Embassy of the United States

2007 Press Releases

Ambassador Ryan Crocker Media Roundtable

October 25, 2007
Baghdad, Iraq

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, thanks for coming over. I'm not going to take up your time with a lengthy statement, but just to say the context for this. A little over a month after General Petraeus and I reported to Congress, I will be taking off -- actually tomorrow -- to make a trip through the region to consult with some of Iraq's neighbors before winding up in Istanbul for the ministerial there the 2nd and 3rd of November. So I kind of have my mind on the regional dimension at the moment, but as always, prepared to talk about anything that is on your minds.

QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, we have some indication that in at least a limited way, there were guarantees of immunity given to Sultan Hashem when he ran into American forces. And now there has been a delay in his execution, as far as we can tell. I know a lot of that is an Iraqi dynamic, but where does the United States stand on the execution of Sultan Hashem?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: First, I can tell you that I myself am quite convinced there were no hints, intimations, promises of immunity when Sultan Hashem surrendered himself. I have talked to officers that were actually involved in that process, and well before this became an issue. So I can say with pretty good authority that there were no U.S. undertakings whatsoever to Sultan Hashem concerning immunities or anything like that.

As you note, this is an Iraqi judicial process. We think it is very important that the rule of law be respected here and that when, and as necessary, that the time be taken to be sure that all of the issues are clarified. In this particular case, there was a question of process, how sentences once handed down might or might not be reviewed. That matter went to the Iraqi Supreme Court, which handed down a statement. And my understanding is that the full and actual meaning of that statement is still under discussion.

So, you know, this -- it's a process that's underway, and I think it's important that it be very carefully and deliberately done.

QUESTION: You mentioned the Istanbul meeting. What are you looking for out of that meeting? Is there anything tangible? Specific? Any way forward?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: We're exactly or will be almost exactly six months after the first ministerial at Sharm el-Sheikh, and a lot has happened on the ground in Iraq since then, most significantly, the marked dropoff in violence in Baghdad, Anbar, and elsewhere. We think this is something that the neighbors should take careful note of, and understand, as I think they do, that what happens in Iraq and the future of Iraq is vital to their own interests and security, and that as we convene this time in Istanbul, there are a lot of positive indications out there. So we will be urging more involvement in a positive way by the neighbors. Saudi Arabia has announced, of course, that it is reopening its embassy. We would like to see others of the neighbors do the same thing, and just in general, step up the positive engagement with Iraq, and as appropriate, step down the negative engagement.

QUESTION: What role is it that the U.S. will play/should play in this dispute between Turkey and the Kurdish side and PKK?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, we have been, as you know, very actively engaged with the Turkish government, the Iraqi government, with Kurdish representatives, over the last couple of weeks. On the one hand, we have been telling Iraqis -- all Iraqis, Kurds and others -- that there have got to be concrete, definitive steps as well as statements to demonstrate Iraq's seriousness in not tolerating a terrorist presence on its soil. And with the Turks, you know, we have been registering our support, our sympathy for their losses, our understanding of their outrage, which we share, but also stressing that decisions on where to go from here have to be very carefully taken, that consequences have to be weighed. And in particular, we have cautioned that military action across the border could be dangerously destabilizing, to the detriment of all our interests.

There have been some encouraging developments. We have seen, I think, some very responsible statements from the Iraqi government, including from the President, who of course happens to be a Kurd; also what I thought was a pretty good statement from the president of the Kurdish regional government. Night before last -- although it seems like one long night -- we had the visit of Foreign Minister Babajan here two days ago, and today a high level Iraqi delegation is on its way to -- literally on its way to Ankara right now.

So, involved with both the parties. But one of the mechanisms that is out there and that we think has merit in this current crisis is the tripartite committee, U.S., Iraq, and Turkey. And, you know, indeed, we've got some people from here going up to Ankara today. I'm not sure that we're going to have a tripartite meeting as such, but we're going to have people out of here on hand with our colleagues in Ankara, and we'll be engaged again with both parties in any way that they and we see as helpful. So yes, we're in it in a lot of different ways.

QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, do you think the proximate cause of this was the reason this crisis has flared? Or do you think that Turkey was looking for provocation in this period of time to cause a crisis?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Look, the Turks have lost a large number of people over the last couple of weeks, military and civilian, to PKK terror. And I don't think you have to look beyond that to understand their reactions, particularly since it is hardly the first time.

