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Unless otherwise indicated, all years referred to in this paper are fiscal years. Likewise, unless otherwise noted, all dollar amounts are expressed in fiscal year 1984 dollars. Program detail for fiscal year 1984 of the Administration's budget was the only data available at the time of publication. Where possible, costs presented in this paper were updated to reflect the latest program revisions. Where no specific data beyond 1984 were provided, cost estimates were based on program detail submitted with last year's budget, amended only for changes in inflation. |
The planned growth of U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF), which may nearly double in size in the coming few years, raises important policy and budgetary issues for Congressional consideration. This growth in forces earmarked for the RDF is being accomplished not by adding combat forces but by changing the primary mission of existing forces, most of which are already committed to the defense of NATO Europe. Though the United States has persistently urged its NATO allies to accept some of the defensive burden resulting from RDF plans, the Congress may wish to consider the extent to which U.S. policy is shifting its focus and the potential budgetary costs of sustaining current U.S. commitments to NATO and Southwest Asia.
Prepared at the request of the Subcommittee on Sea Power and Force Projection of the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Joint Economic Committee, this study analyzes the policy implications of alternative RDF levels and the budgetary implications of the policy decisions. In keeping with CBO's mandate to provide objective analysis, this paper offers no recommendations.
John D. Mayer Jr. of CBO's National Security and International Affairs
Division prepared the study under the general supervision of Robert F.
Hale and John J. Hamre. Cost estimates were provided by Bill Myers and
Joel Slackman of CBO. The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions
of T. Keith Glennan III, Kathleen O'Connell, V. Lane Pierrot, and Nora
Slatkin of CBO and of Donald N. Fredricksen of Systems Planning Corporation.
(The assistance of external participants implies no responsibility for
the final product, which rests solely with CBO.) Johanna Zacharias edited
the manuscript.
Alice M. Rivlin
Director
February 1983
SUMMARY
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
CHAPTER II. COMBAT REQUIREMENTS FOR ALTERNATIVE RDF FORCE SIZES
CHAPTER III. THE EFFECTS OF AN RDF MOBILIZATION ON THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO NATO
CHAPTER IV. MEETING THE MOBILITY NEEDS OF THE RDF-POTENTIAL COSTS AND SAVINGS
CHAPTER V. SUPPORT NEEDS OF THE RDF
APPENDIX A. COSTING THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES
APPENDIX B. AMPHIBIOUS LIFT
APPENDIX C. FACILITIES AND MILITARY CONSTRUCTION IN SOUTHWEST ASIA
| TABLES | |
| 1. | U.S. FORCE COMMITMENTS TO THE CURRENT RDF, BY SERVICE |
| 2. | PROJECTED CUMULATIVE BUDGET AUTHORITY INCREASES AND SAVINGS (-) FOR RDFs OF THREE SIZES, RELATIVE TO ADMINISTRATION PLAN |
| 3. | FORCE COMPOSITION OF THREE POSSIBLE RDFs, BY SERVICE |
| 4. | PROJECTED CHANGES TO MOBILITY PROGRAM FOR THREE RDF FORCE LEVELS |
| 5. | ARMY SUPPORT PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS, CAPABILITIES, AND SHORTFALLS FOR THREE RDFs |
| 6. | PROJECTED RDF SUPPORT COST REQUIREMENTS BY SIZE OF RDF, 1984-1988 |
| FIGURES | |
| 1. | AREA OF CONCERN FOR U.S. RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES IN SOUTHWEST ASIA |
| 2. | SHIFTING WARSAW PACT/NATO FORCE BALANCE: 90 DAYS FOLLOWING PACT MOBILIZATION |
| 3. | EFFECTS OF RDF SIZE ON WARSAW PACT/NATO FORCE BALANCE: 90 DAYS FOLLOWING PACT MOBILIZATION |
| 4. | TOTAL CURRENT MOBILITY CAPACITY FOR THE RDF OVER TIME |
| 5. | TOTAL PROJECTED AIRLIFT CAPACITY FOR THE RDF OVER TIME |
| 6. | PROJECTED TOTAL MOBILITY CAPACITY FOR THE RDF, INCLUDING PLANNED UPGRADES AND EXPANSIONS |
When plans for the Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF) were announced in 1979, no new combat forces were created for them. (For simplicity, the RDF is referred to here as a single unit.) Rather, the RDF was envisioned to consist of existing forces--portions of all four U.S. armed services--most of which already had the traditional mission of assisting in the defense of NATO Europe. The size of the RDF can therefore have important implications for the U.S. policy with respect to NATO.
As the RDF is constituted today, it comprises 222,000 troops. The Administration plans to increase the size of the RDF, perhaps doubling that number. At the same time, though, no plan for an overall increase in U.S. combat forces has been advanced. Thus, the Administration's planned larger RDF could have further effects on U.S. policy for NATO.
Moreover, the RDF could affect the U.S. defense budget. Only $737 million has been earmarked directly for the RDF for fiscal year 1983. But the RDF, and particularly the plans for a larger version, could give rise to pressure for eventual increases in the defense budget and could hamper efforts to reduce the budget deficit in the next few years. Thus the Congress' decision about the appropriate size of the RDF has important implications for the budget as well as for NATO policy.
To assist in deliberations about the appropriate size of the RDF, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has examined several aspects of three possible RDFs--one manned at the Administration's higher level, assumed to include 440,000 troops, one manned at the current 222,000-troop level, and one reduced to 165,000 troops. The analysis first considers the missions appropriate to the different sizes. Then, for each version of RDF, the analysis considers the implications for NATO versus Warsaw Pact force ratios in Europe, and the RDF's combat, mobility, and support needs. To the extent that each of these factors has budgetary implications, the potential costs or savings are also examined.
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