South Korea's economic transformation,
and North Korea's economic decline, the balance of power
internal to the Korean Peninsula clearly has shifted,
and the status quo on the Korean Peninsula is unlikely
to be sustainable in the long term. One result is that
unlike the past in which a weak Korea was the object of
great power rivalry and competition, South Korea has emerged
as an influential actor in regional security relations.
In partial response to these developments, the relative
proportion of US and South Korean capacity and contribution
to the military relationship have gradually transformed
the nature of the US-ROK security relationship from a
patron-client state relationship to one that more closely
approximates partnership. Most notably, the United States
and South Korea in the early 1990s agreed that the ROK
would regain peacetime control of its ground forces, and
US deployments on the Korean Peninsula were adjusted to
give the US a supporting rather than a leading role in
deterrence against the North, but further planned adjustments
were suspended in 1992 with renewed concern about North
Korea's nuclear weapons development efforts.
Some South
Koreans, however, view the joint command structure and
South Korea's continued military dependence on the United
States in key military areas (including current restrictions
on ROK missile deployment) as institutional reflections
of a dependence relationship rather than a structure of
shared responsibility for security commensurate with the
perceived level of development South Korean society has
achieved as a new member of the OECD on the threshold
of joining the industrialized world. As the security situation
in Northeast Asia continues to evolve, some South Koreans
desire to achieve a level of autonomy in the security
arena commensurate with the rapid progress they have made
in the economic and political realm. These sentiments
constitute the primary backdrop for potentially emerging
tensions in US-ROK security relations over military issues
such as South Korea's weapons procurement decisions and
indigenous weapons development programs (for instance,
current negotiations over allowable missile development
ranges), Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) issues, the
ROK's political role as part of a joint strategy for dealing
with North Korea, and the emerging ROK debate over the
future of relations with the PRC (including whether South
Korea should participate in development of theater missile
defense--[TMD]).
US-ROK
Military/Alliance Management
A number of
emerging potential conflicts in the US-ROK military-to-military
relationship essentially have arisen as a result of the
mismatch between ROK self-perceptions as a maturing economy
with a more pluralistic political system and perceptions
that the US-ROK security relationship remains unequal
or has lagged in its recognition of ROK social and political
advances. South Korea's desire to expand its missile development
and deployment capacity beyond the 180-kilometer-limit
imposed under a 1979 US-ROK bilateral agreement to the
international norm of 300 km as defined under the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) are one symptom of South
Korean desires for greater autonomy in the military sphere.
Although a number of complex technical issues must be
resolved in negotiations to revise the 1979 US-ROK bilateral
agreement, that agreement itself is no longer politically
viable while the United States simultaneously pursues
MTCR compliance for North Korea (a less restrictive standard
than for our ROK allies!) as a minimum objective in US-DPRK
missile talks. According to one South Korean commentator,
"We understand the US stance, since it pertains to its
strategic goal of containing the spread of weapons of
mass destruction [WMD]. Nevertheless, we cannot acquiesce
to the US demand for 'the ROK to strip off all its clothes
for the sake of developing missiles.'"
The United
States is prepared to allow South Korea to develop and
deploy missiles up to the MTCR-consistent 300-km-range
limit, but a request by President Kim Dae Jung to develop
missiles with a range of 500 km has held up a final resolution
of this issue in bilateral US-ROK negotiations.
Another manifestation
of South Korean desires for more independent scope of
action in the military sphere is an increasingly active
debate in South Korea over dependency on US-originated
technology for weapons procurement (well over three-quarters
of ROK foreign procurement has traditionally been from
the United States) that on the one hand is desirable to
ensure interoperability but on the other hand may become
a symbol of ROK dependency on the United States in cases
where US-originated technology is less competitive on
quality or price grounds.
A similar desire
to rectify perceived inequities in the US-ROK security
relationship underlies ROK demands to renegotiate the
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). In particular, South
Korean analysts have been particularly sensitive to differences
in the SOFA agreements negotiated with Japan as compared
to agreements negotiated with South Korea. For instance,
differences between handling of cases involving alleged
crimes by US military personnel in Japan and Korea is
one issue that rankles South Koreans. The primary South
Korean concern here is that SOFA-related jurisdictional
issues are most likely to arise in South Korea in emotional
cases where public opinion is more easily inflamed and
may have a broader influence on long-term South Korean
public support for the alliance relationship. This is
just one example of increased South Korean sensitivity
to perceived differences in the US approach to the respective
alliances with Japan and South Korea that have come about
as South Korea has moved down the road of democratization
and modernization. In the future, considering how adjustments
in one alliance relationship may influence perceptions
of the other alliance partner will become increasingly
necessary. This situation will be so because US-Japan-ROK
trilateral coordination on security issues has afforded
more and more opportunities for Japanese and South Koreans
to learn more about the respective bilateral alliance
relationships. Such sharing of understanding about the
intricacies and unique elements of each alliance generally
is likely to increase confidence and transparency, but
comparisons also may lead to pressures to develop a more
uniform approach to the respective alliance relationships,
and may serve as a limited form of pressure to standardize
and regionalize a "virtual (trilateral) alliance" presence
in the region.
One evidence
of this situation has been South Korean discussion about
whether a post-Korean reunification security relationship
with the United States might be organized along the lines
of the current joint command structure, or whether the
independent command arrangements manifested in the US-Japan
security relationship may be more a more desirable configuration.
At the same time, American security planners have doubts
that the command relationships in Japan are inadequate
to permit proper coordination in time of crisis.
Policy Coordination
Toward North Korea
The development
and implementation of a more effectively coordinated policy
toward North Korea is another trend that has important
implications for the US-ROK relationship, although the
extraordinary difficulties that had plagued US policy
coordination efforts with the Kim Young Sam government
have been considerably eased with the advent of Kim Dae
Jung's Sunshine Policy. Another essential factor has been
the review of US policy toward North Korea conducted by
former Secretary of Defense William Perry. Specifically,
Secretary Perry's emphasis on policy coordination among
the United States, South Korea, and Japan through the
establishment of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight
Group (TCOG) represents a concrete vehicle for launching
joint policy initiatives toward North Korea that has drawn
bipartisan support from Congress. Finally, the establishment
of such a coordination process benefited critically from
Kim Dae Jung's opening of ROK-Japan reconciliation and
cooperation during his state visit to Tokyo in October
of 1998.
The primary
result of the Perry policy review process has been the
alignment of policies among the United States, Japan,
and South Korea in favor of working with the North Korean
leadership to engage in mutual threat reduction in return
for the creation of a more benign international environment
to avoid a breakdown in North Korea with the attendant
negative implications for stability on the Peninsula.
This policy coordination effort is itself unprecedented
and has potentially significant implications for the shape
of future security relations in Northeast Asia, but it
may be unsustainable either if the urgency of the North
Korean threat subsides or if North Korea were to somehow
find a way to exploit differences in priority among the
United States, South Korea, and Japan to take advantage
of continued domestic political differences in each country
over how to deal with North Korea. (Given North Korea's
"divide and conquer" strategy, whether or not policy coordination
proceeds effectively may indeed be at least as important
as the direction of the policy undertaken). In this respect,
management of potential political power transitions resulting
from domestic elections scheduled to occur this year in
all three countries will pose a special challenge for
the newly established trilateral policy coordination process.
The trilateral
coordination effort has also led to the enhancement of
"comprehensive deterrence" against destabilizing North
Korean behavior. US-ROK military readiness and technological
depth has been strengthened from the time of the 1994
crisis, which revealed several potential vulnerabilities.
That crisis resulted in the strengthening of US-Japan
coordination in the form of the revised US-Japan Defense
Guidelines and adoption of a new Acquisition and Cross-Servicing
Agreement designed to provide Japanese logistic and equipment
support to US forces in the event of a military contingency
in the region. North Korean threats have also served as
a catalyst for the development of US-Japan-ROK defense
consultations from 1997 that have supported the rapid
improvement of Japan-ROK defense exchanges in the late
1990s. These quiet consultations have proceeded informally
to the point where hypothetical plans exist on paper for
managing a coordinated response to North Korean contingencies,
including the emergency removal of Japanese citizens from
the Korean Peninsula in time of war and handling of North
Korean incursions that cross over from Korean to Japanese
territorial waters. Despite all these developments, however,
quality and direction of performance between both US and
ROK Governments in the midst of a developing crisis remains
a possible defining moment for the future of the relationship
in the event it becomes necessary to respond to sudden
instability in North Korea. One South Korean scholar recently
put a fine point on the stakes involved during a casual
dinner conversation, saying, "When the balloon goes up,
the United States better know how to respond."
The China
Factor in US-ROK Relations
Finally, the
emergence of an internal South Korean debate over how
to deal with China is a trend that may have some impact
on the future of the US-ROK security relationship. Although
most Korean security analysts remain strongly supportive
of maintaining a security relationship with the United
States, there is a growing minority of Korean scholars
who argue that China will play the decisive role in determining
Korea's future aspirations. According to one South Korean
official involved in policymaking toward North Korea,
"The premise of our diplomatic strategy toward China must
be that China is far more important than the United States
in the reunification of North and South Korea." He expressed
concern by saying, "If the DPRK's Kim Jong Il regime collapses
due to the public unrest over food shortages and China
intervenes militarily, the Korean peninsula may resemble
East Timor in Indonesia, which called for the stationing
of UN peacekeeping troops, and the Korean Peninsula may
end up being divided again."
Most important,
South Koreans have no desire to choose between their US
allies and China, which will maintain a vital security
interest in developments on the Korean Peninsula. In this
respect, a Sino-US confrontation would be seen by South
Koreans as a worst case development, and increasingly
greater attention has recently been given to how developments
on the Korean Peninsula might be more effectively isolated
from a potential downturn in US-China relations. South
Korea's decision not to join TMD development efforts by
the United States and Japan is a reflection of South Korean
sensitivity to China's future role as an influential party
to future developments on the Korean Peninsula, as well
as a recognition that TMD in and of itself does not add
to South Korea's own protection from the North Korean
artillery that already represents the primary military
threat to Seoul. At the same time, the significance of
South Korea's burgeoning economic and people-to-people
relationships, particularly with ethnic Korean Chinese
nationals, is becoming more and more complex. On the one
hand, South Korea's trade with China has grown from less
than $3 billion to more than $24 billion in less than
a decade, and there is potential for continued rapid growth
in many sectors. The first exchange of top-level visits
between defense ministers has just occurred within the
past few months, with limited military-to-military exchange
efforts under active discussion. On the other hand, the
interests and activities of South Korean NGOs working
with North Korean refugees has become a political problem
in Sino-South Korean relations, and most recently, China's
decision to hand over seven North Koreans who had been
declared as refugees by a representative from the UNHCR,
has added complexity to the relationship.
Trends in
the US-ROK Economic Relationship
Although relatively
less important in priority than security issues, a number
of economic trends also are influencing the future of
US-ROK relations in increasingly important but often contradictory
ways. Perhaps the most important issues are how South
Koreans are thinking about the implications of globalization
for the South Korean economy, the extent to which South
Korea has learned lessons from its financial crisis of
two years ago, and South Korea's self-perception and the
likely direction of positions on agriculture and competition
issues in the context of a prospective new round of WTO
negotiations over trade liberalization.
The challenge
of adjusting to globalization had received a great deal
of attention in South Korea even before the financial
crisis threw into relief some of key issues and lessons
for practical consideration. In an effort to cross the
threshold to industrialized country status, and in pursuit
of membership in the prestigious OECD, former President
Kim Young Sam repeatedly referred to his policy of "globalization,"
but that proved to be more a mantra than a substantive
consideration of the issues and challenges arising from
competition in a globalized world. Prominent economist
Sakong Il has offered the perspective that for a smaller
country such as Korea, which has almost no opportunity
to shape the rules of the global financial architecture,
the best that can be done is to study the new rules closely
and do one's best to adapt nimbly enough to capture the
benefits and avoid the dangers of the trend itself. In
other words, if globalization is a fact of life, how can
one best use the trend to one's own advantage? The Korean
financial crisis served primarily to focus attention on
failures to adapt to a new global environment and the
elements of reform that would be necessary to survive
and compete in a globalized world, but an underlying edge
to the crisis and recovery remains present in Korean dissatisfaction
with perceived US willingness to use crude, bare-knuckles
leverage in its own economic self-interest at the expense
of the economic interests of others.
The financial
crisis itself has thus had a mixed effect, although only
preliminary conclusions can be drawn regarding its impact
and the effectiveness of the Korean recovery at this stage.
Preliminary reports suggest that one impact has been to
increase the gap between the urban rich and the rural
poor as industrialized areas have rapidly rebounded, but
the underlying fallout from the crisis remains not fully
addressed. In addition, female laborers and older white-collar
middle managers in their forties were adversely affected,
particularly in the banking and financial sector, while
Korea's recovery seems to be offering more jobs in the
form of startups to younger workers who are better equipped
to take advantage of new opportunities in information
technology. Despite initial questioning of the US response
to the economic crisis in the days following the first
IMF agreement, blame for the crisis in Korea shifted to
the many inadequacies and opaque practices that needed
to be cleaned up at home. Although the United States intervened
at the critical point in December of 1998 with support
for the "second line of defense" after it appeared that
the IMF agreement earlier that month was in trouble, many
Koreans also perceived US private-sector "vulture capital"
as attempting to take undue advantage of the crisis as
they swept in to inspect Korean assets that were potentially
available for bargain-basement prices.
In certain
key sectors, Koreans appear to have embraced deregulation
and reform to compete actively in a globalized world,
but in other sectors, needed reforms have run into the
roadblock of vested social and political interests. One
area in which Korea appears to have moved to the leading
edge of reform has been deregulation of the telecommunications
sector, which has spawned a host of interesting developments
that may catalyze additional changes across the board
in key economic, social, and political sectors. Several
facts may serve to illustrate the extent to which Koreans
are embracing new technology as a result of globalization:
In September of 1999, Korea became the first country in
Asia in which the number of mobile phones exceeds the
number of land lines. Online day trading has taken off
in recent months, and half of all transactions in November
of 1999 were conducted online, with the possibility that
Korea could soon "become the global leader in cyber trading."
Internet clubs composed of minority shareholders have
exploded in recent months, bringing new organizational
capabilities to movements in favor of enhanced corporate
governance and economic reforms, including providing a
base of support to NGO "blacklisting" of National Assembly
candidates as part of an effort to demand greater transparency
and reform among the political parties.
Another effect
of the revolution in information technologies and their
applications in Korea is to flatten institutional structures
within Korean society through ease of communication, challenging
traditional hierarchies in innovative and direct new ways.
These trends will add both complexity and internal contradiction
to Korean society as new groups are able to contest for
power in innovative ways that could negatively influence
certain US interests. For instance, local community groups
have been more active in monitoring and protesting potential
environmental problems caused by the presence of US military
bases near their communities, and the tools for surveying
and gathering evidence regarding such problems are increasingly
available to organized local groups who are actively pressing
on these issues. At the same time, differentiation and
pluralization within Korean society will make Korea more
attractive as a potential economic and business partner
for the United States in certain sectors, and new technology
can close the gap and create efficiencies of scale that
might enhance economic cooperation in key areas.
At the same
time, globalization and its effects remain highly contested
in South Korean society. The South Korean agricultural
sector is one example of a South Korean vested interest
that is unlikely to embrace reforms accompanying globalism
in ways that could conflict with US interests. In fact,
South Korean efforts to defend the agricultural sector
will remain a hot button issue, for instance in the context
of US attempts to liberalize global agriculture as part
of the WTO. Perhaps most interesting is that contrary
to the early 1990s, when Japan and Korea pursued their
objectives on agricultural opening on rice separately
as part of the final rounds of GATT negotiations, those
two countries are now cooperating in pursuit of a common
strategy to protect their own interests against US objectives.
The issue of agricultural market opening in particular
may have symbolic significance in Japan and Korea as sectoral
interests that symbolize the preservation of traditional
culture against international and particularly US efforts
that are perceived as undermining or threatening to local
interests (that is, globalization equals Americanization);
thus, it is possible that protests on such issues could
gain public resonance following active protests among
NGOs in Seattle and Davos.
Demographic
and Social Factors Influencing
the US-ROK Relationship
Perhaps the
most significant factors that are likely to influence
the medium-to-long-term future of US-ROK relations are
social and political changes resulting from generational
transitions in Korean attitudes toward the United States.
These demographic changes are also stimulating political
pluralization and social change in South Korea. It appears
that the strong bonds of the US-ROK relationship initially
forged through the Korean war are gradually weakening
as a younger generation without direct experience of the
war itself replaces sentimental views of the United States
based on direct knowledge of American sacrifice on behalf
of South Korea during the war with a more pragmatic view
of the relationship based on a cold, hard assessment of
where shared interests may lie in the future. Although
the survey information presented below is incomplete and
not directly comparable, it is sufficient to illustrate
the major trends in attitudes toward US-ROK relations
and to provide a basis for projecting future challenges
and problems.
According to
a USIA-sponsored survey of Korean attitudes toward the
United States conducted in 1994, the generational shift
in attitudes toward the United States is quite striking.
Although more than 64 percent of individuals surveyed
felt that US-ROK relations were either "good" or "very
good," a breakdown by age, education, and region illustrates
clear changes in attitudes between the older and younger
generations. Among respondents over 40 years old, over
three-quarters of respondents had a positive view of the
United States, but among 24- to 29-year-olds, the figure
dropped to less than 60 percent, and among 18- to 24-year-olds,
more respondents felt that the relationship is bad than
those who felt it was good. Perhaps even more striking
is the fact that there is less support for the US-ROK
relationship among college graduates and urban dwellers,
while rural dwellers and individuals with less education
were more positive about the relationship. A survey by
Dr. Young Jack Lee conducted for then-opposition party
leader Kim Dae Jung in the fall of 1995 demonstrates even
more negative results. According to that survey, 52 percent
of respondents over 40 years of age felt that US troops
should stay in Korea, while 57.8 percent of students in
their twenties thought that US forces should leave, and
almost 40 percent of those students considered themselves
anti-American. Another notable result of the October 1995
survey is that economic globalization was seen as a major
threat by over 20 percent of respondents.
A less scientific
Internet survey of public opinion conducted shortly following
the Nogunri revelations in late October of 1999 may be
interesting as a more recent point of comparison. The
timing of the survey must be taken into account as one
views the responses, and this survey is also not scientific
and therefore would be considered to have a larger margin
of error. That survey revealed that over three-quarters
of respondents think "there are problems with current
ROK-US relations," and once again, the breakdown shows
that the higher a respondent's education level, the more
likely the respondent is to be critical of the bilateral
relationship. Almost 35 percent of respondents believed
that "the ROK Government is dragged along too much by
the United States," the number one reason given for problems
in the relationship. Interestingly enough, the economic
relationship came in for a higher proportion of criticism
among respondents than the security relationship, even
though the survey was taken in the aftermath of Nogunri,
with over 69 percent of respondents indicating displeasure
with the economic relationship. This result underscores
that perceptions are widespread in Korea that the United
States is acting in its own economic self-interest at
the expense of South Korean interests. More than 70 percent
of respondents do not consider the United States to be
giving much help to North Korea, and a similar number
believe that uncovering the truth behind the Nogunri killings
will be hard and the results of the Nogunri investigation
will make no difference in the ROK-US relationship.
If we consider
the gradually declining levels of support in Korea for
the US military presence in Korea (as well as the strong
sense of dissatisfaction with the United States over economic
affairs, which perhaps is an effect of continuing ROK
suspicions about US economic intentions in Korea and the
region), what conclusions may be drawn regarding the near-term
future of the US-ROK relationship?
One preliminary
conclusion we may draw is that the US-ROK relationship
may become somewhat more difficult to manage in coming
years with the end of the "three Kims era" of South Korean
politics, infighting among the next generation of political
elites over who will be dominant and what the political
structure and centers of power of the new era will be,
and the increasing competition to become Kim Dae Jung's
successor that will ensue in the months before December
2002. As one looks at the current generation of likely
successors to the three Kims, their primary focus is clearly
provincial and primarily oriented toward domestic political
concerns, with no individual among the likely next generation
of current political leaders having international credentials
for leadership comparable to Kim Dae Jung's. One potential
danger is that there may be a greater temptation than
in the past to try to use the US-ROK relationship for
political purposes. More likely, however, relative neglect
and increased potential for misunderstanding may come
from a lack of priority given to adequate maintenance
of the relationship or an excessive focus on internal
politics at the possible expense of stable foreign policy.
The wild card,
of course, is the increasing public demand for greater
transparency and responsiveness among the political elite
to popular concerns, rather than the perpetuation of "boss"
politics in which the political leader retains absolute
control over the loyalties of party members. The current
NGO movement to blacklist politicians is itself yet another
example of the forces in favor of pluralization and differentiation
within South Korean society, and NGOs are currently attempting
to open up the political process to improve the quality
of members and their responsiveness to local public concerns.
Such a movement, if it were to succeed, also may have
a mixed impact on US-ROK relations. On the one hand, South
Korean pluralization and the rise of civil society serve
to underscore the shared values that should be at the
core of durable alliance cooperation; on the other hand,
civic organizations also are likely to take aim at some
of the enduring and unequal historical legacies (real
or perceived) of the US security presence in Korea, demanding
a more equitable partnership and constraining USFK freedom
to maneuver in ways that are likely to add strain to the
relationship in the future. The newly emerging criticisms
that are resulting from greater transparency and critical
approaches within Korean society regarding the price it
is now willing to pay for security in a changed post-Cold
War environment are likely to require adjustments to the
US security presence in Korea in line with evolving public
sentiments and aspirations. A rigid bureaucratic US approach
that fails to take into account the accumulated pressures
of gradual change in South Korea's own domestic environment
that have resulted from Korea's own economic and political
evolution may backfire. Gradual adjustments and accommodation
in the context of an enduring security partnership with
South Korea (while continuing to maintain the capacity
to fulfill the military mission of deterrence against
North Korea), however, may succeed in avoiding precisely
the kinds of tensions that could be most threatening to
the maintenance of shared long-term interests and values
that underpin the US-ROK relationship.
Conclusion
The historical
underpinnings of the US-ROK relationship, forged in a
time of great challenge as an urgent response to an external
siege on shared vital national interests during the Korean
war, face the challenge of adapting to a new era--a transition
that will inevitably require a reevaluation of the extent
to which interests, which have thus far sustained a close
relationship, continue to be shared.
The end of
the Cold War and South Korea's democratization are external
and internal factors, respectively, that multiply the
range of factors to be considered as part of the challenge
of nurturing shared interests, and both factors make the
management of the relationship considerably more complex.
At the same time, South Korea's democratization process,
while requiring certain adjustments in the US-ROK relationship,
also creates newly converging interests based on shared
values, a deeper basis for perpetuating a solid relationship
in the future.
This paper
has laid out some of the potential political, security,
economic, and social and demographic trends that will
require structural adjustments in perceptions of the US-ROK
relationship and the way it is managed. South Korean desires
for greater autonomy and independence in military affairs,
possible stylistic friction and differences in priorities
as both parties work together to respond to North Korea's
challenge, and the long-term future role of China on the
Korean Peninsula are among the security issues that must
be dealt with. Likewise, the challenge of responding to
globalization imposes mixed and often contradictory pressures
on the US-ROK relationship. Finally, a new generation
of South Koreans and Americans with different experiences
and perceptions of each other may view the relationship
and its benefits in very different ways from their fathers,
mothers, and grandfathers. These perceptions will also
require effective communication and adjustment as a basis
for perpetuating the relationship.
The overarching
challenge whether the centrifugal forces of complex
social, demographic, and economic change in Korea
and the United States will overpower the centripetal
forces of shared core values that have resulted
from the flowering of South Korean democracy, or
whether both sides will be sufficiently willing
to look beyond their own immediate needs and short-term
calculations to cooperate and adapt to new circumstances
under which shared interests and values may lead
to even stronger cooperation in the years ahead.
