"Who Did The Audit?","Audited Agency","Additional Information","Report Number","Report Title","Date Issued","Report Summary","Requirements","Socio-economic","Cost Estimate","Acquisition Planning","Market Research","Competition","Share in Savings","Fixed Price","Cost Reimbursable","Time and Materials","Performance-based Contracting","Blanket Purchase Agreement","Indef Delivery/Indef Quantity","Govt-wide Acquisition Contract","Multi-Agency Contract","Multiple Award Contract","GSA Schedule","Cost Analysis","Price Analysis","Price Negotiation","Request for Proposal/Quotation","Source Selection","Contract Oversight","Cost Performance Report","Financial Management","Fee Administration","Subcontracting","Contract Close Out","Acquisition Workforce","Information Technology Support","Policy/Guidance/Processes","Funds Management","Illegal Activities","Commercial Items","E-Commerce","Intellectual Property","A-76/Competitive Sourcing","Prime Vendor","Purchase Cards","Report Location","Docs Open Number","Who entered the data"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A61558/P/5/R97023","Review of The Use of Term Contracts Great Lakes Region",6/24/1997 0:00:00,"PBS field offices need to be more effective in ensuring that contractors deliver work on time, at the quality and quantities contracted for.Work was being ordered that was not contracted for. Davis Bacon Act requirements were not being verified",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61549","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A62503/P/9/R97005","Audit of Procurement Actions Central California Field Office Pacific Rim Region",1/13/1997 0:00:00,"IG found that improvements in procurement activities are needed by tightening controls in the administration of term contracts and purchase card procurement actions",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"Denver hard copy","61550","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A53026/P/W/R97004","Audit of Service Contracting",12/12/1996 0:00:00," Improvements needed in administration and monitoring of service contracts awarded by the National Capital Region Public building Service to ensure contractors comply with terms and conditions of their contents. Contract requirements not fully being met in the ares of security clearances, reporting, inspection systems, and training and testing",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61552","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A61816/P/6/R97003","Management Assistance Review On Janitorial Contract Pricing in the Heartland Region",11/7/1996 0:00:00,"NISH janitorial service contracts are significantly more expensive that non-NISH contracts due to the laws that govern the JWOD program, which NISH falls under. PBS's ability to obtain fair market prices for NISH contracts is imparied because reliable comparative data is often not available to determine price reasonableness.",0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61553","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A73010/P/W/R97037","Review of the Decentralization of Contracting Functions in the National Capital Region",9/30/1997 0:00:00,"At property management centers (PMCs) it was found that contracting officials need to have the necessary training to ensure that they have the basis for awarding contracts that are fair and reasonable.  In addition controls over materials or services ordered and received need to be adhered to to ensure that the items are used as authorized.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61554","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A71834/T/6/Z97007","Advisory Review of GSA's Acqusition and Management of Wireless Telephone Service",9/24/1997 0:00:00,"IG evaluated the procurement and management of wireless telephone service in GSA. It was found that significant savings and better program management can be achieved by using one vendor for GSA's wireless needs",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61556","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A62493/P/9/R97006","Audit of Procurement Actions Nevada Field Office, Pacific Rim Region",1/13/1997 0:00:00,"Procurement activities could be made more efficient by enforcing contract terms relating to the quality of work by a contractors.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61557","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A60921/P/3/R97031","Report on the Mid-Atlantic Region's Lease Services Contract",8/7/1997 0:00:00,"PBS should consider performance based contracting.  It should establish contract goals, methods to measure performance,and provide contract oversight.  This will insure that the government obtain the level and quality of serices paid for in a contract. This effort was to determine when it would be cost effective for PBS to use service contracts to aid in its workload.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61558","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"N/A","Semiannual report to Congress 10/1/96- 3/31/97",3/31/1997 0:00:00,"Some contractors engaged in fraud and had to pay over $3 million to resolvecivil liability under the False claims act. Overcharges to federal customers on 15 multiple award schedule contracts resulted in GSA collecting $2.3 million as a total settlement",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61742","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"N/A","Semiannual report  to Congress4/1/97- 9/30/97",9/30/1997 0:00:00,"The IG noted that GSA field offices were not effective in ensuring contractors delivered the services on the dates agreed to. There were problems with accurately pricing delivery orders and with the ordering process. Illegal activities included theft of government property, fraud",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61743","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A83047/F/W/V98021","Management Consulting Review of Procurement Activities Federal Supply Service (FSS) office of the Controller",9/30/1998 0:00:00,"Construction services totalling more than $226,000 were procured  from the same contractor, without the use of contracts. COTRs made purchases made purchases that exceeeded their limits. COTRS needed updated training",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61562","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A81502/P/5/R98027","Advisory Review of Performance-Based Service Contracting Practices",9/25/1998 0:00:00,"GSA IG compared PBS' practices for preparing and administering performance based cleaning contracts with Navy and NASA's practices for preparing and administering performance based cleaning contracts.  It was found that training was a key ingredient for ensuring the success of performance based contracting",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"Denver hard copy","61563","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A83008/F/W/V98007","Audit of Service Contracts",2/4/1998 0:00:00,"IG found that Federal Supply Service is not in total compliance with with OFPP with regard to inclusion of defined performance standards as part of contract adinistration process.  More needs to be accomplished in defining contract performance standards. OFPP policy states that agencies should develop appropriate performance standards to ensure that contractor performance meets contract terms and conditions",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61564","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A72126/0/7/F98001","Audit of the Contracting Officer Warrant Program Region 7",1/22/1998 0:00:00,"IG audited the Contracting Officer Warrant Program (CWOP) appointments and found that these appontments were not in compliance with governing procedures, nor was there sufficient file documentation to support appointments made for nearly half of the appointments reviewed. IG recommended training for current and future appointees to comply with current policies issued by the office of acquisition policy.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61566","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A72473/P/9/R98014","Audit of Guard Service Contract Awards",3/12/1998 0:00:00,"FPS needs to increase management contro;s over the guardservices contracting process.  New guards are often allowed to work before contract imposed training requirements are met, potentially exposing the government to undue risk.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61567","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A71522/P/5/R98013","Audit of Commercial Facilities Management (CFM) Major General Emmett J. Bean Center, Idianapolis, Indiana",3/11/1998 0:00:00,"Contractor did not furnish all of the building maintenance and janitorial serices required by contract.  Quality control documents were not submitted.  PBS did not enforce terms of the contract and make deductions for work not provided",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61568","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A80610/P/2/R98017","Audit of Elevator Maintenance Contracts in Region 2 (Northeast and Carribbean Region)",5/11/1998 0:00:00,"Objectives were to determine if Government is incurring additional costs for elevator repairs and inspections that were the contractual responsibility of the maintenance contractor. Audit was terminated because contracts award periods were being extended beyond the limited three year period up to nine years.  As a result, IG could not evaluate whether the requirement for closeout inspection and repair was being adequately enforced.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61569","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"N/A","Semiannual Report to Congress10/1/97-3/31/98",3/31/1998 0:00:00,"The government entered into 4 settlement agreements  in which companies paid a total of $4 million to resolve potential civil liabilities under the False Claims Act. In a commercial facilities contract, the contractor did not furnish  all the equipment and services at the frequency and quality level required by the contractor. The IG noted that management controls were needed in the award process for guard services contracts in one region.  Theeft of government property was also noted in this report.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61744","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"N/A","Semiannual Report to Congress 4/1/98 -9/30/98",9/30/1998 0:00:00,"The IG noted the following procurement related issues $1.9 millon was recovered from contractors as a result of potential civil liabilities under the false Claims Act.  Many of these involved procurements from GSA's Multiple Award Schedule. The IG observed some contractual work not being performed under performance based contracts. At customer service centers the IG found that a lack of management controls in the procurement area, in which procurement authority was being delegated to employees who were neither experienced nor trained in procurement regulations.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61745","Tanisha"
"Justice IG","Department of Justice",,"98-03","Asset Forfeiture Program Management Letter - Fiscal Year 1995",1/1/1998 0:00:00,"At one U.S. Marshal Service district office, a vendor was awarded two contracts for services @ $25K each without using formal contracting procedures; this violated USMS policy concerning breaking down a purchase requirement into more than one requisition to avoid using formal contracting procedures.  Also, a USMS district office had not performed a contract management review for one contract.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57133","Tanisha"
"Justice IG","Drug Enforcement Agency",,"99-24","DEA Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Disposal",8/1/1999 0:00:00,"Many cleanup files were missing the required Certificates of Disposal/ Destruction or their equivalent.  There was also little DEA verification of contractors' labor and waste quantity claims.  The controls over contractor payments and deobligation of unneeded funds should be tightened. The IG also encountered a problem obtaining payment information for FY 1998 cleanups due to inadequate information in the accounting reports.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","56791","Tanisha"
"Justice IG","Immigration and Naturalization Service",,"99-19","Follow-up Review of INS Management of Automation Programs",7/1/1999 0:00:00,"At the time of this audit, the INS was unsuccessful in procuring independent audits of its Information Technology Partnership (ITP) contract costs, but subsequently arranged for the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to conduct several audits that resulted in over $2.5 million in credit adjustments and/or proposed rate reductions. Additionally, INS made improvements to correct untimely written task order authorizations and took actions to plan for the expiration of its major contract for the automation programs.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","56797","Tanisha"
"Justice IG","Marshall's Service",,"00-21","Court Security Officer Program",8/29/2000 0:00:00,"Protests of CSO contracts over the contracting process have been on the rise since 1997. However, no specific contracting issues were provided in the executive summary (all that is available on the DOJIG website). There was a barrage of protests related to the most recent round of contract awards in early 1999. Additionally, there was a concern among a number of U.S. marshals that CSOs do not receive adequate training for the duties required of them. Marshals identified needed subject areas of training ranging from bomb detection and anti-terrorist programs, to cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and people skills. Currently, there is no provision in the CSO contracts for in-service training.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57110","Tanisha"
"Justice IG","Department of Justice","Audits involving multiple DOJ components","Rpt # 01-16","Justice's Reliance on Private Contractors for Prison Services",7/31/2001 0:00:00,"The DOJ houses about 18,000 prisoners each day in contractor owned or managed facilities. The DOJ components appear to have plans in place to address short-term emergency situations at individual private prison facilities. However, the increased use of private prison contractors and financial difficulties of the DOJ's largest private prison contractor highlight the need for contingency plans for addressing the potential large scale loss of private prison services for an extended period of time. Each component must determine its unique housing requirements (e.g., security level, proximity to courthouses, etc.) based on its specific needs. In addition, because the USMS, the INS, and the BOP rely on the same contractors for prison space and could be competing for the same resources, they need to coordinate development and implementation of their contingency plans.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62804","Tanisha"
"Justice IG","Department of Justice","The audit was performed at 3 locations.","Rpt # 01-12","Federal Cost Recovery and Program Monitoring in the Equitable Sharing Program",3/1/2001 0:00:00,"Case-related contract costs directly related to equitable sharing cases were not recovered from gross receipts before DOJ personnel determined the amount available for sharing among DOJ and state and local law enforcement agencies.  In FY1999, about $12 million in contract costs were not deducted from gross receipts before determining the amount available for sharing, thus reducing the amount to be shared.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62446","Tanisha"
"Justice IG","Department of Justice","The audit covered all DOJ components.","Info Rpt #01-02","Interest Penalties Paid by the Department of Justice as a result of the Prompt Payment Act - FY1999",12/5/2000 0:00:00,"The Prompt Payment Act (P.L. 100-496) as prescribed in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-125 (Revised) requires Executive Departments to either pay contractors on time or to pay interest penalties when payments are late. The amount of interest penalties paid by the DOJ appears to be increasing every fiscal year. The interest penalties paid in FYs 1995, 1996, and 1997 were $1,0850,608; $1,151,081; and, $1,252,144 respectively. (Note: Congress repealed Section 3906 of the Prompt Payment Act by Section 1301(c) of the Federal Reports Elimination Act of 1998. Thus, FY 1997 was the last year components were required to submit any Prompt Payment statistics.)",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57150","Tanisha"
"Justice IG","Bureau of Prisons",,"Report # 02-30","Federal Bureau of Prison's Control Over Weapons and Laptop Computers",8/1/2002 0:00:00,"BOP’s procurement of weapons and laptop computers is decentralized, and each facility has the authority to purchase weapons and laptop computers using either standard acquisition (purchase orders) or simplified acquisition procedures (government credit card).  Currently, the BOP has three national contracts for weapons; if BOP seeks to buy weapons covered by the national contract, it must do so using that contract; it cannot buy the weapon using the simplified acquisition procedures.  The use of government credit cards to purchase weapons poses a problem in that cardholders could physically purchase and take delivery of weapons outside of a BOP facility.  Although the IG found that none of the weapons purchased with credit cards were purchased offsite, this practice increases the likelihood that weapons would not be entered into the BOP inventory system and poses an unacceptable risk to the public because weapons purchased in this manner might be outside of the control of BOP.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"Denver docs","62055","Tanisha"
"Justice IG","Bureau of Prisons",,"Report #02-32","Federal Bureau of Prison's Management of Construction Contracts",8/1/2002 0:00:00,"The IG found that the BOP’s management of prison construction contracts had generally improved since our last audit in 1998. However, they identified exceptions related to contract modifications and late payments that were similar to those found in the 1998 audit. A $1.6 million proposed contract modification in our judgment is unnecessary. Three modifications, negotiated for $306,679 above the independent government estimates were not adequately justified as required by the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). Four payments did not comply with the prompt payment requirements of the FAR because the BOP used incorrect invoice receipt dates to calculate the due dates.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62058","Tanisha"
"Justice IG","Department of Justice","Audits involving multiple DOJ components","Rpt # 02-04","Prompt Payment Act Interest Penalties paid by DOJ in FY2000&2001",2/25/2002 0:00:00,"The Prompt Payment Act (P.L. 100-496), as prescribed in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-125 (Revised), requires executive departments to pay contractors interest penalties when payments are late. The amount of interest penalties paid by the DOJ has significantly increased since FY 1997 shown in the 2001 report: FY1999 - $2,973,319; FY2000 - $4,531,468; FY2001 - $5,801,049.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57171","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-97-002","High Speed Research Prime Contractor Performance Lewis Research Center~",10/25/1996 0:00:00,"Overall, prime contractor controls and procedures concerning award and management of subcontracts was adequate. Lewis Research Center needs to improve controls and procedures over subcontracting.  The Center should perform adequate pricing and technical analysis of proposed subcontracts to ensure fair and reasonable prices. Proposed subcontract awards should be evaluated and documented before granting consent for procurements over $500,000. OIG recommended the Chief of the Procurement Division remind contracting officers (CO's) to comply with FAR requirements for subcontract pricing; require analyses of subcontract costs by the prime contractor and examine according to the FAR before applying decrement factors; require technical analyses of cost proposals according to guidance; and, require to document the evaluation process when granting subcontract consent for procurement exceeding $500,000. Documentation should state rationale for CO acceptance of the contractor justification for not competing the award; cost or price analyses and award amount; and, proposed efforts and statement of work.",1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61615","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-97-007","NASA PROCUREMENT INITIATIVES Credit Card Program",11/22/1996 0:00:00,"Procedures to guide the NASA Credit Card Program are not clear and have been misunderstood.  A Center exceeded authority intended by the credit card program and circumvented standard procurement procedures.  The directorate split a requirement for $167,925 worth of computer systems into 80 separate procurements to 13 directorate personnel as credit card holders in order to fall within the single purchase limit.  Procurement authority of $2,500 is allowed for each purchase and $20,000 annually to each cardholder. The approving official considered each computer to be a separate purchase delivered to an individual user.  The Program Coordinator apparently approved  to purchase 2 or 3 computers using the credit card, but after that approval, the directorate  purchased 80 computers. OIG recommended the NASA Associate Administrator for Procurement issue a letter to the Center clarifying the definition of single purchase and reemphasize the requirements are not to be split.  All NASA procurement officers should be notified of clarifications and reemphasis be added to local credit card training.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"Denver hard copy","61616","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-97-011","Shuttle Processing Contract Sub-Contracting - Circumstances Indicating Procurement Fraud Kennedy Space Center, Florida",12/20/1996 0:00:00,"Officials did not document that the subcontractor was technically qualified and financially responsible. The Statement of Work was not clear. SPC negotiated increases using proposals refuted by their engineering office, and were inadequately documented. The agreement to accelerate was not negotiated until 6 months after project completion that was not met. Change orders were issued for the other subcontract without not-to-exceed price or conducting new competition. In addition, fraud indicators should have alerted to the possibility of unlawful acts. The original date stamped to one contract received appeared altered later to the due date for quotes, and the quote received matched SPC engineer revised cost estimates. Over $800 thousand of unsupported payments should be disallowed. OIG recommended the Center take action to ensure more effective construction subcontract and administration; address identified procurement indicators; review unsupported costs and disallow costs as reported; and, determine whether the contractor be held accountable for cost incurred of $344,421 to move the shuttle to another pad.",0,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61619","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-97-014","Earth Observing System Data and Information System Facility Construction Management Goddard Space Flight Center",2/7/1997 0:00:00,"Prompt change order definitization could more effectively control contract cost if negotiations were conducted on a timely schedule; and, potential recovery for building design errors, omissions and conflicts should be assessed. The delays weakened the agency negotiation position. The contracting officer (CO) did not examine potential recovery from the architect-engineering firm because no single flaw was considered cost effective to pursue. The flaws likely caused work delay, rework, administrative effort and resulted in higher costs due to noncompetitive negotiated contract modifications for the corrective work. OIG recommended that the procurement office should take action to ensure change orders on the Earth System Science Building (ESSB) are definitized within established 180 day guideline.  The Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) CO for the architect-engineer services contract, in conjunction with the GSFC's Office of Chief Counsel, should examine the design errors, omissions and conflicts and take action to reduce the contract amount or recover for services not provided and additional costs incurred by NASA.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61620","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-97-015","Space Station Change Order Process",3/5/1997 0:00:00,"The program had not definitized old and high priority changes within a self-imposed deadline. Plans are to definitize remaining changes within a four-month period.  The program also had not issued undefinitized change orders on an exception basis due to schedule constraints, and had not definitized changes within the agency's 180-day goal. However, the program's effort to eliminate its backlog of changes was viable.  If the program does not take corrective actions, it will continue to experience the adverse effects, such as, cost increases and questionable cost baselines. OIG recommended the Space Station Program Manager assign to a program employee responsibility for definitizing changes within, or close to, the 180-day goal.  The program manager should include the responsibility as an element in the selected employee's performance plan.  The selected program employee should review program and contractor policies and procedures to identify, recommend, and implement actions that are impediments to timely definitizations. Boeing personnel should participate in the review to ensure that timely definitizations are a joint priority.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61621","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A82453/P/9/R99503","Audits of Procurements in the Helena, Montana Field Office",11/18/1998 0:00:00,"Controls and guidelines pertaining to credit card purchases were not being adhered to.Training requirements for warranted contracting officers had not been completed, potentially exposing the Governmentto undue risk on procurements",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61570","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A995160/P/5/W99002","Review of Elevator Maintenance Contract Patrick V. McNamara Federal Building Michigan Property Management Center",4/30/1999 0:00:00,"IG noted serious leveling problems with some elevators in building due to old equipment requiring frequent attention.The contractor did not perform the necessary maintenance work on the elevators.  GSA did not administer the contract to assure that the contractor corrected maintenance problems. Terms of the contract were not being followed.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"Denver hard copy","61571","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A995160/P/5/W99005","Review of The Elevator Maintenance Contract Charles Chamberlain Post Office and Federal Building, Michigan Property Management Center",7/2/1999 0:00:00,"Contractor  had no quality control program and GSA did not actively administer the contract to assure that the contractor was performing essential safety tests, inspections and preventive maintenance tasks necessary to ensure that tenants and visitors to the building were provided with safe and reliable elevator service.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61572","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A995194/T/H/Z99002","Management Control Review: Public Building Serivce Property Management Operations and Maintenance Contracts",9/7/1999 0:00:00,"Controls are not adequate to assure that the services GSA pays for are received and are needed. This is a nationwide problem, based on our review of four regions. Open Recommendations ?Institute a national quality assurance program that establishes a consistent approach for monitoring contractor performance, with a focal point for guidance and direction regarding interpretation and application of O&M contract terms and conditions. Action is to be completed by January 15, 2001.",0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61573","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"N/A","Semi-annual Report to Congress 10/1/98 -3/31/99",3/31/1999 0:00:00,"The IG noted that in two settlement agreements in which companies agreed to  pay $5 million to resolve potential civil liability under the False Claims Act. The IG also noted that in the area of negotiated leases justification needed to be provided for other than full and open competition. Non-competitive leases were being awarded beyond certain thresholds without the approval of the competition advocate as required by regulation.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61746","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"N/A","Semi-annual Report to Congress 4/1/99 -9/30/99",9/30/1999 0:00:00,"The IG noted that there were 9 settlement agreement in which companies agreed to pay $1.4 million to resolve potential civil liability under the False Claims Act. In addition, 5 GSA building supervisors pleaded guilty to taking bribes.  The IG noted that in the areas of courthouse construction that GSA needed a better nationwide system to collect and recover contractor past performance evaluation information when making source selection procurement decisions.   The IG found that, as a result of a nationwide review of performance based contracts for building services,controls needed to be strengthened to ensure that contractors met contractual requirements.  In the area of small purchases through purchase cards, the IG noted that there needs to be more control over verifying usage of cards for official business.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,"Denver hard copy","61747","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A995309/P/5/R00023","Audit of Orders Placed By the Public Building Services Against Multiple Award Construction Contracts",9/27/2000 0:00:00,"Property management centers embraced multiple -award construction contracting, while Public Building Services was inconsistent in its use of multiple award construction contracting",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61574","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A995288/T/H/Z00008","Audit of Federal Technology Serevice's Use of Multiple Award Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity Contracts",9/19/2000 0:00:00,"Provide training and develop tools that enhance multiple award contracting procurement. Ensure practices fair opportunity, and best value",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"Denver hard copy","61575","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A000880/F/3/V00009","Audit of Federal Supply Service's (FSS) Use of Multuple Award Indefinite Delivery Indefinite (IDIQ) Quantity Contracts",7/26/2000 0:00:00,"Ensure fair opportunity to compete is provided when purchasing/leasing vehicles under FSS's mutli-vendor programs",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61576","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A995264/P/9/R00006","Review of Simplified Procurements in the Boise, Idaho Customer Service Center",1/10/2000 0:00:00,"Competition requirements are not in compliance with FASA and the FAR. Controls over purchase card procurements need to be strengthened. Not all purchase cardholders are maintaining required logs listing transactions, evidence of reconciliation is not documented, and approving official review is sporadic.",0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61577","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A995210/P/W/R00004","Audit of Custodial Services Contracts in the National Capital Region",12/21/1999 0:00:00,"PBS needs to improve the administration of its custodial services contracts to ensure that the performance is meeting its customers needs.   Effective contract administration is esssential to the success of performance based contracting and places the responsibility on the contractor to achieve measurable performance standards as specified in the contract.  Inconsistencies were found in how PBS performed contract administration dealing with inspections, meetings with the contractors and delegations for buildings that were sampled. Deficiencies were noted in contractor performance for the GSA headquarters building and the U.S. Courthouse.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61578","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A995175/P/2/R00010","Audit of the Federal Protective Service's Contract Guard Program",3/28/2000 0:00:00,"FPS was not optimally managing the Contract Guard program.   For example, guards were on post without having valid background suitability determinations, and s were lacking training to perform their duties.  These conditions were occurring because regional offices were operating autonomously with limited controls and oversight and oversight with no comprehensive plan for accomplishing the mission. AS a rsult, the safety and protection of Federal Employees and facilities was potentially being compromised",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61579","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A000861/P/6/R00021","Review of PBS Construction Contract Clauses",9/18/2000 0:00:00,"Several studies showed that contract modifications resulted in substantial cost increases on construction projects.  The purpose of the review was to determine if PBS construction contrat clauses could be improved to reduce costs and administrative effort associated with GSA construction projects.   Review of  contracts was discontinued due to the benefits associated with completing the review would not outweigh the resource investment.   This decision was in large part due to a PBS  Construction Excellence initiative which was begun in 1998 for the purposes of identifying specific areas in which GSA's construction program could be improved.",1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61582","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"N/A","Semi annual Report to Congress 10/1/99 - 3/31/00",3/31/2000 0:00:00,"The IG noted that the Government entered into 9 settlement agreements in which companies agreed to pay a total of $3.4 million to resolve their potential civil liabilities under the False Claims Act. A contractor was debarred as a result of engaging in illegal aliens and not following wage labor laws. Other examplesof illegal activities include misuse of fleet credit cards, and mail fraud. The IG also noted that there was ineffective management practices for administering performance-based custodial service contracts resulting in service delivery deficiencies to excedd acceptable levels.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61748","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-97-031","Consolidated Network And Mission Operations Support (CNMOS) Contract",7/18/1997 0:00:00,"Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Mission Operations at Lyndon B Johnson Space Center should take actions to keep the Office of Space Operations (OSO) and Data Systems Directorate Informed of the problems encountered with implementing Performance Base Contracting (PBC).  This will ensure that OSO does not encounter similar problems on the planned Consolidated Space Operations Contract (CSOC).  NASA experienced problems with implementing PBC on the CNMOS contract. NASA and contractor employees encountered problems with communications, training, policies and procedures, and other concepts associated with PBC. The OIG recommended the Mission Operations and Data Systems Directorate at GSFC should have periodic meetings/exchanges with the Office of Space Operations at JSC to share problems encountered and ""lessons learned"" with the implementation of PBC and CNMOS.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61623","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-97-032","Space Flight Operations Contract Performance Metrics",7/22/1997 0:00:00,"The survey revealed no significant weaknesses in the sample metrics reviewed. However, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center made no provision for formal review of metrics during the performance of the contract, and should communicate lessons learned from Performance Based Contracting to procurement personnel.  Without a formal review, NASA could use obsolete or inappropriate metrics to evaluate the contractor's performance and determine award fee. The OIG recommended for the Manager, Space Shuttle Program Office, should select an appropriate point during performance of the contract and conduct a complete review to evaluate effectiveness of metrics presented in the Statement of Work.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61626","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration","no data available","G-97-003","Inspection: Assessment of ISO 9000 Contract Support",,"NASA should develop an integrated and comprehensive acquisition strategy to provide for all necessary ISO 9000 contract support. The strategy should comply with existing NASA policy governing the advocacy of open competition. If NASA does not consider an Agency wide approach, violations to the commitment to both open competition and contract consolidation to achieve savings will occur. NASA should avoid the proliferation of potentially costly local procurements of ISO 9000 support and services.  The Agency should, where possible, consolidate training services to avoid local procurements and to limit redundancies and inconsistencies.  NASA and their Office of Procurement should monitor the development and availability of potential low-cost or no-cost partnering opportunities with other Federal and public organizations. to provide ISO 9000 consulting and registrar services.  Monitor closely ISO 9000 activity at Space Flight Centers to learn and share implementation experiences as lessons learned.",0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","521813","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-98-007","Contractor Facility Leases",3/5/1998 0:00:00,"NASA's management of facility leasing can be improved. The lease costs billed to the government were accurate; however, a significant number of contractor facilities were not effectively utilized. For the 82 leases reviewed, OIG found NASA could spend over $13.7 million needlessly over the remaining life of the leases or contracts with prime contractors. OIG recommended the Associate Administrator for Procurement: reevaluate the facility requirements for those contractor sites with idle space; review the allow ability of costs for those leases that have substantial idle space for over one year; request DCAA to include FAS 13 analysts in their full cost proposal reviews; and, review classification of questioned leases to ensure appropriately classified, and if not, take corrective action as required; including determining the allow ability of costs.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","521057","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-98-011","NASA's International Merchant Purchase Authorization Card Program",5/4/1998 0:00:00,"NASA needs to improve the overall management of the credit card program.  Problems identified were split purchases, and credit cards used by someone other than the cardholder.  To strengthen the program, the Associate Administrator for Procurement should define specific duties and responsibilities of program coordinators; work with financial management personnel to ensure the authenticity of certifications; establish goals for NASA to increase the use of credit cards when making small purchases; and, monitor agency performance.  Identified problems with split purchases, and credit cards used by someone other than the cardholder.  Overall, the program was generally effective, and controls over the use of credit cards were in place. The OIG recommended to define the specific duties and responsibilities of program coordinators; establish goals for NASA to increase the use of the credit cards when making small purchases; and monitor agency performance relative to the Government-wide program, and take appropriate action to encourage greater use of the credit card.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","505007","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-98-025","Earth Science Commercial Data Buy Program",9/3/1998 0:00:00,"Overall, the Commercial Remote Sensing Program Office (CRSPO) was properly planned and managed, but unnecessarily contracted for 1 of 10 contract awards for online Spaceborne Imaging Radar-C archive.  This contract duplicated NASA's capability to access SIR-C data through two existing agreements.  In total, $871,000 could be put to better use.  The OIG recommended that the SIR-C archive portion of the Phase I data buy contract with USI/SIE be terminated. Additionally, CRSPO should not award the SIR-C portion of the Phase II contract.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505005","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-98-029","Outsourcing Desktop Computers",9/14/1998 0:00:00,"NASA has not issued guidance on preparing reliable cost estimates in support of delivery order placement.  Without these estimates Centers may be unable to make well-informed decisions on the type and extent of outsourcing services they should acquire.  NASA did update the available cost data on outsourcing desktop computers, through successive iterations, to support each phase of the competitive procurement process.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505002","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-98-030","Single-Source Suppliers For Critical Items",9/14/1998 0:00:00,"Space Shuttle Project Managers have not adequately developed analyses of critical, single-source suppliers of industrial materials.  As s result, risks may not be fully identified; alternatives to critical single-source suppliers may not be available when needed; and corrective actions may not be taken to minimize risks to the mission.  The OIG recommended that the Space Shuttle Program Manager revise the analysis and reporting requirements for critical, single-source suppliers and include the revised requirements in appropriate Shuttle Program contracts.  NASA Chief Engineer should revise NASA policy to require rigorous analysis of all critical, single-source suppliers for all NASA programs and projects.",0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505000","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-98-041","Consolidated Network Mission Operations Support Contract, Transition and Implementation",9/30/1998 0:00:00,"Contractor cost reduction proposal for a 6 month timeframe overstates savings by about $9 million.  As a result, the contractor received $1.8 million more than entitled under the contract's cost savings sharing clause.  The OIG recommended NASA should seek a recoupment of the overstated share of savings paid to Allied.",0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504997","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-99-011","Earth Observing System (EOS) Common Spacecraft Planning and Management",3/17/1999 0:00:00,"Generally, award fee determinations are correct, and performance is effectively monitored. Management can improve quality control and communication of award fee determinations.  Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) did not submit a finalized Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) and weekly and monthly status reports to the NASA Flight Assurance Manager (FAM) as required by the Letter of Delegation.  The FAM did not enforce compliance with reporting requirements.  Without a formally approved QAP, NASA has no assurance that DCMC is performing the quality assurance.  Without written reports, NASA lacks assurance that the contractor is adequately performing the work described in the contract and that closure is achieved on open items.  Award fee scores and amounts awarded to the contractor may not accurately reflect performance and specific problem areas requiring corrective actions may not be adequately addressed.  NASA coordinators disagreed with assessments and scores regarding contractor award fees. OIG recommends ensuring DCMC perform required quality assurance services, and improve communication of award fee determinations to participants in the process.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504993","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-99-022","Year 2000 Program Compliance Requirements in NASA Information Technology-Related Contracts",3/31/1999 0:00:00,"The Jet Propulsion Lab did not include NASA-directed Y2K requirements in all its applicable information technology operations and maintenance contracts as of January 31, 1999. Until applicable contracts are modified to include the requirements, NASA lacks reasonable assurance that its systems will be Y2K compliant on January 1, 2000.  The OIG recommended the NASA Chief Information Officer, in coordination with the NASA Management Office at JPL, should: establish a target date(s) for JPL to incorporate the PIC-98-9 requirements into all applicable mission-critical and non-mission-critical contracts; and, monitor JPL's progress in meeting the target date(s) established in response to the recommendation.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504992","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-99-023","Commercial Remote Sensing Program Office",3/31/1999 0:00:00,"The Congressionally directed Commercial Data Buy Program (CDBP) has helped achieve Earth Science Enterprise (ESE) goals, but additional programs are not warranted. The solicitation did not address specific scientific requirements so NASA has met its goal to reduce cost of remote sensing science and technology programs from competition within the commercial remote sensing industry. NASA officials revised the solicitation to allow general-purpose products relating to one of four broad Earth science themes.  Including a baseline in the solicitation would have clearly stated NASA requirements.  The resulting products will not replace near-term ESE missions, fulfill specific scientific requirements, or reduce the costs of remote sensing science and technology programs through competition within the commercial remote sensing industry.  ESE officials were prepared to solicit four distinct Earth science measurements, but had not developed a comprehensive baseline for scientific requirements. The OIG recommended that ESE publish a baseline of scientific requirements that will foster competition within the commercial remote sensing industry.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504991","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-99-038","Performance Evaluation Plan For the Earth Observing System Data and Information System Core System Contract",9/8/1999 0:00:00,"NASA did not link contractor performance to the award fee since the contract's Performance Evaluation Plan (PEP) does not contain objective measures of performance. The current award fee plan relies on subjective evaluations by Government personnel as the basis for award fee determinations.  Program and contracting officials have not revised the contract Performance Evaluation Plan to reflect performance requirements detailed in the revised Statement of Work and quality assurance plan after restructuring the contract to reflect a performance-base approach to evaluate contractor performance.  The contract awarded was not originally a performance based contract. OIG recommended the Director, Goddard Space Flight Center should direct the project office, in close coordination with the contracting officer, to revise the Performance Evaluation Plan to link award fee payments to specific cost, schedule, and performance objectives in the restructured ECS contract.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504989","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-99-042","Allied Signal Subcontract Management",9/16/1999 0:00:00,"Overall, Allied-Signal officials appropriately awarded and managed subcontracting activities on the contract.  NASA officials incorporated required contract clauses into the prime contract as did Allied-Signal into subcontracts.  Allied-Signal obtained consents-to-subcontract for subcontracts greater than $25,000 as required by the contract, but did not maintain supporting documentation for three of four justifications for noncompetitive procurements reviewed.  As a result, NASA has reduced assurance that the contractor maximized the competition of its subcontracts.  The OIG recommended management should direct Allied-Signal to maintain adequate documentation to support justifications for noncompetitive procurements.  NASA contracting officer and DCMC should include reviews for supporting documentation in their next purchasing system reviews.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504922","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-99-051","Environmental Aspects of External Tank Contract NAS8-36200",9/24/1999 0:00:00,"The current external tank contract has not been modified to incorporate the Federal waste reduction program as set forth under the FAR.  Consequently, adverse environmental impact may not be minimized and potential recycling benefits cannot be realized.  The OIG recommended if the contracting officer determines establishing a waste reduction program is economically feasible, the contracting officer should add to the existing external tank contract for Marshall the FAR requirements.  The Director, Johnson Space Center should ensure the requirement for a waste reduction program is included in the July 1, 2000, contract modification.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504988","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-99-052","X-33 Cost Estimating Processes",9/24/1999 0:00:00,"NASA did not prepare an independent cost estimate (IGCE) for source evaluations of proposed costs, and the Non-Advocate review did not quantify within the cost estimates the technical and schedule uncertainties inherent in the program.  Program Office believed that the cooperative agreement with Lockheed was comparable to a fixed-price instrument and, not any risk to the Government.  The OIG recommended NASA should improve its evaluation process for cost reasonableness and cost risk to ensure that decision-makers are provided complete and accurate information, that sufficient resources are available, and that the final ""agreed to"" price is fair and reasonable.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504986","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-99-054","JPL Management of Subcontractor Technical Performance",9/28/1999 0:00:00,"The Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL) generally managed subcontracting in an effective and efficient manner to achieve program and project objectives.  JPL's most significant subcontracts were not subjected to adequate surveillance.  JPL does not have adequate policy for monitoring subcontractor performance, and did not act on subcontractor disclosed problems and noncompliance with quality system procedures, in part, due to the lack of surveillance activity to identify and correct problems.   For example, JPL has not adopted the practice of performing engineering and quality audits as prescribed in NASA policy.  As a result, subcontractors have incurred excessive costs to correct technical problems that could have been prevented or mitigated to some extent.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504985","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-99-056","NASA Noncompetitive Procurements",9/28/1999 0:00:00,"Technical analysis for about half of noncompetitive procurement actions reviewed were inadequate.  Contracting Officers (CO) at Johnson did not request technical assistance for a modification made to the International Space Station contract. Technical analysts did not document fact finding meetings held with contractors. Therefore, contract files did not fully support the CO negotiation position and affect tactics and ability to develop a sound and supportable pre-negotiation position.  In addition, over half of noncompetitive purchase orders reviewed did not contain documentation supporting determinations of price reasonableness required by the FAR.  Justifications for noncompetitive procurement actions during procurement surveys were adequate.  OIG recommended CO's and technical analysts communicate more to improve quality and usefulness of technical analysis. CO should provide regulations, guidance, and prior technical reports to analysts.  Analysts should document fact finding meetings to support their conclusions.  Refresher training is needed to support pricing decisions on noncompetitive purchase order awards.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504984","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"testimony","Testimony: Statement of the Inspector General Before the House Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation",4/29/1999 0:00:00,"Contract management is a continuing area of primary concern. GAO does not believe that NASA has demonstrated the capability to consistently produce accurate and reliable procurement-related information to better assess and oversee procurement activities.  GAO cited delay in implementing an information system, lack of formal evaluation requirements for field center procurement activities, and delay in the implementation of NASA's procurement metrics initiative.  At present, shifts in the workload and workforce are impacting the experience levels of NASA's procurement personnel.  Turnover has led to a lack of continuity in administering contracts.  Procurement personnel are seriously challenged both by workload and by many changes in the field of recent years.  NASA procurement personnel are becoming increasingly reliant on contractors to administer programs, which increases risk if oversight is not appropriate.  In addition, OIG contract oversight may be seriously impacted if NASA cannot be guaranteed the access to contractors' data and facilities.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","519056","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-99-053","Contractor-Leased Facilities at Marshall Space Flight Center",9/27/1999 0:00:00,"Marshall's management of facility leasing can be improved. Contractor facilities were not always effectively utilized. Of the 24 facilities reviewed 8 had idle space ranging from 27 to 66 percent of the total space available. NASA could unnecessarily spend more than $617,000 for excess space over the term of the facility leases. Additionally, DCAA identified excess space during an audit of leased facilities at Thiokol Corporation. Also, three contractor leases were not correctly classified as capital leases. NASA could save about $8.6 million in excess lease costs over the terms of the facility leases by reclassifying those operating leases to capital leases. Recommended management review the allowability of lease costs, establish procedures to periodically review facility requirements for those contractors with leased facilities, review classifications to ensure leases are appropriately classified, and recoup any unallowable costs. Management should also ensure that contracting officers ask DCAA to review facility lease costs.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62400","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-00-002","Raytheon Subcontract Management",12/21/1999 0:00:00,"Raytheon appropriately awarded and effectively managed subcontracting activities on the contract, but did not maintain supporting documentation that described the scope or the results of the marketing research referred to in the justifications of four noncompetitive procurements with a total value of $399,300.  As a result, NASA has reduced assurance that the contractor maximized the competition of its subcontracts. The OIG recommended that management should direct Raytheon to maintain adequate documentation to support justifications for noncompetitive procurements.  Additionally, management should ask the NASA contracting officer and DCMA to include reviews for supporting documentation in their respective purchasing system reviews.",0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504983","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-00-007","Performance Management of the International Space Station",2/16/2000 0:00:00,"Performance management of the ISS prime contract needed improvement. From at least October 1998 to February 1999, the contractor reported to NASA unrealistically low projected cost overrun estimates. Although ample evidence provided by the contractor of continued degradation of cost performance was available to NASA management at the Headquarters, Johnson Space Center, and ISS Program Office (Program Office) levels, the Program Office did not effectively challenge the contractor’s estimates and paid unearned incentive fee totaling $16 million that the Agency recouped in April 1999. This incentive fee payment was based on the contractor’s reported cost performance rather than on a Government assessment of available information that clearly indicated the improbability of achieving the contractor’s understated estimates. Also, actions by the ISS Program Office were needed to reset the performance measurement baseline and to eliminate ambiguity concerning responsibility for cost overruns.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62187","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-00-008","Electronic Commerce: NASA's Acquisition of Office Supplies",2/23/2000 0:00:00,"Some NASA installations are purchasing office supplies at higher prices than available in the marketplace by negotiating contracts with vendors to obtain supplies rather using a contract created by another agency such as GSA. As a result, NASA is incurring unnecessary expenses for the acquisition of office supplies and for the administration and maintenance of separate office supply catalogs and other support services.  The OIG recommended the Associate Administrator for Procurement evaluate the office supplies support programs at NASA installations and determine whether their existing processes are cost-effective and meet customer requirements. If the processes were found not to be cost-effective or not meeting customer requirements, then the installations should implement alternative processes.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504982","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-00-010","NASA Contract Audit Follow-Up System At Marshall Space Flight Center",3/6/2000 0:00:00,"The contract audit follow-up system at Marshall did not include complete records of actions taken on findings and recommendations for sampled DCAA audit reports for which resolution and disposition authority had been delegated to the DOD. When NASA retained this authority, Marshall contracting officers (COs) did not track one reportable contract audit report that identified questioned costs of $549,000 and did not resolve or dispose of 10 of 11 reportable contract audit report findings and recommendations within 6 months as required by OMB Circular.  OIG recommended NASA COs maintain a dialogue with DOD Administrative COs who have been delegated activities on NASA contracts and to resolve contract audit report recommendations. Also recommended that the Director, Marshall provide the definition of reportable audit reports to COs and establish performance standards for COs to provide effective audit follow-up.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504981","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-00-011","Spare Parts Quality Assurance For The Space Shuttle",3/8/2000 0:00:00,"Quality assurance processes for the orbiter vehicles were not always efficient, and the Space Shuttle Program Manager has not updated or streamlined criteria for eliminating unnecessary inspection points at spare parts suppliers and has not consolidated quality assurance requirements using a program-level approach.  As a result, at some locations, NASA has redundant Government quality assurance resources that could be used more efficiently to perform other quality assurance functions.  NASA management should establish policies and procedures to improve the efficiency of quality assurance at the supplier level.  In particular, management should establish inspection point criteria at the supplier level consistent with streamlined criteria established for Shuttle processing and vehicle manufacturing.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504980","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-00-018","NASA Oversight of Contractor Exports of Controlled Technologies",3/23/2000 0:00:00,"NASA lacks assurance that contractor export activities are performed in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.  The OIG identified two of three contractors reviewed that may have exported controlled technologies to foreign countries in furtherance of their work on the International Space Station and the Space Shuttle External Tank programs.  The OIG recommended that management include guidance in either a NASA FAR Supplement amendment, Procurement Information Circular, or NASA Procedures and Guidelines that all appropriate NASA contracts require the contractors to deliver: a plan for obtaining any required export licenses to fulfill contract requirements; a listing of the contractor licenses obtained; and a periodic report of the exports effected against those licenses.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504979","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-00-032","NASA Contract Audit Follow-Up System At Johnson Space Center",5/19/2000 0:00:00,"The contract audit follow-up system at Johnson Space Center (JSC) can be improved.  The system did not include complete records of actions taken of findings and recommendations for all sampled DCAA audit reports for which resolution and disposition authority was delegated to DOD. When NASA retained authority for resolution and disposition of audit findings, contracting officers (CO) at Johnson did not track and report identified questioned costs of $2.4 million.  Also, COs did not resolve or dispose reportable findings and recommendations related to 2 of 5 reports within 6 months after issuance of a final audit report as prescribed by OMB Circular A-50.  The OIG recommended that the Director, JSC, provide the definition of reportable audit reports to contracting officers and establish performance standards to ensure effective contract audit follow-up. The Associate Administrator for Procurement agreed to reemphasize requirements to ensure COs maintain a dialogue with DOD ACO's who have been delegated administration on NASA contracts and to resolve contract audit report recommendations within 6 months of the final report.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504978","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-00-033","Relief Granted To Contractors For Overpayment of General and Administrative Costs",8/20/2000 0:00:00,"NASA agreed with DCAA that the Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) inappropriately authorized reimbursement to the contractor for General and Administrative (G&A) costs associated with employee bonuses.  The bonuses were not reimbursable under the terms of the contract, and therefore, were unallowable. The G&A costs allocated to unallowable bonus costs should be identified and excluded from billings to the Government.  The OIG recommended that Kennedy Space Center should clarify under future contracts whether any costs paid from fee, direct and indirect, are allocable and allowable.  NASA seems unlikely to be able to recover the estimated $2 million in G&A costs associated with the bonuses.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504977","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-00-039","Space Flight Operations Contract Phase II",8/4/2000 0:00:00,"NASA cannot be assured it received fair and reasonable pricing because the contract file did not document  the FY98 flight rate credit analysis as required by the FAR.  Specifically, the SFOC file did not contain  evidence of technical, cost, or price analysis, or verification of direct and indirect rates that the contracting officer should have used to determine whether a flight credit was fair and reasonable from two cancelled flights. This support contributes to the basis of the contracting officer's pre-negotiation position.  The OIG recommended NASA perform an adequate technical, cost, or price analysis on each SFOC pricing action, and document the analysis in the contract file; and, verify that appropriate forward pricing rates are used in the credit proposal, and document the verification in the SFOC contract file.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504976","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-00-046","NASA Settlement of DCAA's Incurred Cost Audits at Goddard Space Flight Center",9/18/2000 0:00:00,"NASA follow-up system for DCAA incurred cost audits at Goddard can be improved. Specifically, Goddard contract audit follow-up system did not include complete records of actions taken on findings and recommendations for most sampled DCAA reports reviewed. Audit findings and recommendations may not have been resolved in a timely manner and that the resolutions were in NASA's best interest. In addition, FAR guidelines were not followed to close-out 10 physically completed contracts on the average of 55 months. Delays can result in excess Unliquidated Obligations that could be used for other NASA programs. In addition, delays may affect negotiations and more workload for contractors and contracting officers. Associate Administrator for Procurement should issue guidance to contracting officers, Goddard should monitor efforts planned to improve close-outs within required timeframes.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501434","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-00-043","Consolidated Space Operations Contract - Cost-Benefit Analysis and Award Fee Structure",9/20/2000 0:00:00,"NASA did not properly structure the award fee for the Consolidated Space Operations Contract (CSOC) to evaluate performance of the Integrated Operations Architecture. The award fee plan lacks defined criteria for measuring performance, appropriate evaluation periods, and proper emphasis on cost performance.  Without these provisions, NASA cannot measure contractor performance to assess the appropriate amount of award fee and provide and effective incentive for the contractor.  The OIG recommended NASA establish performance evaluation criteria for the ""lookback"" award fee periods that do not exceed 12 months; and revise the CSOC Award Fee Plan to increase emphasis on cost control.  In addition, NASA should require  progress reports on the architecture baseline beyond the initial submission.  Without current information, NASA cannot measure contractor performance to assess the appropriate amount of award fee.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504975","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-00-050","NASA's Use of Smart Pay Purchase Cards",9/25/2000 0:00:00,"NASA needs guidance on the use of purchase cards to include more specific examples of prohibited purchases and approving officials' responsibilities.  Individuals interviewed were not sufficiently knowledgeable about appropriate and inappropriate uses of the purchase cards.  NASA should expand the FAR Supplement on required training on the use of purchase cards to include additional emphasis on approving officials' responsibilities in reviewing purchase card transactions.  Overall, the NASA SmartPay Purchase Card program was effective.  The OIG found a small number of sampled purchases of various items that did not meet the intent of the FAR and other Federal guidance.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","504974","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"00-049","Health Care Costs At NASA Contractors",9/26/2000 0:00:00,"OIG evaluation for 6 of NASA's top 20 contracts showed 4 of the 6 Contractor Insurance/Pension Reviews (CIPR) were incomplete and that 3 of the 6 reports were untimely. NASA CO must increase oversight to ensure sufficient reviews of insurance and pension plans and costs, including health care costs. Improved oversight should lead to more current, accurate, and complete CIPRs and to negotiations of fair and reasonable contract prices. Recommended NASA management establish a process to track and review CIPRs for its major contractors with a requirement for DCMA to provide a periodic report to NASA on the status of CIPR for major NASA contractors. The FAR Supplement should be revised to include guidance for the CO review of CIPR, the criteria and process for requesting special CIPRs, and any requirements for CO input to the DOD on contractors for which NASA has a major financial interest.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501432","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-00-054","Property Administration Delegations For Contractor-Held Property",9/27/2000 0:00:00,"Controls for delegating property oversight responsibility could be improved.  NASA contracting officers at Johnson (JSC) and Marshall Space Flight Centers (MSFC) did not issue delegations or ensure that DCMA properly acknowledged acceptance, modification, or rejection of the delegations for 10 contracts with more than $12 million in contractor-held property as required by the FAR and NASA FAR Supplement. Delegation issues were not resolved between JSC and Kennedy Space Center for 3 contracts with more than $1.8 billion in contractor-held property. OIG recommended the Associated Administrator for Procurement instruct procurement officials at JSC and MSFC to issue delegation letters to DCMA and obtain acceptance, modification, or rejection of those delegations for the 10 contracts noted earlier.  NASA needs to strengthen procurement controls to follow the FAR regarding property administration. Center Directors also should ensure that COs comply with the FAR and NASA FAR Supplement pertaining to property administration, and complete property delegation for the three contracts noted earlier.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504973","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-00-060","Configuration Controls In Desktop Outsourcing",9/29/2000 0:00:00,"The Jet Propulsion Lab would pay about $33 million more over a 3-year delivery period if they use the same contract vehicle rather than the Outsourcing Desktop Initiative for NASA (ODIN). NASA could avoid significant costs if ODIN is included among competitors for JPL's next outsourcing contract that provides support for the majority of NASA's desktop and intra-installation communication systems.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504972","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"testimony","Testimony: Statement of the Inspector General Before The Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics House Committee on Science",3/16/2000 0:00:00,"NASA can improve contractor oversight through use of Earned Value Management; by strengthening controls over noncompetitive procurements; and, by improving contract and subcontract oversight activities.  Audit work found weaknesses in many aspects of the procurement process that have left NASA vulnerable to crime, fraud, unreasonable prices, poor quality goods and services, and other negative mission impacts.  Given long term contracts with a limited number of major contractors contract oversight is very important and ensure that its business decisions are fully supported by analytical and factual evidence.  However, sufficient resources are not devoted to implementing the controls outlined in the FAR.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","517799","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"N/A","Management Challenges",12/1/1999 0:00:00,"Management challenges are to ensure proper staff level to institute procurement initiatives and manage increased workload; maintain adequate technical expertise for proper contractor oversight; provide controls over and monitoring of both prime and subcontractors; implement innovative procurement procedures; and, performance incentive fees. Contract management is a major management challenge without proper systems and processes to produce accurate and reliable information.  NASA metrics indicate problems in many areas such as leasing, non-competitive procurements, subcontract management, and using contractors for on-site support. Many administrative investigations indicate a need for more management attention regarding the interaction between civil servants and support service contractors.  NASA also faces risks using electronic commerce, multiple award task order contracts and the Small Business Innovative Research Program. Outsourcing brings considerable risks without proper internal controls. Recent investigations have resulted in multiple convictions for premature billing schemes, and kickbacks involving subcontractors.",0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504774","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"G-00-013","Inspection/Letter: To Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. re: OIG Review of NASA's Proposed Sole Source Procurement to the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) for Services in Support of NASA's Sun-Earth Connection Theme",6/23/2000 0:00:00,"NASA provided insufficient justification for their decision to award this contract on a sole source basis to the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (APL).  NASA's description of APL's essential capabilities related to this contract is vague and inconsistent, and there is no evidence to suggest that APL's existing capabilities are at risk.  Information gathered indicates that APL's existing and projected business base is sufficient to maintain its capabilities without NASA's proposed sole source procurement.",0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501717","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"G-00-014","Inspection: Progress Payments under Fixed-Price Construction Contracts",5/5/2000 0:00:00,"In certain instances, Contracting Officers (CO) have failed to ensure that prime contractors submit requests for progress payments according to the FAR, Payments under Fixed-Price Construction Contracts. CO's at various NASA installations are accepting and processing deficient progress payment requests that do not include required information. NASA is not being provided with information pertaining to amounts prime contractor paid to its subcontractors. CO's accept substitute invoice formats that do not provide information pertaining to amounts paid to subcontractors.  Thus, NASA CO's lack important information regarding the prime contractors' payments to subcontractors.  Timely and accurate information is critical to effective contract oversight.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62394","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-01-012","United Space Alliance Use of Professional and Consultant Services",3/16/2001 0:00:00,"NASA controls over United Space Alliance (USA) use of professional and consultant service contracts need improvement. Justifications for noncompetitive procurements of professional and consultant services were inadequate and untimely. The United Space Alliance (USA) did not maintain evidence on the nature and scope of the furnished services; maintain adequate support for decisions for noncompetitive award of service subcontracts; and prepare written justifications for the noncompetitive awards prior to initiation of the work.  As a result, NASA has reduced assurance that USA obtained the best available source or price for professional and consultant services.  The OIG recommended NASA to direct USA to maintain complete documentation on furnished consultant services and on decisions to award these service contracts noncompetitively.  NASA should also request DCAA include reviews of professional and consultant services in future incurred cost audits and that DCMA incorporate such service subcontracts into reviews of USA's purchasing system.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504970","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-01-019","Thiokol's Use of Professional and Consultant Services",3/30/2001 0:00:00,"NASA controls over Thiokol use of professional and consultant services can be improved.  Identified cases in which justifications for noncompetitive procurements of professional and consultant services were inadequate and untimely. Thiokol did not maintain adequate support for decisions to noncompetitive service subcontract awards and did not prepare justifications prior to the initiation of work. As a result, NASA has reduced assurance that Thiokol obtained the best available source or price for consultant services. The OIG recommended NASA direct Thiokol to ensure contractor personnel submit timely and acceptable justifications for noncompetitive procurements. NASA should coordinate with DCMA to include these service subcontracts in future surveillance reviews, and with DCAA for future incurred cost audits.  In addition, NASA should ask DCMA to include the allocation of consultant and professional service costs charged as indirect costs in the surveillance reviews, and to notify the NASA contracting officer when not receiving reasonable benefits in comparison to the costs allocated to NASA.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504969","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-01-027","Acquisition of the Space Station Propulsion Module",5/21/2001 0:00:00,"NASA selected Boeing Company as the sole-source contractor for the Space Station Propulsion Module (USPM) without properly documenting the justification for the noncompetitive selection.  As a result, NASA had not shown that the selection was in the best interest of the Government.  Further, design began before properly accomplishing acquisition planning and preparing project documentation.  NASA spent $97 million and 19 months of effort before it determined that the design was unacceptable.  The OIG recommended for future ISS projects, NASA establish an approved project plan; acquisition plan; and risk management plan; and, synchronize milestones for all related program and project elements.  NASA should also obtain an approved justification required by the FAR before initiating sole-source procurements on the ISS contract.",0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504968","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-01-040","Multiple-Award Contracts",9/28/2001 0:00:00,"Some NASA orders, at 2 of the 6 Centers reviewed, awarded under multiple-award contracts were not in accordance with  FAR requirements.  Johnson Space Center and Langley Research Center contracting officers issued 51 of 104 sole-source orders without obtaining competition.  Therefore, NASA had not received the benefits of competitive bids and may have paid more for goods and services than necessary.  The OIG recommended management review the propriety of multiple-award contract sole-source orders during the procurement management surveys and establish a specific competition goal for multiple-award contracts. Johnson and Langley Center Directors should direct contracting officers to fairly consider all contractors who submit bids for orders under multiple-award contracts.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504967","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-01-041","Procurement Workforce Planning",9/27/2001 0:00:00,"Due to the attrition of procurement employees through retirement, NASA does not have the assurance that it will have enough adequately trained procurement staff at NASA Centers to effectively handle procurement workload demands.  The OIG recommended the Associate Administrator for Procurement continue to pursue education, training, and development of staff to meet the required certification levels for existing staff; evaluate the ongoing results of the NASA Contracting Intern Program to determine whether changes may be necessary to increase the retention rate of interns; and, work with the Office of Federal Procurement Planning to develop procurement performance measures that may be used to evaluate and plan to meet staffing requirements.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504966","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-01-043","Information Technology Security Requirements in NASA Contracts, Grants, and Cooperative Agreements",9/28/2001 0:00:00,"NASA made progress to incorporate IT security requirements into contracts at 2 of 3 Centers reviewed, but had not included the applicable security requirements in its purchase orders, grants, and cooperative agreements.  NASA did not require their Centers to specifically review purchase orders to determine whether they were subject to the security clause or to include the IT security clause in grants.  As a result, the Agency lacks reasonable assurance of complying with requirements, and NASA's systems and information may be subject to additional security risks. The OIG recommended Centers properly identify contracts subject to the IT security clause and modify the contracts to incorporate the clause, where appropriate.  NASA should also direct Centers to include IT security requirements in purchase orders, grants, and cooperative agreements, and be subject to IT security reviews.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504965","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"testimony","Testimony: Statement of The Inspector General Before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations",3/15/2001 0:00:00,"The OIG testified of a need to establish adequate separation of the functions performed by civil servants and service support contractors, and controls are needed to reduce risks for outsourcing some IT functions.  The OIG will center future audits on outsourcing, and oversight of subcontractors. Results of audits and other reviews report problems about inadequate justifications for contractor and subcontractor noncompetitive procurements; lack of adequate market surveys, and technical analysis; improper use of support service contracts; and inadequate contract audit services.  In addition, the Office of Criminal investigations continues to investigate and prosecute those who commit procurement related crimes.",0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","517485","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"N/A","Letter: To House Majority Leader, Richard Armey--NASA Management Challenges",12/1/2000 0:00:00,"Contract management, human capital, outsourcing and oversight, and electronic commerce are management challenges.  For example, a contractor has not delivered a financial computer system needed to produce accurate and reliable management information in a timely manner to oversee procurement activities; NASA issued a stop work order on the project.  Further, significantly fewer personnel are available to oversee an increasing level of procurement activity.  In addition, DCAA and DCMA have reduced staff and have, therefore, experienced significant loss of expertise needed to provide oversight of contractors.  NASA is placing more reliance on prime contractors and other Government agencies for oversight.  Electronic procurements need internal controls, fewer paper approvals, documented support, and supervisory oversight.  Further, the number of criminal investigations involving procurement fraud has increased.  Investigations resulted in 31 convictions or civil settlements for kickbacks, civil false claims, product substitution, cost mischarging and other Major program fraud.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","532366","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"G-99-017","Inspection: Assessment of the Use of Support Service Contractors at the Glenn Research Center",1/29/2001 0:00:00,"Administration of secretarial service functions performed in-house and by contractors leaves the Center liable to violation of several government functions. Glenn Research Center should address this problem by establishing ""pools"" to clearly separate contractors from civil servant personnel performing these functions.  Where work can not be properly restructured, contracted positions should be converted to civil servant positions if necessary.  Glenn has experienced attrition of highly qualified civil servant staff in all functional areas for more than 15 years.  Restrictions on civil servant staffing levels have limited the Center's ability to hire civil servants to backfill many of these positions.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501714","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"G-00-016","Inspection: Assessment of Agencywide Use of Support Service Contractors at NASA",12/27/2000 0:00:00,"NASA should institute Agency wide policy changes to differentiate civil servants from support service contractors.  At least two NASA Centers use contractors to perform general administrative support restricted for civil servants.  Intent of several regulations may be violated by the way support service contracts are administered.  NASA needs to revise its Policy Directive, Distinguishing between Contractor and Civil Service Functions, to specify how to distinguish civil servants from contractors. In addition, procurement planning does not normally consider these issues, and statements of work normally do not contain requirements contractors identify themselves when performing functions that could be construed as Government officials. Policies on the use of such contracts should be clear and applicable to all Centers by establishing Agency wide policies and procedures that require uniform approaches to distinguishing between civil servant and contractor functions.  Training and guidance regarding proper interactions between civil servants and contractors can generally increase both groups' understanding of their respective roles.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501713","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-02-002","Restructuring the International Space Station Contract (ISS)",11/8/2001 0:00:00,"NASA did not provide adequate oversight of restructuring the ISS contract. Further, Johnson Space Center (JSC) settled Boeing requests for equitable adjustments and other potential claims without performing a sufficient analysis that proposed costs were fair and reasonable.  JSC did not adequately support the justification it prepared for waiving the FAR requirement for the contractor to submit certified cost or pricing data, and  inappropriately modified the contract fee structure by eliminating the Agency's option to recoup provisional fees paid to Boeing if the contractor's technical and cost performance is ultimately unsatisfactory. Unlike incentive fee evaluations, the award fee evaluations are subjective. The OIG recommended JSC perform adequate price analysis and properly support justifications for waivers on future modifications of the ISS contract, and the Office of Procurement perform adequate oversight of major procurement actions for the ISS contract.  JSC should assure fee pools for the ISS contract are measurable and consistent with Agency criteria or obtain a waiver for not doing so.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504955","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"G-01-027","Use of Photographic and Video Services at Kennedy Space Center",12/27/2001 0:00:00,"Wasteful duplication of Government resources occurs, infrequently, when photographers from more than one contract are on hand to take similar images of an engineering activity. Incidents occur most often when one set of contractors is tasked to provide support to the public affairs office, while other photographers or videographers are tasked to support close-out activities. Some image gathering could be consolidated to satisfy both public affairs and engineering requirements. Recommended Kennedy's Director implement a tracking process to ensure that work orders and tasks for photographic and video products and services are managed in a manner that avoids unnecessary duplication and maximizes shared use.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501490","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-02-011","International Space Station Spare Parts Costs",3/22/2002 0:00:00,"NASA has no assurance that the prices paid for $334 million of spare parts for ISS were fair and reasonable through FY2000 and may not be able to cost-effectively and competitively procure about $608 million in spare parts that may be needed over the life of the ISS on a competitive fixed-price basis. NASA did not negotiate for separately priced spare parts or develop price histories for use in purchasing additional spare parts. NASA properly justified and approved noncompetitive contract modifications.  The OIG recommended Johnson Space Center require Boeing to propose, negotiate, track, and report individual prices for ISS spare parts and establish price histories.  NASA's Assistant Administrator for Procurement should reestablish Agency procedures for acquiring spare parts.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504954","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-02-013","Lockheed Martin Space Operations' (LMSO) Use of Professional and Consultant Services",3/26/2002 0:00:00,"NASA can improve controls over LMSO professional and consultant services, and LMSO management controls did not ensure compliance with the FAR. Weakness in contract administration exist that pose a potential risk to NASA.  These contracts did not meet FAR requirements for either competition or allowability of cost.  LMSO did not prepare written justifications for noncompetitive procurement of services and did not maintain evidence on the nature and scope of furnished services, including deliverable items as analyses and reports.  As a result, NASA has reduced assurance that LMSO obtained the best available source or price, particularly in the absence of competition; and, that work was proper and did not violate law or regulations.  NASA should coordinate with DCMA and include these service subcontracts in future risk assessments and reviews of LMSO purchasing system, and that DCAA review LMSO costs in future incurred cost audits.  DCMA should require LMSO to prepare written justifications when acquiring these services without competition, and to establish procedures for obtaining professional services.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504952","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-02-014","NASA Acquisition of Services Using the Federal Supply Schedules",3/27/2002 0:00:00,"Contracting Officers (CO's) at three Centers could have used the General Services Administration (GSA) Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) more effectively to acquire services, and were not consistent in their use of the FSS to procure similar services. Also, GSA ordering procedures were not always properly followed in obtaining multiple price quotes or providing information in the Request For Quotation or Statement of Work when acquiring services through the FSS.  CO's had not been consistently trained in the proper use of the FSS.  The OIG directed to waive FAR requirements for sources when using a non-FSS source to acquire services that are available through the FSS, or use the FSS.  Training and a circular to inform CO's of GSA procedures when ordering services from the FSS was also recommended.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504951","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"N/A","Inspector General Assessment of NASA's Most Serious Management and Performance Challenges",2/4/2002 0:00:00,"Procurement continues to be a significant management challenge. The percentage of annual obligation dollars available for competition has decreased from 81 percent in FY1993 to 56 percent in FY2000. OIG audit and inspection activities identified multiple sole-source procurements not adequately justified, and a recent audit of multiple-award contracts indicated that about half of the sole-source orders reviewed did not provide for adequate competition as required by Federal and Agency procurement regulations. A series of OIG audit reports found that sole-source subcontracting by prime contractors under NASA contracts is commonplace and increases the cost to NASA.  Contract administration also continues to be a management challenge for NASA. NASA lacks adequate systems and processes to oversee procurement activities and does not produce accurate and reliable management information in a timely manner. Further, NASA faces increased contract oversight and accountability issues due primarily to the emphasis on contract consolidation and bundling, and human capital issues--NASA has experienced a 30 percent reduction in its procurement personnel between FY 1993 and February 2001.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504773","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"G-02-011","Review of Performance-Based Service Contract Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans, Final Report",6/24/2002 0:00:00,"The NASA OIG assessed NASA’s contract quality assurance surveillance activities under performance-based service contracts, focusing on the use of Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans (QASPs) as part of the contract surveillance function. The IG found several weaknesses related to NASA’s use of QASPs as part of the contract surveillance function. The findings demonstrate the need for improved development, content, and utilization of QASPs; more systematic and better documented contract surveillance, and an increased emphasis on refresher training for designated Contracting Officer’s Technical Representatives (COTRs).",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62126","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-02-018","NASA Oversight of United Space Alliance's Safety Procedures at Kennedy Space Center",6/24/2002 0:00:00,"The safety responsibilities between the contractor and NASA were clear in that NASA established all Shuttle safety requirements, the contractor implemented those requirements through the Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC), and NASA was fully responsible for the safe launch of the Shuttle. However, Kennedy’s procedures for ensuring that the contractor properly implemented those safety requirements were not the same procedures defined in the SFOC. The SFOC states that NASA is to provide direct safety oversight of all USA operations. Nevertheless, Kennedy did not provide direct safety oversight of USA’s ground operations but rather obtained insight into USA’s safety operations through surveillance and audits. Further, Kennedy did not perform any level of safety oversight for integrated logistics, a high-risk area for injuries and mishaps. Implementing a level of oversight that contradicts that required by the SFOC could lead to lapses in safety oversight, increasing the risk of harming personnel and damaging Space Shuttle hardware.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62195","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-02-019","Property Control System Analysis Reporting on Space Flight Operations Contract Subcontractors",7/8/2002 0:00:00,"The NASA Federal Acquisition Regulation (NASA FAR) describes property administration functional oversight responsibilities. The NASA FAR states that NASA contracting officers retain functional management responsibility for their contracts even when NASA uses another contract administration office, such as DCMA, to oversee NASA . The Johnson IPO did not perform required property management oversight responsibilities because 34 of the 107 required FY 2000 System Analysis reports (representing $86 million in Government property) were not obtained from DCMA for review.  The Johnson IPO stated that she did not obtain and review all the System Analysis reports during FY 2000 because of a heavy workload and insufficient staff resources and did not notify the SFOC contracting officer that all the required System Analysis reports (or waiver justifications) for SFOC subcontractors were not received. Therefore, NASA could not determine whether $86 million in Government property held by the 34 SFOC subcontractors was properly managed and accounted for.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62198","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-02-021","Contracting Issues Associated With the NASA Safety Reporting System",7/29/2002 0:00:00,"The NASA contracting officer (CO) did not terminate the NASA Safety Reporting System (NSRS) contract in accordance with laws and regulations or Agency guidance for the SBA’s 8(a) Business Development Program (8(a) program). As a result, NASA will have to take action to avoid a break in NSRS coverage until a new contract can be established.  Further, NASA’s actions are not in compliance with the Small Business Act, Title 13, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 124, and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requirements because the lack of contract termination denied 8(a) opportunities to eligible, disadvantaged small businesses. The OIG also found that NASA’s use of a cost-reimbursement contract for the initial and follow-on 8(a) contracts was not cost-effective. Consequently, NASA paid more than $9,500 a month to process one to two reports each month for the last 35 months and assumed risks that could have been shared or transferred to the contractor to lower NSRS costs.",0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62199","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-02-027","NASA's Contract Audit Follow-up System",9/30/2002 0:00:00,"The NASA contract audit follow-up system can be improved. Where NASA retained resolution and disposition authority for DCAA audit reports, NASA CO’s achieved a significantly lower net savings percentage of the DCAA-reported questioned costs than the DOD. Specifically, for 33 incurred cost, claims, and cost accounting standards audit reports closed during FY’s 1999-2001, NASA CO’s achieved net savings of only $14.9 million (19.0 percent) of the questioned costs totaling $78.6 million. For this same period and same types of reports, DOD CO’s achieved net savings of 54.4 percent of the DCAA-reported questioned costs. Also, NASA CO’s did not adequately monitor DCAA Reportable Contract Audit (RCA) reports on major NASA contractors when NASA delegated resolution and disposition authority to the DOD, and NASA’s corrective action tracking system (CATS II) did not include records for 24 sampled DCAA RCA reports for which NASA delegated resolution and disposition authority to the DOD. As a result, NASA could not ensure that audit recommendations were resolved in a timely and were not aware of the $12.5 million that DOD had sustained on major NASA contracts and programs.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62201","Tanisha"
"NASA IG","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"IG-02-030","NASA's Proposal Evaluation Process",9/30/2002 0:00:00,"NASA contracting officers at Johnson and Marshall can more effectively evaluate proposals on cost-type contracts and noncompetitive fixed-price contracts. The contracting officers used price and cost analyses in accordance with the FAR requirements but had not obtained adequate technical analyses to effectively evaluate proposed costs for 7 of 45 contracts reviewed. As a result, NASA had reduced assurance that contractors’ abilities to accomplish the technical requirements were adequately assessed or that fair and reasonable prices were obtained on the seven contracts totaling about $6.3 million.  In addition, contracting officers at Johnson issued two of three Small Business Administration (SBA) contracts without conducting adequate screening to competitively select a technically capable company from 8(a) contractors. As a result, NASA did not have adequate assurance that it received fair and reasonable prices and may have denied other potential small business offerors the opportunity to compete for procurements.",0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62203","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","Administration for Children and Families",,"A-02-98-02004","Review of Federal Nonparticipating Foster Care Costs Which the New York State Department of Family Assistance Retroactively Claimed to the Title IV-E Foster Care Program",4/24/2001 0:00:00,"The New York State Department of Family Assistance (NYSDFA) (formerly the New York State Department of Social Services) awarded a contract to the New York State Association of Counties (NYSAC) to implement and administer a Federal Revenue Maximization Project (FRMP) designed to generate increased Federal funding. According to the terms of the contract, NYSDFA was to pay NYSAC a fee contingent on the revenue generated under the FRMP.   The IG reviewed a statistical sample of 100 foster care cases, totaling $1,268,262 (Federal share $634,131), which NYSDFA retroactively claimed to the Title IV-E Foster Care program.  We found that 7 of the 100 cases reviewed contained claims that were ineligible for Federal reimbursement.  The total amount improperly claimed to the Title IV-E Foster Care program for the 7 errors was $25,372 (Federal share $12,686).",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","59430","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service",,"testimony","Testimony from HHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson,""HHS Calls on Congress to Reform Medicare Contracting Rules-Proposed Legislation is Part of Broader Improvements to Medicare.""",6/28/2001 0:00:00,"HHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson today called on Congress to enact the Bush administration's proposed legislation to begin strengthening and modernizing Medicare by opening up the program's claims-processing contracts to competitive bidding. By law, Medicare must contract with private health insurance companies to process and pay Medicare claims without needed flexibility available under other government contracts.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57227","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service",,"testimony","Testimony of Michael F. Mangano, Acting Inspector General, HHS, on Medicare Contractor Operations",6/28/2001 0:00:00,"CMS needs to be given greater flexibility in the methods it uses to select,organize,and supervise the contractors who handle the day-to-day operations of the Medicare program.This includes authorities to use entities other than insurance companies,select them competitively,pay them on other than a cost basis,organize them according to functions or benefits areas,and hold them accountable for performance.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","56922","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service",,"A-02-00-01039","Results of ""Review of Fiscal Year 2000 Medicare Error Rate At Seguros De Servicios De Salud De Puerto Rico""",7/26/2001 0:00:00,"Under contract with CMS, Triple S is a Carrier that processes Medicare claims for providers located in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. As such, Triple S is responsible for pricing covered medical items and services, making claims payments, guarding against the unnecessary use of medical services, and reporting financial activity to CMS.  The objective of  the review was to assess claims processing operations at Seguros de Servicios de Salud de Puerto Rico that contributed to the preparation of the fiscal year (FY) 2000 combined financial statements for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Specifically, the IG's sample of 680 claims identified 68 claims that did not comply with Medicare laws and regulations.  Contributing significantly to the errors noted during the course of the review was the fact that provider records did not completely and accurately support amounts reimbursed by Medicare.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","59416","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service",,"A-05-01-00037","Audit of Administrative Costs Claimed Under Parts A and B of Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled Program- Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesaota",6/4/2001 0:00:00,"The BCBSM claimed administrative costs totaling $44,629,598 during the 5-year period included in the IG's review. The IG is questioning costs of $1,037,090.The questioned costs consist of $932,052 that exceeded the budget ceiling established by HCFA for payment of an employee retention bonus and $105,038 incurred for Medicare program closeout.The claim did not comply with provisions of the Medicare contract limiting expenditures to approved budget authority and the Principles of Reimbursement for Administrative Costs that requires costs incurred for contract close out to be submitted in a closeout claim.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","59457","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service",,"A-07-01-00132","AUDIT OF THE PENSION PLAN AT A TERMINATED MEDICARE CONTRACTOR,INDEPENDENCE BLUE CROSS",2/22/2002 0:00:00,"The IG's objectives were to determine IBC's compliance with pension segmentation requirements of its Medicare contract,and to determine the amount of excess assets that should be remitted to Medicare as a result of the contract termination and Medicare segment closing.  Findings: When IBC ’s Medicare segment closed, Medicare ’s share of the excess pension assets was $2,913,129,which the IG is recommending be remitted to CMS.To determine Medicare ’s share, it was necessary to (1)establish the Medicare segment ’s initial pension assets as of July 1,1986, (2)update the segment assets to September 30,1997,and (3)calculate the actuarial accrued liability for accrued benefits for the segment,and the excess Medicare assets.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","60195","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service",,"A-05-01-00023","Audit of Administrative Costs Claimed Under Parts A & B of the Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled Programs -- AdminaStar Federal, Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana",1/17/2002 0:00:00,"This audit covered costs claimed by AdminaStar Federal (AdminaStar) on final administrative cost proposals for Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999.  Costs claimed totaled $193,455,170: $81,763,259 for Part A, $71,399,257 for Part B, and $40,292,654 for durable medical equipment regional carrier (DMERC) operations.  Of the total claimed, the IG recommended a financial adjustment of $4,694,863: $2,171,529 for Part A, $1,602,931 for Part B, and $920,403 for DMERC operations.  The IG also found that information to support the prior approval of leases and the volume of claims used to compute complementary credits was not available.  The IG recommended that AdminaStar provide the necessary documentation to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services for review.  Adjustments to the Final Administrative Cost Proposals should be made if necessary.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","60197","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service",,"A-03-01-00017","Summary Results of Review of the Administrative Cost Component of the Adjusted Community Rate Proposal at Ten Medicare+Choice Organizations for the 2000 Contract Year",11/21/2002 0:00:00,"As demonstrated in a previous review (A-03-98-00046), this final report points out that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) methodology for developing adjusted community rate proposals (ACRP) (developed by managed care organizations (MCO) to claim administrative costs) still results in Medicare paying a disproportionate share of such costs. the IG's audits of the ACRPs prepared by 10 MCOs in nine States showed that $97.1 million of base year costs would have been recommended for disallowance had the MCOs been required to follow the Medicare program’s general principle of paying only reasonable costs. Since there is no statutory or regulatory authority governing allowability of costs in the ACRP process, the MCOs were not required to adhere to this principle. As recommended in the IG's prior report, the IG believes legislation is needed that would require MCOs to follow Medicare’s general principle of paying only reasonable costs.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","60199","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service",,"A-04-99-05561","Audit of Medicare Administrative Costs Claimed by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Florida for Fiscal Years 1995 Through 1998",7/31/2002 0:00:00,"The objective of this review was to evaluate the reasonableness and allowability of costs claimed for reimbursement by the contractor on its final administrative cost proposals for the period October 1, 1994 through September 30, 1998.  The IG identified $5,158,255 of unallowable charges to the Medicare program and set aside $104,836,580 for the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) resolution.  The IG also identified several areas where improvements in the contractor's internal controls and cost allocation system are needed.  The IG recommended that the contractor reduce its claim by $5,158,255,  provide documentation to the CMS contracting officer to support the allowability and allocability of the $104,836,580 of costs set aside, and implement various procedural recommendations to ensure that administrative costs charged to Medicare are allowable. ",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62057","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service",,"A-03-00-00003","Review of Medicare Part B Administrative Costs Fiscal Years 1995 - 1997, Highmark, Inc., Camp Hill, Pennsylvania",4/1/2002 0:00:00,"This final report covers the audit of $299,169,893 in Medicare Part B administrative costs claimed by Highmark, Inc, d/b/a HGSAdministrators for the period October 1, 1994 through September 30, 1997.  The IG identified and recommended for adjustment $1,224,793 in costs that were either unallowable, unreasonable, or unapproved.  The IG also questioned $640,123 in unsupported costs for which documentation supporting the expense was either not provided or proved inadequate to determine the nature, type, reasonableness or necessity of the expense.  The auditors did not render an opinion on reported Medigap credits totaling $478,418 because of the significant amount of unsupported billings.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62565","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service",,"A-06-01-00044","Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas: Audit of Medicare Final Administrative Cost Proposals For the Period October 1, 1998 through September 30,1999",4/16/2002 0:00:00,"Conrad and Associates, L.L.P., certified public accountants, under contract with HHS/OIG, performed a financial and compliance audit of expenditures claimed by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas (BCBS) related to administration of the Medicare Part A and Part B programs for the period October 1, 1998 through September 30, 1999.  BCBS was unable to provide supporting documentation for various transactions selected for testing.  As a result, expenditures totaling $458,377 were not adequately supported.  The self funded insurance program costs were overstated by $528,745.  BCBS imputed $820,796 as an expense to the Final Administrative Cost Proposals for return on investment.  The contractor used facilities capital employed as its base in applying the cost of money rate in calculating the expense.  However, documentation of facilities capital employed was not maintained or provided for our review.  BCBS did not dispute the questioned costs as presented but reserved the right to comment on this issue at a later point in time.  BCBS stated that the use of depreciation expense does not reflect the asset acquisition or disposals that have an effect on the return on investment computation.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62566","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service",,"A-07-01-02086","Audit of Medicare Administrative Costs Claimed by General American Life Insurance Company for the Period October 1, 1993 Through December 31, 1999",4/3/2002 0:00:00,"The purpose of this review, performed by the certified public accounting firm of Carmichael, Brasher, Tuvell & Company, was to determine whether administrative costs claimed by the General American Life Insurance Company (GALIC) to administer Part B of Medicare for the period October 1, 1993 through December 31, 1999 were reasonable, allocable, and allowable. The auditors determined that GALIC had not established adequate systems for internal control, accounting and reporting of indirect costs, fringe benefits, miscellaneous costs, and termination costs. The GALIC could not provide sufficient documentation for these costs and the auditors could not determine the allowability of such costs through other auditing procedures. As a result, the auditors questioned and recommended for disallowance about $42.8 million of administrative costs claimed over the audit perio",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62692","Tanisha"
