In contrast to his work as a private practitioner which focused almost exclusively on white patients, as district surgeon Te Water had also to concern himself with those from other parts of the community not least because their diseases might impact on white health. Here he was responsible for the medical care of prisoners, paupers and other classes of person targeted by legislation, such as cases of STI or of leprosy. The death rates for racial groups in the Graaff-Reinet district indicated stark differentials: 20.2 for whites but 45.5 for those designated “coloureds”.
69 His public duties therefore brought the doctor into contact with a much less healthy portion of the population although this did not appear to alter his restricted political consciousness of the nature of community. Interventions were directed mainly or exclusively at non-whites, then largely excluded from the Cape franchise, and within this context of public health Te Water seemed unaware of tensions between the ideological goals of community benefit and of individual liberty. An awareness of these issues as they affected the white community surfaced later in his ministerial speeches on the Public Health Amendment Act of 1897 where he sought to allay the anxieties of whites about potential interference with their property on sanitary grounds.
70Te Water took his duties as district surgeon seriously, adopting an interventionist stance, as did most contemporary medical colleagues. He was keen to improve local public health, if necessary by expanding public facilities, as in 1889 when he advocated setting up a lying-in hospital.
71 Like his colleagues he was frustrated at what he perceived to be local apathy, ignorance and indifference towards the controversial Contagious Diseases Prevention Act of 1885. The first such act had been passed in 1868 but had been repealed four years later, because of influential opposition to its threat to individual liberty, while attempts to control contagious diseases under the Public Health Act of 1882 had been unsuccessful. The Contagious Diseases Act was thus contentious (as had been the case in Britain and India) and in South Africa involved several select committees on the question.
72 The 1885 act had made it compulsory for “coloured” and African sufferers from syphilis to be treated by the district surgeon, and incarcerated in segregated gaols or lock hospitals in order to protect the white population. Elizabeth van Heyningen has commented aptly that through these pieces of legislation the Cape medical profession “was beginning to assume the role of arbiter of the Colony's morals”.
73Te Water termed syphilis a loathsome condition, thought it was “undermining the health of the community”, and regretted that it was only when cases reached an advanced stage that individuals got treatment at the Contagious Diseases Hospital in the town. He was concerned about the case of an infected butter-seller in the town's morning market, as well as that of a diseased washerwoman, pointing out that in each instance their work could transmit the disease to others. “Only in the hearty cooperation of all in the application of the provisions of the act is there a possibility of stamping out the disease”, he concluded and argued passionately that all public servants should pay special attention to infected cases.
74 In his first report as district surgeon he wrote thoughtfully, systematically and at greater length on this issue than his Cape colleagues, drawing his information from farm-to-farm visits. “The conclusions I have come to from data thus collected and from private observation for some years are that syphilis prevails more extensively in the district than was ever suspected”.
75 At this time Te Water wanted strict enforcement of the act, with more thorough inspection and with suspicious cases of syphilis compelled to be examined and treated.
76 Informing this was the white population's fear of racial contamination through disease.
The doctor showed forceful determination in tackling issues in public health, although along racially differentiated lines. In leprosy, where only non-white cases might be compulsorily removed or isolated, Te Water considered that any measures “should be drastic. Half measures are too dangerous, giving a false sense of security”.
77 In this his view was in line with other medico-politicians. For example, Dr J W Matthews took the opportunity whilst serving from 1881 to 1883 as the senior member for Kimberley in the Cape House of Assembly to visit the “coloured” lepers compulsorily segregated on Robben Island (together with a few whites who had volunteered for treatment), when he expressed the conviction that only “complete segregation could ever stamp out this dreadful disease”.
78 Such interventionist measures in public health had, as van Heyningen comments, “given the medical profession unjustified confidence in its ability to control disease”.
79Te Water's move into political activity was a logical career progression. He was encouraged to go into politics by his life-long friend, J H Hofmeyr, who continued to act as his political mentor. Hofmeyr was the uncrowned leader of the Afrikaner Bond which, by the 1890s, was the most powerful political group in the House of Assembly.