CONTENTS
Southeast
Asian Perspectives
by
Marvin C. Ott
The Regional
Context
For Southeast
Asia, as for the West, the end of the Cold War was a seminal
event. The region had been a major Cold War battleground.
Communism was a clear and present danger to the survival
of regimes and, in the case of Cambodia, to the very existence
of a people and culture. Marxism left its mark in the
three wars and failed economies of Indochina; in the mid-1960s
upheaval in Indonesia; as a contribution to societal disruption
in Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines; and even to a degree,
in the militarization of some Southeast Asian polities.
In the years
immediately following the Cold War, this picture changed
dramatically. The collapse of Soviet power meant the withdrawal
of the Russian Pacific Fleet back to port and the end
of subventions to the Vietnamese economy. In September
1989, the Vietnamese Army ended its occupation of Cambodia.
In the Philippines, the Communist New People's Army, which
in the mid-1980s posed a genuine and growing threat to
the Philippine government, had begun to ebb. The Khmer
Rouge, which also posed a serious threat to take power
had, by the beginning of the 1990s, misplayed its hand
and had become politically isolated and increasingly ineffective.
Thus, for the
first time, the Southeast Asian countries faced no major
security threats from within or without the region. With
relatively marginal exceptions, governments were secure,
societies stable, the status quo accepted, economies were
growing, and external powers posed no immediate danger.
To a degree that far exceeded that anywhere else in the
Afro-Asian world, the Southeast Asian states had developed
regional institutions and patterns of interaction that
gave the region increasing coherence as a single political,
economic, and even security entity. The centerpiece of
that achievement was ASEAN, which subsequently spawned
the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), soon to be followed
by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Asian Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Meanwhile China was
preoccupied with the task of consolidating the far-reaching
domestic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping. By any historical
measure, this was (and is) an extraordinary moment that
could prove short-lived or it could be an opportunity
to consolidate regional security for the long term. As
Jusuf Wanandi of Indonesia' Centre for Strategic and International
Studies has warned, "If this opportunity is missed and
these countries go their separate ways, it would be much
more difficult five or 10 year down the road to construct
a security arrangement."
The urgency
Wanandi expressed reflected a pervasive uneasiness among
the foreign policy elites of the region that seemed to
belie their recent record of success and a palpable growth
in national and regional self-confidence. This uneasiness
derived from a number of perceived vulnerabilities, latent
threats, and related concerns. Economics did not loom
large in most calculations, but it was a crushing economic
downturn that brought Southeast Asia's post-Cold War reverie
to a sudden end.
As senior foreign
affairs and defense officials in Southeast Asia assess
the regional security environment, the vulnerabilities
they see begin but do not end with economic reconstruction.
Economic
Recovery
The financial/economic crisis that began in Thailand in
late summer 1997 and rolled across the region was (and
still is) deeply unsettling. It revealed that the extraordinary
economic growth and modernization of the last three decades--a
phenomenon characterized by the World Bank as the "Asian
Miracle"--was not as solid as nearly everyone had believed.
The image of a kind of regional money machine gave way
to a quite different picture of ineffective regulatory
institutions, illusory bank balance sheets, wildly irrational
investments, excessive corruption, and conspicuous consumption.
As the value of the baht, rupiah, and ringgit collapsed,
Southeast Asians were reminded that not just living standards,
but social order, political stability, and even national
security rested ultimately on economic performance. The
hubris so evident in statements associated with the "Asian
values" debate of the 1980s and early 1990s gave way to
a more chastened, far more worried tone.
Political
Fragility
The political dangers embedded in economic failure were
graphically revealed in Indonesia. For 32 years the New
Order regime of President
Suharto had been a fixture of the Southeast Asian
scene. Indonesia had been politically stable (if not static),
economically successful, and socially quiescent. But under
the impact of the financial crisis, the framework of the
New Order cracked, triggering mass political demonstrations,
widespread street violence, and a change in regime. Next
door in Malaysia where Dr. Mahathir had been entrenched
as Prime Minister for 17 years, a somewhat analogous,
but less virulent chain of events ensued. A confrontation
between the Prime Minister and his deputy over how to
respond to the economic crisis took an ugly turn with
the arrest of the latter and his imprisonment on sexual
misconduct and other charges. Mass demonstrations of a
kind not seen in Malaysia for 30 years shook the government
to its foundations. In Thailand, the Chavalit government,
paralyzed and ineffective in the face of the economic
collapse, was replaced by parliamentary vote amid statements
by senior military officers pledging there would not be
a coup. In sum, the political stability that had seemed
almost as assured as continued economic growth was now
clearly a question mark.
Ethnicity.
Although ethnic disputes have not proven to be as lethal
in post-Cold War Southeast Asia as in some other regions
of the world, ethnic/minority issues are a significant
source of domestic tension. In Burma, a simmering civil
war between the lowland Burmese and highland minorities
(Karen, Karenni, Shan, Wa, Kachin, and so forth) has continued
at varying levels of violence for nearly 50 years. A series
of agreements beginning in the late 1980s between the
Rangoon government and several of the minority groups
has dampened the fighting, at least for the moment. In
Malaysia, the latent tension between the Malay majority
and the over one-quarter of the population that is Chinese,
pervades national life. The spectacular economic growth
of the Federation in the years since the communal riots
of 1969 has been seen by many as almost imperative to
preserve domestic stability. Recurring communal tension
and occasional violence gave way to something much more
serious in Indonesia in 1997-98. Under the strain of economic
deprivation, widespread anti-Chinese violence destroyed
not only property, but also the confidence of the Chinese
business community members in their future as citizens
of Indonesia. Violence against Chinese seemed to trigger
a chain reaction of ethnic and religious strife involving
other communal groups that make up the complex patchwork
of Indonesia. The secession of East Timor produced the
bloodiest tableau of all--this inflicted by "militias"
associated with the Indonesian Army. The potential for
a still more violent confrontation looms in Aceh.
Territory
and Boundaries. Although the territorial status
quo is broadly accepted by the Southeast Asian states,
a number of specific disputes have been minor irritants
for some time, and they could assume more serious dimensions
if the security climate in the region were to change.
These include:
- Claim of
the Philippines to the Malaysian State of Sabah.
- Claims to
the Spratly Islands by China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia,
Brunei, and the Philippines.
- Disputed
ownership by Malaysia and Singapore over Pulau Batu
Puteh.
- Disputed
ownership by Malaysia and Indonesia to the islands of
Sipadan, Sebatik, and Ligitan.
- Clashes
along the Thailand-Myanmar border.
- Dispute
between Thailand and Malaysia over the land border and
offshore demarcation line.
- Boundary
disputes between Malaysia and Vietnam and between Indonesia
and Vietnam over their offshore demarcation lines.
- Boundary
dispute between Cambodia and Vietnam.
- Dispute
between Malaysia and Brunei over Limbang and offshore
boundaries.
Among these
issues, the South China Sea is the most serious for several
reasons. It is the only dispute to involve more than two
Southeast Asian states and the only one to which outside
powers (China and Taiwan) are a party. Large, potential
offshore gas (and possible oil) reserves elevate the economic
stakes to a level higher than elsewhere. Also, any conflict
in these essential, heavily traveled sea lanes would immediately
jeopardize the interests of the US, Japan, and other major
powers.
External
Powers
Two extra-regional powers, China and Japan, are a continuing
source of uneasiness to security planners for the medium
and long term, even as they assume roles in the present
that are largely welcomed.
China is simply
too large and too near not to be a major factor in the
Southeast Asian equation and not to be viewed with some
trepidation. With certain isolated exceptions, China does
not have a history of seeking imperial control over Southeast
Asia. And for roughly three centuries composing the European
colonial epoch, China ceased to be a serious geopolitical
factor in Southeast Asia. But this was an abnormal circumstance
that has now passed into history. China's postwar support
for Communist revolutionary movements in the region marked
the reappearance of Chinese power in Southeast Asia. This,
coupled with the presence of economically influential
Chinese populations in nearly every Southeast Asian city,
has bred distrust. Beijing's explicit claim that virtually
the entire South China Sea constitutes Chinese territorial
waters (and its refusal to disavow the use of force to
back up those claims) has caused alarm in a number of
quarters. Growing Chinese influence in Burma and Cambodia
has been a further source of concern. Finally, the burgeoning
of China's economy in the recent years has been welcomed
by some (mostly ethnic Chinese) Southeast Asian businessmen
as a major new investment opportunity, while being feared
by others because of the potent competition from emergent,
ultra-low-wage Chinese industries.
The prevailing
uneasiness and ambivalence concerning China is evident
not only in official statements and actions but also in
some suggestive public opinion data. For example, in USIA
polls, about 45 percent of respondents in Thailand and
the Philippines view China as an "expansionist power,"
but only a small percentage in both countries regard China
as a direct security threat. In a survey of regional executives
(many of them presumably ethnic Chinese) the Far Eastern
Economic Review found hefty majorities "concerned about
the security situation in the South China Sea." A similar
survey also found majorities ranging from 53 percent (Thailand)
to 80 percent (Indonesia) favoring a "greater [Chinese]
leadership role in world affairs." The latter tracks with
the prevailing strategy among Southeast Asian governments
to draw China into a role as a rising but status quo power
by binding China to the rest of the region with ties of
mutual economic advantage.
Southeast
Asia Territorial Disputes
From Southeast
Asia's perspective, the best China is one that is domestically
preoccupied, much like the China of the last decade. The
fear is that as China gets its domestic house in order,
gains economic and military strength, and is largely freed
of its historic security concerns to the west (Russia)
and the east (Japan), it will feel increasingly free to
turn its energies southward.
Japan labors
under the shadow of historically recent memories of its
often harsh wartime rule over the region. These memories,
however, vary significantly by demography, ethnicity,
and location. Political power has passed to a postwar
generation that has no direct personal recollection of
the New Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Also, some populations,
like the overseas Chinese and the Filipinos, experienced
an often brutal occupation. But others, like the Burmese
and Indonesians, recall the Japanese invasion as the critical
event that broke the hold of European colonialism in the
region and in some instances gave local nationalists their
first taste of political power. Thailand effectively acquiesced
to Japanese occupation and thereby escaped its most adverse
effects. Since the war, Japan's interaction with Southeast
Asia has been confined largely to economics--as trader,
investor and aid provider. In recent USIA polls, 92 percent
of Indonesian respondents gave Japan an overall "favorable"
rating as compared to 77 percent for the United States.
In Thailand, a plurality of opinion regards Japan as the
kingdom's "closest economic partner."
Today, Japan
is valued as an economic engine that powers much of Southeast
Asia's economic growth. Japan plays no direct security
role in the region, and the Southeast Asian states want
to keep it that way. As long as the US-Japan Security
Treaty remains viable, the Southeast Asian governments
are confident that Japan will be content to leave to the
United States the task of protecting the vital Southeast
Asian sea-lanes through which the bulk of Japan's oil
supplies are transported. The great fear is that if Japan
ever feels it must use its own Navy for that purpose,
it will provoke China into military countermeasures. The
last thing the Southeast Asians want is a competition
for military preeminence in the region between China and
Japan.
The United
States
Finally, the Southeast Asians are uneasy about the United
States--about American commitments and staying power.
The reasons for doubts on this score are not hard to discern.
Despite repeated assertions by American officials to the
contrary, many Southeast Asians do not regard the United
States as an inherently Asian power. In time, so the thinking
goes, the United States will withdraw to its natural geographic
sphere of influence in the eastern Pacific. Perhaps ironically,
such doubts were reinforced by America's Cold War victory.
The end of that contest provided the obvious rationale,
if one was needed, for a substantial drawdown of the US
security presence in Asia. Without a worldwide adversary,
there was a logic to calls on the home front for a peace
dividend to be gained in part by pulling back America's
overseas military deployments. For the harshest skeptics,
America's post-Cold War record of military engagements
overseas provided additional evidence. Prime Minister
Mahathir of Malaysia put the matter in characteristically
blunt terms: "The presence of a Western power will not
make a difference especially after Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia,
and Rwanda. It takes only one soldier to be killed before
the whole force will be withdrawn."
All Southeast
Asian governments were keenly aware of the downward pressures
on the US defense budget in the immediate post-Cold War
period. Most watched with dismay as the US-Philippine
negotiations to extend the American lease at Subic failed.
Nor were they reassured by the defeat of President Bush
by a little-known, small state governor in a campaign
that stressed US domestic concerns to the almost total
exclusion of foreign policy. Finally, the Gulf War, when
US troops were deployed through the Mediterranean rather
than Southeast Asia, seemed to suggest yet one more reason
why the United States might de-emphasize its security
role west of Guam. This is ironic because the primary
route for logistic supply to that battlefield (mostly
by sea) was across the Pacific and through the Indian
Ocean.
Against this
backdrop, the US naval deployments in response to the
Taiwan crisis of 1996 and the US-led NATO operations in
Kosovo provided a welcome degree of reassurance regarding
American capacity and determination to retain its global
security role. When US warplanes bombed the Chinese Embassy
in Belgrade, at least some senior military officers in
Southeast Asia reacted, first, by assuming the bombing
was deliberate and, second, by welcoming it as a signal
reminding China who is boss.
At the same
time, there is tangible uneasiness among policy elites
concerning another implication of Kosovo--a growing predilection
on the part of the United States to engage in "humanitarian
intervention." The specter of the United States and its
allies deciding what values are to be enforced internationally
evokes not-too-distant memories of Western colonialism.
Regional Response
The ASEAN response
to this changing security environment has occurred along
three dimensions: unilateral, multilateral, and bilateral
(with the United States).
Unilaterally,
the ASEAN governments have done two things. First, they
continued to act on the central principle they have followed
for nearly three decades--that the foundation of national
security is a successful and growing economy. "Resilience,"
a formulation connoting social stability, economic success,
and a general ruggedness was coined in Singapore and soon
spread as a kind of regional mantra. All of the successful
ASEAN states have kept their focus on the priority objective--economic
growth and modernization.
At the same
time, they began to invest more heavily in their respective
military establishments. This growth has been sufficiently
noteworthy to lead many observers to refer to a regional
arms race. In the early 1990s Southeast Asia was the one
growth area in an otherwise contracting global arms market.
Indonesia purchased much of the former East German Navy--29
ships in all. Malaysia purchased F/A-18s and Russian MIG-29s.
Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand purchased F-16s; Thailand
purchased Chinese tanks and armored personnel carriers,
German helicopters, and American P-3s. The complete list
of such acquisitions was long, but it was misleading to
refer to a regional arms race.
These actions
constituted a reorientation of armed forces away from
domestic counterinsurgency missions toward external defense
coupled with a modernization and upgrading of forces by
countries that now could afford it. The growth in military
spending was within planned national budgets, and it generally
tracked or only slightly exceeded aggregate economic growth.
Other factors at work included an effort to improve national
capabilities to defend offshore territorial claims, particularly
in light of China's assertiveness in the South China Sea;
a response to the considerable political influence enjoyed
by the armed forces in several countries; and some undeniable
competition and one-upmanship among the states of the
region, notably between Singapore and Malaysia.
One of the
consequences of the Asian economic crisis was a scaling
back of military procurement budgets throughout the region--most
notably in Thailand's decision to rescind its purchase
of FA-18s from the United States. If a feeling emerges
in the region that the economic crisis is effectively
over, military budgets can be expected to benefit accordingly.
The most interesting
developments in terms of regional security have a multilateral
character. ASEAN has become the centerpiece in this process.
When the association was created in 1967, its declared
purpose was to foster economic and cultural (and by implication,
political) cooperation among its members. The founders
of the organization were emphatic and explicit that ASEAN
was not, nor would it become, a security organization,
that is, a military alliance. In fact, ASEAN was from
the outset an organization with an overriding security
purpose. Its achievements in terms of fostering cultural
contact and understanding have been constructive, but
hardly earth shaking. Its various initiatives in the direction
of regional economic cooperation have come to little for
the basic reason that the economies of the member states
are competitive rather than complementary.
But security
is another matter. ASEAN was founded in the aftermath
of Indonesian "confrontation" against Malaysia, exacerbated
by the Philippines' territorial claim to Sabah. The clear
intent in creating ASEAN was to prevent the outbreak of
another conflict among the five founding members. And
this has been one of ASEAN's great successes. Patterns
of consultation and collaboration have been fostered,
mutual trust has been nurtured, and political and foreign
policy elites have become closely acquainted with one
another. In short, ASEAN has become a "security community"
defined as a collectivity in which military conflict among
its members has become almost unthinkable. For example,
despite recurring acrimony over a number of issues, a
military clash between Singapore and Malaysia is about
as unlikely as one between Spain and Great Britain over
Gibraltar. Disputes exist, but they are either resolved
through negotiation or adjudication or set aside until
they become negotiable at some future time.
The second
major achievement of ASEAN came in response to Vietnam's
1978-79 invasion and occupation of Cambodia. ASEAN took
the lead in coordinating a remarkably effective diplomatic
campaign that denied Cambodia's UN seat to the Vietnamese-installed
government in Phnom Penh. Three governments (Singapore,
Malaysia, and Thailand) also worked with the United States
(and China) in providing covert assistance to the various
Khmer guerrilla organizations conducting military resistance
against the Vietnamese. These efforts, along with the
US-led economic embargo, were instrumental in persuading
Vietnam to finally withdraw from Cambodia.
Although ASEAN
is not a military pact, several of its members have been
engaged in bilateral cooperation for many years on security-related
issues of shared concern. Examples include Thailand and
Malaysia on their common border (long a haunt of the Malayan
Communist Party and Thai Muslim secessionists), the Philippines
and Indonesia regarding smuggling, and Singapore and Indonesia
concerning piracy. Since the decision to evacuate Clark
and Subic, each of the ASEAN countries has offered to
make appropriate facilities accessible to US naval and/or
air forces. Beginning in 1992, a multilateral dimension
was introduced when security issues were explicitly included
on the agenda of ASEAN ministerials and uniformed officers
included in meetings of senior officials. In the same
time frame, the annual meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers
with ASEAN's "Dialogue Partners" began to encompass security
issues. In 1993, this security dialogue was expanded to
include China, Russia, and India. Meanwhile, Vietnam,
Laos, Burma, and Cambodia have become full members of
ASEAN. All this official dialogue has been supplemented
by semiofficial meetings and conferences conducted by
academics and policy institutes in the ASEAN countries
with invited outside experts and devoted to security issues.
Eventually,
the participants will have to decide whether to extend
multilateral security cooperation beyond discussions to
embrace operational activities, including possible multilateral
joint exercises and training, and coordination of some
equipment purchases (for example, maritime patrol aircraft)
to allow for possible joint use and interoperability.
However, there is little or no likelihood that ASEAN will
ultimately be transmuted into a full-fledged military
alliance. No serious sentiment exists within the organization
for such a step. The region remains too diverse with too
little consensus regarding the identity and extent of
security threats. Thailand and Vietnam, for example, have
distinctly different views of China in this regard. Even
if an alliance were established, the collective military
strength of the region would be insufficient to cope with
aggression or intimidation by a large power. Finally,
nonalignment still exerts a significant tug on official
sentiment within the region.
The latest
development is an ASEAN decision to establish a formal
arrangement to manage the official security dialogue--the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The Forum hosted its first
annual meeting in Bangkok in July 1994. Composed of 21
Pacific Rim countries, including China, Japan, Russia,
and India, as well as the United States, the ARF had the
potential of becoming a significant arena for addressing
such common security concerns as piracy and such regional
disputes as the Spratlys. In reaction to the discovery
of Chinese military construction on Mischief Reef in 1995,
the ARF became the vehicle for a serious initial attempt
to resolve conflicting interests and claims in the South
China Sea. Yet, when additional Chinese construction was
detected during the most acute phase of the Asian economic
downturn, the ASEAN countries could not muster an effective
response within the ARF. At this stage, the jury is still
out as to whether the ARF will become a viable diplomatic
vehicle for addressing security issues in the region.
A current test is provided by efforts within ASEAN to
use the ARF to negotiate a "code of conduct" for managing
disputes in the Spratlys.
The US Role
As a consequence--and
somewhat paradoxically--the ASEAN states still look to
external powers as the ultimate guarantors of their security.
The Five Power Defense Pact links the United Kingdom,
Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia. But it
is the United States that is, overwhelmingly, the region's
preferred security partner. This shows up clearly in US
Information Agency polling of regional opinion (for example,
in Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, and the Philippines),
in official public statements (for example, in Singapore)
and in government actions and private comments by officials
(for example, in Malaysia). Even in nominal outliers like
Vietnam and Burma, some senior military officers are quick
to reveal their preference for a continued robust American
defense presence in the region.
Since the demise
of SEATO, the United States has been party to only one
multilateral Asian alliance, ANZUS, comprising Australia,
New Zealand, and the United States. But America does have
bilateral defense agreements with Thailand and the Philippines.
More important, the US 7th Fleet, headquartered in Hawaii
and forward based in Guam and Japan, (composed of permanently
assigned units and those deployed for six-month periods
from central and eastern Pacific bases) operates on a
continuing basis in the region. US air assets deploy to
the region out of Japan and Alaska, and forces from all
services, including ground forces, regularly go to the
region from the continental United States for a variety
of exercises. Altogether, and on a continuing basis, approximately
100,000 American military personnel are forward deployed.
At the most
basic level, US objectives in Southeast Asia have remained
consistent over the last five decades: (1) prevent the
emergence of a regional hegemon, (2) keep open the sea
and air routes that transit the area, and (3) maintain
commercial access to the economies of the region and the
peace and stability that commerce requires.
Pursuit of
these interests has carried US security policy through
four historical phases over the past half century: the
war against Japan in the 1940s; the counterinsurgency/nation
building period of the 1950s and 1960s, culminating in
the Vietnam War; the Nixon Doctrine; and the focus on
strengthening the 7th Fleet as a counter to the Soviet
military presence based at Cam Ranh Bay in the late 1970s,
and pressure against the Vietnamese military occupation
of Cambodia, culminating in the 1989 Vietnamese withdrawal
and the signing of the 1991 Paris Agreements establishing
a framework for a possible political resolution of the
Cambodian conflict. Coincidentally, the demise of the
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War removed Russian
military power from the region. Since 1991 the United
States has entered a fifth phase with the termination
of the US military presence in the Philippines. The loss
of facilities at Clark and Subic compelled a rethinking
of US strategy that involved a dispersal of the US presence
in the region through access arrangements in a number
of countries but no large US bases. Administrative offices
serving the Pacific Command have been established in Singapore.
With the advent of the Clinton administration, there also
was a change of emphasis more accommodating to multilateral
approaches to security. The new approach embraced the
advent of ARF and explicit intra-ASEAN discussions of
security issues as fully compatible with existing US bilateral
security ties and activities in the region.
The United
States now faces a substantially changed security landscape
in Southeast Asia, one that reflects the essential success
of American post war policies. America currently is without
challenge as the preeminent military power in the region,
and from a Southeast Asian perspective, that presence
is largely benign because it comes without territorial
or overt hegemonic ambition.
Security regimes
generally develop in response to or in anticipation of
threats. What makes the US security role in Southeast
Asia so distinctive and challenging in intellectual and
policy terms is the absence of a clear threat. Instead,
there is the regional sense of uneasiness noted earlier.
The Southeast Asians want the United States present as
an insurance policy--as a benevolent cop on the beat to
protect them against potential external threats, against
the unknown, and, to some extent, against each other.
