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1.1 INTERVIEW SUMMARY

Name:	Salvatore Giambrone
Interviewed by:	Elias, Schiada, Strauch, Weston
Date:	November 1, 1999
Location:	John F. Kennedy International Airport (KJFK), Jamaica, New York

In an interview conducted on November 1, 1999 at the John F. Kennedy International Airport (KJFK), Mr. Giambrone, the Alitalia flight dispatcher on duty the night of October 30, 1999, stated the following:

EgyptAir flight operations in Cairo sends the Alitalia dispatch office a telex with load and balance data, providing Alitalia flight dispatch with the aircraft's zero fuel weight, the number of passengers and cargo data. The Alitalia dispatcher then sends a telex to Cairo, who will, in turn, send back a telex with the flight plan. The Alitalia flight dispatcher compiles weather and wind data based on the information that EgyptAir provides them. Because the EgyptAir Boeing 767s are Extended Twin-Engine Operations (ETOPS) airplanes, Alitalia dispatchers also collect Notice to Airman (NOTAM) data for airports of intended use and equal time point (ETP) alternates specified on the flight plan. The Alitalia dispatcher compiles this information in a folder for EgyptAir. Alitalia dispatchers retrieve the Air Traffic Control (ATC) strip number for the flight and put this information in the folder as well. The folder is given to the EgyptAir dispatcher who usually arrives one hour before the flight crew to look over the folder. The EgyptAir dispatcher will check the work and look for updates. Whatever additional information the EgyptAir dispatcher asks for, the Alitalia dispatchers will provide. Alitalia will add the latest Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) information once the information is updated.

Mr. Giambrone stated that the service Alitalia provides EgyptAir flights is routine and does not change much. Mr. Giambrone is an FAA licensed dispatcher and has been working as a flight dispatcher at Alitalia for 16 months. Previously, Mr. Giambrone worked for Dynair.

The Boeing 767 typically has 3 or 4 alternates for a trans-Atlantic ETOPS flight. By comparison, the Boeing 777 has just one or two alternates for a trans-Atlantic ETOPS flight. For EgyptAir KJFK to Cairo (HECA) flights, the Alitalia dispatcher highlights all the major airports and draws the daily routes using a Jeppesen chart similar to the 55C Atlantic Ocean Crossing chart.

On October 30, 1999, Mr. Giambrone met a captain and first officer from EgyptAir 990 about 45 minutes before departure. Mr. Giambrone stated that

he had seen these particular individuals about twice a month since he started working as a dispatcher 16 months ago. He knew both of them. He never had any conversations of a personal nature with any of them, but he knew them from work. On October 31, 1999, the EgyptAir flight crew he saw looked the same to him; everything appeared normal. The flight crew asked the usual questions at the end of their briefing (e.g., what was the final passenger count?) Mr. Giambrone told them what the zero fuel weight was in comparison with flight plan. It was actually less than the zero fuel weight specified on the flight plan data. They asked about the air traffic at that time. Mr. Giambrone stated that the air traffic was light because it was later than usual and most international flights had departed by then. Mr. Giambrone stated that Runway 22R was in use at KJFK, and consequently, EgyptAir Flight 990 had a short taxi out for departure from their gate.

Mr. Giambrone stated that the flight crewmembers present were talking in Egyptian (sic) to the dispatcher so he did not understand what they were saying. He presumed that they had been informed of the flight delay. The flightcrew did not discuss the flight delay with him and he stated in the interview that he did not know the reason for the delay.

Mr. Giambrone stated that he had little interaction with the flight crews and that during these interactions no real personal conversations transpired. He stated that all of his conversations with the EgyptAir flight crews were limited to work-related information. He did not observe the EgyptAir flight crewmembers present eat or drink anything except maybe some water. Mr. Giambrone described the tone of their voice with the EgyptAir dispatcher as business like. Mr. Giambrone observed the EgyptAir dispatcher and the flight crewmembers present looking at aeronautical charts and discussing the flight routes.