80 In existence from 1880 to 1919, the Bond proceeded pragmatically and exhibited ideological fluidity in reflecting and upholding Afrikaner farming interests. It often lacked cohesion so that leaders and local supporters might find themselves divided over contemporary issues. The Bond was also racist and had been instrumental in disqualifying about a quarter of the Cape's black voters through the Voters Registration Act of 1887.
81 For the 1893 election the Bond sought capable professional men to represent it in the House of Assembly.
82 Te Water clearly fitted this description, as well as having the benefit of a strong basis of electoral support because he had held the chairmanship of the Afrikaner Bond in Graaff-Reinet since 1887. In addition, it seems likely that Te Water was imbued with the strong tradition of public service of his family: his maternal grandfather, T N G Muller, had been a member of the first Cape Assembly in 1854 and his father, F K Te Water had been elected to serve in the Cape Legislative Council from 1869 to 1877.
83 In his turn, Thomas N G Te Water was elected in 1893 to the Cape Legislative House of Assembly to represent the Bond.
National politics was complex and volatile during the 1890s when Te Water entered political life. From 1890 Cecil Rhodes was premier of the Cape with a ministry sustained by an apparently unlikely alliance dating from 1889 between his own imperialist mining interests and the Afrikaner Bond's local, agricultural ones. This alliance was underpinned by a shared belief in the hegemony of white colonial interests and sustained by personal rapport between Hofmeyr and Rhodes, as well as by the accommodating pragmatism of Bondsmen who pursued politics as the art of the possible.
84 After his election in 1893 Te Water acted as a whip for the alliance in the House of Assembly. But both Rhodes' premiership and the formal alliance with the Bond were ended by the abortive Jameson Raid of December 1895. Led by Rhodes' close friend, Dr Leander Starr Jameson, and acting in collusion with the British government, the expedition had aimed to overthrow the South African Republic's government, and so control the rapidly expanding wealth being generated by the Witwatersrand gold mines around Johannesburg in the Transvaal. The Raid politicized the Bond as well as increasing the polarizing tendencies in white South African society. The two Afrikaner republics of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State drew more closely together, and in subsequent years were increasingly concerned to preserve their independence from Britain's aim of consolidating its supremacy in South Africa within an international scramble for Africa. After declarations of war from the two republics, the South African War began in October 1899. It was both a critical chapter in the history of South Africa and an episode in British imperial history.
85 After a devastating conflict, it ended in May 1902 with the British having successfully completed their imperial conquest of South Africa.
86As a local politician, Te Water had aimed to defuse the ethnic tensions in the white community that had become so evident in municipal and divisional elections before his election in 1893. The inhabitants of Graaff-Reinet and its surrounding district were conspicuously split between Dutch (later termed Afrikaner or Boer) agriculturists and wealthier English business people.
87 A political asset was that although Te Water's home language was English, and his wife, Minnie (née Currie), came from a leading town family of British settler stock, his political sympathies were Afrikaner. (Professionally, this broad appeal also helped the doctor's medical practice as his practice records show that he was able to recruit comparable numbers of Afrikaner and English patients.) In political affairs Te Water promoted the term “Africander” to embrace “people of all nationalities whether French, English, Dutch, German”. He refuted opponents' allegations that the Bond was disloyal to the British Crown by arguing eloquently that “we desire to secure to the Africander population the rights to which we as British subjects are entitled”.
88 Te Water was aware of the need to bridge the different white ethnic sensitivities in his constituency and, when elected to the House of Assembly, he chose English for his victory speech, although its content highlighted Afrikaner interests.
89The Cape had had a particularly close relationship between doctors and the state stemming from the regulation and licensing of the medical profession from as early as 1807. Other medical practitioners had found that a well-established medical practice, with the high public profile that this entailed, might assist in constructing the basis of a political constituency. For example, in the first Cape Legislative Assembly of 1853 Dr F L C Biccard (of Durbanville and Malmesbury), Dr Abercrombie, Senior (of Cape Town), and Dr H White (of Swellendam) had been elected members; all later serving in the Upper House. In 1856 these three served on the Select Committee on the Practice and Sale of Medicines, which discussed the competition that unlicensed quacks, storekeepers and traders posed to licensed doctors in remote or frontier areas. Three doctors—White, Te Water as well as Sir Thomas Smartt—went on to hold ministerial office, while Sir William Bisset Berry and Te Water became Speakers in the House of Assembly.
