WELL, I'M SATISFIED THAT BILL COHEN WHO I WORKED WITH IN THIS
           BODY FOR SOME 16 YEARS, WOULD NOT PUT AMERICA AT RISK. IF HE
           DIDN'T BELIEVE WHAT HE SAID, THAT THIS COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN
           TREATY BALANCING ALL THE CONSIDERATIONS WAS APPROPRIATE. MR.
           PRESIDENT, ONCE MOVING BEYOND THE STUDY OF THE TREATY, WHICH I
           HAVE DONE, HAVING ANNOUNCED MY SUPPORT FOR THE TREATY SOMETIME

           AGO, AFTER STUDY, AND AFTER LOOKING AT SOME OF THE EXPERTS, THE
           QUESTION IN MY JUDGMENT IS ESSENTIALLY A POLITICAL QUESTION.
           AND I BELIEVE THAT THE LESSONS OF HISTORY SUPPORT ARMS CONTROL
           CONTROL. THAT IS A VIEW WHICH I HAVE HELD FOR SOMETIME. I
           STARTED MY OWN PERSONAL STUDIES OF THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AS

           A COLLEGE SENIOR MAJORING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT THE
           UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA AND WROTE MY COLLEGE THESIS OUNS
           OUNS-USSR RELATIONS. AND ONE OF THE FIRST RESOLUTIONS THAT I
           OFFERED IN COMING TO THE SENATE IN EARLY 1982 WAS A RESOLUTION
           FOR ARMS CONTROL. AND IN 1982 THE SENATORS WERE PRETTY WELL
           LINED UP REALLY ON PHILOSOPHICAL GROUNDS. THOSE WHO FAVORED
           ARMS CONTROL AND THOSE WHO DID NOT FAVOR ARMS CONTROL. AND I

           RECALL THAT AS A VERY TOUGH DEBATE AGAINST THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
           ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, JOHN TOWER, -- WHO IS ARLEN SPECTER
           TO TELL THE PRESIDENT WHAT TO DO IN PUSHING FOR A SUMMIT
           AGREEMENT. AND SENATOR TOWER PUT ME THROUGH THE PACES, SO TO
           SPEAK. AND WE TALKED ABOUT OUR NUCLEAR DETERRENTS. WELL,
           FORTUNATELY, I HAD BEEN TO GRAND FORKS, NORTH DAKOTA, TAKEN A
           LOOK AT THE MINUTEMAN SILO, ABSOLUTELY TERRIFIED TO SEE THAT

           MISSILE. ABOUT 100 FEET INTO THE GROUND IT WENT. AND I'D GONE
           TO SOUTH CAROLINA AND TAKEN A LOOK AT OUR NUCLEAR SUBMARINES
           AND I'D BEEN TO EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE ON OUR LATEST BOMBERS,
           AND THE SENATE SIDED WITH MY POSITION IN A VOTE OF 90-8 THAT WE
           OUGHT TO HAVE A SUMMIT. AND PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS A MAJOR
           EXPONENT OF ARMS CONTROL. AND PRESIDENT REAGAN THEN PUSHED THE
           SUMMIT CONCEPT. SO THE IDEA OF ARMS CONTROL IS NOT AN IDEA

           WHICH HAS ORIGINATED WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON. IT HAS PRESIDENT
           EISENHOWER AND PRESIDENT NIXON FOURSQUARE BEHIND HIM. I HAVE
           NOT HESITATED TO B.T.U. THE ARMS CONTROL CONCEPT IF I THOUGHT
           THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD SOME TECHNICAL ADVANTAGE TO BE
           GAINED BY STEPPING OUT ON OUR OWN, IF THAT WOULD PROMOTE OUR
           NATIONAL SECURITY. ATTENDING THE GENEVA ARMS CONTROL TALKS IN
           THE MID-1980'S, I GAME PERSUADED THAT THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE

           INITIATIVE WAS A SOUND PROPOSITION, VERY CONTROVERSIAL. AND
           THAT TURNED ON OUR ABIT TO DEVELOP THE S.D.I., THE STRATEGIC
           DEFENSE INITIATTHINK OF. AS TO WHETHER THE ANTI-BALLISTIC
           MISSILE HE TERRESTRIAL WAS SUBJECT TO THE BROAD INTERPRETATION
           OR THE NARROW INTERPRETATION. AND THERE WERE SOME VERY HEATED
           DEBATES ON THE FLOOR OF THIS SENATE. SENATOR MOYNIHAN WAS
           INVOLVED. SENATOR NUNN, A LEADING EXPERT ON THE ENTIRE FIELD,
           ARGUED VERY STRENUOUSLY FOR THE NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE
           ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY. I ARGUED FOR THE BROAD