Mr. Giambrone stated that no weather of significance was reported that night along the flight route planned for EgyptAir Flight 990. Visibility at KJFK was estimated to be 3 statute miles, which he stated, would not have affected departures. Mr. Giambrone stated that the flight crewmembers present did not look tired to him.

Mr. Giambrone stated that the EgyptAir dispatcher usually comes in about an hour before the flight. On October 30, 1999, the EgyptAir dispatcher arrived at the Alitalia dispatch office about 2330. He stated that the EgyptAir dispatcher comes in to review the folder prepared for the flight. Alitalia has a company frequency, but in all the time he has been there, departing EgyptAir flights have never called him via radio. According to Mr. Giambrone, the Alitalia dispatchers tell the EgyptAir flight crews all the time to call them via radio once airborne, but they never call. Mr. Giambrone stated that he just gets the airborne time for departing EgyptAir flights by monitoring the KJFK air traffic control tower frequency and listening for when the tower tells the flight to contact New York departure. He stated that EgyptAir flight crews do provide load and balance via radio before departure. He also stated that

inbound EgyptAir flights will call via radio wanting to know gate information, ATIS information, etc. The flight crew of EgyptAir Flight 990 inbound from the Los Angeles International Airport (KLAX) was told to contact Alitalia dispatch via radio when they landed at KJFK. Mr. Giambrone reported that that flight crew did contact Alitalia dispatch via radio as requested and the radio worked properly during their transmission. He stated that Egyptair crews typically call Alitalia dispatch via radio when they are inbound but not when they are outbound from KJFK. He stated that the Dynair ramp attendants provide the Alitalia dispatcher with the out block time for departing EgyptAir flights. He stated that he also monitors the KJFK ground air traffic control (ATC) frequency to confirm the push back time. According to Mr. Giambrone, on October 31, 1999, 0105 EST was the out block time signifying pushback for EgyptAir Flight 990. The off block time he gets by monitoring the tower frequency. Mr. Giambrone recalled that the off time for EgyptAir Flight 990 on October 31, 1999, was 0620 Zulu (0120 eastern standard time). Mr. Giambrone stated that he did not know if the accident airplane was equipped with an Aircraft Communications And Reporting System (ACARS).

Mr. Giambrone stated that the time change from eastern daylight time to eastern standard time on October 31, 1999, had little impact on Alitalia dispatch operations since they work using Zulu time. After the departure of EgyptAir Flight 990, Mr. Giambrone stated that he sent a telex to EgyptAir flight operations in Cairo to tell them the Alitalia dispatch office was closing for the night. He stated that he left 2 to 3 minutes after the flight was airborne. He stated that he does not know if airplane attempted to call or not after he left.

Mr. Giambrone stated that his shift was 1600 to 0000 on October 30, 1999. He stated that he works a 5 days on, 2 days off schedule. He was off on Monday of that week and the night of October 30 was his last work shift before his two days off.

1.2 INTERVIEW SUMMARY

Name: Capt. Medhat Kamel El Kadah
Interviewed by: Elias, Schiada, Strauch, Weston
Date: November 2, 1999
Location: Hotel Pennsylvania , New York, New York

Capt. Medhat Kamel El Kadah, Born 11/13/48, was interviewed on November 2, 1999 at the Pennsylvania Hotel, New York, New York and stated the following:

Capt. El Kadah was hired by EgyptAir in 1973. His current position is a Captain of the Boeing 767-300. His first assignment at EgyptAir was as a first officer on the Antonov (AN) 24. He flew the AN-24 until 1976, then went to the Boeing 707 as a first officer, then became a captain on the Fokker F-27 in 1982, then was assigned captain on the B-737 in 1984, then Captain on the A-300 B4 in 1992, then captain on B-767 in 1995. Has about 10,000 hours total flight time, with about 3,500 on the B-767.