As long as the US-Japan Security Treaty is operative and
the US 7th Fleet patrols the Southeast Asian sea lanes,
Tokyo will not need to contemplate its own military presence
in the region. Disputes or potential disputes within the
region are less likely to flare up or provoke a local
arms race if a neutral third party is by far the strongest
military presence in the area. The day may come when the
combination of growing economies, militaries, and multilateral
institutions and processes will give the region sufficient
strength and coherence to make a US security presence
largely superfluous--but not yet.
Other considerations
that underlie Southeast Asian support for a continued
US presence include the preference among the armed forces
of the region for American weapons and equipment and for
the United States as a source of common military doctrine
and shared intelligence. US forces treat Southeast Asia
as a single security area, and through joint exercises,
exchanges, and interactions with local armed forces, have
given the region what coherence it has in military terms.
Finally, the US military presence is valued as means of
maintaining US interest in the region and encouraging
an increase in America's economic involvement. The United
States remains Southeast Asia's largest single market.
Since exports and foreign investment have largely driven
the economic growth of the region, the American connection
remains hugely important to the region's future. Southeast
Asian governments also want to encourage increased American
investment as a counterweight to the massive presence
of Japan in that sector. Finally, if Southeast Asian industry
is going to compete successfully with lower-wage Chinese
competitors, an infusion of foreign technology will be
required in many cases.
Having said
all this, significant constraints exist on US influence
in the region. Until recently, the most obvious were limitations
on American defense budgets. Ironically, had the Philippine
Senate approved the tentative agreement for renewal of
the lease at Subic, the United States would have faced
significant difficulties in fulfilling the financial terms
of that agreement. In a new era of Federal budget surpluses,
budget limitations may not pose an insuperable hurdle
to a major capital- and personnel-intensive presence in
Southeast Asia like Clark and Subic. That will become
clear only if an opportunity for such a facility presents
itself. Second, nationalism constrains the willingness
of Southeast Asian states to accept a close, visible tie
to the United States. ASEAN has a longstanding formal
commitment to the objective of establishing a Southeast
Asian Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), which
would amount to the exclusion of the external great powers
from the region. ZOPFAN has taken on no reality beyond
the declaratory, but it accurately reflects a widely held
determination not to be the cat's paw of others outside
the area. This impulse received a recent impetus from
Indonesia's selection in 1993 to serve a five-year term
as leader of the Nonaligned Movement. One consequence
of all this is a desire to minimize the size and visibility
of the American military presence in each of these countries.
None of them want to have the raucous equivalent of Angeles
City or Ilongapo that serviced American airmen and sailors
outside the gates of Clark and Subic in the Philippines.
Visiting Forces Agreements establishing legal jurisdiction
over US military personnel have become a lightning rod
for such concerns.
Finally, several
irritants recur in US relations with the region, most
related to trade disputes and human rights. Examples included
a long-running and acrimonious quarrel with Thailand over
protection of intellectual property rights, a public argument
between the United States (including President Clinton)
and Singapore (including former Prime Minister Lee Kwan
Yew) over the proper punishment for an American teenager
found guilty of vandalism in Singapore, and the Congressionally-mandated
cancellation of some International Military Education
and Training (IMET) aid programs because of human rights
related criticisms--notably Malaysia's policy toward Vietnamese
refugees and Indonesia's handling of East Timor. During
the 1990s, the mood in several of the ASEAN governments
has become palpably more resentful of, and resistant to,
US pressure on behalf of a human rights/democratization
agenda. Singapore and Malaysia were particularly outspoken
concerning US "arrogance" and "cultural imperialism."
The Asian financial crisis has tended to override and
mute these issues while diplomatic negotiations have resolved
some of them. If Indonesia's newly empowered democracy
takes hold, the political climate on these issues in the
region will presumably become more receptive to US views.
At the same
time the Asian financial crisis injected a new discordant
element into the picture--a sense of acute vulnerability
to the forces of the new globalized economy. Malaysia's
combative prime minister angrily blamed international
currency speculators for triggering Asia's meltdown and
the IMF for running roughshod over local sovereignties
in responding to the crisis. Mahathir's view that the
West (and the United States in particular) had acquired
too much economic power over Southeast Asia is widely
shared by other, less outspoken leaders in the region.
In sum, US
security planners face a complex environment in Southeast
Asia that requires an intelligent, sensitive (even subtle)
diplomatic touch; that integrates political, economic,
and military considerations; and that looks beyond the
immediate to at least the midterm future. The names of
the game are anticipation, prevention, deterrence, and
reassurance.
Looking Ahead
Southeast Asian
attitudes and approaches toward US policy and presence
will be shaped, in the first instance, by developments
within the region. These will include performance of the
major Southeast Asian economies, the viability and unity
of Indonesia, and the cohesion and effectiveness of ASEAN.
Beyond these obvious factors, there are some wild cards
in the deck including a potential political upheaval in
Burma.
Economic success
breeds confidence and stability--or in the parlance of
the region, "resilience." Economic growth also provides
the budgetary resources to upgrade national military capabilities.
Economic growth undergirds the development and strengthening
of regional institutions including ASEAN and its various
elaborations and spinoffs. A prosperous and modernizing
Southeast Asia will deal more confidently with the major
external powers--Japan, China, the United States and,
in the future, India. Such a Southeast Asia will be more
inclined to draw lines in the sand (or sea) regarding
China and to insist on conditions and quid pro quos concerning
the US security presence. Conversely, a Southeast Asia
unable to regain its pre-1997 economic footing will be
less assertive vis-à-vis outside players and more
prone to intraregional disputes. Such a region will be
more vulnerable to growing Chinese influence and, at the
same time, more inclined to look to the United States
for both markets and security support.
Indonesia is
a huge X factor in this regard. If it holds together and
begins to restore economic growth under a moderate democratic
government, Indonesia can regain its role as the linchpin
of a modernizing, increasingly interactive Southeast Asia.
In the worst case, a disintegrating Indonesia will fundamentally
alter the balance of power in East Asia. Opportunities
for Chinese ambition will grow, and the tendency of regional
states to strengthen bilateral security arrangements with
the United States probably will grow as well.
All of this
is intimately connected to ASEAN. The association, as
we have known it, cannot survive a breakup of Indonesia,
and it will survive only as a shell if Indonesia becomes
the chronic sick man of Southeast Asia. ASEAN is already
confronting major difficulties as a result of the Asian
financial crisis and the ill-advised decision to rapidly
expand its membership to include Cambodia, Laos, and Burma.
ASEAN today is a distinctly less cohesive and effective
organization than it was in 1996.
The second
broad set of factors that will affect US attitudes concern
the policies and actions of major powers in East Asia--notably
China and the United States, itself. The foreign policies
of Southeast Asian governments are generally predicated
on the hope and the expectation that China will give the
highest national priority to economic development and
modernization, which will in turn require good relations
with its neighbors. A China focused on economic growth
would logically desire increased trade with and investment
from Southeast Asia. And such a China would eschew provocative,
destabilizing policies in the South China Sea or elsewhere
that would jeopardize such relations. Southeast Asian
policies toward China have been designed to reinforce
such logic and tendencies.
But few Southeast
Asian officials are confident beyond doubt that Beijing
will prove to be such a benign presence in the region.
Unlike the United States, China is geographically next
door and does have territorial ambitions. An undercurrent
of apprehension is present in every Southeast Asian government
to varying degrees. The possibility that China may pursue
a strategy designed to assert its primacy in the region
cannot be ruled out. Chinese statements and actions in
the South China Sea validate the danger in the minds of
many regional defense and intelligence officials.
A China with
hegemonic tendencies poses another danger--that Japan
will react by strengthening its military capabilities
and by assuming a more "normal" security role in the region.
In short, a logical consequence of growing Chinese power
could be a great power rivalry with Japan along Asia's
rim. None of this would be welcome in Southeast Asia.
The US economic
presence in Southeast Asia has never been seriously controversial.
Not only was it a source of needed imports, technology,
managerial expertise, and investment--it was most importantly
a natural concomitant of America's most important contribution--its
market. As far as one can see into the future, that market
will remain absolutely vital to Southeast Asian economic
well-being.
The US security
presence has been welcome in Southeast Asia since the
early days of the Cold War for the measure of protection
it provided. In some instances that protection was direct
and tangible as with US assistance to the Philippines
against the Hukbalahap insurgency. In one case--Vietnam--it
was direct, massive and unsuccessful. But generally the
US presence has been valued for a general climate of stability
and security it provided. As long as the strongest military
power in the region was an outside player without territorial
ambition, Southeast Asians could be confident that nothing
really bad--a hostile hegemon or a major interregional
conflict--would be allowed to happen. That confidence
was in turn key to foreign investment and other economic
development initiatives that made the Asian Miracle possible.
In sum, the
regional context in which Southeast Asians view the US
security role is remarkably dynamic and indeterminate.
China's strategic direction--aspiring regional hegemon
or increasingly satisfied status quo great power--remains
entirely uncertain. In all probability the China of the
next 10 to 15 years will emerge as a complex amalgam of
the two. Just as China's strategic direction is a question,
so are its economic and political prospects. The Chinese
economy of today faces huge problems including hopelessly
inefficient state enterprises, a technically insolvent
banking system, and an alarming and unsolved environmental
crisis. A substantial slowing of economic momentum has
profound implications for a regime that has lost Marxism/Maoism
as an effective source of political legitimacy and relies
instead on an improving economy. Future historians may
see the ongoing crackdown on Falun Gong as the first clear
signal of a systemic Chinese political crisis.
Uncertainties
concerning China extend to other elements in the strategic
environment. As the Taiwan dispute becomes more acute,
the confident expectations of a few years ago that the
situation could be managed and contained are no longer
prevalent. ASEAN is reeling under the impact of the Asian
financial crisis and suffering acute indigestion from
trying to incorporate too many new members too fast. The
association's future is very much in doubt. The economic
crisis has raised a number of other uncertainties, the
most basic being whether the region will make a full recovery.
There are some hopeful indicators in that regard, but
whether they represent a real or false dawn is still a
question. Even larger questions surround Indonesia, including
whether the archipelago will remain politically unified.
All these
uncertainties tend to impel the region, however
reluctantly, toward increased reliance on the US
security presence as an anchor in stormy seas. This
will be true only so long as the United States really
is seen as an anchor. Southeast Asian states will
become increasingly sensitive to any signs of declining
US interest in or disengagement from the region.
Assessments of US resolve will become even more
of a cottage industry for Southeast Asian governments
than in the past. For this reason the continuing
(and even growing) ambiguity in US policy toward
the South China Sea does not bode well. What exactly
is America prepared to defend and under what circumstances?
Few in Southeast Asia are confident of the answer.
Those that are uncertain will tend to hedge that
uncertainty. The logical alternative to reliance
on the US security presence will be some sort of
regional accommodation to Chinese primacy.
CONTENTS
Convergence/Divergence
in Political Interests, Values, and Policies
by
William Watts(23)
Before the
"Asian flu" financial earthquake ravaged a number of East
Asian economies in 1997, many observers--and not just
in Asia--argued that "Asian values" provided a new and
better underpinning for economic and political growth.
As opposed to "Western values," which allegedly placed
bottom-line gain above all else, the Asian approach was
to be the exemplar of a kinder, more humane model, one
which provided a surer safety net for the less fortunate,
even as national strength grew.
The troubles
that hit the region have cast doubt on that premise. But
the search continues for some middle ground, one that
would achieve growth and (in some countries more than
others) greater democratization, all the while securing
social equity, especially for the needy. In a recent interview
in the 2 December 1999 issue of the Far Eastern Economic
Review, Japanese Prime
Minister Keizo Obuchi, advocate of a "third way,"
put it this way: "I do support restructuring, but not
the kind of drastic restructuring common in the United
States and Europe, or so-called chopping off of people's
heads. . . . American-style layoffs, sudden cuts that
create instant unemployment, just aren't acceptable. .
. . We don't want people to lose their incentive to work.
We have to find a middle ground."
While the "Asian
values vs. Western values" debate has lost some of its
earlier cachet, few would argue that there are considerable
differences in approach between countries across the Pacific.
The debate is complicated by the remarkable and sustained
health of the US economy. This has led to a degree of
triumphalism in statements by American leaders that can
grate on foreign ears.
Closely related
to this discussion and argument about contrasting values
is another equally sensitive and contentious issue: nationalism
vs. globalism. Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Mahathir
bin Mohamad has spoken out vociferously against forces
of globalization that he sees as undermining national
sovereignty. As the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
imposed certain requirements on states wishing to participate
in IMF bailout efforts, citizens of countries affected
protested what they saw as excessive demands. "I'MFired"
was a popular T-shirt selling in Seoul. The blowup at
the abortive World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in
Seattle is but another example of the extent to which
these conflicting forces will command center stage in
coming years.
Background:
Changing US Congressional Focus
In the midst
of this tidal wave of change, thoughtful observers fret
about the ability of the US body politic to meet the challenges
of the new. An influential senior member of the House
of Representatives voiced his concern at a breakfast meeting
in Washington some months ago. His ruminations on the
changing nature of that body are important for gaining
a better understanding of the role the House plays in
the overall conduct of American foreign policy. While
its role may be secondary to that of the Senate, and certainly
of the executive branch, it does control the purse strings.
As such, its influence must be taken into account.
The Congressman
noted that when first elected to Congress in 1976, he
and most of his colleagues moved to Washington with their
families. They bought homes. Their children went to school
here. They set down roots in the Capitol area. They socialized
with one another, regularly across party lines. They attended
a wide variety of functions in the city and its environs.
They had time to go to the theater, attend lectures and
concerts, and exchange ideas with residents both in and
out of government. They got to know their fellow members
well. They made close links to exposed to a wide range
of thinking, and different outlooks.
No more, according
to the Congressman. Today, the scene has changed dramatically.
In many (most?) cases, the spouse of the elected official
stays home, the result of the growing number of two-member
working families. Many (most?) members fly into Washington
late Tuesday, work Wednesday and Thursday, and go back
to their homes Thursday evening or Friday morning. Time
is controlled by committee meetings, reading memos, briefings
by staff, floor votes, and constituent visits. The Congressional
schedule has been cycled to meet this new pattern of life
and workstyle.
The result
is eminently predictable. Members of Congress have little
or no time to meet people not directly linked to their
work regimen. Many share bachelor apartments with one
or more colleagues. Members must pay attention to constituent
concerns. There is scant room for off-duty socializing.
For most, there is little focus on foreign policy and
trade matters. The old foreign policy "establishment"
no longer commands the attention it once did.
The impact
on a less-informed Hill membership, especially on foreign
policy, is exaggerated by the inherent instability of
the House as an institution. It used to be that a strong
Democratic majority was a given. That meant that the House
leadership could lead. No longer. With a margin in the
number of seats held of 5-10-15, no leader has much room
to maneuver. The ability to cut deals, form coalitions,
and pursue alternatives to get legislation passed is now
severely restricted.
Leadership
inflexibility on key issues (the case now, the speaker
noted with regret) means that what might be possible is
rendered impossible. "Fast-track" legislation for passage
of trade-related issues is a shining example: he said
he could draft a measure that would pass easily, but members
of the leadership will consider only their own bill, which
gives no "wiggle-room" on sensitive environmental and
child labor issues. "The center of gravity in Congress
for free trade is narrowing."
In closing,
the Congressman noted the "anecdotal" nature of foreign
policy debate. The demise of a clear adversary--the Soviet
Union--leaves no touchstone against which to measure and
test foreign policy themes. With a Congressional membership
and leadership both less-well-informed and also unfocused,
coherent deliberation in international affairs becomes
an oxymoron. Policy discussions are dominated by "anecdotal"
forces and pressures, and major US policy interests, such
as "fast -track" legislation, can get lost in the process.
Background:
Some American Views
In trying to
assess national interests on both sides of the Pacific,
we may look at how Americans rate selected countries on
a spectrum ranging from "close ally" to "enemy." We have
clustered "close ally" and "friend" responses, drawing
upon a recent Potomac Associates study, as well as earlier
work by Potomac and the Roper Organization.
[The Question]:
"I'd like to have your impressions about the overall position
that some countries have taken toward the United States.
As I read down a list of countries, do you believe that
country has acted as a close ally of the United States,
has acted as a friend but not a close ally,
has been more or less neutral toward the United
States, has been mainly unfriendly toward the United
States but not an enemy, or has acted as an enemy
of the United States?"
Geography is,
clearly, a decisive factor. With lengthy, porous borders
to north and south, Americans recognize the remarkable
luxury of their relative physical security, giving their
immediate neighbors high ratings as "close ally." Mexico's
problems with drug trafficking (supplying American demand)
and related crime are well documented. The bottom line,
however, recognizes friendship and security.
The standing
of China, while still well down the list, has recovered
much of the ground lost at the time of the 1989 killings
at Tiananmen Square. The image of a lone man standing
defiantly in the path of the tank remains indelibly imprinted
in many minds. Still, Americans have moved steadily toward
a more accepting view of China. This view has been helped
along by a number of factors: reciprocal visits by Presidents
Jiang
Zemin and Bill Clinton, Premier Zhu Rongji's well-covered
journey last spring, and an enduring historical fascination
many older Americans have with China (buttressed over
time by World War II alliance, the writings of Pearl Buck,
and American missionary activity) among others.
Table
1: "Close Ally/Friend" (listed in 1999 order)
(percent)
|
|
1987 |
1989 |
1990 |
1991 |
1994 |
1999 |
Canada |
87 |
n/a |
n/a |
n/a |
85 |
82 |
Mexico |
57 |
56 |
n/a |
n/a |
66 |
72 |
Japan |
66 |
62 |
52 |
59 |
59 |
65 |
Taiwan |
n/a |
n/a |
n/a |
n/a |
n/a |
54 |
South Korea |
39 |
42 |
n/a |
41 |
n/a |
52 |
USSR/Russia |
4 |
16 |
36 |
43 |
48 |
41 |
China |
26 |
16 |
19 |
17 |
25 |
32 |
Vietnam |
n/a |
n/a |
n/a |
n/a |
n/a |
26 |
North Korea |
n/a |
n/a |
n/a |
n/a |
n/a |
18 |
Iran |
2 |
3 |
6 |
n/a |
8 |
13 |
Recent developments
provide a counterweight: charges of illegal campaign contributions,
the Cox Committee report alleging Chinese theft of nuclear
secrets from the Los Alamos facility, and attacks on US
diplomatic missions in China following the mistaken bombing
of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. On balance, the influence
of these items has not halted the steady recovery of China's
image. At the same time, however, the many skeptics about
China's policies and behavior certainly will pursue their
efforts to keep some distance in the Washington-Beijing
relationship. Such skepticism also is reflected in the
fact that nearly three times as many of those interviewed
perceive Taiwan as a "close ally" as do those who see
China that way. Taiwan's favored position in this opinion
measure assumes special meaning in light of current tensions
between the two adversaries.
Japan is an
interesting case. In spite of long-standing and voluminous
attention given to Japan as economic challenge--and, in
the eyes of many, economic predator--it ranks near the
top as "close ally." Many surveys continue to find that
the lead item of a negative nature in feelings about Japan,
aside from economic concerns, is Japan's 1941 attack on
Pearl Harbor. While the "sneak attack" syndrome persists,
numbers mentioning it are declining. When comparing friends
vs. foes, Americans seem to have compartmentalized that
unpleasant memory.
The standing
of the Republic of Korea has advanced markedly in our
new survey. Several factors are at work. First, the growing
Korean and Korean-American community in the United States,
approaching 1 million, is emerging as a significant factor
in America's demographic landscape. Korean restaurants,
grocery stores, cleaning establishments, and Korean-made
consumer goods have probably softened Korea's image. Second,
President Kim Dae-jung has proved to be a strong leader,
his reputation strengthened by progress in Korea's opening
up of its political and social systems. Democratization
is an important part of Kim's agenda. One result has been
the virtual disappearance of stories in newspapers and
on television of student protesters being clubbed and
teargassed by police. His visits here, and return trips
to Korea by President Bill Clinton, received heavy and
generally positive coverage. Third, Korea's steady behavior
in the face of the North Korean potential nuclear threat,
and the aberrational behavior of the regime of Kim Jong-il
in P'yongyang, have earned respect at official levels
and may have reverberated as well among the public.
A special word
is in order about Russia. Attitudes toward this erstwhile
Cold War adversary have undergone by far the most extensive
rejuvenation of any in this series. Barely a decade and
half ago, with the nuclear rivalry still in full swing,
a scant 3 percent looked upon Moscow as either "close
ally" or "friend." Now that number has risen an unprecedented
fourteenfold. Slippage in recent years probably reflects
concern over chaotic and often unpredictable Russian economic,
political, and security behavior. Virtually all experts
will agree that is a concern well taken.
US Policy
Interests
The overarching
political interests, values, and policies of the United
States in East Asia can be clustered into a number of
groupings. Readers may have others to add to the following
list:
- 1. Maintenance
and strengthening of regional peace and stability.
- 2. Promotion
of economic growth and its benefits, including a liberal
trade climate, pursuit of democratic capitalism, and
productive economic engagement.
- 3. Expansion
of democracy and human rights. This arena ensures tension
in our dealings with authoritarian systems. The focus
of US policy has been on countries where restrictions
are the most severe. In addition to pressing for enlarged
political freedoms and individual liberties, this approach
can include humanitarian assistance--supporting USAID-type
programs in education, agriculture, and housing, for
example.
- 4. Pursuit
of programs designed to protect the physical environment,
including problems of air and water pollution, destruction
of rain forests, land degradation, and the like.
- 5. Enhancement
of bilateral and regional cooperation in dealing with
a variety of new and emerging issues, including drug
trafficking, organized crime, population movements,
and piracy.
- 6. Related
to the above, strengthening of regional and international
institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
forum (APEC), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
United Nations (UN), and a variety of other bodies.
- 7. Encouragement
of open communications and information flow. A wide
variety of exchange programs, designed to improve mutual
understanding, are already under way. These can be continued
and expanded. A dramatic new entry in this arena is
freedom of access to the emerging vehicle of choice
for global information interchange--the Internet.
The first two
themes are the subject of other papers for this seminar.
They will be treated only briefly here, as they relate
to the overall political framework.
Regional Peace
and Stability
During the
five-year time frame of this exercise, the United States
will wish to maintain a robust military presence in the
region. With our vast economic and political interests
in the region, any administration is unlikely, in the
near term, to want to risk creating a security vacuum
that would result from any substantial US drawdown of
military forces. A large amount of diplomatic energy and
capital will be devoted to working out the terms of US
engagement in the region, and, in particular, dealing
with growing Chinese military capabilities, concerns,
and suspicions. The general security issue has already
been addressed, with agreement on new US-Japan defense
guidelines.
In that mission,
any president will have considerable public backing. We
found that the American public places "trying to maintain
peace and regional stability" as the first priority for
the conduct of US foreign policy in Asia: 86 percent of
those we interviewed considered it to be either "very
important" (56 percent) or "somewhat important" (30 percent).
Furthermore,
regional force deployment is supported by a substantial
majority of Americans. Our recent survey found that 69
percent of those interviewed favored either increasing
or keeping at the same level the number of US military
personnel stationed in Japan "for defense and peacekeeping
purposes;" 66 percent were or the same view concerning
forces in South Korea. Those numbers were statistically
the same as those found in a comparable 1985 testing of
opinion and were higher than 1978 findings.
The same survey
also registered majority support for coming to the defense
of Japan if attacked by Russia or China, and plurality
backing for defending Japan or South Korea from attack
by North Korea. In the case of Taiwan, a majority of the
general public opposed its defense against attack by China;
a bare majority of a minisample of "better informed" respondents
supported US defense of Taiwan.
A continued
US military presence in Asia is contingent, of course,
on its being welcomed by host nations in the region. The
1992 closure of US bases in the Philippines shows that
any such welcome has its limits. The 1995 rape of a schoolgirl
on Okinawa added to pressures from some quarters in Japan
for a reduction of US military forces. Unease at the huge
American presence in downtown Seoul has long been a source
of friction. Pressure for a reduction in that presence
would likely accompany any genuine movement toward South-North
accord on the Korean peninsula. But in the five-year period
under review, a meaningful forward-based US military presence
seems all but inevitable.