           INTERPRETATION, WHICH I THOUGHT WAS LEGITIMATE BECAUSE IT WOULD
           GIVE LEAVE TO DEVELOP THE STRATEGIC ARMS INITIATIVE. AND THAT
           WAS A COMPLEX ISSUE AND MANY PEOPLE SAID IT WAS "STAR WARS ""OR
           PIE IN THE SKY, COULDN'T BE DONE. AND I RECREATE ELECTED, MR.
           PRESIDENT, THAT BUSH, A LEADING EXPERT IN THE FIELD, TESTIFIED
           BEFORE CONGRESS DURING WORLD WAR II -- OR ACTUALLY IN 1945 --
           THAT IT WOULD BE "IMPOSSIBLE TO DEVELOP INTERCONTINENTAL

           BALLISTIC MISSILES. FAVENSYFUL AS IT MAY HAVE BEEN IN 1945 --
           FANCIFUL AS IT MAY HAVE BEEN IN 1945, WE NOW KNOW WHAT HAS BEEN
           DEVELOPED ON ICBM'S. ROBERT MCNAMARA SAID IN 1945 THAT THE
           UNITED STATES HAD SUCH A TREMENDOUS LEAD, THE SOVIETS COULD
           NEVER CATCH UP. WELL, HE WAS WRONG, TOO. THEY CAUGHT US AND
           SURPASSED US. AND WE KNOW THE STORY THAT IS NOT I HAD POCK CRI
           FAL THAT A CLERK IN THE PATENT'S OFFICE RESIGNED IN THE 19TH
           CENTURY BECAUSE THERE WAS NOTHING NOW TO BE DISCOVERED. SO I

           AGREED WITH THIS ISSUE IN TIFLT AND WE SPENT A LOT OF MONEY ON
           IT AND I DON'T THINK THE MONEY WAS WASTED BECAUSE WE STILL ARE
           WORKING AND MORE RECENTLY WITH SOME SUCCESS ON SMIFL DEFENSE --
           ON MISSILE DEFENSE. BUT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD AN IDEA FOR
           CONTROL. PRESIDENT REAGAN SPOKE OUT ABOUT SHARING WHAT WE WOULD
           LEARN WITH THE SOVIETS TO GIVE THEM OUR DEFENSE SYSTEMS SO THAT
           THERE WOULD NOT BE AN IMBALANCE, SO THAT THE NUCLEAR DETERRENTS

           ON BOTH SIDES, THAT BALANCE OF POWER WOULD NOT BE AFENGTED. ASH
           AEFFECTED. AND I HAD AN OCCASION TO HAVE A LONG DISCUSSION WITH
           PRESIDENT REAGAN, THE 200TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE
           CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. PRESIDENT REAGAN WENT TO MY
           HOMETOWN IN PHILADELPHIA, AND WE HAD A LONG PLANE RIDE AND A
           FAIR-SIZED CAR RIDE AND I ASKED THE PRESIDENT HOW HE COULD SEE
           TO IT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD OUR SECRETS WHEN IT REALLY
           WOULDN'T BE A MATTER DURING HIS PRESIDENCY AND REALLY IT'S A

           MATTER UP TO CONGRESS. AND CANDIDLY PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD NO
           ABSOLUTE ANSWER TO THAT POINT, BUT IT WAS HIS VISION THAT WE
           WOULD HAVE THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE AND THAT WE WOULD
           SHARE IT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. SO, MR. PRESIDENT, WHEN WE TAKE
           A LOOK AT THE SPECIFICS AND THE TECHNICALITIES, MY SENSE SS
           THAT THERE ARE REASONABLE ASSURANCES. BUT IT IS A MATTER OF

           BALANCING THE RISKS. WE HAD REMARKABLE SESSION OF FIVE HOURS OF
           CLOSED SESSION IN S-407 UPSTAIRS WHICH IS THE ROOM WHERE WE
           HAVE OUR SECRET BRIEFINGS. AND AFTER FIVE HOURS THERE WAS NO
           DOUBT THAT IT IS A COMPLICATED SUBJECT. THE DISTINGUISHED
           CHAIRMAN OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SENATOR WARNER, CAME
           TO THE REPUBLICAN LUNCHEON CAUCUS ON TUESDAY AND SAID THERE'S
           AN ADEQUATE RECORD TO ASSURE A NEGATIVE VOTE ON THE
           COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY. AND I LATER A CHANCE TO DISCUSS

           WITH WITH MY DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUE FROM VIRGINIA A CONVERSE
           QUESTION. I SAID, JOHN, WASN'T THERE -- MAY THE PRORD SHOWS ON
           THE FLOOR NOW; NOTHING BEHIND HIS BACK.
           