As the PKK found space in northern Iraq after they were effectively squeezed out of Syria and Turkey itself after 1999, this is a problem that's been building. We and they have dealt with this at least since 2002. And, you know, the sad fact is, as I understand it, kind of the pace of actions and the numbers of casualties are increasing over time. So it's both a -- several serious incidents recently, but it's a building problem as well.

QUESTION: Do the Turks buy into your argument that I suppose you make that this couldn't come at a worse time for the process here?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Again, I think the Turkish government, and I'm certainly not the one to speak for them, but they live in the neighborhood. They understand what the political conditions are.

QUESTION: Sam Dagher with the Christian Science Monitor. First of all, I saw you today (inaudible). My question is about Iran. We've held two rounds of talks with them while you were in Baghdad, and some (inaudible). But in the recent weeks anti-Iranian statements or the statements warning them of the Iranian threat, and Iran's continued sort of meddling in Iraq's affairs, have increased on the U.S. side, where do things stand right now vis-a-vis the Iranians? And also, there were reports that a major part of your strategy or the main part of your strategy going forward in the next few years is the Iranian threat and the threat of the militias, Shia militias, continuing (inaudible).

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: That's a two-fer. Okay. But -- a ten-fer, yes, but neatly linked. With respect to Iran and the talks, we did establish a working group that has met. There are no discussions currently scheduled, but my expectation is that we will have another round at some point. The Iraqis play an important role in this, and when they decide the time is right, if they come to us, I think we would look at that positively. But as I said, there's, you know, no additional rounds scheduled, but my expectation is that the process continues, that we will have such a round.

In terms of what's actually going on, I think it continues to be a mixed and cloudy picture. You know, we've seen some interesting developments -- for example, over the last couple of months, a virtual cessation of indirect fire on the international zone. We have seen Muqtada al-Sadr's announcement at the end of August calling on Jaish al Mahdi to stop its activities, and I just saw today a television report of a further statement by Muqtada al-Sadr saying that that cessation of activities includes even military actions in self-defense, that he means a total stand-down.

Again, as you've noted over the couple of months since the announcement, that has not been a universally observed dictum, and it's unclear to us what role the Iranians might have had in it, if any. But it's -- again, I think it's important for us to continue to push them to try to, by various means, bring their practices into line with their stated policies.

But, you know, on the ground, again, we've seen Jaish al Mahdi actions. Basra two days ago was a case in point. We've seen the other more positive developments that I've just mentioned. How is Iran tied to it all? Again, very hard for us to say. But since it's a mixed picture, it's certainly a picture that we want to stay engaged on.

With respect to the future, again, the future in Iraq can be defined in a lot of ways. But a key definition, as it is for any state, is the state's ability to exercise sovereign control all of its own territory. I know I shouldn't do this, but as Max Weber said roughly, a definition of a state is that entity which enjoys a monopoly of force in a given territory. You know, it is a fundamental definition of a state.

What we've seen over the last couple of months, of course, is major success by the Iraqis and ourselves against al-Qaida. I've seen some of your headlines. You're certainly not going to hear from me that al-Qaida is defeated; victory is at hand. Al-Qaida has shown an extraordinary persistence, and they are persisting now. But clearly, their abilities have been badly damaged, and you can just -- I mean, you remember where we were in terms of al-Qaida attacks six months ago and where we are now, you can see it.

In a sense, that puts into highlight, I think, the other big problem, which are the militias, and particularly again Jaish al Mahdi. I think there are enough indications out there that Jaish al Mahdi is again resilient. So in different parts of Baghdad, I think we've seen Jaish al Mahdi militant kind of transform itself into Jaish al Mahdi Incorporated. They may not be shooting at us or Iraqi soldiers, but controlling gas stations, controlling real estate, you know, controlling trade, controlling services -- that is a major challenge to the state. And it will be a difficult problem to tackle, but one that I think has to be.

And again, what are Iranian intentions? There have been indications again that, looking to Lebanon and their role there, that they have been working on the Hezbollah-ization of at least parts of Iraq, to use militant groups, particularly Jaish al Mahdi, as a means of asserting Iran's influence, weakening the government, and by indirection, by proxy, exerting control in Iraq. I don't know. But certainly it's a question that is very much on my mind as we go forward.