In terms of
convergence/divergence, authorities in Beijing clearly
view the development of a joint Theater Missile Defense
capability by the United States and Japan, no matter how
configured (i.e., against possible North Korean missile
threat, as officially argued), to be a direct challenge
to the interests of the People's Republic. Likewise, moves
to upgrade the US-Taiwan military relationship, inherent
in the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act just passed by
the House, infuriates Beijing. Ambassador Joseph Prueher
was warned by Deputy Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi that
US-China ties would be "seriously damaged" if the bill
becomes law.
Economic Growth
and Trade Ties
Four of our
largest 10 trading partners are located in Asia: Japan,
China, Taiwan, and South Korea. That should mean, by definition,
that we pay in official terms a large share of high-level
attention to nurturing our ties to those countries. Critics
argue that such is not the case, a theme that will be
addressed below.
Since the economic
arena is also the focus of another paper, comments here
will be brief. Our two largest trade imbalances--by far--are
with Japan and China. Indeed, their combined 1998 surpluses
equal those of the next 10. It should come as no surprise,
then, that we found in our latest survey that Japan and
China stand essentially alone at the top of the list of
those countries who are seen as "generally unfair when
it comes to trading with the United States," and whose
"imports from them pose a serious threat now to the jobs
of American workers." Worth noting is that China's position
on both counts has soared steadily and dramatically in
recent years, while concerns about Japan, although still
high, seem to have eased considerably. In American eyes,
China has moved markedly ahead of Japan as problem number
1:
Perhaps surprisingly,
a majority of Americans in our survey took a rather self-critical
view of the current massive trade deficits the United
States is now running. Given two alternatives, 60 percent
of those interviewed said that the deficits are "caused
primarily by problems of our own making," while only 27
percent attributed them "primarily to actions of other
countries." Although that perception may be reassuring,
it also should be seen in the context of very good economic
times. At some point, the current American economic expansion/boom
will slow down. Should the correction be sharp, trade
deficits are likely to provoke a serious political backlash.
Japan and China will be the obvious target of both Congressional
and public wrath. Those deficits represent a potential
time bomb waiting to be armed and detonated.
Encouragement
of Democratic Values and Human Rights
Pursuit of
the human rights issues has become a central element in
American foreign policy. For some, it represents American
idealism at its best: a former staff director at the US
Congressional office for the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) told me that during many
field trips to East Europe he was constantly encouraged
to keep up the pressure for improving human rights--the
annual Congressional reports on conditions around the
world were "a beacon of hope," one prominent Czech dissident
told him.
American
Views of China and Japan as a Trading Partner
For others,
however, the US fixation on expansion of democratic and
values and human rights represents an unwarranted intrusion
into the internal affairs of a sovereign state.
- China,
for example, has been particularly outspoken in its
disdain for what it sees as Washington meddling. It
has vigorously rejected recent US pressures, whether
official or unofficial, about its crackdown on the Falun
Gong group. China has dismissed out of hand any criticism
of its actions in Tibet. Chinese authorities remain
taciturn and testy about any references to the 1989
killings at Tiananmen Square as a "massacre" and routinely
turn aside or ignore outside protests against roundups
of dissidents.
- Vice President
Al Gore felt the wrath of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir
when Gore appeared to take the side of the "reformasi"
movement of ousted Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim
during a speech in Kuala Lumpur.
- Indonesia's
new Foreign Minister, Alwi Shihab, in a speech last
month at the Nitze School of International Studies,
made clear his concern about possible outside intervention
concerning charges of human rights violations by its
military in East Timor. Discussing meetings in New York
with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and members of
the Security Council and the Asian caucus, he said,
"My main purpose was to convey a message to the International
Commission on Human Rights. We don't know what their
recommendation will be, but if it is to establish an
international tribunal we are of the opinion that the
Commission should wait until Indonesia has acted. .
. . I want to convey that an international tribunal
could be counterproductive. It could trigger xenophobia
or excessive nationalism, and encourage some to 'wrap
themselves in the flag.' That would be a disadvantage
to all."
Whatever the
pros and cons, a plurality of Americans (44 percent) believes
that "human rights should be a principal concern in our
dealings with countries where they occur." Attention to
human rights is now a staple of American foreign policy.
But in looking
for areas of divergence, this area surely will provoke
critical response in many quarters. It will be a particular
irritant in relations with those countries where American
concern is most concentrated. Above all, pressures on
democratic values and human rights will stain the official
US dialogue with China and will cloud some unofficial
dialogue as well.
Support for
human rights issues need not be restricted to finding
fault. In a recent visit to the United States, Indonesian
Education Minister Yahya Muhaimin said he was looking
for assistance in English language training and donation
of textbooks, with transportation costs funded by USAID.
The growth of English as the international language, enhanced
by the explosion of the Internet, has made such language
training all the more important. In this area, US interests
and those of recipient nations clearly intersect.
Environmental
Issues
Charges that
environmental issues were being sacrificed in the pursuit
of economic gain were some of the key points of controversy
that turned the WTO meeting in Seattle into a chaotic
nonstarter. Growing global concerns about the environment
ensure that it will remain high on the international agenda.
Periodic global
summits already have taken place, notably in Rio de Janeiro
and Kyoto. More are sure to follow. Cooperation on environmental
issues was a specific item in the 1992 US-Japan Global
Partnership Plan of Action, signed by President George
Bush and Prime
Minister Kiichi Miyazawa. Agreement on specifics has
been difficult to obtain, with developing nations complaining
that the developed world wants to impose and enforce codes
of conduct that sharply limit what those trying to bring
their economies up to the next level can do. This area
has plenty of room for convergence. Finding mutually acceptable
programs and courses of action, however, will not be easy
to achieve.
What is seen
by critics as indiscriminate and/or unwarranted destruction
of resources will remain a consistent bone of contention.
Charges of excessive logging in Indonesia and Thailand,
for example, or development of salt manufacturing facilities
that threaten gray whales in their Baja California, breeding
grounds are but two examples of the kind of commercial
activity that can stir passions and can lead to carefully
targeted protest campaigns. When land clearing, as in
Indonesia, results in fires that spread choking clouds
throughout the region, health concerns come into play
as well. Although US engagement in some of these issues
may be marginal, its global presence dictates involvement
in relevant international forums.
Emerging Social
Issues
Probably no
arena in which humanitarian interests of the United States
and nations of East Asia more easily intersect than those
subsumed under the broad rubric of "social issues." The
list is daunting.
- Health,
with a particular emphasis on the AIDS pandemic. Although
signs are encouraging that progress is being made in
controlling the spread of AIDS in the United States
and some other countries, it remains an international
scourge. Opportunities abound for joint research efforts,
building of new or expanding existing facilities, training
of doctors and technicians, education programs, distribution
of contraceptives and training in safe-sex education,
and more.
- Drugs
and narcotics. Again, bilateral and multilateral
efforts, aimed at both education on the dangers of drug
use and control of drug/narcotics trafficking, are natural
undertakings. Given the enormous profits that are to
be made in the drug business, control efforts are frequently
hampered by corruption at all levels. The enormous problems
US efforts encounter on our own border with Mexico give
dramatic evidence of how intractable the problem is.
Nonetheless, as governments and societies become more
fully aware of the destructive nature of drug addiction
to the social fabric, that awareness opens the door
to expanded attempts to deal with the problem.
- Piracy.
The growth of piracy in the South China Sea. At the
Manila ASEAN+3 meeting, former Japanese
Prime Minister Obuchi announced that Tokyo will
convene a regional meeting on this subject this spring.
(Japanese concern has risen sharply, after seizure of
the Japanese-owned Alondra Rainbow in the Malacca Strait
a few months ago.) And Indonesian
President Abdurrahman Wahid told reporters he would
favor joint Indonesian-Japanese antipiracy patrols in
the region. Whether US involvement in such activities
would be either desirable (from Washington's standpoint),
or welcomed in the region (given concerns about American
military reach) is open to question. This area, nonetheless,
bears examination.
- Population
movements. The plight of refugees, in the aftermath
of the Vietnam War, underscored the difficulties in
dealing with movements and relocation of displaced persons.
Traditionally, the United States has been a haven for
those fleeing both turmoil and repression. By accepting
emigres seeking political asylum, the United States
can earn the opprobrium of the country of origin. It
also provides a safehaven for those exiled by their
native country. These are burdens to be borne.
Now is the
time to begin thinking about a possible new flow, this
time from North Korea. Whatever the future may hold on
the Korean Peninsula, one distinct possibility at some
point down the road is a tidal wave of refugees across
the border, either into South Korea or China. They are
likely to be a desperately forlorn group. Some form of
US involvement will be inevitable. We will need to work
closely with South Korea and, hopefully China, Japan,
and Russia in dealing with this human flood.
Smuggling of
illegal immigrants has become a big business, with dramatic
episodes of ships running aground on US shores, laden
with Chinese being smuggled into the country. Guam has
also become an unanticipated stopping point for Chinese
"illegals," with their unintended stay keeping them in
international limbo. Interestingly, in this area (along
with drug trafficking) US dialogue has yielded constructive
results with Cuba, although interchange on most other
topics with Havana remains stalled. But this example reveals
this area as one where common interest and effective mutual
cooperation can coincide.
Regional/International
Institutions
Strengthening
of viable regional and international institutions has
been a key element of policy makers on both sides of the
Pacific.
ASEAN
Almost two decades ago, Lawrence Krause (then at the Brookings
Institution) described The Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) as ". . . . the most important political
and economic development in the world since the creation
of the European Common Market." Formed in August 1967
by Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines,
it has since grown to include Brunei, Vietnam, Burma (Myanmar),
Laos, and Cambodia. Headquartered in Jakarta, ASEAN had
as its initial mandate the promotion of economic, social,
and cultural cooperation.
ASEAN has been
struggling to define its roles and missions. Most recently,
in the crisis in East Timor, it found itself trumped by
an outside peacekeeping force led by Australia. And ASEAN
member Indonesia was provoked, as noted above, to express
concern about any possible international inquiry into
alleged human rights abuses.
ASEAN remains,
however, a potent force. And it provides what may be an
increasingly influential regional forum through its expanded
"ASEAN+3" format--the 10 ASEAN members plus Japan, China,
and South Korea. The November 1999 meeting in Manila gave
evidence of this prospect, and with it a stance that could
be seen as seeking greater independence from US influence.
Members reportedly agreed that eventually a common market
and common currency are "distinct possibilities." Nihon
Keizai cited Asian leaders as expressing "concerns about
strengthened US influence" and the dominance of "an American
standard" in regional economic affairs. Nikkei quoted
South Korean President Kim Dae-jung as sharing "a common
vision of Asian cooperation for Asia." And host Philippines
President Ejercito Estrada noted: "Let's face it, our
future is intertwined with that of greater East Asia."
In addition,
the "plus 3" members--Japanese
Prime Minister Obuchi, Chinese Prime Minister Zhu
Rongji, and Korean President Kim--agreed to form several
study groups on trade and other issues. (Kim reportedly
offered ten areas, including free trade, financial markets,
industrial issues, fisheries, and environment.) In addition,
Japan was asked by the ASEAN finance ministers to make
permanent the "Miyazawa fund"--an emergency pool of $30
billion created in 1998 to help Asia past the 1997-1998
cash crunch. And Obuchi lobbied openly in Manila to have
former Finance Ministry official Eisuke Sakakibara ("Mr.
Yen") made the next head of the International Monetary
Fund, in place of retiring director Michel Camdessus.
According to Japanese sources, Obuchi's efforts won "strong
backing" from Zhu, Kim, and others.
These straws
in the wind are important--indicators of a readiness for
members of this important Asian regional body, expanded
to bring in as participant observers other key Asian players,
to move in a direction that could give it significant
additional clout in dealing with the American colossus.
Observers in Manila pointed skeptically to the absence
of senior Western officials, or representatives of major
Western media sources. That oversight may prove costly
for US policy interests in the future.
APEC
Another key regional body is the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation group (APEC),(24)
formed in 1989 to further cooperation in trade and
investment between members and the rest of the world.
At President Clinton's urging, the 1993 session,
held on Blake Island outside Seattle, was attended
by chiefs of state or heads of government. With
some stumbling along the way, it remains a significant
forum, with an economic focus that keeps it outside
the purview of this paper. APEC, however, as any
of the major regional or global bodies, requires
constant nurturing and high-level attention. The
huge amount of preparation that goes into the summit
meetings of such groups provides unique opportunities
for focusing on specific issues, exchanging views
at the mountaintop, and establishing easy, compatible
working relationships that can be drawn upon in
times of trouble.
The UN
US interests will have areas of divergence with Asian
counterparts in the United Nations. A singular point of
contention is the US nonpayment of its dues. Although
US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke put on a full-court press
last month, inviting Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) to attend
a "love-in" in New York, the terms of the deal that Helms
and Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) have proposed raise difficult
questions. In addition to stipulating certain UN administrative
reforms, the Helms-Biden bill would cut the percentage
US contribution to the UN budget from 25 percent to 22
percent immediately and eventually to 20 percent. That
would leave the Japanese contribution of 19 percent higher
than those of four of the "Permanent Five" on the Security
Council, since the United States is not now paying.
Japan, without
a permanent Security Council seat and with little chance
of being granted one in the near future, can hardly be
expected to look kindly upon such a US move. Yukio Sato,
Japan's Ambassador to the UN, put it this way in a February
16 interview in The Japan Digest: "Assessed contributions
should be paid without condition. . . . [W]e can't just
accept the conditions put by Congress and say that's fine.
. . . [I]ncreasing numbers of countries see the unreasonableness
of our position. Many of my colleagues at the UN agree
with me when I say that Japan's contribution isn't fully
recognized, and that the most obvious symbol of the lack
of recognition is its absence on the Council."
The WTO
Events at the abortive World Trade Organization meeting
in Seattle underscored difficulties governments will face
in dealing with issues of globalization. Although the
issues may be primarily economic in nature, they also
reflect strong nationalist sentiments. As such, they represent
a formidable challenge to the global political fabric.
The ability to restart this dialogue, and move it forward
successfully, will provide an important litmus test.
Open Communications
and Information Flow
The computer,
and now the Internet, have brought about, in a stunningly
short period of time, monumental change in the way we
communicate, do business, and handle many aspects of contemporary
life. For most, both the extent and rapidity of change
are hard to absorb. American business sees in the Internet
virtually endless possibilities for increases in efficiency
and productivity. Individuals find a new way to shop.
Students have access to previously inaccessible troves
of information. Anything from travel to dining out can
be redesigned.
At the same
time, the Internet poses enormous threats to privacy.
It raises profound questions for corporate security. And
for governments, especially those that wish to keep a
close eye on what individual citizens are doing and thinking
about, these new information tools are often seen as downright
subversive. China, for example, has advocated sharp limits
on the use of the Internet, with access monitored and
restricted.
The United
States has seen a veritable explosion of Internet use
and development, even as "dot-com" Internet stocks have
made alot of people rich. Major corporations, led by Ford
Motor Company and quickly followed by Delta Airlines,
are making home computers and the Internet available,
at virtually no cost, to their employees. That is a considerable
investment in the future. Rewards, in terms of worker
productivity and loyalty, could be huge.
This information
and communications revolution is bound to create interesting
problems for national policymakers. The ability of individuals
to communicate with persons totally unknown to them, across
national borders, becomes simple--minimal hardware, software,
and a telephone line--are all that is needed. That communication
can be harmless and transparent. It can also deal with
subjects that violate standards of good taste. It can
be used to transact illegal business. And, as we have
just seen, computer "crackers" have the ability to paralyze
individual systems for hours with targeted attacks on
central servers.
This new medium
can also be used to think up, organize, and carry out
activities that governments find threatening to their
very existence. China, for example, was unnerved by the
use made of Internet exchange during the 1989 events at
Tiananmen. It has pointed to such Internet communications
as one of the subversive activities of the proscribed
Falun Gong. Japanese authorities have noted the use of
the Internet by the banned Aum Shinrikyo doomsday sect.
Japan also found itself under attack last month by cyberhackers,
who marched through government web sites, adding nasty
comments to home pages, wiping out census and personnel
data, and generally frightening officials over the ease
with which official computer security could be broached.
Internet communications
are becoming increasingly difficult to monitor and control.
That is most troubling, of course, to those who wish to
limit unconventional or antigovernment thinking and activities.
This is likely to put American companies in conflict with
various Asian authorities. Internet giants such as Microsoft,
America Online, Oracle, Cisco Systems, and many others
will not want to see their ability to operate in Asia
restricted by bureaucratic fiat. In pursuing their objectives,
they will want to turn to the US Government to back their
rights of mobility and access. They probably will be joined
by non-American companies, especially in Europe, that
will be ready to join the fray. Whether seen as political
or economic, the struggle and competition over information
flow and penetration is certain to grow in scope. It is
another facet of the friction inherent in the face-off
between forces of nationalism and pressures of globalization.
Specific Country
Comments
Because of
the special nature of US relations with, and interests
in, Japan, China, and Korea, additional commentary concerning
those countries is in order.
Japan
I noted at the outset the comments by a leading member
of the House of Representatives about the changed psychology
of Congress. At one point in his remarks, he lamented
the sea change in the level of attention now being paid
to Japan. Formerly, when a Japan-related issue was raised,
there were immediate calls for hearings. Now, he noted,
even getting a committee quorum is difficult, never mind
a plenum, to address Japan issues.
Relative lack
of interest in Japan, combined with the paucity of high-level
Japan expertise within the administration's inner policy
circle, are carefully noted by America-watchers in Japan.
They point to a number of specifics:
- Shortage
of top-level/inner-circle Japan expertise, just noted.
(Two of our most experienced Asia/Japan hands will shortly
be moving on: Rust Deming, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asia, has been named ambassador
to Tunisia, and Kurt Campbell will reportedly leave
his senior Asia slot at the Pentagon, sometime this
spring, to take a position in the private sector.)
- President
Clinton's overflight of Japan (and Korea) after his
10-day China trip in 1998, which was taken as a serious
(if unintended) snub that confirmed the popular phrase
of the United States moving from "Japan-bashing" to
"Japan-passing."
- Following
that, what Tokyo saw as a tepid US response to North
Korea's firing a Taepo Dong-2 missile through Japanese
airspace.
- Brusque
Washington reaction to the idea of a Japan-led Asian
Development Fund (now effectively endorsed, as noted
earlier, by ASEAN members asking Tokyo to perpetuate
the "Miyazawa fund" at the November ASEAN+3 meeting
in Manila).
At the same
time, Japan has undertaken a number of policy initiatives
that suggest a readiness to pursue a more independent
policy line:
- High-level
discussion of plans to cut Japanese host-nation support
for US forces stationed there. Labeled by Japan a "sympathy
budget," that irritates US officials, who see the support
as Japan's proper contribution to the beneficial security
arrangement it has with the United States.
- A 60-member
delegation visit to Cuba last November, engaging in
talks on restoring economic ties, and possibly rescheduling
12 billion yen in public debt. Japan Air Lines will
start charter flights for Cuban tourist agency Cubanacan
in August. They will fly from Osaka's Kansai International
to Havana via Vancouver.
- Endorsement
of Sakakibara to replace Camdessus as director of the
IMF.
- Scheduled
tripartite talks with China and South Korea on a range
of policy issues.
- Prime Minister
Obuchi's rejection of the "American way" of economic
reform, cited earlier.
- Consideration
of possible free trade agreements with Singapore, South
Korea, and Mexico.
Difficult issues
remain on the bilateral agenda. Dealing with them will
be complicated by ongoing political instability in Japan.
The feuding among various political parties has made passage
of legislation, in some areas, difficult if not impossible.
Jockeying for power and the necessity of covering one's
domestic flank may impede the ability of the Japanese
ruling coalition to deal effectively with rankling trade
and other problems.
Efforts to
address policy issues are buttressed by a backdrop of
American public opinion that is remarkably favorable.
Latest measurements on a number of baseline attitudes
are at high points. At the same time, these views are
colored by holdovers of past concerns: we found a majority
(58 percent) agreeing with the proposition that "Japan
thinks almost entirely of its own self-interest, and does
not act as a good partner of the United States," as against
a minority (30 percent) that viewed Japan as "a valuable
and reliable economic partner." Japan's former economic
shadow was reflected as well among the near majority (49
percent) who said, when asked to look at Japan's future
economic prospects, that "Japan will do what is necessary,
and will soon again be a strong economic power." Put together,
those views reflect a nuanced blend of skepticism and
concern.
Looking to
the future, the Industrial Structure Council of Japan's
Ministry of International Trade and Industry plans to
issue a new "long-term vision" next month. It will reportedly
foresee 2 percent annual growth of the Japanese economy
for the next 25 years, if Japan presses ahead in information
technology, and adds to the labor force by hiring more
older people. That will help offset an average annual
shrinkage in the labor force of 0.6 percent between now
and 2025.
The trade imbalance,
and disagreement over discrete trade issues, have become
a staple on the bilateral agenda. Another issue of looming
importance concerns US military personnel, and particularly
the Marine air wing, on Okinawa. With the G-8 summit scheduled
to be held on Okinawa in August (possibly adding China,
according to reporters traveling with Obuchi in Bangkok
this past weekend), this contentious issue appears a long
way from solution. As the meeting nears, pressure for
a solution will grow.
None of these
items can be looked upon as suggesting any break in the
close Japan-US bond. One just as easily can argue that
they are all part of the mix, with the Japanese Government
for its part pursuing responsibly its own national interest.
Furthermore, popular feelings about the United States
remain positive. The latest annual survey by the Prime
Minister's Office, for example, showed the US in first
place (as usual) among countries for which Japanese hold
warm feelings: 76 percent were of that view--as compared
to 53 percent for the European Union, 50 percent for China,
and 48 percent for South Korea. A recently released report,
drawn up by an advisory panel appointed by Prime Minister
Obuchi, has called for, among other things, adopting English
as a second language (Mitsubishi Chairman Minoru Makihara
had earlier decreed English as the company's official
language). Joint ventures are commonplace, underscored
by a recent grand alliance of Toyota, General Motors,
and Volkswagen for certain production arrangements. And
the Nihon Keizai Shimbun recently reported that the Tokyo
Stock Exchange, the New York Stock Exchange, and Deutsche
Bourse will link up with Standard & Poor's to develop
a new global stock index. It will include 100 multinationals
capitalized at $5 billion or more.
In January
1992, "Global Partnership Plan of Action," noted earlier,
committed both sides to a wide range of initiatives: cooperation
to promote world peace and prosperity; political and security
relations; cooperation on environment, quality of life,
and science and technology; enhancement of mutual understanding
and exchanges; and a variety of efforts concerning major
economic and trade issues between the two countries. This
document remains a useful blueprint for bilateral cooperation
and action. But with the bulk of official attention devoted
to recurrent trade disagreements and other economic disputes,
much of the promise of that 1992 document remains unfulfilled.
Passage of revised defense guidelines could open the way
to move ahead on other aspects of the plan. Much remains
to be done.
An important
opportunity approaches. Eight September 2001 will mark
the 50th anniversary of the signing of the US-Japan peace
treaty. Various groups in both countries are developing
programs to mark that event. It will provide a useful
vehicle to reaffirm and reinvigorate a relationship that
has benefited both sides, and the world, so well. In that
exercise, the warning signals noted above deserve to be
addressed and heeded.
The forthcoming
arrival of this anniversary stands in sharp contrast,
of course, to the continued inability of Japan and the
former Soviet Union to find a way to a peace accord. The
Northern Territories remain an intractable stumblingblock.