90 Whilst some medico-politicians like White and Dr Christie (of Beaufort West) became full-time politicians, Te Water, together with Matthews and Dr W G Atherstone (of Grahamstown), managed to combine medical practice with political activity.
The notable polymath, W G Atherstone, was a member of the Cape Assembly from 1881 to 1883, and of the Legislative Council from 1887 to 1890. Like Te Water he made a considerable professional input in public life. Atherstone gave evidence to the Select Committee on Leprosy that led to reforming legislation in 1884; promoted his views on the importance of compulsory notification of contagious diseases before improved legislation on the subject was passed in 1885; visited British mental asylums in 1887 with a view to learning from best practice how to improve the condition of the Cape insane; wrote an early draft of the Medical and Pharmacy Act of 1891; and helped stimulate the foundation of a Colonial Bacteriological Institute in Grahamstown that dealt more with veterinary than medical questions.
91Like Atherstone, Te Water represented Eastern Cape interests, gaining valuable local endorsement for his political ambitions in supporting non-medical issues important to his rural constituents. He backed the strategic extension of the railway to the town, gave charitable support to “poor whites” in the rural Afrikaner community, and was active in a multiplicity of local organizations.
92 He also promoted veterinary matters such as the efficient administration of the Scab Act of 1886 that aimed to improve animal health in this important sheep rearing area of the Karoo, where the spread of scab disease could drastically lower the value of the wool on which the economy of the area depended, and his private papers included manuscript returns from the local scab inspector.
93 However, Te Water's belief in intervention was not shared by all his constituents. In Midland constituencies such as Graaff-Reinet an anti-scab movement of sheep farmers believed that a scab inspector's interventions would be oppressive to a free people as well as causing crippling expenditure to small farmers. Their pressure succeeded in blunting some of the more forceful clauses of the bill.
94Te Water achieved Cape ministerial office in two short-lived ministries, first as Colonial Secretary in Sir Gordon Sprigg's cabinet from July 1896 to May 1898, and then as Minister without Portfolio in W P Schreiner's ministry from 1898 to 1900.
95 Both had a broad portfolio enabling him to pursue medical interests, although being constrained by holding office within the problematic context of the hardening of racial political positions before and during the South African War. As we have seen, Te Water was a member of the Afrikaner Bond, which after 1896 opposed the pro-British Progressives linked to Cecil Rhodes. Te Water's resignation from Sprigg's ministry was occasioned by a bill to redistribute seats in the House of Assembly that Te Water considered would have provided the Progressives with a majority, and hence would have given a decisive influence to free trade townsmen against the Bond's protectionist stance in defence of agrarian interests.
96 Te Water stated that “the influence of the country party would be destroyed … The object of the Bill was solely to support the diamond-mining industry and the interests of the cities, and to neglect the farmer's interests”.
97 Schreiner's succeeding ministry was unusually dependent on the support of the Bond but, as a Bond member, Te Water marginalized himself. He was perceived as lacking in vision within an increasingly polarized situation, and was criticized by Schreiner for strong protests but poor attendance. Te Water believed that Schreiner was not making enough of the Cape Colony as a third party in the looming conflict between the Boer Republics and Britain. Ultimately, the opinions of his ministers became so irreconcilable that in June 1900 Schreiner resigned.
98That these ministries managed to achieve anything was remarkable when, as Davenport comments, “the dice were loaded heavily against” them.
99 As a minister, Te Water promoted public health and veterinary issues. He took great pains to get the Public Health Amendment Act of 1897 on the statute book, after it had languished on the sidelines following a first legislative draft five years before. Here he highlighted the threat that disease posed to the health of the community, referred to the shocking state of health of the “coloured” population, as well as to insanitary conditions and the high death rates in the towns. Mindful of the wholly white representation in the Cape Assembly he was careful to emphasize that the community could not be dragooned into cleanliness; a contrast to his previous support as district surgeon for compulsory powers where non-whites were concerned. The 1897 legislation was important in centralizing and consolidating the powers of the MOH, constituting the Colonial Medical Council as an advisory board of health, encouraging the appointment of local health officers, and extending their powers of enforcement over local sanitary matters together with those of district surgeons.