"Justice IG","Immigration and Naturalization Service",,"97-05","Immigration and Naturalization Service Contracting for Detention Space",1/1/1997 0:00:00,"The method of reimbursement for the Seattle, WA, detention facility was not based on the number of aliens in detention and would not be cost effective if the facility was not adequately utilized. The IG found that the effective rate for the Seattle, WA detention facilities operated by contractors appeared to be reasonable when compared to other facilities. However, the effective rates for FY 1994, FY 1995, and the first 8 months of FY 1996 did not include fixed and variable facilities costs because the contract with Esmor, Inc. required that INS absorb fixed and variable costs related to the building. The IG could not determine the effect these fixed and variable building costs had on the effective rate for the Seattle, WA, facility because INS could not provide us with these costs. The cost effectiveness of a flat daily rate contract is determined by the daily detainee rate. The contract with Esmor, Inc. would not be cost effective if the number of detained aliens dropped significantly. If the average detention rate dropped to 122 aliens per day, the effective daily detention rate would be $74.27, based on the current contracted flat rate of $9,061, and would exceed the rates for the other four detention facilities.",1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","56793","Tanisha"
"Justice IG","Department of Justice","The audit was conducted at multiple DOJ offices.","98-23","Asset Forfeiture Program Management Letter - Fiscal Year 1996",9/1/1998 0:00:00,"Procurement procedures to ensure competitive bidding for vendor services were not in place at two U.S. Marshal Service district offices and a contract management review of a vendor services contract had not been performed at one district office.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57113","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"N/A","Semi annual Report to Congress 4/1/00 - 9/30/00",9/30/2000 0:00:00,"The IG noted that the Government entered into 6 settlement agreements in which companies agreed to pay a total of $35 million to resolve their potential civil liabilities under the False Claims Act. The IG noted that GSA used Multipel Award Contracts (MACS)  in purchasing goods and services for its Federal TechnologyService (FTS),  Public Building Service (PBS), and Federal Supply Services (FSS). The IG observed that FTS' contract award processes did not provide the same opportunity for all MAC contractors to be considered for an order. The IG found that in the case of PBS, the MACS used for construction work wwas inconsistent and opportunities to provide less costly and higher quality services were not being maximiized. The IG noted that 65% of orers that were sampled were not supported by documentation reflecting that vendors were provided a fair opportunity to compete for these orders",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61749","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A010050/B/3/F01016","Interim Report Audit of the contract Administration of the Pegasys Project by the Office of the Chief Financial Officer",7/31/2001 0:00:00,"Contracting process in pegasys project did not use performance based contract controls needed to ensure the timely and cost effective development and implementation of pegasys",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61585","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A001084/T/W/Z01005","FTS Implementation of the Metroploitan Area Acquisition Program",4/11/2001 0:00:00,"Solicit for additional contractors in other locations to provide price reductions in telephone service.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"Denver hard copy","61586","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A000897/F/3/V01002","Limited audit of the Federal supply Services (FSS) Contracting For Services Under Multiple Award Schedule Contracts,",1/9/2001 0:00:00,"FSS complied with the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). FSS used MAS properly in accordance with FAR",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61587","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A010007/P/5R01023","Audit of the Public Buldings Service Procurement Workforce Education Requirements and Workforce Information System",9/18/2001 0:00:00,"Need for a comprehensive procurement workforce planning. Lack of agreement with some education requirements. Number of people not meeting requirements. Accurate information on workforce planning not readily available.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61588","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A010186/F/6/V01008","Limited Review Of the Award and Administration of the Contract Number GS-25F-6072D Eastman Kodak Company",7/31/2001 0:00:00,"contract file documentation does not substantiate that the government obtained fair and reasonable proces for the contract.  The government's interests are not adequately protected due to contracting personnel modifying a contract clause",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61592","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A000929/P/9/R01010","Audit of PBS Procurements Pacific Rim Region",3/15/2001 0:00:00,"PBS paying utility taxes and surcharges when it should not, due to government exemption. PBS should develop competitive procurement procedures.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61593","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A010112/P/2/R01009","Review of Service Contracts Awarded By the Federal Protective Service's Central Office",3/9/2001 0:00:00,"Contracts were not awarded in accordance with the applicable procurement regulations.  Contract files contained anomalies that raise questions concerning the overall proprietyof procurements..  Some contracts appeared to constitute personal service contracts, which are prohibited by federal regulation.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61594","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A001061/F/9/V01003","Management Control Review Of Contract Management Division Federal Supply Service Pacific Rim Region",1/31/2001 0:00:00,"FSS visits to contractors to ensure contractor compliance with the reporting and remittance requirements for the FSS Schedules Program's  industrial funding fees will have to be improved.  It was found that visits to those contractors reporting a large volume of sales results in greater recoveries.  Contractor visits facilitate enforcement of the reporting and remittance requirements and assist in GSA improving its relationship with the contractor.  Over 57% of large contractors are not being reviewed.  In addition, there was concern about a large amount of time and resources being used to review contractors with little or no recent history of substantial sales volume.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61596","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A000935/P/3/R01007","Audit of GSA's Competitive Electric Procurements and Controls Over Utility Bill Accuracy in Regions 1, 2, and 3",1/11/2001 0:00:00,"Appropriateness of utility surchages not reviewed.  Annual rate reviews not being conducted in accordance with applicable FAR.  GSA not in compliance with post-payment examination proposal approved by GAO relative to the agency's utility's bills",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61597","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A001053/P/5/W01002","Review of Elevator Maintenance Contract Federal Building US Courthouse,Indianapolis, Indiana southern Illinois/Indiana Property Management Center, Springfield , Illinois",12/13/2000 0:00:00,"Onsite inspection and interviews with building management revealed that that the elevator maintenance services contract was not performed in accordance with the terms of the contract.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61599","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A001114/P/1/R01001","Management Consulting Review Assessment of Contractor Performance Boston Courthouse Management Associates",11/17/2000 0:00:00,"IG concluded that Boston Contracting Management Services (BCMA), the contractor, sufficiently met basic contract requirements.  However, IG raised conerns on performance issues dealing with Quality Assurance and performance standards for mechanical operations and maintenance, burdensome amount of papaerwork for monthly submission, use of additional private event  proceeds to Fund CourtHouse and Communnity related Event Security cost",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61600","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A000960/T/F/Z01001","Audit of Federal Technology Service Information Technology Solutions Internal Controls",11/2/2000 0:00:00,"Certification of receipt of goods and services were not always obtained before authorizing payment thus affecting reconciliation of financial records by regions.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61602","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"N/A","Updated Assessment of GSA's Most Serious Challenges from December 1999 to Nov. 2000",11/1/2000 0:00:00,"Various contracts looked at for specific GSA entitiesand found to have weaknesses in obtaining best value, reasonable prices, services received , performance based  deliverables, price incentives, and negotiating fair and reasonable prices.",0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57755","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"N/A","Semi- annual Report to Congress 10/00- 3/31/01",3/31/2001 0:00:00,"The IG noted, however, a need for improvement in the amount of review/supervision given to work conducted by contractors who prepare GSA to analyze offers and ultimately award competitive.especially when the work is to be used in analysis of offers of potential contracts. Recent reviews by the IG's office have indicated some cause for concern that GSA is not getting what it pays for. GSA representatives were not physically inspecting the work performed by contractors While these contracts were nominally written to require contractors to prepare preventive maintenance schedules, lacking appropriate oversight by GSA, some work does not get done. Multiple Award Contract Schedules (MACS) were not being porperly administered in terms of performing  pricing analyses for Most Favored Customer (MFC) staus to obtain the greatest value for the dollar.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57831","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"N/A","Semi- annual Report to Congress 4/01- 9/30/01",9/30/2001 0:00:00,"MACs not being properly  administered to obtain the best value for the government.  For example, FSS not consistently negotiating Most Favored Customer (MFC) pricing for photocopier and IT services. FSS Cos are not adhereing to MAS price fundamentals of doing cost comparisons to ensure value pricing is received. Payments are being authorized for construction contracts before thorough and final inspections are performed. At some Property Management Centers (PMCs), GSA did not receive services it contracted for",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57829","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"N/A","Special Report on  FSS' MAS pricing practices",8/24/2001 0:00:00,"The Federal Supply Service is not consistently negotiating Most-Favored Customer Pricing. Price Negotiations Under two of three Multiple Award Schedules examined do not consistently achieve Most–Favored Customer Pricing.  Many Multiple Award Schedule Contract extensions are accomplished without adequate Price Analysis. Extensions Accomplished with Very Little Negotiation or Price Analysis.  Preaward audits are not being used effectively to negotiate better Multiple Award Schedule Prices. Preaward Audits requested on MAS contract actions have decreased significantly in recent years",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57791","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A010232/P/5/R02009","Audit of the Great Lakes Region Public Buildings Service Lease Award Procedures",3/28/2002 0:00:00," Evaluation proceudres contained errors, contracting officer exceeded warant authority, and limited evidence was available of the assessmentof the physical security of space being leased.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61603","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"N/A","Semi annual report to Congress 10/01/01-3/31/02 (identified propcurement and leasing as management challenges)",3/31/2002 0:00:00,"NIB and NISH believe vendors are not blocking the sale of equivalent commercial items to those that NISH and NIB supply to vendors, thus hueting NIB and NISH sales. Vendors complain of low demnad and increased costs for managing JWOD.  IG recommended that FSS needs to analyze product sales information",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"Denver docs","58814","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A020057/P/4/R02018","Audit of Southeast Sunbelt Region 4 Federal Protective Service's Guard Payment Procedures",9/17/2002 0:00:00,"The region 4 ordering process for additional guard service's is not followed. Region 4 is not paying for production and additional guard services in a timely manner.  The contract administration workload is overwhelming which contributes to poor guard payment administration. Region 4 has significant challenges issuing contracts, administering contracts and paying contractors.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61720","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A010230/P/5/R02023","Audit of The Public Buildings Service Great Lakes Region North Central states Property Management Center",9/30/2002 0:00:00,"The North Central Property Management Center (PMC) did not effectively perform its contract administration duties and assure that the quality of goods and services received is what the government paid for. Exampl;es: poor quality control in service contracts, obtaining personal services contracts improperly",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61722","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A010258/P/6/R02012","Review of Procurements Made by the Denver Federal Center Service Center",7/29/2002 0:00:00,"Procurements made by purchase (credit) cards identified improper purchases and missing documentation..  Fair and reasonable pricing determinations were inadequate and other required contract file documentation was either deficient or non-existent.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"Denver hard copy","61723","Tanisha"
"General Services Admin IG","General Services Administration",,"A010204/F/H/V02007","Audit of FSS' Contractor Responsibility Determinations",4/23/2002 0:00:00,"More can be done to ensure that the determinations derived for selecting Multiple Award Schedule (MAS ) contractors are conssitent, complete, and fully supported. Attention should be focused on improving core analysis of relevant offeror information.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","61725","Tanisha"
"Transportation IG","Department of Transportation",,"R3-CG-7-005","Report on Oil Spill Cleanup Procurements, U.S. Coast Guard",4/18/1997 0:00:00,"The Coast Guard policies and procedures for monitoring contractor performance were effective. The IG found internal controls for monitoring activities of the oil spill cleanup services contractors were sufficient to ensure oil spill cleanups were completed in an effective manner.  However, the Coast Guard needs to improve its policies, procedures, and practices for (i) procurement of oil spill cleanup services and (ii) recovery of oil spill cleanup costs from responsible parties.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","60671","Tanisha"
"Transportation IG","Department of Transportation",," AV-1998-147","Federal Contract Tower Program",5/18/1998 0:00:00,"The IG found that, not all contract towers were staffed according to contract staffing plans and FAA paid for air traffic control services not delivered by the contractors.  Although the IG found the quality of service between FAA-operated towers and contract towers was comparable, FAA should establish procedures to periodically review staffing levels at contract towers.  Closer monitoring of staffing levels is necessary because staffing levels are based on contractor-prepared staffing plans and contract towers are staffed with fewer controllers than FAA-operated towers.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57377","Tanisha"
"Transportation IG","Department of Transportation",,"AV-1998-120","Administration of Security Guard Contracts",4/17/1998 0:00:00,"In a follow-up to the IG's 1991 audit, the IG found that FAA had not corrected deficiencies in the administration of security guard contracts. Specifically, contractors did not: 1) conduct pre-employment suitability investigations; 2) obtain written certifications that the guards attended FAA-approved firearm training and that they demonstrated proficiency with their assigned weapon; and 3) obtain physical fitness certifications on guards.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57442","Tanisha"
"Transportation IG","Department of Transportation",,"MA-1998-060","Procurement Activities Maintenance and Logistics Command Atlantic U.S.Coast Guard",1/15/1998 0:00:00,"The IG reviewed 64 contracts, purchase orders, and blanket purchase agreements, totaling about $24.5 million, for Fiscal Year (FY) 1995 and the first quarter of FY 1996. The IG also selected 30 contract modifications, totaling about $951,000.The audit focused on contracts over $100,000 awarded by the Naval EngineeringDivision, Civil Engineering Division, and Finance Division.  The IG did not review pollution response contracts because those contracts were audited separately. The IG found the MLCA complied with Federal, DOT, and Coast Guard regulations involving contract award procedures.  However, the IG identified deficiencies in the administration of procurements involving use of blanket purchase agreements,authorization and inspection of contract work, closeout and deobligation of contract funds, and designation of individuals authorized to certify fund availability.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57469","Tanisha"
"Transportation IG","Department of Transportation",,"FE-1999-131","Inactive Obligations",9/27/1999 0:00:00,"DOT and its Operating Administrations had recorded obligations totaling $51.2 billion as of March 31,1999.Based on computer inquiries, the IG identified about 63,000 obligations,totaling $5.1 billion,that had no activity within 18 months.In a joint effort with the Operating Administrations, the IG identified $672 million of recorded obligations that no longer represented valid financial liabilities.The unneeded obligations existed because regular reviews of obligations were not being performed.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57671","Tanisha"
"Transportation IG","Department of Transportation",,"TW-1999-031","Top Ten Management Issues Department of Transportation",12/9/1998 0:00:00," Key issues include: Strengthening internal controls to ensure adequate management and oversight of the infusion of substantial additional Federal funds for surface infrastructure projects,preventing fraud,embezzlement,and abuse of funds; ensuring the development of sound financial plans for high-cost transportation infrastructure projects, Promoting the use of cost-saving techniques such as value engineering,design- build procurements,and owner-controlled insurance programs, monitoring major on-going infrastructure projects concerning current costs,work completed,and potential financial and schedule.  As a result of these reviews, the IG identified lessons learned and best practices that offer opportunities for cost-savings in future large infrastructur projects,including the use of value engineering,the design-build contracting approach,owner-controlled insurance programs,and the need for a sound financial plan.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57745","Tanisha"
"Transportation IG","Department of Transportation",,"AV-1999-094","Expanding FAA's Contract Tower Program",5/4/1999 0:00:00,"The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) contract tower program has been extremely successful in providing air traffic services to low activity airports at lower costs than the agency could otherwise provide. FAA’s current contract tower program saves the agency about $250,000 per tower annually. In light of the program’s success, Congress last year directed FAA to conduct a study to determine if additional savings could be achieved by expanding the contract tower program to other FAA-operated air traffic control towers “without radar capability.” FAA currently operates 70 former level II and III visual flight rules air traffic control towers (towers that are not equipped for instrument flight operations). FAA has tasked a work group from the Air Traffic Division to conduct the required study and expects it to be complete by the end of May 1999.  The IG is concerned, however, that the work group has narrowly defined the congressional direction to study air traffic control towers “without radar capability” and is only reviewing 14 former level II and III visual flight rules towers. This is happening because the work group has defined certain visual monitors used in 56 of the 70 former level II and III towers as radar equipment, thus excluding those towers from consideration in the study. The IG does not agree with the decision to exclude the 56 towers and is recommending that FAA expand the scope of the study to consider the costs and benefits of contracting out all visual flight rules towers.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","60673","Tanisha"
"Transportation IG","Department of Transportation",,"AV-2000-127","Technical Support Services Contract: Better Management Oversight and Sound Business Practices Are Needed",9/28/2000 0:00:00,"In response to requests from Senators John McCain and Wayne Allard, the Office of Inspector General reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) contract administration oversight on the $875 million Technical Support Services Contract (TSSC). The IG found that FAA has not exercised effective management oversight or followed its own guidelines on TSSC to ensure that support services are efficiently meeting FAA requirements and are cost-effectiveTechnical Support Services Contract: Better Management Oversight and Sound Business Practices Are Needed",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57350","Tanisha"
"Transportation IG","Department of Transportation",,"MA-2000-096","Report on Ready Reserve Force Ship Managers' Contracts",5/12/2000 0:00:00,"This report presents the results of the IG's audit of Ready Reserve Force (RRF) Ship Managers’ Contracts. The IG's objective was to evaluate the Maritime Administration’s (MARAD) procedures and controls relating to the requirements, specifications, award, and administration of the ship managers’ contracts. This audit was initiated during a joint investigation by the Department of Transportation, Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Defense (DOD). A sharp contrast exists between MARAD ’s implementation of procedures and controls for awarding ship managers ’ contracts and its procedures and controls for administering ship managers ’ contracts and general agency agreements.. The IG found MARAD has not fully adhered to its procedures and practices for administering the ship managers ’ contracts and general agency agreements..Specifically,MARAD has not followed existing procedures to ensure that payments to general agents are for actual costs incurred.MARAD ’s Central and Western Regions paid $63.7 million during FYs 1998 and 1999 to general agents without documentation that costs were incurred.By making funds available to general agents before subcontractor payments are due or services are rendered, the IG estimates that the Government incurred approximately $150,000 in interest costs because funds were transferred from the United States Treasury prematurely.",1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57366","Tanisha"
"Transportation IG","Department of Transportation",,"FI-2000-125","Inactive Obligations on Contracts",9/25/2000 0:00:00,"DOT and its Operating Administrations record obligations on contracts in the Departmental Accounting and Financial Information System.Based on computer inquiries, the IG identified about 4,500 contractual obligations totaling about $143 million.These obligations on contracts had no activity within the last 36 months.In a joint effort with the Operating Administrations, the IG identified about $35.4 million of inactive obligations on contracts that no longer represented valid financial liabilities.The inactive obligations on contracts occurred because contracting officers generally were not reviewing obligations on an annual basis and were not closing contracts as quickly as possible.Timely deobligation of unneeded funds could make funds available for other purposes or return to the United States Treasury.DOT agreed with the IG's results.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57747","Tanisha"
"Transportation IG","Department of Transportation",,"AV-2000-079","Contract Towers: Observations on FAA's Study of Expanding the Program",4/12/2000 0:00:00,"The IG's review answered two objectives. The first objective was to determine if previously identified concerns regarding staffing at contract towers have been corrected. The second objective was to evaluate the accuracy and completeness of FAA’s study of expanding the Contract Tower Program to ensure all relevant costs and benefits were appropriately identified and considered. The IG found that contract towers continue to provide services that are comparable to the quality and safety of FAA-operated towers. Users remain supportive of the Program and previously identified staffing issues have been addressed. The IG also found that FAA’s study did not fully consider several key factors of expanding the Program that should be further analyzed and reported to Congress. The IG is recommending that FAA revise its draft study of expanding the Contract Tower Program to provide Congress a better perspective of the feasibility, costs and benefits of expanding the Program.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","60676","Tanisha"
"Transportation IG","Department of Transportation",,"FI-2001-057","Report on E-Mail System Replacement Contracts, FRA",5/3/2001 0:00:00,"This report identified that FRA used a flawed criterion to justify noncompetitive contract awards of $760,000 for replacing the FRA e-mail system. The IG found that FRA procurement staff lacked the necessary understanding of information technology services for identifying competing sources, and FRA did not check the prospective vendor's financial qualifications prior to contract award. Recommendations are to: (1) terminate the contract or, if deemed not feasible, resolicit for competition at the end of the 1-year base period, (2) enhance knowledge of IT services among procurement personnel, and (3) perform additional qualification checks before future contract awards. FRA did not agree to terminate the contract for the convenience of the Federal Government, but agreed to obtain competition at the end of the base period, and disagreed with the two other recommendations. The IG asked FRA to reconsider its position.",0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57493","Tanisha"
"Transportation IG","Department of Transportation",,"CC-2001-112 (Temporary Report)","Management Oversight Issues",3/8/2001 0:00:00,"Monitoring Contract Expenditures. The IG found that most contracts (1)were closed without independent audits, (2)were not supported with annual certified contractor incurred cost proposals, (3)were not properly adjusted during contract performance for changes in billing rates,and (4)were awarded without determining whether the contractors'accounting systems were adequate to handle cost-reimbursable contracts.In short, the IG  saw little evidence of review of the amounts billed by contractors. The IG's work on a diverse set of FAA acquisitions shows that FAA also needs to strengthen contract oversight.In some cases, the IG found that the contractor prepared the “independent ” Government cost estimate or estimates were not prepared at all. The IG also found that FAA needs to analyze variances between agency and contractor cost estimates to ensure costs are fair and reasonable. As directed by this Committee,greater use of the Defense Contract Audit Agency for assessing costs is also needed to protect the Government ’s interest",0,0,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57748","Tanisha"
"Transportation IG","Department of Transportation",,"CC-2001-089","Management Oversight Issues",2/14/2001 0:00:00,"The IG's work on a diverse set of FAA acquisitions shows that FAA also needs tostrengthen contract oversight.In some cases, the IG found that the contractorprepared Government cost estimates or estimates were not prepared at all.FAA needs to make greater use of earned value management techniques andcost controls (cost ceilings).In addition,FAA needs to analyze variances between agency and contractor cost estimates to ensure costs are fair andreasonable.Greater use of the Defense Contract Audit Agency for assessing costs is also needed to protect the Governments interest.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57749","Tanisha"
"Transportation IG","Department of Transportation",,"PT-2001-017","Top Ten Management Issues Department of Transportation",1/18/2001 0:00:00,"DOT contracting officers are closing out cost reimbursable contracts without independent audits and with minimal oversight. The IG found little evidence of review on the amounts being billed by contractors.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57622","Tanisha"
"Transportation IG","Department of Transportation",,"FI-2001-018","Closeout and Payment Processes for Cost-Reimbursable Contracts",1/23/2001 0:00:00,"The IG found DOT was not properly administering closeout and payment of cost-reimbursable contracts. The IG also found that DOT did not close contracts in a timely manner, resulting in funds remaining obligated on completed contracts for as long as 12 years. As a result, DOT had little assurance that contractors actually incurred the $294 million on the 448 contracts that were not subjected to independent audits and internal desk audits. The IG's work has identified five areas of DOT business practices that the IG thinks rise to the level of the agency's top management challenges.They are:.financial accountability;.timeliness of rulemaking;.oversight of contract costs and closeouts;.implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA);. administrative issues concerning space requirements for a new DOT headquarters building and the Transportation Administrative Service Center (TASC)role in providing administrative support.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57664","Tanisha"
"Transportation IG","Department of Transportation",,"AV-2002-084","Acquisition of the Weather and Radar Processor, FAA",2/28/2002 0:00:00,"The IG reviewed FAA’s progress with acquiring the Weather and Radar Processor (WARP), which will give meteorologists and air traffic controllers more accurate and reliable information to lessen the effects of bad weather. The IG found that FAA has experienced significant problems managing the development and deployment of WARP on controller displays—mostly due to human factors and technical problems. The IG also found the program’s current cost baseline is not realistic and the schedule is at risk. Since 1995, estimated program costs have increased from $227.8 million to $276.8 million. The IG recommended that before WARP receives additional funding FAA provide a credible cost and schedule baseline, reflecting efforts to resolve the remaining human factors and technical problems.",0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57473","Tanisha"
"Transportation IG","Department of Transportation",,"N/A","Semiannual Report to the Congress, April 2001-Sept. 30, 2001",10/1/2001 0:00:00,"Electronic Mail System Replacement May 3 THE FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION (FRA) awarded a $760,000 contract to US internetworking (USi) to replace its electronic mail system. FRA selected USi without competition after confirming it was the sole application service provider (ASP) on the General Services Administration (GSA) schedule. The IG concluded the selection criterion was flawed. There are no industry standards or certifica-tion programs for ASPs; rather, it is up to service providers to decide whether they want Government  to be identified in the industry or on the GSA schedule as an ASP. Other GSA-approved e-mail service providers that did not identify themselves as ASPs were capable of providing the services required. Therefore, FRA’s use of ASP as a criterion to justify a noncompetitive contract award to USi was flawed and inappropriately excluded other vendors from consideration. The IG recommended that FRA terminate the contract with USi at the end of one year, enhance the capability of procurement personnel to bet-ter understand information technology, and review the financial reliability of prospective contractors on the GSA schedule before awarding future contracts.",0,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57683","Tanisha"
"Transportation IG","Department of Transportation",,"FI-2002-092","Oversight of Cost-Reimbursable Contracts",5/8/2002 0:00:00,"The IG's audit report determined that FAA is not properly administering payment and closeout of cost-reimbursable contracts in accordance with acquisition regulations and guidance. The IG found that contracting officers were deficient in how they managed contracts from the time of award to closeout.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","60489","Tanisha"
"Transportation IG","Department of Transportation",,"FI-2002-089","Report on Information Technology Omnibus Procurement Program (ITOP), DOT",4/15/2002 0:00:00,"The IG found no departmental oversight to ensure adequate competition before awarding work. While agencies select only from prequalified contractors, this should not prevent competition among these contractors. About 30 percent of the ITOP task order amounts the IGreviewed were awarded based on sole-source or single bids. Another 40 percent were awarded to incumbents based on best values and not to the lowest bidder.",0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","60497","Tanisha"
"Transportation IG","Department of Transportation",,"AV-2002-068","Audit Report on Subcontracting Issues of the Contract Tower Program",12/14/2001 0:00:00,"The Contract Tower Program has a proven record of providing cost-effective services that are comparable to the quality and safety of FAA-operated towers. While FAA™s decision to allow subcontracted operations at several contract tower locations has not adversely impacted safety or service, it is important to note that this was a recent decision, and it is too early to tell the potential long term impacts of the program. At the time of the IG's review, 17 of the 22 locations operated under subcontracts for less than 1 year. While the IG is not making any recommendations, given the inherent risks of subcontracting operations in any program, the IG encourages FAA to continue closely monitoring subcontract tower operations.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","89369","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","OIG Partnership plan (Federal/State joint audit)",,"CIN:A-10-96-OOOO4","AUDIT OF TRAINING CONTRACT COSTS CLAIMED FOR FEDERAL REIMBURSEMENT BY THE WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES",9/4/1997 0:00:00,"The Department of Social and Health Services claimed Federal reimbursement of $5.6 millionfor unallowable costs relating to staff training contracts with performance periods during the period July 1,1989 through June 30,1995.The unallowable costs related to six contracts with Western Washington University,which was the largest external resource utilized for the staff training during our audit period.The IG found that the State (i)used unallowable third-party contributions to meet the matching requirements under certain Federal programs, (ii)claimed costs for WWU employees in excess of actual costs incurred,(iii)claimed &-allowable costs for facilities,eq~pment,and other miscellaneous items,and (iv)did not always properly allocate training costs between federally participating and nonparticipating programs.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","58335","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service",,"A-05-97-00005","Audit of Administrative Costs Claimed Under Parts A &B of the Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled Program -Associated Insurance Companies,Inc.,Indianapolis,Indiana",2/6/1998 0:00:00,"The audit covered the costs claimed by Associated Insurance Companies (AIC)on final administrative cost proposals for Fiscal Years 1994 through 1995.Costs audited included Medicare Part A,Part B,and durable medical equipment claims (DMERC).  The IG's audit results show that a financial adjustment of $2,542,067 ($525,962 for Part A, $975,239 for Part B,and $1,040,866 for DMERC)is needed to reduce the claimed costs. Some examples of the reasons the adjustments are necessary are because Associated: understated complementary insurance credits by $934,382, charges to complementary insurers did not include cost allocations from all cost centers that supported claims processing activities.claimed executive salary increases of $182,337 which exceeded the average increases for comparable positions,as measured by the Federal Bureau of Labor Statistics, charged pension costs of $46,388 to Medicare based on accrual accounting entries instead of actual cash contributions, charged $153,324 of deferred compensation costs to Medicare based on accrual accounting entries instead of actual cash contributions. An additional $240,733 was charged for premiums on employee insurance policies which listed the company as beneficiary.claimed $76,550 of indirect cost allocations that were for non-Medicare related costs.An additional $449,212 were for estimated costs that were claimed that exceeded actual costs.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","59448","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service",,"A-01-98-00513","REVIEW OF THE ANTHEM BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF CONNECTICUT FISCAL INTERMEDIARY ’S COMPLIANCE WITH MEDICARE LAWS AND REGULATIONS",6/21/1999 0:00:00,"The primary objective of the IG's review was to determine whether Anthem paid for services which were: (1) furnished by certified Medicare providers to eligible beneficiaries; (2) reimbursed in accordance with Medicare laws and regulations; and (3) medically necessary, accurately coded, and sufficiently documented in the beneficiaries' medical records.Through detailed medical and audit review of a statistical selection of 50 representing 171 provider claims processed for payment by Anthem, the IG identified 28 improper Medicare payments totaling $65,917 of $635,823 reviewed.  The IG's analysis showed that providers were reimbursed by Medicare for services which were: not medically necessary ($54,188); insufficiently documented to support the services billed ($15.343): inappropriately coded resulting in under-payments ($8.382)and overpayments ($3,987);and not in compliance with various Medicare regulations resulting in overpayments ($2,426).and under-payments ($645).",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","59426","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service",,"A-05-98-00042","Audit of Administrative costs Claimed Under Parts A&B of the Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled Program- Administar Federal, Indianapolis, Indiana",9/7/1999 0:00:00,"The audit objective was to determine whether Medicare Parts A,B,and DMERC administrative costs claimed by AdminaStar on its “Final Administrative Cost Proposals ”(FACP)were reasonable,allocable,and allowable.Overstated pension costs by $1,652,865 because the costs were based on accrual accounting entries instead of actual cash contributions.  Overstated return on investment costs by $447,414because higher rates of return were used in their calculations than actually earned in their investment portfolio.claimed executive salary increasesof $398,132 which exceeded the average increases for comparable positions,as measured by the Federal Bureau of  Labor Statistics Employment Cost Index. claimed $264,276 of deferred compensation costs based on accrual accounting entries instead of actual cash contributions.overstated cost allocations by $183,665",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","59437","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service",,"A-01-97-00529","Review of Administrative Costs-Medicare Parts A and B- Aetna Life Insurance Company",10/21/1998 0:00:00,"The objectives of the IG's review were to determine (1)whether Aetna has established effective systems of internal control,accounting and reporting for administrative costs and (2)the allowability of costs claimed for the period October 1994 through September 1997. The IG identified $2,906,486 ($1,335,545 -Part A and $1,570,941 -Part B)which consist of unallowabIe charges to Medicare program as well as the net effect of related incentive payments on the Final Administrative Cost Proposals (FACPs)for the period under review.The issues related to these unallowable costs and adjustments are briefly summarized  and reported in more detail in the FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS section of this report.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","59455","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service",,"A-01-98-00509","Audit of Termination and Severance Costs-Medicare Part A and Part B - Aetna Life Insurance Company",12/7/1998 0:00:00,"The purpose of the IG's review was to determine if the contract termination costs claimed by Aetna for termination and severance costs represented allowable,allocable,and reasonable costs under the provisions of applicable Federal regulations,the Medicare agreement and contract,and other HCFA instructions. The IG's review of these costs was limited to Aetna ’s claims through April 1998. Aetna will continue to claim these costs through approximately the fourth quarter of Calendar Year (CY)1999 when severance payments to eligible employees will end. For the period through April 1998,Aetna claimed total contract termination costs of $26,95 1,699 ($2,122,757 for termination costs and $24,828,942 for severance costs).Based on the IG's review of these costs, the IG has determined that $1,768,433 were either unallowable costs per Medicare program regulations or represent cost savings to the Medicare program.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","59458","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","Indian Health Service",,"(CIN:A-15-97-50001)","Review of the Indian Health Service ’s Contract Health Services Program",6/21/1999 0:00:00,".The IHS is paying too much because there is no law requiring providers to offer Medicare or lower rates,and the agency has not been fully successful in its efforts to obtain favorable rates through contracts and other procurement mechanisms.If IHS were to have legislation requiring the favorable Medicare rates,the funds saved could be applied to the backlog of patient services that cannot be accommodated in the CHS program.",1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57270","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","OIG Partnership plan (Federal/State joint audit)",,"A-15-98-50002","Review of the Food and Drug Administration's Cost Increases for the Arkansas Regional Laboratory",9/1/1999 0:00:00,"The objective of this review was to respondto a request from the Subcommitteeon Agriculture,Rural Development,FDA and Related Agencies,House Committee on Appropriations,to determine why the ARL project ’s costs exceededthe original budget estimate. The IG determined that the ARL project ’s cost exceeded the budget estimate by$10.4 million as a result of the following: $3.4 million in costs not included in the estimate FDA used as the basis for the budget request. $2.1 million due to the architecture and engineering (A&E) firm revising its estimate upward in October of 1996.  $4.9 million in additional costs attributable to a combination of factors, including:inflation, the A&E firm ’s unfamiliarity with the Arkansas area,the effects of a “building boom ”in Arkansas,the A&E firm ’s cursory assessment of market conditions,and the inexact nature of construction estimates.The IG also identified several management control weaknesses in FDA ’s oversight of this project,which may have contributed to the agency ’s underestimating ARL ’s project costs.Specifically,FDA did not:establish centralized control over the fiscal Management of the project at the start of the project;maintain a soundproject tracking system,or obtain a second estimate.Furthermore,the estimate obtained by FDA only included the cost of the construction contract,not total project costs,which may also include items such as construction quality management fees,architect and engineering fees,telecommunications,and construction contingency. The IG also noted that FDA does not have adequate written policies for budgeting construction projects.",0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","59459","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","Administration for Children and Families",,"HS923R1","Financial Management of Cost- Reimbursement Contracts at the Administration For Children and Families",6/1/2000 0:00:00,"A multitiude of issues dealing with aspects of contract management such as cost analysis of contractor proposals was performed only occasionally.  Contracts were not complying with the requirement for in- process notifications. Contracts that were reviewed did not show trhat any actions were taken to begin the contract close out process. Contract oversight was not adequate in terms of complying with existing regulations.",1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62568","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service",,"A-05-99-00070","Audit of Administrative Costs Incurred Under Part A and Part B of the Health Insurance For the Aged and Disabled Program--Health Care Services Corporation, Chicago, Illinois",3/1/2000 0:00:00,"This audit, performed by Doshi & Associates, P.C., covered administrative costs claimed by the Health Care Services Corporation (HCSC), a former Medicare Part A and Part B contractor, for the period October 1, 1994 through September 30, 1998. Their final report points out that HCSC's claims included unallowable costs totaling approximately $9.9 million over this period. The majority of the unallowable costs ($7.9 million) were bonuses that were part of an employee retention plan rejected by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) as unreasonable and unnecessary.  The bonuses consisted of a 50 percent increase in salary paid through the transition period and most of the employees were absorbed into ""HCSC's private business operations or accepted positions with the new Medicare contractor. Other major exceptions involved employee placement services costs of $374,629 that were included in the retention plan rejected by HCFA, severance pay of $509,912 which exceeded compensation levels specified in an approved plan, and Year 2000 project costs of $738, 759 incurred after the notice of termination. The IG is recommending financial adjustments totaling $9.9 million.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","59460","Tanisha"
"Health & Human Services IG","Indian Health Service",,"CIN: A-01-99-01502","Audit of Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation's Use of Federal Discount Drug Programs",8/1/2000 0:00:00,"The Mashantucket PequotTribal Nation (MPTN) is a federally recognized tribe under the Mashantucket Pequot Land Claims Settlement Act of 1983 and operates various commercial enterprises,including a casino and its wholly owned and operated Pequot Pharmaceutical Network (PRxN).In 1996,MPTN contracted with the Secretaryof the Department of Health and Human Services(HHS) to assume management responsibility of the health care programs,previously administered by Indian Health Service (IHS),for its tribal members and othereligible recipients. The IG found that MPTN:(1)extended eligibility for federally discounted drugs to its non-Indian employeeswithout making the required determination that reasonable alternative services were not available to these employees;and (2)did not follow Federal guidelines pertaining to the PHS 340B program. The MPTN did not follow the Federal guidelines requiring entities to identify their 340B drug purchases,and its contract relationships with 16 other tribes which prohibits drug diversion.",1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","59461","Tanisha"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-001","Audit Report on Award of the Sole Source Business Process Reengineering Contract",10/3/1996 0:00:00,"The Defense Supply Service-Washington, Department of the Army, planned to award a $45 million, sole source bridge contract to continue the acquisition of business process reengineering service.  As a result, the Defense Supply Service-Washington was limiting competition for those services.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501562","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-002","Vendor Participation in the Federal Acquisition Computer Network (FACNET)",10/4/1996 0:00:00,"The DOD IG surveyed 100 vendors to determine the extent that small businesses used DOD's E-commerce network (FACNET) to conduct business with DOD.  85 of these businesses identified three major impediments to using the FACNET.  As a result, DOD credibility with vendors regarding development and implementation of the FACNET is impaired.  Implementation and use of the FACNET is not occurring, as envisioned in streamlined acquisition strategies.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501561","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-003","The Defense Logistics Agency Value Engineering Program",10/9/1996 0:00:00,"DLA could better motivate contractors to submit value engineering change proposals.  The Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) did not consistently promote and monitor contractor participation in the DOD Value Engineering (VE) Program and did not report any VE accomplishments during FY 1994.  Also, the Defense Personnel Support Center did not always include the required VE incentive clause in contracts.  As a result, eligible contractors were not participating in the VE Program and DCMC had no assurance that DOD acquisition costs were reduced as much as possible through the use of VE.  The three DLA buying centers included savings derived from other cost-reduction initiatives in reported VE savings.  Reported savings for both the VE and the other cost-reduction initiatives were inaccurate and did not include all investment costs associated with the generation of savings.  As a result, reported VE savings were overstated. Also, the overall effectiveness of the DLA VE and other cost-reduction efforts was not readily discernable.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501560","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-014","Controls Over the Return of Repairable Assets",11/1/1996 0:00:00,"The Army and the Air Force did not adequately account for repairable assets.  In a sample of 127 material return transactions for repairable assets sent to 6 contractor repair facilities in 1995, 49 were not on contractor records.  Also, the Army depot level repairable (DLR) items stored at an Air Force location were not recorded on the Army's wholesale inventory account.  As a result, about $126 million in unreported wholesale inventory was not visible to inventory managers to be considered in the requirements computation process.  Also, government-owned DLRs, in the possession of contractors, were vulnerable to loss.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507494","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-010","Defense Information Systems Agency Management of Trouble Tickets for Electronic Commerce/Electronic Data Interchange",10/28/1996 0:00:00,"The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) has not resolved recurring trouble ticket problems in the FACNET system.  As a result, users who reported trouble tickets are dissatisfied with the trouble ticket system, trading partners have filed protests when bids have arrived too late to be considered, and the future success of the trouble ticket process in FACNET cannot be assured.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501559","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-011","Functional and Physical Configuration Audits of the Air Force Navigation System Time and Ranging Global Positioning System",10/28/1996 0:00:00,"The contractor for mission-processor software used incomplete interface control documents to perform formal qualification tests on Block IIR satellite components.  The Joint Program Office (JPO) used those test results to certify the successful completion of functional configuration audits of Block IIR satellite components.  As a result, the JPO had to establish an operational baseline and obligate an additional $15.6 million to modify satellite software, conduct additional system tests, and establish an interface control agreement. For 11 of the 24 waivers, deviations, and engineering changes reviewed, the Joint Program Office did not document what cost reductions or other consideration were appropriate and did not obtain such consideration from the contractor for 6 of the 11 actions.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507513","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-030","DOD Interim Federal Acquisition Computer Network Certifications",11/25/1996 0:00:00,"Of 13 contracting offices reviewed that were interim FACNET certified, 5 were not capable of performing requirements for interim FACNET certification.  As a result, the contracting offices were not capable of sending and receiving FACNET transactions, and contracting officers and their trading partners may be affected by potential loss of business.  Additionally, because not all of the contracting offices were able to perform the tasks required for interim FACNET certifications, the success of the FACNET program may be overstated.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501474","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-064","Air-To-Air Intercept Missile-9X Program",1/10/1997 0:00:00,"The AIM-9X Program Office was effectively managing the acquisition of the AIM-9X and planning the test and evaluation of the ASRAAM as an alternative to developing and procuring the AIM-9X.  The Program Manager had effectively established the framework for the competing contractors to establish realistic cost objectives and gave the contractors incentives to reduce program costs through value engineering modifications.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507520","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-066","Procurement of Gun Mounts for the M1A2 Tank",1/9/1997 0:00:00,"The DOD IG found that the Army had not complied with the Arsenal Act in its evaluation of alternatives for the future manufacture of the M1A2 tank gun mounts and other components that were produced by General Dynamics at the Detroit Army Tank Plant.  As a result, the Army authorized General Dynamics to move government-owned plant equipment for the production of M1A2 tank components from the Army Tank Plant to a General Dynamics-owned plant without the knowledge of the required economic analysis.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501555","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-084","Reimbursable Orders Issued to the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Keyport, Washington",1/29/1997 0:00:00,"The hotline complaint was substantiated: The program office improperly issued reimbursable orders to Keyport without an adequate description of the work or services required.  Keyport accepted orders for intra-agency contracting from the program office on a reimbursable basis, but was not performing 51 percent of the work or services in-house.  As a result, competition may have been restricted and normal procurement support channels were bypassed. Keyport charged taxes in addition to the Keyport stabilized rate to its Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) customers.  The rate charged was understated, and the DBOF customers were charged taxes by Keyport to recover actual costs. The additional costs should have been included in the stabilized rate.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507521","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-090~","Electronic Commerce Resource Centers",2/11/1997 0:00:00,"The Electronic Commerce Resource Centers (ECRC) Program is a DOD funded network of centers established to help small- and medium-sized enterprises (vendors) and Government organizations implement and use electronic commerce technologies.  The DOD IG found that the ECRC program has not been efficient or cost-effective in promoting implementation or increased use of electronic commerce/electronic data interchange (EC/EDI) technologies between Government organizations and vendors.  Of the customers that received ECRC support, 91 percent did not implement or increase their use of EC/EDI technologies to conduct business with the Federal Government.",0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501553","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-096","DOD Controls Over Resources Used to Account for Missing U.S. Personnel",2/19/1997 0:00:00,"The evaluation objective was to determine the adequacy of DOD controls over funds, contracted services, and other resources used to account for missing American military personnel.  The IG found that the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA), U.S. Pacific Command, established reasonable management controls and maintained adequate documentation of resources expended and found no evidence of program mismanagement.  The IG also found that the JTF-FA followed the FAR in awarding contracts for helicopter support and other services.",1,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507523","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-098","Laboratory Support Services for Environmental Testing",2/21/1997 0:00:00,"The 18 DOD organizations reviewed were not efficient and effective in the procurement and administration of environmental testing contracts.  The procedures used resulted in environmental test prices ranging from a difference of 23 to 662 percent for the same tests, high procurement and administrative costs, and unreliable test results.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501554","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-103","Summary Report on the DOD Implementation of Electronic Commerce/Electronic Data Interchange in Contracting for Small Purchases and the Federal Acquisition Computer Network",3/4/1997 0:00:00,"The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 established the simplified acquisition threshold of $100,000 and required the development and Government-wide implementation of FACNET.  Despite intensive efforts, DOD has experienced delays in the successful implementation of FACNET for small purchases and significant issues still need to be resolved.  As a result, the benefits anticipated by the Act of lower prices, reduced processing time, and improved access to DOD procurements, are not yet being achieved.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501551","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-104","Waivers and Deviations for the C-17 Aircraft",3/6/1997 0:00:00,"The C-17 System Program Office generally managed contract waivers and deviations in an effective manner.  However, the IG did find that the Air Force could not readily and fully trace all airframe fracture-critical and landing-gear parts for which the contract required serial numbers on the first 27 C-17 aircraft delivered.  As a result, Air Force maintenance burden and costs will increase because the Air Force lacks the means to readily identify some of the critical parts that are on its aircraft and lacks the necessary information on the origin and history of the parts.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507524","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-105","Lessons Learned on the B-2 Training System",3/6/1997 0:00:00,"The IG found that the B-2 Systems Program Office bought more training devices than needed to support 21 air vehicles; did not revalidate the need for the various components of the training system when it reduced the quantity of air vehicles that it intended to buy; relied upon the air vehicle prime contractor for many training devices rather than separately contracting for the equipment; and the Air Force increased the cost of the B-2 training system by $578.3 million to maintain concurrency between the training system and the three B-2 air vehicle configurations.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507525","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-111","Management and Administration of Contract MDA903-91-D-0061",3/17/1997 0:00:00,"The Defense Supply Service-Washington and DCMC did not manage and administer the contract in accordance with FAR guidance.  As a result, subcontracted services were used without obtaining adequate price competition.  Further, the sole source subcontract awards were not consistently justified by the prime contractor and approved by the contracting officer, which is contrary to FAR requirements.  Also, DCMC did not initiate delivery order closeout procedures until June 1996.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501552","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-114","Award and Administration of Contracts, Grants, and Other Transactions Issued by DARPA",3/28/1997 0:00:00,"Contracting officers were not adequately using all available resources (such as contracting officer technical representatives, DCAA, and administrative contracting officers) in awarding and administering contracts.  As a result, DARPA contracting officers awarded 13 of 18 contracts without documented cost reviews of contractor proposals, field pricing support was not effectively used, and reconstruct costs were approved without adequate justifications.  In addition, field administrative officers did limited monitoring of contractor efforts.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501539","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-120","Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration",4/7/1997 0:00:00,"Five projects, valued at $2.3 billion, of nine projects selected for review and the DUSD (AT) approved, were questionable choices as ACTD projects.  The IG based its assessment on its interpretation of the selection criteria.  As a result, the ACTD process lacked broad support within the Military Departments and the Congress.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507528","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-121","The Navy Value Engineering Program",4/9/1997 0:00:00,"The Navy only reported value engineering savings on 2 of 36 major defense acquisition programs during FY 1994 and on 2 of 30 major defense acquisition programs during FY 1995.  Except for the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Navy organizations reviewed had not established criteria to identify acquisition programs with the greatest potential for VE savings and had not developed annual plans for VE use.  As a result, the Navy lost opportunities to use VE to reduce procurement and maintenance costs and the Navy has not motivated many of its contractors to submit value engineering change proposals. The Navy did not accurately report VE savings and cost for FY 1994. Reported savings for VE were inaccurate and did not include all investment costs associated with the generation of the savings. As a result, reported VE savings were overstated. Reported savings and cost data were not reliable for assessing program effectiveness.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501545","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-127","Supportability Planning for Systems Provided to the Army Reserve",4/14/1997 0:00:00,"Supportability planning was effective for the portion reviewed of the 12 Army Reserve systems.  Specifically: the Army Reserve received support equipment in sufficient quantities and time to support operations and maintenance for all systems reviewed; the condition of the equipment was adequate; training and training support were adequate to ensure that personnel were able to operate and support the systems; etc.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507529","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-135","Contract for Rotary Sweeper Broom Refills for Airport Snow Removal",4/25/1997 0:00:00,"Though allegations that the contract was awarded improperly were not substantiated, the IG found three conditions warranting management action: (1) The use of purchase description requirements by the Center to procure rotary sweeper tufted brushes limits the type and quality of brushes available for purchase; as a result, the Center is not procuring the latest rotary sweeper brush technology for snow and ice removal at military airfields; (2) DCMC did not complete an investigation on a Product Quality Deficiency Report of tufted brushes; thus, defected tufted brushes were delivered and remain in the DOD inventory system; (3) Quality assurance oversight of the contracts needed improvement; as a result, the Military Services have received and used nonconforming tufted brushes.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501548","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-138","Requirements Planning and Impact on Readiness of Training Simulators and Devices",4/30/1997 0:00:00,"The Army and the Navy successfully cooperated in developing and acquiring computer training simulations.  However, three conditions warranted management action: The DOD is developing and procuring large-scale computer training simulations without adequate control and oversight; DARPA and the Joint Staff have investment plans to develop redundant, joint computer training simulations; and the Army, Navy, and the Air Force have not shown that large-scale computer training simulations are effective.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507530","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-144","Defense Special Weapons Agency Procurements Through the Department of Energy",5/21/1997 0:00:00,"The Defense Special Weapons Agency's (DSWA's) management of interagency cost reimbursement orders to DOE required improvement.  For 35 orders and 43 modifications, valued at $147.2 million: 11 orders contained statements of work that did not specify deliverables; 17 orders and 7 mods did not have determination and finding documents; the DSWA did not require and did not receive DOE performance reports for 26 of the orders and did not prepare performance evaluations for any of the 35 orders; DSWA did not obtain certifications from DOE on the accuracy and reasonableness of cost reimbursement vouchers; and $19.3 million of unliquidated obligations that remained on DOE records were not supported with valid requirements.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507581","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-157","Hotline Allegations Concerning Contract Pricing of Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles",6/10/1997 0:00:00,"The DOD IG found that the Air Force can improve its process for negotiating contract prices for AMRAAMs.  Specifically, the Air Force overpaid the Hughes Missile Systems Company about $41.1 million for manufacturing material from FY 1991 to 1994.  The DCCA's postaward audits of AMRAAM contracts showed that the AMRAAM contractors did not always provide accurate, complete, and current cost or pricing data to the Air Force.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501549","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-165","Procurement of M4 Carbines",6/17/1997 0:00:00,"Both the Army and Navy failed to protect Colt's M4A1 carbine technical data package from improper release.  An Army engineer inappropriately released the M4A1 carbine technical data package to the Navy.  The Navy originally requested the technical data package for internal use, but inappropriately released it to 21 contractors in a solicitation for M4A1 adapter kits.  Also, the Army was within its rights to terminate the M4 carbine contract with Colt; however, the Army made numerous administrative and clerical errors during the procurement of the M4.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501544","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-180","Weapon System Supportability for Wheeled, Tracked, and Amphibious Vehicles in the Marine Corps",6/30/1997 0:00:00,"Overall supportability planning for the Marine Corps tracked, wheeled, and amphibious weapon systems programs was effective for the 12 systems selected for review.  However, the Marine Corps did not fully plan for the necessary facilities to support the Assault Amphibious Vehicle and the Light Armored Vehicle Air Defense program.  Supportability, safety, and readiness could be adversely affected at the units receiving these systems.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507531","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-197","Transition of Army Missile Acquisition Programs from Program Management Offices to Commodity Commands",7/28/1997 0:00:00,"The Army , in general, effectively planned and managed the transition of missile acquisition programs from program management offices (PMOs) to the Army Missile Command.  However, the Command lacked sufficient O&M funds to correct deficiencies in missiles and related equipment transitioning.  As a result, the Command was not able to bring up to the minimum levels of readiness missiles and related equipment for all Force Package 2 units, some of which could be expected to deploy within 24 hours.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507532","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-199","The Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program",7/29/1997 0:00:00,"Overall, the Air Force was effectively managing the development of the Guidance Replacement Program and making it ready for low-rate initial production.  However, three conditions warrant additional management attention: Air Force officials did not perform an independent cost estimate to assess the impact of two major program restructures; the Program Office could improve the effectiveness of its resources to monitor, assess, and estimate contract costs for the prime contract; and the Program Office did not plan to develop a programmatic environmental, safety, and health evaluation before the full-rate production decision.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507535","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-204","Undefinitized Contractual Actions",8/15/1997 0:00:00,"The DOD IG found widespread noncompliance with the statutory provisions of undefinitized contractual actions.  Specifically, for 189 letter contracts reviewed and valued at $10.7 billion, contracting officials did not adequately justify the issuance of 65 letter contracts, valued at $3.9 billion; definitize 90 letter contracts, valued at $6.8 billion, within the required 180-day timeframe (29 percent were not definitized within 1 year); and document the reasonableness of negotiated profit rates for 101 letter contracts, valued at $6.2 billion.  As a result, the Military Departments assumed increased risk in the award and negotiation process, and negotiated profits of $26.8 million that were not commensurate with contractor risk.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501543","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-205","Dual Management of Commercially Available Items - Defense Logistics Agency Electronic Catalog Pilot Program",8/15/1997 0:00:00,"Portions of DLA's electronic catalog pilot program duplicated GSA supply programs, particularly the Federal Supply Schedule and Advantage programs.  If an electronic catalog pilot program proceeds as planned, there is no assurance DLA resources will provide value (cost economies and operational efficiencies) to either DOD or the DLA role as a combat support agency.  Additionally, customers ordering items through the electronic catalog could pay higher prices than if the same items were ordered through GSA.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501472","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-207","Contracting Officer Price Analysis",8/26/1997 0:00:00,"The audit determined that 9 of the 12 offices reviewed did not perform required price analyses or justify decisions to avoid the price analyses for 24 of 108 proposed contract actions valued at $6.1 million.  As a result, contractor and Government resources were not used economically when cost or pricing data were provided.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501541","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-209","Summary Audit Report on DOD Value Engineering Programs",8/26/1997 0:00:00,"DOD activities were not using or making effective use of value engineering (VE), and contractor use of VE on DOD contracts varied.  The Military Departments and DLA were reporting significant cost reductions from VE in accordance with the intent of Circular No. A-131.  However, those organizations needed to improve the consistency, accuracy, and completeness of reported VE savings and costs.  During FY 1996, the USD (A&T) took several positive steps to increase the use of VE in DOD acquisition programs.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501542","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-214","Live-Fire Test and Evaluation of Major Defense Systems",9/9/1997 0:00:00,"The primary audit objective was to evaluate DOD implementation of live-fire testing requirements for major Defense systems.  Overall, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Military Departments effectively implemented the LFT&E process for the programs reviewed.  However, four areas required administrative improvements to make resources available for higher priority LFT&E oversight requirements.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507541","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-218","Component Breakout of the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile",9/22/1997 0:00:00,"The Air Force did not take adequate actions to implement a component breakout program for the AMRAAM.  As a result, the Air Force forfeited the opportunity to put funds to better use of as much as $195 million for AMRAMM procurements. (Note: Component breakout is the process in which DOD purchases components directly from suppliers and furnishes them directly to the prime contractors as Government-furnished material.  Such purchases eliminate the portion of the prime contractors' indirect costs and profits that relate to the components broken out, which achieves a reduction in procurement costs.  The reduction is offset by the cost and the risk to the Government for awarding and administering contracts for Government-furnished material.)",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501537","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-219","Lessons Learned from Acquisitions of Modified Commercial Items and Nondevelopmental Items",9/23/1997 0:00:00,"Defense buying organizations have made progress in strengthening acquisition strategies used to acquire modified commercial and nondevelopmental items.  The buying organizations identified lessons learned that described efforts taken to manage program uncertainties resulting from the transfer of acquisition management control from buying organizations to commercial suppliers.  (Note: Appendixes D and E contain numerous buying organization's lessons learned, including 26 contracting-related ones.)",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501538","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"PO 97-005","Army Materiel Command Contract Audit Followup Program",1/31/1997 0:00:00,"The contract audit followup programs at the Army Materiel Command subordinate commands were generally adequate and had high level management interest and support.  However, additional management emphasis is needed to improve the processing of cost accounting standards reports and the recovery of funds due the Government.  Strengthening management oversight of the contract audit followup program will improve the effectiveness of the program in obtaining timely resolution of contract audit reports, with emphasis on protecting the Government's interest.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504550","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"PO 97-039","Evaluation of the Acquisition Audit Process",7/30/1997 0:00:00,"The objective of this evaluation was to assess utilization of auditing resources within the DOD organization.  The DOD IG recommended that the heads of the DOD central internal audit organizations develop a Memorandum of Understanding that would assign primary audit cognizance for Acquisition Category I programs to the Office of the Assistant IG for Auditing and ACAT II and III programs to the Military Department central internal audit organizations; establish procedures for audit organizations to perform audits of programs outside their assigned ACAT; and state the process for Military Departments central internal audit organizations to obtain access to DOD activities for comprehensive audits of acquisition programs.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507538","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-034","Contracting Practices for Defense Fuel Region-South Fuel Delivery Contracts",11/27/1996 0:00:00,"The DOD IG found that a barge towing company's disqualifications from moving DOD bulk fuel shipments and its designation as a nonresponsible bidder under a solicitation for bulk fuel delivery services were proper.  The DOD IG also found, however, that DOD processing of claims for demurrage and accessorial charges was not timely.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501557","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-037","Functional and Physical Configuration Audits of Defense Systems",12/2/1996 0:00:00,"The Military Departments policies and procedures for managing the functional and physical configuration audit process were adequate.  The IG identified no systemic deficiencies in the effectiveness of the functional and physical configuration audit process for the five Defense systems in its review.  However, the IG identified system-specific deficiencies in the areas of verifying closure of action items, updating and completing interface control documents, managing waivers and deviations, updating configuration management procedures, and performing type certifications.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507514","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-038","Refunds Due to DOD for Economy Act Orders Issued to a Central Intelligence Agency Component",12/4/1996 0:00:00,"The IG was unable to determine the refund that the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) owed the DOD Components.  Also, the DOD Components; CIA; NPIC; and Sun Microsystems Federal, Inc., did not maintain adequate financial records to substantiate the costs the NPIC paid to Sun Microsystems Federal, Inc.  As a result, the DOD Components lost control, visibility, and use of their information and technology funds for Economy Act orders.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507516","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-043","Intra-Agency, Sole-Source, Section 8(a) Contract for the Naval Aviation Training Systems Program Office",12/10/1996 0:00:00,"The Aviation Training Systems Program Office improperly planned to avoid competing a $30 million, sole-source, Section 8(a) contract through the use of intra-agency acquisition procedures.  (Note: The FAR requires competition on procurements that will exceed $3 million under the Section 8(a) program.)  In addition, the role and associated costs of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center were not adequately defined and justified, and there was no need to stage (assemble and test) the commercial off-the-shelf hardware being procured.  As a result of the problems associated with the procurement, the Government has no assurance that it would receive the best value for the least amount of money.",1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501556","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-053","Navy Acquisition Planning for Fielding Weapon Systems",12/20/1996 0:00:00,"Acquisition support planning was effective for three of the five systems reviewed.  The remaining two systems had deficiencies related to the availability of spare parts for the Navy Landing Craft, Air Cushion, and duplicative procurements of maintenance assistance modules for the Surface Antisubmarine Warfare Combat System.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507518","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"PO 97-045","Evaluation Report on Dispositioned Defective Pricing Audit Reports at the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center",9/24/1997 0:00:00,"The contracting officers at Warner Robins Air Logistics Center effectively resolved and dispositioned defective pricing audit reports during the sampled period.  In dispositioning the reports, contracting officers generally followed statutory and regulatory guidelines.  Contracting officers issued timely and proper demands for payment and properly assessed, collected, and credited the appropriate U.S. Treasury account when they collected interest on contractor overpayments.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505138","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"PO 97-056","Defense Hotline Allegations Concerning Contract Audit Recommendations",9/29/1997 0:00:00,"The Administrative Contracting Officer did not promptly settle and did not support audit recommendations the DCAA made on the 14 issues cited in the Hotline complaint.  Also, DCAA management failed to properly address the unsatisfactory conditions reported by its field audit staff at the SUPSHIP Newport News.  Additionally, the SUPSHIP Administrative Contracting Officer did not follow FAR and Navy procedures for negotiation and settlement of contract audit recommendations.  Also, DCAA lacks adequate management controls to ensure that unsatisfactory conditions encountered by its Field Audit Offices are resolved in a timely manner.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504548","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"PO 97-058","Evaluation of DOD Requests for Field Pricing Audit Support",9/30/1997 0:00:00,"This DOD IG review showed that audit requests and the scope of requested services were appropriate for large proposals when cost or pricing data were required.  Price analysts at procurement offices adequately determined cost realism for 12 large, competitive procurements before selecting the contractor.  However, 54 of the 83 audits requested were unnecessary because sufficient pricing information to evaluate the reasonableness of cost or pricing data in proposals without field pricing reports was already available at the buying command, the cognizant contract administrative office, or the DCAA audit office.  In addition, procurement offices did not have adequate practices and procedures for implementing existing DOD guidance on requesting field pricing reviews of low-risk proposals.  Also, the Army, Navy, and Air Force had different regulations and practices for evaluating the cost realism of competitive procurements.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501294","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-029","Foreign Military Financing of Direct Commercial Contracts for Israel",11/22/1996 0:00:00,"The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) did not provide adequate controls over the authorization of $331 million in FY 1995 disbursements of grants for direct commercial contracts. As a result, $688,780 in disbursements of grants were made to Israel for contracts never submitted to DSAA for approval. Additionally, Israel received a payment of $59 million for contract escalation costs that DSAA had not approved (but would not likely have disapproved). The DSAA did not adequately review profit rates on Israeli direct commercial contracts over $500,000 and basic ordering agreements. As a result, Israel paid a Defense contractor about $1.2 million profit (23.2 percent) more than the DoD procurement price for 17 purchase orders, valued at about $4.5 million. However, during the audit, the Defense contractor renegotiated the prices on 4 of the 17 purchase orders and agreed to refund $450,190 to Israel, thereby reducing the profit rate.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91659","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-049","Allegations Involving the Ambulatory Data System",12/17/1996 0:00:00,"The IG performed the audit in response to allegations made in a hotline complaint. The complainant stated that the Ambulatory Data System (the System) was not cost-effective, used inefficient diagnosis codes, and was acquired under fraudulent contracting procedures. The complainant also alleged that health care providers were not consulted during System development and that the System required more of the health care providers' time than similar civilian systems. The objective was to determine the merits of the allegations. The audit did not substantiate the allegations. The claimant did not fully understand the purpose of the System and the development process used to determine System requirements.",0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91660","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-052","Vendor Payments-Operation Mongoose, Fort Belvoir Defense Accounting Office and Rome Operating Location",12/23/1996 0:00:00,"The objective was to evaluate the effectiveness of computer routines designed to identify fraud. Operation Mongoose has made progress in developing computer routines for detecting irregular and fraudulent vendor payments. Test results showed that 23 computer routines produced useful results; 29 computer routines would have been more effective in detecting fraud if a payment type code for adjustments had been established and previously recommended changes concerning data standardization, streamlined payments, and identification of fast-pay contracts were implemented; and 2 computer routines were ineffective and were eliminated. Accordingly, the computer routines that require changes should not be used at other sites until the identified problems are corrected. Management of security over payment data at the Rome Operating Location did not comply with DoD security policy. As a result, unauthorized users could compromise or manipulate data without risk of detection.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91661","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-078","Potential Antideficiency Act Violations at the Department of Defense Education Activity",1/23/1997 0:00:00,"The primary audit objective was to assess internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations to support our audit of the DoD-wide financial statements. Additional objectives were to review and to test accounting transactions to validate the effectiveness of the accounting controls. The Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools (DDESS) used $5.4 million of FY 1993 through FY 1996 Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funds, rather than appropriated Procurement funds, to acquire and install investment items, including equipment and software for its local area network (LAN) systems. Specifically, DDESS used $5.4 million of O&M funds, $662,882 of which were used in combination with $775,849 of Procurement funds, to acquire LAN equipment and software. In addition, the Department of Defense Dependents Schools used at least $1.5 million of FY 1994 through FY 1996 O&M funds, rather than Procurement funds, to procure and install LANs. As a result, Antideficiency Act violations may have occurred.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91662","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-134","Disposal of Munitions List Items in the Possession of Defense Contractors",4/22/1997 0:00:00,"At the 15 contractor locations the IG visited, DoD and Defense contractor personnel generally did not identify whether items used by contractors to develop and field weapon systems were munitions list items. Of the 1,820 items the IG judgmentally sampled, 1,400 were not reviewed and categorized. As a result, when the property was no longer needed, the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) directed Defense contractors to sell it, without knowing whether any of it required strict controls to keep it from unauthorized recipients. The DCMC did not adequately monitor the disposal of 155 items that were identified as munitions list items. As a result, the items were sold without application of the required trade security and demilitarization procedures. Improvements in the identification and monitoring of sensitive items used in the production of weapon systems are needed as an anti-terrorism and trade security measure.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91663","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-163","Financing Computer Systems and Other Equipment at the Defense Contract Management Command",6/16/1997 0:00:00,"This report is one in a series of reports on our assessment of the internal controls and the compliance of DLA and DFAS with laws and regulations relating to financial management at DLA. The audit objective was to determine whether DLA had implemented effective management control procedures and complied with laws and regulations in accounting for and reporting on certain accounting transactions. Specifically, the IG evaluated the accounting and funds controls over the acquisition of fixed assets. The Defense Contract Management Command used approximately $8.5 million of appropriated Operation and Maintenance funds, rather than appropriated Procurement funds, to acquire fixed assets from FY1989 through FY 1996. As a result, potential Antideficiency Act violations may have occurred.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91664","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"PO-97-008","Evaluation Report of Defense Contract Audit Agency Audits of Major Contractor Labor Costs (oversight report)",2/28/1997 0:00:00,"The primary objective of this evaluation was to determine the adequacy of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) policies, procedures, practices and training for providing audit coverage of major contractor labor timekeeping and accounting practices. The DCAA defines a major contractor as one with a minimum of $70 million of annual reimbursable contract costs. The IG examined coverage provided by DCAA field audit offices responsible for 11 major contractors. The annual labor dollars allocable to Government contracts at the 11 contractors was approximately $1.8 billion. We learned that DCAA Field Audit Offices cognizant for 11 or 265 major contractors provided labor audit coverage and reporting that was generally adequate except for labor floor costs. The DCAA has sound policies and procedures for performing labor audits; assessing labor-related internal controls, including contractor employee awareness and ethics training programs; issuing comprehensive audit reports on labor and labor-related matters. However, labor floor check audits did not fully adhere to the Government Auditing Standards on due professional care, planning, supervision and examination of evidence.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91665","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"PO-97-012","Evaluation Report of DoD Block Change Modifications (oversight report)",3/14/1997 0:00:00,"The primary objective of this review was to evaluate DoD implementation of the single process initiative, including the approval process and results being achieved. The IG's review disclosed that the single process initiative has the highest level of management attention at the Defense Contract Management Command and the Component levels. Management Councils and administrative contracting officers were generally complying with the prescribed block changes; however, we identified six conditions warranting management attention.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91666","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"PO-97-013","DoD Oversight of Defense Contractor Insurance and Pension Plans (oversight report)",3/28/1997 0:00:00,"The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether the DCAA and the DCMC had implemented agreed to recommendations to improve planning, documentation, and coordination of the reviews. The IG evaluated the overall adequacy of pension review coverage, including the use of audit support services and the overall quality and extent of audit services the DCAA provides the DCMC. Because of the significance of pension related issues in business combinations, the review focused on contractors known to have either acquired or sold business segments. The IG concluded that contractor insurance and pension reviews are ineffective and untimely. Billions of dollars of Government-funded pension assets are not adequately reviewed to ensure incurred costs are properly allocated to contracts and contractor budget estimates used for pricing new contracts are reliable. The reviews also do not provide contracting officers with sufficient technical information to resolve and disposition findings in a timely manner.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91692","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"PO-97-020","Evaluation Report on Procurement of Single Audits by Recipients of Federal Awards (oversight report)",5/22/1997 0:00:00,"The objectives of the evaluation were to address problems observed in nonprofit organizations (NPOs) not competing their contracts for audit services as required by OMB regulation and the potential duplication between Federal and independent auditors. The IG found that thirteen Federal award recipients did not properly procure their single audits; Federal reviewers and non-Federal auditors failed to coordinate their efforts in conducting procurement system reviews; and, and two nonprofit organizations did not credit approximately $144,000 to Federal awards for amounts received back from the public accounting firms that performed their audits.",0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91693","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"PO-97-032","Evaluation Report on Defense Contract Audit Agency Sampling Initiative of Incurred Cost Proposals on Low-Risk Contractors (oversight report)",6/27/1997 0:00:00,"The Defense Contract Audit Agency effectively implemented the sampling initiative of incurred cost proposals for low-risk contractors with ADV of $5 million or less.  Therefore, Audit Policy Memorandum Number 5 will be revised to allow for the sampling plan.  However, DCAA subsequently issued revised guidance that, significantly departed from the plan we reviewed and is not supported.  Hence, the new DCAA procedures are in noncompliance with Audit Policy Memorandum Number 5 (as revised) and should be rescinded.  The IG has one recommendation to  reduce the risk associated with not detecting unallowable costs when performing a desk review as part of the sampling initiative.  To protect the Government's interest in those years closed by desk review procedures, the IG recommend that the contractor's annual indirect rate agreement letter alert the contractor that prior years' costs may be recovered if expressly unallowable costs are found in an subsequent year's audit.  Expressly unallowable costs are costs that are specifically stated as unallowable by law, regulation, or contract.  The contractor must certify, under penalty of perjury, that its proposal does not include expressly unallowable costs.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91694","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"PO-97-046","Evaluation Report on Defense Contract Audit Agency Audits of Requests for Equitable Adjustment (oversight report)",9/24/1997 0:00:00,"The Defense Contract Audit Agency audits of contractor requests for equitable adjustment (REAs) were generally effective.  Auditors screened the REAs for adequate supporting documentation and indicators of fraud and referred for investigation those REAs suspected of fraud, corruption, or unlawful activity.  However, many audit reports did not include needed information on significant events that led to the contractor's request for adjustment.  The omission of significant information results in audit reports that are less credible and informative to users, including the courts and boards of contract appeals.  Further, auditors spent valuable time compiling information that contracting officers should have provided as part of the request for audit services.  Contracting officers did not comply with the Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements to provide the auditor a list of significant events when requesting audits.  We brought this matter to the attention of procurement organizations during the evaluation.  The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Defense Contract Management Command issued guidance to their acquisition offices to reemphasize the Federal Acquisition Regulation requirement to provide the list of significant events.  The actions taken will result in improved audit reporting, and conservation of audit resources.  If contracting officers routinely included a list of significant contract events as part of the audit request, auditors would save from 1 to more than 40 hours per assignment.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91701","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-018","The Patriot Advanced Capability - 3 Program",11/4/1996 0:00:00,"Overall, the Army was effectively managing the PAC-3 system acquisition within schedule constraints in response to the operational urgency of fielding the PAC-3 capability.  In managing the program, the Patriot Project Office has strived to fully implement acquisition streamlining for the PAC-3 Program.  Additionally, the Army had an adequate management control program in place. Also, the Army's Patriot Project Office was receptive to suggestions and has already made changes to improve the acquisition as discussed in Appendix C. We identified six conditions that warrant further management action.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91709","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-007","General and Application Controls Over The Mechanization of Contract Administration Services System",10/9/1997 0:00:00,"Control deficiencies in the DFAS's Mechanization of Contract Administration Services (MOCAS) system previously reported by the IG, DOD, and by DFAS Internal Review have not been corrected.  User identification codes in MOCAS are not being deleted when an employee resigns or is terminated.  Employees also have access to MOCAS-sensitive tables not related to their current assignment, such as non-supervisory personnel with access to tables reserved only for supervisors.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501529","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-012","Federal Acquisition Computer Network Central Contractor Registration (CCR) Program",10/22/1997 0:00:00,"Progress in centrally registering contractors who wish to do business with DOD has been disappointingly slow.  As of August 1997, only 3.3 percent of about 400,000 potential government contractors have registered with the CCR Program since it was initiated in December 1994.  As a result, the vision of using a single method of collecting contractor information is not being realized, the ability to use the data for electronic payment and IRS reporting is at risk, and contractors are not in compliance with FAR requirements to register with the CCR before conducting electronic commerce over FACNET.",0,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501528","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-026","Contractor Selection for the Development of the Range Rule Risk Methodology",11/24/1997 0:00:00,"The Army Corps of Engineers appropriately used a contractor-developed model.  Specifically, the contract awarded gave the Government unlimited rights in technical data and software for all items developed with Government funds.  Also, the Government did not give away intellectual property.  Also, contractor selection for the development of the model was consistent with applicable acquisition rules.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501527","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-031","The DOD Contract Fund Reconciliation Process~",12/5/1997 0:00:00,"The Military Departments and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Columbus Center did not routinely distribute the results of contract reconciliations.  The inadequate distribution of information contributed to the Military Departments' need to obligate current-year funds to cover unmatched disbursements and negative unliquidated obligations that were more than 180 days old.  Also, DOD organizations did not use standardized methods to perform contract reconciliation.  As a result, contract fund reconciliations were not readily accepted or exchanged by the various DOD components that performed them, resulting in duplication of reconciled contracts. The DFAS Columbus Center did not ensure that Defense agencies with Army Fiscal Station numbers received copies of internal adjustments. As a result, contracts at those Defense agencies required extensive reconciliations.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501525","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-032","Contracting Procedures for the Upgrade of the M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier",12/5/1997 0:00:00,"The Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) awarded contracts for the M113A3 conversion kits in accordance with the FAR.  TACOM worked to ensure the successful completion of the contracts for the M113A3 conversion kits through such actions as conducting preaward surveys of the technical, production, and financial capabilities of the contractors; assigning on-site quality assurance representatives; and allowing the contractors to receive progress payments.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501526","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-037","Dual Management of Commercially Available Items - Battery, Food Service, and Photographic Products",12/12/1997 0:00:00,"The DLA managed battery, food service, and photographic national stock numbered items that were not predominantly military and that were already procured by GSA.  The DOD IG's random statistical sample indicated that 27,958 (61 percent) of 45,936 national stock numbered items managed by DLA in 17 Federal supply classes were either procured by GSA or DLA and GSA contracted with the same vendors, but the items were not in GSA vendors' catalogs or the catalogs were not available for evaluation.  As a result, there was no assurance that DLA resources expended to manage those items added value (cost economies and operational readiness) to either DOD or the DLA role as a combat support agency.  Additionally, DOD requisitioners ordering items through DLA generally could and did pay higher prices than if the same items were ordered through GSA and purchases were not consolidated under a singe source of supply for potential price discounts.",0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501523","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-041","Acquisition Management of the Defense Civilian Personnel Data System",12/16/1997 0:00:00,"The DCPDS functional proponent performed responsibilities normally expected of acquisition officials.  As a result, the Air Force cannot ensure that it is adequately managing the high levels of risk in key areas of DCPDS testing, information, and life-cycle costing.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507491","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-043","Supportability Planning for Fleet Introduction of the Strategic Sealift Ships",12/30/1997 0:00:00,"Overall, the Navy and the Army were effectively managing supportability planning for the Strategic Sealift Program.  However, the Navy contracted for climate control equipment that was not required for all Strategic Sealift surge ships.  The Navy took aggressive action to eliminate the requirement for climate control equipment for the last six ships based on audit analysis and input provided in discussions with the Strategic Sealift Program Office.  A potential monetary benefit between $9 million and $38 million will be realized.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507585","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-044","Contractual Actions for Urgent Procurement Requirements",12/31/1997 0:00:00,"The DOD IG found that DOD organizations generally applied appropriate criteria and prepared adequate and properly approved justifications to support use of the unusual and compelling urgency exception to award contracts noncompetitively.  