As authorities in Moscow have made clear in their brutal
war in Chechnya, giving up territory of any sort is not
high on their agenda.
Finally, throughout
much of Asia, Japan's cultural image has improved considerably.
Many sense that Japanese style is a "better fit" than
that of the United States or the EU. In many parts of
Asia, pirated/bootleg copies of Japanese music, movies,
and merchandise are popular. Japanese language study is
on the increase, up about 30 percent over the past five
years, according to one report. This greater sense of
acceptance and acceptability is important to Japan, as
it suffers through a lengthy recession and continues to
confront the ghosts of its history.
China
From talk of "strategic partnership" to the accidental
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, US-China relations
have lurched sharply off course. The bombing aside, China
remains unhappy with what it sees as US hectoring over
human rights issues. It is concerned over America's power
position vis-a-vis China and the global preeminence of
US military might in a post-Gulf war, post-Kosovo environment.
(Those two events underscored to China's leadership just
how far it lags behind in the military sphere, a realization
drawn in many other capitals as well.) It is angered over
continued US arms sales to Taiwan, and the possibility
of a theater missile defense system (with Japan), which
it sees as a direct challenge to its own security. It
is worried about internal unrest, with the leader of the
condemned Falun Gong sect residing in the United States.
It faces serious domestic economic challenges, not the
least of which is a level of corruption that has assumed
daunting proportions. (The New York Times of January 22
reported on ". . . a conspiracy that apparently involved
dozens of party, police and banking officials, the wife
of Beijing's powerful Party chief, virtually the entire
customs department of a major city, and a flamboyant corporate
leader who has vanished. . . . During the 1990s, the sprawling
syndicate smuggled billions of dollars' worth of cars,
oil, and industrial materials through the bustling southeastern
port of Xiamen, evading huge sums in taxes.") It fears
the growth of the Internet, and the threat to its own
continued hold on power this new communications world
entails. And the leadership appears divided on how to
handle relations with the United States. Fierce factional
infighting was reported, for example, on how far to go
in meeting US conditions for Chinese entry into the WTO.
At the same
time, US and Chinese interests coincide, or at least share
some common boundaries, in several areas:
- International
comity. Both countries have an interest in seeking at
least a modicum of cooperation in the various international
bodies and groupings in which both participate--the
UN, APEC, various arms control forums, and soon, hopefully,
the World Trade Organization.
- Regional
security. Ongoing talks with the United States, Japan,
and South Korea concerning the North Korean nuclear
program are the most obvious example. Stability in Southeast
Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Central Asia can benefit
both sides. Chinese interest in guaranteeing its energy
sources comes into play here and can be called upon
in arms sales discussions.
- Chinese
air is badly polluted. Beijing can use American investment
and technology to address this major health and environmental
problem.
- Illegal
emigration. Noted earlier, this mutual interest calls
for cooperation.
- Coping with
drug trafficking similarly calls for cooperation. As
drug use in China surges, authorities there may have
an interest in cooperating with US counterparts in trying
to bring international dealing under control.
- Economic
pragmatism. One-third of China's exports go to the United
States, giving China a $60 billion trade surplus. China
needs our markets, providing leverage/interest in a
productive trade dialogue.
US policymakers
will have to deal with a public that is skeptical about
China. Our survey found that a slight majority (51 percent)
view China as "primarily a threat and challenge to US
security interests, and needs to be contained;" a minority
(40 percent) sees China as "primarily an opportunity for
US business, and a potential benefit from which we should
seek economic gain." Such views will play out in Congress
as the vote comes up for ending China's need to qualify
for normal trade status, a precondition for its entry
into the WTO.
Korea
As noted above, political regeneration under the presidency
of Kim Dae-jung and exchanges of state visits between
him and President Clinton have added luster to the US-Korean
bilateral relationship. The absence from US evening TV
news broadcasts of students being teargassed has also
helped Korea's public image in the eyes of Americans.
The ratings Americans give to Korea thus have improved
across the board.
Restlessness
among many Koreans at the huge American presence in their
country will continue. Periodic incidents involving US
military personnel and Korean civilians add to that brew.
And such outside pressures as those from the International
Monetary Fund for dealing with the Asian economic downturn
compound xenophobic sentiments. For some, "globalization"
can mean "Americanization." At the same time, the overall
current mood in Korea toward the United States is probably
the best it has been since World War II. There has been
a steady movement away from a "patron-client" relationship
to one of partnership.
Views of Japan
among the Korean public have taken a sharp turn for the
better. That improved image has made official cooperation
with Japan easier to sell--as in the Manila agreement
among Kim, Obuchi, and Zhu to set up a number of study
groups.
Of overriding
importance is the ongoing standoff between the two heavily
armed rivals on the Korean Peninsula, which is the focus
of another paper. Suffice it to say that close coordination
and cooperation between Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo (and,
where forthcoming, cooperation with Beijing) are essential
in dealing with North Korea. The policy review undertaken
by former Defense Secretary William Perry has been helpful
in this regard and in reaching understanding on the need
for comprehensive deterrence. Limited recent progress
in US-North Korean talks on capping P'yongyang's nuclear
program suggests that such cooperation may be achieving
positive results.
America:
It's Lonely at the Top
Underlying much of what governments and societies on both
side of the Pacific must deal with in coming years is
a fundamental reality of the new global environment: how
to deal with the conflicting pressures of globalism vs.
nationalism. They will present basic choices, for individuals
and for states. Although the two are neither mutually
contradictory nor mutually exclusive, they will result
in many points of contention.
Former Assistant
Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye has written of the power
and appeal of American "soft power." Whether it be films,
fashion trends, music, or the Internet, there can be little
dispute about the immense projection and influence that
America has on the world scene. Indeed, when Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright referred to the United States
as "the indispensable nation," she expressed a point of
view that many Americans would find quite in order. With
the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet
Union, for many, American supremacy has seemed unchallenged
and unchallengeable.
Historically,
this position cannot be long sustained. Only a few years
ago, we worried about Japan "buying up America." Now,
we push Japan to get its economy in order, reassume its
role as global economic engine and accept a larger share
of the regional security burden. For many, the latest,
and now largest, challenger is China. A recent Nihon Keizai
survey of 1,600 business leaders worldwide found just
over half believing that China will show the fastest growth
rate for the next generation. Just under half were of
the view that by the year 2025 the world will have three
superpowers--the United States, Europe, and China. Some
54 percent of those interviewed believe the Japanese economy
will skid from second place now to third, fourth, or even
fifth. As noted earlier, for Americans, China has surged
past Japan as problem number 1 in Asia. A majority now
views China as "primarily a threat and challenge to US
security interests [that] needs to be contained," while
a lesser minority sees China as "primarily an opportunity
for US business, and a potential benefit from which we
should seek economic gain." The rapid emergence of China
as a perceived cause of concern only underscores the necessity
of keeping one's mind ready for further future shifts
in priorities.
Much as Americans
like to think of US influence as constructive, benign,
and based on friendly motives, others don't always see
America that way. They often wonder about the staying
power of the United States and its perceived relative
lack of interest in Asia. Given America's substantial
military prowess, economic vitality, and intellectual
creativity, others are often prone to hold us to a special--and
higher-- standard.
A trenchant
Asian perspective was expressed by Mohamed Jawhar bin
Hassan, chairman of the Institute of Strategic and International
Studies in Kuala Lumpur at a conference held last year
at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies:
"The fall and
disintegration of the Soviet Union has left the United
States as the lone superpower, one without a credible
rival. Many in the region would rather have the United
States as the hegemon than any other major power if a
hegemonic order is unavoidable.... That sentiment... masks
considerable dissatisfaction and... hostility. More and
more, the United States is seen as arrogant; as seeking
to shape the rest of the world in its own image, notwithstanding
whether this self-image is shared and desired by others;
as being intrusive and prone to ever more coercive and
unilateral behavior in both the political and economic
spheres; as having militarized its foreign policy; as
practicing double standards and not practicing what it
preaches; and as being ignorant of, or worse, ignoring
the sensitivities and peculiarities of other countries.
"Quite obviously,
much has to be done on all sides to arrest the deteriorating
trend in Asian perceptions toward the West. Asia must
recognize that it needs further and more purposeful reform
in the political and economic spheres. In a rapidly globalizing
world, there is no other option to remain viable. Asia
must also tend to its rifts. Suspicions, conflicts and
unhealthy contests among neighbors further undermine regional
resilience and proved added opportunities for exacerbation
of relations with the West. Asia must also guard against
an irrational and emotional backlash against the West,
which would be mutually disastrous.
"The onus for
improving the strategic climate, however, lies more with
the West, in particular the United States. It has to do
more because it is both more responsible for the present
state of affairs and is better equipped to deal with the
situation. After all, it is a superpower."
Those are tough
words. They mirror what a senior member of the Singapore
Foreign Ministry said to me in a conversation in his office
a few years back: "Your foreign policy in this part of
the world reminds us of the workings of your volunteer
fire departments. The firemen spend most of their time
doing their regular jobs. Then, when the fire alarm sounds,
they jump onto the firetruck and rush in. When the fire
is out, they go back to their regular work. That seems
to be the way you deal with Asian policy--on a firealarm
basis."
Whether
one agrees with these assessments or not, they represent
the views of friendly, seasoned, and acute observers.
They merit appropriate attention.
CONTENTS
Economic
Interests, Values, and Policies
Introduction
During the
next five years, the world economy faces significant challenges
in both the trade and financial policy realms. Three main
themes will emerge: disputes over substantive agendas,
haggling over filling top leadership posts, and Asia's
possible desire to go its own way and expand regional
organizations in parallel with, or in opposition to, the
existing global order. These issues will develop in the
context of a probable slowing of the US economy, which
could contribute to a more conflictual environment than
has existed in the recent past.
Macroeconomic
Context
The United
States is currently in the midst of the longest recorded
economic expansion in its history. A number of factors
have undoubtedly contributed to this remarkable performance,
including improvements in economic policy making, commercialization
of technological advances, globalization, favorable demographics,
and probably just plain luck. Ironically, the Asian financial
crisis probably contributed positively to economic performance
in the United States by reducing global demand for capital
and facilitating maintenance of low interest rates in
the United States for the past several years.
Yet all good
things must come to an end, and this 107-month expansion
is surely one of them. A number of developments over the
next five years could bring this expansion to a halt.
The most obvious weakness in the US economy is its very
low level of saving. This low saving rate has two particular
implications. First, the high level of household consumption
in recent years has been made possible by the rapid increase
in asset prices. That is to say, a considerable amount
of the recorded increase in household wealth has taken
the form of capital gains on existing holdings, rather
than incremental flow additions to existing holdings.
At the same time, Standard & Poor's recently classified
the United States as one of 20 financial systems "vulnerable
to a credit bust" due to concern about the quality of
bank portfolios, especially exposure to commercial real
estate. A significant downturn in asset markets, which
many believe currently embody a bubble, could force a
severe retrenchment of spending by the private sector.(25)
As households increase their savings rates to rebuild
their balance sheets and firms cut back on investment
in response to less favorable conditions for raising funds
in response to both weakened stock prices and curtailed
bank lending, a recession could result.
Low national
saving also manifests itself in the current account deficit,
the difference between the value of what a country produces
and what it consumes, which reached a record $339 billion
in 1999, or 3.7 percent of GDP, its highest level ever.
Concerns about the level of US indebtedness (which must
be financed by foreign lending to the US) and/or recovery
in the rest of the world (and hence the growth of desirable
investment opportunities elsewhere) could reduce the attractiveness
of the United States as an investment destination. To
maintain the same level of capital inflow, the United
States would have to offer more attractive terms (that
is, higher interest rates) or experience downward pressure
on the value of the dollar in global markets. A falling
dollar would cause prices of imports to rise. In this
situation, the Federal Reserve would come under pressure
to tighten interest rates, which in turn could cause a
recession. The reduction in the level of economic activity
(and hence a fall in the demand for imports and an increase
output available for export) would be part of the mechanism
by which the United States would re-establish a sustainable
balance-of-payments position.
A less dramatic
end to the expansion could result from a gradual rise
in global commodity prices generated by increased demand
associated with recovery elsewhere in the world (including
most prominently Asia) and/or a tightening of supply conditions
in the United States (especially in the labor market)
could prompt the Federal Reserve into recession-inducing
increases in interest rates in an attempt to pre-empt
inflation. Furthermore, the US economy could be adversely
affected by supply shocks originating abroad, including
disruptions in oil supplies originating in political developments
abroad, or financial market turmoil emanating, for example,
from a meltdown in the Tokyo stock market, or, more benignly,
a shift in portfolio preferences toward the Euro in response
to European monetary integration. Policy mistakes by the
incoming new administration and Congress could subvert
the economy. The point is that one can identify numerous
plausible threats to continued US economic growth over
the next five years.(26)
This possibility
could have important implications for US economic relations
with Asia, and could condition how a number of issues
evolve. In the recent past, surprisingly there has been
relatively little political interest in trade issues,
despite the record-level trade deficits. Presumably this
lack of interest is due to the favorable macroeconomic
performance exhibited by the US economy. If the US economy
were to weaken and if unemployment were to begin rising,
however, trade issues could quickly increase in political
salience, with the enormous US trade deficit acting as
a political lightning rod for discontent about US economic
performance. Despite the fundamental reality that macroeconomic
conditions, not trade policies, are the primary determinants
of the overall US trade balance, US politicians continually
have conflate traded policies, which can strongly affect
the commodity and bilateral partner composition of trade,
with the trade balance. Indeed, the single best predictor
of the amount of US Government attention given to bilateral
trade issues has been the level of the bilateral trade
imbalance.(27)
This situation
could have serious implications for US economic relations
with Asia. Asia already receives more scrutiny on trade
issues than the magnitude of its trade with the United
States would appear to warrant.(28)
Moreover, the largest bilateral trade deficits of the
United State are with Japan and China, the two largest
economies in Asia. There is some evidence that the United
States already pays more attention to bilateral issues
with Japan than objective indicators would predict. Of
similar concern, the US bilateral deficit with China is
likely to grow as China is integrated into the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and quota restrictions on its exports
of textiles and apparel to the United States are phased
out.(29)
In sum, the
US economy is likely to weaken at some point in the next
five years. Trade issues will take on a greater salience.
If the US political system responds as it has in the past,
it is likely to experience increased trade conflicts with
Asia, in particular with Japan and China.
Trade Policy
Historically,
in the absence of any effective multilateral dispute resolution
mechanism, these disputes were resolved predominantly
through bilateral means. Typically, the United States
used the threat of closing its large and lucrative market
to extract concessions from its trade partners. Two developments
will significantly change such dynamics in the future.
First, a declining dependence on the US market will temper
foreign responsiveness to such threats. Although this
process has been interrupted by the Asian financial crisis
and the need to export to the US market, the clear historical
trend is toward orientation away from the US market. This
condition is simply algebra at work: if one trade partner
is growing faster than another, trade volumes quite naturally
will increase more rapidly with the faster growing partner.
This trend has been particularly acute in Asia, where
the rates of national income growth across the region
typically been significantly higher than that experienced
by the United States. The result, up to 1997, was a strong
increase in the share of intraregional trade and a reduced
share of trade with the United States.(30)
As the United States becomes relatively less important
in world trade, threats of market closure will lose their
effectiveness.
At the same
time, the development of the WTO and its improved dispute
settlement resolution procedures significantly constrains
the ability of the United States to pursue its old unilateral
strategies. Although under domestic law the United States
retains its various trade remedy measures (Section 301,
Special 301, et al.), the unilateral use of these measures
certainly will not withstand a WTO challenge. Thus, they
are reduced to the domestic legal mechanism by which WTO-authorized
retaliation can proceed (as was the case in the banana
dispute with the European Union). The death knell of unilateralism
tolled in 1995, when Japan called the US bluff in the
automobile dispute, refused to acquiesce to US market-opening
demands, and threatened to duke it out in the WTO. The
United States decided to settle out of court.
The WTO
Both these
developments mean that the WTO will be increasingly central
to the resolution of disputes between the United States
and its trade partners, including Asia. (Indeed, the United
States has filed by far the largest number of cases of
any WTO member.) The United States faces a number of issues
with regard to the future development of this organization.
The most immediate questions concern what to do in the
aftermath of the debacle in Seattle, and how to integrate
China into the organization. In the longer run, issues
of personnel and substantive agenda issues will reemerge.
The November
1999 attempt to launch a new round of multilateral trade
negotiations in Seattle was driven by a political compromise
left over from the Uruguay Round, rather than any global
ground swell for trade liberalization.(31)
To secure a conclusion to the last round of negotiations,
the United States accepted less than complete reform of
agricultural trade practices on the part of the EU in
return for a commitment to revisit the issue in 1999.
This deal was the origin of the so-called built-in agenda
of talks on agriculture and services motivating the new
round. A certain sense of urgency was attached to the
negotiations over agriculture inasmuch as the "peace clause,"
which prohibits WTO cases against certain practices (principally
undertaken by the EU and United States), is due to expire
in two years.
This built-in
agenda shaped participants' negotiating strategies as
they headed into the Seattle ministerial. Japan and the
EU wanted to broaden the agenda to hide their inevitable
concessions in agriculture and use gains in other areas
to reach an agreement emerging from the new negotiations
that would be politically palatable at home. They preferred
to see a "comprehensive round" involving not only talks
on agriculture and services but also on industrial product
tariff-cutting, competition policy, investment, and reform
of antidumping rules. Within agriculture, the EU jumped
onto the Japanese bandwagon, promoting the notion of "multifunctionality"
in agriculture to distract attention from its increasingly
indefensible export subsidies.(32)
For its part,
the United States showed little flexibility. It largely
tried to limit the agenda to agriculture and services
in which the United States was not be expected to make
major concessions, while simultaneously trying to force
relatively new and controversial issues such as the relationship
between trade and labor standards, human rights, and environmental
concerns onto the agenda.
At Seattle,
officialdom was caught offguard by a wild melange of protest
groups whose motivations and aspirations appeared at times
only tenuously connected to the issue at hand. Despite
police intelligence, the authorities in Seattle appeared
unwilling or unable to comprehend the violent tendencies
of some of these groups. Seattle officials were slow to
react on 30 November when they temporarily lost control
of the streets. The United States was humiliated throughout
the world by the televised scenes of foreign diplomats
being roughed up by the rabble. Only when the White House
demanded that authorities restore order in preparation
for the President's arrival in the wee hours of 1 December
were police permitted to reclaim the streets.
The behavior
of the Clinton administration in Seattle was perplexing,
especially in light of its interest in promoting the social
clause issues. President Clinton's statement, in which
he said that he would like to see economic sanctions used
against countries not meeting labor standards, took his
cabinet members by surprise and destroyed any possibility
of making progress on the issue. Indeed, conversations
with a number of developing-country negotiators indicated
that the President's remark, together with the behavior
of the demonstrators, strengthened their resolve to resist
US demands. Some regarded the demonstrators as an officially
sanctioned attempt to physically intimidate foreign negotiators.
Yet, in the
end, it was the traditional US-EU dispute over agriculture--the
same dispute that nearly scuttled the launch of the prior
round of negotiations and nearly torpedoed those negotiations
a half-dozen times--not the shenanigans of the Raging
Grannies or the Ruckus Society that sank the Seattle negotiations.
This situation, together with the emergence of the developing
countries as a coherent negotiating group, are the real
lessons from Seattle.
The bottom
line is that the meeting was unlikely to accomplish much.
The United States was unlikely to take major actions on
trade policy given its electoral calendar, the Clinton
administration's lack of "fast-track" negotiating authority,
and the change in presidential administration in January
2001. As a consequence, the best that could have been
hoped for would have been the launch of a two-year extended
negotiation over the agenda for a genuine new round of
global trade negotiations two years hence. And in the
aftermath of Seattle, principally the EU and, to a lesser
extent, Japan, have moved to right the organization. They
had led the resuscitation of the built-in agenda talks
and the undertaking of "confidence-building" measures.(33)
With the activities
of the WTO once again fallen off the United States' political
radar screen in the aftermath of Seattle, the most immediate
domestic political issue will be the Congressional vote
to extend permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to China.
For 20 years, as a result of the Jackson-Vanik amendment
to the Trade Act of 1974, the United States has performed
an annual ritual during which it decides whether or not
to extend NTR (née most-favored-nation or MFN)
relations to China. This provision, originally aimed at
encouraging the Soviet Union to permit the emigration
of Soviet Jews, requires the President to certify annually
that nonmarket economies allow emigration. China first
gained MFN status in the US market in 1980, and the certification
was routine until the Tiananmen Square massacre of l989.
Since then, the annual renewal has been a point of contention
involving a bilateral coalition of anti-Communists, human
rights proponents, and protectionists, who have attempted
to use the threat of nonrenewal as leverage to promote
human rights, discourage nuclear proliferation, and reduce
the bilateral trade imbalance.(34)
The President has never failed to extend NTR to China,
and the Congress has never overridden his decision. In
recent years, a rough consensus has emerged that the annual
"Rite of Spring" was not producing desirable results,
and the margin of votes supporting the administration
has grown.
In the current
situation, the United States has reached a bilateral accord
on WTO accession with China, though the administration
has not released the text of that agreement. After China
reaches similar agreements with other WTO members (the
EU is the only major player with which China has not concluded
the negotiations), the WTO secretariat begins compiling
the bilateral agreements. The final outcome is that every
WTO member receives the best terms agreed upon with any
member, (that is, if China agreed to reduce its tariff
on watches to 10 percent with the United States, but agreed
to 5 percent with the EU, the United States would receive
the better deal that the EU was able to obtain), so that
the bilateral agreement could be, at worst, the treatment
that the United States will receive when China enters
the WTO.
The issue,
then, is not whether China will enter the WTO--it will--but
whether the United States will live up to its WTO obligations
by extending PNTR to another member state. The United
States could always refuse, but then it would be out of
compliance with its own obligations under the agreement,
leaving China free to take the United States to the WTO,
as it has indicated that it would. The WTO dispute resolution
panel would presumably rule in China's favor and authorize
retaliation against the United States. Hence, the vote
on PNTR is not a vote on whether China joins the WTO--that
train is leaving the station as soon as the EU climbs
on board--but rather a vote whether the United States
is on that train or left standing at the tracks, subject
to completely legal discrimination against its economic
interests in China.
Presumably
this issue will be resolved within a year or so, if not
much sooner.(35)
In the long run, both personnel and substantive issues
could generate conflicts between the United States and
Asia. With regard to the former, the United States actively
backed New Zealand's Mike Moore over Thailand's Supachai
Panitchpakdi in a protracted dispute over who would succeed
Italy's Renato Ruggiero as the WTO director general. An
eventual compromise was reached by which Moore and Supachai
would split the term. This haggling did nothing to promote
the institutional development of the organization, and
the strong support of the United States for Moore won
it no friends in Bangkok, or in Asia more generally. Another
such brawl can be expected in 2005 when the Moore-Supachai
term ends. The search for Supachai's successor could get
entangled with personnel decisions made in other international
organizations, as will be discussed further.
Beyond personnel
issues, the WTO has a series of intellectually and politically
challenging issues to confront. Most immediate will be
the built-in agenda of agriculture and services. As mentioned
earlier, as part of the Cairns Group, Southeast Asia is
generally supportive of the US position and in opposition
to Northeast Asia. When China enters the WTO, it could
be expected to side with Japan and South Korea against
agricultural trade liberalization.
On services,
developed countries typically have demanded liberalization
of financial and professional services on the part of
developing countries. (Developing countries have countered
by demanding increased possibility for movement of people,
so that, for example, a developing country service firm
could bring its workers into a developed country on a
temporary basis to work on a project (in construction
or maintenance, for example.) The natural alliance is
the United States and Japan against the rest of Asia.