100 Veterinary affairs were important given the value of agriculture to the economy, and Te Water paid close attention to the provision of serum for infected herds. The Scab Bill of 1898 made sheep dipping universally compulsory with a new Ministry of Agriculture formed to enforce more stringent regulations.
101 In addition, Te Water represented the Cape at a South African conference in 1899 to discuss Asiatic plague, which drew up quarantine regulations for ships visiting from infected areas.
102Te Water was instrumental in 1897 in revising the lunacy law in a policy area having a racially differentiated impact. Under the lunacy codes of 1891 and 1897 the mentally ill were perceived as a potential danger to colonial society's public order, and unlimited new powers were provided to commit those “wandering at large” in order to police public safety. In 1897 Te Water responded to the pleas of leading asylum doctors, W J Dodds and T D Greenlees, by ensuring that streamlined procedures for emergency admission orders were enacted, whereby the distinction between ordinary and dangerous cases (specified in 1891) was removed. Felicity Swanson has argued persuasively that this legislation exemplified the unequal power relations of the Cape in privileging white interests over black because, within a society characterized by growing rates of labour migrancy, it led to soaring rates of commitment of black males.
103 Te Water also took an interest in the newly-established Emjanyana Leper Asylum, where African patients suspected of having leprosy could be compulsorily detained under legislation of 1891, and where unrest was becoming apparent.
104The consciousness of a Cape Afrikaner and Bondsman was highly complex involving an identity as a Cape colonist that coexisted with a loyalty to the Crown, and to the empire conceived as a free, loose association rather than the much tighter imperial conception of the British.
105 This hybridity created difficulties for Te Water within the flux of Cape politics before and during the war. Te Water's Bond constituents had earlier regarded his membership of Sprigg's and Schreiner's cabinets with some distrust because they were perceived to be too close to the interests of British imperialism. But constituents' fears were allayed when, after his resignation from Sprigg's cabinet in 1900, Te Water openly supported the Afrikaner/Republican cause. He campaigned against an imposition of martial law and opposed the disfranchisement of active rebels. Indeed Te Water went into voluntary exile in Europe for a time because he feared arrest as a “rebel”.
106 During the war, Te Water's constituency of Graaff-Reinet had been designated as a cavalry depot and base camp from which British forces could engage with Boer commandos, but the loyalty of many of Te Water's constituents was revealed when, after the war had ended, a monument was erected in the town in honour of several executed Boers.
107The end of the war in May 1902 was followed a few months later by Te Water's retirement from political and public life occasioned by a stroke from which he never fully recovered. But a decade later he was persuaded to become a member of the TB Commission appointed in 1912 shortly after the Union of the Cape with the three other colonies. The commission's chairman was Dr A John Gregory (MOH for the Cape from 1901 to 1910), who from 1891 had been in the Health and Local Government Department of the Colonial Office working on health statistics, and who therefore would have been a colleague of Te Water when he was Colonial Secretary.
108 Other members of the commission were the Hon R Jameson (the single lay member), Dr Charles Porter (Medical Officer of Health to Johannesburg Municipality), and Dr George Turner (who from 1900 to 1908 had been Chief Medical Officer to the Transvaal, as well as being a medical adviser to the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association handling migrant mine workers recruited from outside South Africa). Although sharing a similar professional background to the medically-qualified commissioners including an initial medical training in Britain, Te Water stood somewhat apart in that, unlike them, he had been born and bred in the Cape, had worked in general practice, and had public health expertise in rural rather than mining issues.
The commissioners were remarkably hard working, visiting seventy-six areas and taking evidence from over 600 witnesses. Not every commissioner visited each place, although Te Water was unusually assiduous in his attendance, while his close questioning of witnesses contributed to a brisk pace in the inquiry. His vigorous style and firm opinions were evident and are revealed in the two following examples. Te Water's successor as district surgeon to Graaff-Reinet was Dr C H Hudson who gave evidence about his twenty-one years of service in the post. Te Water showed dissatisfaction with Hudson's failure to consult registration statistics for precise figures on mortality, relying instead on consultation with colleagues to gain only an impressionistic view. Equally, Te Water viewed with disapproval Hudson's failure to visit the town's location, which would have enabled him to gain a better understanding of sanitary issues through direct observation of living conditions, and hence acquire an appreciation of the effects of this environment on the health of its “coloured” inhabitants.