QUESTION: Do you know where Muqtada is?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I don't. I heard a day or so ago that he might be back in Iran, but I don't know if that's the case. Anybody got a Muqtada sighting? Okay.

QUESTION: I don't know (inaudible), but I do have a question. One, on Iran, I understood that there were going to be sub-ambassadorial talks with Iran in the next couple of days. And that would be the process you are referring to (inaudible) this next week or so. There was supposed to be (inaudible).

And more generically -- I mean, this stuff is very interesting, but for as much as violence has come down here, what does it mean? I was in Fallujah. I was very impressed by the changes in Fallujah as to the psychic lack of fear there; whereas in Baghdad, even though violence is down, you still have walls going up. You still have people afraid to leave their neighborhoods. You still have -- clearly, reconciliation, I mean, can you talk about that any more?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, since I'm the ambassador and I'm leaving tomorrow, I'd like to think I'd know if somebody was planning ambassadorial-level talks in my absence.

QUESTION: Sub-ambassadorial.

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Oh, sub-ambassadorial level? Yes, it's a possibility. But there is nothing scheduled at this point.

Yes, it's a great question because again, you know, enormously complicated. Feel free to quote that. You know, in Fallujah, Ramadi, other parts of Anbar, where al-Qaida just isn't -- I mean, they're gone -- people do feel that the -- you know, the weight's off. You know, Ramadi had a 5K fun run or something. People have been running for a while in Ramadi, but it hasn't been fun up until now.

(Laughter.)

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: And I think it reflects the clarity with which that situation has developed, that al-Qaida simply is gone.

QUESTION: But it's not just al-Qaida in Baghdad.

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I'm coming to that. So you come to Baghdad. Violence also much diminished, not to the extent in most of Anbar, but diminished. Al-Qaida similarly on the ropes, although obviously still present. Sunni militias increasingly going out of the militia business and coming over to say, we want to hook up with the coalition, and indeed with the government of Iraq.

But you don't have that mood here, at least not in the places I've been, that echoes that in Anbar. And again, I think it reflects the added complexity here that, you know, what Anbar was was al-Qaida against the Sunnis. In most of Baghdad, of course, it's Sunni and Shia, and the awful sectarian fight that waged here, was waged here, for over a year.

People just aren't confident yet that that's definitively, conclusively over. And I think it's going to be a while before they do. If I were one of them, I'd certainly feel that way. It's why the process that's underway now in some of the mixed neighborhoods is so important. You know, it's one thing to accept local citizens who want to turn against al-Qaida, say in a Sunni area. And they become volunteers, and then you transition them to the Ministry of Interior. That's one thing, and not without its complications.

But in a mixed area, it's much more difficult. And that's why I think events such as took place in Jihad -- what was it, three days ago -- become so important. And reconciliation is certainly in my vocabulary, that if communities and their leaders can come together in mixed neighborhoods like Jihad, hammer out some understandings, both agree to go forward to seek appointments and security forces, that's critical. And if that process continues and solidifies, then I think you get to maybe an Anbar level of confidence, but not now.

QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, if I may, I mean, all of that dynamic -- what you see in Jihad, what you see in Ghazalia, I mean, that essentially has been pushed by the American units and is being done definitely on a local level and you are seeing progress. What about the government? To what degree are they following up on this in any real way? I mean, they seem to be the absent player in reconciliation, very much so up to now.

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Yes and no. The no part of it, again, I'm just thinking of Anbar, where the government showed up with the money.

QUESTION: True, but not where Shia and Sunni are involved.

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: And money counts. Well, again, that's an interesting point because as we've seen, you know, kind of thousands increasing of individuals coming forward and saying, you know, we don't want to carry a gun for anybody except the government, if we can get a salary and so forth, we're getting into numbers that no security forces can absorb even if you don't have political tensions. It's just too many.

So I've had discussions with the government. What they want, they want jobs. I mean, they want something that looks like a stable future, is what we hear. We've got -- through the community stabilization program and others, we do a lot of job creation. And I've asked my folks to -- okay, let's look at everything we're doing. Let's look at the areas where violence has come down and where people are coming up. And let's see -- let's be sure we're using our resources where they can have a strategic effect. And let's have that discussion with the government.