In reality, Japan is relatively uncompetitive in much
of the service sector, and Southeast Asia tends to be
more competitive in services than countries at similar
income levels. Thus, the divisions on this issue are not
so stark.
Beyond the
built-in agenda, trade liberalization in industrial products
is dominated by traditional tariff cutting on the one
hand and the need to better integrate antidumping and
competition policy rules on the other. With respect to
the former, the main problem is the US resistance to cutting
some extremely high tariff "spikes" on some products of
interest to Southeast Asia (athletic shoes, for example).
Nevertheless, because the tariff cutting exercise is a
well-understood process, amenable to traditional WTO tariff
offer negotiations, it is a matter of reaching international
consensus on an acceptable formula.
Reform of antidumping
rules and the creation of a more coherent international
competition policy regime present greater challenges.
Asian countries, among others, want to see reform of antidumping
procedures, which they regard, with significant justification,
as simply closet protectionism. Within the United States,
there is little intellectual consensus as to what the
goals of a desirable international competition policy
should be, beyond prohibiting horizontal collusive practices
such as cartels. Although the topic is of relevance to
a wide range of producers, the most active have been import-competing
firms, who regard competition policy as prospectively
a much less protection-friendly alternative to the existing,
and WTO-consistent, antidumping (AD) laws. (There is also
some evidence that AD actions have facilitated anti competitive
behavior--another reason to prefer them to the application
of competition policy.) The intellectual debate has been
hijacked by lawyers arguing that the goal of trade policy
should be "market access," not "efficiency." Indeed, some
commentators go so far as to argue that these putative
differences in orientation demonstrate that trade and
competition policies are fundamentally incompatible.
Within the
US Government, the bureaucracy is split. The Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department fears that any multilateral
accord would amount to a dumbing down of US law and a
weakening of US antitrust practices, while the United
States Trade Representative (USTR), stung by its defeat
in the WTO in the Kodak-Fuji case, opposes the narrowing
of antidumping laws in the interests of its import-competing
clients. The import-competing sectors and their hired
guns are fully prepared to block any weakening of the
antidumping law. Unless there is a significant shift in
domestic politics, much constructive activity on this
issue emanating from the United States in the next five
years is hard to envision. Perhaps the only hope for action
in this area, is that US exporters, increasingly subject
to the equally irrational antidumping actions of US trade
partners (including some in Asia), will emerge as a more
forceful domestic lobby for constructive change.
The antidumping-competition
policy issue is an inside-the-beltway matter as compared
to the hot-button issues of the social clause. Barring
a significant shift in US Government priorities, which
could occur under the next administration, the United
States will continue to press its labor and environmental
agendas within the WTO. This policy thrust has found little
support in Asia (Thailand and Malaysia were among the
complainants who triumphed over the United States in the
infamous sea turtle case), and will find even less support
once China, which could be expected to vehemently oppose
the US labor and human rights agendas, enters the organization.
Regional Initiatives
Indeed, conflict
on these issues could encourage Asia to go its own way,
creating regional preference arrangements similar to those
that exist in Europe and North America. One such scheme,
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free
Trade Area (AFTA), already exists, though this arrangement
has not had much impact on trade.(36)
The goal is to have 80 percent of trade tariff-free by
2000 and 98 percent of tariff lines under 5 percent, with
some sensitive sectors (agriculture) given longer adjustment
times. Treatment of nontariff barriers have been left
vague, and the new, poorer, socialist members, (were not
members when the negotiations began), have been given
more time to implement their commitments. Although ASEAN
espouses "open regionalism," AFTA may violate nondiscrimination
clauses of the WTO. Econometric evidence concerning its
impact is mixed; the intraregional bias in the trade of
ASEAN members disappears when imbedded in larger Asian
groupings.(37)
The other major
regional initiative, APEC, includes countries from outside
East Asia, most notably the United States, and could potentially
play an important role, though it can point to few tangible
accomplishments in its decade of existence. APEC was originally
an Australian initiative; the Asians wanted United States
involvement to counterbalance Japan, which had a similar
proposal. After its first meeting in Canberra in 1989,
the next big step was in 1993 when, at the first APEC
"leader's meeting," the United States hosted history's
first pan-Asian summit, ironically, held outside Asia.
APEC's membership accounts for more than 2 billion people
(40 percent of world population) and more than half of
world output. An officially appointed Eminent Persons
Group issued a report calling for free trade and investment
in the region by 2020 (2010 for rich members, 2020 for
poorer ones), a goal that the governmental leaders adopted
in their Bogor Declaration of 1994.
Because of
the great political-economic diversity among membership,
no one anticipates "deep integration" along the lines
of the EU. Rather, much activity has been in terms of
"business facilitation" such as streamlining procedures,
etc. Progress on trade and investment implementation has
been uneven; agriculture is a highly sensitive issue,
and the Clinton administration lacks the statutory authority
to implement early tariff cuts.
Neither APEC
nor ASEAN played an important proactive role in the financial
crisis, though both may have served to constrain backsliding.
Both organizations were developed largely by their members's
foreign ministries; their finance ministries (in particular,
the US Treasury in the case of APEC) have remained unenthusiastic,
and neither organization has a highly developed financial
component. (The finance ministers do have their own, separate,
annual meetings, however.) Rhetorically, at least, both
groups have continued to support liberalization, however.
The growth
of regionalism outside Asia and the failure of the WTO
meeting in Seattle have encouraged Asian countries to
take a second look at regional economic integration schemes.
The old East Asian Economic Caucus idea has been revived
recently as the East Asian Free Trade Area. In Japan,
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry is actively
studying the possibility of free trade areas involving
Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and possibly even China
and others. The South Korean Government, too, has been
studying the possible free trade areas bilaterally or
trilaterally with China and Japan. The problem, of course,
is agriculture. Because of its inefficiency in agriculture,
Japan is constrained to look to partners who either do
not have an agricultural sector (Singapore) or have similarly
inefficient agricultural sectors (South Korea). Japan's
search for regional alternatives to the multilateral system
is hamstrung by its own agricultural policy. The same
holds for South Korea.
International
Financial Policy
The other important
dimension of trans-Pacific economic relations is financial,
and a similar set of themes: disagreement over substantive
and key leadership issues and a possible Asian desire
to go its own way reoccurs. The focal points have been
Asian dissatisfaction with the performance of the US Government
and the Washington-based International Monetary Fund (IMF)
during the Asian financial crisis, subsequent debates
over reform of the international financial architecture,
and proposals for regional initiatives that could run
counter to policy emanating from "Washington."(38)
With regard
to actions at the time of the crisis, Thailand was stunned
by the initial US refusal to come to its financial assistance
and its refusal to participate in the "second line of
defense" associated with the initial IMF program.(39)
This unfavorable response was compounded by what are now
widely regarded as fundamental mistakes in the fund programs
which actually exacerbated the crisis.(40)
These perceptions--that the United States was an unreliable
ally and that the economic prescriptions being written
by Washington were at best incompetent and at worst malevolent--were
compounded by the US and IMF opposition to Japan's proposal
for an Asian Monetary Fund which was regarded as obstructionist.(41)
The focus has
since shifted to what should be done to reform the financial
architecture in general, and the IMF, in particular. The
US proposal, contained in Summers (1999), makes a number
of constructive and largely unobjectionable recommendations.
However, the recommendation that the IMF phase out long-term
lending and take on a more narrow crisis-prevention mission
than its current activities encompass is controversial.
It calls for the Fund to play a quasi-lender of last resort
function, lending significant amounts at "prices to encourage
rapid repayment" (p. 6). At the same time, it seems to
support the same kind of intrusive conditionality that
proved to be so controversial in the Asian crisis, arguing
that "issues of social cohesion and inclusion. . . should
be addressed as a condition for IMF support" (Ibid.).
These two thrusts appear to be logically contradictory.
If the IMF is to offer short-term financing at penalty
rates, then there is a reduced need for policy conditionality,
much less the kind of deep conditionality embodied in
the Asian crisis packages.(42)
The Summers
proposal goes on to recommend a recalculation of member
quotas (the basis for weighted voting within the organization
and in principal, determining the amount of resources
that a country can call upon in a crisis).(43)
This reallocation could have important implications for
Asia, inasmuch as Asian countries appear to be greatly
underweighted, while European countries are similarly
overweighted. As Bergsten (2000b) observes, Japan's economy
is half as large as that of the United States or EU, but
its quota is one-third of ours and only 20 percent of
Europe's. Other Asian countries, South Korea for example,
are even further underweighted, arguably constraining
their access to fund resources, and limiting their influence
in the Fund's Executive Board. Nevertheless, allocating
the Japanese the second largest national quota within
the fund proved politically difficult, and further quota
reallocation could be equally if not more problematic.(44)
That is all to say, over the next several years, the United
States may attempt to get Asia to pony up more money for
the IMF and at the same time try to move the organization
substantively in a different direction than would be supported
by much of Asia.
These issues
may receive their first high-profile public airing in
the dispute over who is to succeed Michel Camdessus as
managing director of the IMF. Traditionally, this job
has gone to a European, while the presidency of the World
Bank has gone to an American, and a Japanese has traditionally
led the Asian Development Bank (ADB). In a break from
previous practice, Japan has promoted the candidacy of
former ministry of finance official, and promoter of the
Asian Monetary Fund, Eisuke Sakakibara for the managing
director's job. Some other Asian countries have been convinced
to give token public support to his candidacy. Knowing
what to make of this is hard. Of the potential candidates
to succeed Camdessus, whose names have been bandied about
in the press, Sakakibara appears to be the least temperamentally
suited to run the IMF.(45)
Indeed, the fact that Japan has promoted Sakakibara could
be interpreted as an indication the extent to which the
Japanese pool of potential candidates for important international
positions is weak. And, if a Japanese national did get
the position, Japan would come under pressure to release
its hold on the ADB presidency.(46)
In the end,
appointing an Asian to the IMF managing director position
is highly unlikely, and interest in developing Asian regional
financial institutions will continue. Already, there has
been limited cooperation among central banks within the
region. Prior to the crisis, a number of these central
banks had established currency swap and repurchase ("repo")
arrangements. These were easily swamped by the crisis,
but agreements among the members of the organization of
East Asian and Pacific Central Banks and the organization
of Southeast Asian Central Banks were deepened and expanded
in January 2000. In the longer run, Japan may seek to
resuscitate its proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund. The
countries of the region possess enormous foreign currency
reserves (on the order of $600 billion) and financing
such an organization would not be a problem. Japan has
already committed $30 billion of regional finance through
its "New Miyazawa Plan."
Yet, as in
the case of trade, domestic politics and international
rivalries constrain Asia's ability to move forward on
these initiatives. Japan is a major source of saving for
the region, and some in Japan would like Japan to play
a greater role as an international financial intermediation
center. Despite Japan's great wealth, the government has
never shown the willingness to deregulate its own market
to the extent that would be required to become a global
center of financial intermediation. Even regionally, it
is unclear whether Tokyo could ever play the roles that
Singapore and Hong Kong play today and that Shanghai may
play some day in the distant future. Despite the promise
of the "Big Bang," the Japanese Government remains ambivalent
about financial deregulation. Politically, it is fundamentally
inwardly oriented toward its domestic parochial political
interests and financial markets and institutions, not
toward global markets. As a consequence, it appears unwilling
or unable to act in ways that would reassure non-Japanese
institutions that it would play a responsible role as
an efficient and unbiased regulator.
This unease
is compounded by lingering distrust of Japan in region,
especially in China. For its part, Japan remains wary
of China, particularly in light of its authoritarian political
system. The kind of political exigencies that fueled the
rapprochement between France and Germany after the Second
World War appear to be missing from Asia and will limit
Asian attempts at greater regional cooperation, at least
in the medium run.
Conclusion
Asia has been
shaken by its experience during the financial crisis.
Among other things, this situation has led to a reappraisal
of its relationship with the US Government and the Washington-based
multilateral economic institutions. There is a sense of
disappointment in both aspects of "Washington." US Government
attempts to reshape the policies of the international
financial institutions, along with the WTO, are likely
to encounter opposition in Asia. Haggling over leadership
posts could fuel further resentment of the United States
and disaffection with the international institutions.
The virulence
of this conflict could intensify, if as is probable, US
economic growth slows down and trade issues rise in prominence
in US domestic politics. The US political system could
be strained by the political need to "do something" about
trade, and the constraints on unilateral action imposed
by the WTO. Japan and China, because of their large bilateral
trade surpluses, would be the most likely targets of US
ire.
In such
an environment, Asians understandably could intensify
efforts at regional cooperation as an alternative,
either as a complement to, or a substitute for,
multilateral cooperation. The heterogeneity of Asia
in terms of levels of economic development, political
systems, and culture and ethnicity would appear
to greatly raise the "transactions costs" of regional
integration. Although Asians exhibit a kind of grudging
disappointment in the performance of the US Government
and the global multilateral institutions, this does
not appear to be sufficient to propel them into
significantly greater regional cooperation in the
medium run. Rather than expending efforts to construct
regional bodies from heterogeneous countries, individual
Asian countries may be better off working though
global institutions or plurilateral forms of functional
cooperation among like-minded countries. To the
extent that regional initiatives can be molded in
ways consistent with the broader global institutions,
Asian countries can follow a two-track approach.
If regional cooperation is seen as an alternative
to the global order, however, then Asian countries
may face a choice. An ASEAN head of state could
face the following question: which is likely to
yield more gains--AFTA or the Cairns Group within
the WTO? That it would be the former is not at all
obvious. (See appendix C for references).
CONTENTS
The
Perils of Being Number 1: East Asian
Trends and US Policies to 2025
by
Robert A. Manning
The cumulative
impact of US global and regional policies and behavior,
a broad regional trend of emerging, multifaceted national
self-assertiveness, and regional economic dynamics add
up to an East Asia in ferment that increasingly will test,
if not challenge, US interests and policies in the Asia-Pacific
over the coming generation. The degree to which US interests
and current policies are likely to challenged--and the
nature of the challenge--will depend in large measure
on the outcome of China's unprecedented transformation,
the cosmic uncertainty casting a shadow over East Asia's
future.
For most of
the past decade, East Asia has been a largely static security
environment in a slow-motion evolution towards still uncertain
new patterns of intra-Asian and trans-Pacific relations.
As evident in the accelerating pace of inter-Asian diplomacy
(both bilateral and multilateral) and in the political
and military patterns of major East Asian actors, there
has been a dynamic flow of activity designed to cushion
each actor against an uncertain future of the Asia-Pacific.
Although the economic crisis has had a sobering and humility-inducing
effect, it has perhaps slowed, but not altered, these
patterns. Amidst strategic and economic uncertainty, the
Asia-Pacific region has witnessed a torrent of summitry
(Sino-Russian, Sino-Japanese, Korean-Japanese, Korean-Chinese,
East Asia-Europe) and other diplomatic and territorial
rumblings over the past several years. The diplomacy highlights
a fluid security environment currently defined by increasingly
sophisticated hedging strategies on the part of the major
powers in the Pacific. These trends, however, could harden
into new geostrategic patterns rapidly if potential strategic
shocks occur: the reunification of Korea, a conflict over
Taiwan, and possible reactions to US missile defense deployment
decisions.
There is a
discernible shift in the character of East Asian uncertainty
about the future from that which existed in the early
1990s. At the end of the Cold War, the largest concern
was a fear that, absent its global mission, the United
States would begin to reduce its engagement and security
presence in Asia. This fear was combined with looming
concern about the emergence of China. In recent years,
concern about the meaning of a successfully modernized
China has grown more acute. Indeed, there is a tendency
to discount the present for the future in regard to China,
with many acting toward Beijing as though it were already
a multidimensional global power. But Asian views of the
United States have become more wary and complex in new
and paradoxical ways.
- There is
a broad recognition that in every measure of national
power, US pre-eminence is clear and growing--and that
the US role as guardian of global and regional order
has, if anything become more central to stability.
- Discomfort
with this reality is palpable and increasing, as the
United States is viewed as a somewhat capricious actor,
(a rogue superpower?) frequently driven more by narrow
domestic interests and ideological imperatives than
by common goals or evident strategy. The perception
is reinforced by the United States confusing power with
norms of behavior and its willingness to impose its
values by force in some instances. This situation is
exemplified by US rejections of the CTBT, the Kyoto
Protocol, and the International Criminal Court, while
pressing others to approve and the NATO bombing of Yugoslav,
absent UN mandate).
- East Asians
see a lack of sustained focus on the region and a renewed
Eurocentrism manifested in NATO expansion and long-term
obligations in the Balkans, while the locus of both
economic dynamism and potential major conflicts is in
Asia, most notably, the Korean Peninsula, China-Taiwan,
and India-Pakistan.
At the same
time, the regional security environment has become more
complex, with security challenges and foreign policies
becoming more interactive over the past several years.
The accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade
in March 1999 was a deliciously illustrative example of
how disparate strands in values, interests, and geography
can intersect. What in the United States was widely viewed
as a humanitarian intervention against Yugoslavia over
its behavior toward Kosovo, was viewed discomfitingly
as an idiosyncratic, unilateral transgression of sovereignty--absent
a UN mandate--by such US allies as Japan and Korea as
well as others in East Asia. Moreover, the alleged doctrine
of humanitarian intervention was seen as particularly
disconcerting by China, raising the spectre of intervention
in Taiwan, Tibet, or Xinjiang. Central Asian states bordering
Xinjiang all are members of NATO's Partnership for Peace
and have been the venue of US-Central Asian joint military
exercises proximate to China's Western borders conducted
without prior notification. Another example is the unanticipated
impact of North Korea's missile program, which catalyzed
a new security assertiveness in Japan, which, in turn,
adds an element of tension to Sino-Japanese relations.
The discomfort
with US idiosyncratic behavior is mitigated by the widely
acknowledged reality that there is no viable alternative
to the United States as a counterweight to China. It is
further mitigated by the continued importance of East
Asian trade and investment with the United States, roughly
$530 billion in annual two-way trade and some $100 billion
in Asian direct investment in the United States and vice
versa. The net result is a paradoxical situation with
many actors in the region seeking to cushion themselves
against American unilateralism, even as they rely on the
US security presence for stability and find an unspoken
sense of reassurance in the display of hi-tech US military
power. Thus, East Asia is displaying varying degrees of
bandwagoning and balancing at the same time.
- China,
most notably in its 1998 Defense White Paper,
has articulated a competing vision of the future
in which the American role in Asia is greatly
diminished. Although Beijing seeks a dominant
role in the region, at the same time it has bet
its future on integration into the global economy
and has increasingly participated in global (such
as WTO, NPT, CTBT) and regional (for example,
ARF, APEC) institutions. Yet even as it seeks
cooperative relations with the United States,
its military modernization and planning centers
on attaining capabilities to prevail in a Taiwan
conflict in which the United States intervenes.
- Japan's
national desire to carve out its own identity
as a major power in its own right (e.g. Asian
monetary fund initiative, increasingly independent
defense capabilities, constitutional revision
debate) playing more of a leadership role in the
region occurs even as it simultaneously enhances
the US-Japan security alliance;
- South
Korea's remarkable middle power diplomacy, evidenced
most recently in the unprecedented January 2000
visit of Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian
and South Korea's complex relationship with Beijing.
This, even as Seoul deepens its political and
military relationship with Japan in unprecedented
ways and remains dependent on the US for its core
security.
- North
Korea has managed to be at once charity case for,
continuing threat to, and new partner of, the
United States. While developing ties to the United
States, it has maintained its conventional military
assets and continued to develop its WMD and delivery
systems. At the same time, the DPRK has renewed
its ties to China and Russia (witness Russian
FM Ivanov's February trip to P'yongyang), while
expanding ties to Italy, Australia, and the Philippines
and renewing normalization talks with Japan.
- The
collective desire of smaller and middle powers,
particularly ASEAN states, for East Asian nations
to be more independent actors carrying more
weight in the councils of global governance,
even as they depend wholly on the US military
presence and commitment to ensure security and
US markets for exports. The November 1999 ASEAN+3
meeting, replete with fantastic visions of EU-type
regional arrangements for a free trade area
and monetary union, was an expression of this
hope, as was support for an Asian monetary fund.
Vic
Chairman Chi Haotian and South Korean Defense Minister
Defense Cho Song-tae take the stage for talks.
Consequences
of Asia's Emergence
This duality
of Asian perspectives and sense, however unrealistic at
present, of a tilt toward pan-Asian identity and interests
reflects the beginnings of a qualitative shift in established
patterns of relations. The cumulative impact of a generation
of dynamic economic growth, notwithstanding the 1997-98
economic crisis, are waxing nationalisms seeking validation
as fledgling middle-class societies. The Manila ASEAN+3
meeting was but one manifestation of this trend.At the
same time there was a surrealistic aspect to the Manila
meeting in that regional tensions--whether Sino-Japanese
disputes (ostensibly over history), territorial disputes
such as the Spratly islands, Taiwan's identity politics
and quest for international space, or Indonesian-Malaysian
rivalry--all are expressions of these waxing nationalisms
beginning to bump up against each other.
Worth briefly
summarizing are other expressions of Asia's emergence
and its gravity in the world system, a regional economy
that in the space of a single generation went from 4 percent
of world GDP in 1960 to 24 percent by 1995. There is no
shortage of telltale signs of the burgeoning technological,
financial, and strategic heft of modern East Asia. Beijing
recently launched its first orbiting space vehicle, prelude
to a manned space program (with Russian assistance); South
Korea is building a satellite launch capability. Greater
China (China, Hong Kong, Taiwan) Japan and Korea together
hold some $700 billion in foreign reserves, more than
half the world's total, and are three of the world's 10
largest economies. The recent earthquake in Taiwan threatened
the world computer industry with semiconductor shortages,
as the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan threatened liquid
crystal computer displays. China alone is the world's
second largest consumer of energy--though its per capita
energy consumption is ten times less than that of the
United States!
With regard
to American interests, these trends cut in different directions.
On the plus side, an important consequence of East Asia's
success has been a broad trend towards democratization
over the past 15 years: the Philippines, South Korea,
Taiwan, Thailand, and of late, Indonesia. We could argue
that structural economic and political change in Japan,
in part generational in nature, is also deepening its
democracy, in particular, adding a new dimension of civil
society and political accountability. Although this regional
trend removes a potential values conflict and is a source
of public support for US-Asia policy, it also means friends
and allies whose respective political systems are more
unwieldy to deal with. This situation is manifested in
a variety of ways, such as Japan's posture in regard to
base and host-nation issues with Japan, and to a lesser
extent, with Korea, where the No Gun Ri episode and desire
for more capable ballistic missiles (beyond MTCR limits)
have introduced emotional new irritants in US-Korean relations.
The trajectory
of intra-Asian trade and investment patterns is another
important trend that is likely to have a crosscutting
impact on US interests. Although the United States remains
the first or second-largest market for most East Asian
nations, in relative terms, East Asian trade with the
United States is a diminishing portion of the region's
trade. In 1990, the US market accounted for a third or
more of Korean, Japanese, Taiwan, and ASEAN exports. That
has gradually diminished to the 20-25 percent range, with
the exception of China, which is dependent on the US market
for nearly 35 percent of its exports. At the same time,
intra-Asian trade continues to grow, now to roughly 50
percent of total Asian trade.
Asia-Middle
East Energy Nexus
One important
economic trend with strategic implications that is woefully
underconsidered is East Asia's energy patterns, which
are creating pulls that may lead to a divergence of East
Asian and US interests. Already, Asia has a substantial
oil deficit. In 1998, the Asia-Pacific imported 11.5 million
barrels a day of the 19.1 million barrels it consumed
daily, with imports rising to 13.5 million bbl/d in 1999.