A statistical sample taken from a universe of 5,622 contract actions valued at about $2 billion determined that: (1) 77.9 percent of the actions, valued at about $1.5 billion, were supported by adequate justifications and properly cited the urgency exception; (2) 8.3 percent of the actions, valued at about $79.9 million, did not have adequate justifications to support the urgency exception but were valid noncompetitive procurements; and (3) 13.8 percent of the actions, valued at about $384.6 million, were miscoded as noncompetitive procurements based on urgency.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501524","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-053","Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program",1/22/1998 0:00:00,"A contracting officer at a Navy facility issued 13 purchase orders between July 29 and August 29, 1992, for 32 different spare parts, totaling about $296,000, that were overpriced.  The overpricing occurred because the orders were based on contractor proposed prices without a price analysis and resulted in $78,000 of unnecessary costs.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501521","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-063","Defense Logistics Agency Product Quality Deficiency Program",2/5/1998 0:00:00,"Two conditions associated with DLA's product quality deficiency program warrant management action.  First, DLA product quality deficiency investigations did not always adequately identify the cause of the reported product deficiencies.  As a result, the inventory control points missed opportunities to identify contractors with performance problems, and improve product quality.  Second, the DLA Automated Best Value System for tracking contractor past performance did not fully reflect contractor quality problems.  As a result, DLA increased its risk of procuring products from contractors with poor past performance.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507588","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-064","Commercial and Noncommercial Sole-Source Items Procured on Contract N000383-93-G-M111 (FOUO) (Redacted version issued 6/24/1998)",2/6/1998 0:00:00,"The DOD IG found that DLA paid modestly discounted catalog prices that were significantly higher prices than the cost-based prices DOD previously paid for the items.  As a result, DOD was not reaping the benefits anticipated when procuring commercial items.  Also, DLA contracting officers also did not effectively negotiate prices for other (noncommercial) sole-source items procured from Sundstrand.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501512","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-065","DOD Information Technology Solicitations and Contract Compliance for Year 2000 Requirements",2/6/1998 0:00:00,"The DOD IG found that 20 of 35 indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity and indefinite-delivery-requirement information technology contracts (for commercial off-the-shelf products) reviewed did not have the required FAR Y2K compliance clauses and none of the 35 contracts reviewed required testing of purchased products.  As a result, DOD had no assurance that information technology products purchased were Y2K compliant.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501519","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-070","Short-Term Precision Landing Capabilities for C-17 Aircraft",2/11/1998 0:00:00,"Air Force program managers plan to install a developmental Precision Landing System Receiver on C-17 aircraft to provide precision landing capability when used with the existing Mobile Microwave Landing System in support of deployments even though the Air Force has not successfully demonstrated use of microwave landing system technology during an operational deployment.  As a result, the Air Force may install a precision landing system technology that has not been operationally proven, has initiated procurement without knowing the full economic cost for the program, and may spend more than $109.8 million on a high-risk acquisition strategy to procure and install developmental avionics units on up to 120 C-17 aircraft before adequately testing and proving the full operational capability of the developmental avionics unit.",1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507589","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-078","Acquisition of the Amphibious Landing Transport Dock 17 Class of Ships",2/18/1998 0:00:00,"The Navy developed an acquisition strategy for the LPD 17 class that implements acquisition reform principles and reduces risk.  Specifically, the strategy engages the warfighters in the system acquisition, compresses schedules for the development and production phases, reduces cost of ownership, and provides flexibility for delivery deviations and less-than-desired performance.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507590","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-085","Joint Contracting for Depot Maintenance of Secondary Items",3/4/1998 0:00:00,"The Services did not identify and initiate actions to use joint contracts for depot-level maintenance of secondary items.  The DOD IG determined that at least 3,479 contracts, valued at $1.2 billion, involving multiple Services using the same repair facility or supplier, were candidates for joint contracting.  Opportunities for joint contracting may also exist for repair of similar items.  As a result, the Services missed opportunities for administrative efficiencies and economies-of-scale cost savings.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501517","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-087","Cost of SSN-21 Class Submarines",3/6/1998 0:00:00,"The $7.4 billion cost limitation for the Seawolf Program appears to be adequate at this time.  The Navy performed two estimates-at-completion for the program.  The Program Management Office estimate is $7,393 million, the Independent Cost Review Team estimate is $67.3 million less.  The Navy has only requested additional funds for allowable escalation and post-delivery and outfitting costs.  The program has not experienced any cost growth since Congress established the $7.2 billion cost limitation in FY 1996.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507593","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-088","Sole-source Prices for Commercial Catalog and Noncommercial Spare Parts (FOUO) (Redacted version issued 10/13/1998)",3/11/1998 0:00:00,"The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) purchased commercial catalog and noncommercial spare parts from Boeing on a sole-source basis, principally because those items were mistakenly coded by DLA as sole-source when inventory management responsibility was transferred from the Air Force.  The sole-source prices were significantly higher than the competitive prices DOD previously paid for the items.  Based on the IG's analysis of previous competitive procurements for the same items, DLA paid an average of about 172 percent or $3.2 million more than fair and reasonable prices.  The DOD IG recommended that the Director, DLA improve management controls for sole-source procurements, commercial item pricing, and corporate contracting.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501511","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-099","Continued Use of a Single Contractor for Contract Reconciliation Work",4/2/1998 0:00:00,"From 1989 to 1997, DLA and DFAS did not plan the scope or depth of reconciliation services and continuously used the same accounting firm (Coopers and Lybrand) to obtain these services.  DLA and DFAS established initial contact with that firm when it was a subcontractor on an existing sole-source contract and awarded the follow-on contract after limited competition.  DLA and DFAS awarded two additional contracts by issuing sole-source awards claiming unusual and compelling urgency and uniqueness of capabilities for performing the work.  DOD has no idea of the reconciliation requirements and has allowed one contractor to be the sole provided of reconciliation services for over 8 years.  In addition, DOD lost the benefits that result from contract competition.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501515","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-109","Relocation of the System Program Office and Logistics Support for the F-117A Stealth Fighter",4/10/1998 0:00:00,"The primary objective was to evaluate the process and documentation that the Air Force is using in deliberations involving the relocation of the F-117A System Program Office (SPO) and the use of a contract for logistics support of the F-117A.  Several areas of concern warranting management attention were found.  Specifically, the acquisition plan does not: identify and eliminate redundant tasks and positions currently in the SPO; identify tasks and levels-of-effort required for contract purposes; provided for increased risks associated with the change from predominantly fixed-price contracts to a single cost-plus-incentive fee contract; identify $631,000 of warehouse racks and support equipment for reuse; provide an adequate cost tracking system to manage cost growth; consider the existing spares to be provided to the contractor in planning for contract funding; and make a provision for Government retention of competency in the area of low observable technology.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507596","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-119","Allegation of Cost Mischarging by Defense Telecommunications Service - Washington",4/22/1998 0:00:00,"The allegation of cost mischarging by Bell Atlantic through DTS-W was unsubstantiated.  Bell Atlantic did not bill DOD for telephone lines that did not exist.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507597","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-122","Hotline Allegations Involving Contracts for Programmed Depot Maintenance of KC-135 Aircraft",4/24/1998 0:00:00,"This report addresses 6 allegations made to the Defense Hotline regarding two contracts that the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center awarded to Pemco Aeroplex, Inc. for programmed depot maintenance on the KC-135 aircraft.  The 6 allegations alleged improprieties involving Pemco's pension plans, conflicts of interest, misappropriation of fuel by contractor staff, unnecessary contractor labor expenses (two separate allegations), and potential aircraft safety issues.  All 6 allegations were unsubstantiated.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501516","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-131","Food Service Contracts at DOD Dining Facilities",5/7/1998 0:00:00,"The DOD IG found that the Army and the Air Force paid fair and reasonable prices for DOD dining facility food service contracts that were awarded under both the Randolph-Sheppard and National Industries for the Severely Handicapped Programs.  The programs support blind and disabled individuals.",0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501509","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-132","Procurement Practices and Procedures for Obtaining Contractor Support at Defense Finance and Accounting Service-Denver",5/8/1998 0:00:00,"Program officials responsible for projects involving acquisition and development of automated information systems under the cognizance of the accounting department engaged in questionable procurement practices when they directed the work to specific contractors without ensuring that the contractors offered the best value to the Government.  As a result, contracts awarded to obtain support for the acquisition and development of information systems did not receive the benefits of competition and resulted in higher prices adding from $1.8 million to $3.7 million to the contracted costs.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501513","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-133","Foreign Comparative Testing Program",5/13/1998 0:00:00,"The primary objective was to determine whether DOD system acquisition managers were considering and using the Foreign Comparative Testing Program (FCTP) when formulating acquisition strategies.  Although the FCTP Office made progress in reducing the number of FTCP projects selected without fully satisfying project funding criteria, it can make further improvements in the processes used for planning and selecting FCTP projects.",0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507599","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-138","Management of Resources at the DOD Electronic Commerce Office",5/27/1998 0:00:00,"Management practices and controls in the DOD Electronic Commerce Office were not adequate to protect and conserve Government resources.  For example, EC Office officials inappropriately obtained IMPAC cards for 3 staff members and did not adhere to controls established over the use of IMPAC cards, including the purchase of $8,534 of supplies and services from commercial sources when the supplies were available from the DOD or GSA.  In addition, an EC Office employee committed the EC Office to an unauthorized financial obligation totaling $6,000, even though the employee had no contracting authority.  Another office incorrectly used two GSA total quality management contracts to acquire services that were not within the scope of the contracts.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","501503","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-140","Defense Hotline Allegation on Bunker Fuel Purchases at Naples, Italy",5/28/1997 0:00:00,"The Navy paid at least $66,242 more in Naples, and an unknown additional amount in Livorno, than it would have if the fuel had been purchased from existing contract sources.  The existing fuel contracts were not used principally because the Naval Regional Contracting Center, Naples, did not receive timely notification that the contracts were in place.  The Navy Petroleum Office needs to improve controls to avoid repetition of the problem.",0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501508","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-144","Dual Management of Commercially Available Items - Information and Imaging Solutions",6/3/1998 0:00:00,"Immediate action was required to suspend the Defense Industrial Supply Center solicitation because it duplicated and competed with GSA, National Industries for the Blind, and DLA procurement and supply programs.  If the initiative had proceeded as planned, there was no assurance that DLA resources would provide added value (cost economies) to either DOD or the DLA role as a combat support agency.  Additionally, customers ordering items through the prime vendor could have paid higher prices than were the same items procured through GSA or National Industries for the Blind organizations and purchases would not have been consolidated under a single source of supply for potential price discounts.",0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501506","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-149","Defense Special Weapons Agency Advisory Panel on the Nuclear Weapon Effects Program",6/8/1998 0:00:00,"Although the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) could have requested the Defense Science Board, an approved Federal Advisory Committee, to conduct the study, they acquired the services of members of the Advisory Panel on the Nuclear Weapon Effects Program through an omnibus scientific and engineering technical analysis services contract.  Six of the seven members of the Advisory Panel were employees of contractors who are likely to have future DSWA contracts.  As a result, the procedures DSWA followed to acquire the services of the Advisory Panel did not adequately protect DOD from potential conflicts of interest and did not ensure that DOD received the best value for the $277,074 in costs incurred.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507600","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-152","Contracting Practices for the Installation Restoration Program at Massachusetts Military Reservation",6/15/1998 0:00:00,"The Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence did not effectively manage environmental contracts for the Reservation.  Specifically, the Center: (1) used undefinitized contract actions routinely, rather than solely for urgent requirements; (2) used unilateral ordering procedures on time and material contracts, though this did not comply with the FAR; (3) allowed the contractor to perform work outside the scope of the contract; and (4) did not promptly review 8 invoices totaling $37.2 million to identify unallowable or questionable costs.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501502","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-154","Acquisition of Medical Items",6/15/1998 0:00:00,"DLA acquisition resources were expended unnecessarily to centrally support the acquisition of commercially available medical items for DOD medical treatment facilities.  By using the acquisition services of the Department of Veterans Affairs for those medical treatment items that are not military unique as well as reducing its central procurement operations and realigning personnel acquisition resources, DOD could better use an estimated $48 million over the FY 1999 through FY 2004 Future Years Defense Plan.  More benefits could accrue from paying lower prices for medical items.",0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501500","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-165","Modification to the Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire-Command Missile Launcher for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle System",6/25/1998 0:00:00,"More than 800 TOW missile launcher armament control units (ACU) have been modified in the field with no assurance that the system design specifications have been met.  As a result, interchangeability and overall reliability of the ACU may have been degraded.  Also, if modifications of the approximately 1,200 additional units take place in the field, as scheduled, without enforcing quality assurance requirements, more than 2,000 ACU may not reliably operate in accordance with design specifications.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507484","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-172","Contract Terminations at Defense Supply Center Columbus and Defense Supply Center Richmond",7/2/1998 0:00:00,"The Defense Supply Center Columbus and Defense Supply Center Richmond did not aggressively pursue terminations of contracts and purchase requests for material that potentially exceeded requirements.  Of 251 notices of excess procurement valued at $179.3 million, about $47.1 million of material on order were not effectively reviewed and promptly processed.  As a result of the audit, $2.4 million of the $47.1 million was terminated.  An additional $10.7 million was received in inventory.  Until improvements are made in the termination process for contracts and purchase requests, DLA is at increased risk of adding unneeded material to the supply inventory.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501505","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-189","Procuring Fuel and Ground Handling Services at Commercial Airports",8/18/1998 0:00:00,"The DOD IG found no indication that fixed-base operators (commercial businesses that provide fuel and ground handling services to DOD pilots at commercial airports) increased prices for ground handling services as a means to compensate for lower fuel prices negotiated into their respective contracts.  Although the 30 fixed-base operators contacted had different methodologies for determining prices for ground handling services, those methodologies did not result in price increases to DOD.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501497","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-197","Management of Contract Waivers and Deviations for the Trident II Missile System",9/2/1998 0:00:00,"The Strategic Systems Program Office adequately and consistently applied the process for reviewing and approving major waivers and deviations on contracts for Trident II missile and reentry body components.  However, the Program Office did not perform cost and price analyses to determine the adequacy of consideration obtained for the approval of major waivers and deviations.  As a consequence, the Program Office's methodology for obtaining consideration for more than 300 major waivers and deviations approved since FY 1984 did not ensure that the consideration that the Government received was appropriate.  Also, the waiver and deviation incentive-fee provision in the cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts did not effectively motivate the contractor to annually reduce the numbers of waivers and deviations requested.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501493","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-202","Dual Management of Commercially Available Items - Construction, Material Handling and Related Equipment",9/18/1998 0:00:00,"The DLA program for procuring nontactical construction, material handling, and related equipment was more beneficial than the GSA programs.  If acquisition authority were transferred, DOD customers would lose contracting and technical services that were readily available and generally more economical.  Additionally, potential volume discounts would be lost to DOD customers because requirements for tactical and nontactical equipment would not be consolidated.",0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501496","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-207","Year 2000 Contract Language for Weapon Systems",9/22/1998 0:00:00,"The DOD IG reviewed 16 weapon systems that that contracts or solicitations for contracts that required Y2K contract language.  Of the 16 weapon systems, 9 had contracts or solicitations for contracts that did not contain Y2K compliance language.  The Program Management Offices immediately initiated action to ensure that the contracts and solicitations will include Y2K compliance language.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501494","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-214","Implementation of the DOD Technology Transfer Program",9/28/1998 0:00:00,"The DOD technology transfer program was not fully executed for four Army and Air Force programs reviewed.  Specifically, the DCMC was unable to effectively perform the foreign disclosure officer function at contractor facilities supporting those programs and there were no other adequate controls to compensate.  The Navy had adequate controls for its two programs the IG reviewed.  The IG did not find any occurrences of classified and unclassified technical data being compromised for the programs reviewed; however, DOD policy is not being implemented and undue risk may exist that U.S. technical data could be compromised.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507601","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"PO 98-603","Evaluation Report on Dispositioned Defective Pricing Audit Reports at the U.S. Army Aviation and Troop Command",12/23/1997 0:00:00,"While Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) postaward audits were found to be adequate, DCAA was not fully responsive to the Command's requests for additional support of disputed audit findings which contributed to delays in settlements.  Three conditions warrant the Command's attention: (1) Contracting officers experienced processing delays in settling defective pricing audit reports; (2) Contracting officers did not consistently issue timely and proper demands for payment in accordance with the FAR, or properly assess interest payments; and (3) Contracting officers did not consistently sustain recommended price adjustments due to various contributing factors.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505129","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-001","Contract Award for the Fluid Flow Restrictor Spare Part",10/3/2000 0:00:00,"The Defense Supply Center, Columbus (DSCC) properly awarded the contract for fluid flow restrictors to General Electric because the proposal from Birken Manufacturing Company, the low bidder, specified use of a substitute material that was not approved by the engineering support activity.  DSCC granted Birken material substitutions on prior procurements; however, DCSS notified Birken that the material substitution was not a permanent acceptable material for future contracts.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501602","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-012","Acquisition of the Armored Medical Evacuation Vehicle",11/22/2000 0:00:00,"The Army did not have a viable acquisition strategy to acquire the AMEV at the completion of the engineering and manufacturing development phase of the acquisition process.  As a result, the Army had obligated about $9.7 million in RDT&E funds for the program from its inception in FY 1997 through FY 2000 and planned to obligate another $6.3 million to complete the development effort in FY 2001 through FY 2003 for a program that the Army did not intend to fund for production.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507692","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-023","Implementation of Most Efficient Organization for the Defense Finance and Accounting Service Commissary Vendor Payment Function",12/20/2000 0:00:00,"The overall objective was to evaluate the implementation of the competitive sourcing program for Defense agency and Defense-wide commercial activities.  DFAS did not follow procedures for implementing and monitoring the most efficient organization for the commissary vendor payment function or a subsequent MEO deviation that reduced the authorized staffing for the function from 75 to 66 personnel.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507718","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-028","Compliance with Procurement Laws in Purchasing Free Weights and Other Strength Building Equipment",12/27/2000 0:00:00,"DOD organizations procured free weights and other strength building equipment using procurement methods that generally complied with the Buy American Act and other laws and regulations.  Of 90 procurements reviewed, with a total value of about $1.8 million, only 2 procurements and 1 equipment exchange, totaling $53,131, did not comply with the Buy American Act.",0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501603","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-032","Use of Exit Criteria for Major Defense Systems",1/10/2001 0:00:00,"Review of nine major Defense programs showed that improvements were needed in the establishment of exit criteria at milestone decision points and in reporting the status toward attaining exit criteria requirements to milestone decision authorities.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507693","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-036","Acquisition of the Combat Survivor Evader Locator",1/25/2001 0:00:00,"The Combat Survivor Evader Locator Program Management Office (PMO) had planned for and managed the design and development of the system well, despite funding shortfalls.  The report raised concerns regarding how the PMO would fund additional interoperability and security requirements and associated technological challenges, as the needed funds were not included in the Air Force's FY2002 Program Objective Memorandum.  The report also raised concerns that the Air Force plan to incrementally purchase its hand-held radio requirements through FY 2038 would not take advantage of economic order quantities and, more importantly, would not satisfy a critical mission need in a reasonable timeframe.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507694","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-038","Allegations Relating to the Procurement of a Report Module for the Composite Health Care System II",1/29/2001 0:00:00,"The allegation that the Government elected to procure one vendor's ad hoc report module, despite substantial evidence and pricing in support of a competing vendor's request, was unsubstantiated.  Though other allegations were substantiated, there were no adverse effects.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501604","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-047","Equipment Procurement for the National Guard and Reserve Forces",2/7/2001 0:00:00,"Funds earmarked in budget justification exhibits for procurement for the Reserve Components were generally used for that purpose.  For 29 systems, $3.6 billion was expended from FY 1996 through FY 2000 to support Reserve Components.  For two other systems, $328 million in funds was used to support the Active Forces because of revised priorities.  However, for the two systems, the requirements simply were deferred to a future period with reasonable expectations of funds being available at that time.  The Army had legal authority to make those adjustments.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507695","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-051","Use of Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 12 Contracts for Applied Research",2/15/2001 0:00:00,"The lack of a commercial market and established catalog and market prices for applied research, and difficulties in determining fair and reasonable prices for services that do not exist in the marketplace makes the use of commercial item contracts for applied research inappropriate.  DOD has multiple acceptable strategies to engage in applied research with traditional DOD contractors and new contractors that have never performed DOD work.  Despite these alternatives, a DOD contracting component inappropriately awarded a contractor a FAR Part 12 ""firm fixed-price (variable outcome) contract"" for applied research in support of DARPA.  The contract did not satisfy the statutory definition of a commercial item and the contract type is not defined in the FAR.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501605","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-054","Defense Logistics Agency Product Verification Program",2/21/2001 0:00:00,"DLA product test center planning procedures were logical and in conformance with test objectives.  Testing was conducted using contract specifications and objectives, appropriate test equipment was used, and suspected deficiencies were evaluated.  However, the product test selections and the use of test results needed improvement.  Random product test selections did not include all products available for testing at all depots.  For nonrandom testing, the Product Verification Office did not fully consider management's quality priorities and initiatives in test planning.  As a result, funds for product testing were not used in the most efficient manner and DOD lacked sufficient assurance that some critical products would perform as expected.  Also, for two of the three Defense Supply Centers, test failures were not consistently investigated and required actions on test failures were not always taken.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507720","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-061","Waivers of Requirement for Contractors to Provide Cost or Pricing Data",2/28/2001 0:00:00,"Contracting officials properly justified, and used in appropriate circumstances, waivers of the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) requirement to obtain cost or pricing data in an estimated 189 of the reviewed contract actions, valued at $1.04 billion, where waivers were used.  The procedures that DOD contracting organizations used to process the waivers and to determine fair and reasonable prices were effective and not burdensome.  However, the information on cost or pricing data in the Defense Contract Action Data System (DCADS) was very inaccurate and misleading.  The IG estimated that 4,264 actions (92.9 percent), valued at $789 million, of 4,590 contract actions were miscoded.  The significant errors grossly inflated the reported number of contract actions in which the requirement for contractors to provide cost or pricing data had been waived.",0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501607","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-066","Acquisition of the Advanced Tank Armament System",2/28/2001 0:00:00,"The Army did not establish a viable acquisition strategy to develop and acquire the ATAS beyond the program definition and risk reduction phase.  Instead, the milestone decision authority considered the ATAS to be a program element for funding technology demonstrations but did not appropriately manage and fund ATAS as a technology demonstration.  As a result, the Army obligated about $85.8 million in RDT&E funds through FY 2000 and planned to obligate another $62.9 million from FY 2001 through FY 2007 for a program that the Army is not intending to fund for the EMD and production phases of the acquisition process.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507696","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-069","Pilot Program on Sales of Manufactured Articles and Services of Army Industrial Facilities",3/1/2001 0:00:00,"The pilot program has been only minimally successful in increasing the use of the capabilities of the participating Army industrial facilities.  From the June 1998 Army implementation of the pilot program to January 2001, the three participating industrial facilities obtained only 12 contracts valued at $6 million.  Consequently, the pilot program has had little effect on increasing the opportunities for U.S. commercial firms and the Army industrial facilities to participate in contracts and teaming arrangements under DOD weapon system programs.",0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507721","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-072","Industrial Prime Vendor Program at the Naval Aviation Depot - North Island",3/5/2001 0:00:00,"The Defense Supply Center Philadelphia industrial prime vendor program at North Island had not demonstrated an effective shift to commercial, industrial-base resources as an integrated logistics solution.  The program had not reduced total logistics costs, improved financial accountability, streamlined the Defense infrastructure, or added value to the Defense supply system.  In addition, other areas such as benefits from competition and participation by small businesses needed to be fully addressed.  The IG staff calculated that the industrial prime vendor program cost an additional $287,852 to operate for the last 6 months of CY 1999 and North Island was over-billed by $572,302.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507722","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-075","Standard Procurement System Use and User Satisfaction",3/13/2001 0:00:00,"About 63.5 percent of SPS users stated that SPS had not substantially contributed to the DOD goal of paperless contracting.  Based on survey responses, the IG projected that about 26.5 percent of the personnel licensed to use SPS version 4.1 have not used it because SPS either lacked the functionality for those sites or employees received SPS when it was not needed to perform their jobs.  The IG estimated that the Program Management Office spent up to $2.1 million of the $7.9 million in license costs on licenses for users who could not or would not use SPS.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501608","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"PO 98-604","Evaluation Report on Consolidation of DOD Contract Administration Services",1/15/1998 0:00:00,"The Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) is capable of performing the contract administration functions of the Army Ammunition Plants, the Office of Naval Research, and the Supervisor of Shipbuilding.  Delegation of contract administration to the DCMC can improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the administration of DOD contracts.  The economies of scale and consistent application of acquisition regulations envisioned with the establishment of a single DOD contract administration organization, the DCMC, have not been fully achieved due to the retention of contract administration responsibility by the Army and Navy.  Those benefits, one contract administration face to the contracting community, and elimination of duplicate regulations and management structures, should significantly improve the efficiency of DOD contract administration operations.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505126","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"PO 98-6-013","Defense Contract Audit Agency Reviews of Price Proposals",6/18/1998 0:00:00,"This DOD IG review showed that the scope of audit services was appropriate for large proposals when contractors were required to submit cost or pricing data.  However, when pricing information was already available, auditors performed many unnecessary audit audits on low-risk proposals.  Of 85 proposal audits and formal agreed-upon procedure reviews that the auditors judgmentally selected for evaluation during field visits, 58 were unnecessary because pricing information was already available without further review procedures.  Additionally, 129 of 255 agreed-upon procedure reviews statistically selected for evaluation were unnecessary for similar reasons.  Administrative Contracting Officers located at prime contractor facilities seldom coordinated the requests with auditors or with requestors to explain the information already available.  The unnecessary audits and reviews represented an estimated $4.8 million of audit resources during FY 1996.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504547","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"PO 98-6-016","Defense Contract Audit Agency Audits of Indirect Costs at Major Contractors",8/6/1998 0:00:00,"DCAA did not always perform sufficient transaction testing in conjunction with the internal control system review.  In addition, under current guidance, those reviews can be performed less frequently than every 3 years.  Therefore, the internal control review results that DCAA relies on to assess audit risk may be outdated and inaccurate.  Secondly, DCAA audits of indirect costs for allowability, allocability, and reasonableness often did not provide sufficient in-depth analysis to conclude that the costs were acceptable for reimbursement.  The audit procedures used for selecting or sampling transactions for review were frequently not the most effective  means to review indirect costs.  Consequently, DOD may be paying contractors for costs that should not or need not be reimbursed.  Thirdly, DCAA sometimes did not properly recognize or recommend disallowance of the costs that Federal statutes and regulations define as expressly unallowable for reimbursement under Government contracts.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504546","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-093","Statement of Eleanor Hill, DOD IG, before the Subcommittee on Acquisition and Technology, Senate Armed Services Committee, on Acquisition Reform",3/18/1998 0:00:00,"Though the DOD IG focused her testimony on recently completed audits relative to acquisition reform, she discussed several completed audits that dealt with contracting issues.  The areas included (1) buying spare parts at prices that were far higher than commercially available prices; (2) lack of contracting officer's use of uncertified cost or pricing data to determine price reasonableness of sole-source items; (4) negotiating and awarding a new indefinite-delivery contract that provided more substantial discounts off catalog prices; (5) joint contracting for depot maintenance of secondary items; and (6) dual management of commercially-available commodities.  It also discussed service contract issues, including avoidance of competition, improper use of task order contracting, and DOD staff directing contractor employees to perform unauthorized services.  She also discussed the procurement fraud threat, benefits of DCAA audits, and benefits of the Truth in Negotiations Act.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501495","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-118","Statement of Eleanor Hill, DOD IG, before the Subcommittee on Government Management Information Technology, House Committee on Government  Reform and Oversight, on Department of Defense Financial Management",4/16/1998 0:00:00,"Though the DOD IG focused her testimony on financial management issues in DOD, her comments addressed one contracting-related area.  Specifically, she highlighted DOD IG Report 98-031, The DOD Contract Fund Reconciliation Process. Ms. Hill stated that the cited audit found inefficient processes that were unnecessarily costly, time consuming, and ineffective in terms of facilitating accurate reporting, prompt payment and timely contract close-out.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501498","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-123","Statement of Eleanor Hill, DOD IG, before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology, House Committee on Government  Reform and Oversight, on 20th Anniversary of IG Act",4/21/1998 0:00:00,"Though the DOD IG focused her testimony on the role of the Inspectors General, she made the following comments pertaining to contracting issues:  (1) DOD IG criminal investigators focus primarily on contract and procurement fraud, health care fraud, antitrust violations, bribery, corruption, and large-scale thefts of government property; (2) Last year, the DOD IG received 365 inquiries from Members of Congress, most on behalf of their constituents concerning personnel or contracting issues; and (3) As IGs are increasingly relied upon to perform independent validation of outsourcing studies as required by OMB Circular A-76, this will create additional resource burdens.  Moreover, as outsourcing continues, there are legitimate questions about the extent to which government can maintain adequate oversight of the taxpayer dollars being directed to the private sector.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501501","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-057","Defense Finance and Accounting Service Acquisition Program for the Electronic Document Management Program",1/27/1998 0:00:00,"This is the first in a series of reports on DoD acquisition strategy for the DFAS Electronic Document Management Program and provides the results of our review of Increment 1, Vendor Pay, life-cycle documentation. The Director, DFAS, requested that we review the implementation of the Program and provide input during the acquisition process. The overall audit objective was to assess DFAS development and implementation of the Program. Specifically, we reviewed the acquisition documentation for Increment 1, Vendor Pay. The integrated product teams identified cost, funding, and testing concerns that needed to be resolved before a deployment decision could be recommended. The Program Office provided a cost reconciliation document, funding information, and a schedule for testing to minimize the concerns of the integrated product teams. DFAS developed the required life-cycle documentation and subsequently received a Milestone III deployment decision, for Increment I, Vendor Pay, of the Program on December 16, 1997.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91650","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-076","Funds Used for the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Program",2/17/1998 0:00:00,"""The audit was requested by the Principal Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental Security) to determine whether $1.2 million of funds for the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Program were used properly. We could not verify that funds provided for the Program were used for their intended purpose. The funds were not managed in the most efficient and effective manner, and contracting functions were not always properly performed. As a result, the Government has no assurance it will receive expected products and services for the $1.2 million provided to support the Program, and the plan to direct a contractor to subcontract with a specific subcontractor would have been improper if it had been implemented. 
""",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91652","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-096","Acquisition of the Army Tactical Missile System Anti-Personnel/Anti-Materiel Block IA Program",3/25/1998 0:00:00,"Overall, the Army was effectively managing the Block IA Program and moving the Block IA from LRIP to full-rate production. In March 1997, the Army slipped the full-rate production decision from March 1997 to March 1998 because it had not demonstrated to the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), that the Block IA was operationally effective and suitable. Later, the Army demonstrated to DOT&E that the Block IA was operationally suitable and, in March 1998, provided operational test results to DOT&E to use in determining whether the Block IA is operationally effective. In addition to the operational effectiveness issue, the following two areas warrant management attention before the program enters full-rate production. o The Army did not verify the war-reserve munitions requirement for the Block IA Program. Unless the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans determines the quantity of Block IA missiles required before the scheduled March 1998 full-rate production decision, the Army Acquisition Executive cannot be sure that the planned production quantities are appropriate. o The Army procured at least 31 more Block IA missiles under LRIP than it needed for legitimate LRIP purposes. In addition, the Project Office did not prepare a Selected Acquisition Report for Congress for the quarter that ended on June 30, 1997, showing that the full-rate-production decision for the Block IA Program had slipped more than 6 months and that the LRIP quantity procured exceeded 10 percent of the total Block IA requirements in the acquisition strategy.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91653","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-185","Financial Management of the RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter Program",8/6/1998 0:00:00,"This report is the second of a series on the audit of the acquisition of the RAH-66 Comanche. The objective was to evaluate the overall management of the Comanche Program. The specific objective of this portion of the audit was to evaluate the financial aspects of program management. The Cost Performance Reports did not present an informative picture of the Comanche Program. Also, the process for determining the award fee was not fully documented and the life-cycle cost was underestimated. To correct the problems, Comanche Program Office officials agreed to require the contractor for the Comanche to revise its procedures for preparing the Cost Performance Reports, and request the Defense Contract Management Command to perform more comprehensive reviews of the contractor's earned value management system. Those officials also agreed to fully document the process of determining the award fees. In addition, the officials agreed to include the costs associated with the use of hazardous materials and disposal costs related to the Comanche helicopter in its life-cycle cost estimate prior to the next milestone review. When implemented, the agreed-upon action plans will correct the problems identified.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91656","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"98-198","Allegations of the Gulf States Initiative Program",9/9/1998 0:00:00,"This audit was performed in response to a complaint to the Defense Hotline regarding perceived violations of standard DoD management and contract authorization processes by the Program Office. The objective was to evaluate the allegations. One allegation was substantiated and the second allegation was partially substantiated. GSA awarded a sole-source contract task order to develop wireless communications technology without proper justification. More than one company could have performed the work and competition should have been used in awarding the task order. Also, a facility used as a counternarcotics intelligence center by law enforcement personnel of the state of Mississippi was not properly authorized before construction and was constructed without the use of funds from the required appropriation account. The improper obligation of funds for the construction of the facility in that manner created a potential violation of sections of U.S.C., title 31, """"the Antideficiency Act."""" The Mississippi facility is in use. In addition to the allegation, the Gulf States Initiative planned to construct an addition to an Investigative Support Center in Louisiana without proper oversight. Although the Program Office provided high-quality service to the states, changes need to be made to ensure that provision of that service is conducted in accordance with congressional and DoD direction.",0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91657","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-001","Defense Logistics Agency Procurements from Federal Prison Industries, Inc.",10/5/1998 0:00:00,"The Defense Supply Center (DSC), Richmond contracting officers paid higher prices than necessary for supplies purchased from both Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (FPI) and commercial vendors.  As a result, buyers missed opportunities to reduce the cost of supplies when purchasing items manufactured by both FPI and commercial vendors.  Also, Defense supply centers did not always obtain replacements for defective supplies manufactured by FPI. As a result, the Defense supply centers missed the opportunity to replace about $127,000 in defective items at no cost to DLA.",0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501458","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-002","Contracting for Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Support",10/5/1998 0:00:00,"DFAS program officials did not properly perform acquisition functions, and DFAS personnel in acquisition oriented positions did not meet training and experience requirements.  Specifically, DFAS officials circumvented FAR requirements for full and open competition by awarding new contracts and new delivery orders to existing contracts without adequate justification for sole-source procurements.  Also, none of the individuals determined to be performing acquisition and/or program management functions were qualified.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501457","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-011","Management of Contract Waivers and Deviations for Defense Systems",10/13/1998 0:00:00,"Program offices needed to improve the procedures used to manage contract waivers and deviations for 4 of 7 Defense programs reviewed.  As a result, the 4 program offices did not have assurance that the Government received equitable or appropriate consideration for the degraded value of nonconforming items accepted through waivers and deviations.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501460","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-021","Acquisition Management of the Comanche Program",11/4/1998 0:00:00,"The audit identified opportunities for improvements in the acquisition management of the Comanche Program.  The acquisition strategy of developing and manufacturing two Comanche prototypes for developmental testing and six early operational capability Comanches for user evaluation was risky and could have further delayed and increased the cost of the program.  The Army planned to delay the development of a fire control radar for the Comanche until 2004.  As a result, integrating a fire control radar into the Comanche could have required a major redesign that could have been unaffordable.  The 1991 Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis for the Comanche helicopter was no longer valid.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507616","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-023","Procurement of Military Clothing and Related Items by Military Organizations",10/29/1998 0:00:00,"Contracting officers at 12 military organizations procured military clothing and clothing items that were manufactured abroad without determining, as appropriate, whether items manufactured in the U.S. or a qualifying country were available as required by the Berry Amendment and the Buy American Act.  As a result, contracting officers awarded 16 contracts valued at $1.4 million to contractors supplying items manufactured abroad that may have been available from U.S. contractors.",0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501459","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-024","Contract Terminations at Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) and Defense Supply Center Philadelphia",10/29/1998 0:00:00,"The Navy, Air Force, and DISC procedures for managing terminations of contracts and purchase requests for material potentially in excess to requirements needed improvement. Of 103 items judgmentally sampled, valued at $21.3 million, 69 had no evidence of prompt reviews by item managers at DISC.  Additionally, 68 of 103 sampled items were incorrectly reported as potentially excess procurements.  DISC also initiated procurements valued at $2.4 million for material in excess to requirements.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501456","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-026","Commercial Spare Parts Purchased on a Corporate Contract",1/13/1999 0:00:00,"DLA supply centers paid Allied Signal Incorporated prices that were higher than fair and reasonable in FYs 1996 and 1997 when compared to the noncommercial prices paid to Allied in previous years.  Proper application of acquisition reform principles, could reduce total ownership cost.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501455","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-037","Initiatives to Improve Acquisition Lead Time",11/23/1998 0:00:00,"DOD components have implemented many initiatives to reduce acquisition lead time.  Those initiatives include increased use of automated contracts, flexible long term contracting, use of commercial practices, and the team concept of contracting.  DOD components have also implemented management processes for monitoring and reducing acquisition lead time such as developing goals for reducing acquisition lead time and establishing process action teams to monitor acquisition lead time.  As a result of those actions, DOD components have shown an overall reduction of 14 percent in acquisition lead time since 1995.",0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501454","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-040","Navy Hazardous Substance Management System Contract",11/25/1998 0:00:00,"Contract provisions were not consistent with regulations for personal protective equipment.  As a result, contractor employees risked potential exposure to hazardous materials and the Navy risked health and safety claims.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501453","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-041","Ship Repair Contracts at Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair, Jacksonville, Florida",11/27/1998 0:00:00,"The Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, Jacksonville, Florida complied with applicable Federal Acquisition Regulations when acquiring ship repair services.  Specifically, the Supervisor allowed a bidder a minimum of 30 days to respond to a negative performance evaluation for repairs performed on a prior contract.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501452","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-048","Dispositioned Defective Pricing Reports at the Naval Air Systems Command",12/8/1998 0:00:00,"The IG reviewed 32 DCAA defective pricing reports that questioned costs of $34.3 million to determine if contracting officers processed such reports in a timely and appropriate manner.  Specifically, Navy contracting officers experienced delays of up to 4 years in settling 13 defective pricing audit reports that questioned $12.9 million.  Also, Navy contracting officers issued demand letters that were untimely and understated interest charges.  These problems resulted in delayed recoveries of contract debts and understated interest payments.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501450","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-054","Acquisition of the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle",12/15/1998 0:00:00,"The AAAV Program Management Office (PMO) was effectively managing the development of the AAAV.  The AAAV PMO had aggressively implemented acquisition reform initiatives and taken positive actions on issues raised during this audit and previous DOD IG audits.  The AAAV PMO reduced the risk in the development program; addressed command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence support requirements; and ensured that the year-2000 problem was appropriately addressed in the AAAV development contract.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","502957","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-057","Settlement of Contractor Incurred Indirect Cost Audits",12/21/1998 0:00:00,"Navy and Defense Contract Management Command did not maintain and report accurate contract audit follow-up data. As a result, component management was not able to effectively determine whether their contract audit follow-up systems were adequate and facilitated oversight of the timely and appropriate disposition of audit reports.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501448","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-067","Defense Medical Logistics Standard Support",1/12/1999 0:00:00,"Funds totaling $885,000 were inappropriately passed to another Government organization and funds totaling $20,300 were provided for program development but were used to pay contractor employees for duties that were not program related.  Also, contract support services at the Defense Supply Center Philadelphia were inefficient and contract administration was ineffective.  Also, a contractor employee may have been improperly employed.  Also, a prospective contractor may have had an inappropriate competitive advantage.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507475","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-068","Acquisition Management of the Composite Health Care System II Automated Information System",1/21/1999 0:00:00,"The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) has taken many positive actions to manage the acquisition of the complex CHCS II.  However, further actions are needed to complete a project management system for the acquisition.  A work breakdown structure linking financial accountability needs to be implemented to improve DOD ability to evaluate whether program results deviate from baseline parameters for cost, schedule, and performance and milestone decision authority exit criteria.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507473","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-071","Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) Program Office Use of Defense Contract Management Command Resources",1/27/1999 0:00:00,"The CEC Program Office did not make optimum use of resources at the contract administration office to support its program.  The program office reliance on Navy technical agents (at the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Crane, Indiana and Dahlgren, Virginia) limited the contract administration office in its ability to provide the contract administration support (i.e., quality assurance and other contract administration functions) agreed to in the memorandum of agreement.  Also, the Program Office could put to better use up to $51.6 million of funds that it budgeted for in the FYDP to pay the Navy technical agents.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501480","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-077","Allegations to the DOD Hotline on Contract Maintenance for the C-20 Aircraft",2/4/1999 0:00:00,"Although the contractor regularly achieved the specified mission capable and supply rates, DOD program and contracting personnel did not effectively manage the following aspects of the C-20 contractor logistics support contract: cost of purchased or repaired parts; material handling charges; cost reimbursable expenses for subcontractor effort; contractor operated and maintained base supply; maintenance guidance; depot operations; and contractor oversight.  As a result, DOD may have (1) paid at least $12.8 million more than necessary for parts and services, (2) paid for services that were not received, and (3) used resources resolving issues arising from poor contract language.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501447","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-078","Outsourcing of Defense Commissary Agency Operations",2/5/1999 0:00:00,"Although the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) commercial activities inventory reports for FYs 1996 and 1997 fairly presented the total in-house personnel for operating locations, the coding of 2,431 in-house employees in FY 1996 and 788 employees in FY 1997 was faulty.  The faulty coding was caused by DeCA interpretation of legislation and guidance.  Additionally, cost reductions that DOD expected to achieve form the DeCA commercial activities program may not be realized because DeCA considers large cost comparison studies to be incompatible with its core function of delivery of a commissary benefit.  Also, DeCA withdrew from a study involving 493 full-time equivalent accounting employees and has not rescheduled the study.  As a result, future reporting of a significant number of employees as exempt from cost comparison study and the small-scale functions that DeCA plans to study and convert directly to contract during FYs 1999 through 2003 will limit the cost avoidance that DOD can expect from the DeCA commercial activities program.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501477","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-111","Commercial Satellite Leased Capacity",3/26/1999 0:00:00,"DOD could not determine the total leased commercial satellite bandwidth capacity and the associated costs, the type of transmission media used for long-haul telecommunications services and the total capacity available to warfighters.  As a result, the communications decision makers' ability to use historical trends to predict future capacity and cost requirements was impaired, the Joint Staff deliberative planning process was hampered, and capabilities to support the two major theater war scenarios could not be determined. DOD has not implemented an efficient system to centrally monitor and track the inventory of international satellite equipment and airtime costs.  Further, the total number of DOD-owned international maritime satellite terminals and the associated airtime costs could not be determined.  As a result, the ability of communications managers to effectively oversee the acquisition and management of satellite equipment and airtime costs was degraded and economies of scale could not be achieved through combined purchases.  Also, the $1.4 billion Commercial Satellite Communications Initiative was not providing technically efficient or cost-effective satellite communications services to support the missions of many warfighters.  As a result, warfighters were continuing to lease commercial satellite communications through multiple commercial contracting vehicles and not all economies of scale, as intended by Congress, were being achieved.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507471","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-116","DOD Use of Multiple Award Task Order Contracts",4/2/1999 0:00:00,"Delivery orders for product contracts were awarded competitively and to the low bidder for 78 percent of the delivery orders.  However, DOD use of multiple award task order contracting for services was not consistent with the statutory requirements.  The statutory requirements call for each contractor to be given the opportunity to be considered for all orders over $2,500 awarded under the multiple award mechanism.  DOD use of multiple award contracts did not take full advantage of the benefit of having multiple bidders.  Specifically, contracting officers awarded task orders without regard to price even though price was not a substantial factor in selection of vendors for the initial multiple award contract.  Also, contracting officers directed work and issued orders on a sole-source basis for 66 of 124 task orders, valued at $47.2 million, without providing the other contractors a fair opportunity to be considered.  Only 8 of 66 orders, valued at $8.8 million, had valid justification for sole-source award.  As a result, DOD did not achieve the full benefits associated with the multiple award mechanism.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501446","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-121","Pilot Program on Sales of Manufactured Articles and Services of Army Industrial Facilities",4/2/1999 0:00:00,"This report discusses the status of the Army pilot program to sell manufactured articles and services of three industrial facilities to commercial contractors providing weapon systems to DOD without determining whether the articles and services are available from United States commercial sources.  The IG found that the pilot program initiative has the potential to produce monetary benefits for modernization and readiness programs but, to date, has resulted in little additional work for the three Army industrial facilities participating in the program.  (Note: This pilot program was authorized for 2 years by section 141 of P.L. 105-85, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1998.)",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507622","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-129","Use of the International Merchant Purchase Authorization Card",4/12/1999 0:00:00,"DOD organizations were not using the purchase card to the maximum extent possible for their micro-purchases, resulting in DFAS processing additional financial transactions.  The three DFAS locations visited were making commercial invoice payments for purchases that could have been made with the purchase card.  With the purchase card, the cardholder submits one invoice for all purchases during the monthly billing cycle.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","501445","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-132","Outsourcing of Defense Supply Center, Columbus, Bus and Taxi Service Operations",4/13/1999 0:00:00,"The audit substantiated the allegation that the DSC, Columbus, outsourcing study for bus and taxi service operations was based on incorrect methodology.  Installation Services officials did not comply with legal and policy requirements for outsourcing commercial activities, and created unnecessary disruption and distrust within the motor pool.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501476","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-154","Defense Contract Management Command Support (DCMC) to System Acquisition Program Managers",5/12/1999 0:00:00,"Although DCMC provided effective contract administration office support to system acquisition program officials overall, it could improve implementation of procedures in the following two areas.  Program support teams did not document that they reviewed 17 of the 34 memorandums of agreement annually as required at the 4 contract administration offices the IG visited; as a result, the offices did not document that they had verified with program managers that the 17 MOAs still clearly defined the roles and responsibilities needed to support current program acquisition strategies.  Program support teams did not define contract-specific surveillance responsibilities and procedures for 47 of the 48 program surveillance plans at the 4 contract administration offices; as a result, the plans may not have been optimally effective in assisting program support teams to effectively and efficiently evaluate contractor systems and processes on 100 major acquisition system contracts.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501444","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-156","Evaluation of the Effect of the Boeing, Rockwell, and McDonnell Douglas Business Combination on Pension Plans and DOD-Funded Pension Assets",5/13/1999 0:00:00,"The overall objective was to determine whether DOD pension costs and DOD-funded pension assets, which represent the accumulation of pension costs charged to Government contracts, were properly protected in the business combination of Boeing, Rockwell, and McDonnell Douglas.  No material discrepancies or problems were found in the pension records maintained by contractors.  However, two issues were identified.  The first issue is an apparent discrepancy in the allocation of pension assets between Boeing and Rockwell and will be addressed in a separate report.  The second issue is the impact of the new Boeing pension plan on Government pension costs and pension fund assets.  The Government does not have the information required to evaluate future cost projections for Boeing pensions.  As a result, there is no accountability for the allocation and projected use of approximately $3 billion of Government surpluses in funding the new Boeing pension plan.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507625","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-166","Initial Implementation of the Standard Procurement System",5/26/1999 0:00:00,"The Standard Procurement System (SPS) evolutionary software approach currently does not provide some critical functional requirements to meet user needs or the need to replace legacy systems.  In addition, unless an expanded license is obtained, DOD is required to obtain sole-source support over the 30 year life-cycle of the SPS.  The SPS also may not have met the mission need to standardize procurement policies, processes, and procedures.  Users of the SPS were not receiving adequate training, guidance, and support from the contractor help desk.  As a result, DOD organizations may expend about $70 million on separate contracts for additional customer support and on developing workarounds to make the SPS functional.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501443","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-183","Acquisition Management of the Defense Commissary Information System (DCIS)",6/11/1999 0:00:00,"Cost, schedule, and performance baselines for the DCIS became unattainable because the Defense Commissary Agency, the Air Force Standard Systems Group, and the contractor overestimated the Defense Commissary Agency's ability to reengineer its business practices and processes to mirror commercial chain operations and to maintain defined system requirements after they were baselined. They also overestimated the quality of software application modules obtained from a commercial grocery industry software supplier to provide a business information solution.  After investing about $62.1 million in the project, the Director, Defense Commissary Agency, prudently canceled the acquisition.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501442","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-195","Contract Actions for Leased Equipment",6/30/1999 0:00:00,"DOD organizations either did not perform or did not properly perform required lease purchase analyses prior to awarding 543 contract actions, valued at about $58.6 million, for leased equipment based on statistical projections.  As a result, DOD organizations incurred about $6.2 million in unnecessary costs.  Also, the Military Sealift Command and the Military Traffic Management Command did not maintain effective contract oversight of contracts for leased intermodal shipping containers.  Consequently, DOD paid approximately $1 million in FY 1996 for 115 leased containers that were lost.  DOD also incurred approximately $65,000 in late Prompt Payment Act interest because of unpaid leased container invoices.  In addition, DOD organizations rarely screened existing inventories of DOD or other Federally owned equipment as procurement sources and incurred unnecessary costs by leasing equipment that may have been available form other Government sources.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501439","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-208","Defense Finance and Accounting Service Commercial Activities Program",7/8/1999 0:00:00,"DFAS completed two OMB Circular No. A-76 cost comparison studies during 1997 that contained errors and lacked thorough independent reviews.  In addition, DFAS suspended another cost comparison study during 1997 and has not deobligated $288,259 on the support contract for the study.  The errors and omissions in the cost comparison studies were not significant enough to challenge the decisions to perform the functions with in-house personnel.  Also, DFAS did not adequately plan, coordinate, and compete the requirements for two contract efforts costing about $335,000 for the development of computer software.  As a result, DFAS was developing software for its A-76 cost comparison studies that will generate different cost estimates than a widely used Air Force-developed program, which could result in protests to DOD cost comparison decisions.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501470","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-216","Earned Value Management Support to System Acquisition Program Managers",7/21/1999 0:00:00,"The IG audit showed that the contract administration offices could further improve their earned value management support to program managers.  Specifically, 4 of 5 contract administration offices visited could provide program managers with more insightful system surveillance assessments of the contractors' earned value management system (EVMS).  Also, all 5 contract administration offices could provide more useful analysis of contractor cost, schedule, and performance data to program managers on a more timely basis.  As a result, program managers for defense system contracts were not kept fully informed on whether the contractors' EVMS provided reliable cost, schedule, and technical information and were not receiving timely and useful EVMS data analysis to assist in making program management decisions.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501438","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-217","Sole-source Commercial Spare Parts Procured on a Requirements Type Contract",8/16/1999 0:00:00,"Bell Helicopter Textron and DLA had established an equitable business relationship that provided the best value for DLA customers.  Using techniques most aptly described as cost-based analysis, DLA obtained fair and reasonable prices for sole-source commercial items, and also improved delivery times and reduced government inventory.  Over the past 4.5 years prices had increased an average of only 0.8 percent, 92.5 percent of the orders were shipped within 8 days, and government inventory was reduced by $11.4 million.  However, the IG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology include guidance on circumstances under which contracting officers should require contractors to provide price information and uncertified cost information in its commercial pricing ""Information Guide.""  The IG also recommended that the Under Secretary develop and implement procedures relating to unified management and procurement of commercial items and commercial price trend analysis required by section 803 of the FY99 Defense Authorization Act.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501437","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-218","Sole-Source Noncommercial Spare Parts Orders on a Basic Ordering Agreement",10/12/1999 0:00:00,"For the spare parts reviewed, DLA supply centers paid Allied prices that were higher than fair and reasonable.  DLA supply centers paid about $4.9 million or 18 percent more than fair and reasonable prices, cost plus reasonable profit, for the $32.2 million of spare parts procured from Allied.  The IG calculated that DLA supply centers could reduce total ownership costs for their customers by at least $53.7 million during FYs 2000 through 2005 by using a combination of both cost and price-based acquisition tools and negotiating a long-term commercial type contract with Allied for sole-source spare parts.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501436","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-220","Computer Equipment Acquisitions for the Defense Information Systems Agency Megacenters",7/21/1999 0:00:00,"DISA acquired new mainframe computer equipment for its Megacenters in accordance with applicable acquisition regulations. DISA appropriately based its decision to purchase new Clearpath enterprise servers rather than upgrade existing mainframes primarily on cost.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501435","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-224","The Ground Based Common Sensor Program",7/26/1999 0:00:00,"The Ground Based Common Sensor Program was not managed efficiently and effectively.  As a result, the program spent 9 years in the engineering, manufacturing, and development phase, and the Army spent $902 million on the development and procurement of the program and its subsystems.  Also, the Government accepted seven limited-procurement-urgent systems that never passed initial operational test and evaluation and planned to accept five more systems upon the production contract close-out.  Also, the Army planned program transition to Milestone II without required documentation.  Also, program officials did not fully implement an effective management control program.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507630","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-236","Independent Review of the Defense Finance And Accounting Service Competitive Sourcing Study of the Defense Commissary Agency Accounting Function",8/19/1999 0:00:00,"Specifically, objectives of the independent review were to determine whether: data in the management plan reasonably established the Government's ability to perform work requirements in the performance work statement with resources provided by the most efficient organization, and all costs entered on the cost comparison form are fully justified and calculated in accordance with procedures described in Part II of the Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-76 Supplemental Handbook. The independent review led the DOD IG to conclude that the management plan reasonably established the Government's ability to perform work requirements in the performance work statement within resources provided by the most efficient organization. The independent review also concluded that costs entered on the cost comparison form were fully justified and calculated in accordance with procedures described in Part II of the Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A- 76 Supplemental Handbook.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"Denver docs","60255","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-244","Independent Review of the Defense Finance And Accounting Service Competitive Sourcing Study of the Transportation Accounting Function",9/1/1999 0:00:00,"Specifically, objectives of the independent review were to determine whether: data in the management plan reasonably establish the Government's ability to perform work requirements in the performance work statement with resources provided by the most efficient organization, and all costs entered on the cost comparison form are fully justified and calculated in accordance with procedures described in Part n of the Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-76 Supplemental Handbook.  The independent review led the IG to conclude that the management plan  reasonably established the Government's ability to perform work requirements in the performance work statement within resources provided by the most efficient  organization. The independent review also concluded that costs entered on the cost comparison form were fully justified and calculated in accordance with procedures described in Part II of the Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A- 76 Supplemental Handbook.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"Denver docs","60251","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-088","Statement of Eleanor Hill, DOD IG, before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, on DOD Vulnerabilities to Waste, Fraud, and Abuse",2/25/1999 0:00:00,"Weapon system acquisition: The IG stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other DOD leadership, and the Congress have acknowledged the significant gap between modernization requirements and planned funding and that increasing the weapons procurement share of the budget is a high priority DOD budget goal.  Other procurement issues: The IG stated that the vast majority of the several million annual DOD contracting actions involve equipment, ammunition, supplies and services, rather than major weapon end items such as new ships and missiles.  The sheer volume and great variety of DOD contracting activity make this a high risk area.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501478","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-117","Statement of Eleanor Hill, DOD IG to the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Senate Committee on Armed Services, on Acquisition Reform in the DOD",3/17/1999 0:00:00,"The IG primarily discussed her observations on acquisition reform efforts at DOD.  She also discussed several contracting issues and include a citation to the applicable IG report.  Specifically, she discussed the following contracting issues: spare parts pricing issues at DLA; support service contracting; acquiring automated information systems; and compliance with the Buy American Act and Berry Amendment.",0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501479","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-012","Use Of Funds Appropriated For Major Defense Systems",10/14/1998 0:00:00,"The audit objective was to determine the use of funds appropriated for the acquisition of major Defense systems. GAO Testimony No. GAO/T-NSIAD/AIMD-98-122, """"Defense Management: Challenges Facing DoD in Implementing Defense Reform Initiatives,"""" March 13, 1998, states that DoD cannot accumulate reliable information on its business activities' costs. We noted a similar situation for 9 of the 10 major Defense systems reviewed. The nine program offices did not have cost-accounting systems established to track and report program costs by functional categories, such as systems engineering, program management, logistics, departmental assessments, test and evaluation, and acquisition of weapon-systems hardware and software from prime contractors. Because the nine programs reviewed did not have cost-accounting systems, the IG used budget-execution reports to identify functional cost categories within the various appropriations and detailed cost activities associated with those cost categories. For FY 1997, the program offices for the 10 systems reviewed used an average of about 69 percent of their program funds to fund prime contractors for the development and acquisition of weapon-systems hardware and software. Those offices used the remaining 31 percent of their funds mostly to perform program office functions required in DoD Regulation 5000.2-R, and to accomplish weapon-system mission-support requirements. About five percent of the funds were siphoned off, however, as Congress, DoD or the Services levied assessments on program offices to fund activities, such as small business innovative research; DBOF cash shortfalls; Bosnian disaster relief; a Presidential initiative on anti-terrorism, counter-terrorism, and security enforcement; and other unbudgeted DoD costs. The IG cannot compare the reasonableness of the percentages with other DoD programs as no benchmark has been established. The IG results, based on a review of 10 programs, should not be extrapolated to all programs in DoD.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91575","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-075","Acquisition of the SH-60R Light Airborne Multipurpose System Mark III Block II Upgrade",2/2/1999 0:00:00,"Overall, the SH-60R program office was cost-effectively developing and readying the program for low-rate initial production; however, two areas warrant immediate management attention before the program enters low-rate and full-rate production to maintain an effectively managed program. At the July 1993 engineering and manufacturing development decision milestone, the Navy Acquisition Executive (the milestone decision authority) did not inform the program office of the exit criteria that he would use to make the low-rate and full-rate production decisions for the Block II Upgrade. As a result, the program office did not have approved exit criteria to track and measure the program's readiness for the planned low-rate and full-rate production decisions. { Without approved exit criteria, the program office also did not complete the exit criteria section of the DoD quarterly defense acquisition executive summary that acquisition officials and the milestone decision authority need to track, manage, and determine system readiness for the planned production decisions. The SH-60R program office and the user did not the update the program documents that they needed to effectively manage the Block II Upgrade. Program documents, such as the test and evaluation master plan and the operational requirements document, did not reflect current programmatic requirements. Further, the program office did not have a command, control, communications, computer and intelligence support plan to verify that production representative SH-60R helicopters will perform as required in the intended command, control, communications, computer and intelligence operational environment. As a result, the program manager cannot ensure that planned testing will accurately evaluate the SH-60R program readiness to enter low-rate initial production.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91576","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-101","Logistics Response Time for the Direct Vendor Delivery Process, Defense Supply Center, Columbus",3/4/1999 0:00:00,"The overall audit objective was to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of direct vendor delivery in improving logistics response time. This audit addressed supply center requisition processing time, which is a subset of logistics response time. The IG also reviewed the management control program as it applied to the audit objective. Direct vendor delivery was not effectively implemented by the Defense Logistics Agency and the Defense Supply Center, Columbus, Ohio. Direct vendor delivery was effective in reducing consumable hardware inventory; but, as implemented by the Defense Logistics Agency and the Defense Supply Center, Columbus, it did not optimize logistics response time. As a result, the Defense Supply Center, Columbus, prolonged logistics response time for 39 direct vendor delivery purchase requests in two of our samples by an average of 45 days. Although DoD established a corporate goal to reduce logistics response time and to implement a system to monitor achievement of that goal, improvements were needed to assist in accomplishing the corporate goal and measuring results. As a result, there was no assurance that direct vendor delivery would contribute to achieving the DoD goal to reduce logistics response time. Additionally, measuring progress toward achieving the DoD goal may be hampered.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91605","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-108","Logistics Response Time for the Direct Vendor Delivery Process, Defense Supply Center, Richmond",3/17/1999 0:00:00,"The overall audit objective was to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of direct vendor delivery in improving logistics response time. The IG also reviewed the management control program as it applied to the audit objective. Although Defense Supply Center, Richmond, requisition processing time for planned direct vendor delivery was better than that for direct vendor delivery for unplanned and for non-stocked items, requisition processing time for all direct vendor delivery types at the Defense Supply Center, Richmond, could be improved. Direct vendor delivery was effective in reducing consumable hardware inventory; but, as implemented by the Defense Supply Center, Richmond, it did not optimize logistics response time. As a result, the Defense Supply Center, Richmond, prolonged logistics response time for 25 direct vendor delivery purchase requests in two of our samples by an average of 60 days (Finding A). Although DoD established a corporate goal to reduce logistics response time, subordinate and supporting goals were not established at Defense Supply Center, Richmond. As a result, there was no assurance that direct vendor delivery would contribute to achieving the DoD goal to reduce logistics response time (Finding B).",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91606","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-136","Government-Furnished Equipment Year 2000 Issues for Army Chemical Demilitarization",4/16/1999 0:00:00,"The overall audit objective was to determine whether the Army Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, was adequately preparing information technology systems to resolve date processing issues regarding the year 2000 computing problem. Specifically, this portion of the audit determined whether contracting actions for the construction of chemical disposal facilities at Anniston, Alabama; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; and Umatilla, Oregon, complied with the Army and DoD Management Plans. The Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization did not assess the inventory of Government-furnished equipment to determine its year 2000 compliance. In addition, the Program Manager did not prepare the assessment, contingency, and risk management plans (finding A). Although the Army Program Manager took positive action to include the year 2000 compliance language in prime contracts for the construction of three stockpile disposal facilities, he did not assess the Government-furnished-equipment contracts to determine whether they needed to be modified to include year 2000 compliance language (finding B). As a result, the Army's equipment and systems at the Anniston, Umatilla, and Pine Bluff sites may not be year 2000 compliant, increasing the risk of delayed completion of construction or operational problems after installation.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91608","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-173","Ground Based Common Sensor System Fielding",6/2/1999 0:00:00,"This report, which is the first of two reports on the Ground Based Common Sensor Program, addressed a pending Army contractual action. This report discusses the Army's plan to field four GBCS Systems to the 82d Airborne Division. The GBCS System was an Acquisition Category III program that was to provide division commanders with the capability to search, intercept, and listen to signals intelligence data, and to precisely locate the signal's point-of-origin for hard-kill or electronic attack. The GBCS System was to be fielded in three platform configurations, the GBCS-Light, the GBCS-Heavy, and the Advanced Quickfix. The audit objective was to evaluate the economy and efficiency of fielding the GBCS-Light System to fulfill the 82d Airborne Division's 1988 Operational Needs Statement. The Army planned to field a system to the 82d Airborne Division that may not have satisfied their needs. The system may not have satisfied the users' needs because the 82d Airborne Division's 1988 Operational Needs Statement had not been updated to reflect the current threat, alternate solutions to the users' needs had not been fully assessed, and the system had a history of nonperformance. In addition, the user had not agreed to accept the system. In fielding this system, the Army may not have been addressing the users' needs to combat the current and future threat. Furthermore, the small number of systems the Army planned to field may have resulted in excessive logistics and training requirements.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91612","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-184","Financial Impacts of Defense Logistics Agency Electronic Catalog and Office Supplies Initiatives on Retail Level Purchasing",6/11/1999 0:00:00,"Retail organizations generally procured items through the most economic and efficient centralized Federal procurement program (Appendix C). The IG also commends DLA for implementing commercial inventory practices such as the electronic catalog and office supplies initiatives. However, the DLA process for developing cost recovery rates for the electronic catalog and office supplies initiatives needed improvement to ensure that the rates were properly computed. The DLA system used to bill customers and pay vendors for materiel ordered through the electronic catalog also needed improvement to ensure that customers were billed and vendors were paid. As a result, cost recovery rate charges were inaccurate and DLA did not have the cost data required to evaluate the effectiveness of the electronic catalog program. Additionally, retail organizations sometimes paid higher prices than if the same items were ordered directly from vendors, and customer billings and vendor payments were not made promptly.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91613","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"99-188","Statement of Robert J. Lieberman, Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, Department of Defense, Before the Subcommittee on National Security Veterans Affairs, and International Relations Committee on Government Reform, United States House of Representatives on Financial Management: The Prompt Payment Act and DoD Payment Processes (Testimony)",6/16/1999 0:00:00,"The DoD faces continued challenges in providing proper stewardship of the resources provided to the Department by the taxpayers for national defense. Improving controls in the fund disbursement process is a vital aspect of that stewardship. The DoD needs to be able to control payments to prevent errors and fraud; however, at the same time it must be a reliable business partner and comply with the reasonable requirements of the Prompt Payment Act. The IG believes that advanced technology and application of sound management principles, including a good internal control plan and effective oversight, can enable the Department to meet these goals.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91628","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"PO 99-6-001","Defense Contract Audit Agency Audits of Contractor Compliance with Cost Accounting Standards (Oversight Report)",1/11/1999 0:00:00,"The Defense Contract Audit Agency audits of contractor compliance with the Cost Accounting Standards add value and consistency to the negotiation of cost-based contracts.  When contracts are negotiated based on costs, which is common practice for most unique weapons systems, the Cost Accounting Standards provide measurement rules that ensure consistency among bids and are understandable by all parties.  Compliance with the rules is monitored and verified through audits.  The Government has realized significant monetary benefits through audit findings related to contractor accounting changes and noncompliances with the standards, as discussed in Appendix B.  The Defense Contract Audit Agency could, nevertheless, improve procedures for auditing contractor compliance with the Cost Accounting Standards.  The IG identified three conditions that require management actions.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91633","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"00-003","The Air Force Contract Audit Followup System",10/4/1999 0:00:00,"The Air Force contract audit followup system was generally accurate and complete.  However, contracting officers experienced delays of 9 to 60 months in settling 12 overage contract audit reports.  Also, contracting officers did not issue demand letters on seven defective pricing settlements involving $1.6 million in contract overpayments and interest.  Consequently, overpayments and associated interest were not collected in a timely manner in all cases.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507649","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"00-019","Procurement Practices for the Composite Armored Vehicle and Composite Affordability Initiative Programs",10/26/1999 0:00:00,"The allegations received by Congressman Ted Strickland were not valid.  The Army did not award a sole-source contract to Boeing for the Composite Armored Vehicle program.  The Boeing Company did not realize a cost advantage on the Composite Armored Vehicle program because it will not be using a government-owned machine.  In addition, the IG did not find evidence that Boeing unfairly excluded competition from the Composite Affordability Initiative program.  Finally, government and contractor personnel did not withhold funding from  Spectrum Textiles, Inc. in order to gain access to Spectrum's proprietary technology.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501536","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-035","Procurement Systems Year 2000 End-to-End Tests",11/9/1999 0:00:00,"More needs to be done to provide assurance that DLA's Mechanization of Contract Administration Services (MOCAS) procurement system will function properly in the year 2000.  The DLA conducted end-to-end tests of its mission-critical procurement systems, but did not test external interfaces for any of its mission-critical procurement systems.  Without additional checks, the Director, DLA cannot ensure that the procurement process will not be adversely affected by data from external interface partners.  At a minimum, checks are needed to ensure that the window being used to interpret the century from the year is clearly defined and communicated to the interface partners to mitigate the risk that the  MOCAS procurement system will not function properly in year 2000.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501535","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-055","Acquisition Management of the Joint Total Asset Visibility System",12/14/1999 0:00:00,"The Joint Total Asset Visibility Office did not establish sufficient management controls and appropriate oversight was not provided for the acquisition of the Joint Total Asset Visibility In-Theater and Global automated information systems.  As a result, acquisition cost, schedule, and performance baselines were not established; variances were not computed to measure results, assess controls, and oversee acquisitions; and budget submissions were not verified and validated.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501534","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-056","DOD Electronic Mall Implementation Planning",12/15/1999 0:00:00,"The electronic mall is a work in progress and updates are constantly being made to improve its usefulness as a viable source of supply.  However, management needed to address several implementation issues for the mall.  Significant barriers to the Military Departments using the mall existed, duplication of GSA supply programs was not minimized, and no metrics or system to measure the effectiveness of the mall had been developed.  Controls were inadequate to ensure that DOD did not pay twice for bank credit card fees, the mall had an inadequate integrated comparison shopping system, and the cost recovery rate charged appeared to be excessive.  As a result, implementation of the electronic mall might not have progressed as efficiently as possible, there was no assurance that procurement resources were properly used, customers could be paying more than necessary for needed material, and depot stocks might not be drawn down.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501531","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-059","Allegations Relating to the Security Controls on Two Air Force Programs",12/16/1999 0:00:00,"The audit objective was to evaluate allegations regarding security procedures on the Big Safari and the Senior Year programs.  No indications of improper security procedures resulted from this audit.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507651","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-061","Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Technology Selection Process for the Discriminating Interceptor Technology Program Laser Radar",12/17/1999 0:00:00,"The selection process used by BMDO for the Discriminating Interceptor Technology Program laser radar technology demonstration funding was fair and objective.  However, BMDO had not ensured that one independent evaluation team member executed the appropriate nondisclosure agreement, as stipulated in the technology selection plan, or ensured that independent evaluation team members had been screened regarding any financial interests in the competing contractors.  Further, the BMDO program office did not formally coordinate implementation of the technology selection plan, which was essentially a contract administration action, with BMDO contracting personnel and legal counsel.",0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501532","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-065","Costs Charged to Other Transactions",12/27/1999 0:00:00,"The management of the financial and cost aspects of other transactions needs improvement.  DOD inappropriately accepted $60.2 million of prior independent research and development, $19.7 million of research funded by the Government, and $3.5 million for duplicative equipment depreciation as contractor cost share.  As a result, research contractors were allowed to reduce their actual cost share and risks.  Also, DOD officials were not always aware of the actual cost to the Federal Government for other transactions.  Also, research contractors' accounting treatment of cost shares was inconsistent, and contractors did not always use provisional overhead rates for other transactions.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507677","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-075","Administration and Management of the Civil Air Patrol",2/15/2000 0:00:00,"The Civil Air Patrol (CAP) corporate headquarters did not have authority to enforce corporate and Federal Aviation regulations over the volunteer force.  As a result, the CAP corporate headquarters could not ensure adequate management control over assets assigned to the volunteer force.  Also, neither the CAP nor the CAP-USAF was adequately administering or managing nonexpendable equipment items (excluding aircraft and vehicles) acquired in support of the CAP mission and valued at about $19 million.  Also, the CAP did not adequately manage its flying mission reimbursement program and mission paperwork was not always submitted and processed within required time frames.  Also, the CAP was procuring aircraft without establishing a valid size requirement for its fleet.  Also, the CAP purchased vehicles without establishing a valid requirement.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507676","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-088","DOD Acquisition Workforce Reduction Trends and Impacts",2/29/2000 0:00:00,"The OIG found that, using the congressional definition of the DOD acquisition workforce, DOD reduced its acquisition workforce from 460,516 to 230,556 personnel, about 50 percent, from the end of FY 1990 to the end of FY 1999; however, the workload has not been reduced proportionately.  From FY 1990 through FY 1999, the value of DOD procurement actions decreased from about $144.7 billion to about $139.8 billion, about 3 percent, while the number of procurement actions increased from about 13.2 million to about 14.8 million, about 12 percent.  The report also identified 9 impacts from acquisition workforce reductions.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501533","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-098","Spare Parts and Logistics Support Procured on a Virtual Prime Vendor Contract",6/14/2000 0:00:00,"The OIG found that the DLA virtual prime vendor contract with Hamilton Sundstrand was not the most economical and effective purchasing strategy to obtain spare parts and logistics support.  This condition existed because (1) the vendor's dealer (used to procure, manage, and stock purchased parts) did not always obtain the best available prices or procure economic order quantities; (2) the parts procured were primarily military specific, so there was no virtual inventory of commercial assets and depot stock to either satisfy DLA logistics response time goals or effectively reduce government inventory, or improve National Defense readiness; and (3) Warner Robbins used the virtual prime vendor contract to buy Air Force-managed reparable parts for wholesale inventory and continued to charge redundant management fees for logistics support.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501618","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-099","Procurement of the Propeller Blade Heaters for the C-130 and P-3 Aircraft",6/12/2000 0:00:00,"The OIG found that the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) did not effectively negotiate fair and reasonable prices for the C-130 and P-3  blade heaters procured as sole-source commercial items.  Specifically, DLA contracting officers (1) failed to conduct negotiations for the blade heaters after the commercial item determination was made and accepted the significantly higher commercial prices without obtaining some assurance that the prices were reasonable; (2) failed to challenge the contractor on the rights to the technical data for the blade heaters and excluded solicitation provisions for royalty information, and thus were unaware of the excessive licensing fees for royalty payments; and (3) used unnecessary third party or DLA logistic support rather than using the actual manufacturer.  As a result, DLA supply centers paid between $927,483 to $1 million or from 123.6 to 147.7 percent more than fair and reasonable prices.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501172","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-100","Contracts for Professional, Administrative, and Management Support Services",3/10/2000 0:00:00,"The OIG found contracting activities and program offices requesting contracts for professional, administrative, and management support services did not adequately manage the award and/or administration of the contract actions.  Specifically, every reviewed contract action had one or more of the following problems: (1) non-use of prior history to define requirements; (2) inadequate government cost estimates; (3) cursory technical reviews; (4) inadequate competition; (5) failure to award multiple-award contracts; (6) inadequate price negotiation memorandums; (7) inadequate contract surveillance; and (8) lack of cost control.  As a result, cost-type contracts that placed a higher risk on the government continued without question for the same services for inordinate lengths of time--39 years in one extreme case--and there were no performance measures in use to judge efficiency and effectiveness of services rendered.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501621","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-102","Military Working Dog Procurements",3/14/2000 0:00:00,"The IG found that military working dog procurements by an Air Force unit complied with the Buy American Act and other procurement laws and regulations.  Also, other allegations were not substantiated.  Specifically, the Air Force unit did not give preferential treatment to European vendors or improperly pay transportation costs for dogs from European vendors.",0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501622","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-107","Navy Acquisition of Air Membrane Dehydrators",3/23/2000 0:00:00,"The OIG found that the Navy properly procured air membrane dehydrators for the carrier fleet and was justified in using other than full and open competition.  In addition, the air membrane dehydrators were qualified by Navy standards and included adequate shock, vibration, and endurance testing.  However, the Navy did not always use the designated Life Cycle Manager to test, qualify, and approve all models of dehydrators installed on Navy aircraft carriers.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501623","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-108","Radioactive Material Containment Bags",3/22/2000 0:00:00,"The audit objective was to determine whether the Navy properly administered the contracts for radioactive material containment bags.  The Navy properly administered three contracts with Defense Apparel Service for polyvinyl chloride bags.  The Navy used the same quality assurance and inspection procedures for Defense Apparel Services and another polyvinyl chloride bag manufacturer.  The Navy had not specified, accepted, or used polyvinyl chloride material in radioactive material containment bags that had inherent defects.