He was the captain on the Cairo (HECA) to John F. Kennedy International Airport (KJFK) leg, but because of the visibility, they diverted to Newark (KEWR). He was the "operating captain" on the flight and he was in charge of the whole flight crew. They have two crews, the second does the cruise portion, the first crew flies the first 4 hours, the second crew flies the next 6 hours, then the first crew returns to fly the last 1-2 hours. They had an first officer on the flight, (name of individual), who was in training for his first flight to New York. He was receiving a familiarization flight on the route to JFK so he can fly that route.

Upon arrival at KEWR, the aircraft (SU-GAP) did not need maintenance. EgyptAir has only two 767s. Capt. El Kadah described the airplane as a "nice, smooth airplane" and commented that the technical log was "clear, very clear," with only one snag: the left thrust reverser was inoperative. This was a "B-snag" which allows you to continue to operate the airplane with this maintenance item outstanding. They have 3 snag categories, this would be the second.

For him personally, he likes to be able to go back about a month when reviewing the technical log. The length of time you can go back to review the log depends, but is not less than 2 weeks, and may be a month at most. For him personally, he likes to know the history of the airplane and likes to see at least 2 weeks information available. On the Airbus he has the flight engineer to help, but on the Boeings he doesn't have a flight engineer.

On the B-767 the crews were training in house at Egyptair, but they used a simulator in England, at London, Gatwick Airport. Egyptair training captains

performed the simulator training. The first 767 crews (767-200) were trained in the United States.

The trip to the United States was a "perfect trip." There were no items on flightdeck or cabin that needed to be written up. For sleeping quarters on the airplane they use a first class seat that has a curtain around it.

When he returned to the flightdeck after his rest period they had made landfall, somewhere past 50 degrees west longitude. The command captain receives a briefing from the cruise captain when he relieves the captain before landing. There is no printed briefing checklist. During this briefing, they review fuel, progress, clearance, ATC station they are working with, etc. Nothing unusual was reported to him during this briefing.

They entered a holding pattern for a little while then diverted to KEWR. The controller asked them if they were Category III Instrument Landing System (CAT III ILS) certified. The airplane is category III ILS certified but the crew is not. Company policy is that only CAT I ILS approaches are to be used. He knew before taking off from Cairo that visibility at the John F. Kennedy International Airport (KJFK) would be poor, but the weather at KJFK was above minimums when they departed Cairo. Air traffic control entered him in a holding pattern. Upon entering the holding pattern, he asked ATC and they informed him that the weather had deteriorated. He asked about Newark Airport (KEWR) and found that he could land there. They made one orbit, then requested to divert to KEWR. He made the decision to use KEWR based on best available alternate based on immigration and passenger connection considerations.

When he decided to divert, they informed the company and asked them to meet the airplane, otherwise they would have had to wait on the airplane for customs. When they call the company, they talk to Alitalia personnel. He stated that after landing at KEWR, the airplane was perfect and the passengers were laughing. The flight crew stayed in the cockpit. The crew were laughing, the five of them, until the station manager came; they saw that the passengers were happy so they were happy.

Capt. El Kadah stated that on routine departures from KJFK, they receive their paperwork from the Egyptair dispatcher.

He knew all the crewmembers on the accident flight. The captain in charge on that flight was (name of command captain). Which first officer flies which leg is not determined by seniority. The aircraft is operated with two crews. The cruise captain will fly the New York to Los Angeles (KLAX) flight, a flight with only one crew, and then return to KJFK using only one crew. The crew then gets a rest. On the return flight to Cairo, the operating captain on the United States bound flight will serve as the cruise captain on the return flight to Cairo. The operating crew on the flight from Cairo does not fly to Los

Angeles (KLAX). Instead, they get two days rest in New York, then fly as the cruise crew on the return flight to Cairo.

Capt. El Kadah stated that he was friends with all of the flight crew on board the accident flight. He had flown with (name of cruise captain) and (name of cruise first officer) to KEWR. They operated as the cruise crew with him on that flight. They had been to LAX and back to New York. So the accident crew had been the cruise crew with him 15 days before. The stay in the United States is about one week. He spends one week in Cairo then flies back to the United States. During this time, they went to KLAX and were back in New York again. He met members of the accident crew for one day before they took the accident flight. He knew them well and had flown with them in the cockpit.