109 Indeed, the contrast between Hudson's routine pursuits and Te Water's earlier energetic activities was striking. Fittingly, the final report of the commission quoted approvingly from Te Water's earlier observations as district surgeon.
110A second encounter a few weeks later also revealed Te Water's decided professional views. Mining areas were objects of prime scrutiny for the commission, and in Kimberley, the centre of the diamond mining industry, Te Water was unusually assertive. Here he clashed with Dr J E Mackenzie, one of Kimberley's nine mine medical officers, who held an appointment as Medical Officer to the Wesselton Mine Compound Hospital that cared for De Beer's sick workers. Te Water's earlier sectional focus on the health of whites, and his concern for the way in which black disease might impact on the white community, meant that he was out of sympathy with the universalistic beliefs and egalitarian considerations of Mackenzie. Contrary to the views of Te Water (and other members of the commission), the Wesselton Hospital had a policy of retaining TB sufferers in the compound, rather than sending the sick miners back to their reserves.
111 Mackenzie asserted, “[W]hen you send them out of the compounds they are spreading the diseases in their homes—which is [
sic] the nursery of the labour market—worse than in the compounds.”
112 Mackenzie's view was before its time and would have gained support from later commentators who deprecated the spread of tuberculosis to rural areas by migrant miners.
113 A clash of political philosophy between Te Water and Mackenzie was also evident when the latter expressed the kind of advanced liberal views befitting a son of a leading missionary family, in disagreeing with compulsion applied to an African but not a white miner, precisely because this would have involved what he regarded as undesirable racial differentiation.
114 Mackenzie described the custom in the Wesselton Compound of allowing miners who had recovered from any active symptoms of tuberculosis to return to work; a practice strongly deprecated by the commission in its final report.
115Relationships within the commission showed growing tension. Porter and Turner used dissenting footnotes—based on an intimate knowledge of the mining industry—to challenge statistical conclusions in the commission's final report.
116 Within the small professional world of public health, Gregory, Porter and Turner had had interlocking professional careers that it is possible had produced hidden resentments: Turner had worked with Gregory in the Cape, and Porter had been an unsuccessful applicant for a post to which Turner was appointed.
117 Arguably a more substantive cause of disagreement was that Porter and Turner had had much more professional experience of health issues in the mining industry than had Gregory. Professional disagreement climaxed on the final evening when Gregory as chairman attempted to force his policy recommendations for the future control of mine workers and mine sanitation on his colleagues, but was rebuffed. In his minority report, Gregory challenged the professional integrity of Porter and Turner, by implying that they were identified with current systems of control and hence were insufficiently critical of a lack of oversight over mining.
During the commission's activities before this climacteric, Te Water had preferred to support the chairman's conclusions, but he found it impossible to back Gregory's final actions. The fact that he took six weeks before publicly supporting Porter and Turner by regretting Gregory's remarks perhaps suggests how difficult he found the situation. Te Water thought Gregory's allegations cast “grave reflections on the
bona fides” of Porter and Turner, whereas Te Water asserted that “their thorough and accurate acquaintance” with the Witwatersrand (Johannesburg) gold mines had “proved of the greatest possible value” to the commission. “I wish most distinctly to dissociate myself from the suggestion against our two Johannesburg colleagues, which is unjust and without any foundation.”
118 Professional disagreement rumbled on, with Gregory maintaining that it was in fact Porter and Turner who—by their sympathetic view of the needs of the mining industry—had succeeded in blunting the commission's conclusions.
119 These professional differences of opinion had a longer-term significance in that Porter and Turner's belief—in a racial physiological paradigm in which Africans were susceptible to tuberculosis—weakened the impact of the commission's criticism of environmental conditions in the mines, and thus undercut the reforming case for improvement.
120