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507674","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-117","Independent Review of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service Competitive Sourcing Study of the Depot Maintenance Accounting Function",4/28/2000 0:00:00,"Specific objectives of the independent review were to determine whether: data in the management plan reasonably established the Government's ability to perform work requirements in the performance work statement with resources  provided by the most efficient organization, and the Government cost estimates are fully justified and calculated in accordance with procedures described in part II of the Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A- 76 Supplemental Handbook.  The independent review of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service competitive sourcing study of the depot maintenance accounting function concluded that: the management plan reasonably established the Government's ability to  perform work requirements of the performance work statement within resources provided by the most efficient organization, and the Government cost estimates entered on the cost comparison form were fully justified and calculated in accordance with procedures described in part II of the Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-76 Supplemental Handbook.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"Denver docs","60256","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-129","Air Force Contract for Installation of Radios and Antennae",5/22/2000 0:00:00,"The DOD IG found that the Air Force could legally require the section 8(a) prime contractor to use a specific subcontractor because the Air Force made the decision that a part of the overall system had to be the same form, fit, and function as previously developed by the subcontractor.  There was no evidence that the Air Force directed the prime contractor to continue using the subcontractor.  While the Air Force legally could support the decision, questionable business decisions were made throughout the procurement.  The Air Force did not adequately assess the prime contractor or subcontractor capabilities before awarding the contract.  In addition, the Air Force used the small disadvantaged business set-aside program to award the contract to avoid perceived problems with competition requirements.  The Air Force also lacked an aggressive approach to keep the contract on schedule and meet deliverable milestones.  As a result, the Air Force received an incomplete and late product at a cost that was $6 million greater than planned.",0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501289","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-142","Defense Information Systems Agency's Acquisition Management of the Global Combat Support System",6/9/2000 0:00:00,"The Defense Information Systems Agency had not established management accountability for effectively acquiring and preparing the Global Combat Support System for deployment and life-cycle support as required by DoD and Office of Management and Budget guidance. As a result, the Defense Information Systems Agency could not determine whether resources invested in the Global Combat Support System acquisition provide quality and timely products to users within life-cycle estimates; and therefore, by the beginning of FY 2001, they plan to implement a performance-based measurement system in order to integrate management accountability into the Global Combat Support System acquisition.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507458","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-149","Use of an Open Systems Approach for Weapon Systems",6/14/2000 0:00:00,"Of the 17 major Defense acquisition programs that gained approval to begin program definition and risk reduction or to enter engineering and manufacturing development between March 1996 and July 1999, 14 programs proceeded into the next acquisition phase without program managers clearly defining open system design objectives or strategy for achieving the objectives.  Specifically, users and program managers did not include language concerning the required use of an open systems design in acquisition planning documents.  Detailed documentation reviews of 4 of the 17 major Defense acquisition program offices showed that program managers for 3 of the 4 programs did not document a means for determining the extent of design openness of systems, subsystems, and components. Also, DoD guidance on open systems did not require program managers to assess the impact of a given level of design openness on the long-term viability and affordability of systems.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507678","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-159","U.S. Joint Forces Command Comptroller Division Operations",7/12/2000 0:00:00,"This DOD IG review showed that the processes for budget formulation and execution, for liquidating travel claims, and for the travel and purchase card programs were adequate.  No problems were found in their review of procedures in the purchase card program.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","502676","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-162","Summary of Audits of Acquisition of Information Technology",7/13/2000 0:00:00,"Acquiring information technology in accordance with Congressional direction and OMB and DOD guidance continues to challenge DOD.  Analysis of 30 reports shows that the economy and efficiency with which information technology is acquired varies greatly among DOD organizations.  Within these reports, systemic problems were identified as follows: inadequate documentation/validation of system requirements; inaccurate life-cycle cost analysis or incomplete cost data; incomplete analysis of alternatives to assure that programs are not duplicative and are most cost effective; systems not properly categorized for oversight purposes according to acquisition criteria established in DOD policy; and incomplete or nonexistent acquisition program baselines to record cost, schedule, and performance goals.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507339","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-163","Ground Control Approach-2000 Radar System Test Plan and Test Results",7/20/2000 0:00:00,"The Air Force test planning for the GCA-2000 radar system was incomplete and needed improvement.  As a result, the extent to which controllers could meet the multiple target requirement with the GCA-2000 radar was unknown.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507680","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-174","V-22 Osprey Joint Advanced Vertical Aircraft",8/15/2000 0:00:00,"The V-22 aircraft had 22 deficiencies in operational effectiveness and suitability requirements that will not be corrected and tested before the Milestone III full-rate production decision.  The test team described those items as major.  In addition, DOD had not provided adequate funding for V-22 aircraft logistical support to obtain the required fully mission-capable rate of 75 percent.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507681","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-180","Commercial Contract for Total Logistics Support of Aircraft Auxiliary Power Units",8/31/2000 0:00:00,"The cost savings, availability, and reliability information (pricing data) used in the business case analysis was based on questionable data and judgments and, therefore, did not support the decision to award the total logistics support contract to Honeywell.  Also, the impact of transferring management responsibility for procurement and management of consumable items for selective prime customers from the Defense Logistics Agency to the total logistics support contract was not considered in the business case analysis.  Further, the impact of the total logistics support contract on other ongoing DLA initiatives such as the industrial prime vendor program, or the Honeywell rapid improvement team, were also not factors in the business case analysis.  The IG recalculated that the total logistics support contract could cost the Navy an additional $357,555 to $7,223,475 rather than saving $13.98 million over the 10-year contract period.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","503750","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-188","Contract Management for the National Defense Center for Environmental Excellence",9/14/2000 0:00:00,"The OIG found that Concurrent Technologies Corporation (established by Congress as a resource to transition environmentally acceptable materials and processes to DOD industrial activities and private industry) charged general purpose property and leased facility improvements as direct costs to a contract instead of applying them as indirect costs.  As a result, the contractor issued purchase orders for $ (amount is proprietary) in unallowable charges that are not in compliance with OMB Circular A-122, Federal Acquisition Regulation, and Cost Accounting Standards regulations; and the Army cannot be assured of receiving best value for its contract expenditures.  The OIG also found that the contractor charged lease costs for unoccupied office space in a commercial leased facility.  In addition, the Army did not require Concurrent Technologies Corporation to conduct a lease analysis for another leased facility.  As a result, the Army could not be assured of receiving best value for the lease costs and facility construction costs incurred to perform the contract.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501624","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-192","Results of the Defense Logistics Agency Strategic Supplier Alliance for Catalog Items",9/29/2000 0:00:00,"The new strategic supplier alliance catalog contract offers a positive opportunity for DLA and Honeywell by providing a significantly more efficient and economical procurement and management strategy for sole-source spare parts than earlier strategies.  For the initial 34 items, shipment times will be reduced from a window of 20-25 days to less than 15 days and DLA inventory stock levels will be reduced from more than $8 million to almost nothing.  In addition, DLA customers' prices will be reduced between $23 and $40 million for CYs 2000 through 2011.  Also, both DOD and the contractor will realize procurement administrative savings because there will be only one negotiation and one contract.",0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507682","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-6-004","Evaluation of the Defense Contract Audit Agency Audit Coverage of Tricare Contracts",4/17/2000 0:00:00,"DCAA provided the requested audit support for contract awards, change orders, and contract administration.  However, there is a need for expanded DCAA audit coverage because the TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) requests for pre-award audit coverage were normally limited to the administrative costs, which were only about 15 to 20 percent of the proposed contract costs.  The remaining 80 to 85 percent represented health care delivery costs.  The TMA requested limited audit coverage because of TRICARE development and implementation problems.  TRICARE did not coordinate with DCAA on what audit services should be performed.  Also, coverage was limited because managed health care contracts were initially considered fixed-price contracts with bid price adjustments and, therefore, not subject to audit procedures.  As a result of limited audit coverage, there was inadequate assurance that reasonable and allowable health care costs were charged to Government contracts.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504541","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-077","Statement of Donald Mancuso, Deputy DOD IG before the House Committee on Budget on Defense Management Challenges",2/17/2000 0:00:00,"The OIG representative testified that OIG staff members were actively involved in numerous DOD acquisition reform process action teams and task forces.  Also, in-depth audits of some acquisition issues of particular interest to the Department and Congress were conducted, including spare parts pricing, and the use of multiple award task order contracts.  The OIG also stated that audits continue to indicate problems in the Department's attempts to comply with reform legislation, specifically in the area of adopting commercial buying practices and establishing equitable business relationships with contractors for spare parts.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501592","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-106","Statement of Robert J. Lieberman, Assistant IG for Auditing before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology, House Committee on Government Reform on Defense Acquisition Management",3/16/2000 0:00:00,"The OIG representative identified 9 management challenges, including improving defense acquisition results by learning from best practices in the commercial sector, without trying to adopt practices that may not be appropriate or readily adaptable to the public sector; striving for rapid and far-reaching acquisition process improvements, without overwhelming the workforce with changes that are not accompanied by timely and effective training; and attempting to minimize the cost of Defense support functions, without reducing the workforce past the point where it can effectively handle its workload. The OIG then provides several examples of where the Department has made notable progress in acquisition reform and also set several commendable goals, including--de-emphasizing overly detailed military specifications and standards; using credit cards for nearly 9 million small purchases in FY 1999; and pushing for public and private sector implementation of public key infrastructure technology to enable secure electronic commerce.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","501593","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-118","Statement of Donald Mancuso, Deputy DOD IG before the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Senate Committee on Armed Services on Defense Acquisition",4/26/2000 0:00:00,"The OIG representative stated that the Department has made notable progress in acquisition reform and set several commendable goals, including: de-emphasizing overly detailed military specifications and standards; using credit cards for nearly 9 million small purchases in FY 1999; pushing for public and private sector implementation of key infrastructure technology to enable secure electronic commerce; replacing multiple, inconsistent, and government-unique requirements imposed on certain contractors.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","501288","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"testimony","Reply letter from Donald Mancuso, Acting DOD IG to Congressman Richard Armey, Majority Leader on DOD Management Challenges",12/1/2000 0:00:00,"The OIG representative testified that DOD is working toward the goal of becoming a world-class buyer of best value goods and services from a globally competitive industrial base by rapidly inserting commercial practices and technology, creating a workforce that is continuously retrained to operate in new environments, and heavily emphasizing faster delivery of material and services to users.  Nonetheless, recent audits continued to indicate a lack of effective means for identifying best commercial practices; overpricing of spare parts; and adverse consequences from cutting the acquisition workforce in half without a proportional decrease in workload.  Also, the most fundamental acquisition issues confronting the Department relate to requirements and funding.  Finally, concentrating on prices and timely delivery is vital, but quality should be the most important attribute for DOD purchases, especially for material used by the warfighters.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501594","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-092","Acquisition of the Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program",3/1/2000 0:00:00,"Overall, the System Program Office successfully developed and readied the program for low-rate initial production within established cost, schedule, and performance baselines; however, the following three areas warrant additional management attention: 1. The System Program Office did not ensure that analyses of the potential environmental consequences of developing and deploying the Propulsion Replacement Program were performed and approved as required. As a result, the System Program Office may not be able to inform the Air Force Acquisition Executive of the environmental effect of the program before the full-rate production decision planned for September 2000 (finding A). 2. The System Program Office did not complete its programmatic environmental, safety, and health evaluation (evaluation). As a result, the System Program Office did not receive the benefits of early identification and resolution of potential environmental problems during the system engineering process and cannot be assured that the program's environmental, safety, and health issues, and their associated life-cycle cost impacts are incorporated in future day-to-day decisionmaking processes (finding B). 3.The System Program Office did not plan to develop a comprehensive total ownership (life-cycle) cost estimate for the Propulsion Replacement Program. As a result, the System Program Office did not realize the benefits of performing cost and performance tradeoff analyses early in the acquisition process. Moreover, the System Program Office did not have a baseline to measure future mandated reductions in program life-cycle costs (finding C).",1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91547","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-114","Six Information Technology Services Contracts for the Defense Intelligence Community",4/24/2000 0:00:00,"The Defense Intelligence Agency awarded and used the DoD Intelligence Information System Integration and Engineering Support Contracts in accordance with applicable statutory and regulatory guidance. The DoD Intelligence Information System Integration and Engineering Support Contracts were an effective and efficient vehicle for providing information technology services to the Defense Intelligence Community. The Defense Intelligence Agency awarded 76 firm fixed-price or fixed-price level-of-effort blanket purchase agreement orders valued at $53.4 million between June 1998 and October 1999. The Defense Intelligence Agency management controls were adequate in that we identified no material management control weaknesses in the administration of the DoD Intelligence Information System Integration and Engineering Support Contracts and the award of the blanket purchase agreement orders.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91548","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-125","Audit of the Reporting Requirements for Major Automated Information Systems Programs",5/17/2000 0:00:00,"As the Chief Information Officer, DoD, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) is required to design and implement a process to maximize the value of information technology acquisitions and to assess and manage the risks related to those acquisitions. This process shall be used to monitor and evaluate the performance of information technology programs and, based on the results, to advise the Secretary of Defense whether to continue, modify, or terminate a program. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) is transitioning to using the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary report for obtaining information on Major Automated Information Systems. Our objective was to evaluate the implementation of the reporting requirements for Automated Information System programs. Specifically, we determined whether the information required by current policies and regulations for the Automated Information System Programs is being adequately and accurately reported to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Defense Acquisition Executive Summary report, which is used to assess and manage risk for developing Major Automated Information Systems, is not complete or timely and is not used or received in a consistent manner. As a result, management could make decisions without having received all available information.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91549","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-131","Statement of Robert J. Lieberman, Assistant IG, Department of Defense, before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Veterans Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, on Procuring Pharmaceuticals for the Department of Defense (Testimony)",5/25/2000 0:00:00,"The overall DoD acquisition workforce has been cut in half over the past several years, with no proportionate decrease in workload. The Defense Logistics Agency should not retain any more pharmaceutical procurement workload than absolutely necessary to handle unique DoD management problems that the Department of Veterans Affairs lacks the resources and expertise to handle. In our view, such unique requirements are minimal and the IG remains hopeful that Defense will gradually shift routine procurement workload to Veterans Affairs. The main opportunity for cost reduction, however, lies in achieving the best possible prices. The IG is encouraged by reports of progress in that regard. The ongoing effort to implement the 1999 Memorandum of Agreement should be monitored to ensure that both sides are genuinely committed to minimizing duplication, enhancing the Government’s best interest, and reducing customer costs.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,"Dallas Docs","91551","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-151","Acquisition of the Defense Joint Accounting System",6/16/2000 0:00:00,"The overall objective of the audit was to determine whether the process for managing the DJAS program meets the DoD standards for acquisition of information technology and the requirements of the Clinger-Cohen Act. Although the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) established numerous conditions and required actions after granting joint Milestone I and II approval for DJAS development, those measures did not fully compensate for the lack of requisite planning before Milestone I and II. Specifically, DFAS did not develop a complete and supportable feasibility study, analysis of alternative systems, economic analysis, acquisition program baseline, or performance measures. DFAS also did not ensure that business processes had been reengineered to meet the DoD standards for Milestone I and II of the acquisition management process and the requirements of the Clinger-Cohen Act. The DoD had not yet conducted a proper Milestone review for DJAS. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), and the Information Technology Overarching Integrated Product Team had not ensured that DFAS demonstrated that the DJAS acquisition plan was sound and user requirements would be met. As a result, DoD set a poor precedent for management control of major information technology investments and remained unsure that DJAS program risks had been minimized.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91557","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-171","Reacquisition of Surplus Materiel by the Defense Logistics Agency",8/9/2000 0:00:00,"The IG's overall audit objective was to evaluate the processes that DoD uses in the identification, redistribution, sale, and reacquisition of surplus materiel. Specifically, the IG evaluated the reacquisition of surplus materiel by the Defense Logistics Agency. The IG also reviewed the management control program as it related to the audit objective. The Defense Logistics Agency's reacquisition of surplus materiel, valued at about $114,000, was reasonably justified. The Defense Logistics Agency generally followed DoD policy on the disposal of excess materiel and reacquired small quantities of surplus materiel with a low dollar value. The Defense Logistics Agency issued interim guidance in June 1999 to establish policy to standardize and improve the process for evaluating offers of surplus materiel, but the guidance has not been finalized. DoD could potentially reduce delivery times and put funds to better use by implementing standard procedures for acquiring surplus materiel. Management controls that the IG reviewed were adequate in that no material management control weaknesses were identified.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91564","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-6-006","Contractor Self-Governance Programs (Oversight Report)",4/25/2000 0:00:00,"The objective of the evaluation was to determine the adequacy of the Defense Contract Audit Agency reviews and reports on contractor self-governance programs. The Defense Contract Audit Agency performs a review of a contractor's ethics program as part of its internal control system review of the control environment and accounting system. The review did not, however, cover all elements of a management control system as defined in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement subpart 203.70, iu Contractor Standards of Conduct. Therefore, although the internal control review covered the areas noted in the auditing standards, it did not address the additional areas unique to the DoD business environment. In addition, the audit coordination process between audit offices cognizant of certain contractor corporate offices and those cognizant of related contractor entities needed improvement. Finally, improvements could have been made to the testing of controls for certain audit steps.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91569","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-6-007","Evaluation of Contractor Accounting and Estimating for Postretirement Benefit Costs and Related DoD Oversight (Oversight Report)",8/4/2000 0:00:00,"DoD needed to ensure that group insurance costs charged to Government contracts are reasonable and tested according to regulatory guidance and that information on service organizations is obtained and evaluated.  Also, there was a need for additional rules and regulations covering segment accounting for postretirement benefits.  The Defense Contract Management Agency needed better criteria for determining the reasonableness of postretirement benefit costs. Also, DoD reviewers did not always test whether costs were allowable according to regulatory guidance and did not obtain information on service organizations' controls.  Also, the agency had not developed a comprehensive joint Group Insurance Review Program.  The deficiencies in review coverage could result in overpayments to DoD contractors for group insurance costs that are not reasonable, allowable, or allocable.  For example, at 2 of the 23 contractors evaluated, the IG estimated the impact from the deficiencies to be about $4.7 million.  Contractors requested adjustments of previously unfunded postretirement benefit liabilities after segments were closed because of discontinued operations or the sale of a business segment.  The contractors turned to contract appeals boards, and in some instances the courts, to settle claims representing substantial accrued unfunded liabilities that the Government had not contractual obligation to settle.  Although the Federal Acquisition Regulations covered the allowability issues that arose, additional cost accounting standards guidance was needed to address the measurement of costs and the computation of amounts to be adjusted, if any, after a segment closed.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91571","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-161","Statement of Robert J. Lieberman, Assistant Inspector General, Department of Defense, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Defense Anthrax Vaccine Contracting (Testimony)",7/12/2000 0:00:00,"In summary, the IG determined that applicable laws and regulations allowed the Department to provide extraordinary relief to BioPort Corporation during late FY 1999, but significant risks continued. Because there appears to be no alternative U.S. domestic source, at least in the near term, the DoD anthrax vaccination policy is viable only if BioPort can bring its production facility up to Food and Drug Administration standards this year.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91714","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-187","The Low-Rate Initial Production Decision for the Joint Biological Point Detection System",9/11/2000 0:00:00,"The primary objective was to evaluate the overall management of the Joint Biological Point Detection System Program. Because the program was in the engineering and manufacturing development phase, the IG evaluated preparation of the Block I version of the system for the low-rate initial production phase of the acquisition process. The Joint Program Manager for Biological Defense and the Product Manager for Point Detection System implemented an evolutionary acquisition strategy for developing the Point Detection System and were working diligently to meet an aggressive schedule for developing and fielding the Point Detection System. However, the Services' independent test agencies, in draft operational assessments, concluded that the Block I Point Detection System was not ready to enter into low-rate initial production as planned in September 2000. In the draft assessments, the independent agencies concluded that the Point Detection System was not yet operationally effective, suitable, and survivable and that it needed major design changes. Further, the milestone decision authority for the planned low-rate initial production decision is below the appropriate organizational level based on estimated program expenditures.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91715","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-076","Acquisition of General and Industrial Items",3/13/2001 0:00:00,"Procurement support at the Defense Supply Center Philadelphia was inadequate in acquiring general and industrial items.  Inadequate procurement support was largely responsible for about a 48 percent rise in backorders of general and industrial items.  To address the problems, the Center had a surge in overtime, took steps to hire temporary employees, and initiated a contractor study.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507697","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-077","Buying Program of the Standard Automated Materiel Management System Automated Small Purchase System: Defense Supply Center Philadelphia",3/13/2001 0:00:00,"Vendors were not abiding by the terms of blanket purchase agreements with the DSC Philadelphia that constrained vendors to a 30 percent markup over vendor cost.  As a result, the IG projected that 4,105 of 9,733 micro-purchases could have been purchased for an estimated $1.2 million less than the nearly $14 million paid.  If the DSC Philadelphia improves management controls on micro-purchases, it could avoid about $7.2 million of costs over the 6-year Future Years Defense Program.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501609","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-082","Management of the Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiative Program",3/19/2001 0:00:00,"Several Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiative projects transitioned without problems to either a traditional FAR Part 12 or 15 contract.  However, the audit identified that improvements were needed in program oversight and the issuance of prototype other transactions.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507698","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-086","On-Board Jammers for the Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures",3/20/2001 0:00:00,"The overall objective was to evaluate the test planning and requirements for the AN/ALQ-165 and AN/ALQ-214 on-board radio frequency jammers.  The Navy significantly reduced mission reliability requirements so that the AN/ALQ-165 jammer could pass the operational test and evaluation and be installed on the F/A-18 E/F aircraft.  Furthermore, the AN/ALQ-214, the jammer for Blocks II and III will be tested against the same operational suitability requirements.  By reducing the mission reliability rate, the Navy's logistical support requirement may have to be significantly increased in order to accomplish a 90 percent operational availability rate for the system.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507700","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-089","Management Issues at the Joint Simulation System Program Office",3/30/2001 0:00:00,"The overall audit objective was to evaluate the management of the Joint Simulation System and to address specific management concerns raised by the Director, Joint Staff.  The report concluded that the four concerns raised by the Joint Staff did not warrant further action.  Specifically, transfers of $2.1 million in RDT&E funds between the Joint Simulation System Program Office and the Air Force were appropriate.  Also, there were no indications that the Program Office made significant errors in processing obligations or recording deliverables.  Also, no conflicts of interest or improprieties in the hiring practices of the Program Office for contractor or direct-hire personnel were found.  Also, the Program Office appropriately reimbursed moving expenses in accordance with the Joint Travel Regulation.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507701","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-090","Obligations and Duplicate Payments on Air Force Maintenance Contract FA2550-96-C-0003",3/30/2001 0:00:00,"DFAS Omaha personnel did not completely or accurately post all contract modifications, obligations, or disbursements on this contract.  Specifically, over $2.9 million in erroneous obligations were posted to this contract; 58 disbursements had incorrect fund citations; the contractor was paid nearly $530,000 on seven duplicate disbursements; there were over $700,000 of unnecessary upward adjustments of obligations posted to this contract; and attempts to properly administer and ultimately reconcile this contract were frustrated.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501610","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-093","Acquisition of the Battlefield Combat Identification System",3/30/2001 0:00:00,"The BCIS acquisition strategy and test and evaluation master plan warranted management attention.  Specifically, the Army did not have a viable acquisition strategy to acquire the BCIS at the completion of the EMD phase of the acquisition process and had not provided $918.5 million of procurement and O&M funds for the BCIS procurement objective.  Also, the BCIS did not have an up-do-date and comprehensive test and evaluation master plan, the Army lacked funding to test 19 operational requirements, and did not plan to operationally test a production prototype of the system in cold, fog, snow, or rain.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507702","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-094","Management of Contracts for F110 Engine Procurements",4/4/2001 0:00:00,"The procurement and administrative contracting office personnel did not adequately manage and monitor certain clauses in contracts for F110 aircraft engines. As a result, the contracting officials were unaware of events that impacted contract performance, and funds owed to the Government were not collected in a timely manner.  DOD lost the use of more than $50 million for other priorities and also lost the opportunity costs associated with this money.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507723","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-103","Acquisition of the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System",4/18/2001 0:00:00,"The Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System operational tests, as planned, would not provide the objective test results necessary to support the full-rate production decision.  As a result, the Air Force would spend about $6 million for operational testing without adequately determining whether the system will be operationally effective, suitable, and would provide the warfighter with a first look, first shot advantage within visual range in the air-to-air combat arena.  Also, the acquisition approach of the joint program needed improvement to recognize the risks associated with the rebaseline and the contracting structure of the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System program, and to explore component breakout opportunities for full-rate production.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507703","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-106","Powered-Low Cost Autonomous Attack System Advanced Technology Demonstrator",5/7/2001 0:00:00,"The Air Force Research Laboratory planned to continue refining the P-LOCAAS technology beyond satisfying the system requirements (exit criteria) identified in the technology transition plan.  As a result, the Air Force Research Laboratory might have spent an additional $24 million in FYs 2002 and 2003 to refine the system capability although no assessment had been made to support this continued expenditure.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507704","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-111","Acquisition of the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System",5/2/2001 0:00:00,"Overall, the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) program office was cost-effectively developing and readying the program for full-rate production phase.  However, one area warrants management attention before the program enters the full-rate production.  Navy officials had to use assumptions concerning related acquisition programs to determine the number of ALMDS units needed to satisfy Navy requirements.  Until the Navy firms up requirements and tactics for related acquisition programs and assesses the feasibility of transferring ALMDS between deployed and nondeployed ships, the Navy will not be able to ensure, through programming and budgeting, that ALMDS production requirements remain fully funded in the FYDP.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507706","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-115","Audit of the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Targeting Vehicle Program",5/8/2001 0:00:00,"Office of Naval Research and Marine Corps Systems Command officials did not establish exit criteria and a technology transition plan for the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Targeting (RST) vehicle advanced technology demonstrator program. In addition, the potential exercising of options in the other transaction agreement would result in an unauthorized initial production decision.  As a result, the Office of the Naval Research and Marine Corps officials did not properly plan for the potential introduction of the RST vehicle or emerging technologies into existing systems.  Also, the possibility exists that the Navy would exceed its authority for other transaction agreements by exercising options for production of 39 more vehicles.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507707","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-118","Public/Private Competition at Lackland Air Force Base",5/14/2001 0:00:00,"The Air Force did not achieve supportable results from the Lackland Air Force Base A-76 competition.  The independent review officer and source selection evaluations of the Government's most efficient organization proposal were flawed.  Also, the administrative appeal process failed to reasonably assess the merits of issues in the appeal submitted by the affected Government workforce.  As a result, the current cost comparison results for the public/private competition lack credibility.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501475","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-125","Procurement Actions Related to the 3.0 Managed Care Support Services Request for Proposal",5/22/2001 0:00:00,"The IG determined that there were no improprieties in the award of the contract to review the 3.0 Request for Proposal or in the contract itself.  Further, the contract did not contain a provision indicating that the consulting firm would receive a follow-on contract to fix identified problems in the 3.0 contract.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501611","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-129","Contracting Officer Determinations of Price Reasonableness When Cost or Pricing Data Were Not Obtained",5/30/2001 0:00:00,"Contracting officials lacked valid exceptions from obtaining certified cost or pricing data, and failed to obtain required data in 46 (32 percent) of the 145 contracting actions reviewed.  In addition, price analysis documentation did not adequately support price reasonableness in 124 (86 percent) of those 145 actions.  Also, contracting officials did not challenge items categorized as commercial, and they accepted prices based on contractor catalogs and price lists without analyses.  Contracting officials used questionable competition as a basis for accepting contractor prices and relied on unverified prices from prior contracts as the basis for determining that current prices were reasonable.  As a result, the IG calculated that 52 of the 124 contract actions in which price reasonableness was not adequately supported were overpriced by about $23.1 million (22.7 percent).  Of the other 72 contract actions, data were inadequate to determine whether overpricing existed.",0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501612","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-132","Funding and Logistics for the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System",5/31/2001 0:00:00,"The activation of a depot maintenance capability to support core capability requirements for the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System is delayed and at risk.  As a result, the system may not efficiently transition from an interim contractor support capability to an organic depot maintenance capability.  Additionally, costs for depot activation may unnecessarily increase.  Also, the Air Force F-15 F-16, and F-22 system program offices were not provided reliable cost information to budget for Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System requirements.  As a result, there is a $29.7 million shortfall to acquire 205 system units within the FY 2002 to FY 2007 budget request.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507712","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-138","Acquisition of the Joint Biological Point Detection System",6/13/2001 0:00:00,"The product manager for the Point Detection System implemented an evolutionary acquisition strategy and was working diligently to develop and field the system.  However, program officials released the draft operational requirements document that did not include required key performance parameters; clearly define performance objectives; and fully address system affordability and quantity requirements.  Also, program officials did not notify the Comptroller of the need to realign procurement funding when the production schedule for the Point Detection System was restructured.  As a result, the Comptroller withdrew only $14 million in procurement funding instead of up to $84.6 million. The Director, Joint Services Integration Group Secretariat, was coordinating, for approval, draft operational requirements documents for the Army Point Detection System and the Marine Corps Joint Biological Tactical Detection System that included similar requirements for developing a lightweight, tactical biological point detector. As a result, the Joint Program Manager could unnecessarily approve the development of two systems having similar tactical detection capabilities.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","92068","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-148","Automated Transportation Payments",6/22/2001 0:00:00,"The DOD transportation community's automated transportation process is already a major improvement from the previous manual process, but additional measures are warranted to effectively reengineer transportation freight operations.  Accounting procedures used to process commercial transportation freight payments through PowerTrak needed reengineering. DOD did not optimally streamline its internal procedures to attain the objectives of Management Reform Memorandum No. 15 or to take advantage of the automated efficiencies offered by the PowerTrack service.  DOD was unnecessarily incurring processing costs and late payment charges, and creating problem disbursements as it attempted to annually distribute $1 billion of transportation costs to thousands of lines of accounting.  Also, controls over security and management of the automated transportation payment process were not adequate to safeguard sensitive information or produce reliable data.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507452","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-164","Implementation of a Cost-Accounting System for Visibility of Weapon Systems Life-Cycle Costs",8/1/2001 0:00:00,"Although the Secretary of Defense reported to the Vice President that DOD was implementing plans for a cost-accounting process for weapon systems, DOD did not establish a standardized cost-accounting system to control and reduce weapon system life-cycle costs and to make management decisions, as described in DOD Acquisition Reform Goal 10 and in the Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards No. 4.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507713","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-167","Independent Review of the Cost Comparison Study of Military Retired and Annuitant Pay Functions",8/2/2001 0:00:00,"The independent review of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service competitive sourcing study of the military retired and annuitant pay function concluded that: the management plan reasonably established the government's ability to perform work requirements of the performance work statement within resources provided by the most efficient organization; and the government cost estimates entered on the cost comparison form were fully justified and calculated in accordance with procedures described in part II of OMB Circular No. A-76 Revised Supplemental Handbook.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62612","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-171","Industrial Prime Vendor Program at the Naval Aviation Program - Cherry Point",8/6/2001 0:00:00,"The Defense Supply Center Philadelphia industrial prime vendor program at Cherry Point had not placed sufficient bench-stock material on contract to demonstrate an effective shift to commercial, industrial-base resources as an integrated logistics solution to support Cherry Point.  As a result, Raytheon was primarily relying on the Defense supply system for the bench-stock material used to support the program at Cherry Point.  Although the industrial prime vendor program provided additional resources to manage bench-stock material at Cherry Point and improve parts availability, the program will not become cost effective unless Raytheon can place sufficient material on contract at economical prices. Raytheon also erroneously charged Cherry Point for material on the contract. We calculated that Cherry Point was overcharged by $666,883 because of problems with unpriced items, units of issue, and contract oversight. Raytheon refunded $337,893 to Cherry Point on June 1, 2000.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507549","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-173","Independent Review of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service Cost Comparison Study of Civilian Pay Function",8/14/2001 0:00:00,"The independent review of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service competitive sourcing study of the civilian pay function concluded that: the management plan reasonably established the Government's ability to perform work requirements of the performance work statement within resources provided by the most efficient organization, and the Government cost estimates entered on the cost comparison form were fully justified and calculated in accordance with procedures described in part II of the Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A- 76 Revised Supplemental Handbook and the DoD A- 76 Costing Manual.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"Denver docs","60254","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-176","Survey of Acquisition Manager Experience Using the DOD Joint Technical Architecture in the Acquisition Process",8/22/2001 0:00:00,"Nearly all acquisition managers indicated awareness of the requirement for complying with joint technical architecture (JTA) standards in the design of weapon systems.  Also, program manager responses were largely positive concerning experiences to implement JTA, but the responses also showed opportunities for improvement.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507716","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-178","Summary of DOD Acquisition Program Audit Coverage",9/10/2001 0:00:00,"The objective of the review was to summarize audit coverage for acquisition programs in category levels I through IV.  Fifty-eight reports on acquisition programs in category levels I through IV were issued from October 1, 1999, to March 31, 2001.  Nineteen of the reports issued were from GAO; 22 of the reports were from the DOD IG, of which 6 were classified; and 17 of the reports were from Military Department audit agencies.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507717","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-188","Revised DOD Progress Payment Practices",9/27/2001 0:00:00,"The progress payment policy established by the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in August 1988 and the Defense FAR Supplement policy for payment instructions were not adequately implemented for 82 fixed-price contracts with multiple appropriations.  Specifically, for 6 of the 9 contracts that met the Comptroller's criteria for payment instructions, DCMA contracting officers did not provide payment instructions to DFAS.  In addition, for 76 of 138 contracts that met the Defense FAR Supplement criteria, contracting officers did not include the required instructions.  As a result, for the 82 fixed-price contracts with estimated total progress payments of $915.6 million, progress payments will not be distributed to appropriations based on the best estimates of the specific work performed under the contract using available information.  In addition, DFAS did not follow the payment instructions on 20 of 63 progress payments on 7 contracts with payment instructions provided by contracting officers.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501616","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-189","Multiple Award Contracts for Services",9/30/2001 0:00:00,"Contracting organizations continued to direct awards to selected sources without providing all multiple award contractors a fair opportunity to be considered.  The IG found that 304 of 423 task orders (72 percent) were awarded on a sole-source or directed-source basis of which 264 were improperly supported.  As a result, DOD was not obtaining the benefits of sustained competition and the reduced costs envisioned when Congress provided the authority for multiple award contracts.  Only 119 of 423 task orders were competed and only 82 (69 percent) of these orders received multiple bids.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501614","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-050","Statement of Robert J. Lieberman, Deputy DOD IG before the Senate Committee on Budget on Defense Management Issues",2/12/2001 0:00:00,"The OIG representative stated that DOD is working toward the goal of becoming a world-class buyer of best value goods and services from a globally competitive industrial base by rapidly inserting commercial practices and technology, creating a workforce that is continuously retrained to operate in new environments, and heavily emphasizing faster delivery of material and services to users.  Nonetheless, recent audits continued to indicate a lack of effective means for identifying best commercial practices; overpricing of spare parts; inattention to good business practices and regulations when purchasing services; poor oversight of the several hundred medium and small acquisition programs; and adverse consequences from cutting the acquisition workforce in half without a proportional decrease in workload.  Also, the most fundamental acquisition issues confronting the Department relate to requirements and funding.  Finally, concentrating on prices and timely delivery is vital, but quality should be the most important attribute for DOD purchases, especially for material used by the warfighters.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501590","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"TD-2001-083","Statement of Robert J. Lieberman, Deputy DOD IG before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, on Top Defense Management Challenges",3/15/2001 0:00:00,"The OIG representative stated that DOD is working toward the goal of becoming a world-class buyer of best value goods and services from a globally competitive industrial base by rapidly inserting commercial practices and technology, creating a workforce that is continuously retrained to operate in new environments, and heavily emphasizing faster delivery of material and services to users.  Nonetheless, recent audits continued to indicate a lack of effective means for identifying best commercial practices; overpricing of spare parts; inattention to good business practices and regulations when purchasing services; poor oversight of the several hundred medium and small acquisition programs; and adverse consequences from cutting the acquisition workforce in half without a proportional decrease in workload.  Also, the most fundamental acquisition issues confronting the Department relate to requirements and funding.  Finally, concentrating on prices and timely delivery is vital, but quality should be the most important attribute for DOD purchases, especially for material used by the warfighters.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501591","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-020","Letter to Congressional Leaders on Top Defense Management Challenges",12/1/2000 0:00:00,"This report is in reply to a letter from Congressional leadership requesting that the Office of the Inspector General update previous assessments of the most significant management problems facing the DoD; identify related reports and recommendations; comment on progress being made in resolving significant problems; and identify programs that have had questionable success in achieving results. Despite the lack of comprehensive audit coverage in certain areas, we feel confident in identifying the following principal management challenges: 1. Information Technology Management; 2. Information System Security; 3. Other Security Concerns; 4. Financial Management; 5. Acquisition; 6. Health Care; 7. Supply Inventory Management; 8. Other Infrastructure Issues; 9. Readiness; and 10. Human Capital. These 10 challenges are essentially the same as those the IG identified last year, except that Turbulence from Change has been broadened to Human Capital.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91510","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-112","Acquisition Management of the Joint Personnel Adjudication System",5/5/2001 0:00:00,"""The overall audit objective was to evaluate the acquisition management of the Joint Personnel Adjudication System. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) and the Air Force did not manage the Joint Personnel Adjudication System as an information technology investment. As a result, acquisition planning for the Joint Personnel Adjudication System did not extend beyond the Future Years Defense Plan; funding for the system acquisition did not comply with DoD Regulation 7000.14-R, """"Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation,"""" June 2000, and acquisition management oversight did not comply with the intent of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996. During the audit, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) and the Air Force agreed to work towards implementing a project plan for developing life-cycle acquisition strategy costs, performing independent cost and economic analyses, transferring program funding for development and deployment from the Operations and Maintenance appropriation to the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation appropriation, and transferring program funding and accounting responsibilities from the Air Force. However, despite the system's significance in support of DoD missions, action had not been initiated to provide a prudent level of acquisition oversight. 
""",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91511","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-114","DoD Contractor Debt Collection Process",5/7/2001 0:00:00,"The Defense Finance and Accounting Service did an inadequate job on debt collection from 37 large DoD contractors in the debt collection cases examined. DoD had 204 open debts valued at $39.4 million with 37 large DoD contractors, some of which remained open from the mid-1980s. We determined that 29 cases for $8.6 million were apparently invalid and there were 9 cases for $0.4 million where the collection period had lapsed. Also identified one debt case for $17.8 million was collected by the Department of Treasury but was not subsequently forwarded to the DoD. The net result was that DoD had not collected $12.6 million in contractor debt. The amounts due ranged from $25 to $6.4 million. Implementing the recommendations would allow DoD to collect $12.6 million. The IG identified 148 cases to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service during the audit and DoD took some actions to resolve those debts. If the Defense Finance and Accounting Service fully implements the IG's recommendations, additional monetary benefits will be achieved. The List of Contractors Indebted to the United States, prepared by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, did not include sufficient data to ensure that disbursing officers could identify payments to administratively offset contractor debt, did not include all eligible contractor debts, included apparently invalid debts, and did not include sufficient data to ensure that debts were removed in a timely manner. As a result, the List of Contractors Indebted to the United States was not an effective tool to collect contractor debts, and potential administrative offsets were not made against payments to collect contractor debts.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91512","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-121","Use of the DoD Joint Technical Architecture in the Acquisition Process",5/14/2001 0:00:00,"""The Secretary of Defense Policy Offices have worked to promote program manager and DoD Component use of the Joint Technical Architecture in the design and development of weapons systems and, in response to Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 98-023, established a hierarchy of management councils and groups through which they exercise oversight and configuration management of the JTA. However, the Policy Offices have not yet established centralized tracking and controls to ensure that DoD Components effectively plan and execute implementation of JTA requirements in the acquisition process. Specifically: Six of the 17 DoD Components that submitted JTA implementation plans to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) for JTA Version 1.0 did not submit updated plans as requested to meet the expanded requirements of Versions 2.0 and 3.0. Also, 7 of the 10 DoD Components that submitted updated plans, along with 1 DoD Component making an initial submission, omitted one or more major planning topics from their implementation plans (finding A); Thirty-nine of 43 program managers did not insert JTA or JTA-compliant DoD Component technical architecture standards requirements into one or more key acquisition planning documents. Also, 10 of the 43 program managers did not require contractors to use the JTA standards in supporting the design of their system or system upgrade (finding B); and Thirteen of 15 program managers did not submit a waiver request as required for using alternative standards to JTA performance-based standards (finding C). As a result, the DoD will not fully realize the JTA objective of improving and facilitating the ability of its systems to support joint and combined operations in an overall investment strategy. 

""",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91513","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-127","Data Reliability Assessment Review of win.COMPARE2 Software",5/23/2001 0:00:00,"The win.COMPARE2 is a windows-based personal computer application developed by a contractor hired by the Air Force Manpower Innovation Agency, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, to perform cost comparisons required by the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 Revised Supplemental Handbook. The win.COMPARE2 software was designed to replace a Disk Operating System-based version of the software called COMPARE that was developed by the Air Force Management Engineering Agency in 1994. The overall objective was to perform a reliability assessment of the win.COMPARE2software. The specific objectives were to assess the general and application controls, and through software testing, determine whether computations were sufficiently reliable, accurate, and in accordance with Office of the Secretary of Defense and Office of Management and Budget guidance. The audit also assessed the Government's data rights in the software. The IG concluded that general and application controls over the software were adequate. The IG determined, through software testing, that computations and reports generated by win.COMPARE2 were sufficiently reliable, accurate, and in accordance with the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 Revised Supplemental Handbook and the DoD A-76 Costing Manual. The IG also determined that the Government's data rights in the software were sufficient.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91514","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-185","FY2002 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Obligations for DoD Component Contracts",9/21/2001 0:00:00,"The objective of this audit was to determine whether the Corps of Engineers obligations and related disbursements of DoD Component funds, specifically Air Force, were properly approved, supported, and validated. The IG did not review the Corps of Engineers management control program because the Army Audit Agency reviewed management controls during the audit of the ""FY 2000 Financial Statements: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Civil Works."" Air Force obligations the IG reviewed with the Corps of Engineers were generally valid. The IG's focused review of unliquidated obligations for FY 1998 through FY 2000, constituted 99 percent of the Corps of Engineers available Air Force resources. The review showed that 96 percent of the obligations and 95 percent of the disbursements reviewed were supported by source documentation. However, the Corps of Engineers did not always maintain required audit trails to support triannual reviews and obligations were overstated by $991,942.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91515","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-6-003","Defense Contract Audit Agency's Role in Integrated Product Teams (Oversight Report)",3/23/2001 0:00:00,"The overall objective was to evaluate the role of DCAA auditors in the Integrated Product Team (IPT) process. Specifically, the IG evaluated the nature, extent, and timing of DCAA participation, and the benefits achieved from timely audits of proposal parts as the contractor submits them. The IG also reviewed the adequacy of management control programs relating to the area evaluated at DCAA field audit offices (Appendix A). Results: DCAA has embraced the IPT concept and the auditors have developed good working relationships with team members while maintaining their independence. However, the requestor of audit services did not always know what specific services were required or available, and audit acknowledgments did not always explain what the auditors could or could not provide. Further, audit procedures could be improved for responding to requests for services, documenting team coordination, planning the IPT proposal reviews, and reporting the audit results. Audit file documentation frequently did not evidence auditor participation on an IPT. Budgeted and actual hours varied substantially in some instances, and standard audit programs at two offices were not adjusted to reflect the teaming arrangements. Several reports did not mention the IPT process, and one office misinterpreted the audit guidance on reporting on the results of an IPT process.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91516","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-043","Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams",1/31/2001 0:00:00,"The Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO) did not manage the WMD-CST program effectively. Specifically, CoMPIO failed to provide adequate guidance, training, and equipment for the 10 CSTs. Additionally, the Army process for certification of the teams lacked rigor and would not provide meaningful assurance. Lastly, safety issues identified by the WMD-CSTs were unresolved. As a result, the program had slipped significantly and none of the teams were fully operational. As of January 2001, the certification requests were still being evaluated by the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and none of the 10 WMD-CSTs had received Secretary of Defense certification.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91724","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-013","The Defense Supply Center Richmond Qualified Products List Program",11/2/2001 0:00:00,"An effective product qualification process was not realized at DSC Richmond.  DSC Richmond could not conduct facility audits, adequately maintain the Qualified Products List (QPL) Program's list of Government designation status and qualified manufacturers (and authorized distributors), or monitor QPL-related product deficiencies.  As a result, the Government could not obtain the benefits of the QPL Program, and the users were at a higher risk of receiving nonconforming products.",1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507451","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-021","Maintenance and Repair Type Contracts Awarded by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Europe",12/5/2001 0:00:00,"U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Europe and U.S. Army, Europe Directorates of Public Works personnel did not properly award and administer contracts and task orders for the maintenance and repair of real property in Germany.  Specifically, they did not adequately control and complete contract documents, including records of price negotiations; properly report on contractor performance; and report contract actions in a timely and complete manner.  As a result, the rights of the Government were not adequately protected, and there was an increased potential for fraud, waste, and mismanagement for about $50 million for job order and multiple task order contracts for real property maintenance in Germany.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501595","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-023","Independent Review of the Administrative Appeal Authority Adjustments for Transition Costs to the Military Retired and Annuitant Pay Functions Cost Comparison Study",12/11/2001 0:00:00,"The purpose of the independent review was to determine whether the Administrative Appeal adjustments for transition costs to the cost comparison complied with the Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-76 Revised Supplemental Handbook and DoD guidance.  The adjustments to the in-house cost estimate for transition costs from $17,772,009 to $2,043,076 were consistent with the Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-76 Revised Supplemental Handbook. The Office of Management and Budget and the applicable DoD guidance contained little detail on transition period costing. The few references to transition costing in the guidance did not clearly state what costs should be included in or excluded from the transition period.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91955","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-027","Closing Overage Contracts Prior to Fielding a New DoD Contractor Payment System",12/19/2001 0:00:00,"Based on the closure rate overage contracts achieved during the February 2000 to March 2001 period, the IG estimated that it would take at least 6 years for DOD to close all remaining overage contracts.  The IG's sample of 80 contracts showed that there were weaknesses in the closure process, including inadequate monitoring of contracts that could be closed, inattention to closure requirements, erroneous data about contracts available for closure, lack of coordination, lack of sufficient funding, a shortage of personnel, and untimely contractor input.  Unless improvements are made and additional resources applied, DOD will have a significant number of overage contracts when it implements its new contract payment system.  (Note: DOD was planning to transition from its then present MOCAS contract payment system to a new payment system, the Defense Procurement Payment System, by October 2002.)",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501471","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-029","DOD Purchase Card Program Audit Coverage (Summary Report)",12/27/2001 0:00:00,"From FY 1996 through FY 2001, 382 reports were issued on the DOD purchase card program.  The reports addressed the following systemic issues: account reconciliation and certification (88 reports); administrative controls (70 reports); management oversight (115 reports); property accountability (79 reports); purchase card use (50 reports); purchases (222 reports); separation of duties (22 reports); and training (52 reports).  Because of its dollar magnitude, the purchase card program is an area requiring continued management emphasis, oversight, and improvement by DOD.  Independent internal audits should continue to be an integral component of management controls.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","501597","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-056","Controls Over Vendor Payments Made for the Army and Defense Agencies Using the Computerized Accounts Payable System",3/6/2002 0:00:00,"DFAS field sites did not implement effective and consistent internal controls to detect and correct improperly supported or erroneous payments. As a result, DFAS made at least $13.2 million in duplicate payments, an estimated 30,584 payments in the wrong amounts, and other vendor payments that did not comply with CFR Part 1315.  Also, access to the two versions of the Computerized Accounts Payable System (CAPS) was not adequately controlled and monitored.  Also, DFAS field sites frequently made erroneous payments and other payments that were not fully supported by proper documents.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507450","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-059","Results of the Defense Logistics Agency Strategic Supplier Alliance with Honeywell International, Incorporated",3/13/2002 0:00:00,"The strategic supplier alliance resulted in three primary contracts for sole-source Honeywell items (catalog, build-to-order, and replenishment).  The contracts were designed to address the nature of the demand for different customers and the supplier economics of responding to those demands.  As of September 2001, the 3 contracts covered 594 items with an annual demand of over $26 million.  The DLA/Honeywell strategic supplier alliance contracts provide a significantly more efficient and economical procurement and logistics support strategy for sole-source spare parts than earlier commercial or noncommercial order strategies.  As a result, DLA has been able to improve wait time, reduce inventory, and lower prices for its customers.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507449","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-061","Pilot Program to Treat Procurements of Certain Commercial Services as Commercial Items",3/13/2002 0:00:00,"Only two DOD components are participating in the pilot program, and those components were in the program planning stages and had not awarded contracts under the program.  Other components have not participated because both the legislation itself and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics presented it as a voluntary option.  Additionally, the FAR already permitted procurement of commercial services as commercial items, and components did not consider the program relevant or useful to their purposes.  As a result of the low participation rate, Congress may not obtain the expected information from the pilot program.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501598","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-066","Buy American Act Issues on Procurements of Military Clothing",3/20/2002 0:00:00,"DOD contracting offices continued to violate the Buy American Act on FYs 1998 and 1999 procurements of military clothing and related items.  Of 698 contracts reviewed, 416 (60 percent) did not include the appropriate clause to implement the Buy American Act or the Berry Amendment.  Contracting officers at 13 military installations procured military clothing and related items that were manufactured or produced abroad without determining whether items manufactured in the U.S. or a qualifying country were available, as required by the Buy American Act, or items manufactured in the U.S. were available, as required by the Berry Amendment.  As a result, contracting officers awarded 28 contracts to contractors that supplied $593,004 worth of items manufactured abroad that may have been available from contractors supplying items manufactured in the U.S.",0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501599","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-075","Controls Over the DOD Purchase Card Program",3/29/2002 0:00:00,"The Purchase Card Joint Program Management Office needed to improve oversight and management controls over the 231,856 purchase cards in use and 10.6 million purchases made in FY 2001.  Improved controls were needed over: selecting cardholders; assigning approving officials; setting of spending limits; transactions at blocked businesses; purchases declined by banks; purchases made after card accounts were closed; and management of convenience checks.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","501601","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-047","Statement of Robert J. Lieberman, Deputy DOD IG before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, on the Standard Procurement System (SPS)",2/7/2002 0:00:00,"The Deputy IG stated that when discussing the SPS program, it is important to keep in mind that it represents one of the Department's most aggressive attempts to modernize and standardize its information processing in a core business function.  The SPS was originally intended to replace a jumble of between 70 and 80 existing systems and to support what the Department refers to as the End-to-End Procurement-Finance Model.  The concept of a common system to be used by all Military Departments and Defense Agencies for the whole gamut of procurement tasks, with efficient links to the finance systems, is extremely challenging.  The SPS program merits attention because of: the need for productivity enhancing information tools to offset the 50 percent reduction of the Defense acquisition workforce; its prominence as a major attempt to tailor off-the-shelf commercial software for government use; and its spiral development and incremental deployment approaches.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501588","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-063","Statement of Robert J. Lieberman, Deputy DOD IG to the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Senate Committee on Armed Services on Defense Financial Management (testimony given on 3/6/2002)",3/13/2002 0:00:00,"Though the Deputy IG's statement for the record focused on financial management issues, he also made the following remarks pertaining to contracting issues: (1) DOD agreed with Congress in August 1988 to implement a new policy to decrease the risk of progress payments being charged to the wrong accounts.  The IG reported in September 2001 that implementation had been poorly managed and the new policy was ineffectual (Report D-2001-188); (2) DOD plans to transition from the existing contractor payment system, the archaic MOCAS system, to the new Defense Procurement Payment System by FY 2003.  To ensure a smooth transition, it is important to close as many contracts that have been completed, but not closed out, as possible.  In December 2001, the IG reported that DOD had a 6-year backlog of contract closure actions and needed to accelerate the process (Report D-2002-027); and (3) From FY 1996 through FY 2001, 382 GAO and DOD audit reports addressed a wide range of management control issues in the DOD Purchase Card Program.  Those audit results were summarized in a December 2001 report (Report D-2002-029).",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","501586","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-069","Statement of Robert J. Lieberman, Deputy DOD IG before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations, House Government Reform Committee on Defense Financial Management",3/20/2002 0:00:00,"Though the Deputy IG's statement for the record focused on financial management issues, he also made the following remarks pertaining to contracting issues: (1) DOD agreed with Congress in August 1988 to implement a new policy to decrease the risk of progress payments being charged to the wrong accounts.  The IG reported in September 2001 that implementation had been poorly managed and the new policy was ineffectual (Report D-2001-188); (2) DOD plans to transition from the existing contractor payment system, the archaic MOCAS system, to the new Defense Procurement Payment System by FY 2003.  To ensure a smooth transition, it is important to close as many contracts that have been completed, but not closed out, as possible.  In December 2001, the IG reported that DOD had a 6-year backlog of contract closure actions and needed to accelerate the process (Report D-2002-027); and (3) From FY 1996 through FY 2001, 382 GAO and DOD audit reports addressed a wide range of management control issues in the DOD Purchase Card Program.  Those audit results were summarized in a December 2001 report (Report D-2002-029).",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","501473","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-005","Management of the Joint Simulation System",10/12/2001 0:00:00,"The audit objective was to evaluate the financial and program management of the Joint Simulation System. The IG also evaluated the management control program related to the objective. The Joint Simulation System Program Manager has made significant progress toward complying with DoD security and acquisition policies. However, the Joint Simulation System may not receive security certification and accreditation in time for scheduled initial operating capability. Further, the Joint Simulation System acquisition program baselines are not complete or accurate and may not be attainable. As a result, there were no assurances that the Joint Simulation System would provide the level of information technology security required by initial operating capability or that the Milestone Decision Authority would be able to make informed investment decisions concerning the acquisition of the Joint Simulation System.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91161","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-011","Acquisition of the Wide Area Munition",10/24/2001 0:00:00,"The audit objective was to evaluate the overall management of the Wide Area Munition program. Because the program was in the engineering and manufacturing development phase, the IG determined whether management was cost-effectively developing and readying the system for the production phase of the acquisition process. In addition, the IG evaluated the management control program as it related to our audit objective. The Wide Area Munition program consists of two versions: the basic Wide Area Munition (Hornet) and the product improvement program (Advanced Hornet). The Army and the Wide Area Munition Program Manager did not effectively manage the expenditure of $305 million in research, development, test and evaluation funds through FY 2001 to ready the Hornet for production and deployment, and to conduct the engineering and manufacturing development phase for the Advanced Hornet. The findings include that the program manager did not properly develop and update the test and evaluation master plan and the acquisition strategy to manage the Wide Area Munition program effectively and make informed decisions; and the program manager did not recommend that the Defense Acquisition Executive oversee the Wide Area Munition program as required, even though the program procurement costs will exceed $3 billion.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91162","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-012","Acquisition of the Firefinder (AN/TPQ-47) Radar",10/31/2001 0:00:00,"Overall, the Army was effectively managing the Q-47 engineering and manufacturing development phase and readying the Q-47 for the production phase of the acquisition process. However, four areas warrant management attention before the program enters the full-rate production phase of the acquisition process.  One area is the Firefinder Product Office did not update its acquisition plan to incorporate its revised acquisition strategy to acquire the Q-47. Without an up-to-date acquisition plan, the Product Office cannot ensure that the efforts of personnel collectively responsible for the acquisition of the Q-47 are coordinated and integrated to ensure that the Army meets its needs in the most effective, economical, and timely manner (finding A).",0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91181","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-018","Development and Implementation of Wide Area Workflow-Receipts and Acceptance",11/28/2001 0:00:00,"The overall objective of the audit was to evaluate the adequacy of the development and implementation of the Wide Area Workflow-Receipts and Acceptance (WAWF-RA) application. An additional objective was to determine whether the WAWF-RA application was compliant with national and DoD security requirements. Because of the status of the WAWF-RA development and implementation, the IG did not review compliance with security requirements. The IG also assessed the management control program as it relates to the objective of the audit. After 3 years and $8.4 million expended, the Defense Electronic Business Program Office (DEBPO), formerly called the Joint Electronic Commerce Program Office, initiative of the WAWF-RA has realized limited acceptance and use. As a result, WAWF-RA has not been effective in providing a DoD-wide solution for receipts and acceptance in the end-to-end procurement process. Also, WAWF-RA has not yet achieved the goals of the FY 2001 Authorization Act to implement a means for electronic claims for payment processing by October 2002.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91187","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-026","Acquisition of the Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle",12/14/2001 0:00:00,"Overall, the Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program Office was cost-effectively developing and readying the program for the full-rate production phase. However, three areas warrant management attention before the program enters full-rate production.  One of these areas is the Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program Manager developed a schedule-driven acquisition strategy rather than an event-driven acquisition strategy to achieve a directed initial operational capability date of September 2003 for the system. As a result, the program manager is proceeding with an acquisition strategy that includes high-risk items, which may not be resolved before the scheduled production milestone decision and may require the program manager to add time and funds for research, development, test, and evaluation to the budget to complete system development (finding A).",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91188","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-032","Audit of Major Defense Acquisition Programs Cycle Time",12/28/2001 0:00:00,"The overall objective was to evaluate the Major Defense Acquisition Program Cycle Time (MDAP) cycle time for tracking performance under GPRA as indicated in the FY 2000 Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense. Specifically, the IG assessed whether the process and factors, used to establish the metric goal of MDAP cycle time, were valid. The database used to calculate MDAP acquisition cycle time for inclusion in the FY 2000 Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, was not accurate or complete. Of the 48 MDAPs reviewed, data for 28 programs was incorrect. The IG also identified three programs that were not included in the database. As a result of the IG's findings, USD (AT&L) has contracted for the complete verification and reconciliation of any omissions and inconsistencies in the database. As of December 2001, USD (AT&L) estimated that it will complete the verification and reconciliation of the database by February 2002.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91193","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002--036","Acquisition of the Naval Fires Control System",1/8/2002 0:00:00,"The primary audit objective was to evaluate the overall management of the NFCS. Because the program was in the engineering and manufacturing development phase, the IG determined whether management was cost-effectively readying the program for the production phase of the acquisition process. The IG also evaluated the management control program as it related to the audit objective. Overall, the NFCS program warrants attention in the areas of development and acquisition, earned value management, operational requirements, and test and evaluation planning before it enters the full-rate production phase of the acquisition process. For example, the earned value management system (EVMS) for the NFCS did not provide the program office with information needed to effectively manage the program's cost and schedule data. Without a certified EVMS that accurately shows contractor cost and schedule performance data, the Navy has increased the risk of the program being adversely affected by undisclosed cost and schedule overruns (finding B). The management control program that we reviewed was effective in that no material management control weakness was identified.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91195","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-043","Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service Public/Private Competition",1/25/2002 0:00:00,"The audit was performed in response to a request from Congressman John M. McHugh of New York. Congressman McHugh asked us to review a constituent's allegations relating to the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 public/private competition to provide logistics services at 10 Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service offices. The constituent alleged that the selection process was biased and designed to support the award of a contract to Resource Consultants, Incorporated, because the contractor's program director was a close friend of the Commander of the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service. The constituent also alleged that the contractor was not sufficiently staffed to perform the required logistics functions and intended to default on the contract. The objective of the audit was to determine the merit of the allegations. The IG did not substantiate the allegation that the contract award to Resource Consultants, Incorporated, was biased because their program director was friends with the then Commander, Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service. The IG determined that the Commander, Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service knew the Resource Consultants, Incorporated program director, but they were not friends, and the Commander did not participate in the award process. The Commander, Defense Logistics Support Command, made the award decision. The allegation that Resource Consultants, Incorporated, was not sufficiently staffed to perform the required logistics functions also was not substantiated. As of September 2001, performance levels were being met, and there were no indications that the contractor would default on its obligations.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91210","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-046","Acquisition Management of the Defense Counterintelligence Information System",2/6/2002 0:00:00,"The overall audit objective was to evaluate the acquisition management of the Defense Counterintelligence Information System. Specifically, the audit determined whether the information technology system was being cost-effectively acquired, monitored, tested, secured, and prepared for deployment and system life-cycle support in accordance with DoD and other applicable guidance. In addition, we evaluated the management control program related to the objective. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) and the Defense Intelligence Agency had not adequately managed risk in acquiring the Defense Counterintelligence Information System. As a result, the program was discontinued. Because a business need still exists for the automated information system, the Director of Counterintelligence, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), has restructured the program and plans to invest more than $45 million between FY 2002 and FY 2007 for development, deployment, operation and maintenance. Further, the Director intends to follow a more disciplined acquisition strategy by avoiding and reducing risks that caused deployment delays and users dissatisfaction with the prior acquisition.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91211","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-054","Major Defense Acquisition Programs Cost Growth",2/26/2002 0:00:00,"This report is one in a series of reports on how DoD meets the GPRA goals and discusses the FY 2000 GPRA Performance Measure 2.4.1, Major Defense Acquisition Programs Cost Growth, on keeping the cost growth to 1 percent annually. Major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) are designated by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD [(AT&L]) as a major defense acquisition program, or are estimated by USD (AT&L) as a program that requires an eventual total expenditure of more than $365 million in FY 2000 constant dollars for research, development, test, and evaluation or more than $2.19 billion in FY 2000 constant dollars for procurement. Cost growth is the difference between the MDAP program costs in the current year's budget and the previous year's budget, divided by the program costs in the previous year's budget. The IG's objective was to evaluate the MDAP cost growth for tracking performance under GPRA, as indicated in the FY 2000 Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense. Specifically, the IG determined whether DoD met the GPRA performance goal established for MDAP cost growth. In FY 2000, cost growth for MDAPs exceeded the 1 percent goal established under the GPRA Performance Goal 2.4, Improve Acquisition. DoD accurately reported the 2.9 percent cost growth increase in the GPRA Performance Report for FY 2000.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91213","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-076","Funding Invoices to Expedite the Closure of Contracts Before Transitioning to a New DoD Payment System",3/29/2002 0:00:00,"The overall audit objective was to evaluate actions to close out completed contracts and transition them from MOCAS to Defense Procurement Payment System. The IG focused this part of the audit on the policy and procedures for closing out contracts that require current-year funds because the original funding appropriation had been canceled. DFAS and DoD Components did not take sufficient actions to fund payments on outstanding contract invoices that would permit closing contracts. DFAS Columbus did not notify DoD Components timely that funding was needed to close contracts where original funding had been canceled. Also, DoD Components were not providing timely current-year funding to DFAS. MOCAS records showed that 3,954 contracts could require as much as $97 million in current-year funding to pay invoices and close the contracts. Two of the invoices have required funding since 1993. Unless improvements are made, DoD will have a large number of contracts requiring current-year funds when it begins the transfer of MOCAS data to the new payment system. This could adversely affect its orderly transition. Additionally, the DoD incurred unnecessary costs because of the untimely payments for those invoices awaiting funds, to include approximately $215,429 in prompt payment interest penalties on invoices we reviewed.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91215","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-086","Defense Hotline Allegations on the Procurement of a Facilities Maintenance Management System",5/7/2002 0:00:00,"The complainant made eight allegations concerning the acquisition of MAXIMO. None of the eight allegations was substantiated. Five allegations addressed the procurement process used by the Marine Corps to acquire MAXIMO. The complainant alleged that the Marine Corps should have followed DoD acquisition procedures, designated a program manager, and appointed a senior decision maker to oversee the program. DoD managers are required to follow DoD acquisition procedures, to include appointing a program manager and a senior decision maker, if the total program cost of an automated information system exceeds $120 million. The IG determined that the Marine Corps had initially purchased MAXIMO software in 1997 costing only $1.27 million; therefore, the Marine Corps was not required to follow DoD acquisition procedures for major information technology programs.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91326","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-090","Evaluation of the Defense Supply Center Columbus Qualified Products List and Qualified Manufacturers List Program",5/14/2002 0:00:00,"This report is a review of the Defense Supply Center Columbus Qualified Products List and Qualified Manufacturers List Program. The Defense Supply Center Columbus currently has management responsibility for over 300 Qualified Products Lists and 4 Qualified Manufacturers Lists. The Defense Supply Center Columbus actively procures approximately 186,000 National Stock Numbers from Qualified Products Lists with sales of over $126 million in FY 2000. The Sourcing and Qualifications Unit was assigned the responsibility of managing the Qualified Products List/Qualified Manufacturers List Program. Because the Defense Supply Center management directed the Sourcing and Qualifications Unit to shift engineers to the Commodity Management Group and Base Reutilization and Closure, the workforce has been reduced from approximately 90 staff-years in FY 1989 to 50 staff-years in FY 2000. In the same time period, the Qualified Products Lists and Qualified Manufacturers Lists managed increased from 164 to over 300. Defense Supply Center Columbus did not have an effective manufacturer and product qualification list program. Certification and retention policy for its qualified manufacturers was not fully enforced. Specifically, 512 (42.8 percent) of the required 1,196 manufacturing line audits scheduled during 1999-2000 were not accomplished. Some of the manufacturing lines have gone 8 years without certification. The Sourcing and Qualifications Unit did not receive 1,739 Product Quality Deficiency Reports required to monitor the Qualified Products List and Qualified Manufacturers List Programs. The Sourcing and Qualifications Unit could not trace sources and authenticity of their products because they did not receive 6,479 certificates of conformance and traceability. As a result, manufacturers without the proper certification remained in the Qualified Products List and Qualified Manufacturers List Program. Further, the Services, which rely on these programs, are subjected to a higher risk of receiving nonconforming parts.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91342","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-094","Pricing of Pharmaceutical Items in the Medical Prime Vendor Program",5/23/2002 0:00:00,"Defense Supply Center Philadelphia did not have adequate management controls to ensure that customers were properly charged for pharmaceutical items ordered through its medical prime vendor program. DSCP recognized the need for such controls in 1993 and reported a management control weakness in FY 1998, but a computer system upgrade to compare negotiated prices for individual pharmaceutical items with the prices that prime vendors charged customers for the items was not implemented until August 2001. However, the system upgrade was a work in progress that had not been completely tested and, as implemented, did not provide the required control. Approximately 91 percent of the items ordered (1,754,127 of 1,924,563) during the 6?month period ending November 2001 were excluded from the price comparison. As a result, DSCP had limited assurance that customers were properly charged for pharmaceutical items.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,"Dallas Docs","91386","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-097","Contract Administration Services Function at Edwards Air Force Base",6/4/2002 0:00:00,"Air Force retention of the contract administration services at the Flight Test Center was appropriate and the allegations were not substantiated. The Air Force decision to retain the contract administration function at the Flight Test Center is not in violation of Defense Management Report Decision 916. The Flight Test Center only administers that portion of contracts that pertain to developmental flight test activities and only for the duration of the developmental test. The Defense Contract Management Agency performs only acceptance testing and has no experience in supporting developmental flight-testing. The Defense Contract Management Agency officials acknowledged that they cannot ensure the availability of experienced staff. In addition, officials at the Flight Test Center stated that the transfer of the function would increase potential safety and program cost risk if there are delays or impacts to flight test schedules. The alleged costs avoidance were an unsubstantiated estimate that 25 Flight Test Center employees would be transferred to the Defense Contract Management Agency at an average annual personnel cost of $60,000. If these functions were transferred from the Flight Test Center, the costs to perform the function would transfer from the Air Force to the Defense Contract Management Agency and DoD would realize no cost reduction for the contract administration services function. Therefore, there is no valid reason to transfer the contract administration services function from the Flight Test Center to the Defense Contract Management Agency.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91388","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-105","Fire Performance Tests and Requirements for Shipboard Mattresses",6/14/2002 0:00:00,"The Naval Sea Systems Command and Defense agency contracting officials did not require National Industries for the Blind to conduct sufficient fire performance tests for first article and quality assurance requirements on the innerspring mattresses. As a result, the Navy spent $12.5 million for 90,448 mattresses that did not meet Navy-defined fire performance requirements. The Defense Supply Center Philadelphia then needed to procure fire-resistant mattress covers, costing an additional $4.3 million, to reduce the risk of the mattresses catching fire. Requiring compliance with technical requirements to perform tests on future procurements of innerspring mattresses or notifying the contracting officer if the Navy amends its technical requirements will ensure that mattresses meet contract requirements. Implementation of acquisition requirements will improve the Defense Supply Center Philadelphia's abilities to: maintain adequate documentation on future innerspring mattress procurements to support all contractual actions, require the contractor to provide innerspring mattresses that comply with contract requirements, and require the contractor to comply with contract quality assurance requirements. Improvements should also include requiring the contractor to comply with contract quality assurance requirements for any future innerspring mattress contracts or obtaining a contract modification from the contracting officer.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91389","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-106","Allegations Concerning the Defense Logistics Agency Contract Action Reporting System",6/14/2002 0:00:00,"This audit was performed in response to allegations made to the Defense Hotline concerning the contract for modernization of the Defense Logistics Agency Contract Action Reporting System. The complainant alleged that the Defense Logistics Agency did not properly plan, execute, or manage the contract to re-host the Contract Action Reporting System from a mainframe computer to a mid-tier computer. The complainant also alleged that the contractor did not fulfill the performance obligations in accordance with the contract requirements. The Defense Logistics Agency awarded a task order on an existing multiple award contract to Science Applications International Corporation on March 13, 1998, at a cost of $333,137 for re-hosting the Contract Action Reporting System. The contract task was to modernize the Defense Logistics Agency system for capturing, validating, storing, and retrieving information relating to contract actions. The projected completion date for the contracted work was July 1998. The re-hosted system is currently operational and now more effective but the modernization effort could have been completed sooner and at a lower cost. The Defense Logistics Agency did not effectively plan and execute the upgrading of the Contract Action Reporting System. The Agency was overly optimistic in its assessment of the contractor's abilities; improperly awarded the task orders to re-host the Contract Action Reporting System; expressed concerns about the re-host project, but did not address the concerns until problems were apparent; and performed little oversight of the contractor. As a result, completion of the effort slipped by nearly 17 months and the final cost exceeded original estimates by about $507,000. Because of the delay, the agency also had to upgrade the original mainframe software to make it Year 2000 compliant, which it originally intended to avoid, at a cost of about $298,000.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91391","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-107","Army Transition of Advanced Technology Programs to Military Applications",6/14/2002 0:00:00,"Acquisition program officials were not adequately involved in fully facilitating and supporting the successful and timely transition to the warfighter. The IG reviewed 20 science and technology projects with expenditures of $441.5 million that included 6 advanced technology demonstration programs and 14 science and technology objective programs. Improvements were needed because none of the 18 projects had formally agreed to technology readiness levels; five science and technology projects that were advanced technology demonstrators did not have acquisition program funding necessary for transitioning, and of two science and technology projects that transitioned with expenditures of $36.3 million, one did not meet the exit criteria before it transitioned and the other required substantial additional development by the receiving acquisition program office. As a result, unless recommended measures are undertaken to effectively coordinate formal acquisition program support for the 18 science and technology projects that have planned additional funding of $244.4 million, the Army cannot make fully informed and prudent decisions on whether continued investment is warranted. Management did not use the performance appraisal process effectively to assist in achieving DoD performance goals and the Army Materiel Command's corporate objective. Science and technology officials' management performance plans need to include technology transitioning as a performance element.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91392","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-109","Army Claims Service Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests",6/19/2002 0:00:00,"The Army Claims Service did not appropriately plan or fund about $3.8 million of the $11.6 million it provided to the General Services Administration Information Technology Fund for procurement of support services and information technology. The Army Claims Service may have incurred potential Antideficiency Act violations on the $3.8 million by transferring and obligating FY 1997 through FY 2000 operation and maintenance funds to the General Services Administration without establishing a bona fide need. Of the $11.6 million provided to the General Services Administration Information Technology Fund, the Army Claims Service had about $2.8 million remaining or improperly ""banked"" in the Fund for future requirements. These funds are potential monetary benefits that may be available for other uses. The banked funds consisted of about $2.7 million obligated for undefined projects for which a bona fide need was not shown. The remaining $0.1 million was for three projects involving hardware, software, network integration, and acquisition support and one software development project for which specific requirements were identified, but the funds were not expended in the years of the applicable appropriations. The Army Claims Service also incurred higher administrative costs by using the General Services Administration rather than partnering with an Army contracting office. A lack of policy and procedures for processing military interdepartmental purchase requests, inadequate acquisition planning, and questionable year-end spending practices led to the inappropriate handling of funds. The Army Claims Service also inappropriately used $3.3 million of the $11.6 million in operation and maintenance funds for the development of personnel claims software and the torts and affirmative claims software instead of research, development, test and evaluation, and/or procurement funds. Use of the wrong type of funds occurred, in part, because the guidance on funding information technology projects was unnecessarily broad. In addition, USARCS was not aware of the guidance from the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) that clarified procedures for funding information technology systems.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91394","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-112","Industrial Prime Vendor Program at the Air Force Logistics Centers",6/20/2002 0:00:00,"""The Defense Supply Center Philadelphia IPV contract with SAIC has provided structure and improved availability of bench-stock material at the Air Force air logistics centers; however, the increased costs associated with these improved services and other problems with the existing program need to be addressed. Problems include not placing sufficient bench-stock material on contract economically to offset additional personnel costs and not using existing depot inventories. As a result, the IPV Program uses 55 additional personnel to manage bench-stock material at a cost of $4.6 million and will not make use of almost $9 million of available inventory in Defense depots to satisfy program requirements over the next 3 years. In addition, the current IPV Program was not designed to address problems with the supply infrastructure, contracting methods, administrative lead times, inventory investment, and cost recovery rates associated with most of DoD bench-stock material business. The Defense Supply Center Philadelphia is working to revise its concept for the IPV Program. The Defense Supply Center Philadelphia did not validate the accuracy of pricing data prior to authorizing spot buy procurements. As a result, SAIC erroneously charged the air logistics centers $79,698 on spot buy invoices. Similar conditions were reported at Naval Aviation Depot, North Island in Inspector General of the Department of Defense Report No. D-2001-072, and Naval Aviation Depot, Cherry Point in Inspector General of the Department of Defense, Report No. D-2001-171 (finding B). 