           MR. WARNER: MR. PRESIDENT, NO, INDEED. AIM RIGHT HERE. AND SUCH
           POINT AS THE SENATOR COULD ENTERTAIN A QUESTION, I WOULD BE
           HAPPY TO PUT IT TO MY COLLEAGUE.
           

           MR. SPECTER: WELL, WE MAY COME TO THAT. I AM JUST GOING TO
           REPEAT THE ASTPHURNSES SHAH SENATOR WARNER HAD GIVEN ME. HE
           ALSO SAID THERE WAS AN ADEQUATE RECORD FOR AN AFFIRMATIVE VOTE,
           DEPENDED ON HOW YOU LOOKED AT THE EVIDENCE. SO THAT MY VIEW AS
           IT COMES DOWN TO A JUDGMENT CALL. IT COMES DOWN TO AN ISSUE
           WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY A POLITICAL QUESTION AS TO HOW THE
           NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES IS BETTER SERVED BY

           RELYING ON OUR SUPERIORITY TODAY AND STOPPING OTHER NATIONS
           FROM ACHIEVING SUPERIORITY. MR. PRESIDENT, I BELIEVE THAT THE
           UNITED STATES WOULD BE WELL-ADVISED TO MOVE AHEAD, TO RATIFY
           THIS TREATY, AND TO SHOW THE WORLD THAT WE STILL HAVE THE
           PREEMINENT ROLE OF WORLD LEADERSHIP IN MORAL TERMS AS WELL AS

           IN ARMAMENT TERMS. WE HAVE THE UNPRECEDENTED EVENT JUST THIS
           MORNING WHERE YOU HAVE THE OP-ED PIECE APPEARING IN "THE NEW
           YORK TIMES" WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF BRITAIN, THE PRESIDENT
           OF FRANCE, CHANCELLOR OF GERMANY, ALL URGING THIS UNITED STATES
           SENATE TO RATIFY THE COMPREHENSIVE BAN TREATY. I HAD OCCASION
           TO TRAVEL TO U CRANE IN AUGUST -- TO UKRAINE, TALKED TO THE
           PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE, THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND OTHER RANKING
           OFFICIALS, AND THE RATIFICATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

           TREATY WAS HIGH ON THEIR AGENDA. UKRAINE HAS TAKEN A VERY
           UNIQUE ATTITUDE IN GIVING UP NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MANY NATIONS
           AROUND THE WORLD SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS A SIGN OF THEIR
           NATIONAL POWER. BUT UKRAINE IS PREPARED TO GIVE THEM UP. AND I
           ASKED THE LEADERS THAT HAVE COUNTRY WHY. AND THE THE PRESIDENT,
           KUSHNAR KUSHNAR, RESPONDED, WE PREFER THE MODEL OF JAPANESE
           STRENGTH. ALSO WE HAVE HAD THE TERRIBLE EXPERIENCE AT CHERNOBYL

           AND WE DO NOT WANT TO HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR THE FEAR OF WHAT
           HAPPENED AT CHERNOBYL. BUT HIGH ON THE AGENDA OF UKRAINE TOP
           OFFICIALS IS RATIFICATION BY THE UNITED STATES. SENATOR HANK
           BROWN AND I HAD OCCASION TO TRAVEL TO THE SUBCONTINENT IN 1995,
           AND WE TALKED TO INDIAN PRIME MINISTER RAO WHO TOLD US THAT HE
           WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED IN SEEING THE SUBCONTINENT
           NUCLEAR-FREE. THERE, TOO, LATER, WE WERE IN PAKISTAN TALKING TO

           THEN-PRIME MINISTER BUTHELEZI BUTED AND WE RELAID TO PRIME
           MINISTER
           

           MR. BUYER: WHAT PRIME MINISTER RAO HAD TO SAY. SHE SAID, DID
           YOU GET IF IN THIS WRITEDING?
           
           

           MR. SPECTER: WE SAID, NO. AND COUNTERED WITH AN EQUALLY FLIP
           QUESTION AND SAID, "WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME YOU TALKED TO THE
           PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA?" SHE SAID, WE DON'T TALK. SENATOR
           BROWN AND I SAID, WELL, WE THINK YOU SHOULD. AND THE NEXT DAY,
           AUGUST 28, WE HAD DEPARTED FOR DAMASCUS, SENATOR BROWN AND I
           SENT A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT URGING HIM TO CALL INTO THE OVAL
           OFFICE, THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF
           PAKISTAN. GREAT POWER IN THE OVAL OFFICE. NO ONE DECLINES AN

