On February 7, 2006, at 2359 eastern standard time, a Douglas DC-8-71F, N748UP, operated by United Parcel Service (UPS) as flight 1307, landed at Philadelphia International Airport (PHL), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, after the crew reported a cargo smoke indication.  The three crewmembers were able to evacuate the airplane using the L1 slide.  The airplane later became engulfed in flames and was substantially damaged by fire.  The three flight crewmembers received minor injuries.  Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed for the flight from Atlanta, Georgia, to PHL.  The scheduled cargo flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 121.

The Safety Board was notified of the accident shortly after it occurred, and investigators from the NTSB’s Ashburn, VA, regional office initially responded.  A team of investigators and other staff arrived on scene that morning.  Former Board Member Engleman-Connors was the Board Member on scene. 

A brief history of flight follows.

Almost 25 minutes before the landing, as the airplane was descending through about 31,000 feet, the cockpit voice recorder (or “C V R”) recorded the first officer saying, “smells like wood burning, smell that?”  The flight engineer confirmed that he had also smelled something. 

The flight engineer went back to look for smoke.  He stated that he pulled back the smoke curtain and shined a flashlight along the wall of the upper cargo deck.  He could smell the odor but there were no fumes.  He sealed the smoke curtain and returned to the cockpit.  During interviews with investigators, the flight engineer stated that there is no room to be able to walk back into the cargo area to troubleshoot the source of a problem. 

Approaching Philadelphia, as the flight descended to about 4,000 feet, the odor became stronger, and simultaneously the [main deck] smoke warning light came on. This occurred about 3 ½ minutes before landing.   

The first officer stated, “alright, I’m turning into the airport then.”  The flight was handed off to Philadelphia Tower and then cleared to land on runway 27R.  Seconds later, the captain reported the smoke indication to the air traffic controllers (or “A T C”).  Shortly thereafter, the flight engineer noted that the lower aft cargo fire warning light came on, and the captain commented about the need for everyone to make sure they had their oxygen masks on. 

The captain indicated that during the final approach, he experienced a loss of some of his electrical instruments.   

Crew members indicated that smoke began streaming into the cockpit just before touchdown and that as the airplane decelerated after landing, the smoke became much thicker.  The captain stated that once the airplane came to a stop, he initiated an evacuation and opened his window.  He tried to get a breath of fresh air out the window but inhaled smoke instead. 

The first officer leaned out his side window to get fresh air but also inhaled smoke instead.  In a strained voice, the first officer transmitted to Tower, “UPS flight 1307 evacuating the aircraft.”  The smoke was so heavy that he could not see his hand in front of him.  He grabbed his flashlight and reached behind the captain’s seat for the NOTOC (or “Notice to Captain”), which contains information about the type and location of hazardous materials on board.  However, he could not locate the NOTOC envelope. 

Because of the dense smoke, the first officer soon disappeared from the captain’s view as he headed towards the rear of the cockpit.  After exiting, the first officer could see black smoke rolling out the door.

The captain stated that he began to grope around in an attempt to locate the NOTOC but was unable to locate it.  (In post-accident interviews, the flight engineer stated that en route, the NOTOC envelope had fallen on the floor and he picked it up and wedged it in the fire-axe sheath on the bulkhead aft of the flight engineer’s station.)

The captain exited toward the galley area behind the cockpit and went down the slide.  Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) personnel were already there.  He informed them that there were hazardous materials on board the airplane and that he had not been able to locate the NOTOC information.  He indicated that UPS would be able to provide the information regarding the type and location of the hazardous materials onboard.

Some time later, one of the firefighters asked a UPS manager who had come out to the airplane for information about the hazardous materials on board.  The manager stated, “I only can give you the positions of the hazardous materials; the only way I can tell you what is on board is from the NOTOC.”  The NOTOC was eventually found in the cockpit by firefighters about 35 minutes after the airplane landed. 

During interviews by Safety Board investigators after the accident, UPS personnel indicated that the NOTOC information (specifically, the type of the hazmat) could only be obtained by contacting the UPS Flight Control Group in Louisville.  Following the accident, UPS revised its AOMM to include information on how ground personnel can obtain the NOTOC information.  UPS has also indicated that many of its gateways now have remote access to the UPS Hazardous Materials database so that details about the hazmat onboard its flights can be accessed online and provided to emergency responders.

Firefighters continued in their attempts to gain access to the interior of the airplane and cargo.  Approximately 2 hours after the airplane landed, flames were seen venting through the top of the airplane.  The following slide shows a brief video of the fire, courtesy of the CBS affiliate in Philadelphia.