""",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,"Dallas Docs","91409","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-120","Air National Guard Decision on the Asynchronous Transfer Mode Installation Contract",6/26/2002 0:00:00,"The request for this audit was based on information Congressman Roscoe G. Bartlett received from both the Air National Guard and Digicon Corporation regarding the Air National Guard's decision not to exercise the final option years on a contract between the two parties. In June 2000, the contracting officer awarded a $32.2 million firm-fixed-price contract with one base year and three 1-year options to Digicon Corporation to establish an Asynchronous Transfer Mode network at 90 Air National Guard flying units. The Air National Guard sent a memorandum dated September 21, 2001, to the contracting officer with its decision to not exercise the final option years of the Digicon Corporation contract. The contracting officer then officially notified the Digicon Corporation that the Air National Guard would discontinue the terms of the lease as of October 31, 2001. Results: On October 9, 2001, the contracting officer informed the Digicon Corporation that the Air National Guard decided to not exercise the option years because it desired to pursue a technology refresh under a new contract and because it was not able to develop a mutually beneficial working relationship with the Digicon Corporation. However, through testimonial evidence, it was determined that the reason the Air National Guard decided to not exercise the remaining option years was the need for a standard network at all 90 flying units, which required an equipment upgrade. Conflicting statements between the Air National Guard and the Digicon Corporation showed that there was clearly a disagreement between the two entities as to the reasons for the Air National Guard decision. Notwithstanding the conflicting statements, the Air National Guard made the decision to not exercise the option years and was within its rights, as provided by the Federal Acquisition Regulation and the option clauses incorporated into the contract, to make that unilateral decision.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91412","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-123","Acquisition and Clinger-Cohen Act Certification of the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System",6/28/2002 0:00:00,"Program management officials faced significant risks associated with the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System acquisition strategy, making the upcoming Milestone B review and Clinger-Cohen Act certification particularly challenging. As of February 2002, it was uncertain whether program officials could execute the acquisition within acceptable cost, schedule, and performance boundaries. The Milestone B review needs to validate that alternative acquisition approaches have been thoroughly considered. Additionally, establishing time limits to resolve potential issues during system development would reduce schedule and performance risks. As of June 2002, DIMHRS program officials have deferred Milestone B to September 2002. See finding A for detailed recommendations. The Chief Information Officer of the DoD had sufficient basis to certify, in June 2000, that the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System was being developed in accordance with the Clinger-Cohen Act with respect to Milestone 1. However, substantial work remained to meet the requirements of the Clinger-Cohen Act with respect to Milestone B.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91458","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-124","Allegations to the Defense Hotline on the Management of the Defense Travel System",7/1/2002 0:00:00,"Despite recent actions by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, the Defense Travel System remains a program at high risk of not being an effective solution in streamlining the DoD travel management process. The Defense Travel System was being substantially developed without the requisite requirements, cost, performance, and schedule documents and analyses needed as the foundation for assessing the effectiveness of the system and its return on investment. In addition, planning for security at user sites is incomplete. The additional projected funding for the Defense Travel System Program from FYs 2002 through 2007 was $377.1 million. As a result, there was increased risk that the planned additional investment of $377.1 million to fully develop and implement the Defense Travel System and the $114.8 million and 6 years of effort already invested will not fully realize all goals to reengineer temporary duty travel, make better use of information technology, and provide an integrated travel system. The Defense Travel System Program is projected to expend approximately $491.9 million (approximately 87 percent more than the original contract cost of $263.7 million) and deployment will not be completed until FY 2006, approximately 4 years behind schedule. Managing the Defense Travel System as a major automated information system with requisite documentation and tracking of cost, schedule, performance, and security can reduce the program risk. Further performance of a cost-effectiveness study of the system will also reduce risk.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91468","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-126","Acquisition of the Evolved SEASPARROW Missile",7/5/2002 0:00:00,"Overall, the Evolved SEASPARROW Missile program warrants management attention in the area of program documentation, including the acquisition program baseline agreement, operational requirements document, and the Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and Intelligence Support Plan, before the full-rate production decision. As a result, the Evolved SEASPARROW Missile Program Office does not have all the necessary acquisition documents needed to effectively manage program cost and performance, and acquisition decision makers cannot make fully informed investment decisions. Further, the program office will not be able to accurately report the liability for demilitarization and disposal costs for the missiles in Navy financial statements.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91483","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-139","Naval Facilities Engineering Command Environmental Services Contracting",8/20/2002 0:00:00,"Favoritism in the award of environmental services contracts did not occur and the facilities management contract award was proper. However, there were problems with the extended time frames for contracts. The NAVFAC Atlantic Division did not comply with competition requirements in regulations when it improperly extended environmental services contracts N62470-93-D-3033 and N62470-97-D-5000, with a total estimated value of $325 million, for 5 years and 2 years, respectively. In addition, NAVFAC headquarters improperly exceeded regulatory 5-year contract limits by including a 7-year limit for four multi-award environmental services contracts with a total value of $758 million. Neither the extensions nor the 7-year limit was supported by adequate written justification or cost/price analysis. NAVFAC contracting officials made inaccurate interpretations of Federal Acquisition Regulation competition requirements. In addition, NAVFAC headquarters had not developed a strategy to award environmental services procurements and did not coordinate the 1998 multiple award procurement with all its Component divisions. As a result, the Navy did not obtain the benefits from competing the requirements for the environmental services.",1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91484","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-143","Acquisition of the Army Land Warrior System",9/5/2002 0:00:00,"The Program Manager for the Land Warrior System (the program manager) effectively implemented an evolutionary acquisition strategy to develop and produce the Land Warrior System in three sequential blocks to reduce technical risk and to expedite fielding the Land Warrior's capabilities. In executing the evolutionary acquisition strategy, four areas were identified as requiring additional management attention.  Two of these areas are directly related to procurement.  In one area, the program manager did not insert a suggested provision for performance metrics in the other transactions agreement with the Land Warrior Consortium to measure the benefits of implementing the other transactions agreement. As a result, the program manager will be less able to provide the acquisition community with measurable information on the value of using an other transactions agreement for acquisition programs.  In another area, the program manager had not implemented specified processes, documentation, and reporting requirements in the risk management plan. As a result, the program manager and the Consortium members were not using the risk management plan to promote continuous risk assessment and to timely and effectively inform acquisition decision makers on program risk and risk mitigation.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91497","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-145","Effect of the Raytheon Defense Business Acquisitions on Pension Plans and DoD-Funded Pension Assets",9/11/2002 0:00:00,"Adequate contractor records that would ensure the Government received proper credit for its share of contributed pension assets under several of the pension plans transferred to the Raytheon Company did not exist. The Government is at risk of either overpaying or not receiving proper credit for certain contributions made to the pension funds. The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) should request that the Raytheon Company and Raytheon's certified public accounting firm correct their respective financial reports for the E-Systems Salaried Plan to report the unauthorized withdrawal of $7.9 million. The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) should also review and verify the E-Systems Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan asset balances and record the balances in the E-Systems permanent audit file; review and verify the Texas Instruments pension plan asset balances and record the balances in the Texas Instruments permanent audit file; determine the cost impact to the Government that Hughes caused by not properly segmenting the pension assets transferred as a result of the General Dynamics acquisition in 1992; determine the cost impact to the Government that Hughes caused by not properly segmenting the newly created Direct TV segment from the Government segments in 1994; and revise the pension audit guidance program to require that periodic reviews of Cost Accounting Standard 413.50(c)(7) asset balances are performed.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91501","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-146","The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Transition of Advanced Information Technology Programs",9/11/2002 0:00:00,"Congress and DoD officials have voiced concern that technology has not quickly transitioned to the warfighter. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's mission is to develop imaginative, innovative, and often high-risk research ideas offering a significant technological impact on DoD and commercial systems. The primary role of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is to act as the technical change leader for the DoD and its mission is to promote revolutionary technical innovations to support our national security. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has transitioned advanced information technology programs to the military and civilian communities. A review of 17 information technology programs funded at a total of $280 million from FYs 1999 through 2001 showed that all or parts of 13 programs funded at a total of $240 million over the same period were transitioned to military and commercial users, two programs were still ongoing, and two programs were terminated. Transition of programs that advanced warfighting capabilities occurred because the program managers were effectively planning, managing, and coordinating with potential users.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91505","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-152","Defense Hotline Allegations Concerning the Procurement of the Seat Management Initiative",9/25/2002 0:00:00,"In the rush to have the General Services Administration award the blanket purchase agreement by November 6, 2001, for the Seat Management initiative, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) inappropriately determined that the requirements of the Clinger-Cohen Act were not applicable to the $452 million blanket purchase agreement ($19 million obligated through February 2002). However, we did not substantiate the allegation that pressure was present to transfer by January 19, 2001, funding for the FirstGov Web site. The planning for the Seat Management initiative did not identify the return on investment for Seat Management, quantify benefits and risks of Seat Management, and prescribe performance measures that would measure how well Seat Management would support DoD programs. 
As a result, DoD was unable to assess whether a favorable return on investment and expected performance of the Seat Management initiative were realized on the General Services Administration blanket purchase agreement. On June 28, 2002, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) terminated the blanket purchase agreement for convenience. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) needs to ensure that future information technology procurements for that office, through the General Services Administration or another Federal agency, comply with statutory and regulatory requirements applicable to DoD.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91507","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-6-009","The Army Contract Audit Followup Process",9/18/2002 0:00:00,"Although the Army generally complied with DoD contract audit followup procedures, the Army needs to improve the reliability of its contract audit followup databases and to correctly and timely pursue repayments, including interest. One settlement the IG reviewed resulted in a potential Antideficiency Act violation. The Army should create a process for the accurate and complete preparation of Army semiannual reports to improve their reliability. The Army should also include the contract audit followup function as an area of special interest in its FY 2003 Procurement Management Review Program. Increased awareness of debt collection guidance and improved documentation on the status of reportable audits will assist contracting officers to improve their efficiency at dispositioning audit findings. Finally, the Army must conduct a preliminary review to determine whether a potential Antideficiency Act occurred when a contracting officer settled an audit report and did not send the interest payment to the U.S. Treasury.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","91508","Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"97-145","Purchasing Commercial Products",5/23/1997 0:00:00,"The DOD buying commands were purchasing commercial products when practicable.  The Army, Navy, Air Force, and DLA buying commands conducted market research to identify commercially available products to satisfy their needs.",0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501550","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"97-9","Flight Safety Parts",11/6/1996 0:00:00,"The Army's revised policy and associated procedures, implemented by U.S. Army Aviation and Troop Command, for acquiring tested flight safety parts were generally adequate to make sure the Army acquired the parts from tested sources at fair and reasonable prices.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523085","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"97-53","Combat Service Support Control System",12/12/1996 0:00:00,"The Combat Service Control System was being developed, generally based on user input, to satisfy most combat service support requirements.  However, materiel and combat developers need to improve processes to make sure remaining requirements are satisfied.  Command personnel need to make sure other parties get involved in the process.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523083","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"97-58","Savings From Acquisition Reform",1/7/1997 0:00:00,"The DOD IG projected that the Army saved the equivalent of $155 million in work years of effort in FY 96 by using credit cards instead of purchase orders to execute its micro purchase transactions.  However, the Army could enhance the program to potentially increase savings.  Also, key management controls provided an adequate balance between the risks and costs for the new credit card procedures.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","523716","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"97-59","Improved Recovery Vehicle Program",12/20/1996 0:00:00,"The engineering and manufacturing development program for the improved recovery vehicle considered the user's current performance requirements and intelligence personnel's assessment of enemy threats.  Also, the acquisition strategy was generally cost effective.  It included measures to competitively buy replenishment parts, increase annual production to the most economical quantity, and streamline testing and contracting practices to reduce program costs and expedite fielding.  The product manager, however, could have further reduced program costs through multiyear contracting.  Product manager personnel considered, but didn't include, the technique of multiyear buys in the acquisition strategy or their budget submissions.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523081","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"97-76","Contractor Support for the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Operation Joint Endeavor",12/23/1996 0:00:00,"First, the Army needed to update and expand program guidance, doctrine, and training on the use of contractor support under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program.  Specific roles and responsibilities for overall management of the logistical support contract weren't clearly defined and disseminated to all command levels.  Second, revision of some contract provisions would enhance management oversight of contractor costs for future contingency operations.  The Army needed an improved process, such as the use of task orders, in order to evaluate the contractor's cost estimates and expenditures in a more timely manner.  Third, the Army needed to implement a contract surveillance plan--including a systematic method of inspections--during future contingency operations.  Fourth, the Army needed better procedures to effectively evaluate contractor performance for award fee determination purposes.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523740","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"97-77","Contractor Payment Process",1/17/1997 0:00:00,"The Army's contracting offices generally had adequate procedures for processing vendor payments timely.  Analysis of data from 33 paying offices showed the Defense Finance and Accounting Service paid about 91 percent of the Army's vendor payments on time.  Another 4 percent were late, but didn't require interest because the amount was less than $1.  The remaining 5 percent of the reviewed vendor payments processed through the system required interest.  Weaknesses in Army processes and problems within the paying office caused these interest payments.  During FY 1995, the Army reported about $1.6 million (.009) in prompt payment interest on about $15.9 billion in vendor payments--well under the DOD goal of .02 percent.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523744","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"97-156","Reforming Ammunition Procurement - Phase I",3/20/1997 0:00:00,"This review of selected ammunition items showed a substantial increase in production unit costs.  Higher labor, material, and overhead costs resulting from a significant drop in workload caused the increases.  However, Industrial Command was implementing initiatives that should reduce operating costs at the active ammunition plants.  The Army has also been successful at reducing costs associated with maintaining its inactive production facilities by implementing a program directed by Congress.  The program is called the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support Program.  However, better policies and procedures would maximize the benefits realized by the government's investment in the program.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523079","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"97-175","Contracting Under Acquisition Arrangement With The Government of Hungary U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army",3/31/1997 0:00:00,"The U.S. Army was charged for supplies and services in accordance with the terms of the Acquisition Arrangement and reciprocal pricing was followed for identical services acquired from Hungarian government organizations.  However, the Acquisition Arrangement could be amended to clarify provisions discussing lowest cost, reciprocal pricing, and retention of documentation.  Also, Command personnel didn't always follow prudent procurement practices when goods and services were obtained from the Hungarian Logistical Directorate, particularly during the early phase of Operation Joint Endeavor. Specifically, requiring activities didn't always prepare statements of requirements and government estimates for contracting personnel. Also, contracting personnel didn't always: ensure that requirements and other terms and conditions of the orders were well defined; implement procedures for verifying receipt of requested services; limit the use of verbal orders; and, ensure funds were available before logistical support was furnished.",1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523074","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"97-183","Heavy Assault Bridge Program",5/5/1997 0:00:00,"The system's performance requirements, as approved, were supported and represented the user's current need for a heavy assault bridge vehicle to support the modernized maneuver forces.  The acquisition strategy included practices and streamlining initiatives to make the program cost effective. Product manager actions to minimize lifecycle costs included the competitive selection of the program's contractor; integration of the bridge onto the upgraded Abrams tank chassis to, in part, permit horizontal contracting; and planned breakout of bridge unique components and multiyear production contracts.",1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523070","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"97-184","Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System 2000 U.S. Army Training Support Center, Fort Eustis, Virginia",4/28/1997 0:00:00,"U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's U.S. Army Training Support Center didn't base quantitative requirements for the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System 2000 upgrades on the best available indicator of user's needs-usage of the predecessor system.  The methodology considered, if used, will cause excesses and shortages of devices in individual training support centers.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","522937","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"97-189","Compliance with Acquisition Policy, U.S. Army Health Care Systems Support Activity",5/12/1997 0:00:00,"The U.S. Army Health Care Systems Support Activity had an adequate system of controls set up for acquisition and accountability.  However, Army Audit staff several exceptions to these controls, which occurred primarily because activity personnel had a desire to service the customer and overlooked established controls.  For example, the Director of the activity's Network Operation Division orally modified the delivery location for 1,064 computers without notifying the contracting officer or obtaining approval through a contract modification, and the Director signed for receipt of the computers without recording the equipment in the property book.  In addition, the award of a FY 95 noncompetitive Small Business Administration contract didn't allow for competitive quantity pricing because the contracting activity wasn't presented a timely requirement.  Although the contract was awarded as an indefinite delivery-indefinite quantity contract with an estimated total cost of about $2.3 million, 46 delivery orders totaling more than $17 million were initiated within 23 days of the contract award.",0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523746","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"97-205","Incorporating Manprint Into Weapon Systems Development",6/10/1997 0:00:00,"Combat and materiel developers generally made sure the human element was integrated into weapon systems.  Managers appropriately used MANPRINT in 8 of 9 weapon systems reviewed.  The human systems integration training program wasn't adequate for creating an awareness and belief that a fully integrated human systems integration program is critical to the overall success of new weapon systems.  Sufficient training was either not available or not required.  And where training existed it was primarily definitional.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","522933","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"97-268","Army's Small Computer Program Fort Monmouth, New Jersey",8/15/1997 0:00:00,"The Army acquired small computers cost effectively through the office of the Product Manager, Small Computer Program.  Customers obtained significant savings when buying computers from the programs Personal Computer2 and Portable2 contracts.  However, the OIG found two instances where customers would pay more for a high-performance system if they ordered it as a bundled system rather than a configured system.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523065","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"97-271","Review of Vendor Pay Initiative",7/23/1997 0:00:00,"Fort Drum needed better management controls over vendor payments.  The following controls weren't in place: separation of duties; supervision; and documentation.  These conditions occurred because the Defense Finance and Accounting Service reorganized and implemented a new automated system.  These events eliminated controls previously in place.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505754","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"98-30","Achieving Efficiencies In Testing U.S. Army Redstone Technical Test Center",12/15/1997 0:00:00,"The U.S. Army Redstone Technical Test Center accurately computed its direct labor rates based on salaries and fringe benefits, but it couldn't support the indirect cost rate it charged. Also, the center didn't adjust rates for excess funds that had accumulated during the year, and controls over the review and approval process weren't adequate. As a result, there was no assurance that customers paid a fair and reasonable price for testing services.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523052","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"98-53","Contract Termination Process, U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command",12/23/1997 0:00:00,"Command contracting personnel generally released excess funds effectively from terminated contracts once it received instructions from termination contracting officers.  As a result, the Army was able to reuse funds totaling about $6.3 million and returned an additional $1.8 million to the U.S. Navy.  However, Army Audit identified two contracts where termination  contracting officers didn't issue instructions to release excess funds even though costs to settle the contract were less than the contract price.  Had the contracting officers reviewed the status of these contracts, they could have taken steps to expedite the release of these funds.  As a result, the Army couldn't use about $4.8 million for other contracts.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523752","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"98-78","Contracting Policies and Procedures",2/2/1998 0:00:00,"The District's Contracting Division's polices and practices for managing supply contracts weren't adequate.  Because the District chose to retain the majority of contract administration functions instead of assigning them to DCMC, it should have had written polices and standing operating procedures to guide all phases of contract management.  However, the division had issued only a few such policies and procedures.  Also, key management controls related to contract management functions weren't in place or weren't working properly because the contracting division didn't give its personnel the written guidance and supervision necessary to make sure they clearly understood and properly performed their contract administration duties.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","503826","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"98-84","Contract Termination Process, U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, St. Louis, Missouri",1/26/1998 0:00:00,"Contracting personnel at the U.S. Army Aviation and Troop Command (now part of U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command) needed revised procedures to streamline the contract termination process.  Also, contracting personnel needed a better understanding of the termination process, and management personnel needed better visibility over terminated contracts.  In addition, contracting personnel: weren't familiar with the terminations because of personnel turnover; weren't properly trained about contract terminations; and didn't' have timeline guidance to follow.  As a result, command didn't reprogram unused funds as quickly as possible.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523755","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"98-92","Real Estate Acquisition",3/9/1998 0:00:00,"The Army's process for acquiring land needed improvement.  Real estate policies and procedures for major land acquisitions didn't provide for a systematic analysis of long term requirements and development of an overall acquisition strategy.  The Army needed a strategy for acquiring land that looks at total requirements rather than just meeting the needs of individual installations.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523049","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"98-96","Advisory Service Contracts",2/12/1998 0:00:00,"This audit showed that the Army was generally identifying and properly documenting the need for advisory and assistance services for contracts reviewed.  However, Army policy guidance hasn't been revised to incorporate new, less restrictive, exemption criteria provided in the FAR.  As a consequence, some Army activities were confused as to whether required services were governed by advisory and assistance services policies.  Properly identifying advisory and assistance service requirements is important because Congress mandated a separate reporting requirement for such contracts.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523047","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"98-145","Rotary Wing Aircraft Flight Simulators Army",4/17/1998 0:00:00,"Simulators don't necessarily represent the current versions of the aircraft they are associated with.  Several engineering change proposals have been applied to some actual aircraft but not to the associated simulators.  This may have caused some negative skill transfers.  If so, the Army may unnecessarily spend funds to conduct training in simulators as well as the actual aircraft.  Also, simulator management also needs improvement.  The Army paid contractors about $2 million in FY 96 for simulator aviation units it didn't use.  Further, the Army couldn't support the level of skills transferred from simulators to aircraft.  Therefore, the Army may be paying millions of dollars for unnecessary aircraft operating tempo costs rather than using simulators more efficiently and effectively.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","503812","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"98-193","Tank Weapon Gunnery Simulation System/Precision Gunnery System (TWGSS/PGS) For Force-On-Force Training",5/11/1998 0:00:00,"The Tank Weapon Gunnery Simulation System/Precision Gunnery System (TWGSS/PGS) is a significantly more realistic trainer than the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System 2000 (MILES 2000).  Also, the device interoperates acceptably with other MILES 2000 devices that the Army intends to buy and is durable enough to withstand the rigors of force-on-force training.  If the Army could find a way to pay for the more expensive TWGSS/PGS device, it would better fulfill the home station force-on-force training requirement.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523045","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"98-207","Service Contracts, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky",5/29/1998 0:00:00,"Contracting officers appropriately administered service contracts, and contracting officers generally used contract types that were in the best interest of the Army.  However, one contract--for graphic, photographic, and fabrication of products and services--was a cost-reimbursement contract that was no longer in the Army's best interest.  This contract place unneeded cost risk on the Army.  As a result, commercial products and services were more expensive than necessary, and administering the contract was costly and difficult.  The Army could reduce its costs and risks by using a firm fixed-price or combined-type contract.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523760","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"98-210","Contract Termination Process, U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama",6/10/1998 0:00:00,"Command contracting personnel often didn't settle terminated contracts promptly.  Army Audit found that contracting personnel needed to: make sure Defense Contract Management Command's administrative contracting officers promptly assign termination contracting officers to settle administration actions; release excess funds from terminated contracts in a timely manner; and periodically review the status of their terminated contracts to determine why termination actions weren't settled promptly.  Though Command personnel didn't lose the use of any funds, it could have put funds to better use sooner if it had settled terminated contracts in a more timely manner.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523762","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"98-243","Implementing Acquisition Reform Initiatives In Base Operations Contracting III Corps and Fort Hood",6/19/1998 0:00:00,"Fort Hood's implementation of acquisition reform initiatives was generally effective.  Contracting officers awarded fixed-price contracts when appropriate and used best value concepts when awarding contracts.  However, functional activities that prepared statements of work sometimes didn't use performance-based work statements and didn't include past performance as a significant factor in the source selection plans.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523042","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"98-253","Planning For Software Support U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command",6/30/1998 0:00:00,"The Office of Product Managers for the Grizzly and Wolverine systems generally took appropriate actions to manage the development and acquisition of software. Product managers planned to acquire sufficient software documentation and support environments--sometimes using innovative approaches that resulted in access to key data at a reduced cost.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523039","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"98-273","Combining Armor Simulator Capability",7/23/1998 0:00:00,"Combining the Close Combat Tactical Trainer and Advanced Gunnery Training System capabilities in one module has merit.  However, there isn't sufficient time to combine the systems and meet critical M1A2 System Enhancement Program fielding dates.  Also, the applicable Army regulation that governs the development of training devices contained management controls.  However, the Army proponent of AR 350-38 needs to determine if key management controls are appropriate for development and acquisition of training devices. If so, the Army should include them in and annex to the regulation.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","502362","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"98-261","Followup Audit - Savings From Acquisition Reform",7/31/1998 0:00:00,"During FY 1997, the Army used the credit card for 89 percent of its micropurchases.  However, the installations reviewed didn't fully implement the best practices associated with the card.  The Army can achieve greater efficiencies from using IMPAC by greater implementation of recommended best practices procedures.  Specifically, the activities reviewed could realize greater savings by: eliminating most supervisory prepurchase approvals; using bulk funding for nonreimbursable purchases; and making certain the Army uses the credit card for its printing services.  Greater implementation of the best practices would save the Army about $10.6 million in direct labor annually.  Internal controls were generally adequate and provided an adequate balance between risks and efficiencies.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","523719","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"98-282","Contract Termination Process",8/11/1998 0:00:00,"Commodity commands often didn't settle terminated contracts promptly.  The settlement process was delayed because: Commands didn't monitor assignments of termination contracting officers; Commands didn't release excess funds from termination contracts in a timely manner; and Commands' contracting officers didn't have a tool to monitor the status of terminated contracts.  As a result, the Commands didn't deobligate and recoup excess funds at the earliest possible date.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504508","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"98-340","Observations and Lessons Learned on A-76 Cost Competition",9/22/1998 0:00:00,"Many of the A-76 commercial activity studies announced to Congress during FY 1997 experienced delays.  According to the timeline set by the Assistant Chief of Staff of Installation Management, most of the studies would have been completed by September 1998.  However, Army Audit determined that none of the 36 studies involving more than 65 positions would be completed during FY 1998.  In addition to taking longer than planned to complete, the delays will affect installation funding and the Army's overall plan to achieve commercial activity savings.  Specifically, the FYs 99-03 program objective memorandum guidance withdrew more than $1.2 billion from CONUS installations beginning in FY 1999.  The decrease was based on a projected savings factor of 20 percent of the civilian pay for positions to be studied and the assumption that funding reductions would start 2 years after the announcement date for the commercial activity study.  However, because of the time it is taking to complete the studies, budget reductions will occur before installations complete the studies and achieve expected savings.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504504","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"98-357","Program Objective Memorandum 98-03 Efficiencies Workload Benchmarking and Electronic Contracting",9/18/1998 0:00:00,"Army Audit concluded that the Army won't realize savings of about $98.2 million projected for planned efficiencies.  Specifically, savings for 357 of 760 personnel space cuts won't accrue because (1) the Assistant Secretary and the Deputy Chief both claimed savings related to the same 250 spaces; (2) 93 space cuts resulted from base realignment and closure actions; and (3) 14 space cuts involved reimbursable positions associated with foreign military sales.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504511","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"98-358","Program Objective Memorandum 98-03 Efficiencies Using Credit Cards",9/18/1998 0:00:00,"The manpower section of POM 98-03 reflected 76 space cuts related to increasing credit card usage, but 6 of the space eliminations resulted from base alignment and closure actions.  Army Audit concluded there was reasonable assurance that use of credit cards would generate about $19.2 million in savings.  It recommended that the Assistant Secretary reduce the projected efficiency savings by $1.7 million (6 spaces) to recognize absence of savings for space cuts related to base alignment and closure actions.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","504506","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"99-1","Materiel Packaging and Preservation U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command",10/15/1998 0:00:00,"Command streamlined reviews of commercial packaging and buys under $5,000 made extensive use of direct vendor delivery contracts, and made good use of commercial packaging. Command didn't have complete packaging data on all items.  Also, Ar 700-15 (Packaging of Materiel), which prescribes joint policies for all DOD components, didn't have controls and was being revised.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501761","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"99-11","Public Works Construction Contracts",11/13/1998 0:00:00,"The Eighth Army and 19th Theater Army Area Command could make some improvements to the surveillance and design processes for barracks renovation projects managed by Directorates of Public Works.  Specifically, additional surveillance resources and compliance with contract administration guidance would reduce the risk of lower quality control work in barracks renovation projects.  Contracting officer's representatives and inspectors were overburdened with the additional workload of inspecting barracks renovations and didn't always comply with contract administration guidance, nor fully use U.S. Army Engineer District, Far East surveillance resources available under a memorandum of understanding.  As a result, some construction deficiencies went undetected.  Also, building design modification costs totaling about $138,900 could have been avoided if engineers reviewed the design for two-story metal barracks before it was made the standard design, conducted site surveys, made corrections to designs based on final design comments, and coordinated more effectively with the contracting officer before contract awards.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504500","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"99-12","Army and Air Force Exchange Service Transportation Charges in Support of Operation Joint Endeavor/Joint Guard U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army",11/13/1998 0:00:00,"Transportation charges weren't adequately supported or fully reimbursable.  The Army and Air Force Exchange Service overbilled U.S. Army, Europe by about $1.5 million for transportation costs.  In addition, the U.S. Army Contracting Command, Europe should modify its contract with the Army and Air Force Exchange Service.  This contract included some incorrectly computed transportation rates.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507313","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"99-73","Overhead Management and Contractor Logistics Support U.S. Army Simulation, Training and Instrumentation Command",12/30/1998 0:00:00,"Improvements were needed in the process for developing and documenting overhead management budgets.  In addition, improvements were needed in the Army's process for identifying, programming, and budgeting for contractor logistics support requirements.  Also, AR-1-1 (Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System) didn't identify key management controls.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507256","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"99-85","Performance Work Statement--Fort Lee",12/21/1998 0:00:00,"Fort Lee's performance work statement, dated 28 July 1998, and command's planned changes to the statement reasonably represented work requirements for the Directorates of Public Works and Logistics.  During the audit, however, problems with task requirements and workload data were identified.  Specifically, some task requirements and workload data were omitted, wrong, disclosed improperly, or referenced directives improperly.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","522923","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"99-87","Global Command and Control System-Army Program",1/22/1999 0:00:00,"Command and the materiel developer didn't adequately identify or satisfy user requirements.  Specifically, Command didn’t: establish the appropriate integrated concept teams to refine user requirements; finalize the program's requirements timely; fund and develop the system's detailed functional description; and include management when prioritizing user requirements.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505135","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"99-99","Performance Work Statement--Fort Monroe",12/31/1998 0:00:00,"The performance work statement dated 1 October 1998, updated to include agreed-to changes, accurately represented the work requirements for the Directorates of Public Works and Logistics.  However, auditors identified problems in the statement related to incomplete workload data and incorrect task requirements.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505565","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"99-138","Service Contracts, Eighth U.S. Army, Korea",2/12/1999 0:00:00,"Support Activity personnel cancelled 6 service contracts costing about $2.7 million and identified 10 more contracts costing about $1.7 million that were no longer required and should be cancelled, and 2 contracts costing about $1.4 million that could be reduced in scope.  Support Activity personnel could reduce funding shortfalls further by continuing periodic contract reviews and monitoring contract requirements more closely.  Army Audit Service staff identified at least 4 more service contracts costing about $1.9 million that could be consolidated, and 2 contracts costing about $3.3 million that could be reduced in scope.  Contracting officer's representatives made verbal agreements with some contractors to pay the contractors for services ordered rather than services performed as specified in requirements-type service contracts.  In addition, the representatives didn't track or monitor actual services the contractors performed.  As a result, some contractors were underpaid or overpaid by minor amounts.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504499","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"99-140","Performance Work Statement--Fort Eustis",2/12/1999 0:00:00,"The tasks and functions in the performance work statement, dated 15 October 1998, and agreed-to changes accurately represented the mission requirements for the Directorate of Public Works.  However, auditors identified problems in the statement related to incomplete workload data and incorrect task requirements.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505591","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"99-147","Digitization of the Battlefield: Tactical Internet",3/15/1999 0:00:00,"The spiral development approach has given the Army increased flexibility and insights for determining requirements in areas where the Army had little experience.  Although the Tactical Internet's requirements have evolved, the Army still needs to make sure the Tactical Internet's key performance requirements are defined as much as possible to guide and direct supporting programs, influence test criteria, and prove its adequacy for fielding.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505543","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"99-168","Using Credit Cards for Intragovernmental Purchases",4/6/1999 0:00:00,"The Army can realize savings and efficiencies by inserting the International Merchants Purchase Authorization Card (IMPAC) into the Army military clothing procurement process.  Placing the card at the battalion level and using it to make clothing purchases at the Army and Air Force Exchange Service stores would: reduce or eliminate late payments; provide more accurate and timely accounting and reporting of information; produce monetary benefits by reducing Defense Finance and Accounting Service processing fees; and improve controls over clothing purchases.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","504498","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"99-220","Refuse Collection Contract",4/9/1999 0:00:00,"This audit identified two areas in the current family housing refuse collection contract that required immediate attention.  First, based on observations and benchmarking with other activities on Oahu, auditors concluded that the Command should reduce the frequency of bulk refuse pick-up to once per month.  Auditors estimated that a reduction to monthly bulk service could save about $202,800 annually without adversely affecting family housing residents.  Second, auditors identified 204 family housing units that continued to receive full refuse service after they were either vacated or demolished, resulting in unnecessary payments of about $11,750.  In addition, 98 new units were not added to the contract at a cost of about $5,500.  Thus, there was a net overpayment of at least $6,250 for the period.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523975","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"99-235","Affirmative Procurement Program",4/20/1999 0:00:00,"The Army had not implemented the federally mandated Affirmative Procurement Program and, in turn, didn't encourage the acquisition and use of designated environmentally preferred products.  Consequently, the Army didn't define roles and responsibilities, develop and issue program guidance, or establish a preference for and promote the purchase and use of designated items.  In addition, the Army needed to make sure procurement offices implemented contract requirements and reporting for the Affirmative Procurement Program.  Specifically, contracting officers didn't insert prescribed provisions in solicitations and clauses in contracts.  Also, the Army didn't have effective and efficient procedures for reporting program results.",1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504497","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"99-254","Review of Garrison Commander's Areas of Concern, Survey of Contracting Functions Memorandum Report",5/6/1999 0:00:00,"This contracting survey produced several concerns.  First, the Directorate of Contracting Office for the U.S. Army Garrison, Hawaii, did not have the current version of the IMPAC software--FirstView 2.0G that operates under Windows 95.  After identifying this problem, the purchase card provider provided the proper software.  However, most Command personnel were not familiar with Microsoft Access software and required appropriate training.  Also, the auditors recommended that the Command take the lead, through the Joint Acquisition Management Board, in coordinating with the other Services to identify contract requirements that could potentially be served by common joint service installation contracts.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","504339","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"99-266","Total Environmental Restoration Contracts, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers",6/25/1999 0:00:00,"To more effectively execute a new contracting concept know as TERC, the Corps needed to update the management plan by incorporating lessons learned and clarifying some areas.  The Corps districts didn't effectively implement of manage all aspects of the concept.  Districts had varying interpretations of the management plan in implementing established controls and meeting the intent.  Specifically, some districts did not always: designate a program manager dedicated to maintaining total oversight of contracts awarded; issue Quality Assurance Plans for task orders; issue appointment letters for Contracting Officer Representatives; adequately document reviews of the contractor's performance; and issue Memorandums of Agreement.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504502","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"99-285","Best Practices for Clothing Alteration",6/28/1999 0:00:00,"The Army's current procedures weren't adequate to allow soldiers located in remote geographical areas to obtain uniform alterations without added costs.  The Army Reserve has designed and implemented interim best practice procedures for remotely located soldiers to obtain alterations from the Army and Air Force Exchange Service stores.  These procedures, along with additional best practices, can be a model for the Army.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504821","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"99-288","Specific Contract Issues, Survey of Contracting Functions Memorandum Report",5/20/1999 0:00:00,"The OIG identified issues related to 6 different contracts awarded by the U.S. Army Garrison, Hawaii.  The specific issues were: (1) The replacement parts inventory list in the Preventative Maintenance Services contract had several items that were identical or interchangeable to items that were available at a local store for lower than contract prices; (2) A contractor billed the Army for state taxes despite a tax exemption contract provision; (3) Auditors could not determine if the Army received full credit for rebates received from the Electric company because command personnel did not keep supporting documents; (4) and (5) Contracting officer representatives approved payment requests without verification on two separate contracts; and (6) The laundry contractor failed to remit monthly fees collected from customers to DFAS.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504365","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"99-289","Survey of Contracting Functions, U.S. Army Pacific",5/20/1999 0:00:00,"Command activities had done a good job of identifying recurring, systemic problems in contract requirements and contract administration.  Recent inspections and reviews have focused on these areas.  However, audit results led to the reduction of bulk refuse pick-up service from weekly to twice a month and the immediate recapture of about $137,000 of funds provided to the Navy for maintenance and repair of family housing units.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504364","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"99-355","Aliamanu Military Reservation Maintenance and Repair Contracts, Audit of Interservice Support Costs and Reimbursements",8/17/1999 0:00:00,"This audit determined that the U.S. Army Garrison, Hawaii could save about $624,200 annually by providing its own contracting functions for some maintenance and repair projects at Aliamanu Military Reservation.  To achieve the estimated savings, the Garrison should assume contract administration responsibilities for the maintenance and repair mission for the Aliamanu Military Reservation housing area that was being administered by the Navy Public Works Center.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504362","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"99-372","Commentary on Network Managers for the Digitized Battlefield",8/19/1999 0:00:00,"Aggressive timelines and limited resources are the biggest challenges for developing the Integrated System Control Version 4--the planned network management tool for brigade and below.  Providing and retaining an adequate number of skilled signal network managers and determining the degree of contractor involvement needed are key challenges for providing network manager personnel. Training challenges include keeping pace with information technology and providing training for digitized and non-digitized equipment.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","504458","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"00-16","Tank Training Devices for National Guard Units U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command",11/1/1999 0:00:00,"The Army needs to decide on which of two gunnery devices will be the primary training device for the National Guard.  Without a decision, the Army may retain or acquire unneeded devices.  Also, if the Abrams Full Crew Trainer is successfully upgraded, the National Guard could phase out all of its M1 Conduct of Fire Trainers not scheduled for upgrade, resulting in a cost avoidance of about $5.3 million.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","502955","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"00-28","Audit of Use of International Merchant Purchase Authorization Card (IMPAC)",11/12/1999 0:00:00,"The Army's Civilian Operations Center Management Agency used purchase cards to make 13 purchases that cost $7,556 and weren't necessary expenses.  Also, the Management Agency didn't fully comply with Army acquisition policies and limits.  Specifically, it split 6 orders into 13 purchases circumventing management controls associated with purchases over $2,500.  Also, it didn't' obtain competitive price quotes for three purchases over $2,500, allowed unauthorized personnel to use purchase cards, and didn't use mandatory sources and small business set-aside vendors to obtain supplies and services.",0,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","504496","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"00-29","Audit of Use of International Merchant Purchase Authorization Card (IMPAC)",11/10/1999 0:00:00,"The Army's Northeast Civilian Personnel Operations Center used a purchase card to purchase two coffee urns, which weren't a necessary expense.  Also, the Center didn't fully comply with Army acquisition policies and limits.  Specifically, it split three orders into eight purchases circumventing management controls associated with purchases over $2,500.  Also, it didn't obtain competitive price quotes for two purchases that were over $2,500 and didn't always obtain office supplies from mandatory sources.  Also, reasonable prices may not have been obtained on all supplies and services because the Center didn't obtain competitive price quotes.",0,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","504494","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"00-194","Equipment Purchased Through Contracts, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina",4/28/2000 0:00:00,"Command personnel often didn't obtain proper approval or have a valid authorization before purchasing equipment.  Specifically, Army Audit staff reviewed 69 equipment purchases (39 contract purchases and 30 credit card purchases) and found that command personnel didn't obtain proper approval or have a valid authorization for 16 (23.2 percent) of the purchases totaling about $564,000.  This occurred because personnel didn't submit purchase requests through the proper approval channels or to the property book office for validation before they purchased the items.  In addition, justifications for some purchases didn't adequately address equipment requirements, include detailed distribution plans or fully consider other issues.  As a result, equipment was on hand from 4 to 10 months without being used.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","505679","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"00-199","Contracts for Field-Level Maintenance of Tactical Equipment",3/14/2000 0:00:00,"Fort Campbell hadn't implemented effective procedures for reporting and evaluating the productivity of aviation maintenance operations or identifying the level of contract support that was needed to augment its military mechanic workforce.  Performance measures such as utilization rates, production backlogs, and efficiency rates weren't used to evaluate contract maintenance operations.  Without such measures, the contractor's performance couldn't be adequately assessed.  Further, procedures hadn't been developed and soldier usage rates weren't used to calculate the number of contractor personnel needed to support aviation procedures.  As a result, there was no assurance that the proper level of contract support was acquired or that the contractor's performance was commensurate with the contract cost.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505680","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"00-204","Foreign Military Sales U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command Huntsville, Alabama",4/6/2000 0:00:00,"Some changes to the organizational structure and operating practices should improve the efficiency and effectiveness of foreign military sales operations.  The International Logistics Master Record database generally provided program managers with information needed to manage individual programs, but the database couldn't be used to evaluate program performance.  Also, security assistance personnel couldn't effectively use the Defense Security Assistance Management System to accomplish the security assistance mission.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","503897","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"00-206","Contracts for Chemical Agent Resistant Coating, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army",4/2/2000 0:00:00,"The process for identifying requirements and administering chemical agent resistant coating contracts weren't adequate.  Specifically, units didn't inspect vehicles to assess the need for painting when they defined requirements and included quantities in excess of on-hand quantities.  Also, delivery orders didn't list the serial number of the equipment that was to receive the coating, only the quantities by type and location, resulting in many problems during contract execution.  As a result, some vehicles were painted twice and there was no process in place for making sure that the appropriate quantity of vehicles were delivered to contractors.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505677","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"00-210","Contracts for Maintenance of Tactical Equipment in the Field, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army",4/4/2000 0:00:00,"U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army needed to improve the procedures used to justify contract maintenance support to aviation units.  Specifically, some maintenance requirements were double-counted by the intermediate maintenance activity and units; estimates of phase and unscheduled maintenance for the same type of aircraft varied significantly from unit to unit; and the number of hours that military mechanics were available to perform aviation maintenance was overstated.  Also, U.S. Army Europe needs to reevaluate its use of contractor personnel to operate the reserve storage activity.  Auditors estimated that the Army could save almost $1.8 million annually by replacing contract workforce acquired using a time and materials contract awarded by the U.S. Air Force with locally hired civilians.  Also, contracts for the maintenance of tactical equipment weren't always properly administered.  Specifically, unit quality assurance personnel had not developed quality assurance plans or performance standards to evaluate the efficiency of contractors.  In addition, unit project officers often didn't prepare monthly contractor evaluation sheets.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505678","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-341","Global Combat Support System-Army Program Contract",6/22/2001 0:00:00,"The Project Manager and the contracting activity didn't comply with the detailed requirements for evaluating contractor performance.  Specifically, they didn't establish criteria for evaluating the competing contractors that executed task orders used as the basis for selecting the ""prime"" contractor, and they didn't document the rationale selecting the ""prime""  contractor.  These requirements fall under the ""fair opportunity to be selected"" provisions of the act, and not following them could have resulted in award protests from ""non-selected"" contractors.  Also, the selected time and materials contracts wasn't the optimal type for an information technology program, and it lacked provisions dealing with incentives and ownership of work in progress.",1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501348","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-366","Administering Service Contracts (Dining Facility Services)",7/3/2001 0:00:00,"The contracting officer made sure the contracting officer representative was formally assigned and trained in administering contracts.  Aviation and Missile Command could strengthen procedures for assessing contractor performance by validating and using the quality assurance surveillance plan.  Also, the contracting officer certified the validity of requirements before exercising contract options.  However, contracting and requiring activity personnel could strengthen procedures by placing more emphasis on historical and projected number of meals served when validating requirements.  By placing more emphasis on headcount data, command would have more assurance that the military dining facility is operating effectively and efficiently.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501354","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-377","Administering Service Contracts (Custodial Services)",7/17/2001 0:00:00,"Command personnel needed to validate the completeness of square footage data used as the basis for payments.  Because such validations weren't performed, command personnel didn't detect invoice errors and authorized reimbursement for about $12,000 less than the contractor was entitled to.  Also, the contracting officer made sure his representative was formally assigned and trained in administering contracts.  However, another employee who also monitored contractor performance needed to be formally assigned and trained.  Command had a quality assurance surveillance plan, but the plan needed more detail so it could serve as a guide for assessing all significant aspects of contractor performance.  Also, contract requirements for custodial service sometimes weren't reviewed and adjusted when necessary because of weaknesses in procedures for identifying changing needs.  By improving procedures, command could increase assurance that is isn't paying for services that it doesn't need.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501353","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-378","Administering Service Contracts (Software Engineering, Maintenance, and Training Support)",7/18/2001 0:00:00,"Quality assurance plans and procedures for assessing contractor performance and deficiencies weren't sufficiently defined.  The procuring contracting officer delegated contract administration responsibilities to the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).  An Aviation and Missile Command employee was also monitoring the contractor's performance, but DCMA wasn't aware of her role or her assessment results.  Contracting and project office personnel need to work together to decide whether monitoring contractor performance is necessary at locations other than the contractor's facilities.  Also, Command needs to make sure it develops and uses a quality assurance surveillance plan for evaluating contractor performance.  The plan should clearly define responsibilities and provide for coordination between Aviation and Missile Command and DCMA.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501352","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-382","Administering Service Contracts (Grounds Maintenance)",7/31/2001 0:00:00,"Contracting personnel needed to strengthen procedures for assessing contractor performance by developing a quality assurance surveillance plan.  The contracting officer made sure his representative was formally assigned and trained in administering contracts.  However, the contracting officer needed to make sure the employee assisting in monitoring contractor performance was formally assigned and trained.  Procedures were in effect to make sure contract requirements were reviewed and adjusted as necessary.  The contracting officer certified the validity of requirements before exercising the first contract option.  In addition, contracting and requiring activity personnel periodically reviewed contract requirements to see if they needed adjustment.  Such adjustments were evident in periodic modifications to annual delivery orders.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501347","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-383","Administering Service Contracts (Installation Support Services)",9/5/2001 0:00:00,"The contracting officer made sure the contracting officer representatives were formally assigned and trained in administering contracts.  However, the contracting officer needed to make sure other employees who monitored contractor performance were formally assigned and trained.  In addition, command didn't have a quality assurance surveillance plan that was sufficiently detailed to serve as a guide for assessing contractor performance.  Having a detailed plan would increase the government's assurance that surveillance is effective and efficient throughout the life of the contract.  Procedures were in effect to make sure contract requirements were reviewed and adjusted, as necessary.  The contracting officer certified the validity of requirements before exercising contract options. In addition, activity personnel periodically reviewed contract requirements to see if they needed adjustment.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501344","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-395","Energy Savings Performance Contracts (Walter Reed Army Medical Center)",9/14/2001 0:00:00,"Energy savings baselines weren't adequately established.  The baselines were incorrect because contractors used inflated operating hours, quantities of equipment, and incorrect methodologies and assumptions.  They also didn't provide adequate detail to identify the operation and maintenance savings for each energy conservative measure.  In addition, project cost and savings weren't valid because the energy savings baseline wasn't adequate, material and labor costs appeared excessive, and Directorate of Public Works personnel removed installed energy conservation measures.  Also, the contractor didn't provide adequate detail to justify the operation and maintenance savings for each energy conservation measure installed.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501343","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-442","Initial Brigade Combat Team Materiel Requirements",9/21/2001 0:00:00,"To date, the Army has effectively managed the process to select and field materiel for the Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT).  The Army effectively used the Interim Organizational and Operational Plan as a conceptual basis for selecting materiel for the IBCT.  As a result, the Army has put itself into position to make sound decisions for selecting materiel.  However, some materiel selected for the IBCT may not be ready for full release to the unit by the Initial Operational Capability date.  Consequently, the Army was pursuing interim/conditional release strategies for some items.  By releasing materiel early, the Army is assuming significant risk.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","502980","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-466","Energy Savings Performance Contracts (U.S. Army Infantry Center and Fort Benning, Georgia)",9/20/2001 0:00:00,"Energy savings baselines weren't adequately established because the contractor didn't adequately present the underlying baselines.  In addition, U.S. Army Infantry Center and Fort Benning didn't provide adequate contract administration and oversight.  Also, project costs and savings weren't valid because the energy savings baselines weren't adequate, labor costs appeared to be excessive, and Fort Benning didn't verify the energy savings.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501342","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-471","Energy Savings Performance Contracts (U.S. Army Joint Readiness, Training Center and Fort Polk, Fort Polk, Louisiana)",9/24/2001 0:00:00,"Energy savings baselines weren't adequately established.  On two ongoing contracts, the baselines were incorrect because the contractor used inflated operating hours and incorrect assumptions.  Also, Fort Polk didn't have adequate contract oversight functions.  Also, project costs and savings weren't accurate and savings may not be realized.  This occurred because the baseline was overstated, Army representatives didn't verify contractor measurements, and one contract didn't have provisions for unforeseen contingencies such as reduced occupancy, demolitions or conflicting information.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501341","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"02-4","Contract Administration at Army Ammunition Plants",11/5/2001 0:00:00,"Contract administration at the ammunition plants was generally effective for making sure the Army received quality ammunition that met production contract specifications.  However, improvements were needed over facility-use contracts to make sure statements of work were clear, quality assurance plans were prepared, and services paid for were received.  In addition, contracts lacked procedures for withholding contractors' payments for poor or nonperformance of services.  Also, contracting personnel applied appropriate contract administrative actions to minimize operating costs at inactive facilities.  They made sure contractors performed only necessary maintenance to maintain facilities and initiated other actions to reduce operating costs.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501382","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"02-66","Administering Service Contracts (U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama)",11/20/2001 0:00:00,"Contracting and requiring activity personnel needed to improve plans and procedures for assessing contractor performance and addressing deficiencies.  Improvements were needed in formally assigning and training personnel who monitored contractor performance, and in developing and using quality assurance surveillance plans.  Also, requirements sometimes weren't reviewed and adjusted as necessary.  Command needed to strengthen procedures by requiring personnel to document the methodology and results of requirement reviews, including their rationale for conclusions on requirements.  In addition, command needed to implement effective methods to identify needed contract adjustments for individual contracts.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501383","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"02-98","Energy Savings Performance Contracts (XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Fort Bragg, North Carolina)",12/14/2001 0:00:00,"Energy savings baselines weren't adequately established.  The baselines were incorrect because the contractor used inflated operating hours and included temporary buildings.  Also, the baselines weren't independently verified.  Also, project costs and savings weren't accurate, the proposed and accepted costs may be too high, and savings may not be realized.  This occurred because the baseline was overstated, Army representatives didn't verify contractor measurements, and the methodology used to measure some savings wasn't clear.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501385","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"02-114","Weapon System Requirements - Thermal Sight (U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command)",1/23/2002 0:00:00,"Command overstated programmed demand requirements for the thermal sight.  Due to a system problem, the system didn't include replenishment demands--which are computer-generated based on engineering failure factors--when determining total requirements.  To compensate for this problem, the item manager appropriately increased the number of programmed demand requirements manually to make sure requirements weren't overstated.  However, once the system problem was corrected and the system began generating replenishment requirement demands automatically, the item manager should have deleted the manually generated requirements from the system.  Because these manually generated requirements weren't deleted, overall requirements for the thermal sight were overstated.  As a result, command was buying more thermal sights than needed.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501381","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"02-115","Weapon System Requirements - Gimbal Assembly (U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command)",1/23/2002 0:00:00,"Command overstated programmed demand requirements for the gimbal assembly.  The automated system computed replenishment demands by multiplying engineered estimates of usage by the number of end-items in the field.  However, the system developed both the engineered average monthly demands and the number of Bradley vehicles in the field based on incorrect fielding information.  Specifically, the system computed requirements based on an initial fielding date for the Bradley of April 2000, but the Army Audit review showed that the Bradley vehicles weren't initially fielded until November 2000.  As a result, Command was buying more gimbal assemblies than needed.  The net effect was overstating requirements for the gimbal assembly by about $1.6 million.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501380","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"00-235","Homestation Instrumented Training System Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command",5/5/2000 0:00:00,"The Homestation Instrumented Training System was making progress, and the concepts behind the system were valid.  However, progress could be jeopardized if the Army doesn't adequately develop a key enabling technology--the Common Training Instrumentation Architecture.  Timely development of the common architecture would allow the Army to leverage its use in all planned homestation instrumented training systems and ongoing/planned instrumentation system upgrades.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","503871","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"00-301","Reforming Ammunition Procurement - Phase III",6/28/2000 0:00:00,"The Army's acquisition strategies had improved in recent years by incorporating best practices as outlined by DOD Regulation 5000.2 and acquisition reform techniques.  As a result, auditors found indications that the cost of ammunition items acquired by managers was declining.  However, additional steps were needed to improve life-cycle management and the process of privatizing Army-owned production facilities.  Also, increased competition would make the ammunition program more cost-effective.  Also, ammunition managers had implemented several acquisition reform techniques when planning ammunition procurements valued at $6.5 billion.  Techniques such as integrated product teams, best value contracting, and performance-based testing were used throughout the acquisition process.",0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","503868","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-23","Simulated Based Acquisition Program U.S. Army Materiel Command",11/8/2000 0:00:00,"The Army is aggressively pursuing implementation of the Simulation Based Acquisition Program.  However, material developers needed to improve their planning for the use of modeling and simulation.  A review of 10 systems showed that for 9 systems the responsible program management office hadn't fully planned for the use of modeling and simulation across the life cycle of the systems.  Materiel developers used modeling and simulation to supplement and, in one case, replace hardware prototypes.  However, for several programs, the use of modeling and simulation was often focused on specific performance and quality issues--as opposed to the systematic and integrated use envisioned by the Simulation Based Acquisition Program.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","503864","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-37","Contracts for Maintenance of Tactical Equipment in the Field, Fort Hood, Texas",11/3/2000 0:00:00,"The aviation maintenance requirements contract was adequately justified and approved.  However, requirements for the cost plus award fee weren't estimated properly.  Specifically, the Directorate of Logistics used a formula that was based on the number of hours expended in prior years instead of data related to future maintenance contracts.  Consequently, there was little assurance that Army managers could objectively evaluate contractor performance as compared to anticipated maintenance requirements.  Also, the contract for aviation maintenance was awarded competitively  and administered properly, except for those aspects related to contractor performance.  Specifically, Air Force Logistics personnel responsible for monitoring performance didn't have effective procedures, and didn't use performance measures stipulated in the award fee plan to monitor contractor performance.  Instead, they relied on general observations and customer feedback.  Also, Logistics personnel didn't monitor contractor performance for phase maintenance inspections.  Consequently, about $330,000 more than necessary was spent annually on phase maintenance inspections.",1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501408","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-52","Contracts for Maintenance of Tactical Equipment in the Field, Fort Dix, New Jersey",11/9/2000 0:00:00,"Contracts for the maintenance of tactical equipment were awarded competitively when appropriate.  One sole source contract was necessary to meet an urgent requirement that couldn't be met through other sources.  Also, contracts for the maintenance of tactical equipment were adequately justified when they were initially awarded.  However, contract options for a commercial activities contract weren't adequately justified.  Specifically, Fort Dix personnel didn't perform required reviews to determine whether a current commercial activities contract was still cost-effective before they exercised options to extend the contract period.  Also, maintenance managers and quality assurance representatives properly administered maintenance contracts.  However, the administrative contracting officer didn't adequately verify the accuracy of the contractor's invoices.  As a result, the Command reviewed overpaid the contractor about $42,000.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501357","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-65","New Equipment Testing U.S. Army Special Operations Command Fort Bragg, North Carolina",12/18/2000 0:00:00,"U.S. Army Special Operations Command's units adequately tested and reported on the usefulness of new equipment they received from systems developers.  During the 12-months ended 31 March 2000, units participated in 48 tests of new equipment.  Command's testing activities reported on all of the requirements in the test plans.  Further, the test reports documented the details of the analyses and provided the systems' developers with the data needed to make decisions about further development and testing of the equipment.  Also, Command adequately evaluated new equipment obtained from contractors under no-cost loan agreements.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","503862","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-111","Contracts for Maintenance of Tactical Equipment in the Field",1/31/2001 0:00:00,"The Army didn't adequately manage and control its contracts for field-level maintenance of tactical equipment.  First, various activities awarded contracts for field-level maintenance.  Thus, contracts proliferated, thereby increasing the cost for contract administration and preventing the Army from leveraging its buying power and bundling requirements to obtain the best possible prices.  Second, the Army didn't effectively use its military mechanics to minimize contract support.  Third, requirements for contract maintenance weren't adequately defined.  Fourth, activities generally didn't adequately monitor contract maintenance operations, including contract labor hours and the accuracy of invoices.  As a result, some contractors were overpaid and activities had no assurance that labor hours billed were accurate.  Fifth, the Army didn't have adequate visibility of maintenance contracts.  Activities used a wide variety of contracts for maintenance support that originated from many sources including other Services.  The fragmented nature of maintenance contracting made it difficult to identify all contracts used at an installation for tactical equipment maintenance.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523822","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-128","Integrated System Control",1/29/2001 0:00:00,"The audit concluded that all configurations of the Integrated System Control program had valid requirements.  However, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command needed to update its requirements for Versions 1 and 2 and the Tactical Internet Manager (formerly called version 4).  Because of resource constraints, however, the materiel developer faces tremendous challenges and risk of not meeting user needs and fielding schedules of the future digitized battlefield. Also, the Integrated System Control had an adequate strategy for keeping pace through spiral development with the modernization efforts of related systems. By documenting and updating its strategy in Operational Requirements Documents, the Army would make sure it keeps pace with modernization efforts.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","503858","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-159","Linen Services Contract, Madigan Army Medical Center, Fort Lewis, Washington",1/29/2001 0:00:00,"Contract specifications didn't adequately identify the Medical Center's linen service requirements, and the cost of the contract exceeded comparable costs for linen service.  The contract price was about 40 percent ($200,000) higher than local market rates, and several requirements in the contract's statement of work needed correction or clarification.  In addition, administration of the contract had significant weaknesses in areas such as identifying and documenting the transfer of linen from the Medical Center to the contractor, making sure that the contractor had adequate quality control and contingency operations plans, following the quality assurance surveillance plan, and documenting and reporting performance problems.",1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501356","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-169","Best Practices for Using Award Fees, U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command; Office of the Program Executive Officer, Tactical Missiles; and Office of the Program Executive Officer, Air and Missile Defense",2/20/2001 0:00:00,"The AAA reviewed award fee processes for six cost-plus-award-fee contracts that the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command's Acquisition Center issued during FY 98 and FY 99.  The AAA found weaknesses in developing award fee plans, evaluating contractor performance, and determining and paying award fees.  These weaknesses existed because: Command personnel didn't have detailed guidance on how to structure award fee plans to help manage risk and incentivize contractors; Command personnel didn't place sufficient emphasis on managing critical aspects of the award fee process; and oversight responsibility wasn't clearly assigned for making sure the overall award fee process worked effectively.  As a result, there wasn't reasonable assurance that contractors received award fees commensurate with actual performance or that the contractors were motivated to strive for excellence.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501350","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-221","225th Army Birthday/Spirit of America",3/26/2001 0:00:00,"Washington Headquarters Services and the Military District of Washington generally used adequate contracting procedures to award and administer contracts to help support the ""Spirit of America"" performances and the celebrations of the Army's 225th Birthday.  They generally awarded contracts in accordance with regulations, monitored contractor payments in accordance with regulations, and oversaw the delivery of required services.  However, Military District of Washington personnel didn't award the arena rental contract until 1 week before the start of the performances, mainly because of delays in finalizing the statement of work.  As a result of the delays, the government didn't have enough time to negotiate with the contractor when its cost proposal was substantially higher than government estimated costs.  Military District personnel effectively used and tracked purchases made with the International Merchant Purchase Authorization Card.  All reviewed purchases made were mission-related, properly documented in the internal records, and shown on the billing statement for payment.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","502672","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-239","Administering Service Contracts (Security Services)",4/3/2001 0:00:00,"Procedures for authorizing contractor payments were generally effective.  However, Aviation and Missile Command personnel needed to improve procedures for assessing contractor performance by developing a quality assurance surveillance plan.  In addition, contracting personnel needed to make sure personnel responsible for assessing the contractor's performance were formally assigned and technically qualified.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501355","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-240","Administering Service Contracts (Maintenance of Reproduction Equipment)",4/3/2001 0:00:00,"Contracting personnel made sure the person responsible for assessing the contractor's performance was formally assigned and trained in administering contracts.  Also, procedures for authorizing contractor payments were adequate.  However, Aviation and Missile Command personnel needed to improve procedures for assessing contractor performance by developing a quality assurance surveillance plan.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501362","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-241","Administering Service Contracts (Maintenance of Portable Toilets)",4/3/2001 0:00:00,"The contracting officer made sure the person responsible for assessing the contractor's performance was formally assigned and trained in administering contracts.  During the audit, Aviation and Missile command personnel improved procedures for authorizing contractor payments.  However, they needed to improve procedures for assessing contractor performance by developing a quality assurance surveillance plan.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501361","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-304","Administering Service Contracts (Training Services)",5/22/2001 0:00:00,"Quality assurance plans and procedures for assessing contractor performance and addressing deficiencies weren't sufficiently defined.  The procuring contracting officer delegated contract administration responsibilities to the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).  An Aviation and Missile Command employee was also performing quality assurance functions, but DCMA was not aware of her role or results of her assessments.  Command personnel could improve plans and procedures for assessing contractor performance and addressing deficiencies by developing a quality assurance surveillance plan.  The plan should clearly define responsibilities and provide for coordination between Aviation and Missile Command and DCMA.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501360","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"01-305","Administering Service Contracts (Hawk Missile Maintenance and Repair Services)",5/22/2001 0:00:00,"Quality assurance plans and procedures for assessing contractor performance and addressing deficiencies weren't sufficiently defined.  The contracting officer delegated contract administration responsibilities to the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).  However, an Aviation and Missile Command employee was also performing quality assurance functions.  There weren't provisions for communicating results of the employee's assessments to DCMA, which was responsible for authorizing payments to the contractor.  As a result, DCMA could authorize payments for unsatisfactory performance.  Command personnel could improve quality assurance by developing and using a surveillance plan.  The plan should clearly define responsibilities and provide for coordination between Aviation and Missile Command and DCMA.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501349","Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"A-2002-0580-AMA","Managing Service Contracts",9/23/2002 0:00:00,"The Army needed to correct recurring weaknesses in administering service contracts and develop a strategy to position itself to meet increasing contract administration demands.  Although most key management controls were in place, The Army needed to increase its emphasis to make sure the controls work. Preparation for administering contracts wasn’t sufficient to set the stage for effective quality assurance.  Although contracting officers generally appointed representatives formally, they didn’t formally apprise other quality assurance evaluators (monitors) of their responsibilities and limitations of authority.  They also didn’t make sure evaluators were trained in quality assurance procedures and specific contract requirements.  Contracting and requiring activity personnel either didn’t develop quality assurance surveillance plans or didn’t develop effective plans to provide a roadmap for monitoring contractor performance. Quality assurance evaluators didn’t effectively monitor contractor performance or document results of inspections.  Procedures for validating and approving contractor invoices sometimes weren’t adequate.  In addition, responsibilities and processes for approving invoices weren’t properly defined. The Army also needed to place additional emphasis on reviewing and adjusting contract requirements.  Contracting officers made a written determination that contract requirements fulfilled an existing govern­ment need before exercising contract options.  However, requirement reviews weren’t well documented, and audits and inspections indicated that some reviews may not have been sufficiently thorough.  In addition, contracting and requiring activity personnel needed effective mechanisms that would alert them to changing requirements as a routine part of the contract administration process.  And, for performance-based contracts, they needed to make sure contractors didn’t provide services that exceeded government needs.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62624","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"95064037","Fielding of the AC-130U Gunship",11/14/1996 0:00:00,"The AC-130U Gunship System Program Director aggressively worked logistics support challenges arising from low reliability of some AC-130U Gunship-unique systems. Further, logistics managers accomplished the spares provisioning process properly, although lower than expected spare parts reliability impacted mission readiness.  However, logistics managers needed to identify spare parts usage history to acquire the proper levels of follow-on spare parts.  Additionally, program office personnel needed to restructure ICS contract award fee plan.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507554","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"96052026","Hazardous Waste Disposal",11/29/1996 0:00:00,"Environmental managers could more effectively manage hazardous waste disposal.  Specifically, managers at the 11 installations reviewed did not adequately use existing disposal contract services or establish contractor oversight control procedures.  Furthermore, these managers did not properly plan, control, and bill for disposal services provided to customers.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506362","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"96064027","Airborne Information Transmission Program",11/29/1996 0:00:00,"The Air Force did not follow existing policy and direction in executing the subject program.  The Airborne Information Transmission (ABT) program acquisition managers did not establish exit criteria for the current program acquisition phase.  Also, the program manager did not prepare an Acquisition Program Baseline to establish cost, schedule, and performance thresholds.  As a result, ABT program management did not have well-defined goals and objectives to manage and measure program progress.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507555","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"95064015","Air Force Center For Environmental Excellence and Related Air Force Environmental Acquisition Activities",12/2/1996 0:00:00,"This audit concluded that the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence (AFCEE) and related Air Force environmental activities could improve their management of environmental cleanup projects.  Specifically, environmental managers selected cleanup service agencies without determining the most cost-effective source.  Further, opportunities existed to enhance major command and installation project management by (a) establishing and monitoring memorandums of agreement with DOD service agencies and (b) maintaining current, accurate, and complete information in the environmental cleanup database.  Finally, AFCEE contract administration was adequate except for property administration.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507553","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"95064001","B-2 Transition to the Active Force",4/10/1997 0:00:00,"This audit concluded that B-2 program personnel could enhance selected transition activities.  Although the technical order validation and verification process was effective, B-2 logistics managers could improve the accuracy of initial provisioning and recoverable consumption item replenishment requirements computations.  Further, HQ Air Combat Command personnel needed to track training device and simulator utilization and associated contractor logistics support levels.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507558","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"96052032","Closed Installations Utility and Vendor Payments",5/2/1997 0:00:00,"Air Force Base Conversion Agency and Defense Finance Accounting Service (DFAS) activities did not process utility company and vendor invoices for payment in a timely manner at 5 locations reviewed.  Specifically, 79 of 152 invoice payments occurred more than 30 days after the invoice date.  However, utility companies and vendors did not generally charge penalties for late payments.  When charged, however, late payments (about $40,000) were immaterial when compared to total billings (over $3.3 million) and were primarily isolated to one installation.  Nevertheless, these instances tend to cast doubt on the Air Force's ability to pay bills on time.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505720","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"96064012","Acquisition of Educational Services and Training",5/6/1997 0:00:00,"Air Force acquisition of educational services and training and related internal controls were generally satisfactory.  Contracting activities assured outsourced training met user requirements by determining that the overall price offered was fair and reasonable, considering contractor past performance, and developing performance work statements that established qualifications for contractor personnel.  Air Force ROTC scholarship  programs paid only for classes authorized, attended, and successfully completed by appropriate individuals.  However, the education offices at two of eight installations reviewed did not effectively enforce existing controls to ensure they recouped tuition assistance funds from students failing to attain a passing grade or successfully complete a course.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506075","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"96066008","Software Developmental Test and Evaluation Deficiency Reporting Process",7/11/1997 0:00:00,"Overall, Air Force personnel could improve management of deficiency reporting during software developmental test and evaluation.  Program managers had not implemented adequate deficiency reporting systems to monitor, investigate, track, and resolve problems; or required contractors to use internal deficiency reporting systems that were compatible with the Air Force in-house system.  In addition, program managers had not established software-related exit criteria at milestone II.  As a result, the Air Force could deliver systems that do not satisfy user needs, are not easily maintained, and contain deficiencies that may cost 10 to 100 times more to fix than if found and resolved during development.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507563","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"96064028","F-22 Program Management During Engineering and Manufacturing Development",7/22/1997 0:00:00,"Overall, F-22 program personnel adequately managed program aspects.  Program personnel effectively managed pre-production verification acquisition and production planning.  Further, the Joint Estimate Team adequately assessed engineering and manufacturing development cost growth.  However, the cost risk abatement and integrated product team processes required improvement.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507559","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"96064011","Controls Over the Use of the International Merchant Purchase Authorization Card (IMPAC)",8/11/1997 0:00:00,"The Air Force implemented a cost-effective IMPAC program.  Additionally, from review of more than 4,000 IMPAC transactions, the IG concluded the items met IMPAC guideline criteria and, with one exception, established program controls were adequate.  