           INVITATION TO THE OVAL OFFICE -- I DON'T KNOW OF ANYBODY WHO'S
           DECLINED AN INVITATION TO THE OVAL OFFICE. AND I HAD OCCASION
           TO SPEAK TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT IT LATER IN 1995 AND HE SAID HE
           THOUGHT IT WAS A GOOD IDEA BUT HE WANTED TO DEFER IT UNTIL
           AFTER THE 1996 ELECTION. I TALKED TO HIM AFTER THE 1996
           ELECTION, SAID HE STILL WASN'T READY TO DO WHAT WOULD HAPPEN
           WITH CHINA, THE CHINA-INDIA BATTLE?
           I'M NOT GOING TO CRITICIZE THE PRESIDENT FOR NOT CALLING THEM N

           I HOPE HE WILL YET. BUT I THINK WHEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN TESTED
           NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE SPRING OF 1998, IT WAS A VERY DANGEROUS
           SIGN FOR THE WORLD. AND HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES ASK INDIA AND
           PAKISTAN NOT TO TEST NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHEN WE WON'T RATIFY THE
           COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY?
           SIMPLY DOESN'T MAKE ANY SENSE. AND THAT'S WHY I THINK THE
           NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE ENHANCED ON A
           BALANCE OF RISKS. MAY NOT BE PERFECT ON VERIFICATION, MAY NOT

           BE PERFECT ON THE STAFBITL OUR STOCKPILES, BUT WHATEVER RISK IS
           INVOLVED THERE -- AND I BELIEVE IT IS MINIMAL -- IT IS A SMALL
           RISK COMPARED TO HAVING I UNDERSTAND -- TO HAVING INDIA AND
           PAKISTAN TEST NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SET OFF AN ARMS RACE THERE
           WHICH CAN BE DUPLICATED AROUND THE WORLD. MR. PRESIDENT, THE
           FAILURE OF THE UNITED STATES TO RATIFY TH COMPREHENSIVE TEST
           BAN TREATY HAS CAUSED A RIPPLE AROUND THE WORLD. PEOPLE WONDER

           WHY THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT RATIFIED THIS TREATY. BUT IF THE
           SENATE WERE TO REJECT THE TREATY IN A SENATE VOTE, THERE WOULD
           BE A WAVE AROUND THE WORLD, AND IT WOULD BE A TIDALWAVE. WHAT
           IS NOW A RIPPLE OF WONDERMENT WOULD NEURON A TIDALWAVE OF
           DISBELIEF -- WOULD TURN INTO A TIDALWAVE OF DISBELIEF AND
           COULDCAUSE A CHAIN REACTION, WHICH WOULD BE --
           

           THE PRESIDING OFFICER: DOES THE SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA --
           

           MR. SPECTER: I ASK FOR AN ADDITIONAL FIVE MINUTES?
           
           

           MR. WARNER: MR. PRESIDENT, I WOULD -- I ASK FOR AN ADDITIONAL
           MINUTES ON OUR SIDE HERE SO THAT I MIGHT CHARGE OUR TIME TO ASK
           A QUESTION TO MY GOOD COLLEAGUE.
           

           THE PRESIDING OFFICER: THE ENTIRE DEBATE IS EVENLY DIVIDED.
           THERE ARE MANY HOURS LEFT ON THAT SIDE. WARN WAFRN I THANK THE
           CHAIR.
           

           MR. MOYNIHAN: THE SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA WILL HAVE ALL THE TIME
           HE WISHES.
           

           MR. WARNER: THANK YOU.
           

           THE PRESIDING OFFICER: THE SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA HAS FIVE
           ADDITIONAL MINUTES.
           

           MR. SPECTER: TO REPEAT MY LAST THOUGHT -- IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN
           LOST IN THE UNANIMOUS CONSENT REQUEST -- THE FAILURE OF THE
           UNITED STATES UP TO DATE TO RATIFY THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN
           TREATY HAS CAUSED A RIPPLE OF WONDERMENT. A VOTE BY THE SENATE
           REJECTING THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY WOULD CAUSE A
           TIDALWAVE OF ASTONISHMENT. AND MIGHT SET OFF A CHAIN REACTION
           AROUND THE WORLD WHICH WOULD BE EVEN MORE SERIOUS THAN THE
           CHAIN REACTION OF THE ATOMIC BOMBS AT NAGASAKI AND HIROSHIMA.

           WHEN WE TAKE A LOOK AT WHAT IS SCHEDULED FOR NEXT USE IT DEPAI
           WHERE WE HAVE THE VOTE -- FOR NEXT TUESDAY, WHERE WE HAVE THE
           VOTE, IT IS MY HOPE THAT WE WILL FIND A WAY YET TO WORK OUR WAY
           OUT OF THE UNANIMOUS CONSENT REQUEST.
{END: 1999/10/08 TIME: 10-45 , Fri.  106TH SENATE, FIRST SESSION}