And I've had it now at the prime ministerial level. The government needs to spin up, I think, for job creation assistance in mixed neighborhoods and elsewhere -- you know, civil jobs. And the prime minister says he's fully supportive of that, so --

QUESTION: Is the military then, though, making a mistake? Because you say you've got far more people now in the process, i.e. the concerned citizens groups who are hoping, and have in some ways been promised, that the best effort will be made to get them absorbed into the police or the Army. You say that there are way too many to be absorbed. Are we making -- I mean, is the military making promises or setting up a problem for the future because they can't be absorbed?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, I don't mean to say there are way too many. But just looking at the numbers who are coming in, if we're not over now, we're going to be. I don't think so. First, I think the military by and large has been pretty conservative in what they're telling folks. But the other thing I'm hearing is that by no means do all of those who are coming forward -- are they saying, I want to be a policeman, only a policeman, and nothing but a policeman. The way it's being translated back to me, they're saying, I want gainful employment.

They often put it, I'm told, in terms of the security forces because that's what's out there. That's how this has gone so far. But I think we need to be working, and the Iraqi government needs to be working, on a whole range of options. And again, we know how to do this because we've done it with community stabilization. I just think we need to be sure some of our existing programs are really targeted where they can make a major political difference.

QUESTION: With all due respect sir, the perception among the Iraqis now -- they have a prime minister of Shiites and a vice president of Sunnis, more than ever?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: And that is an impression that they both need to work to shake. It's why I think events such as Tariq al-Hashimi's visit to Najaf and the meeting with Sistani become important. It's why Amar al-Hakim's visit to Ramadi is important, and the efforts that Sheik Ahmed has made to engage the sheiks of Karbala in the meetings between the governors of Anbar and Karbala.

It's all of this cross-communal activity that I think is important. We've seen an increase in that, a significant increase in that, over the last few months. And it's no coincidence that that's going up, I think, as violence tends down. These sorts of efforts and gestures would have been virtually impossible, I think, you know, back last spring at some of the height of the violence.

But more clearly, it needs to be done. And again, we may find national leaders sort of taking their cue from lower levels. If you've got local level reconciliation moving, then that's a signal up the line. And, you know, of course, Prime Minister Maliki has been out to Anbar. He's been to Tikrit. And, you know, he was the one who made the decision, for example, on the absorption of a significant number of young men in Abu Ghraib into the Iraqi police. And all of those, 1700-odd, that was his personal order to do that even though a number of them clearly had been part of the Sunni insurgency.

But, you know, I said this, you may remember, earlier on in my tenure and I still believe it: You know, a single word at the time I got here that in my mind distilled modern Iraq was "fear." And to a significant degree, you know, fear is still very much part of the scene, and you know all its dimensions. The Shia fear that the Sunnis are really just waiting for the day when they can reassert the old ascendency. The Sunni fear that they are a community under pressure, if not actually in peril. And then the Kurdish fear of all manner of things.

So, you know, that fear is deeply rooted. The sectarian violence of 2006 definitely deepened it, and it isn't going to go away overnight. But leaders have to take steps and make moves, and I can tell you we encourage leaders in both communities to do just that.

QUESTION: Coming back to Iran, as you see problems in Iraq that you believe lead to Iran rise? Is that in your thinking for a reason for U.S. forces to stay in greater numbers longer?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, first, you know, again, the Iranian connection is -- these are difficult things to see. Much of what Iran has done, for example, in its EFP networks or supported EFP networks were actually against us rather than working at undermining Iraqi authority.

You know, General Petraeus made his recommendations on force levels that the President accepted back in September. And we were all clear at the time that looking six months ahead was as far as we could look, that our force deployments and redeployments need to be tied to conditions. Conditions need to be carefully assessed because it's not just about, well, we got violence here and therefore you got to have troops there. It's, you know, what kind of violence? What are its origins? What are its dimensions? You know, does the U.S. coalition military presence actually get at the problem, or maybe not?

So, you know, we just have to look at the specifics as they develop. And I'm not about to make even a hint of a prediction until we absolutely have to, which will be in March.