He stated that one knows their fate 40 days before they die. Captain El Kadah stated that after arriving in New York, he met with the cruise first officer from EgyptAir flight 990. At this meeting, the cruise first officer had given him some money and insisted that he take it and "give it to his (the cruise first officer's) son if something should happen to him (the cruise first officer)."

He knew the command captain since 1965. There are 13 Boeing 767-300 captains in EgyptAir. Capt. El Kadah stated that all the Boeing 767 captains know each other well and have known each other for a long time. Capt. El Kadah stated that he spent one day with the accident crew. He saw them before they left on October 30, 1999, around midday. He met the cruise first officer and talked to the cruise captain on the phone. The command and cruise flight crews left the hotel together.

1.3 INTERVIEW SUMMARY

Name:	Hassan Mohammed Abou Hussein
Interviewed by:	Elias, Schiada, Strauch, Weston
Date:	November 2, 1999
Location:	Hotel Pennsylvania , New York, New York

Mr. Hassan Mohammed Abou Hussein, Born 7/27/68, was interviewed on November 2, 1999 at the Pennsylvania Hotel, New York, New York and stated the following:

Mr. Hussein was currently in New York after serving as the command first officer on the flight from Cairo to New York in SU-GAP (EgyptAir Flight 989).

Mr. Hussein was hired by EgyptAir in April 1992. After his initial hiring, he was in training for 2 years, then served as a first officer on the Boeing 737-200. He attended a flying institute in Egypt. He is a civilian pilot, and has no military flight background. He was on the Boeing 737 for only about 200 hours, then flew the 737-500 for about 3 years, then went to the 767-300 in March 1997. He has a type rating on both the 767-200 and the -300. He has about 3,000 hours total time, with over 1,000 hours on the 767. He has never flown as captain, and has only a commercial pilot license. He has a rating on the 737-200, but he has not flown as a captain for EgyptAir. He learned to fly the 767 in Egypt, but went to the simulator in Frankfurt (FRA) with an EgyptAir instructor. The EgyptAir instructor was a line pilot and a training pilot as well.

When he checks in, he goes to dispatch and reviews weather, payload and fuel. Flight crews also review maintenance write-ups in the dispatch. No abnormalities, except the inoperative left thrust reverser, a "B-snag", were noted for SU-GAP. This was the only write up that he was aware of. He had flown the accident airplane, SU-GAP, many times. Mr. Hussein stated that he never noticed problems before with SU-GAP. He described it as "a good ship." EgyptAir operates only one 767 now. Before the accident they had two. EgyptAir phased out their 767-200s and currently only operate 767-300s. He flies them on any routes. Sometimes they will fly charters for the United Nations.

Departing out of Cairo, the command captain made the takeoff. The first officer will make takeoffs many times, they will usually switch legs, as per company policy. Although not on every flight will one have a leg then the other.

Everything appeared normal with the airplane. All flight crew members get briefings from EgyptAir flight dispatch, then in flight during crew changes. Any new phase of flight requires a briefing, as per their operating practices.

On the flight to New York, they did not brief the relief crew with anything unusual. Two hours before descent they got the weather report for KJFK with visibility reported as nil and only Category III ILS landing permitted. The company operates only to Category I minimums. They got the weather at KEWR and found the weather there to be better, so it was decided to divert to KEWR. Their filed alternate was Boston (KBOS) and they had 6 metric tons of fuel, but they decided to go to KEWR instead.

Mr. Hussein stated that he goes to recurrent training twice a year. They discuss Crew Resource Management (CRM) and they train that way and the crews operate that way. They attend recurrent training either in London, Gatwick, England, or in Frankfurt, Germany.

They called Alitalia and told them that they would be diverting. They made only one orbit over Calverton, they asked about any improvements to the visibility at JFK and then they made the decision to divert. The captain made the landing. It was very good. It is company policy not to do any automatic landings. The captain hand flew the aircraft for the landing.