However, the Air Force can improve overall implementation of the program.  Specifically, IMPAC program coordinators, approving officials, and cardholders did not maximize use of the IMPAC and did not always comply with established controls; payments were not properly processed; and internal controls over the purchases and payments, although adequate, were not properly implemented.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","506076","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"96064021","Contracting for Contractor-Operated Civil Engineering Supply Store",8/11/1997 0:00:00,"The management and administration of contractor-operated civil engineering supply store contracts required improvement.  Specifically, Air Force personnel could have more effectively established material requirements prior to contract awards, evaluated and negotiated fixed-price item additions to material requirements lists, and implemented related management internal controls.  These conditions precluded the Air Force from obtaining the most fair and reasonable prices for contractor-operated civil engineering supply store requirements.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506073","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"96064013","Contracting for Architectural and Engineering Services",8/22/1997 0:00:00,"Architectural and engineering services contract award procedures were effective.  However, contract administration needed improvement.  Specifically, civil engineering officials could have deobligated unneeded funds to other requirements; strengthened internal controls to validate payment requests for Army and Navy contracted projects; and developed a more efficient method to evaluate the financial status of military construction design funds transferred to the Army and Navy.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506074","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"96064034","Laboratory and Test Center Advisory and Assistance Services",8/28/1997 0:00:00,"Air Force laboratories and test centers reported advisory and assistance service obligations for FY 1996 totaling $86 million.  This total represented a $54 million increase over FY 1995 reported amounts and established a materially accurate reporting baseline for future policy and management decision making.  However, Air Force managers need to improve data collection and reporting procedures to maintain an accurate reporting baseline for future trend analyses.  Not sure this is a contracting issues",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507561","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"96064030","Full Scale Aerial Target Acquisition and Logistics Support Planning",9/1/1997 0:00:00,"Full scale aerial target acquisition management was generally effective.  However, program managers could improve logistics planning.  Specifically, the Air Force could avoid about $2.52 million in program costs by converting 14 fully capable QF-4 aircraft into target drones and replacing  these aircraft with 14 refurbished F-4s from the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507560","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"97064010","Air Logistics Center Contract Terminations",1/23/1998 0:00:00,"Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) personnel effectively terminated contracts for $8.9 million in excess items identified in the automated reparables system.  Further, air logistics center personnel correctly determined items totaling $189.3 million were not appropriate for termination.  However, for items totaling $18.8 million, more timely excess on on-order validation could have resulted in additional contract terminations.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506066","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"97058046","Telephone Service for Personnel Residing on Installations",2/25/1998 0:00:00,"Opportunities exist for the Air Force to provide more effective telephone service to personnel residing on base and generate additional earnings for Air Force service activities.  Specifically, the Air Force can contract for low-cost telephone service with additional capabilities for installation residents and generate $128.1 million in revenues for Air Force services activities over the next 6 years.",0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506342","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"97064027","Government-Furnished Material Provided to the Boeing Guidance Repair Center",8/14/1998 0:00:00,"Air Force repair contract program managers aggressively worked material support challenges originating from the privatization-in-place operation.  Although contractor inventory levels were excess to current contract requirements, the levels arose, in part, from the distribution of residual material to the contractor.  However, Ogden and Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center material managers needed to improve inventory oversight for controlling contractor access to government material.  As a result, the contractor requested and material managers approved additional material excess to repair requirements.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507611","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"96062004","Acquisition Strategy For Aircraft Maintenance Contractor Logistics Support Operations",9/10/1998 0:00:00,"Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) personnel could increase opportunities to directly procure contractor logistical support (CLS) from subcontractors rather than through a prime contractor, thereby expanding cost reduction opportunities, and could consolidate similar subsystem maintenance requirements. Specifically, for 7 of 8 aircraft systems reviewed, AFMC personnel could have solicited CLS proposals that provided the opportunity to procure the needed support requirements directly from subcontractors rather than through a prime contractor. With improved contracting operations, the Air Force could reduce CLS costs approximately $27 million over the past 15 years. Also, CLS personnel did not consolidate similar subsystem maintenance contract requirements for 3 of 6 systems reviewed. Consolidating similar engine maintenance requirements would eliminate some of the additional administrative contracting burden associated with direct procurement of logistics support and reduce CLS contracting costs.",1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506068","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"96064002","Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) Acquisition and Logistics Planning",9/14/1998 0:00:00,"This audit concluded the JDAM program initial acquisition and logistics planning was generally effective.  The program office was innovative, effectively implemented acquisition reform initiatives, and adequately planned surveillance of weapon storage reliability.  However, auditors noted areas requiring improvement.  Specifically, program office personnel needed to (1) clarify the warranty clause to obtain the desired level of system support and (b) establish an adequate lot acceptance testing sample size to provide confidence the production lots meet system specification requirements.  In addition, the JDAM program office production incentive clause did not require the contractor to exceed minimum contractual performance requirements.  As a result, the Air Force will pay the contractor incentive fees of $2 million for lots 1 and 2 if the contractor meets minimum contract requirements.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507610","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"97058040","Video Teleconferencing Systems",9/15/1998 0:00:00,"Although new systems were not experiencing interoperability problems, and management generally used the most economical communications mode, authorizing officials approved acquisitions of new systems without reviewing utilization data and validating a need for the systems.  Further, unit property custodians did not adequately maintain accountability for system equipment.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506344","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"97064001","C-17 Flexible Sustainment Acquisition",12/18/1998 0:00:00,"C-17 program officials proactively adapted the Flexible Sustainment concept in accordance with DOD acquisition policy, Acquisition Strategy Panel direction, and current acquisition reform initiatives.  However, specific issues related to Air Force funding policies, government/industry partnerships, and cost comparison requirements limit Air Force ability to fully implement the Flexible Sustainment concept as originally conceived.",1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507639","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"97064011","Electronic Data Interchange Procurement Transactions",12/24/1998 0:00:00,"The Air Force has implemented a cost-effective acquisition electronic data interchange (EDI) system.  However, review of more than 1,000 EDI transactions and 6,600 deliveries showed the Air Force contracting personnel (1) did not always maximize EDI use when procuring commercial items, (2) did not always review and use vendor past performance records when awarding contracts; and (3) did not properly prepare EDI solicitations, thus, increasing the risk that the Air Force could obtain only limited or restricted competition and, therefore, pay higher prices for commodities.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506065","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"97064015","USAF General-Purpose Vehicles",2/1/1999 0:00:00,"Air Force leasing of general-purpose vehicles from General Services Administration (GSA) was generally effective.  In addition, leasing general-purpose vehicles was slightly more economical than purchasing, but not significantly.  In addition, internal control procedures to recoup washing and fuel costs from GSA were in effect, but opportunities existed to further reduce leasing costs.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507642","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"98058032","Long-Haul Telecommunications",3/10/1999 0:00:00,"The U.S. Air Force Academy and Air Force Space Command effectively managed their long-haul telecommunications.  The Academy managed long-haul operations in-house, while Space Command supplemented their efforts with a telecommunications service contractor.  With contractor assistance, the Command reduced long-haul requirements, optimized bandwidth use, and identified billing errors.  At the command installations reviewed, this process reduced the annual $7.8 million long-haul costs approximately $1 million (13 percent).",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506287","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"98058003","Intelligence Advisory and Assistance Services Program",3/12/1999 0:00:00,"Overall, Air Intelligence Agency implementation of the Advisory and Assistance Services Program required improvement.  Specifically, Agency personnel had not established responsibilities and implemented procedures to adequately identify contracts, complete determination decision documents, or track and report program dollar amounts and man-years.  Consequently, auditors identified inaccuracies on all 30 contracts reviewed.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506302","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"97064014","Flight Simulator Acquisition, Management, and Use",3/22/1999 0:00:00,"Air Force operational activities did not efficiently use contracted simulator capacity.  Specifically, (a) contracted availability significantly exceeded actual usage at one-half the B-1, F-15, and F-16 facilities reviewed, (b) usage rated for C-130 simulators varied widely relative to user requirements, and (c) usage rates could not be accurately determined for KC-135 simulator platforms.  As a result, the Air Force acquired unneeded capacity and unnecessarily consumed operation and maintenance funds that could be applied to other mission requirements.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507640","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"98066004","Global Combat Support System Award Fee Management",5/13/1999 0:00:00,"The Air Force Logistics Information Systems Program Office could improve its management of contract award fees.  Specifically, the program office did not appropriately define Award Fee Review Board membership in the award fee plan.  Also, the award fee plan did not require the fee-determining official to provide adequate justification for changes to the award fee recommendation, and performance monitors did not consistently develop and document contractor ratings.  Further, the award fee plan did not clearly define ""enabling technology.""  Finally, the program office did not document how it calculated award fee pools.  These conditions could lead to incorrect award fee payments and contractor protests.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506106","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"98058036","Intelligence Service Contracts",7/13/1999 0:00:00,"Personnel at the Air Force's Air Intelligence Agency did not adequately manage intelligence service contracts.  Specifically, task orders did not always cover the actual period of contractor performance or clearly define and quantify the tasks or deliverables required.  Additionally, managers and base contracting office personnel did not always award contracts to obtain the required services economically.  For example, contractors for at least 17 of 21 time and materials contracts were awarded one or more previous contracts for the same or similar requirements.  A FAR rule specifies that a time and materials contracts may only be used when it is not possible to estimate accurately the extent or duration of work or anticipated costs with any reasonable degree of confidence.  However, management did not collect or maintain historical data for repetitive or continuing tasks on any of the contracts.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506064","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"99052016","Affirmative Procurement Program",11/23/1999 0:00:00,"Installation managers at 7 of 9 locations did not effectively implement affirmative procurement programs.  Specifically, installation officials did not always designate program managers to coordinate procurement requirements.  Also, activities responsible for ordering and buying supplies and materials were not aware of program requirements.  In addition, although transpiration managers routinely purchased recycled oil and retread tires, IMPAC coordinators at 6 of 9 locations did not include affirmative procurement requirements in training courses or consistently provided cardholders information on EPA designated items.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","506061","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"98064003","Airborne Laser Program Integrated Product Team Participation",12/8/1999 0:00:00,"Airborne laser program officials effectively managed transition to the program definition/risk reduction acquisition phase, proactively embraced acquisition streamlining principles, and implemented integrated product and process development acquisition management concepts.  Additionally, this assessment highlighted opportunities to further enhance initial program planning efforts, streamline internal management processes, and facilitate Year 2000 compliance efforts for program software and related interfaces.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507663","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"98064024","Award Fee Management on Commercial Activity Contracts",3/27/2000 0:00:00,"Award fee officials could improve award fee management on commercial activity contracts.  Although officials established provisions consistent with the overall contract strategy, they did not always maintain adequate documentation supporting award fee determinations or accurately account for award fee funds.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507667","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"97064003","F-22 Life-Cycle Planning During Engineering and Manufacturing Development",4/10/2000 0:00:00,"F-22 program personnel have made significant progress addressing F-22 life-cycle planning activities including (a) environmental management integration; (b) software development, integration, and maintenance; and (c) system disposal requirements.  However, the IG assessment highlighted opportunities to further enhance these planning efforts and are discussed in more detail in the report.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507669","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"99064028","Sensor Fuzed Weapon Pre-Planned Product Improvement",4/10/2000 0:00:00,"Program officials aggressively addressed P3I cost growth and schedule slippage issues.  However, auditors determined that management visibility could be improved by (1) increasing the level of cost reporting detail, (b) establishing improved analytical capabilities to assess contractor performance, and (c) improving the timeliness of earned value data submissions.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506420","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"99064007","International Merchant Purchase Authorization Card (IMPAC) Usage",6/16/2000 0:00:00,"Overall, the Air Force had implemented an effective IMPAC program and significantly increased IMPAC use from FYs 1996 to 1998.  However, Air Force personnel did not, in all cases, comply with internal controls for IMPAC purchases.  Specifically, installation program coordinators did not perform adequate cardholder surveillance, and approving officials did not maintain, or require cardholders to maintain, all necessary documentation.  Further, cardholders did not always obtain approvals for regulated items, use the correct cards to purchase items for non-appropriated fund activities, observe single purchase criteria that disallowed purchase splitting, or purchase supplies from approved vendors.  As a result, IMPAC cardholders were able to make improper purchases and installation program coordinators and approving officials did not detect and deter these improper IMPAC card purchases.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","506059","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"99064008","Acquisition of Commercial Spare Parts",1/24/2000 0:00:00,"The Air Force and Air Force Material Command (AFMC) provided adequate guidance and training to implement FAR Part 12 commercial acquisition policies. Specifically, management officials employed a variety of media, including ""train the trainers"" sessions, pricing guides, video presentations, policy memorandums, and Internet web sites to publicize commercial item acquisition procedures.  However, contracting officers did not always perform adequate price analysis before awarding contracts for spare parts acquired as first-time commercial item buys using both FASA and FARA guidelines.  As a result, the Air Force paid higher prices than necessary, establishing overstated pricing baselines for subsequent acquisitions.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506057","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"99064019","Service Contracting Quality Assurance Evaluation Program",1/12/2000 0:00:00,"Although adequate internal controls were in place to ensure the Air Force received the services paid for, Air Force quality assurance surveillance plans were not always effective.  Specifically, for 12 of 30 contracts reviewed, Air Force contracting personnel did not develop proper plans.  As a result, quality assurance surveillance plans did not provide an effective and effective method for ensuring contractor performance.  Also, for 16 of 30 contracts reviewed, quality assurance evaluations did not conduct and document surveillance in accordance with the plan.  Consequently, the Air Force had no assurance the contractor actually performed the required services and could prevent the Air Force from supporting disputes with the contractor.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506051","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"99066028","Controls Within the Acquisition and Due-In System",5/1/2000 0:00:00,"Although controls were adequate in three areas, the IG identified weaknesses in access controls, transaction histories/audit trails, transaction controls, completeness controls, and documentation.  As a result, management could not ensure system data was accurate and complete.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506049","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"99064023","C-17 Integrated Product Team Participation (Phase II)",9/14/2000 0:00:00,"Program officials proactively managed Flexible Sustainment implementation efforts while preserving options for a depot support decision in FY 2003.  Although program personnel were operating in a performance-based acquisition environment, management officials developed a comprehensive strategic plan to manage and control implementation efforts and remained fully engaged with contractor personnel to monitor and facilitate Flexible Sustainment implementation activities.  Further, program personnel effectively managed contract engineering data requirements and addressed legislative changes impacting Flexible Sustainment.  No change",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507670","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"99058021","Cellular Telephone Management",10/25/2000 0:00:00,"The Air Force does not have a centralized procurement policy for cellular telephones and associated services.  A centralized procurement policy for cellular telephones could reduce costs, improve managerial accountability, and enhance overall services.  Specifically, a national contract could reduce costs from 20 to 40 percent Air Force-wide.  Using a centralized contract, the vendor's automated managerial accounting system would provide an accurate and up-to-date accountability record, monthly detailed expenditure reports, and cost data that could be summarized at any level.  Also, centralized procurement would offer increased options, advanced cellular telephone services, system-wide interoperability, and flexibility to best meet individual user's needs.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505892","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"00061024","Memorandum Report, Contract Warranty Data",12/14/2000 0:00:00,"This audit concluded that the Oklahoma City and Warner Robins Air Logistics Centers (ALCs) did not accurately enter source of repair data in the Automated Budget Compilation System (ABCS) for 16 of 29 warranty items reviewed.  These data identify the organization (contractor or ALC) responsible for repairs, depending on whether the warranty is still in effect.  Because the ALCs did not enter accurate source or repair data in the ABCS, repair requirements were overstated approximately $9.7 million.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507709","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"00064002","Airborne Laser Program Integrated Product Team Participation (Phase II)",4/17/2001 0:00:00,"The Airborne Laser (ABL) program officials achieved satisfactory progress during the current acquisition phase and continued to meet scheduled milestone events leading to an Engineering and Manufacturing Development decision.  Program personnel established and maintained successful government and contractor teaming arrangements, embraced streamlined acquisition principles, and implemented integrated product and process development concepts to meet all major program tasks.  Also, although program officials effectively managed the ABL contract award fee provisions, they could enhance award fee administration by (a) establishing a formal training program for newly assigned performance monitors and (b) clearly defining in the award fee plan the required award fee review board membership quorum for voting purposes.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507689","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"00061010","Contract Cost Performance Following Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 Review",4/20/2001 0:00:00,"The Air Force could improve the processes for estimating, monitoring, and reporting cost performance for OMB Circular A-76 contract awards as Air Force managers did not achieve anticipated cost savings during contract performance.  Further, management did not input and maintain accurate Commercial Activities Management Information System (CAMIS) data for projecting and tracking the potential savings.  Specifically, Air Force managers at 14 locations reviewed (30 contracts) did not achieve $26.1 million of $100.8 million in anticipated cost savings during contract performance for FYs 1995 through 1999.  As a result, FY 1999 competitive sourcing cost savings reported to Congress were inaccurate.  Also, manpower personnel at 13 of 14 locations did not input accurate CAMIS data.  Erroneous cost or savings data in this system could result in incorrect future competitive sourcing decisions.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506046","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"99064010","Tunner Loader Acquisition Program Management",5/10/2001 0:00:00,"Maintenance personnel properly recorded maintenance data for future logistics support analyses.  However, Tunner Program Office personnel could better implement and monitor earned value management requirements.  Specifically, cost performance report formats did not provide sufficiently detailed visibility or accurately portray contractor progress toward specific reliability improvement objectives.  Additionally, program officials awarded a contract for reliability growth that will not meet the Acquisition Program Baseline reliability requirements. As a result, the Tunner loader may not meet wartime mission requirements, and the cost of maintaining the Tunner fleet over its 30-year lifetime will be much greater than anticipated.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507688","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"00064001","Space Based Infrared System Integrated Product Team Participation",7/16/2001 0:00:00,"Program officials aggressively addressed programmatic challenges during the current acquisition phases and were making progress towards meeting scheduled milestones.  Program personnel established and maintained successful government and contractor teaming arrangements, embraced streamlined acquisition principles, and implemented integrated product and process development concepts.  Also, although program officials effectively managed the SBIRS High contract award fee provisions, official contract award fee files did not contain all required documents.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507686","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"01064024","Memorandum Report, Acquisition of Theater Battle Management Core System",7/30/2001 0:00:00,"This survey disclosed that the completion of certain fundamental acquisition processes, analyses, and documentation had not kept pace with the evolving program.  The lack of an up-to-date Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS) Operational Requirements Document contributed to the system program office developing a unit-level system that was ultimately unacceptable to the user.  Moreover, the acquisition plan did not address the separate development efforts of the selected unit-level system.  Also, program officials could improve management insight into TBMCS contract cost and schedule performance.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507687","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"00052016","Financial Accounting for Relocation of the 126th Air Refueling Wing and Related Units",8/8/2001 0:00:00,"Overall, Air Force officials effectively managed the 126th Air Refueling Wing and nonflying unit relocations.  However, weaknesses existed in Air National Guard financial record keeping and project management.  Specifically, financial management personnel made accounting errors and omissions that prevented reconciling detail fund balance records; contracting officials did not properly contract for four architect-engineer (A-E) projects (i.e., they did not publicly advertise or compete the projects, nor document justification for not competing the acquisitions); contracting officials did not notify Congress before awarding four delivery orders and five A-E contracts exceeding $300,000; and contract management files did not always include independent government estimates for contracts and modifications exceeding $100,000.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506282","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"01052013","Air Force Contract Augmentation Program Support for Operations SUSTAIN HOPE and NOBLE ANVIL",8/9/2001 0:00:00,"Overall, the contractor achieved the Air Force augmentation goals.  The goals for Operation SUSTAIN HOPE included building Camp Hope shelters for 20,000 refugees in less than 60 days.  The contractor also achieved the Operation NOBLE ANVIL goal to develop a facilities assessment plan, move building kits and shipping containers, and provide vehicles and equipment for various civil engineering missions.  In addition, contractor personnel were properly trained and equipped for deployment.  Opportunities existed, however, to strengthen contract management internal controls for future Air Force Contract Augmentation operations.  Specifically, DOD contract evaluators could improve documentation of surveillance actions and should issue reports to correct contractor performance, as necessary.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506042","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"01064018","Memorandum Report, Pacific Air Forces' Programming and Budgeting Actions Associated with OMB Circular A-76 Reviews",9/21/2001 0:00:00,"Programming and budgeting actions associated with OMB Circular A-76 studies were not always accurate.  Specifically, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) FY 2003 programming errors and other required adjustments totaled over $7 million.  Also, PACAF officials had not considered funding offsets of $7 to $8 million annually associated with inflation and program change requests.  These programming errors and offsets eroded the excess savings PACAF officials reported as available for reprogramming.  Consequently, PACAF did not have sufficient funds to support an annual $5 million reprogramming action.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506040","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"F2002-0003-B05800","Satellite Operations and Training",2/27/2002 0:00:00,"Overall, opportunities existed for Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) to improve the satellite control operation and training processes.  Specifically, the satellite acquisition process did not provide for fully functional training devices, which ultimately impacted operator qualifications and unit qualification and recurring training.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506258","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"F2002-0005-B05800","Commercial Space Launch Support Costs",3/5/2002 0:00:00,"Patrick and Vandenberg AFBs did not charge commercial customers for all allowable contract support costs, and they did not charge for the electricity range equipment used to support commercial launches.  Obtaining reimbursement for contractor labor-related expenses could result in Patrick and Vandenberg recouping an additional $6.9 million to support 56 commercial launches scheduled for FYs 2003 through 2008.  Furthermore, recouping the cost of electrical consumption to support 42 scheduled commercial launches at Patrick AFB could result in an additional reimbursement of $366,000 for FYs 2003 through 2008.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","506257","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"F2002-0007-B05800","Competition and Award of Selected Intelligence-Related Goods and Services Contracts",3/19/2002 0:00:00,"Managers did not always select the acquisition method that would maximize use of available funds.  Specifically, Air Force Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) program managers unnecessarily incurred significant surcharges and paid higher labor rates when they acquired goods and services from other DOD or government organizations.  Specifically, they could have avoided the surcharges and higher labor rates by using the local contracting office instead of issuing Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests to procure intelligence mission-related goods and services.  As a result, during a 3-year period reviewed, AIA managers spent more than a million dollars a year on avoidable surcharges.  Additionally, AIA managers did not realize the potential benefits available from competition in contracting.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501747","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"F2002-0003-C06400","F-22 Integrated Product Team Participation (Phase III)",4/29/2002 0:00:00,"The contract did not require the contractor to comply with established deficiency investigation and analysis time limits. As a result, program officials may not resolve system deficiencies in a timely manner, and other weapon system acquisition or sustainment programs may not have deficiency information readily available to provide past performance history for planning purposes.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","61332","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"F2002-0004-C06400","U-2 Acquisition Management",8/6/2002 0:00:00,"The corrective action plan did not fully employ the program Work Allocation Board 2 and Acquisition Over-sight Board 3 to clarify user requirements. Further, program officials had not (a) established an internal configuration management function; (b) required associate contractor agree-ments between otherwise unaffiliated program contractors; (c) developed acquisition program baselines to identify and measure progress on important cost, schedule, and technical performance parameters; and (d) employed earned value management criteria on system modification contracts. Finally, although this review did not disclose any evidence of improperly applied modification or sustainment funds, the U-2 acquisition strategy did not provide adequate financial control and visibility over modification efforts. Unless management addresses these areas, the overall action plan may not optimize opportunities to mitigate program risk and facilitate manage-ment control over future acquisition efforts.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","61333","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"F2002-0005-c06400","Airborne Laser Program Integrated Product Team",7/30/2002 0:00:00,"Contractor hazard analyses did not always include sufficient detail to facilitate reviewer assessments of technical and safety risks. As a result, program personnel may be unable to adequately assess and accept residual risk for system flight tests and may not identify needed system design changes in a timely manner. Monthly Cost Perform-ance Reports did not contain detailed information on perform-ance measurement baseline adjustments. Reporting baseline adjustments facilitates cost and schedule performance insight, improves visibility, and enhances program budgeting and phasing.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","61335","Paulina"
"Air Force Audit Agency","Air Force",,"F2002-0006-C06400","Air Force Purchase Cards",8/6/2002 0:00:00,"Overall, Air Force guidance established adequate purchase controls and oversight procedures that, when followed, pro-vided reasonable assurance that cardholders used the pur-chase cards appropriately. However, accountable officials (Installation Purchase Card Program Managers and billing officials) did not adhere to the guidance in executing their surveillance responsibilities, resulting in preventable deficiencies in 7 of 12 purchase categories reviewed. Moreover, installation commanders and chiefs of contracting did not adequately monitor and enforce the purchase card guidelines.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"Denver docs","61370","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"90205","Management Oversight Should Be Strengthened To Improve Administration of the Treasury Information Processing Support Services (TIPSS) Contract",11/6/1998 0:00:00,"Improvements were needed in planning for acquisition of contractor services and in determining the type of contract to use for task orders: term or completion type contracts. A significant number of task orders were issued undefinitized.  Term contracts were used when it might have been more appropriate to use completion contracts and vice versa; as a result, the Service paid more in fees than it should have in both cases.  Further, contractors were invoicing the Service for significantly fewer hours than were originally contracted; thus, improvements were needed in timely descoping contract efforts.  Funds were not timely deobligated on completed task orders. Contractor evaluations were not timely.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501040","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"90302","Review of Contractor Activities on the Year 2000 Project",11/6/1998 0:00:00,"Work requests did not: capture the extent of work being tasked; clearly describe the services or products to be provided; specify product acceptance requirements; or, specify product due dates. Also, contractor activities were not always well documented to substantiate hours invoiced. In addition, there was not adequate separation of duties between those authorized to request, approve, and accept services and products.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501041","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"91502","Evaluation of the Services Efforts to Acquire A New FFRDC",11/20/1998 0:00:00,"Management needs to clearly define the responsibilities of all contractors involved in the modernization efforts.  Also, procurement personnel need to take additional pro-active steps to ensure the FFRDC will be free from organizational conflicts of interest.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501043","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"199920068","The Service Center Mainframe Consolidation Project Has Made Significant Progress, But Project Execution and Administration Risks Remain",9/28/1999 0:00:00,"While the SCMC Project is making significant progress, critical risks related to Service Center mainframe consolidation remain unresolved.  For example, methods used to transfer data were not efficient, some programming changes were not effective, and detailed standard operating procedures had not been developed for the consolidated environment.  Also, IRS management needs to ensure that the technical aspects of contract administration are improved and that the cost of the project is accurately budgeted, captured, and reported.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501050","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"93009","Review of the Electronic Fraud Detection System",6/2/1999 0:00:00,"As part of the Electronic Fraud Detection System (EFDS) development, the contractor was to develop new techniques for identifying fraudulent returns, but the contractor has been unsuccessful in converting its research ideas to final usable products. Several contractor deliverables were not operational or functional when scheduled. One of these - the Scheme Tracking and Referral System being designed as a subsystem of EFDS, may have been delayed because complete requirements had not been provided to the contractor. In addition, the EFDS Project Office may not have provided adequate oversight in monitoring the contractor’s efforts since it apparently lacked detailed knowledge of the contractors work. Also, Project Office cost figures were not complete or accurate.  Total project costs were understated by $22.3 million, $11.9 million in expenditures incurred by the IRS Research Division and $10.4 million in errors and omissions.  Total project costs did not include contracts with the prime contractor in Fiscal Years 1993 through 1996 totaling $4.4 million and with the Electronic Data Systems Corporation in Fiscal Year 1994 for $2.5 million; and hardware, software, and maintenance purchases in Fiscal Years 1993 and 1994 totaling $5 million.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","60352","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"2000-10-017","Improvements Are Needed In Planning And Awarding Internal Revenue Service Contracts To 8 (a) Businesses",12/28/1999 0:00:00,"While the 8(a) contractors provided valuable services to the IRS, additional emphasis is needed on planning and awarding 8(a) contracts.  Also, improvements are needed in documenting 8(a) contractor compliance with federal subcontracting limitations.",0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","500965","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"2000-10-044","Improvements Are Needed In Planning For the Acquisition of Goods and Services and In Managing Contract Closeouts",3/10/2000 0:00:00,"Funds are being placed at risk due to inadequate planning and oversight by the Program Offices.  Specifically, Program Offices have not adequately planned for the acquisition of goods and services and, as a result, approximately $1.6 million of government funds have either been unnecessarily expended or placed at risk.  Also, Procurement management is not able to adequately manage the closeouts of contracts due to inconsistencies with the automated systems used to monitor contracts.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","500968","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"2000-10-051","Former Employees Had Access to IRS Credit Cards and Computers",4/17/2000 0:00:00,"Current controls did not protect the IRS from former employees potentially misusing credit cards or accessing taxpayer information.  Controls should be established to ensure functional coordinators take action to cancel access to government credit cards and computer systems.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","500903","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"2000-10-086","Incurred Cost Audit Reports Are Not Effectively Used To Settle Indirect Rates",6/2/2000 0:00:00,"Contracting Officers (COs) are effectively using the DCAA Cost and Pricing Branch to help determine whether a proposal audit is necessary and if the contractors' proposed prices are fair and reasonable. However, additional emphasis is needed to assist COs in working with contractors to settle indirect cost rates on completed contracts and task orders. Only one CO had received the applicable DCAA audit reports and could explain how to use the reports to determine the monetary effect of the final indirect rates.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","500974","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"2000-20-099","Significant Risks Need To Be Addressed To Ensure Adequate Oversight of the Systems Modernization Effort",6/20/2000 0:00:00,"The oversight of the systems modernization effort was hampered by the lack of a stable program management organization.  Specifically, program management staffing needs had not been determined, roles and responsibilities were not clearly defined, and key processes such as performance monitoring and risk management needed to be improved.  As a result, the IRS scaled back or delayed delivery of several modernization initiatives.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","500973","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"2000-40-081","Oversight of Private Vendors For The Credit Card Programs Should Be Strengthened",6/1/2000 0:00:00,"IRS does not routinely exercise its contractual right to inspect work of private vendors under contract to IRS to provide credit card services to taxpayers to pay taxes, to ensure that enhancements to credit card programs are effectively implemented.  Instead, the IRS monitors the vendors' work through conference calls and reviews of vendor work schedules.  It does not verify vendor work or evaluate vendor test results.  Without such verification, there is inherent risk of negatively impacting taxpayer relations if potential problems are not identified and corrected prior to program implementation.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","500971","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"2000-10-138","Administration of the PRIME Contract Can Be Improved",9/6/2000 0:00:00,"Procurement management should work with the program office and the contractor to definitize the current task orders as quickly as possible and seek to issue definitized task orders as contract progresses.  Specifically, 25 of 29 task orders reviewed had been issued undefinitized.  Task orders had not been definitized because requirements were vague, incomplete, or constantly changing, and the rates for consultants, sub-contractors, and profit percentages had not been agreed upon.  Also, a stable program management structure had not been established to oversee the systems modernization effort, and this had impacted the administration of the prime contract.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501036","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"2000-20-140","Actions To Correct Service Center Mainframe Consolidation Contract Administration Issues Have Not Been Completed, But Progress Is Being Made",9/25/2000 0:00:00,"Delivery order definitization has not been completed.  Specifically, 62 of 136 delivery orders (about $173.4 million of $352.3 million) were not completely definitized. The process of definitizing contracts ""after the fact"" has been much more labor-intensive and time consuming than Procurement personnel anticipated. Definitization efforts as of April 2000 have resulted in $40.2 million in cost savings of which $31.8 million has been deobligated. Also, invoices for services still are not adequately verified.  Specifically, full-time Government Task Managers, as previously recommended to verify delivered goods and travel costs, were not hired.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","500873","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"2000-10-028","Cost Savings Can Be Achieved Through Improved Monitoring of the Treasury Communications System Contract",2/15/2000 0:00:00,"The IRS Program Office is not properly verifying invoices for the TCS contract to ensure that all costs are appropriate. For example, the IG identified approximately $633,000 for circuits and equipment maintenance costs that were questionable or unnecessary because the circuits or equipment could not be located, the specific piece of equipment could not be identified during site verifications, or the charges were for sites no longer occupied by the IRS. Also, the IRS is paying approximately $13,000 a month for maintenance of metal cabinets and racks, but equipment of this type requires little or no maintenance and should be removed from maintenance coverage.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","60375","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"2000-20-158","Additional Actions Are Needed to Strengthen the Development and Enforcement of the Enterprise Architecture",9/26/2000 0:00:00,"The IRS paid its Business Systems Modernization contractor nearly $3 million for six architecture products. However, the IRS did not conduct a thorough validation of these products before accepting them to ensure these products met the IRS’ needs. As a result, the IRS did not realize all the expected benefits from the funds invested in these products. In the past, the General Accounting Office has recommended that the IRS define and implement processes to validate life cycle products, including architecture deliverables. The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 also requires government agencies to implement validation controls. This legislation requires government agencies to focus on the results they are achieving through their information technology investments. Agencies are required to put their technology procurement decisions in a true business context and analyze investments for their return on investment.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","60380","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"2001-10-012","Federal Tax Information Used by Customer Satisfaction Survey Contractors Needs to Be Better Protected",11/1/2000 0:00:00,"The vendor and its subcontractors can improve controls over federal tax information.  While no evidence of improper disclosure of federal tax information was found, the vendor (who received just slightly less than 1 million taxpayer records in 1999) had not met all security requirements.  OIG staff also determined that the IRS had not conducted on-site security reviews of the vendor's and its subcontractors' facilities.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501075","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"2001-20-109","Management Advisory Report: Review of Longstanding Concerns with the Treasury Communications System (TCS) Program",7/1/2001 0:00:00,"Efforts have been made to resolve outstanding billing issues and improvements have been realized.  However, until the root causes of the billing problems can be identified and corrected, problems will continue to be experienced.  The Treasury Communications System (TCS) has taken steps to institute Performance-Based Contracting and a Revised Award Fee Program; however, efforts in both areas have been inconsistent and have yielded limited results.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501071","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"2001-20-143","The Telecommunications Modernization Project Provided Some Benefits, But Process Improvements Are Needed for Future Projects",8/27/2001 0:00:00,"The Telecommunications Enterprise Strategic Program (TESP) project provided some valuable benefits to IRS' current and future telecommunications program.  The project team provided support to other modernization projects and direction to the IRS in upgrading and consolidating its telecommunications environment.  However, the timing of the of the decision to cancel the project and delays in finalizing a task order resulted in increased costs to the IRS.  Also, the IG found weaknesses in project tracking, inaccuracies in the TESP section of the September 2000 Information Technology Investment Account Expenditure Plan, and inconsistencies in the implementation of critical project management processes.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501067","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"2001-20-144","Improvements Are Needed in the Management of the e-Services Project to Enable Timely Progress Towards Future Goals",9/10/2001 0:00:00,"The IRS Business Systems Modernization Office (BSMO) has made progress in establishing critical processes to guide the e-Services and other modernization projects.  The BSMO has established a quality review process to evaluate products delivered by the contractor, the e-Services project team has begun working diligently to ensure the project is in compliance with the Enterprise Architecture, and IRS business executives have become more involved in monitoring the progress of the project.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501065","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"2001-20-039","The Business Systems Modernization Office (BSMO) Has Made Solid Progress and Can Take Additional Actions to Enhance Chances for Long-Term Success",2/1/2001 0:00:00,"The BSMO has rewritten and better defined task orders issued to the PRIME contractor, but performance-based incentives have not been clearly defined. For example, several task orders were written such that the IRS only withholds payment until the modernization contractor delivers, rather than reducing the payment to the modernization contractor to compensate for the delay in implementing systems that will benefit taxpayers. Without strong positive and negative incentives, the PRIME contractor may not work efficiently and may not provide timely products to the IRS. As a result, systems that are intended to provide benefits to taxpayers may not be provided within time, cost, and quality constraints. In March 2000, the IRS tasked Jefferson Solutions to teach IRS and PRIME contractor personnel how to properly implement performance-based contracting concepts. As of September 1, 2000, the IRS had issued 10 task orders that contain performance-based specifics.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","60395","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"2001-20-140","The Customer Relationship Management Examination Project Experienced Delays and Increased Costs, But Lessons Learned Should Improve Future Modernization Projects",8/22/2001 0:00:00,"The BSMO and the contractor developed policies and procedures for configuration management but the project team did not ensure the processes were properly followed. Access to official documents was not restricted and procedures for making and approving changes to the documents were not properly implemented making it difficult to determine which document or configuration item is the official baselined document. This could lead to project teams following the wrong set of requirements or agreements while developing the projects. During the last phase of planning, the requirements for security and the integration with other projects were not stable. The BSMO did not include requirements to develop critical security documents in the initial contract for the final planning phase. While the BSMO has recently been focusing on issuing contracts where payments are based on contractor performance, the most recent contract with the contractor did not apply performance-based contracting methods and did not properly define the requirements of the next phase of the project’s development. Also, the BSMO and the contractor use earned value measurement to periodically compare actual cost and schedule results to budgeted results.  However, the earned value data did not include all costs and had not been validated, which meant that actual return on investment and earned value could not be calculated accurately.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","60396","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"2002-10-008","Pricing Discrepancies on the Long Term Maintenance Computing Center Contract",10/1/2001 0:00:00,"The contractually agreed upon price for specific contract line items was incorrectly priced by the contractor and/or its subcontractor.  Specifically, the IRS was billed monthly for the yearly costs of software coverage for nine contract line items. Additionally, the IRS paid for a higher priced software upgrade than that provided by the contractor. Approximately $580,000 was associated with these billing discrepancies. After consulting with the contractor's legal counsel, the Assistant U.S. Attorney declined civil and criminal prosecution.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501052","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"2002-20-059","The Business Systems Modernization Office Needs to Strengthen Its Processes for Overseeing the Work of the PRIME Contractor",3/1/2002 0:00:00,"The BSMO developed various management processes intended to ensure the prime contractor delivers quality goods and services within expected time frames.  As of the completion of this audit, however, many of the these processes were still maturing and some had not yet been effectively implemented.  This contributed to delays and cost increases in the four projects reviewed.  As the BSMO continues its ongoing work to strengthen its processes for overseeing the prime contractor, improvements will be needed if the IRS' systems modernization effort is to avoid major delays and cost increases in the future.  Further delays could erode confidence in the IRS' ability to deliver modernized systems that are needed to dramatically improve both internal operations and service to taxpayers.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501061","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"2002-20-100","The Management of Information Systems Maintenance Contracts Can Be Improved",5/30/2002 0:00:00,"As of August 2001, IRS had awarded 606 contracts that included computer asset maintenance services for its mission critical tax processing systems and other computer assets costing an estimated $157 million in FY 2001. However, IRS is unnecessarily paying for maintenance on these computer assets (some of which should be replaced rather than maintained) and paying for maintenance on equipment cabinets and racks that require no maintenance.  Canceling these maintenance contracts and allocating funds for computer asset replacement could save over $400,000 per year. Further, information about maintenance contracts in IRS’ computer asset management system is either incomplete or never input.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62098","Paulina"
"Treasury IG for Tax Administration","Internal Revenue Service",,"2002-20-170","Additional Improvements Are Needed in the Application of Performance-Based Contracting to Business Systems Modernization Projects",9/13/2002 0:00:00,"Improvements have been made in managing task orders issued to the contractor as evidenced by the time required to obtain agreement between the BSMO and the contractor on task order requirements has been reduced from 384 days to 90 days, and the average number of modifications required for task orders has been lowered from 8 to less than 5.  However, improvements in the application of performance-based contracting techniques in four areas would improve the BSMO’s ability to manage the contractor's performance (1) Performance standards in project work statements were sometimes too numerous to be monitored, were not always measurable, and often focused on the production of documentation rather than the development of the business systems; (2) Plans for monitoring contractor performance were not consistent among projects, subjective monitoring methods were often used, and determinations of whether or not the PRIME contractor met the performance standard were often not made and documented; (3) Incentives were not consistently tied to specific levels of performance or balanced among the key areas of cost, schedule, and timeliness; and (4) The BSMO has reduced the use of firm fixed-price task orders, the type most recommended for performance-based contracting.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","61445","Paulina"
"Treasury IG","Department of the Treasury",,"OIG-97-020","Audit Of The Treasury Small Business Program",12/11/1996 0:00:00,"Treasury effectively oversees and monitors its Small Business Program by monitoring its prime contract performance and using proactive efforts.  Although some bureaus did better than others, monitoring of the subcontracting area needs improvement.  These conditions occurred because of difficulty in using the automated systems, difficulty in understanding the required forms, no control point is held accountable for the subcontracting area at some bureaus, and personnel did not following up with prime contractors to ensure that the required forms were submitted.   The subcontracting universe was incomplete and performance data was not accurate or complete.  With inadequate data, the Department could be losing subcontracting opportunities for small business.",0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62602","Paulina"
"Treasury IG","Customs Service",,"OIG-98-061","The Small Purchase Procurement Process Could Be Further Streamlined At The United States Custom Service",3/11/1998 0:00:00,"Customs could further reduce the use of purchase orders, blanket purchase agreements and imprest funds to achieve maximum cost efficiency if adequate controls and procedures were in place to ensure employees took full advantage of the purchase card program and the available travel related system.  In addition, cardholders did not always properly use the card or supply supporting documentation for charges.  Accounts were always promptly canceled when employees separated from Customs.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"Denver hard copy","62603","Paulina"
"Treasury IG","Comptroller of the Currency",,"OIG-00-120","Audit On The Effectiveness Of The Office Of The Comptroller Of The Currency's Procurement Operations",8/28/2000 0:00:00,"The Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) took positive steps to improve its procurement practices and policies, but should gather and analyze data on prior labor-hour contracts and determine whether a fixed-price or labor-hour contract is the most cost effective to use in the future for the same services. Other steps to be implemented are more training on reported procurement issues, and revise policies and procedures. Implemented actions are to reorganize procurement operations for goods and services, and a comprehensive review process to immediately identify and correct problems. Contracts projecting the appearance of improprieties were being re-competed.  Also, OCC was in the process of replacing its automated system to improve internal controls.  The OIG reports corrective action to occur for split purchases that avoid competition; personal service provisions in contracts; price and cost analysis; support contractor ability to perform and for contract vehicle; contract close-outs; simplified acquisition procedures; contract supervision; and, COTR approval of payment vouchers.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62601","Paulina"
"Treasury IG","Customs Service",,"OIG-00-121","Review of Contract Performance Related To Seized And Forfeited Property",9/8/2000 0:00:00,"The OIG found that Customs had not revised contract requirements for property insurance that were out of date, and had not revised contract criteria used to determine performance award fees that were no longer applicable.  An agreement between contractor and Customs personnel regarding the method for obtaining insurance was not properly authorized by the contracting officer.  As a result, the contractor was not in compliance with the property insurance requirements set forth in the contract.  In addition, Customs' award fee evaluation process raised concerns about how consistently established criteria was applied.  Award fees may not be an accurate reflection of the contractor's performance.  This condition was due, in part, to the implementation of a new management information system that did not produce the required reports.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62605","Paulina"
"Treasury IG","Department of the Treasury",,"OIG-01-012","Procurement Practices At The Community Development Financial Institution Fund",10/17/2000 0:00:00,"During the Fiscal Year, the Fund has made improvements in its procurement practices.  However, the Fund awarded sole source contracts to 8(a) firms in order to streamline contracting procedures.  These firms were used as ""pass-through"" to select and retain pre-selected consultants.  The Fund did not always specify the roles of the 8 (a) firms.  This constituted a misuse of the 8 (a) program by the Fund.  Further, the consultants were allowed to perform inherently Governmental functions.  The Fund also retained a contractor on a ""de facto"" sole source basis under a GSA contract for an extended period of time and increased the scope of work to include management consulting services.  These services were outside the scope of the original contract. The Fund revised their procurement procedures and if implemented as described, should prevent a reoccurrence of the deficiencies.",0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62606","Paulina"
"Treasury IG","Department of the Treasury",,"OIG-01-013","Follow-Up Audit Of The Office Of Thrift Supervision's Procurement Operations",10/27/2000 0:00:00,"The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) has taken positive steps to improve its procurement practices.  The OIG encouraged OTS to continue efforts to obtain a legal opinion of whether OTS is required to follow the FAR.  The Department of Treasury Acquisition Regulation did not recognize this exemption.  OTS maintained that it is exempt from the FAR pursuant to the legislation that created OTS.  Another issue was that the structure of the prime contract and associated subcontracts provided for compensation to the prime contractor on a cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost basis, which is prohibited by Federal procurement law.  Also, the prime contractor received management fees on overtime charges.  Accordingly, there was a disincentive for the prime contractor to control costs.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62607","Paulina"
"Treasury IG","U.S. Mint",,"OIG-02-074","GENERAL MANAGEMENT: The Mint Leased Excessive Space For Its Headquarters Operation",3/29/2002 0:00:00,"The Mint did not follow sound procurement practices in acquiring space to consolidate its headquarters operations.  Their leasing activities lacked proper planning, in-house leasing expertise, adequate documentation to support decisions made, sound internal controls, and managerial oversight. As a result, more space was leased than it needed. In the OIG's view, this is a basic tenet of public accountability by Federal agencies that did not go away with the Public Enterprise Fund (PEF) legislation that exempted the Mint from certain FAR provisions. Also, the Mint used the same broker, without competition, who was unlicensed in the District of Columbia.  The OIG recommended that the Mint should institute appropriate policies and procedures with effective management controls to avoid this problem in the future.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62608","Paulina"
"Treasury IG","Department of the Treasury",,"PO-1099","Statement of Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary, Before the Subcommittee on Treasury and General Government, Senate Appropriations Committee",3/14/2002 0:00:00,"Presidential Management Initiative 5 - Competitive Sourcing: Expanded steps are underway with each bureau to enhance competitive sourcing knowledge sharing, and knowledge management Department-wide so that necessary sourcing competitions can begin as soon as possible.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62641","Paulina"
"Treasury IG","Customs Service",,"OIG-02-104","Interim Report on Customs ACE Contract Management: Customs Did Not Promptly Obligate The Minimum Order Quantity Under Its Prime Integration Contract",7/17/2002 0:00:00,"The Customs Service awarded an Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity as a prime integration contract to design and build an commercial trade environment system.  Customs did not place the minimum order under the contract at contract award but waited five months to definitize three task orders worth $25 million as the minimum order.  However, according to 31 U.S.C. 1341 and 1501, the $25 million minimum order should have been obligated against the contract at the time of award; therefore, Customs obligations were understated for five months until the task orders were issued.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62427","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"7R5-E02-003","Audit of Sole Source Contract for Security Services",10/10/1996 0:00:00,"The OIG audited this sole source contract for security services at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA Outpatient Clinic (OPC) in Columbus, Ohio at the request of the Congressional Subcommittee for Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations to determine if the contract award under other than full and open competition was justified.  The sole source award was justified because the clinic's location warranted continuous security coverage.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62220","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"7R5-E03-014","Evaluation of A Management Consulting Contract",12/13/1996 0:00:00,"The VA needs to better manage and monitor the contractor's performance.  The contracting officer did not properly train the COTR or inform him of his responsibilities.  The COTR certified the contractor's invoices for payment without determining the acceptability of the end products.  Specifications of the statement of work (SOW) were not met.  Specifically, the VA paid for products that were required in the SOW but were not delivered, and VA received products that did not conform to the SOW. The contractor also produced end products that were not called for in the SOW.  None of the informal modifications to the SOW work were approved by the contracting officer or the COTR and documented as a change in the SOW. OIG recommended review contract documents and practices, and corrective action. Seek restitution for undelivered or unacceptable products, or provide acceptable products if needed.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62554","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"7R8-A99-026","Summary Report: Audits of VA - Medical School Affiliation Issues",1/29/1997 0:00:00,"VA made much progress to follow procurement rules and sound business practices in negotiating and administering contracts with medical schools. Policy was strengthened on scarce medical services contracts, contracting staff were trained, and sharing agreement requirements were simplified. However, some medical centers began using IPA agreements to obtain physician services to circumvent Shared Medical Service (SMS) contracts. Medical centers paid significantly more by using IPAs in these cases.  In addition, recent OIG audit work found staff may still not fully understand SMS contract requirements. Although sharing agreements were effectively managed, medical schools had difficulty providing reliable cost and pricing data for procedure-base sharing agreements. Rather than using cost and pricing data, medical centers should base agreements on Medicare reimbursement rates in lieu of cost and pricing data. OIG recommends to renegotiate affiliation agreements according to current priorities and management philosophy to better reflect broader scope, complexity, and economics.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","532329","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"7R3-A02-043","Interim Report: Audit of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine Service",2/7/1997 0:00:00,"For the decentralized equipment acquisition to field facilities, there is no centralized repository of information on the total number of cost per test (CPT) contracts nationwide, nor the cost-per-test price at each site available for comparison purposes.  Therefore, VA facilities could pay different prices to lease the same equipment.  In addition, additional economies may be available to VA medical centers from multi-facility contracts.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505043","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"7R1-G10-052","Management Advisory: Greater Compliance With Government wide Purchase Card Procedures Is Needed",2/26/1997 0:00:00,"The OIG found that 1 of 8 purchase card buys reviewed was not procured from the required GSA source. Greater compliance with purchase card procedures and guidance is needed for: accountability of cardholders, maintenance of cardholder accounts, certification and documentation of cardholder statements, audits of cardholder procurements, use of required sources of supplies and services, and proper use of funds and distribution costs.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","505044","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"7R3-A05-099","Audit of Internal Controls Over the Fee-Basis Program",6/20/1997 0:00:00,"The VA could reduce expenditures for fee-basis home health care by encouraging medical centers to use formal contracting and by establishing benchmarks for reasonable prices.  Charges for health care varied widely for comparable services, both from one medical center to another and within individual medical centers.  VHA did not provide guidance for contracting for home health services and, consequently, many medical centers did not have formal contracts for home health services. Medical Centers could realize significant cost savings from negotiated contracts.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","532401","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"7R8-A16-098","Audit of the Use of General Post Funds to Purchase Furniture, VA Medical Center, W. Los Angeles, CA",7/15/1997 0:00:00,"The Office of Inspector General (OIG) performed a review to determine the propriety of VA Medical Center (VAMC) West Los Angeles using $400,433 in general post funds (GPF) for the purchase of day room furniture. The review determined this was an appropriate use of GPF.  VA policy stated that non-earmarked GPF should be used for the direct benefit of veterans, and should not be used for recurring operations or to supplement appropriations.  Based on the OIG review of the circumstances surrounding the furniture purchase and on a Regional Counsel opinion, the OIG  concluded that the use of GPF to purchase day room furniture was appropriate.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62226","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"8R5D05004","Audit of VA Leased Space",10/10/1997 0:00:00,"Veterans Health Administration (VHA) and Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) generally established the leases economically, reduced leased space when appropriate, and administered the leased property effectively.  VBA negotiated rental rate reductions when GSA billed for more space than VBA actually occupied and when commercial rental rates declined. VBA also reduced space when the number of employees declined.  However, VHA’s medical facility contracting officers were not adequately documenting that competition was solicited for leases. Also, VHA is considering increasing the approval thresholds for VAMC contracting officers from $300,000 to $1 million that would allow direct negotiation for leases valued up to $1 million. If VHA increases the approval thresholds, not all facilities will have contracting officers with the proper lease training and experience.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62237","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"8R8D04013","Audit of VAMC Use of Prior Year Funds for Nonrecurring Maintenance Construction Projects",10/10/1997 0:00:00,"The Expired Funds Control Act is to ensure that Prior Year funds were used only for valid contract obligations of the year covered by the appropriation. The VA Office of Financial Policy (OFP) was responsible for monitoring the use of PY funds that were to be used only to pay for changes that were within the scope of NRM contracts. VA medical centers (VAMCs) were required to obtain OFP approval to use PY funds.  However, the audit found that it was possible for VAMCs to use PY funds without requesting OFP approval.  Also, 11 of the 12 projects reviewed used PY funds to pay for additional work that was outside the scope of the contracts, and 9 of the 11 projects, used PY funds to expand the scope of work covered by the contracts.  The audit also found that there was a strong relationship between the high use of PY funds and inadequate NRM project planning and management.  During FYs 1993 - 1996, VAMCs requested and OFP approved, an average of $11.5 million a year. However, the actual amount was probably significantly larger, since the OIG found that VAMCs had used PY funds without obtaining OFP approval.  The OIG estimated that better controls could reduce PY funds usage by about $3.81 million a year.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62240","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"8R4-A07-027","Review of Multi-State Nursing Home Contracts",10/20/1997 0:00:00,"One single-state contract established because of difficulties to place patients and needed access to more Community Nursing Home (CNHs) beds allowed CNHs already doing business with the VA to join  the contractor, Harmony Provider Network, Inc., and increase their rates without providing any additional services for patients.  The Harmony contract did not provide any services not already covered by the all-inclusive local contracts. With the negotiation of new rates, the problems have largely been resolved.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505020","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"8R5-E02-046","Report of Audit of Sole Source Contracts VAMC Las Vegas, NV",12/5/1997 0:00:00,"Initial use of sole source contracting for a 2-month period was justified based on an unusual and compelling urgency precluding full and open competition. Most of the supplemental agreements, amendments, and re-awarding of sole source contracts beyond this period was not justified and did not comply with Federal and VA Acquisition Regulations and policies.  Actions were made without any effort to solicit services through full and open competition, and used amendments without supplemental agreements to expand the scope of the work required under the contract.  The contract file documents lacked the appropriate price negotiation documentation and there was no evidence in the file of any cost saving analysis for obtaining the service through a sole source contract. The contracting officer did not submit contracts for required technical review. VA may have paid more than necessary for the contracted services.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62246","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"8D2-E01-002","Audit of VA Procurement Initiatives For Computer Hardware, Software, and Services (PCHS/PAIRS) And Selected Information Technology Investments.",1/22/1998 0:00:00,"VA needs to evaluate risks and benefits from using BPAs and to assess need to control their proliferation to avoid duplication of acquisition resources in making Information Technology (IT) purchases.  The COTR has not received formal training in duties which also need to be designated in writing.  VA made significant IT buys from other buying mechanisms because a contract replacement was not completed timely.  Acquisition risks have been addressed by procurement planning actions. OIG determined contracting officials addressed most lessons learned from past IT contracts and took actions comparing with best practices in the industry.  Procurement actions and decisions were well documented and supported.  Contracting officials took timely actions to disallow credit card use charges that could be significant. VA also needs to strengthen controls for effective and efficient IT acquisition and take timely advantage of the rapid advances in the IT industry. Requirements analysis needs revision to establish realistic estimate of cost, schedule, and performance goals for this IT procurement.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505021","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0402","Audit of the Management of the Department of Energy's Leased Administrative Facilities",4/1/1997 0:00:00,"The Department was not applying good business practices in its management of leased administrative facilities.  Specifically, the Department leased more office space than it used and it could not determine its future leased space needs.  These problems occurred because the Department did not have an effective management system that included comprehensive site development plans and an accurate Department-wide database.",1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523330","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"CR-B-97-02","Audit of Department of Energy's Contractor Salary Increase Funds",4/4/1997 0:00:00,"A review of 8 major contractors showed that 6 complied with the Department's polices on salary increases. The other two gave salary increases that were not always in accordance with Departmental polices.  If these two contractors had implemented Department and contract requirements and contracting officers had properly performed their contract administration responsibilities concerning salary increase funds, both contractors would have frozen salary increases and would not have exceeded their annual budgets.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","746680","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0403","Audit of the Use of Intra-Departmental Requisitions",5/2/1997 0:00:00,"The audit disclosed that the Department's prime contractors did not always use intra-Departmental requisitions appropriately. Specifically, the review showed that 40 of 104 intra-Departmental requisitions were used to (1) acquire goods and services that were commercially available; (2) obtain goods and services which were not part of the performing contractor's mission; (3) procure the services of subcontractors; and (4) augment staffing.  As a result, the Department could not be certain that goods and services procured with these requisitions were cost effective.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523861","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"CR-B-97-03","Followup Audit on the Procurement of Support Services for the Energy Information Administration",5/6/1997 0:00:00,"(Note: This audit was performed to follow up on actions taken in response to a July 1990 report on ""Procurement of Support Services for the Energy Information Administration (EIA).""  That report stated that over 50 percent of the work under the cost-reimbursement contracts examined was recurring, could have been estimated with a reasonable degree of accuracy, and was suitable for fixed-price contracting.  In responding to the prior report, the Department's Office of Procurement Operations (Procurement) said it would work closely with the EIA to identify work susceptible to fixed-price contracting.)  In the followup audit, the OIG found that EIA and Procurement had made little progress towards awarding firm-fixed price contracts.  Much of EIA's contract work continued to be recurring in nature, but it had not developed statements of work that were appropriate for awarding firm fixed-price contracts.  As a result, EIA had 14 contracts valued at about $202 million that were issued as cost reimbursement and labor hour contracts.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523865","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0406","Review of Proposed Subcontract for Outsourcing Information Technology",6/2/1997 0:00:00,"The OIG reviewed a Department Operation Office's selection of Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) as a proposed subcontractor for outsourcing information technology.  The review found that the Operation Office: (1) did not use effective competitive techniques regarding both the solicitation and evaluation of bids for the proposed award; (2) failed to maintain adequate file documentation appropriate to the value of the proposed procurement; and (3) had not ensured that the pricing of the proposed subcontract was fair and reasonable.  During the course of the review, the Department's Operation Office made the decision to disapprove the proposed subcontract with CSC.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523859","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0409","Audit of the Western Area Power Administration's Contract with Basin Electric Power Cooperative",6/25/1997 0:00:00,"The OIG conducted an audit of charges to the Western Area Power Administration made by the Basin Electric Power Cooperative under contract No. DE-MP65-82WP-19001.  The OIG found that Basin overcharged Western approximately $23.8 million.  The overcharges occurred for 8 disclosed reasons.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523858","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0410","Audit of Environmental Restoration at the Los Alamos National Laboratory",7/15/1997 0:00:00,"The OIG determined that Los Alamos did not generate the information needed to assess the cost effectiveness of remediation on a site-by-site basis.  This situation occurred because the performance criteria used to evaluate cost effectiveness were not always reasonable, measurable, and complete.  As a result, neither Los Alamos nor the Department could evaluate the cost effectiveness or progress of the remediation program or accurately budget for upcoming remediation activities.  The audit also determined that Los Alamos' sample validation procedures were too costly because Los Alamos validated more samples than called for by Federal and state standard practices.  (Note: In 1995, the DOE and Los Alamos adopted a performance-based management approach to contracting to hold Los Alamos more accountable for its Environmental Restoration Program.)",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523856","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0411","Audit of the Contractor Incentive Programs at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site",8/13/1997 0:00:00,"The OIG found that contrary to the Department's guidance on cost reduction incentives, Rocky Flats approved 3 cost reduction proposals that did not meet basic criteria.  These proposals, with approved savings of about $16 million, were not innovative and generally did not return savings to the Department.  The proposals were approved because Rocky Flats did not use the contract in conjunction with Departmental guidance as a basis for accepting or rejecting the proposals.  In addition, the OIG found that the contract for the operation of the Rocky Flats site contained performance measures which did not always include clearly defined criteria, were not structured to encourage and reward superior performance, and were often process-rather than results-oriented.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523862","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"CR-B-97-04","Audit of Controls Over the ADP Support Services Contract",8/15/1997 0:00:00,"The OIG found that the DOE Headquarters program offices did not effectively manage the ADP support services contract by fully evaluating and controlling costs for automated office systems support and local area network administration (AOSS/LAN) task assignments .  Although the AOSS/LAN task assignments reviewed covered similar services in each program office, the number of contractor full time equivalents used and cost to complete the task assignments varied significantly in comparison to the number of computer users that each task assignment supported.  This occurred because in all but one instance the AOSS/LAN task assignments were not based on detailed analysis of user requirements and related costs.  In addition, none of the task assignments were benchmarked against best practices from internal or external sources.  The OIG estimated that the application of benchmarks could reduce the cost of support services by as much as $2 million annually.",1,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523872","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"WR-B-97-07","Audit of Desktop Computer Acquisitions at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory",8/25/1997 0:00:00,"The OIG found that Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies Company (hired to manage a DOE laboratory under a performance-based contract) did not always pay the lowest possible prices for desktop computers because its standard desktop computer figuration was excessive.  Additionally, some acquired desktop computers were not fully justified in accordance with established policies and procedures.  Further, the contractor purchased desktop computers from a local vendor rather than a less costly alternative source and did not pursue the possibly more economical option of leasing computers. The OIG estimated that the Department could save approximately $750,000 annually by requiring the contractor to adhere to a more conservative standard configuration for computers and using alternative sources of supply.",1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523851","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0412","Audit of the Contractor Incentive Program at the Nevada Operations Office",10/20/1997 0:00:00,"The OIG found that the performance measures set forth in a contract with Bechtel Nevada Corporation (hired to manage the Department's Nevada test site) did not conform to requirements set forth in a 1994 Contract Reform Team report and the Bechtel contract.  Specifically, the Department's Nevada Operations Office established measurement milestones after the work had been completed by Bechtel.  Further, many of the performance measures were vague and non-specific and, as a result, the Nevada Operations Office rewarded performance that could not be objectively validated.  Thus, the success of the effort to implement performance-based contracting at Nevada was at risk.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523898","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"INS-0-98-01","Report on Inspection of Concerns Regarding DOE's Evaluation of Chevron U.S.A.'s Unsolicited Proposal for the Elk Hills Naval Petroleum Reserve",11/17/1997 0:00:00,"Inspectors found that DOE's merit review process for the Chevron unsolicited proposal proceeded in accordance with the requirements of DOE Order 4210.9A, ""Unsolicited Proposals.""  However, inspectors also found that administrative deficiencies occurred in the processing of required documents during DOE's review process.  Specifically, required conflict of interest and procurement integrity forms were not always completed as required by those DOE officials involved with reviewing and evaluating Chevron's unsolicited proposal.  Additionally, the written approval of the Director of the Office of Clearance and Support, which was required, was not obtained in accordance with the time frames specified in the Order for obtaining such approval.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505983","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0414","Audit of the Department of Energy's Management of Field Contractor Employees Assigned to Headquarters and Other Federal Agencies",12/5/1997 0:00:00,"The OIG found that the Department did not effectively manage the use of field contractor employees assigned to Headquarters and other federal agencies.  Specifically, the Department was unable to identify all contractor employees assigned to the Washington, DC area or determine the total cost of maintaining them; some employees were providing routine support and administrative services rather than unique program expertise; and several of the Department's contractors had assigned their employees to work in other agencies without receiving full reimbursement for their services.  In addition, the Department did not fully implement the corrective actions it agreed to in a prior audit report.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501583","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"ER-B-98-05","Audit of the Department of Energy's Contracts with Envirocare of Utah, Inc.",12/10/1997 0:00:00,"Auditors found that the Department's contractors did not always use the most favorable waste disposal rates available.  Although volume discounts were available under Department-wide contracts, two of the Department's contractors awarded subcontracts to Envirocare with rates that were higher than the Department-wide rates.  This occurred because the Department did not require contractors to use the most favorable rates available.  As a result, the Department has incurred unnecessary costs to dispose of contaminated wastes.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505785","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0416","Audit of Support Services Subcontracts at Argonne National Laboratory",12/23/1997 0:00:00,"Four major program offices did not follow Departmental policy during FY 1996 when they acquired support services through subcontracts awarded by the Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne).  The offices acquired their subcontractor services through Argonne because they believed that Argonne's procurement organization could provide the services faster than the Headquarters procurement organization.  As a result, the Department may have paid more than necessary for the services, while many of the safeguards against noncompliance with laws and regulations that are normally provided by the Department's procurement process were lost.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505779","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"8R4-E01-092","Audit of VA's Pharmaceutical Prime Vendor (PPV) Program",3/31/1998 0:00:00,"Contract price monitoring by National Acquisition Center (NAC) staff is inefficient due to a lack of an automated process.  The current automated system contains incorrect and out-dated information, and is missing other information.  Recommended that NAC, Office of Acquisition and Material Management (OA&MM) officials develop an electronic prime vendor price monitoring system and that policy among organizations be established defining responsibility for monitoring prime vendor contract performance, including adherence to correct product pricing. Internal controls governing the solicitation, and award of prime vendor contracts were effective, and controls to ensure correct PPV pricing were generally effective.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505030","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"8R3-A01-101","Audit of Cost-Per-Test Leases and Reagent Rental Contracts In Pathology and Laboratory  Medicine Service",5/13/1998 0:00:00,"VHA achieved $8 million recurring annual savings from groups of facilities obtaining volume-based discounts under cost-per-test leases using BPAs. Some Centers did not participate in BPAs. Other Centers did not  achieve maximum volume-based discounts, and paid a wide range of prices for non-routine tests from many vendors and procurement methods.  Further, VHA did not monitor the prices paid by routine and non-routine tests. As a result, VHA was paying higher prices than some private hospitals for the same tests in lower volumes. VA could save $32 million annually by taking full advantage of its purchasing power, and $25 million by increasing use of its purchasing power in conjunction with VHA medical facilities. VA should combine VISN and DOD tests in the same geographic region to a BPA for lowest volume-based discount rates; contracting officials should write uniform request for proposals for price comparisons, and survey prices VA, DOD, and private healthcare organizations to target lowering vendor rates.",0,0,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505034","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"8R5D02107","Audit of Adult Day Care Clinic Construction Project at VAMC, Asheville, NC",5/28/1998 0:00:00,"The construction project to renovate a building for an Adult Day Health Care (ADHC) program was not advantageous to VA since only 13 veterans use the program, and 9 of them were nonservice-connected veterans.  Non-service connected veterans are not eligible for the ADHC program after 262 days.  Also a private firm is planning to open ADHC centers in several locations within the city in the next few years.  Contracting for the ADHC services would eliminate the need to renovate the space saving an estimated $913,000.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62248","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"8R3-G01-123","Audit of the Government Travel Card Program",7/14/1998 0:00:00,"VA management should make better use of reports provided by the credit card contractor to monitor the program at both VA Central Office and individual facilities.  Some charges were for retail purposes or ATM withdrawals.  VA should also increase use of travel cards to obtain advances.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","505038","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"8R5D02127","Audit of Nonrecurring Maintenance Construction Project at VA Domiciliary, White City, OR",7/24/1998 0:00:00,"The purpose of the audit was to determine if a construction project to connect Avenue L to Highway 62 was necessary or whether there were alternatives that would satisfy the needs of the domiciliary in a more cost-effective manner.  The IG found that the portion of the road project to pave the baseball field parking lot was not necessary.  The estimated cost of $275,000 to pave the parking lot could be better used for other purposes.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62250","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"8R5D02133","Audit of Energy Construction Project at VAMC, Ann Arbor, MI",8/12/1998 0:00:00,"The purpose of the audit was to determine if the construction project was necessary or whether there were alternatives that would satisfy the needs of the medical center in a more cost-effective manner.  According to the project plans, 20 energy-saving measures identified in a DOE audit would be implemented. One of these measures involved installing occupancy sensors throughout the medical center and another involved installing a variable air volume system to improve the efficiency of the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning system in research rooms.  The OIG found that installing occupancy sensors throughout the medical center and installing the variable air volume system in research rooms that already had fume hoods were not cost-effective.  The OIG concluded that the estimated cost of $238,269 to complete both measures could be better used for other purposes.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62251","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"8R5D02139","Audit of Pharmacy Renovation at VAMC, San Francisco, CA",9/10/1998 0:00:00,"The OIG audit found that the pharmacy workload did not justify the need for automated prescription-filling equipment.  While some benefits concerning accuracy and efficiency of filling prescriptions would result, prescription workload was low and dispensing errors were already very low.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62253","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"8PR-E11-134","Special Inquiry - Procurement Issues, VA Medical Center Ann Arbor, Michigan",9/16/1998 0:00:00,"The Medical Center did not meet competition requirements for 6 of 12 procurements reviewed, and  Department officials did not appropriately resolve the procurement protests made by a competing vendor.  Medical Center officials did not adequately supervise these procurements and that, as part of year-end spending, the Medical Center inappropriately spent $468,395 after the legal authority had expired.  The Center did not properly dispose of summary appraisals for purchasing agents, or follow up on reports that purchasing agents were not following procurement regulations. Further the Center did not consistently comply with other procurement requirements involving best-value determinations for 6 purchases from the FSS, set-aside reviews, and procurement reporting. Regardless, product descriptions were written as brand names or model numbers rather than salient features as required.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62592","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"9R5D02007","Audit of Surgical Suite Renovation Project at VAMC, Fresno, CA",10/23/1998 0:00:00,"The construction project was proposed to remodel the existing surgical suite containing four operating rooms (ORs). The project would provide state-of-the-art equipment and utilities and adequate space for efficient traffic flow. The OIG found that the surgical suite needed to be upgraded but the current surgical workload plus increases in workload expected by VAMC staff support the need for only 2.3 ORs. This occurred because VAMC and VISN management did not assess space needs based on workload. Since there were four ORs in existence, they planned to remodel all four.  According to the Acting Chief, Facilities Management, the cost to remodel four Ors instead of three would not be significant, since the entire surgical suite is being remodeled. However, the OIG determined that eliminating the equipment for the fourth OR would enable $126,000 in equipment funds to be redistributed for better use.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62268","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"9R8-E11-008","Evaluation of VA Medical Center Clinical Services Contracts With Medical Schools",10/30/1998 0:00:00,"Additional policy guidance would reduce risks associated with using noncompetitive commercial items contracts to purchase clinical services.  Guidance will emphasize the importance of obtaining sufficient information to insure that contract prices are reasonable. Commercial Items contracts do not require cost or pricing data to support proposed prices so cost and pricing data is not required for staff-based contracts. Procedure-based contracts found no deficiencies because procedure prices were set using Medicare rates as the ceiling.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505016","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"9R8A06021","Evaluation of Allegations re' Selected Fee Services at the Jerry L. Pettis Memorial VAMC, Loma Linda, CA",12/31/1998 0:00:00,"The VAMC referred patients needing a specialized technique for removing skin cancer to the affiliated medical school practice group and paid full price for the surgery when it could have been done for less cost at the VAMC, at other nearby VAMCs, or under contract with the medical school or other providers.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62270","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"9R5D02032","Audit of Ambulatory Care Renovation Project at VAMC, Atlanta, GA",1/29/1999 0:00:00,"Construction of a new 12,500 net square feet ambulatory care facility costing $3.7 million did not take into account three other construction projects, which will more than double the existing ambulatory care space.  Also, they did not adequately determine the effect that Community Based Outpatient Clinics (CBOCs) will have on reducing medical center workload and space needs.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62272","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"9R3-E99-037","Audit Of The Department Of Veterans Affairs Purchase Card Program",2/12/1999 0:00:00,"VA did not effectively implement management controls to ensure integrity of the Purchase Card Program. Reconciliation of billing statements were either not performed, or were not performed timely; and, approving officials were not certifying the reconciliation timely.  These conditions occurred because the VA did not have a system in place to identify cardholders and facilities that were not reconciling or approving transactions timely, or meeting other basic financial management responsibilities.  