QUESTION: There was a report today that the U.S. government is going to announce broad sanctions against Iran, and specifically against the IRGC. If that does happen, will it affect your relationship with the Iranian officials here and your interaction with them?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: You know, one thing that Phil Reeker does is say, you idiot, don't answer hypothetical questions. So, ignoring that, first, that's a Washington question. I have no idea. It's not going to be announced here, I can tell you that. I think I'd stick with -- because I have seen the reports. But I'd stick with what I said earlier. I mean, I would expect another trilateral round.

QUESTION: Going back to the issue of the PKK, you mentioned (inaudible) by the Iraqis. (Inaudible) with the three or four or five top PKK leaders. Do you see the extradition as a -- arrest and extradition of those people as a possibility? And is the U.S. willing to consider helping finding and arresting those people?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I'm glad we came back to that because, you know, one thing we didn't talk about is geographic reality. That area up around Qandil, I mean, I guess most of you have probably seen it. That's -- they are there for a reason, because that's real hard to get to. I mean, the Iraqi Kurds held off Saddam Hussein from that and similar purchase for years and years. So I don't think it's realistic to expect that the Iraqis are going to march up that mountain and take on the PKK in their positions or arrest their leaders. I just -- I think that's in the "too hard to do" category.

But it is reasonable to expect the Iraqis to use all the means that they have to monitor PKK movements, including, you know, roads, airports, whatnot, to make an active effort to try to learn what travel patterns may be, and then be prepared to act if these guys, you know, come down out of that mountain south into areas under Iraqi government control, including the Kurdish regional government. That I think is not only reasonable, it's an expectation.

QUESTION: -- there is a major incursion, do you expect the Iraqi forces and ministry to sit back (inaudible) or do you expect a response of some kind?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, really our efforts right now with both the Turks and the Iraqis is for that not to happen. And again, that is a hypothetical that even I wouldn't get into. If there were cross-border operations what they might be and what responses they might occasion. I just hope we don't get there.

QUESTION: Is there any way U.S. Special Forces could get involved in trying to take out the PKK along the border?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: That would have to be a question for somebody else to answer, not me. Sorry.

QUESTION: What are the concrete steps that the U.S. is expecting the Iraqi government to take?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, I think there are a number of things. First is just the declaratory policy. I mean, statements don't solve problems but statements are important. And the statements the Iraqi government has been making over the last couple of months, as well as the last couple of weeks, I think have been important. This is a terrorist organization. It has no place on Iraqi soil. It is counter to Iraq's interests and its policy that this organization would even be there, let alone conduct operations.

I think it is important to get that out there. They've done it. That wasn't the case in the past.

I think engaging with the Turks on serious discussions, you know, what concrete steps does each side see as possible and desirable? And that really sort of gets under way today. What are those steps? You know, not for me to be the authoritative voice, but I think they are pretty obvious. You know, having a leader's lookout list; doing everything possible to interdict other movements. You know, folks heading up that way need to be stopped. Folks coming down need to be picked up to do everything possible to interdict resupply. These are not -- it is not a laundry list, but those are examples.

QUESTION: Do you suggest that you are asking Iraq to take military action against PKK?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: No, I am saying take steps to stop the movement of people and goods into that area. That doesn't mean military action.

QUESTION: Are you suggesting, I mean, with -- many of us have been up there. This is not -- everybody knows where they are. This is not a secret. I mean, if dumb little me knows the route, yeah, well, so clearly they could have done this; they chose not to until now, in terms of stopping access in and out.

Do you see a commitment now by the Kurds to do this?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: We're just going to have to see what is actually done. I sense a seriousness on the part of Iraq's leaders, including its Kurdish leaders, to take these kinds of steps. But the proof will be in what they actually do. But they need to do it.

Has everybody had a question that --

QUESTION: If I could ask, when you testified in Congress in September, you spoke highly of Blackwater and other security contractors (inaudible) that they did. In retrospect now, do you feel that there was a disconnect between what you were seeing and the practices of Blackwater?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Again, these guys guard my back. And I have to say, they do it extremely well. I continue to have high regard for the individuals who work in Blackwater, as I do for the other security contractors.

You know, that said, the incident in September was a horrific one. It has caused us to not only do a very detailed investigation of that particular incident, which is ongoing, but also for the Secretary to ask Ambassador Kennedy to come out with colleagues and do a top to bottom look at the entire operation. You have seen his report. There are things that need to be done and we are doing them.