No maintenance issues were found during the flight. But an annunciator light for one of the packs had illuminated during flight. He referred to the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) and took corrective action. He believes that it occurred early in the flight, before they crossed the ocean. He told the relief crew of this, but afterwards everything was normal. During the flight, all conversations with the flight attendants were routine.

Mr. Hussein stated that he knew all the pilots on Flight 990. He had flown with all of them. He knew two of the first officers very well, but one first officer was new to the 767 and had just checked out on the 767 and was onboard the airplane to observe and learn the North Atlantic Track System (NATS). In the past he had been a first officer with the captains on board Flight 990. Mr. Hussein described the command captain as a "normal captain". With over 35,000 hours, he was a very experienced captain. He was the first in EgyptAir to fly the 767. The other captain, (name of cruise captain), was a former military pilot. The cruise first officer was an instructor both in the Air Force and with EgyptAir. Mr. Hussein stated that he got along with all of the pilots on the accident flight. He said he had no problems with any of them.

On Saturday, October 30, 1999, he only talked on the phone with one of the captains, (name of Boeing 767 chief pilot), and met with (name of command first officer) until about midnight, before the time change was made. (The command first officer) was very funny and, as usual, he was joking. He (the command first officer) was supposed to get married next week. Mr. Hussein offered his congratulations to the command first officer and told him that he would be in Cairo next week. One of the other pilots, (name of deadheading first officer), was flying as a passenger to Cairo to go into simulator training. The pilot he talked to on the phone, (name of Boeing 767 chief pilot) was the

767 chief pilot and he was performing a route check on one of the captains, on Flight 990 but was unsure which captain was receiving a checkride. (The B-767 chief pilot) was like a father figure to many of the EgyptAir pilots including the interviewee. Mr. Hussein had called him just to say hello while they were both in New York.

Mr. Hussein stated that he thought that there are currently more than 500 pilots in the company, about 35 of which are flying the Boeing 767s.

1.4 INTERVIEW SUMMARY

Name:	Captain Zakaria Ibrahim Abou Eleish
Interviewed by:	Elias, Schiada, Strauch, Weston
Date:	November 2, 1999
Location:	Hotel Pennsylvania , New York, New York

Captain Zakaria Ibrahim Abou Eleish, born 1/2/41, was interviewed on November 2, 1999 at the Pennsylvania Hotel, New York, New York and stated the following:

Capt. Eleish was hired by EgyptAir sometime between 1964-1966. He first flew on the Antonov 24B, then flew the Comet 4C, then the 707 as a first officer. He then flew as captain on the B-737, then A-300, then the Airbus A300-600 then the B-767. He must retire at 60. He has over 14,000 hours total. He has flown for about 4 years on the 767, and has about 3,000 hours on the 767. He received ground training in Cairo followed by simulator training at Gatwick. The simulator instructor pilots were EgyptAir captains who were line and instructor captains.

He is currently a Captain on the Boeing 767-300. He was in New York after operating as the cruise captain of Flight 989 from Cairo to New York. He flies as operating captain also; he switches between operating and command captain on various legs. Upon arrival at Newark (KEWR) there was a crew change. He remained in New York City and he will be the operating captain on the next flight to Cairo.

Enroute to New York, he was briefed by the operating crew on approach to JFK on weather, fuel, and the expected clearance. The operating crew reported that the weather was good but the clearance was changing on the expected flight level for entry over land. There were no problems with the aircraft reported, except for one comment on the temperature pack, which was reset. This was considered usual. This event had happened before he took over the flight. There were no other problems with the airplane thereafter. He took over flying the airplane after 4 hours and flew for about 5 hours thereafter. The flight was smooth, with good weather and their fuel burn was good.