Monthly samples of credit card transactions identified system-wide VA problems, but did not identify specific cardholders or facilities requiring corrective action, and as a result, none was taken.  Reconciliation of card transactions is a material weakness. VA has developed and provided facility managers with procedures to monitor and control purchase card use.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","505017","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"9PR-A99-059","Administrative Investigation - Travel Use, and Contracting Issues At The Mid-Atlantic Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN), Durham, North Carolina",3/25/1999 0:00:00,"The VISN Director on five occasions over a 15-month period initiated actions to obtain consulting services costing $77,500 from firms employing a close personal acquaintance, in these actions.  VISN officials under his supervision and employees at two medical centers improperly made awards without competition and paid an excessive rate.  Because of the influence of his office, the Director and his subordinates were able to steer procurements to the source preferred by the Director rather than permitting contracting officers to independently fulfill their responsibilities under FAR.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62593","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"9R5D02118","Audit of VA's Minor Construction and Nonrecurring Maintenance Programs",6/14/1999 0:00:00,"While each VAMC and VISN had a process to review project requests, at least 6 of the 68 projects in our statistical sample were not justified or needed to be reduced in scope. The questioned costs in these six projects totaled over $1.7 million. Based on the sample results, the IG projected that the Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 Operating Plan contained at least $20.4 million of construction items that were not needed. During the audit, the IG issued separate reports for the six projects in question.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62278","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"9PR-E03-143","Administrative Investigation - Contracting Issues at the VA Chicago Health Care System, Chicago, Illinois",9/15/1999 0:00:00,"Contracting officers and purchasing agents improperly awarded prohibited personal services contracts to two retired VA employees.  In addition, no contract document exists that describe the specific tasks and payment to perform; nor do documents exist that identify any end product they were expected to produce, such as a report or recommendations.",1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62594","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"98-00057-1","Audit of Procurement Initiatives For VA's Integrated Data Communications Utility (IDCU) Telecommunications Support",10/1/1999 0:00:00,"The OIG identified issues in the current Integrated Data Communications Utility (IDCU) contract that adversely impacted VA operations and costs.  About 14 percent of the IDCU ports were not used consistently, which cost VA about $3.1 million to maintain unused ports.  The IDCU contract contained prices and terms that were not favorable to VA and the contract lacked effective contract administration and oversight. For example, there was no documentation or explanation for contract modifications that increased the value of the contract by about $142 million.  Cost information for the IDCU contract was not complete and difficult to reconstruct because many customer service orders were not priced, work was performed before the contractor provided a priced impact statement, and some impact statements were missing.  The IG found the price reasonableness of new services and technology was not assured and some items added to the contract were not consistent with the contract’s original scope.  VA managers did not have timely, reliable, and sufficient information to make sound management decisions to ensure the continuation of mission critical services while transitioning from one contract vehicle to another. This lack of information resulted in VA exercising the final option year of the IDCU contract instead of proceeding with a more favorably priced interim offer from another vendor.  The most favorable contract pricing terms made in the incumbent contractor’s Best and Final Offer were never adequately considered, which cost VA about $27 million by not exercising a purchase option and paid more to lease IDCU equipment than necessary.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501775","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"99-00113-55","Review of VAMC Albuquerque's Contract with American Medical Depot for Distribution of Medical/Surgical Supplies",4/4/2000 0:00:00,"OIG’s review concluded that VAMC Albuquerque’s contract with AMD was not cost-effective and that many of the claimed savings, such as reductions in full-time staff, never materialized. OIG’s analysis of the top 75 items shows that product prices increased an average of 23 percent from when the first purchases were made in May 1998 through August 1999 resulting in additional expenditures of $491,000. Projecting these results to the total purchases from AMD for the same time period results in additional product costs incurred by Albuquerque of $1.1 million. Also, the OIG found that AMD over-billed Albuquerque by at least $212,475 for the period May 1998 through August 1999. The additional expenditures and over-billings occurred on a contract that was supposed to have generated a guaranteed $400,000 in savings from February 1 through September 30, 1998.  The initial contract and the subsequent modification to incorporate prime vendor services for medical/surgical product requirements were poorly written and represented an illegal contract that caused continuing problems administering the contract and satisfying the customer that went unresolved due to management’s decision not to address the problem and/or a lack of accountability. As a result, VAMC frequently was not able to get the right product, at the right time, at a reasonable price to the user.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,"Denver docs","62282","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"98-00160-57","Allegation of Mismanagement of the Equipment Program at VAMC, Decatur, GA",4/5/2000 0:00:00,"The OIG found that the computer equipment program had indeed been mismanaged; among other things, over $336,000 of new computers and monitors were in storage excess to facility needs. The deficiencies occurred because the Information Technology (IT) Service purchased medical center ADP equipment based on the availability of funds, rather than from a formalized plan, and the Equipment Program was centralized to Logistics Service without sufficient resources to meet the workload requirements. The OIG recommended that the medical center develop a formal, written plan to acquire ADP equipment based on need and ensure that new unused computers and monitors are put to appropriate use or excessed to a VA facility that can properly utilize this equipment.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62285","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"99-00875-50","Administrative Investigation - Conflict of Interest and Other Issues, VA Great Lakes Health Care System, Hines, IL",5/11/2000 0:00:00,"The Health Care System created an improper conflicting financial interest by participating in an official capacity in negotiations with a corporation, The Ronald McDonald House, on whose board of directors served, in violation of Federal law and the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch.  These negotiations resulted in VA granting a license to the Ronald McDonald House to use real property, rent free, at the Hines VA Hospital.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62595","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"testimony","Testimony: VA Deputy Assistant Secretary For Acquisition and Material Management on VA/DOD Joint Pharmacy Procurement--Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Committee on Veteran Affairs",5/25/2000 0:00:00,"DOD and VA face a significant challenge to interface their electronic data systems needed to transition from the DOD Defense Supply Center's (DSC) Distribution and Pricing Agreements with manufacturers and distributors to successful negotiation by the VA of a Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) contract for a given item. FSS contracts combine identical medical related items, leverages volume to enhance negotiating better prices, eliminates duplication of contract efforts, and broadens product availability for both VA and DOD, while allowing the customer to select the product and pricing that best meets their needs. VA and DSC staff agreed to work on existing FSS contracts with pharmaceuticals first because advanced data management capabilities and National Drug Codes ease comparisons of drugs and pricing. GSA delegated to VA the responsibility to establish and administer FSS contracts for health care related commodities for the Federal Government. VA and DOD agreed to establish an IT Business Process Group to improve the data systems interface.  Standing reports and formal notes of conference calls are forwarded to stake holders including GAO.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","532288","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"99-01780-67","Administrative Investigation, Prosthetic Service Procurement Issue, VAMC, Denver, CO",5/26/2000 0:00:00,"Complainant alleged that VAMC-Denver denied nearby facilities the opportunity to compete when awarding a service contract for prosthetic devices.  The OIG found that limiting competition was not justified since the justification document did not identify a specific rationale, such as the vendor's unique qualifications or an urgent and compelling need for services to explain why the noncompetitive procurement was needed.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62286","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"testimony","Testimony: VA Assistant Secretary For Financial Management On VA Pharmaceutical Procurement Policy Before The Subcommittee On Health Committee On Veterans' Affairs U.S. House of Representatives",7/25/2000 0:00:00,"VA is delegated by GSA responsibility for establishing and administering the FSS contracts for health care related commodities for the Federal Government. FSS is a Multiple Award Schedule (MAS), with IDIQ type contracts. These contracts are national in scope and available for use by all Federal agencies. Prices are negotiated with the goal of obtaining equal to or better than Most Favored Commercial Customer prices.  Best pricing is ensured for the life of the multi-year contract through monitoring commercial market pricing trends.  The customer evaluates price lists and identifies contractors with the best overall value. Master Pricing Agreements set Federal Ceiling Prices for VA, DOD, HHS, and the Coast Guard. The price of the covered drug may not be more than 76 percent of Non-Federal Average Manufacturer Price.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","532291","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"00-02285-19","Review of Hotline Complaint: Misuse of Government Purchase Card",12/6/2000 0:00:00,"The Interior Designer at the Lakeside Division of the CHCS, continually made purchases of just below the $2,500 micro-purchase threshold for purchase cards.  The government purchase card is to be used for small, non-recurring purchases. Credit card and purchase order transaction records revealed that on four occasions from April 1997 through June 2, 2000, the designer acquired $169,331 worth of landscaping and landscaping-related services, using 94 separate purchase card transactions. For example, on September 5, 1997, the designer acquired $12,250 in unspecified landscaping services by breaking the acquisition down into five separate purchase card transactions of exactly $2,450 each. This practice is “purchase splitting,” and is prohibited under government purchase card rules.  While only some of the 94 transactions clearly showed purchase splitting, all of them represented a violation of the government purchase card program in that they were for recurring needs.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"Denver docs","62292","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"99-01685-10","Review of Selected Construction Contracts, Purchase Card Activities, and Vehicle Administration at VAMC, Clarksburg, W VA",1/25/2001 0:00:00,"The OIG review of the VAMC’s contract award and administration process identified significant performance deficiencies, and unexplained and unsupported project costs including: a helicopter pad was constructed without design plans, specifications, or establishing a contract to cover work requirements, performance liabilities, or associated expenses; construction work was performed before the award of a major contract; contract modifications were issued for work outside the scope of original contracts; some contract awards lacked or did not adequately justify determinations of price reasonableness and some modifications lacked support for increasing project costs; prior year funds appeared to be used inappropriately and construction projects included unexplained and significant performance delays; controls over construction contract progress payments were non-existent; and serious record keeping and administrative deficiencies exist.  The OIG found a systemic breakdown in program controls in the VAMC’s purchase card program as evidenced by splitting purchase orders to avoid competition (one vendor was paid non competitively approximately $90,000 over 17 months by splitting orders inappropriately); paying excessive prices for services and processing multiple orders for the same work.",0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,"Denver docs","62295","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"01-01855-75","Evaluation of the Department of Veterans Affairs Purchasing Practices",5/15/2001 0:00:00,"Medical centers increased open market purchases without determining price reasonableness or negotiating prices. Contractors not participating on the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) continue selling large volumes to VA through distributors on FSS. This eliminates Government ability to leverage prices using aggregate buying power.  Also, when a vendor is required to enter into separate local contracts with Government Facilities it will not offer the most favored customer pricing on the FSS. OIG recommended requiring VA facilities purchase items from national contracts, such as FSS, to be mandatory sources of medical/surgical supplies and equipment and pharmaceuticals and local contracts be prohibited unless authorized by the Procurement Executive or designee; implement a program to monitor local purchases and hold officials accountable for not complying with regulations and FAR; and, policy be made limiting contracts to distributors or for distribution services only unless responsible for negotiating and establishing prices for items distributed to the commercial customers.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,"Denver hard copy","62524","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"00-02773-106","Memorandum Report: Evaluation of the VA Enhanced-use Lease Program",7/13/2001 0:00:00,"The OIG determined that the Enhanced-Use Lease (EUL) program operated effectively with adequate management oversight. EULs provided VA with a cost-effective way to use undeveloped or underutilized property to generate revenues, defray operating costs, and benefit veterans.  For example, the John L. McClellan Memorial Hospital leased a 76-acre golf course with an appraised value of $800,000 to the city of Little Rock for 35 years. In exchange for the lease, the city made course improvements valued at $60,000; and allowed inpatients free access and provided veterans and VA employees with course discounts valued at $27,500 per year. By leasing the golf course, the hospital was able to shift annual operation and maintenance costs totaling about $93,000 to the city of Little Rock.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62300","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"testimony","Testimony before the House Small Business Committee re' small business and competition with other service providers",7/18/2001 0:00:00,"The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) support of small business in America is good, and under the leadership of Secretary Principi the agency is taking steps to further improve that support.  The VA has authority to purchase health care resources needed for veterans' health care from community providers and, in limited circumstances, to sell resources to other community entities. This authority is found in Title 38 USC Section 8153.  However, as a matter of policy, VA is not interested in competing with any other provider of a community health care resource or causing harm to any commercial provider of a health care resource.",0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62305","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"00-02772-105","Memorandum Report: Evaluation of VA's Enhanced Health Care Resources Sharing Program",8/30/2001 0:00:00,"Public Law 104-262, dated October 9, 1996, greatly expanded the scope of VA's sharing agreement authority.  The OIG reviewed Veterans Health Administration (VHA) to determine if sharing agreements had effective management controls to ensure that the agreements generated adequate revenues, benefited veterans, and protected VA interests.  VHA needed to strengthen management controls and oversight to ensure that VA reimbursements were reasonable and VA's interests were adequately protected.  VHA needed to ensure:  (1) Concept proposals and other required documents were properly reviewed and approved, (2) required legal reviews were completed, (3) Rationale and justification for reimbursement rates were documented.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62308","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"01-00504-9","Summary Report - Combined Assessment Program Reviews at Veterans Health Administration Medical Facilities (January 1999 - March 2001)",10/10/2001 0:00:00,"Negotiation and administration of noncompetitive clinical services contracts needs to be improved because of inadequate support for contract prices and ineffective monitoring of contractor's performance by the COTR.  Further, controls over the Government purchase card program needs improvement.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"Denver hard copy","62526","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"01-02982-59","Administrative Investigation - Fees for Legal Services, Office of General Counsel and Offices of the Regional Counsel",2/6/2002 0:00:00,"The Office of General Counsel, at your request, another Federal entity, resolve whether nonprofit research and education corporations fall under the definition of an ""agency"" as used in the Economy Act.  Further, to ensure appropriations documents specify which services OGC provides are covered by Congressional appropriations, and which are not.  The OIG investigated possible irregularities regarding an arrangement whereby their attorneys provide legal services to a nonprofit organization on a reimbursable basis.  A complaint questioned cash awards, and the OIG questioned receiving fees for these services.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62630","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"testimony","STATEMENT OF WILLIAM A. CONTE, DIRECTOR, EDITH NOURSE ROGERS MEMORIAL VETERANS ADMINISTRATION MEDICAL CENTER, BEDFORD, MASSACHUSSETTS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS",7/22/2002 0:00:00,"In 1993, the full conversion to a prime vendor concept enabled the facilities to reduce inventories size and manage more efficiently. CMOPs quickly utilized this advantage since large volumes of items were being turned over daily. The inventory turnover rate at the Bedford CMOP is 60 times a year. The prime vendor, over a period of time, has been able to accommodate the rapid growth, deliver items on a daily basis, automate the billing with the CMOP inventory system, and provide a significant discount for prompt payment. The just-in-time inventory system now used by the Bedford CMOP has reduced the need for large inventories, decreased out-dated and return items, and improved service to veterans due to the decreased numbers of out of stock situations.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,"Denver docs","62353","Paulina"
"Veterans Affairs IG","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"02-01265-152","Evaluation of Hotline Complaint Concerning Office Space Furnished to a Government Contractor at the Austin Automation Center",8/21/2002 0:00:00,"Office space located in the same area with VA contracting officials was furnished to a contractor's employees that were monitoring subcontractor activities.  The contractor’s employees could have gained access to proprietary or other confidential information concerning RFPs, contract bids, etc., however, the OIG found no evidence that the Government contractor had gained an unfair advantage in the bidding process, received preferential treatment, or obtained access to proprietary or other confidential information.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62531","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0400","Summary Audit on Contractor Employee Relocation and Temporary Living Costs",1/27/1997 0:00:00,"OIG audit reports showed that the Department reimbursed contractors $13.6 million for costs associated with employee relocation and temporary living costs that the OIG found to be either unallowable or unreasonable.  The OIG found that contractors were reimbursed for these costs because the Department did not use clearly defined contract provisions that were consistent with standard FAR or DEAR clauses to limit reimbursements to allowable and reasonable amounts.  (Note: This summary report highlights systemic problems with contractor charges for contractor employee relocation and temporary living costs.)",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523853","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0401","Inspection of the Performance Based Incentive Program at the Richland Operations Office",3/10/1997 0:00:00,"Auditors found that the FY 1995 Performance Based Incentive (PBI) Program at Richland has not always made the best use of incentive dollars paid to the M&O contractor.  For example, auditors found: (1) an instance where the fee paid was excessive; (2) instances where PBI fees were paid for work that was accomplished prior to the establishment of the PBI Program; (3) instances where PBI fees were paid for work that was not completed; (4) instances where PBI fees were paid for work that was easily achieved by the M&O contractor; and (5) an instance where quality and safety were compromised by the contractor in order to achieve a PBI fee.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523339","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"ER-B-98-06","Fluor Daniel Fernald's Use of Temporary Services Subcontractors",4/1/1998 0:00:00,"The OIG found that Fluor Daniel Fernald (a contractor hired by the Department's Ohio Field Office) was required by the terms of its contract to postpone hiring new employees during work force restructuring, and to retain as many displaced employees as possible by placing them in open positions or by retraining them for future jobs.  Despite these contract requirements, Fluor Daniel used temporary service subcontractors to replace separated employees and to occupy positions which could have been offered to separated employees.  These conditions occurred because the Ohio Field Office did not effectively monitor Fluor Daniel's activities.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501582","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"ER-B-98-08","The Cost Reduction Incentive Program at the Savannah River Site",5/1/1998 0:00:00,"The OIG found that the Department's Savannah River Operations Office did not take appropriate action in response to an internal 1997 assessment of performance based management contracts used at the Savannah River site.  (The 1997 assessment recommended that the Savannah River Operations Office reevaluate the effectiveness of its cost-reduction incentive program (CRIP) and consider either modifying the program to provide for payment only for innovative ideas, or cancel the program and utilize performance-based incentives to reward cost savings over some pre-established threshold.)  Despite the recommendation, the Savannah River Operations Office incurred at least $1.7 million in unnecessary costs in FY 1997 as a result of providing CRIP awards to the Westinghouse Savannah River Company for non-innovative proposals.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501581","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"INS-0-98-03","Report on Inspection of the Fiscal Year 1996 Performance Based Incentive Program at the Savannah River Operations Office",5/1/1998 0:00:00,"The OIG determined that the Department's Savannah River Operations Office experienced problems with the establishment and implementation of individual performance based incentives (PBIs).  For example, the Savannah River's PBI program was established without any specific written policies or procedures for the management and administration of an incentive fee program, and the performance evaluation plan was not approved until four and one-half months into the performance period.  The OIG also found three instances of questionable fee payments.  In one instance, PBI fees were paid for achieving minimal cost savings.  In another, PBI fees were paid for work which did not meet PBI stated requirements.  In the third case, new sources of additional funding were double-counted toward two PBIs.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501580","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"HQ-B-98-01","The U.S. Department of Energy's Value Engineering Program",7/17/1998 0:00:00,"The OIG found that the Department had not fully developed and implemented an effective value engineering (VE) program.  Specifically, several major Departmental sites had no formal VE programs or processes in place.  Furthermore, some VE savings were not always supported or not truly the result of the formal VE methodology and some field activities had not consistently computed and reported VE savings.  The Department's success with VE was limited by inadequate policy and procedures and the lack of annual plans, goals, and objectives.  As a result, the intended VE goals of reducing costs, increasing productivity, streamlining operations, and improving quality may not have been achieved to the fullest extent possible.*",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501579","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0424","Architect and Engineering Costs at Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories",8/7/1998 0:00:00,"The OIG found that Sandia's A-E costs were reasonable in relation to published industry standards, but that Los Alamos' A-E costs were not.  Specifically, A-E costs for Los Alamos projects included in the review were 65 percent, or $2.5 million, over the adjusted standard.  Los Alamos incurred these high costs because controls and performance measures were inadequate.  The OIG estimated that if controls and performance measures were not improved, Los Alamos would spend $8 million in excess of the adjusted industry standards on projects planned for funding over the next three years.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501578","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0427","The U.S. Department of Energy's Prime Contractor Fees on Subcontractor Costs",9/11/1998 0:00:00,"The OIG found that the Department included a majority of subcontractor costs in the fee bases of many for-profit contractors even though subcontractor efforts did not require significant oversight or management by the prime contractor.  In effect, both prime contractors and their subcontractors received fees for the same effort.  The Department had not developed specific policies and procedures to define subcontractor costs that should be excluded from prime contractor fee bases.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501576","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"testimony","Statement of John C. Layton, Inspector General, Department of Energy before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Commerce Committee",10/9/1997 0:00:00,"With respect to contract administration, the IG stated: OIG reviews identified weaknesses in the Department's administration of its laboratory contracts.  Pointing out that under its traditional management and operating contracts, DOE had accepted all risk, reimbursed all contractor costs, and paid some small management fees or allowances.  Further, these contracts had broadly defined scopes of work.  Because of recognized weaknesses in DOE's traditional management and operating approach, OMB designated contract administration in the Department as a high risk area.  Congress has also insisted on greater accountability for the taxpayers' money spent by the Department on its laboratories.  The Department has attempted to move to more specificity in its contracts.  The past practice of paying small fees and allowances has changed.  The Department is now paying higher contractor fees than ever.  For example, available fees rose from under $100 million in FY 1992 to over $450 million in FY 1996 for all DOE contractors.  The Department has not, however, looked at the breakdown of available fees or allowances for the laboratories.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501575","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"testimony","Statement of John C. Layton, Inspector General, Department of Energy before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House of Representatives",10/23/1997 0:00:00,"The following is a summary of the IG's statement.  The OIG has identified deficiencies in the administration of performance-based contracts.  For example, the OIG found: (1) incentive fees were excessive in relation to the cost of the work; (2) incentive fees were paid for work completed before the establishment of the performance objective; (3) incentive fees were paid for work that was not completed by the contractor; (4) incentive fees were paid for work that was easily achieved; and (5) performance measures were not results oriented.  Since 1989, in accordance with the requirements of the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act, DOE has reported contract administration as a material weakness.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501574","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0430","The U. S. Department of Energy's Project Hanford Management Contract Costs and Performance",11/3/1998 0:00:00,"Consistent with the Department's FY 1997 Strategic Plan, the Department's Richland Operations Office awarded a performance-based contract that included a goal that its management contractor and major subcontractors would help create 3,000 new, private sector jobs over a 5-year period that would help stabilize and diversify the area's economy, including 200 jobs by the end of the first year that were to be highly skilled, high paying, long-term, and unrelated to DOE's mission.  However, the OIG found that most of the new jobs the contractor claimed to have established during the first year were not comparable to those that existed at the contractor's site and did not help the Department's Richland Operations Office meet its commitment for long-term, economic stability.  Specifically, the OIG questioned 140 of 201 newly created jobs.",0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501572","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0432","The U.S. Department of Energy's Efforts to Increase the Financial Responsibility of Its Major For-Profit Operating Contractors",11/20/1998 0:00:00,"The OIG found that the Government was not adequately protected against contractor created liabilities on 16 of its 20 major for-profit operating contracts awarded by the Department.  This occurred because (1) the Department had not incorporated contract reform liability provisions into many of its major operating contracts and (2) Departmental officials had not recognized the implications of adding contract reform liability provisions without obtaining a performance guarantee with indemnification provisions from parent companies of its major operating contractors.  As a result, the Department may be liable for any monetary awards resulting from liabilities such as fines, penalties, third-party claims, and damage to or loss of Government property.",1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501573","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0436","The U.S. Department of Energy's Procurement and Assistance Data System",1/19/1999 0:00:00,"The OIG found that the Department's Procurement and Assistance Data System (PADS) did not contain material inaccuracies or omissions for data that was required by the system.  However, PADS did not meet user needs or comply with current generally accepted system practices.  Due to an outdated system design, it was not easy to use, particularly with regard to data entry and retrieval.  Furthermore, the system did not provide users with the information they believed was needed to manage procurements.  As a result, the field and program offices relied on systems that they had independently developed to meet their informational needs.  In addition, PADS did not comply with current generally accepted system practices of integrating the procurement information system with the financial management system.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501571","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"ER-B-99-02","Small Disadvantaged Business Program at the Chicago Operations Office",1/25/1999 0:00:00,"The OIG found that the Chicago Operations Office did not provide the maximum practicable opportunity for small disadvantaged businesses to participate in contract awards.  Specifically, Chicago had 12 contracts with small disadvantaged businesses in June 1998, 9 of which were awarded non-competitively.  (Full and open competition among eligible small disadvantaged firms is essential if one of the most important goals of the program, to achieve the ""maximum practicable opportunity,"" is to be satisfied.)  The OIG also found that changes to the terms and conditions of two other contracts suggested that adjustments were made to reduce the total anticipated costs to a level below the competitive threshold, allowing the contracts to be awarded without competition.",0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501570","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"ER-B-99-03","Westinghouse Savannah River Company's Health Benefit Plan",1/25/1999 0:00:00,"A portion of Westinghouse's 1997 and 1998 health benefit costs were unnecessary and unreasonable.  Westinghouse instructed Blue Cross/Blue Shield (BC/BS) to pay health care providers in the Aiken area at higher rates than BC/BS paid its other preferred providers in South Carolina.  This condition existed because Westinghouse did not want its employees to be inconvenienced and it wanted to protect the Aiken Regional Medical Centers from financial difficulty.  As a result of the higher rates paid to Aiken area health care providers, the Department will incur unnecessary and unreasonable costs of about $1.7 million over a 3-year period.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505734","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"WR-B-99-03","Hanford Site Contractors' Use of Site Services",3/11/1999 0:00:00,"Contractors acquired telecommunications, copying, and photography services that were already available, even though the Site had enough capacity to respond to contractors' needs.  Although the Site Infrastructure Division (SID), Richland Operations Office was responsible for optimal use of its site services, it neither used nor obtained information needed to properly coordinate the use of those services.  Instead, it allowed the contractors to develop in-house services or purchase commercial services rather than use the established site services.  If Richmond continues to allow contractors to independently procure services already available on site, it will forego savings of almost $1.5 million annually.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505628","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"ER-B-99-04","Credit Card Usage at the Ohio Field Office and the Fernald and Miamisburg Environmental Management Projects",3/15/1999 0:00:00,"The OIG reviewed credit card usage by the Department's Ohio Field Office, two subordinate management offices, and two contractors.  The OIG found that one contractor did not always use its credit cards for appropriate purposes.  Specifically, some cardholders used credit cards to purchase items that were unallowable under the terms of their company's contract with the Department.  Unallowable costs were incurred and claimed because cardholders were not provided adequate guidance on what was considered non-reimbursable costs.  Additionally, approving officials and cost account mangers did not consistently monitor card purchases.  As a result, the contractor employees incurred and the Department reimbursed $42,000 for unallowable items in FY 1998.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","501568","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"ER-B-99-05","Westinghouse Savannah River Company's Withdraw of Fees",4/8/1999 0:00:00,"The OIG found that the operator of the Department's Savannah River Site (Westinghouse Savannah River Company) correctly withdrew $51 million in award fees and $47 million in performance based incentive fees in FY's 1997 and 1998.  However, it withdrew $170,400 more in cost reduction incentive program (CRIP) fees than authorized by the Department.  Specifically, it made mistakes in 13 of 19 CRIP fee withdrawals, and withdrew fees that were not authorized by the Department for at least 21 cost reduction proposals.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501567","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"ER-B-99-06","Bechtel Jacobs Payroll Creation",4/14/1999 0:00:00,"The OIG could not determine if Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC (recipient of performance-based contract for the management and integration of environmental programs at Departmental facilities in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Paducah, Kentucky; and Portsmouth, Ohio) met its contract requirement to create new jobs in the Oak Ridge area with a cumulative payroll of $427 million through FY 2003, including $11 million in new payroll in FY 1998.  Bechtel Jacobs reported that it created $13.5 million in new payroll through September 30, 1998.  In the OIG's opinion, the Department was not provided with sufficient data to fully verify that all claimed payroll had been created.  Specifically, the Operations Office only verified that $4.9 million in new payroll had been created through September 30, 1998. As a result, Bechtel Jacobs may have received up to $4.5 million in fee to which it was not contractually entitled.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501565","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"ER-B-99-08","Health Physics Technician Subcontracts at Brookhaven National Laboratory",5/12/1999 0:00:00,"The OIG found that Brookhaven had not fully enforced the terms of its subcontracts, and as a result, Brookhaven and the Department paid about $288,000 more than necessary for health physics technicians.  For example, Brookhaven reimbursed the subcontractor for per diem on days when work was not performed and when the contractor did not pay subsistence expenses to its technicians.  Brookhaven also increased the subcontracts' fixed reimbursement rates without adequate justification and reimbursed the subcontractor for overtime even though the subcontract did not provide for an overtime reimbursement rate.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501564","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0444","The U.S. Department of Energy's Large-Scale Demonstration and Deployment Projects",5/19/1999 0:00:00,"Additional administrative costs were incurred because project management allowed repetitive procurements for similar contractor services.  Each operations and field office that participated in the Large-Scale Projects acquired services from commercial deactivation and decommissioning companies.  Often, these companies participated in one or more of the seven demonstration projects.  Separate procurements were used each time a company participated in a demonstration project even though the services provided by the company were essentially the same.  For the seven projects that have been completed or are ongoing, six contractors participated as team members more than once.  In total, 17 separate procurements were used to acquire services from the six contractors.   Accordingly, the IG recommended that the Focus Area Manager be directed to centralize procurement for contractor services.",0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","502307","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"INS-O-00-02","Inspection of Alleged Improprieties Regarding Issuance of a Contract",12/16/1999 0:00:00,"The OIG found that the Department did not pursue a competitive procurement despite that other companies were known to be interested in the procurement.  Instead, the Department contacted a DOE facility operator with the objective of quickly putting a contract in place with a firm that submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Department.  The facility operator subsequently arranged to have one of its subcontractors issue a letter contract to the firm that submitted the unsolicited proposal.  The OIG concluded that the Department effectively circumvented federal requirements designed to ensure the appropriate use of competition in contracting.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501563","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"WR-B-00-03","Outsourcing Opportunities at the Los Alamos National Laboratory",1/18/2000 0:00:00,"The audit found that Los Alamos had not identified all support services with outsourcing potential.  Specifically, of the 184 support services Los Alamos reviewed, it determined that only 4 had outsourcing potential.  However, the IG concluded that at least 128 of Los Alamos' support services reviewed had outsourcing potential.  These services were not identified because Los Alamos' screening process was flawed.  Since this process was the initial step leading to cost-benefit analyses, Los Alamos did not conduct such analyses on the majority of its support services.  Thus, Los Alamos cannot ensure that about $128 million spent on these services represent the least cost to the government.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","502301","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0460","The Department's Management and Operating Contractor Make-or-Buy Program",2/17/2000 0:00:00,"Only one of four contractors reviewed (Westinghouse Savannah River Company) had included all operating functions in its make-or-buy planning efforts.  This occurred because Program Offices did not provide management and operating contractors with guidance to assist in the identification process and procurement officials did not monitor contractor implementation of the program adequately.  As a result, cost saving opportunities were missed.  The OIG estimated that the Department could save over $5 million if cost-benefit analyses were conducted.  Additional savings are likely if the three contractors reviewed the functions that they had excluded from the make-or-buy process.*",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501263","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"HQ-L-00-01","Charitable Giving Requirements in Department of Energy Contracts",3/14/2000 0:00:00,"The OIG found that several contracts awarded to manage DOE facilities improperly included clauses requiring charitable giving by the contractors.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501639","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0463","Commercial Off-the-Shelf Software Acquisition Framework",3/20/2000 0:00:00,"The Department had not developed and implemented software standards or effectively used enterprise-wide contracts, key components of a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) acquisition framework.  Departmental offices acquired application and operating system software that varied in type and price and duplicated procurement efforts by awarding and managing multiple contracts for the same product.  The Department's inability to establish a framework was due to its decentralized information technology strategy and a lack of organizational support.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505622","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"WR-B-00-05","Performance Incentives at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL)",4/3/2000 0:00:00,"The OIG found that performance-based incentive contract awarded for operation of INEEL had not been fully successful in improving performance and reducing costs.  Incentives were not fully successful due to problems with the way the incentives were structured (to award process rather than outcome) and with validating contractor performance.  The problems resulted in the auditors questioning about $11.3 million in incentives paid to the contractor.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501640","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0470","Follow-up Audit of Health Benefit Costs at the Department's Management and Operating Contractors",5/11/2000 0:00:00,"The Department's actions in response to the prior 1994 audit have significantly reduced employee health benefit costs.  Several contractors implemented actions that substantially reduced overall costs while maintaining competitive benefit programs for employees.  However, despite these improvements, the Department continued to pay substantially more than competitive market benchmarks per capita for employee health benefits in CY 1998.  This occurred because the Department did not require contractors to bring health benefit plan costs in line with competitive market benchmarks and industry practices.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505620","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"ER-B-00-01","Central Shops at Brookhaven National Laboratory",5/11/2000 0:00:00,"Brookhaven did not prepare make-or-buy analysis for Central Shops.  Brookhaven and the Department did not give a high priority to performing a make-or-buy analysis in part due to outsourcing restrictions in Brookhaven's collective bargaining agreement.  Also, limitations in its financial system impeded the performance of a make-or-buy analysis.  As a result, Brookhaven and the Department may be missing opportunities to reduce fabrication costs.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505613","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0476","Best Practices for Environmental Management Baseline Development",7/7/2000 0:00:00,"The Department improved baseline development through the use of best practices developed while correcting weaknesses in the environmental liability estimate.  These best practices were designed to ensure that baseline development guidance was followed and that the baselines developed were more accurate and supportable and periodically updated.  While these improvements are important steps, recent OIG and other independent reviews indicated that problems with baselines still existed.  The OIG found instances of baselines that were incomplete, contained duplicate costs, were not being properly updated, or contained outyear costs estimates that were not supportable.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","502298","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"HQ-L-00-02","Polling by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory",7/19/2000 0:00:00,"This audit disclosed that Livermore contracted for a poll to gauge public awareness and impressions of the lab with respect to unfavorable press coverage.  In the OIG's view, the use of taxpayer dollars for this kind of exercise is questionable, as to its utility and appropriateness.  The OIG believed that the Department and the National Nuclear Security Administration should determine if the costs involved are, in fact, allowable.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501262","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0481","The Decontamination and Decommissioning Contract at the East Tennessee Technology Park",9/12/2000 0:00:00,"The OIG found that the contractor was not on track to complete the project within the current contract price or on schedule.  Specifically, the OIG estimated that the project would cost $94 million more than the contract amount of $250 million and that completion was at least 2 years away.  The OIG concluded that the contractor's management team was ineffective and that DOE's Operations Office did not pay sufficient attention to the escalating project cost.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501641","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0487","The Restructure of Security Services by the Oak Ridge Operations Office",10/31/2000 0:00:00,"The audit disclosed that the Operations Office did not manage the restructuring effort in a way that would have achieved its goals.  Specifically, the Operations Office did not: perform an analysis of security service staffing levels; determine the scope of work to be transferred to Wackenhut; or develop cost-reduction measures or incentives to ensure efficient contractor performance.  Also, despite its commitment to achieve greater economies in security services, the Operations Office did not consider cost as a ranking factor in the selection of the security services contractor.  As a result, the Operations Office incurred at least $7.5 million in avoidable security services and did not meets its goal of consolidating these services under a single contractor.",0,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505609","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0491","Management Challenges at the Department of Energy",11/28/2000 0:00:00,"The OIG found that many previously established contract reform goals had yet to be fully achieved.  For example, while incentives were included in most Department contracts, OIG reviews disclosed systemic weaknesses in the way the incentives had been administered.  Further, while fees rose dramatically, OIG reviews disclosed that there had not been a commensurate increase in financial risk to the contractors.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501642","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"INS-O-01-01","Inspection of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Credit Card Usage and Property Management Concerns",2/20/2001 0:00:00,"Review of nearly 13,000 credit card transactions made during FY 1999 revealed that the vast majority of items purchased were for allowable goods or services that were procured in accordance with established procedures.  However, the review found some weaknesses in the implementation of the credit card procurement program, and areas where improvements could be made both in the credit card and property management process.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","505608","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0498","Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC's Management and Integration Contract at Oak Ridge",3/21/2001 0:00:00,"The OIG found that Bechtel Jacobs ( an environmental remediation contractor) did not use competitive, fixed-price subcontracts or reduce staffing to the extent proposed.  In fact, nearly three years after award of the contract, Bechtel Jacobs had subcontracted less than 60 percent of the original work scope.  Further, the contractor had reduced staffing through transition to subcontractors by only 58 percent.  The audit found that Energy officials had not incorporated contractor proposals into the contract, thus limiting the Department's ability to hold the contractor accountable for achieving the goals.  The OIG concluded that the Department could have saved an additional $44.1 million in FY2000 had Bechtel Jacobs met the initial terms of its proposal.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501627","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0499","Department of Energy's Super Energy Savings Performance Contracts",4/2/2001 0:00:00,"The OIG concluded that the Department has not maximized the use of its cost-recovery authority to enhance super Energy Savings Performance Contracts (super ESPCs).  Specifically, the Department did not fully recover the cost of providing services to other Federal agencies and use recovered funds to achieve greater energy efficiency.  This occurred because the Department did not develop an appropriate pricing strategy for recovering costs and did not formulate a plan for spending the funds it recovered.  As a result, the Department, as well as other federal agencies, may not meet their long-term energy-savings goals because they will miss opportunities to use private financing mechanisms such as super ESPCs to fund energy-savings projects.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501629","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"INS-O-01-04","Inspection of the Purchase of Protective Force Respirators",4/12/2001 0:00:00,"The OIG concluded that Energy officials did not adequately plan and execute the procurement of respirators for use by the Department's protective forces.  Specifically, the OIG determined that (1) the procurement will not result in a standard respirator for use by protective force personnel Department-wide, which was a goal of the procurement; (2) the procurement was not adequately coordinated with affected organizations; (3) Energy officials may  be procuring considerably more respirators than are needed; and (4) Energy officials may have unnecessarily spent about $63,000 to purchase the respirators and other chemical equipment.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501628","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0503","Incentive Fees for Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC",5/7/2001 0:00:00,"The OIG found that the Oak Ridge Operations Office did not incentivize performance objectives for the contractor prior to the beginning of fiscal year 1998; did not finalize performance objectives prior to the start of FY 1999 and 2000; and modified performance objectives during each of these years to reduce expectations.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501630","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"CR-B-01-01","Issues Regarding Fee Structure for Three Environmental Management Contracts",5/9/2001 0:00:00,"The OIG was unable to determine whether fees made available to three contractors were fully commensurate with the risks and responsibilities assumed.  The OIG found that there are many complexities in determining applicable fee, and that the documented record in certain cases was not adequate for the OIG to make a determination.  In addition, the OIG found that the Department used a different negotiating methodology for calculating available fees at each of the three locations and that available fees at two of the locations tended to be higher than fees made available to other Department contractors.  Procurement officials held the position that the fees made available to the three contractors were developed in accordance with the FAR and that available post-negotiation memorandums provided a detailed record of the fee negotiation process.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501631","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0506","Inspection of Selected Aspects of the Office of River Protection Performance-Based Incentive Program",6/14/2001 0:00:00,"Based on review of 23 of 26 performance-based contract incentives (PBCIs), the OIG concluded that (1) PBCIs did not always challenge the contractor to achieve higher levels of performance and did not always focus on high priority tasks and (2) internal control weaknesses adversely impacted the ability of management officials to effectively administer their PBCI program.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501632","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0509","Integrated Planning, Accountability, and Budgeting System-Information System",6/28/2001 0:00:00,"To support its mission, the Department's Office of Environmental Management (EM) developed a corporate-level project known as the Integrated Planning, Accountability, and Budgeting System - Information System (IPABS-IS).  IPABS-IS was not integrated into the Department's Corporate Systems Information Architecture; did not fully satisfy Department goals; and perhaps of greatest importance, did not meet users' information needs.  The audit disclosed that the Department did not actively manage the system's development.  As a result, the Department spent about $6 million for a corporate-level information system that does not fully satisfy management information needs.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","502262","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0510","Use of Performance-Based Incentives at Selected Departmental Sites",7/9/2001 0:00:00,"The OIG found that the Department did not utilize performance-based incentives in a manner that would consistently result in improved contractor performance. For example, 12 of 19 performance based incentives selected for review were not clearly designed to facilitate improvement.  Additionally, some performance fees were increased without a corresponding increase in performance expectations.  In other cases, the ""challenge"" to the contractor in the form of the performance standard was lowered while the monetary incentive remained unchanged.  Finally, some incentives were established after the expected outcome had been achieved.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501633","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0512","Recruitment and Retention of Scientific and Technical Personnel",7/10/2001 0:00:00,"The Department has been unable to recruit and retain critical scientific and technical staff in a manner sufficient to meet identified mission requirements.  Based on the OIG's analysis of attrition and hiring since 1999, the IG determined that, as of January 2001, the Department faced an immediate need for as many as 577 scientific and technical specialists.  If this trend continues, the Department could face a shortage of nearly 40 percent in these classifications within five years.  Despite its 1998 Workforce for the 21st Century Initiative, the Department had not developed a comprehensive workforce plan, nor had it fully exploited available tools to recruit and retain staff.  As a result, the Department may not have the Federal scientific and technical expertise to provide essential Federal contract management activities at its contractor-operated facilities.  Based on past experience, this could lead to ineffective, inefficient and unresponsive contractor operations.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","502261","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0516","Information Technology Support Services Contracts",8/23/2001 0:00:00,"The OIG found that, despite initiatives sponsored by the Chief Information Officer, the Department was not effectively managing the acquisition of IT support services.  For example, headquarters and field elements routinely obtained IT support services without making maximum use of existing federal contracts designed for this purpose.  When existing contracts were used, headquarters program elements did not coordinate or consolidate requirements.  For example, the program elements issued 58 separate task orders against a single contract for the same or similar services.  The OIG advocated full and open competition to acquiring IT support services and other items at the best or lowest price available.  The OIG concluded that savings of as much as $44 million may be possible over a three-year period by adopting a department-wide approach.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501634","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"testimony","Statement of Gregory H. Friedman, Inspector General Department of Energy, Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations of the Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives",3/15/2001 0:00:00,"In its Fiscal Year 2000 Accountability Report, the Department reported that most procurement challenges as defined by its Contract Reform effort have been resolved.  Based on the IG's observations and reviews, the IG has concluded that many of the Department's contract reform goals have yet to be achieved.  For example, while incentives have been included in most Department contracts, OIG reviews have disclosed systemic weaknesses in the way these incentives have been administered.  Further, while fees have, in fact, risen dramatically, OIG reviews have disclosed that there has not been a commensurate increase in financial risk or accountability of the Department's contractors.  In addition, performance measures have not been fully established to clarify expectations and monitor contractor performance.  In the IG's judgment, improvement in contracting practices represents one of the greatest opportunities for enhancing the economy and efficiency of Departmental, including National Nuclear Security Administration operations.  Of the Department's total budget of about $18 billion, over $13 billion is spent by its major contractors.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501625","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"CR-B-02-01","Fixed-Price Contracting for Department of Energy Cleanup Activities",10/15/2001 0:00:00,"The OIG found that projected savings associated with awarding 9 fixed-price contracts were not likely to be fully realized.  Projected savings were unlikely because some savings estimates were unsupported or based on invalid cost comparisons and because increases in actual costs had occurred or were likely.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501635","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0532","Progress of the Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) Project",11/19/2001 0:00:00,"This audit found that the project's technical scope was reduced to allow the cost and schedule components to be met.  Contrary to original commitments, in June 2006 (the anticipated completion date), the project will not: have instruments to address all of the initially planned areas of science; provide complete user facilities; and process critical spare parts and equipment.",1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501261","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0536","Follow-on Inspection of the Department of Energy's Value Engineering Program",12/20/2001 0:00:00,"The OIG found that, despite a requirement dating to 1993, the Department had not developed or implemented an effective ""value engineering"" program as required by OMB Circular A-131.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501259","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0538","Management Challenges at the Department of Energy",12/21/2001 0:00:00,"With respect to contract administration (the first of ten identified management challenge areas), the OIG found that the Department continues to experience difficulties in managing some of its major projects which, for the most part, are managed by prime contractors.  Cost overruns, schedule delays and undesirable scope reductions have been recurring problems.  (Note: At the request of congressional leadership, the OIG identified what it considered to be the most significant management and performance challenges facing the Department.  The methodology employed by the OIG placed great emphasis on the identification of those programs and operations with demonstrated performance problems and those which were, in the OIG's judgment, inherently the most difficult to manage.  As a result, this report identifies the most serious challenge areas that the Department will need to address in 2002 and beyond.)",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","501638","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"I01OP001","U.S. Department of Energy's Purchase Card Programs--Lessons Learned",2/26/2002 0:00:00,"Taken together, prior OIG report findings suggest that the Department's system of safeguards and controls over its purchase card programs needs to be strengthened.  This report presents a series of ""lessons learned"" to improve the integrity and performance of the Department's purchase card programs.  Specifically, the report discusses the following 4 lessons learned: (1) comprehensive guidelines that clearly delineate and segregate duties with respect to approval of purchases, and receipt, reconciliation, and acceptance of goods and services are essential; (2) clearly delineating unallowable and non-reimbursable items in credit card policies and cardholder guidelines would result in more efficient and effective use of government purchase cards; (3) more aggressive steps are needed to assure compliance with established policies and procedures; and (4) a system is needed that provides a full accounting of the number of cardholders, cardholder status, and spending limitations.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","501626","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0549","Idaho Operations Office Planned Construction of a Waste Vitrification Facility",4/1/2002 0:00:00,"The OIG review found that DOE had not adequately considered potentially less costly alternatives to constructing the vitrification facility, including several proposed by the National Research Council. These options would allow Idaho to treat the liquid waste by upgrading an existing facility for as little as $80 million and deferring action on solid waste until technical uncertainties are resolved. DOE chose not to fully consider other approaches because it interpreted the Settlement Agreement to require that Idaho's waste be ""road ready"" by the milestone date of 2035 and judged that vitrifying the waste was the only treatment process that would meet this milestone. Consequently, DOE may spend significant funds to construct a facility that may ultimately prove to be unnecessary.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","61525","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"WR-L-02-03","Rocky Flats Closure Contract Quarterly Incentive Fees",5/2/2002 0:00:00,"The DOE Rocky Flats Field Office (RFFO) had not defined withholding policy for fee levels other than target performance, and RFFO did not budget for fee withholding.  The contract calls for proportionally adjusting fee for cost and schedule variances and FAR guidance calls for a fee adjustment formula that provides an effective incentive over the full range of reasonable foreseeable variations from target cost.  While RFFO had made four quarterly fee payments, there was no quantitative link from the fee awarded to cost and schedule variances.  Finally, RFFO did not budget for fee withholding because it did not want to account for the withheld fee as a funded liability, which would preclude using the withheld fee to fund other contract work.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","61539","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"IG-0559","Privatization of Safety Management Services at the Savannah River Site",6/18/2002 0:00:00,"Rather than reducing costs as expected, the privatization effort actually increased DOE’s safety management operating costs by, on average, $2 million per year. The OIG found that the Westinghouse privatization proposal contained an inaccurate make-or-buy analysis, that it was not thoroughly evaluated by responsible Federal managers, and that DOE did not require competitive bids for the safety management services. In fact, the OIG was told that a desire to avoid layoffs, not reducing cost, was the primary factor in the decision to approve the establishment of WSMS. As a result, from 1998 through 2001, DOE incurred about $8 million in unnecessary costs. Based on the average annual cost for the last three fiscal years, an additional $6.3 million in unnecessary costs could accrue during the remainder of the contract, which extends through Fiscal Year 2006.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"Denver docs","61527","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"WR-B-02-03","Sandia National Laboratories Procurement Card Program",8/6/2002 0:00:00,"The OIG found that Sandia procurement cardholders: (1) Purchased restricted items; (2) Split purchases to avoid transaction limits; and, (3) Allowed unauthorized users to make purchases. Sandia had not enforced its existing policies and procedures nor did it have adequate controls over the approval of transactions. Without the necessary policies and procedures, the risk of waste or abuse within the Procurement Card Program is increased.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"Denver docs","61530","Paulina"
"Energy IG","Department of Energy",,"CR-B-02-02","Procurement Administration at Brookhaven National Laboratory",8/22/2002 0:00:00,"Brookhaven did not always properly administer procurements. Specifically, Brookhaven did not always: (1) Provide DOE with required advance notice for certain procurement actions, including those that exceeded specified dollar thresholds; (2) Prepare adequate justification for non-competitive procurements or exemptions from requirements of the Buy American Act; and, (3) Accurately maintain procurement data on small business contracting and small purchases. Problems with procurement administration occurred because Brookhaven had not provided adequate training for acquisition staff, implemented appropriate control measures, and effectively implemented an assessment and performance measurement program. As a consequence, neither DOE nor Brookhaven had full assurance that competition was adequate and that procurement awards provided the best value and were in the best interests of the government. Additionally, inaccuracies in its procurement database contributed to Brookhaven overstating its small business contracting activity by about $10 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 and $12 million in FY 2001.",0,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","61531","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"002-97","C-2 R Aircraft Program",10/4/1996 0:00:00,"The C-2A (R) program was generally managed in an effective and efficient manner.  However, the aircraft's quantitative requirement for 40 C-2A-R aircraft was overstated from 5 to 11 aircraft. The overstatement occurred because Navy managers had not updated the requirement to reflect the reduction in aircraft carriers supported from 15 to 12.  Also, further extensions of the aircraft's service life were possible.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507545","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"003-97","Terminations of Contracts for Spare Parts at the Naval Inventory Control Point",10/15/1996 0:00:00,"The review of the effectiveness of Naval Inventory Control Point's (NAVICP's) contract termination policies and practices disclosed weak controls over the tracking and processing of contract terminations.  Specifically, NAVICP did not identify and deobligate $40.1 million in unused funds related to terminated contracts, for period ranging from 4 to 65 months after such action was required.  The $40.1 million represents funds that could be put to better use.  Also, NAVICP did not maintain accurate automated contract termination data bases, due primarily to insufficient staffing.  As a result, the data bases were unreliable and not effective for monitoring and tracking the status of contract terminations.  Also, NAVICP's internal controls were inadequate to detect and correct material internal control weaknesses in the contract termination process.  As a result, NAVICP did not identify problems related to delays in identifying and deobligating unused funds from terminated contracts and inaccuracies in the contract termination data bases.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505667","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"047-97","F-14 Aircraft Modification and Maintenance Program Model",9/3/1997 0:00:00,"The report explains the value and benefits of the F-14 Aircraft Modification and Maintenance Program Model. It shows that the Navy needed and did initiate actions to reduce the number of active aircraft requirements and perform aircraft modification work concurrently with the scheduled maintenance program.  However, auditors estimated that the Navy could avoid spending $165 million in Operation and Maintenance, Navy funds and $191.6 million in Aircraft Procurement, Navy funds for the remaining life of the F-14 aircraft before its retirement in fiscal year 2010.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507548","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"014-98","Planning for the Acquisition of Flight Recorders for Naval Aircraft",12/18/1997 0:00:00,"The audit showed that the Navy had not implemented the policy it established as early as 1987 for installing flight recorders on all naval aircraft because flight recorders received low priority in the budget.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507603","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"016-98","Acquisition of Computer Equipment and Displays on Air Force Contracts",1/8/1998 0:00:00,"AEGIS and Tomahawk program managers directed the development of 3 tactical systems under two Air Force repair and maintenance contracts for replacing failed, older microelectronic components.  These actions violated the FAR requirement that new procurement must be subject to full and open competition.  Though Navy contracting services were available, program managers opted to use the Air Force contracts so they could continue development with the contractors of managers' choice.  As a result, the Navy contracted for about $52 million of development work on a noncompetitive basis, needlessly paid at least $1 million in contract administration costs to the Air Force and a contractor, and bought LRIP units before the systems had been operationally tested and accepted.  The Navy also improperly used procurement funds to develop and procure two tactical systems.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505447","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"017-98","Marine Corps Procurement of Replenishment Material Requirements",1/6/1998 0:00:00,"This audit determined that replenishment materials at the wholesale level were not always procured in the most effective and efficient manner, and that obligations established for replenishment material did not always represent the actual cost of the procurements.  Specifically, personnel at the Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB), Albany, Georgia, did not cancel $5.4 million in outstanding purchase requests that were no longer needed.  Also, bulk fuel pumps that were procured for a special project with Procurement Marine Corps funds were receipted for into the Navy Working Capital Fund and subsequently issued with charge, contrary to Navy and Marine Corps guidance.  Consequently, the Marine Corps ultimately paid for 339 fuel pumps twice, resulting in an unnecessary duplicate expenditure of $10.1 million. Also, MCLB Albany did not always perform timely and comprehensive reviews of unliquidated obligations.  As a result, invalid obligations projected to total $2.8 million were on the accounting records.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505674","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"029-98","Acquisition, Management, and Use of Flight Simulators",3/27/1998 0:00:00,"The Navy and Marine Corps were effectively managing most aspects of flight simulator acquisition, management, and use.  Two areas that needed management attention were the use of military instructors instead of contractor instructors, and the maintenance of a data base that management agreed was inaccurate, incomplete, and had little use.  Specifically, the Navy could make available $6.7 million of military flight simulator instructor's time by contracting for the instruction.  Also, from $1.1 to $2.2 million were expended to collect, enter, and maintain simulator data that was unreliable.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507607","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"035-98","Navy Tugboat Requirements",4/24/1998 0:00:00,"The audit concluded that four of eight shore stations reviewed did not provide or plan to provide tugboat services in the most cost effective manner.  This condition existed because (1) two shore stations overstated tugboat requirements; (1) one shore station wanted to use Navy tugboats rather than tugboats from an independent contractor; and (3) one shore station did not consider all viable alternatives.  The audit identified $30.9 million that the Navy could put to better use.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62999","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"038-98","Administering Contracting Actions Without Final Prices at Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair",6/2/1998 0:00:00,"Unpriced contract actions administered by 9 Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair (SUPSHIPs) were over obligated and had excessive profits awarded to contractors.  Over obligations occurred because SUPSHIPs were obligating funds to the estimated final price when issuing unpriced contract actions.  The Naval Audit Service concluded that SUPSHIPs were not considering contractors' reduced risk for work completed or substantially completed when negotiating final prices for unpriced contract actions.  As a result, SUPSHIPs were awarding contractors excess profits when final pricing these contract actions.  Of 378 unpriced contract actions reviewed, 232, or 61 percent, had excess profit of $6.5 million.  Also, 284, or 75 percent, of the 378 unpriced contract actions were not definitized within the scheduled timeframe.  An average of 549 days elapsed from the date of issue to final pricing for these 284 contract actions.  Adherence to acquisition regulations regarding obligations and profit determination would have provided the Navy monetary benefits of $95.1 million over the 6-year DOD Future Years Defense Plan.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505671","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"043-98","Major Acquisition Budget Process",8/31/1998 0:00:00,"Auditors evaluated the programming and budgeting phases for two major acquisitions.  Even though the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) program was a high interest program, the Navy did not include FY 1998 Other Procurement, Navy funding for required LRIP items in its budget request.  In addition, budget and acquisition controls were not adequate to ensure that the CEC program office properly funded the E-2C aircraft portion of the program.  For the V-22 program, auditors found that the FYs 1988.1999 POM was not fully funded due to a need for improved reporting controls within the programming process.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507608","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"048-98","Program Executive Office (Mine Warfare) Financial Management Process and the Surface Mine Warfare Systems Program Office",9/28/1998 0:00:00,"Auditors determined that the PEO-MIW financial management process did not provide the Program Executive Office or the program manager accurate, timely information regarding PMS-407 financial management.  Program plans, budgets, and unfunded requirements and actions to mitigate them were not consistently linked to each other or the financial management information system.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507609","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"050-98","Interim Supply Report",9/25/1998 0:00:00,"Two contractors had ISS material valued at $38.558 million that was excess or residual to current and projected NAVSEA program requirements. One contractor located in New Jersey had material on hand and due in that exceeded established allowances by $31.052 million. Another contractor in California provided a list to us of material, valued at $7.506 million, that had been left over from production contracts in the 1980s.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","502846","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"001-99","Auditor General Advisory: Program Executive Office Auditor Project",10/22/1998 0:00:00,"The primary goal for the PEO Auditor project is to deliver timely products and services to the PEO and program managers to facilitate effective decision making.  The auditors found that six PEOs and NAVAIR managed a total of 447 acquisition efforts.  Of these, 218 were in Acquisition Categories I through IV programs and 229 were not-ACAT programs.  The offices will oversee total funding of about $87.8 billion from FYs 1998 through 2005.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507632","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"009-99","Budget and Programming Estimates for the Trident II (D-5) Missile Program Contained in the Weapons Procurement, Navy Appropriation",11/25/1998 0:00:00,"Department of Navy funding, totaling approximately $32.4 million, could be redistributed within the Trident II (D-5) missile program to satisfy other underfunded requirements.  The Navy's Office of Strategic Systems Programs delayed formally identifying and redistributing FYs 2002 through FY 2004 funds because of the high program risk associated with maintaining the D-5 missile supplier base.  This resulted in the understatement of budget estimates for the alternative requirement, which is contrary to Navy Comptroller guidance.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507633","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"010-99","Commercial Credit Card Programs at Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD)",11/27/1998 0:00:00,"In general, the International Merchant Purchase Authorization Card (IMPAC) and U.S. Government Fleet Services Card programs were not managed in accordance with appropriate directives.  In addition, internal controls were not in place or functioning as intended to prevent or promptly detect material errors and irregularities related to management of the credit card programs.  Weaknesses noted involved noncompliance with directives and other deficiencies, including: semiannual reviews of the IMPAC purchase card program were not conducted as required; NAWCAD was late in making 71 of 142 IMPAC credit card payments, resulting in paid interest charges of $24,350; requirements were inappropriately split into multiple purchases to keep purchase orders under the micro-threshold of $2,500; NAWCAD had no separation of duties in the approval process for IMPAC purchase card program requisitions; and the Naval Air Station Patuxent River Public Transportation Department did not reconcile monthly U.S. Government Fleet Services Card invoices against purchase receipts as required.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","505686","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"014-99","Management of Government Furnished Aviation Material Obligations Associated Primarily With Indefinite Delivery",12/10/1998 0:00:00,"The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) and the Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) held excess Government furnished material (GFM) valued at $45.2 million at the facilities of two commercial aviation production and repair contractors. The excess material was not visible to the Navy supply system, and accumulated because officials at the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) did not exercise oversight needed to manage this material. CNO officials stated they did not provide oversight because they believed NAVAIR and NAVICP had implemented adequate controls over GFM. The IG determined NAVAIR’s and NAVICP’s controls did not comply with Navy guidance because managers were more concerned about adequately supporting their own programs and did not consider the benefits of redistributing excess material to the supply system so it could be used by other Navy activities.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","502856","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"025-99","Obligations Associated Primarily with Indefinite Delivery Contracts and Basic Ordering Agreements",2/18/1999 0:00:00,"About $101.2 million in unliquidated contractual obligations recorded in the Navy's Standard Accounting and Reporting System (STARS) were invalid.  The obligations were invalid primarily because: (1) contracts were modified to reduce the amount of funding, but the reductions in funding were not recorded in STARS; (2) contracts were closed and total contract costs were less than total funding, but the STARS obligations were not reduced to match total costs; and (3) Defense Contract Management Command administrative contracting officers reviewed contract costs and funding and determined that total funding exceeded total costs.  By not preventing, identifying, and deobligating invalid contractual obligations, activities tied up $101.2 million that could have been put to better use.  (Note: This audit focused primarily on two types of contractual obligations: indefinite delivery orders and basic ordering agreements.)",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505658","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"030-99","Program Executive Office (Mine Warfare) Financial Management Process and the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program Office",3/26/1999 0:00:00,"The auditors determined that the PEO-MIW financial management process did not provide the PEO or PMS-EOD program manager accurate, timely information regarding financial management. Program plans, budgets, and unfunded requirements and actions to mitigate them were not consistently linked to each other or to the financial management information system. Monitoring of adherence to the operating budget to ensure maximum financial performance was ineffective because field activity report expenditure data was not always provided and when available was often inflated.  Without accurate and timely financial management information, the effectiveness of the PEO is reduced.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507634","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"034-99","Program Executive Office (Mine Warfare) Financial Management Process and the Airborne Mine Countermeasures Program Office",4/23/1999 0:00:00,"The auditors determined that the PEO-MIW financial management process did not provide the PEO or the PMS-210 program manager accurate, timely information regarding financial management. Program plans, budgets, and unfunded requirements and actions to mitigate them were not consistently linked to each other or to the financial management information system. The most vulnerable areas in the PMS-210 were Operation and Maintenance, Navy planning and outyear funding deficiencies; and outyear Other Procurement, Navy spares.  Monitoring of adherence to the operating budget to ensure maximum financial performance was ineffective because field activity report expenditure reporting was canceled without establishing an alternative process and expenditure data was deleted from the financial system.  Without accurate and timely financial management information, the effectiveness of the PEO is reduced.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507636","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"061-99","Department of the Navy Competitive Sourcing Program",9/16/1999 0:00:00,"In 1996, the Department of the Navy established its current Competitive Sourcing Program (competition between the Government and commercial industry) as a way to reduce costs.  OMB Circular A-76 established Federal policy for determining whether commercial activities should be performed under contract or in-house by the Government.  The Navy anticipated saving about $5.4 billion between FYs 2000 and 2005 as a result of competitive sourcing.  The Naval Audit Service concluded that the basis for and the actions taken to achieve savings resulted from the Competitive Sourcing Program were not adequate.  It noted the following areas of concern: (1) the Program was initiated without first establishing a corporate strategy that defines core and non-core competencies; (2) the Navy relied heavily on various major commands to execute the Program, which were reluctant to perform needed tasks; (3) the Program was behind schedule; (4) savings projections appeared questionable; (5) training was too general in nature, outdated, and not applicable to some types of functions under study; and (6) the system the Navy used to capture Program cost data was unreliable.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505657","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"066-99","Marine Corps Management of Night Vision Programs",9/24/1999 0:00:00,"The Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) did not validate requirements in the Logistics Management Information System (LMIS) for night vision programs totaling $347.7 million.  Also, it did not keep documentation supporting the allowances in the LMIS for programs totaling $240.5 million.  As a result, there is no assurance that data in LMIS is accurate.  Also, the Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) did not coordinate night vision requirements with MCCDC and Marine Corps Logistics Bases.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507637","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"068-99","F/A-18 Aircraft Modification and Maintenance Program",9/24/1999 0:00:00,"PMA-265 and the audit team jointly identified a potential cost avoidance in the F/A-18 upgrade and modification budget estimates.  These could be achieved by decreased modification requirements and performance of modifications concurrently with maintenance.  The cost avoidance could be redistributed to satisfy other underfunded, unfunded, and/or high priority requirements for the F/A-18 Aircraft Program.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507160","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2000-0007","Recording On-Hand Quantities of Aviation Depot Level Repairable Inventories at Commercial Contractor Repair Facilities",10/29/1999 0:00:00,"We found that NAVICP did not implement an effective inventory accuracy program for aviation depot level repairables at commercial contractors. Furthermore, the Naval Supply Systems Command did not provide adequate oversight. As a result, NAVICP’s recorded inventory balances of aviation depot level repairables at selected commercial contractors were not reliable and were misstated by $87.8 million. This occurred because of: (1) ineffective NAVICP procedures for implementing contractual reporting requirements; and (2) a lack of coordination between responsible NAVICP directorates.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","502863","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2000-0015","Auditor General Advisory: Program Executive Office Auditor Project",1/25/2000 0:00:00,"The Program Executive Officer (PEO) Auditor project represents a variance from traditional audit approaches.  It used fewer audit resources and provided Navy management with timely recommendations and/or advice to assist them with decision making.  The primary goal of the project is to deliver timely products and services to the PEO and program managers to facilitate effective decision making. This allowed the Naval Audit Service to provide real-time audit coverage to a significant portion of the Department of Navy budget, and provide that coverage more efficiently than would be possible through traditional audit methods. A secondary goal of the Program is to provide auditors with an opportunity to gain acquisition program office experience, which will ultimately enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the acquisition audits they perform when they return to traditional audit duties.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507660","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2000-0027","Independent Logistics Assessment Process",6/27/2000 0:00:00,"The audit objective was to evaluate compliance with Navy Independent Logistics Assessment (ILA) policy, and assess the adequacy and effectiveness of the ILA process.  Auditors determined that the ILA process was not effectively implemented. PEOs and SYSCOMs did not perform a significant number of ILAs, and did not always disclose results or the basis of logistics certifications to decision authorities.  Without timely and quality ILA results and/or knowing the basis of logistics certifications, decision authorities could not make fully informed decisions. The Navy's ineffective implementation of the ILA process adversely impacted the achievement of ASN (RD&A) strategic goals.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507661","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2000-0040","Predator Short Range Assault Weapon: Acquisition Planning and Contractor Merger",8/29/2000 0:00:00,"Staff analysis of Predator's acquisition planning concluded that the Predator program overstated training requirements and the Marine Corps had not explored potentially more affordable alternatives to the weapon despite significant cost growth and schedule breaches.  The approved acquisition objective was 18,910 units with 73 percent, or 13,245 units, allocated for training.  In addition, despite a Full Operational Capability schedule delay of 4.5 years and unit cost growth to 253 percent of the original threshold ($11,500 to $29,076), the program office had not requested an Analysis of Alternatives since 1994 and did not plan to examine alternatives prior to the next Milestone Decision.  As a result, the affordability of the Predator program as structured was questionable.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","505691","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2001-0018","Total Ownership Cost-Reduction Plans",3/20/2001 0:00:00,"Since 1998, Acquisition Reform Office and other Navy officials emphasized Total Ownership Cost-Reduction (TOC-R) and they achieved considerable success with the initiative.  However, much more needs to be done to make the TOC-R initiative fully effective.  For example, Navy managers did not submit about 30 percent of the required TOC-R plans.  Also, slightly more than half of the plans submitted contained only part of the required information.  Additionally, a detailed review of three plans found various problems.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507683","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2001-0031","Marine Corps Total Ownership Cost-Reduction Plans",6/19/2001 0:00:00,"In May 1998, Navy management officials issued policy guidance to implement the Navy's Total Ownership Cost-Reduction (TOC-R) initiative.  Auditors found that the Marine Corps program offices generally prepared TOC-R plans as required.  However, the process used to prepare TOC-R plans needs improvement and information used in the plans was not always supported.  Auditors concluded a major cause of TOC-R deficiencies was the lack of specific guidance.  Inadequate implementation, time constraints, and limited resources also contributed to the deficiencies.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","507684","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2001-0046","Independent Review: Clerical and Administrative Functions at the Naval Aviation Depot, Cherry Point, NC",8/31/2001 0:00:00,"After modification to original documents, the independent review concluded that the management plan reasonably established the Government’s ability to perform work requirements of the performance work statement (PWS) within resources provided by the Most Efficient Organization (MEO). The independent review also concluded that costs entered on the cost comparison form, prior to bid opening, were fully justified and calculated in accordance with procedures described in Part II of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-76 Supplemental Handbook.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","502868","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2002-0005","Independent Review of the Northeast Region Personal Property Services Function at the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Norfolk, VA",10/26/2001 0:00:00,"After modification to original documents, the independent review concluded that the management plan reasonably established the Government’s ability to perform work requirements of the performance work statement (PWS) within resources provided by the most efficient organization (MEO). The independent review also concluded that costs entered on the cost comparison forms, prior to bid opening, were fully justified and calculated in accordance with procedures described in Part II of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-76 Supplemental Handbook.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","502875","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2002-0006","Independent Review: Naval Supply Systems Command Southeast Region Household Goods Function, Jacksonville, FL",11/2/2001 0:00:00,"After modification to original documents, the independent review concluded that the management plan reasonably established the Government’s ability to perform work requirements of the performance work statement (PWS) within resources provided by the most efficient organization (MEO). The independent review also concluded that costs entered on the cost comparison forms, prior to bid opening, were fully justified and calculated in accordance with procedures described in Part II of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-76 Supplemental Handbook.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","502884","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2002-0007","Independent Review: Administrative and Clerical Functions at Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C.",11/2/2001 0:00:00,"After modification to original documents, the independent review concluded that the management plan reasonably established the Government’s ability to perform work requirements of the Performance Work Statement (PWS) within resources provided by the Most Efficient Organization (MEO). The independent review also concluded that costs entered on the cost comparison form, prior to bid opening, were fully justified and calculated in accordance with procedures described in Part II of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-76 Supplemental Handbook.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","502885","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2002-0015","Contracting and Related Functions at Naval Security Group Activity, Sugar Grove, WV",12/13/2001 0:00:00,"The Naval Security Group Activity (NSGA), Sugar Grove, West Virginia did not maintain proper separation of duties or adequate records for contract awards and purchases made with the government purchase card. Specifically, the Contracting Officer both awarded contracts and performed the receipt, inspection, and acceptance functions for goods and services.  Moreover, the Contracting Officer did not retain receipt records for 92% of purchases made with the government purchase card, nor forward these records to the Approving official.  These conditions occurred because NSGA did not adequately staff and document the receiving, inspection, and acceptance functions or comply with procurement regulations.  As a result, there was an increased risk of fraud, waste, and abuse.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","505696","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2002-0017","Independent Review: Tools and Parts Attendant Services Function at the Naval Aviation Depot, Cherry Point, NC",12/18/2001 0:00:00,"After modification to original documents, the independent review concluded that the management plan reasonably established the Government’s ability to perform work requirements of the Performance Work Statement (PWS) within resources provided by the Most Efficient Organization (MEO). The independent review also concluded that costs entered on the cost comparison form, prior to bid opening, were fully justified and calculated in accordance with procedures described in Part II of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-76 Supplemental Handbook. Upon review and acceptance of revised documents, we signed the independent review official certification on 27 September 2001 and provided this certification to the appropriate Contracting Officer for deposit in the bid box.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","502888","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2002-0023","Management of the Purchase Card Program at Public Works Center (PWC), San Diego, CA",1/10/2002 0:00:00,"The management of the program at PWC was not sufficient to ensure the integrity of the command's purchase card program.  PWC's internal operating procedures did not clearly define duties and responsibilities, nor did they adequately control the various processes involved in the purchase card transactions.  Approving officials had too many cardholders assigned for adequate review.  Management oversight of the program was sporadic and there were no periodic reviews as required by Navy policy.  As a result, misuse of the cards went undetected.  Also maintenance and repair services valued at $1.4 million were obtained from contractors with credit cards on a piece - meal basis instead of being aggregated and performed as entire projects. These services as procured appear to violate the rules defined under the Davis-Bacon Act or the Service Contract Act.  Both Acts require that certain wage clauses be transmitted in the contract when purchases meet the dollar thresholds specified within the Acts.  Purchases made with the government credit card did not provide the ability to transmit the required clauses regarding wages.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","505695","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2002-0026","Independent Review: Environmental Services Function at Navy Public Works Center, Norfolk, VA",2/5/2002 0:00:00,"After modification to original documents, the independent review concluded that the management plan reasonably established the Government’s ability to perform work requirements of the Performance Work Statement (PWS) within resources provided by the Most Efficient Organization (MEO). The independent review also concluded that costs entered on the cost comparison form, prior to bid opening, were fully justified and calculated in accordance with procedures described in Part II of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-76 Supplemental Handbook. Upon review and acceptance of revised documents, we signed the independent review official certification on 26 June 2001 and provided this certification to the appropriate Contracting Officer for deposit in the bid box.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","502897","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2002-0032","Management of Purchase Cards at Naval Support Activity Washington",2/25/2002 0:00:00,"Auditors reviewed 1,358 credit card purchases in FY 2000 with a value of $661,548 and found incomplete receipt retention.  Specifically, of the 1,358 purchases reviewed, 144 missing receipts.  Auditors extended their scope to include 172 purchases in FY 2001 with a value of $63,349.25 and found great improvements in both receipt retention and internal controls over purchase card use.  Specifically, only one purchase was missing a receipt.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"GAOHQ Docs","505694","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2002-0044","Independent Review: Photographic Optics Branch Functions at the Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu and China Lake, CA",4/26/2002 0:00:00,"After modification to original documents, the independent review concluded that the management plan reasonably established the Government’s ability to perform work requirements of the performance work statement (PWS) within resources provided by the Most Efficient Organization (MEO). The independent review also concluded that costs entered on the cost comparison form, prior to bid opening, were fully justified and calculated in accordance with procedures described in Part II of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-76 Supplemental Handbook. Upon review and acceptance of revised documents, we signed the Independent Review Official Certification on 1 August 2001 and provided this certification to the appropriate Contracting Officer for deposit in the bid box.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"Denver docs","62080","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2002-0045","Independent Review: Ocean Terminal Operations, Fleet and Industrial Supply Center Norfolk, VA",4/29/2002 0:00:00,"After modification to original documents, the independent review concluded that the management plan reasonably established the Government’s ability to perform work requirements of the Performance Work Statement (PWS) within resources provided by the Most Efficient Organization (MEO). The independent review also concluded that costs entered on the cost comparison form, prior to bid opening, were fully justified and calculated in accordance with procedures described in Part II of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-76 Supplemental Handbook. Upon review and acceptance of revised documents, we signed the independent review official certification on 20 June 2001. Due to wage grade changes, the independent review was recertified by the Naval Audit Service on 1 August 2001 and provided to the Contracting Officer for deposit in the bid box.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"Denver docs","62081","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2002-0046","Independent Review: Facilities Support Services Function at Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, SC",5/6/2002 0:00:00,"After modification to original documents, the independent review concluded that the management plan reasonably established the Government’s ability to perform work requirements of the Performance Work Statement (PWS) within resources provided by the Most Efficient Organization (MEO). The independent review also concluded that costs entered on the cost comparison form, prior to bid opening, were fully justified and calculated in accordance with procedures described in Part II of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-76 Supplemental Handbook. Upon review and acceptance of revised documents, we signed the independent review official certification on 20 April 2001 and provided this certification to the appropriate Contracting Officer for deposit in the bid box.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"Denver docs","62082","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2002-0049","Contractor Logistics Support at the Naval Sea Systems Command",5/17/2002 0:00:00,"Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and affiliated Program Executive Offices (PEOs) were not consistently able to demonstrate whether use of Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) resulted in reduced costs and improved system availability. Many product support decisions had no basis or were not based on cost and performance considerations. Further, the achievement of desired results was not always monitored or assessed. This occurred because NAVSEA and affiliated PEOs did not establish a performance plan or other internal controls to manage the implementation of the CLS acquisition reform initiative, as required by Department of Defense (DoD) and Navy guidance. As a result, program managers may not be employing the most efficient and effective sources of product support.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62083","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2002-0051","Naval Sea Systems Command Commercial Purchase Card Program",5/29/2002 0:00:00,"Naval Sea Systems Command did not effectively use purchase cards in accordance with established Department of the Navy guidance and did not adequately account for goods and services purchased. Naval Supply Systems Command Instruction 4200.94 requires activities to establish specific internal controls for managing the purchase card program. The Naval Supply Systems Command Instruction identifies the specific internal control requirements needed to help manage the program, such as screening mandatory sources, maintaining a purchase log, reconciling the purchase card statement, and retaining records. The Naval Sea Systems Command did not comply with this instruction. This condition was caused by a breakdown in internal controls. The primary problem noted with the process controls was that cardholders and approving officials simply did not follow established internal controls.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"Denver docs","62084","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2002-0062","Naval Air Systems Command Award Fee Management",7/24/2002 0:00:00,"Naval Air Systems Command’s (NAVAIR’s) management of its award fee process needs improvement. The IG's detailed review of 22 contracts determined the following: ?Contracting officers did not justify the cost effectiveness of selecting a cost-plus-award-fee contract type for any of the 22 contracts. ?Contracting officers included a statement in the award fee provisions of 8 contracts that erroneously excluded the award fee determination from the “Disputes” clause of the contract. ?Award fee officials’ use of the special reserve award fee pool clause in 8 contracts was questionable. ?Award fee plans for all 22 contracts included vague evaluation factors and did not identify critical areas or desired outcomes. ?Award fee officials did not maintain adequate documentation supporting award fee determinations for 21 contracts. ?Award fee officials did not always rely on available earned value data to evaluate contractor performance on 4 of 7 contracts that required it. These conditions were primarily caused by the lack of Navy guidance and lack of awareness that documented rationale is needed to support the award fee determination.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62085","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2002-0068","Naval Facilities Engineering Command's Process To Identify and Recover Contractor Debts",8/8/2002 0:00:00,"Potential contractor debts at Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) were not prevented by existing management controls and not identified or recovered by the command in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Potential contractor debts went undetected and were not recovered because NAVFAC did not have an established process to identify potential contractor debts owed to the Government. NAVFAC believes sufficient controls reside within the contract administration process to provide reasonable assurance that potential contractor debt will be prevented. However, the IG determined that existing management controls did not prevent some potential contractor debts and cannot provide reasonable assurance that contractor debts will be identified and recovered properly. As a result, unidentified contractor debts could result in a loss of funds due the Government. For example, if contractor debts we identified at Engineering Field Activity Chesapeake (EFACHES) are recovered and/or put to better use, the Navy could realize approximately $6.9 million in potential monetary benefits.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62086","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2002-0069","Contractor Logistics Support at the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command",8/8/2002 0:00:00,"The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) was not consistently able to demonstrate whether use of Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) resulted in reduced costs and improved system availability. Many product support decisions had no basis or were not based on cost and performance considerations. Further, the achievement of desired results was not always monitored or assessed. This occurred because SPAWAR did not establish a performance plan or other internal controls to manage the implementation of the CLS acquisition reform initiative, as required by Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of the Navy (DON) guidance. As a result, program managers may not be employing the most efficient and effective sources of product support.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver hard copy","62087","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2002-0070","Naval Facilities Engineering Command Commercial Purchase Card Program",8/14/2002 0:00:00,"The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) purchase card transactions processed at five activities deviated substantially from Navy guidance. Specifically, the IG found that: purchases were split into more than one purchase to avoid obtaining competitive bids; transactions were not adequately documented and documentation was not retained; purchase requirements were not screened for availability from statutory sources; and vendors were not rotated. These conditions occurred because there was a breakdown in internal controls in that cardholders did not comply with purchase card program requirements. As a result, NAVFAC had no assurance that funds were expended to accomplish its mission. In addition, the inadequate purchase card controls identified could result in improper use of the purchase card and increase the risks associated with the purchase card program.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,"Denver docs","62088","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2002-0075","Centralized Visual Information, Administrative Support, and Centralized Facilities Operations and Maintenance Services at the Corona Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona, CA",9/10/2002 0:00:00,"After modification to original documents, the independent review concluded that the management plan reasonably established the Government’s ability to perform work requirements of the Performance Work Statement (PWS) within resources provided by the Most Efficient Organization (MEO). The independent review also concluded that costs entered on the cost comparison form, prior to bid opening, were fully justified and calculated in accordance with procedures described in Part II of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-76 Supplemental Handbook. Upon review and acceptance of revised documents, we signed the independent review official certification on 11 December 2001. Due to changes in the General Schedule Pay Scale and Master Study Tables, the study was recertified on 4 April 2002 and provided to Contracting Officer for deposit in the bid box.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"Denver docs","62089","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2002-0078","Validation of Selected Unliquidated Obligations at Naval Air Systems Command",9/25/2002 0:00:00,"Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) did not always conduct validations of unliquidated obligations (ULOs) and maintain documentation in accordance with the required Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations (DoD FMR) and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller) (ASN, FM&C) memorandum dated 16 July 2001. This condition existed due to lack of personnel available to perform the reviews, higher priority work, and unreconciled differences between official accounting records and unofficial records. As a result of not performing adequate reviews, NAVAIR did not identify $8.7 million that could be used for other valid needs. Additionally, the IG encountered difficulty in obtaining documentation, receiving responses concerning validation requests, and in identifying the appropriate personnel regarding the validity of ULOs totaling $10.3 million. These funds may be available for recapture pending further research by NAVAIR.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62090","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2002-0081","Naval Personnel Command Nonappropriated Fund Construction Contracting",9/30/2002 0:00:00,"The objective of this review was to determine if NPC costs to award and administer construction contracts resulted in savings or cost benefits as compared to having the contracts awarded and administered by NAVFACENGCOM. On average, for the demonstration construction projects, NPC was able to complete its projects faster than NAVFACENGCOM or ACFSC. However, the varying degrees of project complexity and differences in start dates decreased the level of reliance that should have been placed on this comparison criterion.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62091","Paulina"