QUESTION: Do you feel that you were doing the proper job before in terms of the fact that you didn't see that there were things that needed to be (inaudible) mistakes (inaudible)?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, I am the Ambassador here, so I am responsible, down the line on anything under my authority, and that includes this operation. So yes, I certainly do wish that I had had the foresight to see that there were things out there that could be corrected. I think about those things all the time. When I came here, I started looking at different elements of this operation and I have changed a lot of things. And I am the guy who is responsible. So I certainly wish that I had had the foresight or the insight to say, got to get on this one right away.

QUESTION: What should you have done do you think that you didn't?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, look, again, as I said, I'm responsible. That said, being as honest and as frank with myself as I can, I'm not sure that given the things -- all the stuff that needed to be done, I am not sure even in hindsight I would have seen the things there that said you've got to get on this; this is a disaster waiting to happen.

And indeed, I don't even make that connection, that this was an accident waiting to happen. Something bad did happen and what we've got to do now is, you know, sobered by that, then look at the whole thing and that's what we're doing.

QUESTION: Do you think that there is something you think (inaudible)?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, questions on the future, I can't answer yet. We've still got the specific investigation ongoing. But in terms of their capabilities, all the security contractors operating here I think have done a pretty darned good job of keeping us alive out here, because we just haven't lost anybody that has been under their protection.

QUESTION: So you are satisfied with the job that Blackwater is doing as (inaudible)?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, you know, the report came up with a number of good recommendations that have more to do, I think, with sort of control and coordination than they do with -- there weren't many questions raised about skill levels in that report. It's how things were organized, how they are supervised, how information is passed, how it's coordinated. So I think there are a lot of very capable individuals out there. There were and there are.

QUESTION: A couple of years ago, I was at a roundtable discussion with one of your predecessors (inaudible) might have been there. But it was after the shooting by the ambassador's PSD of (inaudible). And that was on a slick road, airport road at night. And, you know, there were investigations, there probably still are investigations in Italy. I'm not sure what happened that night. But the Ambassador was able to clarify at least the outlines of what had happened for us. And I don't know if that impinged on any investigations, I'm not sure. But after that, things sort of started to make sense with the story. In this case, a lot of us (inaudible) as much reporting we've done on it (inaudible) as much as anybody, to talk to the witnesses who say that they were -- we haven't found a single witness who has said anything than that we shot down in cold blood, basically. And we have looked as Americans, and as journalists, we have looked for that evidence that there was something else there.

And so in light of that history, that longer history and more recent history, I guess I'd call upon you to clarify anything you can about the incident (inaudible).

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Again, as you would probably expect, I am just not going to be able to say really anything about it. This was obviously an extremely serious incident. I felt that it warranted an FBI investigation. I asked for that. And that is what we got. So, you know how it works. Anything that is going to be said about that investigation is going to need to be said at this point by the FBI.

QUESTION: If I could follow up on that. Is there any way of giving (inaudible) Department of Justice (inaudible)? Is there any way that possibly some of these Blackwater contractors could be prosecuted in some form of court?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: It's a great question. It is obviously one I can't answer. But I think that is one of the questions I think was touched on in the Kennedy report. I mean, what is the basis in U.S. law for prosecutions of individuals who are found to have committed criminal acts over here? And that's again, obviously, not to make any prejudgments on this. But I think there are, at the very least, at least some questions as to whether we've got the legal -- the requisite legal means to prosecute such cases.

QUESTION: Do you support the move by the Iraqi government to perhaps (inaudible) conflicts in Iraq?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Clearly, among the things that have to be looked at here are that order. And that will be something I would expect to be discussed -- well, I know will be discussed in the joint U.S.-Iraqi commission.

I have time for about one more. A quick one.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, that's -- you know, I'll make the same distinctions here we make for ourselves. That is the Iraqi parliament moving out.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: In submitting a draft --

QUESTION: They are supposed to review it in the next couple days (inaudible).

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: It hasn't been discussed with us. I'm sorry, I've really got to go.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) 2004, Kurds, Turkmen and Sunni (inaudible) told that Kurdish leadership had actually brought down the PKK rebels into the (inaudible) area. Do you have (inaudible).

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I don't. And I would say, given the amount of violence that has taken place between the PKK and both the PUK and the KDP over the years, that that may be in the realm of urban legend.