Their routine for KJFK to Cairo (HECA) legs includes: transit from hotel to airport, going to dispatch at Alitalia where a briefing is given by Alitalia dispatch and an EgyptAir dispatcher from Cairo if there is one at KJFK. Inbound KJFK maintenance is coordinated by an EgyptAir mechanic. They have maintenance at Los Angeles (KLAX) but not with EgyptAir. A contractor handles it. They can get maintenance done at KLAX.

Recurrent training is given every six months. These include line checks and spot checks. Spot checks are performed by civil aviation authority officials. They do line oriented flight training (LOFT) in the simulator. The training is conducted by EgyptAir. His son is currently in training. He is not happy that his son has chosen this profession because the job is hard work.

He has been flying the 767 for 3-4 years. He flew from Amsterdam to Cairo about 3-4 days prior. He was the operating captain on that flight. This particular flight was in SU-GAO, not in accident aircraft (SU-GAP).

On the flight from Cairo to New York, no problems were observed in the technical log for SU-GAP. B-snags are logged in a separate book. Also, a B-snag sticker is put in the cockpit. According to airplane's Minimum Equipment List (MEL) it is permissible to continue operating the aircraft with a B-snag. The particular B-snag for this aircraft was for an inoperative left thrust reverser.

Capt. Eleish stated that it is policy that both crews for the flight must attend the dispatcher briefing at Alitalia at KJFK.

Captain (name of Boeing 767 Chief Pilot) was the Chief Pilot for the 767-300 for EgyptAir. He also served as Chief of Training. Capt. Eleish considered (name of Boeing 767 Chief Pilot) to be a friend. He described him as very kind and a leader who could handle everything.

About 2030 on Saturday, the usual pickup time is when he saw one of the pilots. They were told of a 2-hour delay. The pilot went back to his room. (The cruise first officer) called him and they had a conversation about family. Later, they saw each other briefly. (The cruise first officer) was in a good mood. (The cruise first officer) was the same age as the interviewee and a good friend. (The cruise first officer) was hired later than the interviewee and was only licensed to fly as a first officer in the 767-300.

1.5 INTERVIEW SUMMARY

Name: Mohammed Rafat Elian
Interviewed by: Elias, Schiada, Strauch, Weston
Date: November 2, 1999
Location: Hotel Pennsylvania , New York, New York

Mohammed Rafat Elian, born 11/3/70, was interviewed on November 2, 1999 at the Pennsylvania Hotel, New York, New York and stated the following:

Mr. Elian's is currently a First Officer for EgyptAir flying the Boeing 767-300. He was first assigned to the Boeing 737-200 as a first officer for 3 years, then he became a first officer on the Boeing 767 about 1996. He has about 4,000 hours total, with about 1700 on the 767. He went to civilian flight training school, Egypt Air Institute for 3 years. The school is owned by the government and is not affiliated with EgyptAir. Anybody can attend the school, as long as they meet qualifications. Upon completion of the school, EgyptAir interviews and makes selections from graduates. He had about 250 hours when he graduated, all on small aircraft, the biggest being the Beech Baron 55. When he finished he had a Commercial License, 9 hours of multi-engine airplane time, and partial instrument training. He then trained with EgyptAir for one year before he flew passenger flights. The instruction in ground school lasted 5 weeks. This instruction was given in Cairo. This was followed by approximately 21 days of simulator training in Athens.

He was the cruise first officer on Flight 989 (SU-GAP) from Cairo to New York. The EgyptAir 767 operations office determines who will be assigned as active crew and who will be assigned as cruise crew on a given flight. EgyptAir posts a schedule in the operations office. They operate on approximately a 15-day schedule. From his roster, he knows who will be assigned operating first officer duty and who will be assigned as cruise first officer. First officers can make requests for preferred flights, but they cannot choose flights. Flights are assigned and posted on the duty roster.

This flight was part of a trip lasting about four days. On the next leg he will be the operating first officer. They alternate duty assignments serving as operating crew and then as cruise crew on the next flight.