[SLIDE showing video]

The flames were eventually brought under control and were extinguished by around 4:00 that morning, approximately 4 hours after landing. 

Later in the day of the Go Team’s arrival on scene, an NTSB organizational meeting was held.  NTSB groups were formed in the areas of, Hazardous Materials, Fire and Cargo, Survival Factors and ARFF, Operations, and Systems.  Groups were also convened to assist in the preparation of the CVR transcript and to review maintenance records on the airplane. 

[SLIDE showing investigative groups]

The Hazmat group reviewed shipping documentation about declared hazmat onboard the flight.  The documentation confirmed that the hazmat had been stored in cargo containers 3 and 14.

[SLIDE showing ULD positions]

Investigators ultimately identified these items in the cargo.  Burn patterns suggest that they were not involved in the initiation of the fire onboard.  The Hazmat Group also identified several undeclared hazmat items in the cargo; however, these also did not show evidence of being involved in the initiation of the fire. 

The Fire and Cargo Group conducted detailed examinations of the fire damage to the airplane, the cargo containers, and the cargo itself. 

These slides show some of the exterior fire damage to the airplane. 

[SLIDE 1 showing exterior fire damage]

[SLIDE 2 showing exterior fire damage]

Documentation showed that the fuselage crown had burned through in two major areas just aft of the wing and just forward of the empennage.  Accordingly, the most severe fire damage to the interior of the airplane and the cargo containers was also located in these areas. 

 [SLIDE 1 showing ULD and limited space]

[SLIDE 2 showing extent of interior fire damage]

Documentation revealed no fire damage to the lower cargo areas.  There has been no evidence that the airplane wiring or other systems were involved in the initiation of the fire.

Several items were removed from the cargo and taken to the NTSB lab in Washington, DC, for further examination.  Several of the items were lithium ion batteries from laptop computers.  [Lithium ion batteries are often referred to as “rechargeable” or “secondary” lithium batteries.] In many cases, portions of the batteries had burned.  It is not known at this time the role that these types of batteries may have played in the fire.   

Nevertheless, secondary lithium batteries as well as primary (or “non-rechargeable” lithium batteries) can present fire hazards due to the heat often generated when they are damaged or suffer a short circuit.  Several lithium battery incidents have occurred in recent years, including a lithium-ion battery fire that occurred less than two months ago on an airplane in Chicago.  Flight attendants used extinguishers on an overhead bag that was smoking.  The bag was removed from the airplane and placed on the ramp, where it then caught fire.  The fire apparently started from a spare laptop battery being carried in the bag. 

The Safety Board’s investigation of a 1999 lithium battery fire involving airplane cargo prompted the issuance of a safety recommendation for the evaluation of the fire hazards posed by lithium batteries in air transportation.  Subsequent FAA testing revealed that bulk shipments of primary lithium batteries posed a significant fire hazard.  The Safety Board also investigated a 2004 Fedex cargo container fire involving lithium-ion batteries, which prompted the FAA to initiate testing on lithium-ion batteries.  The Safety Board noted in its July 6, 2005, response to action by PHMSA---which involved restrictions on the carriage of primary lithium batteries on passenger aircraft---that the risks posed by shipment of lithium-ion batteries remains unclear.  Pending further response, the Safety Board’s recommendation remains “open”.   

As a result of information obtained during the Safety Board’s investigation of the UPS investigation and previous aircraft fires, four main topic areas were identified for this hearing: 

1. Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting. 

• Testimony under this topic will address such things as training, as well as challenges and lessons-learned during the response to the Philadelphia UPS fire. 

2. Design, Testing, and Failure Modes of Lithium Batteries. 

• Testimony about lithium batteries will include discussions of their benefits and their hazards, as well as their safety features and failure histories.  

3. Operations and Regulations concerning Lithium Batteries.

• Discussion under this topic will focus on the requirements involving air transportation of lithium batteries—including differences in these requirements between passenger and cargo aircraft--and ways in which the hazards associated with lithium batteries can be minimized and finally,

4.  Aircraft Fire Detection and Suppression Systems and Regulations

• The Safety Board has issued recommendations in the past for incorporation of detection and suppression systems on commercial aircraft.  Discussion under this topic will include a review of technology and regulations of these systems, difficulties and challenges that these systems may bring, and differences in these areas as they pertain to both passenger and cargo aircraft. 

Chairman Hersman,

The record of this investigation, to date, has been entered into the public docket.  All material is now public and available through the Safety Board’s Records Management Division. 

This concludes my opening remarks.