This amounts to about 62 percent of total petroleum products
consumed in the region. Asia-Pacific import needs are
projected to approach 17 to19 million bbl/d by 2010, and
the Energy Information Agency (EIA) forecasts those import
needs to rise to 24 million bbl/d by 2020, possibly up
to 31 million bbl/d if high-end economic growth projections
are realized. China's import needs alone are projected
to grow to roughly 3 million bbl/d by 2010, and as much
as 5 to 6 million bbl/d by 2020.(47)
Even discounting for the region's economic crisis, by
2020, according to the Energy Information Agency (EIA)
of the US Department of Energy, Asian oil demand will
still grow two to three times faster than that of the
industrialized West.(48)
The vast majority
of East Asian oil imports--and much of its rapidly growing
natural gas consumption--will come from the Middle East.
The workings of the highly efficient globalized oil market
tend to be based largely on transport costs. This condition
has meant a bifurcated pattern of supply, with the US
obtaining most of its oil imports from the Atlantic Basin
and/or the Western Hemisphere (North Sea offshore West
Africa, Mexico, Canada, Latin America. Already some two-thirds
of Persian Gulf crude is exported to Asia, and an oil-thirsty
Asia increasingly depends on Gulf/Middle East crude, already
nearly 80 percent of its imports. A sign of the times
was when Chinese
President Jiang Zemin made the first ever trip by
a top Chinese leader to Saudi Arabia last November (declaring
a "strategic oil partnership"). Thus, a burgeoning Asia-Middle
East energy nexus is taking shape. This trend appears
long term and a permanent feature of the oil market. Thus
far, it has not altered strategic ties beyond a thickening
commercial relationship with Asians investing in upstream
Middle East, while Gulf states invest in downstream Asia,
both designed to lock in supply and customers, respectively.
What the geopolitical implications are of the burgeoning
Asia-Middle East energy nexus is an open question explored
further below.
Diplomatic
and Strategic Trends
The diplomatic
and strategic trends in the region range from efforts
to attain more independent postures within the framework
of a cooperative or alliance relationship (Japan) to the
prospect of a peer competitor (China). The military capacities
of key actors, particularly China and Japan, which are
undergoing qualitative improvements, both foreshadow and
raise the stakes of prospective strategic competition.
The challenges to US policies and interests range from
prospective strategic rivalry to those of adjusting to
a less dominant role with more equal partners, transitioning
from de facto quasi-imperial metropole to extra regional
balancer without risking stability or diminishing American
interests.
The China
Factor
The most stark
and consequential potential divergence of interests with
the United States arises from China's continuing military
modernization, its irredentist claims and preferences
for a Sino-centric regional order. Two decades of double-digit
growth have moved China's closer to its highest national
goal: economic modernization, the foundation of its 21st
century version of the Meiji Restoration slogan: Rich
Country, Strong Army. Beijing's long-term objective is
to lay the foundation for becoming a multidimensional
great power by attaining a new level of "comprehensive
national strength"--the sum of economic, technological,
and military power that together define a country's international
standing.
Yet for China,
the terrible symbolism of US bombing of the Chinese Embassy
in Belgrade underscored China's weakness. It also illuminated
the degree to which China's core assumptions about international
trends (for example, a multipolar world, United States
in decline, China ascending) have been shattered since
the mid-1990s. The Yugoslav war, revealing still more
improvements in US precision-guided weapons since the
Gulf war, deepened China's perception of a growing technology
gap and sense of frustration and impotence. Such military
prowess, combined with the strengthening of US alliances
in Europe and Asia and a penchant for values-based intervention
has left China frustrated and overwhelmed by US power.
At the same time, India's moves to become a full nuclear
weapons state has still further complicated China's security
calculus. The net effect of the 'Kosovo shock" has been
to accelerate the pace of military modernization, particularly
in hi-tech areas such as cruise missiles and laser weapons
and China's strategic and political cooperation with Russia.
This reality
reflects China's contemporary conundrum: its highest goal
of economic modernization makes it highly dependent on
the one power that can impede its aspirations to be the
dominant power in East Asia. At the same time, the United
States also stands between China and its reclamation of
sovereignty disrupted by Japanese and Western imperialism
during its 150 years of humiliation--reunification with
Taiwan and its historic claims in the South China Sea.
Indeed, there is a lingering fear that the United States
is quietly erecting a structure of containment around
China's periphery to mitigate its modernization and limit
its freedom of action.
The March 1996
Taiwan Strait crisis reinforced China's fears. The unanticipated
arrival of two US aircraft carrier battle groups off Taiwan
dramatized the military-technological gap while bringing
into sharp relief the possibility of a conflict with the
United States over Taiwan. The fact that one month later,
the United States and Japan announced new defense guidelines
updating the US-Japan alliance, began to deepen Beijing's
concerns that not only was multipolarity not the dominant
trend, but that the US bilateral security network was
reinforcing US pre-eminence. One important aspect of the
Taiwan Strait crisis worth noting is that only Japan and
Australia publicly supported the US gunboat diplomacy.
This reflects the ultimate strategic nightmare for East
Asia: having to choose between the United States and China.
Nonetheless, the presence of the two carrier task forces
were a sobering reminder to Beijing of the magnitude of
US military power in the Pacific.
To balance
its near-term economic goals and longer-term security
agenda, China has evolved its own hedging strategy, one
beginning with efforts to neutralize potential threats
along its enormous borders. As the strategy has evolved,
two phases are discernible: 1989 to 1996 and 1996 to present.
Since the 4 June 1989 Tiananmen tragedy and ensuing distancing
from the West, China has crafted a diplomatic strategy
designed to solidify ties to its neighbors. In the early
1990s, it normalized relations with Singapore and Indonesia.
It has cultivated ties to ASEAN nations, forging particularly
close ties to Thailand, Malaysia and Burma. Beijing made
progress on border talks and trade with New Delhi and
enhanced political and military/technical ties to Russia.
In response
to its predicament, China also increasingly has sought
to foster its own security network as a counter-hedging
strategy. This approach has taken the form of bilateral
"partnerships" and new concepts of multilateral security
structures. At a conceptual level, since 1997, Beijing
has begun to articulate what it calls a "New Security
Concept," as part of an effort to discredit and attenuate
US alliances and ostensibly replace the de facto situation
with a collective security framework. As spelled out in
its July 1998 Defense White Paper, the new concept incorporates
Beijing's emphasis on noninterference and respect for
sovereignty embodied in its traditional five principles
of peaceful coexistence. Added to this is the notion that,
"security is mutual, and security dialogues and cooperation
should be aimed at promoting trust, not creating confrontations
. . . ."(49) This
concept largely has been a rhetorical and diplomatic device
and has not prevented China from demonstrations of military
force in instances such as in the South China Sea. The
most conspicuous manifestation of this approach has been
its "cooperative strategic partnership" with Russia. Though
still largely a military supply relationship, for both
countries, it has become therapeutic and for the US, potentially
obstructionist: Sino-Russian summit communiques routinely
denounce US "hegemonism" and call for "multipolarization
of the world and the establishment of a new international
order."(50) But
fledgling Sino-Russian strategic cooperation is discernible
and appears to have grown significantly in response to
the US/NATO Yugoslavia war: Beijing and Moscow have increasingly
found common cause in denouncing US efforts to amend or
scrap the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and build
ballistic missile defenses; some 2000 Russian technicians
are employed in Chinese military research institutes;
joint use of Russia's GLONASS GPS system, which would
aid PRC targeting is under negotiation. In 1997, China
has signed protocols with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan governing armed forces along borders, an agreement
hailed by Beijing as a "new model for security." More
recently, China has signed bilateral amity and friendship
accords with Thailand and Malaysia.(51)
Together, these individual elements are aimed at stabilizing
the international environment in East Asia, advancing
China's national goal of economic modernization, bolstering
China's strategic capabilities, and attenuating the US
position in the region.
Beijing's assertive
diplomacy has unfolded in parallel with its conventional
and nuclear military modernization program. A series of
recent acquisitions and deployments have the effect of
significantly raising the cost of conflict in the one
scenario where direct military confrontation is imaginable--Taiwan--as
well as reducing US freedom of action. Beijing has begun
to acquire 48 Su-27 fighters, along with 200 to be assembled
in China under coproduction with Russia. In addition,
during his December 1996 visit to Moscow, Premier Li Peng
finalized a deal to purchase two Sovremenny-class, missile-carrying
destroyers for $400 million each, (the first was delivered
in February 2000) along with Sunburn antiship missiles.
These ships were developed in 1980 by the Soviets to counter
US aircraft carriers, and the PLA Navy very likely sees
such hardware as necessary if it plans to counter US aircraft
carrier task forces in the future. Moreover, Beijing has
signed a $2 billion contract for some 30 to 60 150 Sukhoi
Su-30MK multirole fighters and is negotiating to buy more
advanced Su-37 models. China also has deployed some 200
M-9 and M-ll missiles in Fujian Province, across the strait,
and US projections are that Beijing may deploy some 700
missiles there by 2005-6. At least another 10 to15 years
will be needed before China obtains significant air and
amphibious force capability to sustain force projection
beyond its borders.(52)
At the same time, China is the only nuclear weapons state
quantitatively and qualitatively expanding its arsenal,
with the DF-31 mobile missile near deployment and the
DF-41 likely to be deployed by 2010. These medium- and
long-range missiles can carry multiple independent re-entry
vehicles (MIRVs).
For US interests,
these first fruits of Chinese military modernization already
complicate and raise the cost of any US military intervention
in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan strait, the most
likely, if not the only, scenario that can be envisioned
pitting the United States and China in a direct military
clash. In broad terms, China's incremental development
of force projection capabilities is beginning to circumscribe
US freedom of action in the Pacific. In its diplomacy,
China is positioning itself to influence the future of
the Korean Peninsula and the security architecture in
Northeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, it is accentuating
a geopolitical divide between continental and peninsular
ASEAN states.The challenge to both Washington and Beijing
is to avoid a cycle of action-reaction that pushes the
relationship in an adversarial direction and to maintain
the ambiguity of their respective hedging strategies until
the outcome of China's transformation is evident.
Japan's New
Nationalism
While China
is an important factor catalyzing a remarkable evolution
in Japan's strategic culture, the quickening pace of change
in Japan's national security policies is unfolding in
a larger crucible of social, economic, and political ferment.
These changes come as a decade of economic stagnation
has demonstrated to most Japanese that the "development
state" post-WW 2 model in Japan has been outgrown and
is being superseded gradually in a process of structural
change. In broad terms, Japan's evolving security policies
reflect identity politics writ large--in redefining individual's
relationship with society and localities' relations with
Tokyo, as well as Japan's regional and global role. In
tempting shorthand, Japan is becoming a more normal nation.
Chinese
Su-27SK—note PLAAF markings on the tail
In the security
realm, it reflects the perception of a Northeast Asian
security environment more menacing than during the Cold
War, a perception fostered by North Korean behavior during
the 1990s as well as a sense of defining a Japanese international
role and personality. North Korea's first missile test,
into the Sea of Japan in May 1993, hinted at Japan's vulnerability
to ballistic missile attack, and the possibility of conflict
on the peninsula, potentially involving Japan, was brought
into sharp relief during the spring 1994 nuclear crisis.
In terms of mass public opinion, P'yongyang's August 1998
Taepo Dong test over Japanese territory was roughly equivalent
to the psychological impact of the Soviet Sputnik launch
on the United States in 1957-58. Similarly, beginning
around 1993-94, Japanese perceptions of China began to
change. Prior to this time, Japan considered economic
aid, trade, and investment to assist China's economic
development and to foster internal political stability
as adequate to manage China. But the cumulative effect
of two decades of double-digit economic growth--particularly
set against the background of Japan's own decade-long
economic stagnation--began to raise questions about the
balance in Sino-Japanese relations and the limits of "checkbook
diplomacy."
These concerns
were reinforced by China's accelerating military modernization
program, the 1995 controversy over nuclear testing, and
by its increasingly assertive behavior on issues relating
to sovereignty: the 1995 occupation of Mischief Reef South
China Sea, actions--and persisting contention--over the
disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands, and most dramatically,
during the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. At the same time,
China repeatedly has warned of the destabilizing effects
of Japan's participation with the US in ballistic missile
defense R&D systems The implication that China was
actively targeting Japan came as a shock to many Japanese.
The palpable discord in the October 1998 Sino-Japanese
Summit, with Japan refusing to give Jiang
Zemin the full and perpetual apology demanded as the
price of Sino-Japanese harmony was a reflection of Japan's
new wariness of China.
Faced with
this set of challenges, Japan moved initially to strengthen
its alliance with the United States, which has been--and
continues--to serve as the foundation of its diplomacy
and security policy. At the same, Tokyo has moved towards
bolstering its independent military capabilities and coterminously,
sought to forge an independent diplomatic posture and
solidify its economic network in the region. Thus, we
have seen the April 1996 reaffirmation and updating of
the US-Japan alliance during Clinton's visit to Tokyo,
the new defense guidelines defining Japan's support role
in a regional crisis, Japan's decision to build an indigenous
intelligence satellite, joint research on theater missile
defenses, and moves toward attaining air-refueling capabilities.
Japan's "rearming"
as the often heard refrain goes, is not the question.
Japan already has the second or third largest defense
budget in the world, $45 billion--depending on the value
of the Yen. Even without the United States, Japan possesses
the most capable hi-tech air and naval forces in East
Asia, including F-15J and F-4EJ fighter interceptors,
E-2C Hawkeye early warning radars, AWACS, a fleet of destroyers,
Aegis cruisers, and 100 P3C antisubmarine patrol planes,
and a C3I system interoperable with that of the United
States.(53) In
addition, there is a host of areas where Tokyo is creating
an independent defense base: Japan's decision to pursue
an independent satellite reconnaissance capability; its
satellite launch program, which gives it a potential ballistic
missile capability; it has four of the world's most advanced
supercomputers; and its plutonium reprocessing program,
which makes it in the eyes of some, a virtual nuclear
power.
But perhaps
more important is the 'software' of Japan's new assertiveness.
The defense guidelines issue is part of a larger Japanese
debate about the limits of Japan's willingness to engage
in military action, indeed, over the interpretation and/or
revision of its constitution. This in turn, is a source
of Chinese anxiety, particularly that Japan is laying
the foundation for an independent military capability
under the US security umbrella. In any case, former Prime
Minister Obuchi's popularity went up when Japanese ships
fired their first shots in anger in March 1999 at intruding
North Korean spy board. In several opinion polls over
the past three years, a majority favored revising the
constitution. And in terms of outward trappings, the Diet
passed legislation making official the hinomaru
flag and making the Kimigayo the national anthem.
Japan's drift toward a posture of collective self-defense
is reflected in the July 1999 Diet decision to establish
a commission to study revision of the constitution.
Although Japan's
alliance with the US is viewed as critical leverage in
any counterbalancing strategy, the days of gaiatsu,
of a top-down command US-Japan relationship are in
eclipse. Japan is aware it has no alternative to the US-Japan
alliance. But it is seeking a more equal partnership,
one that is likely to have growing sets of issues on which
there is disagreement (for example, Burma and Iran). At
the same time, Japan's assertive diplomacy is aimed at
countering the possibility of declining US political/military
involvement in East Asia. To this end, Japan has made
some headway in repairing problems of the past. In October
1998, former Prime
Minister Keizo Obuchi extended to South Korea's visiting
president, Kim Dae Jung and agreed to a "cooperative twenty-first
partnership."(54)
Signs of a Japanese-Korean rapprochement are visible in
economic and security relations. A month later, Obuchi's
visit to Moscow yielded the Moscow Declaration of a "creative
partnership between Japan and Russia" and a reaffirmation
of commitments, made previously by President Yeltsin and
then Prime
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, to reach agreement on
a peace treaty and on the future of the disputed Northern
Territories.(55)
Both Japanese efforts were designed with China very much
in mind. In the case of Korea, Tokyo has sought to influence
future geopolitical directions Korea may take; in the
case of Russia, a range of cooperative endeavors, particularly
regarding oil and gas from Sakhalin and also eventually
from Irkutsk, bolster Russia and offer it alternatives
to strategic cooperation with China. Japan's Russia policy
is part of a larger "Eurasian diplomacy" extended to Central
Asia with oil and gas resources as much the objective
as geopolitical positioning.
In Southeast
Asia, throughout the 1990s Japan has worked to strengthen
ASEAN and its institutions. Japan's recent overtures to
Burma, which put it at odds with the US again appear aimed
at counterbalancing Chinese influence. Although Japan
has become more realistic about the limits of current
efforts at multilateralism over the past three to four
years, its support for various multilateral ventures reflects
a broader aspect of Japan's hedging strategy--the fostering
of new multilateral regional institutions to compensate
for any diminished American role while seeking to showcase
Tokyo's role. Thus, Tokyo has called for a six-party forum
in Northeast Asia (United States, Japan, Russia China,
and North and South Korea.) Similarly, Japan's proactive
response to the Asian financial crisis was in this vein,
proposing an Asian fund in October 1997 as the Thai baht
foundered. And Japan had no qualms about actively participating
in the ASEAN+3 meeting in Manila contemplating an EU-like
future for the Asia-Pacific.
In sum, Japan
is no less committed to the US-Japan alliance than at
any time in the past, but it is more assertive in redefining
its role within the alliance, is building an independent
defense industrial base, and is positioning itself for
potential future shocks that could render the US force
presence in Japan more problematic, if not the alliance
itself. This approach does not suggest any sudden or visible
breakpoint or even a strategic distancing. Rather, in
the current environment of universal hedging and incremental
change, it is largely a matter of alliance management
problems and will require more creative, flexible approaches
on the part of Washington (for example, a 15-year base
agreement with a renewal clause based on the security
situation or joint use of bases).
Similar types
of behavior characterize South Korea and ASEAN. But for
the scope of this paper, US, Japan, and China relationships
and behavior largely define the security environment.
At most, Korea is a middle power that can be a factor
in shaping the strategic balance depending on which direction
it tilts, and ASEAN security is largely derivative of
Northeast Asian security, that is to say US-China, US-Japan,
and Sino-Japanese relationships. The exception, of course,
is Southeast Asian security challenges growing out of
internal crisis (for example, Indonesia unraveling).
In any event,
Asia is reaching a stage where probable events and policy
choices made in pursuit of respective national strategies
may soon begin to foreclose options in regard to the future
geopolitical architecture of the region. Three probable
decision points are just over the horizon, any one of
which could transform the region: decisions made in the
process of Korean reunification, possible conflict over
the future of Taiwan, and in regard to the deployment
of missile defense systems by the United States and its
allies. Each of these developments holds the possibility
of irreversibly reshaping the geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific.
Already, all three issues--Korean reunification, Taiwan
conflict, missile defense deployments--are being factored
into the security calculus of every actor. The potentially
tragic prospect is that fateful decisions may be forced
prematurely, before key factors fostering uncertainty--most
importantly, the outcome of China's transformation--warrant
such choices. Thus, the necessary geopolitical ambiguity
characterizing this interim period could harden into new
strategic configurations.
The Korea
Factor
Most prominently,
the impending reunification of Korea suggests it will
play as much of a defining role in catalyzing Asian geopolitics
in the 21st century as imperial rivalries did at the end
of the last century. The resolution of the Korea question
probably will force a shift from respective hedging strategies
to new diplomatic patterns and political configurations
that will shape the region into the mid-21st century.
One key variable
will be the then nature of Sino-American relations and
the health of the US-Japan alliance. Under the best of
circumstances, a stable, nonadversarial relationship with
Washington, Beijing will not greet with enthusiasm the
prospect of a unified, democratic, free market Korea allied
with the United States with forward-deployed American
forces on its border. Potentially conflicting approaches
to regional security will make Korea a seminal case in
establishing the possibilities of mutual accommodation
and defining their future roles in East Asia. The point
here is that the present congruence of US and Chinese
interests in Korea--a desire to avoid war, collapse, and
nuclear proliferation--is unlikely to endure after reunification,
at which point they will begin to diverge.
Sino-American
differences, both on the nature of forward-deployed US
forces on the Peninsula and on the future of the US-Korean
relations, will be brought into sharp relief at the point
of reunification, if not before. Certainly, any postreunification
US-Korean relationship in which Washington maintains a
military presence in Korea will require some clear understanding
with Beijing. In lieu of some new understandings, a polarization
and ensuing tension probably will result.
China can be
expected to exert tremendous, if subtle, pressure on the
government of a unified Korea to forego any continuing
US military presence. This situation, in turn, would leave
Japan as the only country in Asia with forward-deployed
US troops, and almost certainly at a minimum, spark a
debate there, and may attenuate the US-Japan security
alliance. If Beijing is heavy-handed in its efforts regarding
the US-Korea linkage, however, the result could be counterproductive
and reinforce a Korean desire for close security ties
with the United States lest the 21st century begin to
resemble the beginning of this century.
At the same
time, a newly unified Korea will watch closely the strength
of US-Japan security relations in gauging its approach
to regional security. A strong US-Japan alliance, one
that constrains Japanese power projection would have a
confidence-building effect on Seoul's strategic vision
and force development. Conversely, a diminished or more
problematic alliance, and movements by Japan toward autonomous
capabilities, could spur strategic competition in Northeast
Asia. Certainly, any diminution of the US forward-deployed
presence in Korea probably would trigger more heated debate
in Japan about the US force presence there, if not begin
to reconfigure the US forward-deployed presence. That,
in turn, would force Korea to rethink its security options.
The nuclear
temptation has been underappreciated by most analysts
in assessing postunification security options. But
South Korean efforts to attain nuclear weapons in
the 1970s, when there was a less ambiguous US security
umbrella and far less Japanese capability (for example,
no potential delivery system or source of fissile
material) warrant such postunification concern.
Discussions with South Korean officials and writings
of the scientific and military elite reveal a continued
interest in acquiring fuel cycle capabilities--reprocessing--with
a clear intent of maintaining at least the technical
capacity.(56)
The status of any US nuclear guarantee will be an
important factor shaping the attitude of an a reunified
Korea towards such weapons. The experience with
NATO expansion, for example, the absence of US troops
in Poland, the Czech Republic or Hungary, suggests
the possibility of maintaining such a nuclear umbrella
without forward-deployed forces if a treaty relationship
continues, whether the current treaty or a successor.
Unified
Korea's Security Options
Four possible
alternative future scenarios for the regional security
posture of a unified Korea can be envisioned:
- Neutrality
along Swiss lines.
- Strategic
independence.
- Sino-Korean
entente.
- Continued
alliance with the United States.
Neutrality
for Korea does not comport well with history. At the time
of unification, a relatively weak and vulnerable Korea
probably would harbor too much distrust of its larger
neighbors to place its security on good faith alone. This
vulnerability makes difficult envisioning a unified Korean
Government entrusting its security to cooperative arrangements
not resting on a foundation of military balance. Indeed,
President Kim Dae Jung makes a compelling realist argument
for the continuation of a US presence after unification,
namely thata small Korea exists tenuously between powerful
continental and maritime powers.(57)
Strategic independence,
although more appealing than neutrality, is unlikely to
be the option of choice. Yet inevitable changes in the
US-Korean security relationship following reunification
could push Seoul in such a direction. Worth noting is
that a Korean posture of strategic independence holds
a realistic possibility of renewed efforts to obtain nuclear
weapons capability. From a Korean perspective, this situation
is not a wholly unreasonable quest. Perpetual fears that
Japan is a virtual nuclear weapons state and the reality
of being surrounded by China and Russia offer a window
into Korean logic. Moreover, Seoul probably would inherit
intermediate- (and possibly long-range) missile capabilities,
chemical and biological weapons capabilities, and possibly
also an opaque or overt nuclear capability.