On Flight 989, he took over the first officer's seat about 4 to 5 hours into the flight and stayed there about 4 to 5 hours. He got a briefing from the operating crew when he took over. There was some difficulty with a pack temperature light but everything was normal when the crew change was made. The incident involved an Electronic Indicator and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) message and an indicator light on the overhead panel. During such an event, the pack does not shut down, but it will be stuck in the last position. Upon receiving the EICAS message, pilots refer to the Quick

Reference Handbook (QRH) and follow the procedures for corrective action. The indicator did not come on while he was sitting in the right seat. In fact, the temperature was perfect the whole time, about 24 degrees C. During the final crew change, they briefed the operating crew on weather, clearances, etc. It was a routine briefing. He had flown SU-GAP before and found it to be a very good airplane.

He attends simulator training twice a year. One time is strictly for a training ride on the simulator. The other time is for a proficiency check. During the simulator training they will practice crew resource management (CRM) procedures. The last simulator training he received was at London - Gatwick. He went to Athens for his 737-200 training. They have a training center at EgyptAir that covers technical and other relevant items. Their own EgyptAir check pilots observe their performance in the simulator.

When a B-snag is encountered, it is checked against the Minimum Equipment List (MEL). The aircraft is permitted to fly with a B-snag provided the procedures and requirements specified in the MEL are met. Both the cruise crews and the operating crews attend dispatcher briefings. At JFK they get a briefing from Alitalia. However, because it is an ETOPS flight, they will bring an EgyptAir dispatcher with them to review the paperwork with them. Alitalia only arranges the papers for them. He believes that before operating on Flight 989, he last flew SU-GAP about a week to 10 days before, he believes that the flight was from Frankfurt to Cairo. He stated that there was nothing unusual found on the flight.

He knew all of the pilots on the accident airplane. He had flown with the captains on that flight many times. (Name of command captain) was a very nice man, very intelligent, good experience, the other captain, (name of cruise captain), was also very nice and had military experience. Captain (name of Boeing 767 chief pilot) was their chief pilot. He was performing a line check on the captain. Every captain had to make line check at least once a year. He was a very, very nice man. He would have been performing a line check just on one of the captains, on the line check you have to make two complete legs with 2 landings. He saw the first officer before they left for KJFK. He talked to (Name of Boeing 767 chief pilot) about routine stuff, nothing specific. He spoke with another pilot who was going to get married next week in Cairo. Everything was good, on the flight; everything was normal, there was nothing unusual. Everything appeared normal with all of the pilots.

1.6 INTERVIEW SUMMARY

Name: Abdelfatah Orabi
Interviewed by: Elias, Schiada, Strauch, Weston
Date: November 2, 1999
Location: Hotel Pennsylvania , New York, New York

Abdelfatah Orabi, born 3/31/41, was interviewed on November 2, 1999 at the Pennsylvania Hotel, New York, New York and stated the following:

Abdelfatah Orabi is currently a captain on the 767-300 flying for EgyptAir. He was the inbound Captain on Flight 990 from KLAX to KJFK. He has been working for EgyptAir for 35 years. His first assignment was as a first officer on the Antonov 24, then he served as a first officer on the Comet 4C, and the Boeing 707. He was a captain on Boeing 737 and 767. He has 14-15 years experience as captain on 767. He flies about 50 hours per month. He has about 20000 hours total flying time. He has flown both the 767-200 and -300. He prefers the -300 because it flies better.

On October 13, 1999, he flew as the command captain of SU-GAP from Cairo (HECA) to New York (KJFK). Everything was normal with the aircraft on that flight. He had flown from KJFK to Los Angeles (KLAX) on October 28, 1999 in SU-GAO. He returned from KLAX to KJFK on October 30, 1999 in SU-GAP.

At KLAX there was nothing noted in the technical logbook. At KLAX, the aviation maintenance technician (AMT) found that the Number 7 tire was flat. The AMT told him that they would have to also change the Number 8 tire as well due to load balance. The maintenance company did not have a second spare and had to get one from another company. Both the Number 7 and Number 8 tires were changed at KLAX. The Flight was intentionally "delayed" one hour initially, due to scheduling around the change from daylight savings to standard time. The flight was further delayed due because of the tire change. He thought they left KLAX at 2330 Z, about two hours after their scheduled departure time.

He reported that the flight was very normal. They flew at Flight Level (FL) 370 but encountered turbulence and climbed to FL 410 where it was smooth. He reported no problems with the autopilot or Flight Management System (FMS). He reported that everything worked well with the airplane. There was a B-snag on the left engine reverse thrust. He had no other snags or write-ups that he encountered on the flight. He flew SU-GAP many times. When asked about repetitive snags or problems, he mentioned leaky hydraulics in the wheel well that was corrected a long time ago. He also mentioned that the left pack temperature system has had intermittent caution indications that "come and go" but usually operates normally. The

system has "N" and "W" switch positions and if it was not operating properly in N, they would switch to "W".¹

He met the accident crew at KJFK. They asked about the airplane. He said it flew nicely with no problems. They asked about snags and he said that there were none except for the inoperative thrust reverser. He also informed them about changing the tires. They seemed happy but there was not much conversation between him and the accident crew.

He had flown in the past with all of the pilots on the accident flight. He described the command captain as very calm and a very nice person. (The cruise captain) flew with him as a first officer and later he became a captain. (The command first officer) and (The cruise first officer) were very good first officers. (The cruise first officer) was going to retire this year.

¹ The pack control selector on Boeing 767-300 series aircraft has 5 positions: OFF, AUTO, "N" (Normal), "C" (Cool), and "W" (Warm).

1.7 INTERVIEW SUMMARY

Name: Adil Nagib Ebid
Interviewed by: Elias, Schiada, Strauch, Weston
Date: November 2, 1999
Location: Hotel Pennsylvania , New York, New York

Adil Nagib Ebid, born 6/30/49, was interviewed on November 2, 1999 at the Pennsylvania Hotel, New York, New York and stated the following:

Mr. Ebid was hired by EgyptAir in 1977 and his current position is flight purser on the Boeing 767-300. Mr. Ebid was in New York after operating as the purser on EgyptAir Flight 989 from Cairo to New York.

As purser, his duties are director of safety and cabin service for the flight. On Flight 989, he was the only purser. Usually there are 2-3 on board. On that particular flight the total cabin crew was 10. Medical assistance was needed for a passenger before they departed Cairo, otherwise there was no unusual events on the flight. While on the ground in Cairo, there was a problem with a music tape and technical service replaced the unit under the floor board before departure. There was a late equipment change in Cairo. They were originally going to fly on SU-GAO, but switched to SU-GAP. Two or three times on the flight, passengers expressed discomfort regarding the cabin temperature and he asked the flight crew to adjust the cabin air temperature. Otherwise there were no problems. Hot meal systems were normal. He flew SU-GAP quite a bit. A long time ago there were problems with the video systems, but these had been replaced. The last time he flew on SU-GAP was 2 weeks ago as a passenger on a domestic flight in Egypt. He was unaware of any problems during that flight. The only flight crewmember from Flight 990 that he saw was (name of command first officer) whom he passed in the hotel lobby. (Name of command first officer) was in a hurry and was overheard asking about a delay. He also saw (name of a flight attendant). He stated that they spoke briefly and she appeared normal to him.

1.8 INTERVIEW SUMMARY

Name: Essam Gamaleldin
Interviewed by: Elias, Schiada, Strauch, Weston
Date: November 2, 1999
Location: Hotel Pennsylvania , New York, New York

Essam Gamaleldin was interviewed on November 2, 1999 at the Pennsylvania Hotel, New York, New York and stated the following:

His is currently employed by EgyptAir as a flight purser on the Boeing 767-300. He was in New York after serving as the purser onboard EgyptAir Flight 990 for Los Angeles (KLAX) to New York (KJFK) on October 30, 1999

Mr. Gamaledin stated that there was a delay at LAX. He further stated that there were no unusual events or problems with equipment in the passenger cabin on the flight from KLAX to KJFK.