Perhaps the
most unstable possible outcome would be a Sino-Korean
alignment. In its most extreme form, it could define a
heartland-rimland polarization either to counter or ensure
against the US-Japan alliance. Given China's historic
relations with Korea, or even the evolution of PRC-ROK
ties since the 1995 unprecedented Jiang
Zemin six-day visit to Seoul, Korean fears of a kind
of neotributary status suggest that this option would
not be preferred by Seoul.(58)
The rapid expansion of Sino-Korean relations in the early
1990s, in large part related to Seoul's efforts
to build leverage against P'yongyang and Beijing's strategic
decision forge ties to Seoul while maintaining ties to
P'yongyang to enhance its leverage on the peninsula. Beijing's
decision to embrace Seoul initially produced a Sino-Korean
relationship that also was anti-Japanese in overtone in
during Jiang's 1995 visit. Should the US-Japan alliance
fray and Japan move to strengthen its independent military
posture, a Korean alignment with China cannot be ruled
out.
From a US perspective,
the best case that is in the realm of the possible will
be some variation or combination options two and three.
US and Korean interests overlap in Seoul's desire to balance
the major powers. One can envision access, propositioned
equipment, joint training, and exercising in the context
of a revised security treaty up to, and perhaps including,
a small logistic unit sustained in Korea. Moreover, recent
trends have seen South Korea tilting more toward the United
States and Japan, in large measure as a consequence of
the persistent North Korean threat.
A large spectrum
of options exists between the current status quo and no
security relationship with Korea. Four possible models
can be envisioned: an alliance absent ground troops and
smaller air and naval presence;a reconfigured alliance
with emphasis on access, logistic support, propositioned
equipment, and joint training and exercising; a Singapore
model, small logistical presence, joint training and access;
a Philippine model, a security treaty with no presence
or regular access, but joint training. Indeed, the future
US security relationship with Korea must be viewed in
the context of a larger US strategy toward East Asia--sustaining
US access to and some credible presence in the region.
The key externalindependent variable in the equation once
again will be the outcome of China's unprecedented transformation
and its posture towards the region.
The Taiwan
Conundrum
The Taiwan
problem may be the ultimate symbol of clashing US-China
interests and values. A Cold War remnant, Taiwan captures
the divergence between China's new security concept and
the reality of US dominance in the Pacific. Perhaps most
starkly, the Taiwan issue illuminates a perception gap,
with the United States viewing it as a case of defending
a democracy and free market partner, while China sees
only claims of national sovereignty denied by 150 years
of imperialist humiliation. For the United States, a cross-strait
military conflict is almost certainly a lose-lose proposition.
If the United States did not come to Taipei's aid in the
event of an invasion, profound doubts would be raised
in the minds of allies as to the credibility of the US
security umbrella. Yet a US military response would force
choices polarizing East Asia, put its alliances at risk
by forcing the region to make choices, and harden an enduring
enmity, and a probable new Cold War with China. This possibility
was painfully evident in the responses of East Asians
to the March 1996 Taiwan crisis.
The current
situation also illustrates what might be called "one country,
two policies," in regard to US policy toward the Taiwan
issue. Contrast Clinton's "three no's" statement during
his June 1998 China visit, with Congressional legislation,
most recently the Taiwan Enhancement Act. These pull in
precisely opposite directions, with the Clinton position
reinforcing the post-1971 "one china" policy framework
of the three communiques, and Congress, in its inimitable
way, essentially saying to defend Taiwan democracy. Both
send the wrong signals to both sides and compromise US
strategic ambiguity that has been important to the preservation
of cross-strait stability. Clinton's position reverses
the posture of wanting China to think the United States
would intervene in certain situations, while the behavior
of Congress could be read in Taipei as a green light to
pursue moves toward formal independence. This aspect is
one of the post-Cold War breakdowns of the bipartisan
consensus on China policy. It also is read by some in
the region as an illustration of Washington's seeking
to export its values and the United States redefining
the role of sovereignty in international relations.
Missile
Defense
The Taiwan question overlaps with the third potential
decision point that could create new polarization between
the United States and China, if not others in East Asia.
China has made the US provision of Aegis cruisers and
PAC-3 theater missile defenses a red line in Sino-American
relations. Rhetoric about PAC-3, still under development,
could have the unintended consequence of leading China
to consider military action before the balance of military
forces becomes less favorable. But in any case, virulent
Chinese opposition, as is the case with the Taiwan Security
Enhancement Act, reflects a near-term political fear:
obtaining TMD might lead to a US-Taiwan quasi-alliance
that could embolden Taipei to formally declare independence.
More broadly,
such strategically capable systems as THAAD, and Navy
Theater Wide also are having a impact on Chinese military
planners and the outcome of its nuclear modernization
program. Chinese nuclear managers are beginning to do
worse case planning against the possibility that their
modest nuclear deterrent might be neutralized by US ballistic
missile defenses. The risk is that this perception may
lead Beijing to pursue a more robust and MIRVed nuclear
force than otherwise might be the case. So far, the absolute
numbers have not risen substantially. Whether the newly
deployed DF-31 or DF-41, when they becomes operational
in the 2010 time frame, will result in only modest additions--beyond
replacement of existing forces or part of a significant
nuclear buildup is unclear. If so, the unintended consequences
of looming missile defense decisions could be less strategic
stability. This situation also could foreclose possibilities
for arms control between the US, Russia, and China. Moreover,
part of China's response apparently is increased cooperation
with Russia. A MIRVed China with penetration aids and
countermeasures, together with regional deployments of
a US-Japanese missile defense-- depending on what architecture
is chosen--could reinforce a polarization in Northeast
Asia.
Conclusion
For the near
term, the trends described above will not qualitatively
alter the basic structure of relations in East Asia. Over
time, however, even if precipitous events do not force
change, there will be a gradual erosion of US influence
in the face of waxing nationalism and enhanced economic
and strategic capabilities. At a minimum this situation
requires more coherent US policy approaches and more "enlightened
self-interest" adjustment to new realities. Apart from
possible decisions on missile defense systems over the
coming year or two, the other two seminal developments
may not occur for some time, and in the case of Taiwan,
the possibility of a peaceful resolution can not be ruled
out. On missile defense systems, the nature of the decisions
taken and the architecture decided upon will determine
the Chinese response.
A key question
is whether the US and China can sustain an ambiguous relationship
where both are hedging against uncertainty until China's
transition to a post-centrally planned economy produces
a more clear economic and political outcome. A China where
the iron rice bowl is broken and some form of a constitutional
rule-of-law system is established alters the possibilities
for US-China relations, and hence, the geopolitical equation.
A China that is a corporatist, authoritarian system--also
a possible scenario--would have very different implications.
More
broadly, the net result of the interplay of the
executive branch and the Congress--that is to say,
the multitude of crosscutting single issue interests--is
US policy appearing to many imperious and confused.
To argue that all this is matter little in a world
of overwhelming American power and influence is
tempting. Yet, actions have consequences. The US
global advantage is impermanent. During the next
quarter century, the role of other powers, Europe,
China, perhaps even Russia will increase. The American
challenge is to husband its advantage wisely. That
means fostering a global structure of relations
that advances US long-term interests in which other
major players feel they have more of a stake in
cooperating than in obstructing. Recent actions
of US allies and others indicated that message we
seem to be sending is less one of norms and rules
than of arbitrary power. The irony is that global
trends are largely beneficial to US interests and
values--democratization is spreading in Asia, deregulation
and privatization continue apace.
CONTENTS
Appendix
A: Conference Schedule
9:00
- 9:05 a.m. |
Welcome
Robert L. Worden, Chief, Federal Research
Division, Library of Congress
|
9:05
- 9:15 a.m. |
Opening
Comments
Robert G. Sutter, Moderator, National
Intelligence Officer for East Asia, National
Intelligence Council
|
9:15
- 10:45 a.m. |
Panel
One
Japanese and South Korean Attitudes and Approaches
Susumu Awanohara--"Japanese Attitudes and
Approaches Toward US Policies and Presence in
the Region" Scott Snyder--"US-ROK Relations:
Trends at the Opening of the 21st Century"
Commentators--William Heinrich, Timothy
Miner, and Guy Arrigoni
|
11:00
a.m. - 2:30 p.m. |
Panel
Two
Chinese and Southeast Asian Attitudes and
Approaches
Bonnie Glaser--"Trends in Chinese Assessments
of the US, 2000-2005"
Marvin Ott--"Southeast Asian Perspectives"
Commentators--Greg Knight, Paula Causey,
and James Ellis
|
2:00
- 3:30 p.m. |
Panel
Three
Political and Economic Issues
William Watts--"East Asia and the United
States--Current Status and 5-Year Outlook: Convergence/Divergence
in Political Interests, Values, and Policies"
Marcus Noland--"Economic Interests,
Values, and Policies"
Commentators--Mary Tighe, Dean Carver,
and Craig Hoepfl
|
3:45
- 5:15 p.m. |
Panel
Four
Security Issues and Wrap-Up
Robert Manning--"The Perils of Being No.
1: East Asian Trends and US Policies to 2025"
Commentator--Donald Kilmer
|
CONTENTS
Appendix
B: Participants
Guy
Arrigoni, Defense Intelligence
Agency
Susumu
Awanohara, Medley Global Advisers
Dean
Carver, specialist on East Asian economic issues
Paula
Causey, Department of State
James
Ellis, specialist on East Asia
Bonnie
Glaser, independent specialist on China
William
Heinrich, Department of State
Craig
Hoepfl, specialist on East Asia
Donald
Kilmer, National Security Agency
Greg
Knight, Department of State
Robert
Manning, Council on Foreign Relations
Timothy
Miner, National Security Agency
Marcus
Noland, Institute for International Economics
Marvin
Ott, faculty of the National War College
Scott
Snyder, Asia Foundation
Robert
Sutter, National Intelligence Officer for East
Asia
Mary
Tighe, Deputy National Intelligence Officer
for East Asia
William
Watts, Potomac Associates
Robert
L. Worden, Chief, Federal Research Division,
Library of Congress
CONTENTS
Appexdix
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CONTENTS
Footnotes
(1)
Wang Jisi, director of the Institute of American
Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
asserted in an interview that, "A general estimation
is that the United States' status as the sole superpower
in the world will remain unchanged until the first
quarter of the next century [2000-2025]. We do not
have sufficient data to predict what the situation
will be after that." Liaowang, no. 52, December
27, 1999, FBIS, January 13, 2000.
(2)
Lu Qichang and Ding Sheng, "Viewing the American
Global Strategy from the Atrocity of NATO," Contemporary
International Relations, vol. 9, no. 6, June
1999.
(3)
For a relatively balanced analysis of the US economy
see Gu Wenyan, "US Economy: What's Ahead?," Contemporary
International Relations, vol. 9, no. 12, December
1999.
(4)
Lu Zhongwei, president of the China Institute of
Contemporary International Relations, wrote: "Economic
globalization benefits our country, but is logic
of borderless economy will definitely challenge
our state control and sovereignty." "Global Economic
Scene Vs. Economic Security at the Turn of the Century,"
Contemporary International Relations, vol.
9. no. 8, August 1999.
(5)
Shi Xiaohui and Xu Hongzhi, "Although Some New Characteristics
Have Been Shown in International Situation, Peace
and Development Still Remain Main Themes of Our
Time--Roundup of 1999 Symposium on International
Situation," Renmin Ribao, December 2, 1999,
FBIS, January 1, 2000.
(6)
Li Bin, "China's Security Environment in the Early
2000s," interview with Jiang Lingfei, Deputy Director
of the International Relations Department of the
National Defense University, Beijing Review
(Internet version), no. 2, January 10, 2000.
(7)
Bonnie Glaser and Banning Garrett, "China and the
US-Japan Alliance at a Time of Strategic Change
and Shifts in the Balance of Power," published by
the Asia/Pacific Research Center, Institute for
International Studies, Stanford University, September
1997.
(8)
HR 1838, The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA)
passed the House of Representatives 341-70 on 1
February 2000.
(9)
Lu Junyuan, "Taiwan's Geostrategic Value Makes Reunification
Essential," Taiwan Yanjiu [Taiwan Studies],
no. 33, March 20, 1996, FBIS-CHI-96-171, 4 September
1996.
(10)
"If the US sells advanced weapons and technology
to Taiwan, then China might be forced to reconsider
its commitments to arms control agreements, such
as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),"
warned a senior colonel from China's National Defense
University privately in October 1999.
(11)
While it is true that cueing from US satellites
would allow for earlier detection of an incoming
missile and thus increase the chances of interception,
there are other early warning options that can be
implemented that do not involve surveillance from
US satellites. See "Report to Congress on Theater
Missile Defense Architecture Options for the Asia-Pacific
Region," at _ HYPERLINK "http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs".
(12)
During the January 24-26, 2000 Defense Consultative
Talks in Washington, Deputy Chief of the General
Staff Gen. Xiong Guangkai reportedly warned that
"a sale of antimissile systems to Taiwan would,
in China's view, violate the 1979 pact in which
the United States agreed to recognize Beijing's
government, sever its defense pact with Taiwan,
and withdraw US military forces from the island."
Steven Mufson, "Chinese Military Leader Objects
to US Missile Sale to Taiwan," The Washington
Post, 27 January 2000.
(13)
Dr. David M. Finkelstein and Rear Admiral (Ret.)
Michael McDevitt, "Competition and Consensus: China's
'New Concept of Security' and the United States'
Security Strategy for East Asia-Pacific Region,"
CNA Project Asia Issue Paper, December 1998, Center
for Naval Analyses Corporation, Alexandria, Virginia.
(14)
Bonnie Glaser and Banning Garrett, "China's Pragmatic
Posture Toward the Korean Peninsula," The Korean
Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. IX, no. 2,
Winter 1997-98.
(15)
Yearender by Xu Baokang, Renmin Ribao editor;
Zhao Jiaming, Renmin Ribao reporter stationed
in DPRK; and Wang Linchang, Renmin Ribao
reporter stationed in ROK: "Peace Process in the
Korean Peninsula--The Burden Is Heavy and the Road
Is Long," Renmin Ribao, 22 December 1999,
FBIS, December 25, 1999.
(16)
The Korea Times, 10 December 1999, FBIS,
10 December 1999.
(17)
For an interesting set of discussions on different
scenarios of China's future, see China's Future:
Implications for US Interests, Conference Report,
24 September 1999, Library of Congress, sponsored
by the National Intelligence Council and Federal
Research Division, Library of Congress, CR 99-02,
September 1999.
(18)
See, for example, Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the
National Interest" and Robert B. Zoellick, "A Republican
Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, vol. 70,
no.1, January-February 2000.
(19)
Robert B. Zoellick, "A Republican Foreign Policy."
(20)
"A National Security Strategy for a New Century,"
December 1999, The White House, released on January
5, 2000, _ HYPERLINK "http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov"
_www.pub.whitehouse.gov_.
(21)
Condoleezza Rice termed China "a strategic competitor,
not the 'strategic partner' the Clinton administration
once called it." She also criticized the "three
no's" as a policy that tilted toward Beijing and
created uneasiness in Taiwan. Condoleezza Rice,
"Promoting the National Interest."
(22)
An unnamed senior PRC official in Washington was
quoted as saying, "For its own defense needs, if
the United States wants to develop a [theater missile
defense] system, that's its own business. What we
don't want to see is TMD covering Taiwan. That would...
damage US-China . . . relations." Steven Mufson,
"Chinese Military Leader Objects to US Missile Sale
to Taiwan," The Washington Post, 27 January
2000.
(23)
In the body of this paper, I will make frequent
reference to a recent Potomac Associates survey
and analysis of the attitudes of Americans toward
Asia and US policy/interests in the region, Americans
Look at Asia, A Potomac Associates Policy Perspective,
by this writer. The study was undertaken with a
grant from the Henry Luce Foundation, with fieldwork
carried out by Opinion Dynamics Corporation, Cambridge,
Mass. Copies of the full report are available upon
request from Potomac Associates.
(24)
Members include Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile,
China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand,
Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore,
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the United States,
and Vietnam. It is headquartered in Singapore.
(25)
For discussions of possible bubbles or bubblelike
phenomena in US asset markets, see Miller, Weller,
and Zhang (1999) and Makin (2000).
(26)
This is not inevitable--the US could experience
a "soft landing." See Mann (1999).
(27)
See Noland (1997).
(28)
See Noland (1996).
(29)
With regard to Japan, see Noland (1997). With regard
to China, the vast majority of Chinese exports to
the US compete primarily with exports from other
sources, not US domestic production (Noland, 1998).
In particular, a removal of quota restrictions on
Chinese textile and apparel trade with the US could
be expected to increase China's bilateral surplus
with the US for the simple reason that imports that
are currently sourced from third countries, such
as South Korea or Kenya, would in the future come
from China, reflecting a more rational locational
pattern of production worldwide. That is to say,
even if the overall US trade balance remained unchanged,
the pattern of bilateral balances would change.
The bilateral deficit with China would increase,
and bilateral deficits (surpluses) with other countries
would decrease (increase) to offset this change.
(30)
See Noland (1995) for more substantiation of this
argument.
(31)
Just the opposite: The developing countries believed
that they had been taken to the cleaners during
the Uruguay Round, the previous round of negotiations,
and were skeptical about taking on further trade
liberalization commitments. They were far better
prepared to defend their interests in these negotiations.
Similarly, Asia was still recovering from its financial
crisis, and policymakers there believed they already
had enough issues with which to grapple. Japan showed
its lack of interest in further trade liberalization
by blocking the Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization
effort in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
forum (APEC). And in the US, President Clinton has
been unable to secure "fast-track" trade negotiating
authority from the US Congress.
(32)
In contrast, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia,
and Malaysia are members of the Cairns Group of
self-identified, nonsubsidizing agricultural exporters,
which generally takes positions similar to that
of the US in the agricultural trade negotiations.
For a more detailed analysis of Asian countries'
positions on agricultural trade issues, see Noland
(1999).
(33)
These include the possible extensions of the 31
December 1999 deadline for developing countries
to implement WTO agreements on intellectual property,
investment measures, and customs valuation.
(34)
See Noland (1998) and Bergsten (2000a) for more
on the PNTR issue.
(35)
In his January 2000 State of the Union address,
President Clinton indicated that he would like to
a vote on PNTR this year, and Republican Congressional
leaders voiced mild support for this initiative.
However, China has yet to reach a bilateral accession
agreement with the EU. Once the bilateral agreements
are complete, observers expect the WTO secretariat
to take about six months to compile the various
bilateral accords into a single accession protocol.
Given the US electoral calendar and the relatively
short Congressional session, it is unlikely that
the Congress could vote on PNTR this year--if it
waits for the Chinese WTO accession protocol to
be completed. The Congress could, however, vote
on PNTR before the WTO process is complete, presumably
on the basis on the US-China bilateral agreement.
(36)
ASEAN was founded in 1967 as a Cold War response
to the war in Indochina. In 1992 it began talks
leading to the creation of AFTA. The original members
were Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and
the Philippines. Brunei joined in 1984. Ironically,
Vietnam joined in 1995 and was followed by Laos
(1997), Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia (1999). ASEAN
initially attempted regional industrial ventures
that failed; in 1978 it put into place a preferential
trade agreement (10 to 15 percent preference margin
on designated items). A free-trade agreement was
discussed, but rejected, at the time. The impact
of the policy was insignificant. Important items
were excluded, and, in one infamous case, Indonesia
granted its partners a preference on snow removal
equipment. A decade after the deal, it covered less
than 3 percent of actual trade.
(37)
See Frankel (1997).
(38)
Many in Asia regard the IMF as a front for the US
Government, and do not distinguish between the actions
and positions of the two entities. In part this
reflects ignorance, but in part it is an understandable
response to the predominate influence the US wields
in the Fund, and the fact that in the case of South
Korea, the Fund program conditionality included
items of direct mercantilist interest to the US,
which were of questionable relevance to the financial
crisis.
(39)
The US participated in the "second line of defense"
associated with the second IMF program in Thailand.
However, even this participation was purely symbolic
inasmuch as the US Treasury fought the actual use
of "second line" funds and has never disbursed a
dime.
(40)
To cite but one example, Joseph E. Stiglitz, at
the time the chief economist of the World Bank,
contemporaneously put forward serious criticisms
of the IMF programs. See Stiglitz (1998, 1999).
(41)
In the interest of brevity, these statements blur
distinctions among Asian countries. In Indonesia,
in particular, some segments of the society actually
welcomed the IMF, which was regarded as less cozy
with the Suharto regime than was the World Bank.
At the other extreme, a widespread view in South
Korea is that the IMF program was a deliberate attempt
to subvert the South Korean economy, which was believed
to pose a threat to the US in sectors such as automobiles.
(42)
Frankly, the US position is unclear on this point.
Some have interpreted this ambiguity as reflecting
a desire by the Clinton administration, in general,
and the Treasury, in particular, to pre-empt the
strongly market-oriented critique expected from
the Congressionally-appointed International Financial
Institutions Advisory Commission (known colloquially
as the Meltzer Commission after its chair, Professor
Allen Meltzer), while at the same time preserving
support from Congressional members concerned with
labor, human rights, etc.
(43)
The traditional quota constraint on borrowing was
bent for Mexico in 1994 under US pressure, and was
broken dramatically during the Asian crisis, when
South Korea was permitted to borrow nearly 20 times
its quota.
(44)
Indeed, the problem with quota reallocation would
not be giving Asia a greater share, it would be
how to reduce the European share while preserving
the historical prerogatives of individual countries.
Simply treating the EU (or, alternatively, the ECB
members) as a single member could result in the
European quota exceeding that of the US. This situation
would not only be unacceptable to the US on diplomatic
grounds, but it would also require moving the IMF
and the World Bank headquarters to Brussels (which
no one wants), since the charter states that the
organizations' headquarters must be located in the
capital of the largest member.
(45)
To cite a mild example, while in the midst of "campaigning"
for the job, Sakakibara publicly blasted, Masaru
Hayami, Governor of the Bank of Japan, as "incompetent"
and called for Hayami's resignation. Sakakibara
would presumably need the Bank of Japan's support
to get the managing director position. Some have
speculated that Sakakibara's ultimate goal is Hayami's
job, not Camdessus's.
(46)
The problem for Japan is that there is no other
Asian country able to provide major support for
a Japanese candidacy at the IMF in exchange for
Japanese support in the ADB.
(47)
Author's calculations based on IEA forecast, EIA,
and Fereidum Fesharaki of the East West Center (1998).
(48)
US DOE, Energy Information Agency, International
Energy Outlook, 1999. p.141
(49)
See "China's National Defense," Beijing: State Council
of the People's Republic of China.
(50)
See Sherman Garnett's study of Sino-Russian relations,
"Limited Partnership," Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Washington, DC, 1998, for a full discussion
of the bilateral relationship.
(51)
See BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, "China and
Malaysia sign Joint Statement for Future Cooperation",
June 2, 1999.
(52)
See Ronald Montaperto, "Reality Check: Assessing
the Chinese Military Threat," Defense Working Group
paper No. 4, PPI, April 1998, for a sober view.
Also the US Deptartment of Defense Report to Congress,
"China: Future Military Capabilities and Strategy,"
Washington, DC 1998.
(53)
See James E. Auer, "Japan's Military Capability
in 2015," SAIS Policy Forum, December 1998 for a
full discussion of Japan's military capacity and
approach to security.
(54)
See Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration; Tokyo,
Japanese Foreign Ministry, 8 October 1998.
(55)
See Moscow Declaration, Japanese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs; November 1998.
(56)
See Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)
Special Memorandum, "South Korea's Emerging Nuclear
Potential," 22 February 1996 for a sampling of views
among the Korean intelligentsia.
(57)
Remarks to Council on Foreign Relations Task Force,
Seoul, May 1998, Remarks to Council on Foreign Relations
Task Force, Seoul, May 1998.
(58)
See Robert A. Manning "Will The Koreas Play the
China Card?" The International Economy, March/April
1997, for a discussion of these potential alignments.
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