"Navy Audit Service","Navy",,"N2002-0082","Validation of Selected Unliquidated Obligations at Naval Sea Systems Command",9/30/2002 0:00:00,"Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) did not always conduct validations of unliquidated obligations (ULOs) and maintain documentation in accordance with the required Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations (DoD FMR) and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller) (ASN (FM&C)) memorandum dated 16 July 2001. This condition existed due to lack of personnel available to perform the reviews, higher priority work, and unreconciled differences between official accounting records and unofficial records. As a result of not performing adequate reviews, NAVSEA did not identify approximately $6 million that could be used for other valid needs. Additionally, we encountered difficulty in obtaining documentation, receiving responses concerning validation requests, and in identifying the appropriate personnel regarding the validity of ULOs totaling approximately $32.4 million. These funds may be available for recapture pending further research by NAVSEA.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","62092","Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","multiple agencies","DoD and muliple agencies","NSIAD-97-3","Acquisition Reform: The Government's Market Research Efforts",10/11/1996 0:00:00,"Our review of 21 selected contracts and discussions with DOD and civilian agency officials showed that the government’s market research efforts varied widely, but the variances appeared to be appropriate. For example, for pre-FASA efforts, DOD emphasized the use of market research for commercial items and NDI more than the civilian agencies did, primarily because of statutory requirements that applied to DOD. However, post-FASA, the civilian agencies we visited have increased their emphasis on market research. In addition, the type and extent of market research varied for the 21 contracts we reviewed. Overall, the agencies (1) obtained commercial items or NDI in 16 of the 21 contracts, although for 3 of the 16, market research was, for legitimate reasons, not performed and (2) used market research to obtain government unique items or services in 5 of the 21 contracts.",0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Architect of the Capitol",,"GGD-97-17R","Capitol Hill Lighting Retrofit",10/16/1996 0:00:00,"We believe you will need to pay close attention to the implementation of the methodology to ensure the integrity of the data used in computing the quantities of energy saved. If the methodology is not properly implemented, the accuracy of the calculation of the savings could be adversely affected.  In reviewing the materials attached to your letter, we noted examples where it appeared that the data input to the formula could be refined to provide more precision. For example, the nature of congressional activities result in fluctuations in the hours of operation within and between buildings. Consequently, documenting and using the actual operating hours rather than an across-the-board standard for hours of usage, as shown in the material attached to your letter, could provide more accurate data on energy consumed during peak, shoulder, and off-peak hours.",0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Forest Service","Bureau of Land Management","RCED-97-14","Timber Management: Opportunities to Limit Future Liability for Suspended or Canceled Timber Sale Contracts",10/31/1996 0:00:00,"From October 1992 through June 1996, the Forest Service and BLM paid more than $6.6 million in claims for 49 contracts that were suspended or canceled to protect threatened or endangered species. The Forest Service had 48 of the contracts; BLM had 1 contract. The agencies have paid the purchasers for the value of replacement timber, interest, lost profits, and such unrecovered costs as those incurred in maintaining performance bonds. The Forest Service paid damages of almost $6.5 million from its appropriations. BLM settled its single claim (almost $228,000 plus interest) by modifying another contract held by the purchaser to reduce the amount paid to the federal government for purchased timber without changing the original volume of timber to be harvested.  BLM has repeatedly revised its timber sale contract to minimize its liability when it must suspend or cancel a timber sale contract to protect threatened or endangered species.  The Forest Service has not.  Since the late 1980s, the Forest Service has been developing new regulations and a new timber sale contract that would limit the government’s liability on canceled timber sale contracts and redistribute the risk between the agency and the purchaser. The Forest Service has not finalized either the regulations or the contract.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","multiple agencies","DoD and various civilian agencies","NSIAD-97-22BR","Acquisition Reform: Implementation of Title V of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994",10/31/1996 0:00:00,"Title V of FASA is designed to foster the development of (1) measurable cost, schedule, and performance goals and (2) incentives for acquisition personnel to reach these goals.  Federal agencies’ progress in complying with title V timeframes and requirements varies and is discussed in general terms in this report.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Energy",,"RCED-97-17","Department of Energy: Opportunity to Improve Management of Major System Acquisitions",11/26/1996 0:00:00,"From 1980 through 1996, DOE conducted 80 projects that it designated as major system acquisitions. DOE has completed 15 of these projects, and most of them were finished behind schedule and with cost overruns.  Thirty-one projects were terminated prior to completion, after expenditures of over $10 billion. The remaining 34 projects are ongoing. Cost overruns and “schedule slippages” have occurred and continue to occur on many of the ongoing projects. GAO believes that there are four key factors underlying the cost overruns, schedule slippages, and terminations: (1) Constantly changing missions for DOE often make it difficult to maintain departmental and congressional support for these long-term, high-cost projects; (2) Funding of projects incrementally, from year to year rather than up front subjects the projects to potential delays or terminations in funding each year; (3) A flawed system of incentives that does not always reward individuals and organizations for doing “the right thing” and has often rewarded contractors despite poor performance; and (4) difficulty in hiring, training, and retaining enough people with the requisite skills to provide effective oversight and/or management of contractors’ operations.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","US Aid for International Development",,"NSIAD-97-19R","USAID Democracy Contracts",11/27/1996 0:00:00,"The two democracy offices awarded contracts through competitions for 17 democracy projects in various regions of the world. USAID used appropriate contracting procedures, which resulted in a wide distribution of contracts for these projects. With one exception, all of the contracts were awarded using procedures providing for full and open competition, and based on the documentation we reviewed, we found that USAID followed applicable agency and federal acquisition regulations. In general, we found the procurement files to be complete, and for each contract they included documentation supporting the selection decision. Concerning the level of competition obtained, we found that USAID received at least 3 proposals in 13 of the 17 competitions conducted for democracy contracts. With the agency's shift toward the use of multiple award contracts in 1994, we noted a significant increase in the number of contractors used to implement democracy projects. Prior to January 1994, for 8 democracy projects, the agency relied on 8 single-award contracts with five different organizations. After January 1994, for 9 projects, USAID awarded 20 contracts to 16 separate organizations.",0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"NSIAD-97-49","Defense Transportation: Reengineering the DOD Personal Property Program",11/27/1996 0:00:00,"The Department of Defense (DOD) is reengineering its personal property moving program. The Congress, while expressing support for DOD’s plan to reengineer the process, is concerned that the reengineered program could adversely affect the moving industry, particularly small business. The Congress directed DOD to convene a DOD/industry working group to develop a mutually agreeable program to pilot test.  The working group came to a consensus on many issues, including a set of program goals, but it could not reach agreement on the approach to take for the pilot test. Consequently, the two sides presented separate proposals, which GAO reviewed. The goals were to: 1. Provide quality service; 2. Improve on-time pickup; 3. Improve on-time delivery; 4. Achieve high customer satisfaction in relationship to the entire move process; 5. Adopt corporate business processes that lead to world-class customer service; 6. Lower loss/damage and lower claims frequency and claims averages; 7. Simplify the system, including reducing administrative workload; 8. Ensure capacity to meet DOD’s needs for quality moves; 9. Provide opportunity for small businesses offering quality service to compete for DOD business as a prime contractor; and 10. Provide best value moving services to the government.  Our assessment shows that DOD’s proposal meets the goals for reengineering the personal property program to a greater extent than the industry plan.",1,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"AIMD-97-9","Defense Communications: Performance Measures Needed to Ensure DISN Program Success",11/27/1996 0:00:00,"Congress asked that we determine whether (1) Defense considered alternative approaches in its selection of an acquisition strategy and (2) the selected acquisition strategy will yield the best value to the government over DISN’s life-cycle. Your office also requested that we determine what performance measures Defense managers are using or plan to use to objectively evaluate the outcomes and effectiveness of their DISN implementation efforts. Defense considered several options prior to selecting an acquisition strategy: an approach that would have involved using a single comprehensive service provider to furnish an integrated set of services to the government and one that involved separately acquiring component services with the government integrating those components itself. Defense considered the advantages and disadvantages of each option in terms of five factors: requirements, technology enhancement, schedule, management, and cost. Defense is striving to fully implement its DISN CONUS system by July 1997. However, it has yet to establish the basic cost and performance baseline information critical for assessing DISN’s success. In addition, Defense has not established performance measures that would determine how the implementation of this multibillion dollar initiative measures up to its cost and operational goals.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Environmental Protection Agency",,"RCED-97-15R","EPA's Cost of Preparing Regulatory Impact Analyses",12/6/1996 0:00:00,"Congress asked us to determine (1) whether EPA has a systematic way to identify and track the costs of preparing RIAs and (2) what have been EPA’ s costs to prepare RIAs for implementing regulations required by the 1990 amendments.  EPA’ s Office of Air and Radiation, which has four program offices, does not have a systematic way to identify and track all of its costs for preparing RIAs. Only two of the program offices are currently identifying and tracking the contract costs associated with preparing RIAs. None of the program offices are identifying and tracking the in-house costs of preparing RIAs. Because none of the offices had a systematic way to identify and track total costs, we requested program officials to provide us their best available cost data for preparing the 27 RIAs issued after enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. According to program officials, the data on contract costs were generally based on the cost estimates in the contract work assignments and the data on in- house costs were based on the project officers’ best estimates.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Energy",,"RCED-97-18","Department of Energy: Contract Reform is Progressing, but Full Implementation Will Take Years",12/10/1996 0:00:00,"While DOE has adopted competitive contract awards as the new standard for management and operating contracts, in practice, DOE continues to make noncompetitive awards for these contracts. DOE noncompetitively awarded 16 of 24 new management and operating contracts between July 1994 and August 1996. Furthermore, DOE did not competitively award three major contracts before it negotiated the terms of the contract renewal—a practice that is contrary to contract reform.  DOE’s contracting offices include performance goals in their management and operating contracts, but the contract goals are not always clearly linked to those of the Department. In addition, some contract language allows contractors to dispute the available amount and allocation of incentives, which impinges on DOE’s authority to place priorities on contract work, motivate contractors to perform the work, and create the potential for compromising DOE’s ability to fulfill its missions. DOE’s contracting offices have implemented another important reform by using incentive contracts, but the negotiation of these incentives did not always prove effective. For cost incentives to work, the incentives must be based on good contract price negotiations. Although the government-wide procurement regulation identifies procedures to follow in negotiating contract prices and incentives, DOE’s procurement regulation for its management and operating contracts does not.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Library of Congress",,"GGD-97-20R","Buy American Act",12/13/1996 0:00:00,"In your September 16, 1996, letter, you expressed concern that two Library contractors used subcontractors employing foreign nationals, which may have violated the Buy American Act. Your request letter specifically mentioned a newspaper article alleging that two contractors for the American Memory Project subcontracted work to firms using Jamaican and Filipino workers.  The Buy American Act, with several exceptions, generally requires federal agencies to give a preference to domestically produced end products over foreign end products in their procurements. The act does not apply to contracts for services. Our review of the information available indicated that the two Library contracts in question did not violate the act.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Army",,"NSIAD/AIMD-97-33","Environmental Cleanup: Inadequate Army Oversight of Rocky Mountain Arsenal Shared Costs",1/23/1997 0:00:00,"At the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, the Army manufactured chemical weapons, such as napalm bombs and mustard gas, and conventional munitions until the 1960s and destroyed weapons through the 1980s. In addition, it leased a portion of the arsenal to Shell from 1952 to 1987 to produce herbicides and pesticides. In 1983, the United States sued Shell Oil Company for its share of the cleanup costs. In February 1989, after extended litigation, the Army and Shell signed two agreement to share the costs of the arsenal’s cleanup. The agreements apportion cleanup costs to be paid by each party and costs to be shared by both, direct that environmental legislation be complied with, and provide a procedure for resolving disputes. However, the Army does not have detailed procedures for examining Shell’s shared costs. In the absence of such procedures, the Army’s examination consists of comparing Shell’s monthly costs with the previous month’s costs to look for significant variances. We found that the Army has not fully exercised its authority to review the costs of Shell’s contractors and subcontractors. For example, the Army shared about $48 million in costs that Shell claimed for technical studies, but has not examined the relevant contracts. The Army is permitted to review Shell’s costs under the arsenal agreements and should do so to ensure that costs being claimed are appropriate.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Energy",,"HR-97-13","High-Risk Series: Department of Energy Contract Management",2/1/1997 0:00:00,"The changes proposed in DOE is implementing contracting reforms, which are unprecedented in scope within DOE, to provide a comprehensive plan to address the problems resulting from the Department’s past contracting practices. However, we recently completed a review of the status of all of DOE’s contract reform actions, and noted that competition now may be the rule but most of DOE’s contract decisions continue to be noncompetitive. In addition, we found that problems are emerging in early implementation, such as contract goals are not always linked to those of the Department. Given the magnitude of these reforms, implementation problems are to be expected, but they must be identified and corrected for contract reform to succeed. DOE also needs to make the specific changes we identified in our recent review of its early implementation of contract reform. For example, DOE should competitively award its management and operating contracts to the greatest extent possible and link the contractors’ goals to DOE’s strategic goals.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"HR-97-4","High-Risk Series: Defense Contract Management",2/1/1997 0:00:00,"Improvement and simplification of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) contract payment system is imperative. If DOD does not achieve effective control over its payment process, DOD’s Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) will continue to risk overpaying contractors millions of dollars. Further, failure to reform the payment system perpetuates other financial management and accounting control problems and increases the administrative burden of identifying and correcting erroneous payments and their associated costs.  With improved contractor cost-estimating systems, DOD could reduce the risk of overpricing and manage contracts more efficiently. Contractors’ cost-estimating systems are a critical control for ensuring sound price proposals. Sound price proposals reduce the risk that the government will pay excessive prices, and they permit less government oversight and management attention. DOD has improved its oversight of contractors’ cost-estimating systems, and some improvement in contractor systems is indicated. Nevertheless, poor cost-estimating systems remain an area of concern at some contractors’ locations and require continued attention by contractors and government contracting officials.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"NSIAD-97-80R","NASA Procurement Assessments",2/4/1997 0:00:00,"Over the past several years, we have reviewed a variety of issues related to contract management at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Early last year, we reported that the quality, consistency, and usefulness of self-assessments of procurement functions by NASA's field centers could be improved if the centers had additional guidance and information. In March 1996, NASA's Office of Procurement asked centers for their views on the need for additional self-assessment guidance. Several centers said that additional agency-wide guidance was needed. To date, NASA headquarters has not issued additional guidance or collaborated with center procurement officials to do so. Our recent work on the self-assessment process at centers has reinforced our initial concern about the need for additional guidance. Developing ways to ensure the consistency and quality of centers' assessments is particularly important in view of recent and planned changes in the procurement process and headquarters' reduced oversight role.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"HEHS-97-58","Defense Health Care: Dental Contractor Overcame Obstacles, but More Proactive Oversight Needed",2/28/1997 0:00:00,"Concordia has overcome numerous start-up problems and is now performing the task areas we reviewed within the contract’s requirements. DOD, however, has not yet taken a proactive role in overseeing the contract and thus far has not acted to assure itself and the Congress that the contractor is performing as required. (1) Regarding fee appropriateness, neither applicable regulations nor the contract establish how Concordia’s fees should be set nor whether or when they should be revised. Thus, while contractually required to pay dentists at certain fee levels based on “prevailing charges” (or less when billed charges are lower), in effect, Concordia is left to determine whether its fees are appropriate and whether and how such contractual requirements are met. (2) Even though the fixed-price contract places the greatest risk on Concordia, DOD’s oversight, generally relying on contractor self-reporting, does not provide DOD adequate assurance that the contractor is performing as required. To date, DOD has not conducted a contract performance evaluation nor independently verified Concordia’s data. Responding to our concerns, DOD officials told us they plan to conduct a performance evaluation in the summer of 1997, but they have not yet defined what the evaluation will entail.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"NSIAD-97-114R","NASA Procurement: Contract Management Oversight",3/18/1997 0:00:00,"NASA believes that its planned integrated financial management system will help address the data problems at Goddard and throughout the agency. The system is being designed to collect and retrieve past and current financial, program, and related performance data for analysis, decisionmaking, and performance reporting by managers at all levels. The agency believes the system will provide agency officials and managers with complete, reliable, consistent, and timely information. Planned features of the proposed system include single points of data entry; common processing of similar kinds of transactions; common data elements; consistent internal controls, processing and reporting; and consistent user interfaces and data presentation. NASA projects that core finance, budget, executive information system, and procurement components of the new system will be operating agency-wide by July 1, 1999. This is nine months behind the original projected date of October I, 1998.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"AIMD-97-69R","DOD Problem Disbursements: Contract Modifications Not Properly Recorded in Payment System",4/3/1997 0:00:00,"We have an ongoing review of 175 selected long-term contracts for which recurring payments are made by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Columbus Center. These contracts were associated with large amounts of problem disbursements. As a part of this review, we evaluated those contracts’ modification files. We advised you and your staff during our March 13,1997, brief- that our preliminary analysis raised significant concerns as to whether (1) modifications were being input properly into the Center’ s payment system in a timely manner and (2) information from the modification files was being used to effectively manage the input process. The purpose of this letter is to outline our concerns in three key areas: missing modification numbers, delayed modification input, and duplicate modification input.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"NSIAD-97-37","Contract Management: Fixing DOD's Payment Problems is Imperative",4/10/1997 0:00:00,"In recent years, we have reported on DOD’s numerous problems in making accurate payments to defense contractors. These reports identify millions of dollars in government overpayments, underpayments, and interest on late payments, in addition to other financial management problems. DOD continues to risk hundreds of millions of dollars in potential overpayments and other financial management and accounting control problems. Further, improving the efficiency of the payment process would save additional millions of dollars annually in reduced processing costs. The following factors contribute significantly to problems and increased costs in DOD’s payment process: (1) nonintegrated computer systems that require manual entry of data that is erroneous or incomplete, (2) multiple documents that must be matched before contractors are paid, and (3) payments that require allocation among numerous accounting categories.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Housing and Urban Development",,"RCED-97-132R","Procurement: Overview of HUD's Contracting Activities",5/9/1997 0:00:00,"Contracting data were maintained at each location that performed contracting and varied considerably in terms of its completeness and reliability. The headquarters procurement office has maintained its data in the same automated database since 1977, and procurement officials believe that at least from 1991 to the present, the data are generally reliable. However, HUD field offices only began using a common automated database to track contracting activities in 1995, and agency officials consider information from this system incomplete and unreliable. We were consequently unable to develop any reportable information from this database. Ginnie Mae does not have an automated system for maintaining its contracting data, although it is developing a system expected to be operational by July 1997. HUD is in the process of implementing a new system that will integrate and centralize headquarters and field procurement data, but the new system does not include data on Ginnie Mae’s contracting activities.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"NSIAD-97-166R","Defense Advisory and Assistance Service Contracts",6/13/1997 0:00:00,"We focused our review on the amount that the prime contractors include in their general and administrative expenses, overhead costs, and profit for managing subcontractors’ efforts. Our analysis showed that the prime contractors’ indirect costs and fees for managing the subcontracted efforts ranged from about 2 percent to 8 percent of the subcontracts’ costs. While subcontractors performed a substantial portion of the work, prime contractors also performed significant direct work and consequently did not function principally as nonvalue-added intermediaries. The five contracts were funded from research, development, test and evaluation appropriations; procurement appropriations; and operations and maintenance appropriations. The statement of work for each contract was broad and provided for a range of technical and management services to assist selected procuring organizations. Because the detailed work requirements, timing, and definite cost of work could not be reasonably known when the basic contracts were awarded, the contracts were structured as task order or delivery order contracts. Detailed work requirements were established when separate task orders or delivery orders were issued.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"HEHS-97-107R","VA Construction: Contract Award Delays",6/16/1997 0:00:00,"The Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) annual appropriations act sets deadlines for awarding contracts for major construction projects. VA is required to award a construction documents contract by September 30 of the fiscal year in which funds were appropriated for a major construction project, and award a construction contract by September 30 of the following fiscal year.  VA’s December 12, 1996, letter to your Committees identified 15 awards, for 11 major construction projects, for which VA did not award a construction documents contract or a construction contract by September 30, 1996. In addition, through our review of VA’s construction project status report, we identified two more awards that we believe VA should have reported as delayed.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"HEHS-97-141","Defense Health Care: Actions Underway to Address Many TRICARE Contract Change Order Problems",7/14/1997 0:00:00,"Since the 1994 award of the first TRICARE contract, DOD has made 357 change orders to the five TRICARE contracts now in place, which cumulatively have increased tasks and overall costs. DOD has settled 134 of the orders at a cost of about $336,000, and estimates costs for the 223 orders that are yet to be settled at $38 million. However, contractors’ estimates for 85 of the 223 orders amounted to $423 million. The change orders have entailed policy, automated data processing (ADP), and operational changes to the contracts. About one-third has resulted from legislative or regulatory requirements; such as legislation establishing a hospice benefit. The remainder was DOD-initiated changes, such as changing contractor reporting requirements. Although there have been numerous change orders, DOD has not adequately managed the process. For example, rather than separately budgeting for the costs of individual change orders, DOD has used funds budgeted for other Defense Health Program (DHP) activities to pay for them—an approach that could potentially create a need for supplemental funding. In addition, DOD’s initial cost estimates for new orders, the basis for obligating funds for the orders, have not been sound. As a result, DOD has not developed a reliable estimate of the total federal liability for the contract changes.",0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"NSIAD-97-200BR","Base Operations: Contracting for Firefighters and Security Guards",9/12/1997 0:00:00,"DOD has asked Congress to repeal the prohibition against contracting for firefighter and security guard services. DOD officials believe that significant savings can be realized if the services were allowed to compete these services and that repealing the law prohibiting this practice would promote more efficient and effective use of military personnel.  Visits and discussions with service personnel at two Navy bases that contract for firefighter and security guard services found that in those instances in which the services had been contracted the results have been mixed. At one Navy facility with an omnibus contract for all base operation services, firefighter service inspection reports showed satisfactory performance, and contract evaluation reports for both firefighter and security guard services showed outstanding performance.  Another Navy facility that has contracted for security guard services since before 1983, however, has experienced problems with contractor performance, including one contractor who went bankrupt. According to service representatives from the Air Force, Navy, and Army, contractor performance has been generally satisfactory, although some minor problems have occurred. The representatives generally believe that the problems could have been resolved through better contracting and contract oversight practices.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","multiple agencies","Report information from 24 federal agencies","NSIAD-97-232","Acquisition Reform: Classes of contracts not suitable for the Federal Acquisition Computer Network",9/17/1997 0:00:00,"Senior procurement officials generally found contracts unsuitable for FACNET when (1) widespread public solicitation of offers was inappropriate, (2) transmitting essential contracting information through the network was not practical or feasible, or (3) alternative purchasing methods were faster and more efficient. The agencies provided clear, reasonable, and consistent business and technical reasons why numerous types of contracts should be excluded from mandatory FACNET processing. Available data showed continuing limited use of FACNET for contract awards. However, there is no government-wide data available on agencies’ use of other EC purchasing methods. Consequently, it is difficult to assess the government’s overall progress in doing business electronically in a standard way. Government-wide EC statistical information may not be available until the year 2000.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"NSIAD-98-46R","DOD Procurement: Funds Returned by Defense Contractors",10/28/1997 0:00:00,"Between fiscal years 1994 and 96, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service’s Columbus Center received checks from defense contractors totaling about $1 billion a year. For the first 7 months of fiscal year 1997, the Columbus Center received checks totaling about $559 million (see encl. Il)  The Columbus Center’ s data show that, of the $5.1 billion that the center received from contractors during the period of fiscal year 1993 through the first 7 months of fiscal year 1997, $3.7 billion was attributable to factors outside of its control. These include contract administration actions, such as reductions in contract prices due to contractors’ not meeting delivery dates, reallocations of costs to other contracts resulting in returned progress payments, and contract definitizations resulting in lower unit costs than previously billed by the contractor and paid by DFAS. The remaining $1.4 billion was due to payment errors at the Columbus Center.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of the Treasury",,"OSI-98-1","Inspectors General: Contracting Actions By Treasury Office of Inspector General.",10/31/1997 0:00:00,"GAO investigated the Treasury IG's award of two sole source contracts and found that neither met the competition exception for unusual and compelling urgency and should not have been awarded without competition.  In the first case, the contract appeared to have been awarded at an artificially high amount based on a comparison with a very similar contract with the same contractor at a different agency but awarded under full and open competition.  The second was a time and materials contract that was insufficiently and ineffectively administered by Treasury resulting in payments for out of scope work, work that may not have been completed, and undocumented costs.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","multiple agencies","Reports survey results from 26 Inspectors Gerneral","T-OSI/AIMD-98-28","Inspectors General: Concerns About Advisory and Assistance Service Contracts.",10/31/1997 0:00:00,"Twenty-six of the 27 Presidentially appointed IGs responded to our survey of the extent to which they procured advisory and assistance services, describing the types of services procured and the types of contracts used in acquiring the services, and indicating whether the services were non-competitively procured. Advisory and assistance services are provided under contract by nongovernmental sources to support or improve an organization’s policy development, decision-making, management and administration, program management and administration, and research and development activities. Nineteen of the 26 IGs procured advisory and assistance services during the 3-year period, awarding 208 contracts, task orders, or purchase orders, most of which were for audit and/or investigative work. These awards were initially valued at approximately $29 million to 80 different contractors. Of the 208 contract actions, about 84 percent (176) were competitively awarded. For the remaining 32, we examined the written justifications required to use other than full and open competition. The written justifications were adequate for 18 actions and for 14 actions awarded by five different IGs, the justifications were not adequate.  Except for the two Treasury IG contracts, time did not permit a determination of whether there actually was an acceptable justification for the 14 noncompetitive acquisitions. In the case of the two Treasury IG contracts, which were the highest priced of the 14 inadequately justified noncompetitive acquisitions and among the highest priced of all of the 208 IG acquisitions, there were no adequate justifications for using other than full and open competition in their award.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Energy",,"RCED-98-26","Department of Energy: Information on the Tritium Leak and Contractor Dismissal at the Brookhaven National Laboratory",11/4/1997 0:00:00,"Brookhaven employees did not aggressively monitor its reactor’s spent-fuel pool for leaks, and years passed before tritium contamination was discovered in the aquifer near the spent-fuel pool. Even after laboratory and DOE staff agreed with Suffolk County regulatory officials to install monitoring wells near the reactor in 1994, Brookhaven officials postponed their installation in favor of environmental, safety, and health activities they considered more important. Once the wells were installed and high levels of tritium were discovered, the laboratory reported that the spent-fuel pool could have been leaking for as long as 12 years.  DOE’s on-site oversight office, the Brookhaven Group, was directly responsible for Brookhaven’s performance, but it failed to hold the laboratory accountable for meeting all of its regulatory commitments, especially its agreement to install monitoring wells. The responsibility for failing to discover Brookhaven’s tritium leak has been acknowledged by laboratory managers, and DOE admits it failed to properly oversee the laboratory’s operations.  Senior DOE leadership shares responsibility because they failed to put in place an effective system that encourages all parts of DOE to work together to ensure that contractors meet their responsibilities on environment, safety and health issues. Unclear responsibilities for environment, safety and health matters are a problem that has been tolerated by DOE management for years.  DOE officials expressed frustration with Associated Universities’ performance and also with DOE’s evaluation process, which they told us did not appear to reflect actual performance at the laboratory.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Energy",,"RCED-98-30R","Department of Energy: Subcontracting Practices",11/24/1997 0:00:00,"DOE contracts out the management and operation (M&O) of most of its facilities.  At DOE's Idaho Falls Facility, the M&O contractor (EG&G-Idaho) was in the process of awarding a fixed-price plus fee subcontract to Lockheed Martin Advanced Environmental Systems (LMAES) for the cleanup of a nuclear waste disposal site when it lost the Idaho Falls Facility M&O contract to Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies Company (LMITC).  As a result, the subcontract to LMAES would be with an affiliated company. However, under DOE acquisition policies, no fee could be paid to LMAES because it is affiliated with LMITC which already was receiving a fee under the same corporate entity--Lockheed Martin.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"OSI-98-3R","TOPAZ II Space Nuclear Power Program: Management, Funding, and Contracting Problems.",12/1/1997 0:00:00,"Phillips Laboratory officials were not in compliance with the statutory requirements of CICA in 10 U.S.C. section 2304(f)(l) in awarding a facilities contract in support of the TOPAZ II program. This contracting impropriety occurred when Phillips Laboratory awarded a sole-source contract to the New Mexico Engineering Research Institute for test facilities and technical support services, without justifying the need for the award (10 USC Section 2304(f)(l)(A)) and without obtaining the appropriate approval for such an award (10 USC section 2304(f)(l)(B)).",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"NSIAD-98-82","Base Operations: DOD's Use of Single Contracts for Multiple Support Services",2/28/1998 0:00:00,"The decisions to use a single contract for multiple services occurred in two ways. At seven installations, the decision occurred at the time of a commercial activity, or A-76, study; in three cases, the decision was made at the time the installation or its current mission was established.  Seven of the 10 installations awarded fixed-price-award-fee contracts.  Although some installations received extensive base operations support services through a single contract, none received all of its required services through a single contract. At all 10 installations, base operations support requirements were met through some combination of single contracts for multiple services, single contracts for specific services, regional contracts for specific services, and the use of in-house personnel.  The kinds of services procured under the multiple service contracts also varied and were influenced by a number of factors, including the mission and functions performed at the installation, missions of tenant activities, existing contractual arrangements, a desire to keep some functions in-house, and legislative restrictions. The activities contracted out ranged from relatively basic tasks such as messenger mail and refuse services to more complex ones such as computer software development and utilities systems operations.  DOD officials at the 10 installations we reviewed have learned a number of lessons from their experiences with single contracts for multiple base operation support services, including the need for well-defined performance work statements, and when to use best-value selection criteria and contract performance incentives.  Small Business Administration and DOD officials are aware that consolidating multiple base operation services into single contracts may reduce the participation of small businesses as prime contractors. In 1996,DOD issued a policy statement requiring the services to consider the effect of consolidating contract requirements on small businesses when considering outsourcing. Also the Small Business Administration Reauthorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 adds new provisions to section 15(a) of the Small Business Act, which at the time of our work required federal agencies to consider the effect on small businesses when requirements currently being performed by small business are considered for consolidation",1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Housing and Urban Development",,"RCED-98-65","Single Family Housing:  Improvements Needed in HUD's Oversight of Property Management Contractors.",3/27/1998 0:00:00,"None of the three HUD offices we visited adequately performed the contractor oversight functions needed to ensure that the contractors meet their contractual obligations to maintain and protect HUD-owned properties. Our physical inspection of properties for which the contractors in each location were responsible identified serious problems, including vandalism, maintenance problems, and safety hazards. These included such things as broken windows, graffiti, leaking roofs, and broken steps. These conditions will likely decrease the marketability of HUD’s properties; decrease the value of surrounding homes; increase HUD’s holding costs; and, in some cases, threaten the health and safety of neighbors and potential buyers.  HUD headquarters has no mechanism for routinely monitoring field offices’ oversight of real estate asset management (REAM) contractors, it has no assurance that its field offices are consistently and effectively applying HUD’s guidance for overseeing contractors’ performance.  HUD’s guidance suggests or requires various methods for monitoring REAM contractors’ performance, such as conducting monthly on-site property inspections, maintaining files on contractors’ performance, and providing contractors with written results of performance evaluations.  For the three offices we reviewed, we found that these activities have not consistently been used in a way that assures HUD that REAM contractors are meeting their contractual obligations. As a result, field offices may extend contracts without current information on the quality of the REAM contractors’ past performance; do not consistently receive the timely information they need to make informed marketing decisions for the properties in inventory; and may compensate contractors for services that were not provided in accordance with contract requirements.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Forest Service",,"RCED-98-88","Forest Service: Weak Contracting Practices Increase Vulnerability to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse",5/6/1998 0:00:00,"The Forest Service is highly vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse because it does not have an effective system of contracting internal controls. The Forest Service (1) has no written plan defining control objectives and techniques, (2) lacks complete documentation in the contract files of critical contract award and administration actions, (3) does not routinely supervise contracting staff, (4) inconsistently monitors contractors’ progress, and (5) has significant errors and omissions in its management information system for contract actions. Also, the Forest Service’s system that sets limits on contracting officers’ authority, and its periodic field office reviews are not effectively implemented. For example, contracting officers may be exceeding their authority because of an unclear policy on how the dollar limits apply to different types of contracts; and field office reviews are too infrequent to be considered an effective internal control in the absence of routine supervision. The Forest Service is not preparing adequate acquisition plans or incorporating performance factors into its contracting process. The Federal Acquisition Regulation requires agencies to prepare acquisition plans to enhance contracting’s effectiveness and lower costs. The six Forest Service offices that GAO visited either had no acquisition plans for fiscal year 1996 or the plans were incomplete or not completed on time. Also, the Forest Service’s contracts for services seldom require contractors to meet pre-established performance goals, a technique that other federal agencies have used to save costs. Furthermore, the Forest Service does not routinely evaluate contractors’ performance at the end of a contract or effectively store past performance information so it can be used in negotiating future contracts. Finally, although required by USDA, the Forest Service has not implemented procurement performance measures to evaluate and improve the procurement system.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Energy",,"RCED-98-169","Department of Energy: Alternative Financing and Contracting Strategies for Cleanup Projects",5/29/1998 0:00:00,"The Department of Energy’s Environmental Management program faces the monumental task of cleaning up the environmental problems created by nearly a half century of nuclear weapons production. In an effort to reduce costs and improve timeliness, DOE’s Office of Environmental Management proposed a “privatization” approach with two key elements: fixed-price contracts and private financing of the construction of waste treatment facilities. Fixed-price contracting, can successfully be used for environmental cleanup projects when certain conditions in the FAR are met: fixed-price contracts are appropriate when projects are well-defined, uncertainties can be allocated between the parties, and sufficient price information and/or multiple competing bidders are available to help determine a fair and reasonable price for the work. Total private financing represents one end of a continuum of construction financing options. Private financing transfers performance risk from the government to the private contractor, but costs for this approach are significant because of the increased risk assumed by the contractor. A complex matrix of decision factors needs to be considered when deciding how to contract for and finance a cleanup project. Once a contract type and financing method are chosen, DOE and the contractor would need to carefully develop a contract that clearly defines each party’s roles and accountability through provisions that allocate the project’s risks between parties; define DOE’s oversight role; and identify measures for use in judging the contractor’s performance.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Office of Management and Budget",,"T-GGD-98-146","OMB Circular A-76: Oversight and Implementation Issues",6/4/1998 0:00:00,"A-76 has shown itself to be an effective management tool in increasing the efficiency of the federal government and saving scarce funds. However, despite its proven track record, A-76 is seldom used in civilian agencies. OMB has not consistently sent strong messages to the agencies that A-76 is a priority management initiative. In addition, agencies need to ensure both that they have the sound program cost data needed to make comparisons and that mechanisms are in place to monitor and oversee contracts. Finally, we believe that agencies’ development and Congress’ use of annual performance plans under the Results Act provide an opportunity to consider A-76 and other competition issues within the context of the most efficient means to achieve agency goals.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Housing and Urban Development",,"T-RCED-98-222","HUD Management: Contracting Issues Need Continued Attention",6/5/1998 0:00:00,"HUD’s field office staff does not consistently provide adequate oversight of Real Estate Asset Management (REAM) contractors. This lack of oversight contributed to some of the poor property conditions—ranging from graffiti and debris to imminent safety hazards—that we saw when we visited 66 HUD properties. Such conditions can decrease the marketability of HUD’s properties, decrease the value of surrounding homes, increase HUD’s holding costs and, in some cases, threaten the health and safety of neighbors and potential buyers. HUD’s field office staff are directly responsible for overseeing REAM contractors. We found, however, that key oversight responsibilities, (e.g. REAM contractor evaluations) were not always performed by staff at the three HUD field offices we visited. Further, Both we and the Inspector General found that HUD’s ability to manage contracts is limited because its procurement systems do not always contain accurate critical information regarding contract awards and modifications and their associated costs. Although HUD recently combined several of its procurement systems, the new system is not yet integrated with HUD’s financial systems, thus limiting the data available to manage the Department’s contracts.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"NSIAD-98-130","Defense Depot Maintenance: Contracting Approaches Should Address Workload Characteristics",6/15/1998 0:00:00,"Depot maintenance contracting represents a challenge to relying on commercial market forces, because most depot maintenance is performed on noncommercial, DOD unique items. About 91 percent of the depot maintenance contracts we reviewed were awarded non-competitively, mostly to original equipment manufacturers that own the data rights. Precisely defining requirements also impacts efforts to rely on competitive market forces. As DOD transitions from its traditional contract management and oversight structure, it will need to increase the use of competitively awarded depot maintenance contracts. To the extent that competition for some maintenance workloads is not possible or practical, DOD needs to address how best to assure product quality and reasonable prices when competitive market forces are not present. DOD has developed a logistics strategic plan that lays out specific objectives and strategies for improving DOD’s logistics activities, but the plan does not address the depot maintenance issues raised in this report. The challenges that DOD faces in successfully relying on competitive market forces for depot maintenance require management attention and actions to address the unique characteristics of DOD’s depot maintenance activities and assure that expected savings can be achieved.",1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"HEHS-98-188R","VA Construction: Contract Award Delays",7/10/1998 0:00:00,"The Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) annual appropriations act for each fiscal year since 1984 has set deadlines for awarding contracts for major construction projects. VA is required to award a construction documents contract by September 30 of the fiscal year in which funds were appropriated for a major construction project, and award a construction contract by September 30 of the following fiscal year. VA correctly and accurately identified 10 awards for nine major construction projects for which VA did not award the required construction documents contract or construction contract by September 30, 1997. Our review of VA’s listing of the status of all active major projects indicated that six more awards should have reported as delayed. We believe, however, that none of the contracting delays for the 16 contracts described in the enclosure constitute impoundments of budget authority under the Impoundment Control Act of 1974. In our view, VA has shown no intent to refrain from using the funds appropriated because information VA provided to us indicated that legitimate programmatic considerations caused the contracting delays.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"NSIAD-98-198R","NASA Procurement: Status of Efforts to Improve Oversight",7/13/1998 0:00:00,"In May 1997, we reported that NASA has implemented or is implementing all our major recommendations for improving NASA contract management and related activities and the one key outstanding matter related to NASA’ s fulfilling its commitment to improve its ability to oversee contract management activities. However, removing NASA contract management from GAO’s high-risk list is premature at this time because the agency has delayed by 8 months the initial implementation of its integrated financial management system that is intended to provide more complete, accurate, reliable and timely information procurement-related information. Further, NASA has not implemented its procurement metrics initiative. Finally, while NASA is making progress evaluating its field centers’ procurement activities based on international quality standards and its own procurement surveys, it has not issued formal requirements for this evaluation. Taken as a whole, we believe this record does not provide sufficient evidence that NASA has met the standard we established in our May 1997 report; namely, that NASA has a demonstrated capability to consistently produce accurate and reliable procurement-related information in order to better assess and oversee its procurement activities.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"NSIAD-98-162","Defense Contractor Restructuring: DOD Risks Forfeiting Savings on Fixed-Price Contracts",7/17/1998 0:00:00,"Defense contractors have been consolidating and restructuring their operations to increase efficiencies and become more competitive.  The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition concluded that this consolidation and restructuring of their operations would reduce costs to DOD.  To recoup potential savings caused by reduced direct and overhead costs attributed to the restructuring, DOD can use contract price adjustment clauses, also called reopener clauses to ensure that DOD receives its fair share of contractor restructuring savings on fixed-price contracts awarded to companies involved in a business combination between the time a combination is announced and the time that restructuring savings are reflected in the mechanism used for pricing contracts.  However, contracting officers rarely included reopener clauses for savings in fixed-price contracts awarded during this period. Without reopener clauses, DOD cannot recoup its share of restructuring savings. Reasons that DOD contracting officers cited for not using reopener clauses. included the desire to have contracts with no loose ends and concerns that the use of the clauses would cause an excessive administrative burden in renegotiating contract price adjustments. Another factor that appeared to influence the use of reopener clauses is the level of contractor resistance. However, the use of reopener clauses can result in substantial savings to DOD. In one case the contract price was reduced by almost 4 percent, or about $1.8 million. Unless DOD takes steps to include reopener clauses in its fixed-price contracts with companies forming business combinations, it risks losing further substantial savings resulting from contractor restructuring.",0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Energy",,"RCED-98-223","Department of Energy: Lessons Learned Incorporated Into Performance-Based Incentive Contracts",7/29/1998 0:00:00,"DOE has taken steps to correct the problems identified in DOE/OIG reports and its own assessment of performance-based incentives. These steps included issuing guidance, conducting training, and incorporating lessons learned into the fiscal year 1998 incentives.  At three of the four sites we visited, DOE’s performance-based incentives incorporated the baseline measures in the Department’s 10-year plan for environmental cleanup and were generally linked to both DOE’s strategic plan and the site-specific plans. The fourth site, Idaho Falls, has not yet developed performance incentives in environmental management, but its goals and objectives do incorporate the 10-year plan’s baseline measures. Furthermore, each of the four sites generally allocates fees to individual performance incentives in proportion to their relative importance and on the basis of the site’s missions and objectives. DOE evaluates completed actions that were tied to performance-based incentives through reviews by its technical, financial, and contracting personnel to determine whether the contractor satisfied the criteria and earned the amount of fee to be paid. Overall, DOE maintains that performance-based incentives have been effective in achieving desired end results. However, it is not clear whether the successes reported in the department-wide assessment have been due to the performance-based incentives or to the accompanying increased emphasis on program management. Furthermore, it is too soon to assess the effectiveness of the fiscal year 1998 incentives because the evaluation of these incentives will not be complete until the end of the fiscal year.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"NSIAD-98-127","Acquisition Management: Workforce Reductions and Contractor Oversight",7/31/1998 0:00:00,"From fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 1997, civilian personnel in DOD’s acquisition workforce decreased by 24 percent, while the military personnel in the acquisition workforce decreased by 28 percent. Throughout this 5-year period, DOD’s civilian acquisition workforce remained at roughly 30 percent of DOD’s overall civilian workforce.  Since 1993, the two organizations directly associated with contractor oversight, DCAA and DCMC, have had personnel reductions of roughly 19 and 27 percent, respectively. According to DCAA and DCMC officials, the organizations have implemented a variety of risk-based initiatives and reengineering programs during this time frame as their respective workforces have been reduced. For example, DCAA has implemented risk assessment procedures based on contractor size (the dollar value of contracts) and process reengineering activities in the areas of contractor self-governance and contractor billing. Similarly, DCMC has instituted risk-based initiatives and initiatives aimed at improving efficiency. For example, DCMC’s Performance-Based Assessment Model determines how often and to what extent contractors should be reviewed based on risk potential; the Single Process Initiative encourages the consolidation of common processes in facilities that produce commercial and DOD products.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"NSIAD-98-225","Defense Contractor Restructuring: Benefits to DOD and Contractors",9/10/1998 0:00:00,"To encourage defense contractor consolidations, DOD pays for restructuring costs on transferred flexibly priced contracts in certain circumstances. Concerns over the payment of restructuring costs led Congress in 1994 to pass section 818 of Public Law 103-337, requiring that certain conditions be met before DOD could reimburse defense contractors for restructuring-related expenses. In 1996, Congress passed section 8115 of Public Law 104-208, which stipulated that for business combinations occurring after September 30, 1996, projected savings had to (1) be at least twice the amount of costs allowed or (2) exceed the costs allowed, provided the Secretary of Defense determined that the combination would result in the preservation of a critical capability. In November 1997, section 804 of Public Law 105-85 made these requirements permanent. For the seven business combinations we reviewed, DOD expects to save about $3.3 billion from contractor restructuring activities. Our assessment of selected restructuring activities showed that they had lowered the cost of operations at the seven business combinations by hundreds of millions of dollars. Such reductions benefited DOD because the costs of defense contracts were lower than they would have been if the restructuring activities had not occurred. However, determining the precise impact of restructuring on specific contract prices requires isolating the impact of these activities from nonrestructuring-related factors, such as changes in business volume, quantities purchased, and accounting practices and we were generally not able to isolate the effects of restructuring from those of other factors.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"OSI-98-15","DOD Procurement Fraud: Fraud By an Air Force Contracting Official",9/23/1998 0:00:00,"In 1992, an Air Force Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR) on two Hughes contracts successfully encouraged certain Hughes employees to bill the government over $300,000 for services that were not rendered. He attempted to obtain these funds by directing Hughes to pay a nonexistent subcontractor for consulting services based on a bogus subcontractor invoice that he supplied. Had this scheme worked, the government would have paid Hughes for work “performed” by the fictitious subcontractor; and Hughes would have “reimbursed” the subcontractor by sending the money to a post office box controlled by the COTR. Hughes contract administration personnel learned of the billing scheme, conducted an internal investigation and returned the government checks, which the company had not negotiated. However, the contractor did not notify government authorities about the incident. Later in 1992, the COTR executed another plan without Hughes involvement by submitting 11 bogus invoices totaling over $500,000. In January 1993, the Air Force issued payment checks for the invoices and mailed them to a post office box opened by the COTR. The theft was detected after officials of the bank in which he had deposited the checks became suspicious of what they considered to be unusually large transactions and reported them to the U.S. Secret Service.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","International Boundary and Water Commission",,"NSIAD-98-238","International Boundary and Water Commission: U.S. Operations Need More Financial Oversight",9/28/1998 0:00:00,"The International Boundary and Water Commission is responsible for resolving water and boundary issues along the U.S.’ and Mexico’s 1,952-mile common border. Under treaty and subsequent agreements, the Commission is responsible for resolving boundary problems and maintaining the boundary between the United States and Mexico and managing issues involving the waters of the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers. The focus of Commission responsibilities has evolved over time to include resolving border water quality problems and, more recently, to designing, constructing, and operating and maintaining wastewater treatment facilities along the border. Regarding the administration of U.S. Section operations and maintenance contracts, required monthly reports on contractor performance were not submitted. As a result, the U.S. Section made payments of $1.2 million to the contractors without proper documentation verifying that the required work was completed.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","multiple agencies","DOD (DISA & USAF) Transportation. GSA, and NIH","NSIAD-98-215","Acquisition Reform: Multiple-award Contracting at Six Federal Organizations",9/30/1998 0:00:00,"Efforts to provide a fair opportunity and therefore promote competition for orders placed under multiple-award contracts varied among the six organizations we reviewed. One organization issued 64 percent of orders (accounting for 20 percent of dollars awarded) on a sole-source basis through the end of fiscal year 1997. Another organization named preferred contractors in announcements of opportunities. This practice resulted in only one proposal being received on most orders and OMB has recommended that federal procurement regulations be revised to prohibit the practice. All but one of the organizations we reviewed allowed other agencies to place orders on their multiple-award contracts. The organizations charged varying service fees intended to recover the costs of awarding and administering the orders. According to analyses performed by two organizations, fees exceeded costs in one case and did not recover costs in another. However, management information was insufficient for the other three organizations to compare fees and costs.  Our analysis of aggregate government-wide contracting data did not measure the specific impact of multiple-award contracting on small business opportunities but shows that the small business share of federal contracts has increased since FASA. However, awards to small businesses at three contracting activities we visited have declined. The organizations we reviewed are taking steps to ensure that small businesses are not excluded from receiving orders placed under their multiple-award contracts.",0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Environmental Protection Agency",,"RCED-99-27","Environmental Protection: EPA's Progress in Closing Completed Grants and Contracts.",11/20/1998 0:00:00,"EPA has made progress in closing out inactive grants and contracts, but a considerable number remain to be closed.  The agency reduced its backlog of non-construction grants from nearly 18,000 in 1996 to approximately 4,100 in June 1998.  It is likely that EPA’s goal of closing out the remaining grants by July 2000 will be attained. EPA has reduced its inactive wastewater treatment construction grants needing closeout from about 5,900 at the end of fiscal year 1990 to about 500 as of March 1998. While EPA initially projected this backlog would be eliminated by the end of fiscal year 1997, this goal was not attained, and in December 1996, EPA revised its projection to eliminate the backlog by 2002. However, recent estimates indicate that this goal is unlikely to be attained. In March 1993, EPA had approximately 2,000 inactive contracts needing closeout, and by August 1998, that number had been reduced to 1,028. However, many of the remaining contracts will be more difficult to close out because they are old (37 percent have been inactive for 5 years or more) or are of a type that requires additional documentation to close out. Therefore, EPA is not likely to sustain the closeout progress made in the past. Significant amounts of unliquidated obligations remain for these inactive grants and contracts that could potentially be allocated to other EPA projects and programs. As of June 30, 1998, inactive grants and contracts accounted for over $600 million in unliquidated obligations, and for about $423.8 million of this total amount, there are no statutory time restrictions on the use of funds. Therefore, a large portion of these funds is potentially available for recovery and could be used for other approved projects.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"NSIAD-99-12","Contract Management: Recovery Auditing Offers Potential to Identify Overpayments.",12/3/1998 0:00:00,"Profit Recovery Group International (PRGI) performed recovery auditing techniques and identified $19.1 million in overpayments for purchases made during 1993-1995, and efforts to identify additional amounts continue. However, recoveries of overpayments amounted to only $1.9 million, in large part, because vendors took issue with some of the overpayments identified by PRGI and because the recovery process virtually stopped for 8 months, while Defense Supply Center Philadelphia (DSCP) reviewed the merits of the vendors’ complaints.  Of $19.1 million in overpayments, $12.4 million was related to cash discounts not taken or received or deducted at the wrong rate, $2.2 million related to most favored customer terms not received, $1.3 million related to duplicate payments made, and $1.2 million related to credits for returned merchandise not taken.  Documentation was difficult to retrieve for both PRGI and vendors, and sometimes it was not available. PRGI also had considerable difficulty identifying duplicate payments because the needed information was not retained in the Defense Finance and Accounting Service payment files.  PRGI has made recommendations to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service and the DSCP to reduce future overpayments, but none have been implemented.  GAO also made recommendations to: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Comptroller to: (1) focus future audit recovery efforts on the most recent purchases to maximize the likelihood that government and vendor documentation is available to support overpayment identification and recovery; (2) critically review PRGI’s recommendations and implement those that are cost-effective; (3) consider the extent to which it may be cost-effective to undertake moderate internal efforts to identify overpayments before turning audit recovery efforts over to an external group. One technique that DOD might find cost-effective is to periodically request status of accounts from its vendors; and (4) establish a process for dealing with overpayments due other agencies.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Amtrak",,"OSI-99-4R","Amtrak: Contracting Improprieties by Chief Engineer",2/26/1999 0:00:00,"Amtrak paid over $2 million to a neighbor of the Chief Engineer of Amtrak’ s Northeast Corridor Division. This work was requested without adequate planning and identification of Amtrak’ s needs. Instead of identifying the nature and estimated total cost of consulting work needed, determining the best way to obtain these services, and obtaining expenditure approval from an appropriate approving official, the Chief Engineer hired a neighbor to provide consulting services.  From September 1996 to September 30,1998, the neighbor provided consulting services on behalf of three different firms, at times with no written contract for services The arrangements with all of the companies violated numerous Amtrak procurement requirements, including: (1) written justifications were not prepared explaining the need for outside consulting services; (2) written agreements detailing the nature, price, and duration of the work were not prepared prior to the contractor’ s performance; (3) written sole-source justifications were not prepared explaining the uniqueness of services or capability to be provided; (4) the reasonableness and acceptability of rates were not determined via an audit by the Contract Audit Department or by comparing rates with those proposed by other consultants; and (5) expenditure approval by Amtrak management authorities was not obtained.  The final contract was awarded shortly after receiving the Amtrak Board’s approval of the contract.  However, the Chief Engineer had already concluded that the consulting services were no longer needed but she nevertheless signed the contract causing the unnecessary expenditure of approximately $1.3 million by Amtrak.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Energy",,"RCED-99-107","DOE Management: Opportunities for Saving Millions in Contractor Travel Costs.",4/1/1999 0:00:00,"The Department of Energy (DOE) incurs hundreds of millions of dollars in travel costs each year. The contractors managing and/or operating the Department’s various facilities incur about 80 percent of these costs.  A 1995 DOE initiative reduced contractor travel costs from $261 million in fiscal year 1995 to $223 million in fiscal year 1996. Since then, travel costs have increased—to $249 million by fiscal year 1998—even though funding to the contractors during this period had been decreasing. About 96 percent of the contractors’ travel was to domestic locations, the most frequent of these being Washington, D.C. and the sites of DOE’s major laboratories and test facilities.  The purpose of most travel was reported as being for purposes related to the mission of the facilities. The second most frequently cited travel purpose was for attending conferences. DOE’s Inspector General identified hundreds of DOE contractor staff attending a 1997 conference in Vancouver, British Columbia, resulting in travel costs of about $1 million.  DOE’s success in reducing contractor travel costs has been limited.  Only in fiscal year 1996 did DOE attain savings in contractor travel. Contractors did not continue to achieve savings because DOE did not enforce its cost reduction targets and some contractors did not have an overall strategy or plan to achieve lower travel costs. Greater emphasis on travel management—controlling the amount of travel—and travel cost control—minimizing airfare costs and other travel costs—could result in additional travel cost savings.  GAO made recommendations to the Secretary of Energy designed to reduce contractor travel costs and to clarify DOE’s policy on allowable travel costs.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","multiple agencies","DOE and multiple civilian agencies","NSIAD-99-93R","Acquisition Reform: Review of Selected Best-Value Contracts.",4/14/1999 0:00:00,"GAO identified best-value contracts that included premiums, the dollar amount of those premiums, and the documentation government buyers used to support their award decisions. We defined premiums as the difference between the awardee’s evaluated price and that of the lowest acceptable offeror.  Of the over 250 contracts we reviewed, 53 were awarded to other than the lowest offeror because the buying official decided that a higher offeror provided the government the best value.  The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) does not specify the types of goods or services for which premiums may be paid. However, we found that the majority of contracts that involved premiums were for sophisticated government products and services, such as cleanup activities at a former nuclear production facility, construction of chemical weapons disposal facilities, and procurement of various items such as amphibious transport dock ships and radar shelters.  Laws and the FAR require the government to clearly state evaluation factors and their relative importance in the solicitation and require award decisions to be based solely on those factors. For the 53 contracts we reviewed, government buyers complied with the requirements and linked their decisions for selecting the higher-priced proposals to the key evaluation factors identified in the solicitations.  The FAR was changed in 1997 to require agencies to document, in the contract file, that the perceived benefits of the higher-priced proposal merited the additional cost.  Government buyers frequently based their decisions to choose higher-priced offers on the offerors’ superior technical ability, exceptional management practices, or outstanding relevant experience.  No recommendations were made.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Energy",,"RCED-99-141","National Laboratories: DOE Needs to Assess the Impact of Using Performance-Based Contracts",5/7/1999 0:00:00,"DOE’s use of performance-based contracting for its laboratories is in a state of transition. While all laboratory contracts we examined had some performance-based features, we found wide variance in the number of performance measures and the types of fees negotiated. About half of the 18 laboratory contracts have performance fees to encourage superior performance—a major goal of performance-based contracting. Most of the remaining laboratory contracts are still based on DOE’s traditional fixed-fee arrangement in which the fees are paid regardless of performance.  DOE has not evaluated the impact of performance-based contracting on its laboratory contractors and, as a result, does not know if this new form of contracting is achieving the intended results of improved performance and lower costs. Specifically, DOE has not determined whether giving higher fees to encourage superior performance by its laboratory contractors is advantageous to the government.  Fees for the laboratories totaled over $100 million for fiscal year 1998. While the contractors were unable to cite measurable benefits achieved by switching to performance-based contracting, they support its goals. The main benefits from performance-based contracting cited by laboratory contractors was that it has helped DOE clarify what it expects from the contractors and that it has improved communication.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Inter-American Foundation",,"OSI-99-11R","Inter-American Foundation: Allegations of Improper Contracting and Personnel Actions at the Foundation.",5/20/1999 0:00:00,"IAF improperly issued a sole source purchase order to AccounTemps for services in violation of the FAR and extended the period of performance beyond the limit set forth in OPM regulations for using an individual employee of a temporary-help firm. The Competition in Contracting Act requires, with certain limited exceptions, that contracting officers provide for full and open competition in government procurements. For acquisitions not exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold of $100,000, agencies may orally solicit quotations and may solicit from a single source if the contracting officer determines that due to urgency, exclusive licensing agreements, industrial mobilization, or a similarly compelling reason, only one source is reasonably available.”  The IAF contracting officer told us that the sole source purchase order to AccounTemps was justified by unusual and compelling urgency. We find that no unusual or compelling urgency existed in this case. The FAR permits contracting officers to enter into contracts with temporary-help firms for the brief use of temporary employees. However, these services must not be used in lieu of regular recruitment under civil service laws and must comply with OPM limits on the duration of the temporary services.’ An OPM regulation limits agencies to using an individual employee of a temporary firm initially for no more than 120 workdays during a 24month period. An agency may extend this period for up to 240 workdays if the agency determines that using the services of the same individual will prevent significant delay.” IAF incrementally extended its purchase order with AccounTemps to 273 days, exceeding the 240-workday limit by 33 workdays.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"NSIAD-99-90","Contract Management: DOD Pricing of Commercial Items Needs Continued Emphasis",6/24/1999 0:00:00,"The FAR defines price analysis as the process of examining and evaluating a proposed price without evaluating its separate cost elements or profit.  In 33 of the 65 commercial sole-source purchases we reviewed, price analysis consisted of comparing the offered price to an offeror’s catalog or price list, and/or to the price(s) the government previously paid for the same or similar items. In the other 32 purchases, contracting personnel used one or more additional price analysis tools such as obtaining commercial sales cost information. These price analyses performed by contracting personnel were often too limited to ensure that prices were fair and reasonable.  Further, contracting officers, generally, were not using a discretionary solicitation clause that requires offerors to provide information other than certified cost and pricing data, such as sales data, in support of their offered prices. In addition, some contracting officers paid prices that included unneeded services. Finally, many contracting officers were not documenting in the contract file how they determined that a price previously paid for an item was fair and reasonable and, therefore, could be relied on in evaluating the currently offered price.  Reasons given for the limited price analysis included workload burdens and urgent requirements for items. DOD officials also noted the reduced negotiation leverage that contracting officers now have when purchasing commercial items in a sole-source environment.  GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology to (1) include, as part of DOD’s efforts to implement recent legislation, clarification of the circumstances when it is appropriate to use the FAR clause (52.215-20) requiring an offeror to provide information on the prices at which the same or similar items have been sold in the commercial market; and (2) issue a memorandum to contracting personnel emphasizing the importance of understanding and using historical pricing information for sole-source commercial item purchases.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Health Care Financing Administration",,"HEHS-99-115","Medicare Contractors: Despite Its Efforts, HCFA Cannot Ensure Their Effectiveness or Integrity.",7/14/1999 0:00:00,"Since 1993, six Medicare contractors have settled civil and criminal charges following allegations that they did not check claims to ensure proper payment or allowed Medicare to pay claims that should have been paid by other insurers. Even though inadequate management controls and falsified data are a common theme in these cases, GAO found that HCFA still does not regularly check contractors’ internal management controls, management and financial data, and key program safeguards to prevent payment errors. Furthermore, HCFA’s headquarters office generally has not set oversight priorities, leaving such decisions almost entirely to regional office reviewers. HCFA’s organizational structure contributes to the problem by dividing responsibilities for contractor oversight between the regions and headquarters without assigning overall accountability to one office.  Increased competition among contractors could enhance contractor performance but statute and current regulations limit HCFA’s authority to contract HCFA is seeking new or explicit authority from the Congress that would allow it to (1) choose its intermediaries, rather than having providers nominate them, and contract with non-health insurance companies; (2) contract separately for specific functions, such as responding to beneficiary inquiries; and (3) use payment methods that would allow contractors to earn profits on their Medicare business, rather than reimbursing contractors only for their costs up to a preset target. While these changes might broaden the pool of contractors HCFA could choose from and would increase its flexibility in contracting for specific functions, past experience with other efforts to change the program has shown that HCFA will need several years to carefully plan, properly implement, and conduct a post-implementation review of any new contracting initiatives.  In this report, GAO makes a number of specific recommendations to the HCFA Administrator to help ensure that  contractor internal controls are working;  contractor performance is evaluated against a comprehensive set of clearly defined and measurable performance standards; HCFA’s oversight of contractor performance is more consistent;  best practices are shared among regions; and  HCFA has a strategic plan for implementing requested legislative modifications sought in contracting proposals.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"NSIAD-99-131","DOD Contract Management: Greater Attention Needed to Identify and Recover Overpayments.",7/19/1999 0:00:00,"In the 5 years between fiscal year 1994 and 1998, defense contractors returned about $4.6 billion to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service’s, Columbus Center--in fiscal year 1998, $746 million. The Center attributes most of the returned money to overpayments caused by factors outside its control. However, payment errors by the Center were also a factor. It took about a year, on average, before 13 contractors that GAO contacted refunded overpayments of $56.2 million to the Center. In addition, four of the contractors were still retaining overpayments totaling $1.1 million. After we brought these overpayments to the contractors’ and the government’s attention, the contractors refunded the overpayments. A Defense Contract Management Command area office has instructed its personnel to ask contractors reporting overpayments to immediately return the money. In some cases, government personnel were aware of overpayments, but they did not take timely action to obtain recovery. Under current law, there is no requirement for contractors who have been overpaid to notify the government of overpayments or to return overpayments prior to the government issuing a demand letter. The Center has a sizable and growing backlog of contracts waiting to be examined to ensure that contractors were properly paid—a process called reconciliation. Reconciliation has often resulted in claims against contractors for overpayments. The longer a contract remains unreconciled, the longer any overpayment identified through reconciliation will remain undetected, and the greater will be the government’s loss of the timely use of these monies. Further, delays in seeking return of overpayments may result in increased difficulty in collection or actual monetary loss to the government.  GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense require contractors to promptly notify the government of overpayments made to them; direct the Director, DFAS, and the Commander, DCMC, to reemphasize the need to request refunds of overpayments promptly and to perform timely reconciliation; and direct the Director, DFAS, to examine the cost-effectiveness of requiring contractors to periodically provide a status of their accounts with the government.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"NSIAD-00-56","Contract Management: Few Competing Proposals for Large DOD Information Technology Orders",3/20/2000 0:00:00,"GAO's review of 22 large orders from task- or delivery- order contracts were made without obtaining competing proposals and that DOD made frequent use of the statutory exceptions to the fair contracting opportunity requirement.  Most work descriptions for these orders were broadly defined, were for information technology services covering several years' effort, and did not establish fixed prices for the work but provided for reimbursement of the contractors' costs.  The report hinted that the best value to be derived by using task- or delivery-order contracts for IT services may not have been obtained since little effort was expended to obtain competing proposals for the work to be done, however, no specific negative effects were identified.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Small Business Administration",,"GGD-00-82","Small Businesses: Limited Information Available on Contract Bundling's Extent and Effects.",3/31/2000 0:00:00,"GAO's analysis of contracting data at three procurement centers showed that the small business share of federal contracts overall increased at Johnson Space Center and DOE’s Albuquerque Operations Office and declined at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base since 1997. Procurement center officials identified and had available data on 74 contracts worth $13.6 billion that were consolidated to 13 contracts worth $12.4 billion. The small business share in terms of  percentage of contracts and contract dollars awarded declined ranging from a 28-percent reduction in contract dollars at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base to a 52-percent reduction at NASA’s Johnson Space Center. SBA identified 1 of the 13 contract consolidations as a bundled contract.  SBA oversight of contract bundling is limited due, in part, to budget limitations, according to SBA officials. SBA has not developed a strategy that sets forth how it can most effectively achieve the results it desires through its oversight of contract bundling. Such a strategy could take into consideration factors such as its statutory mandate to review all proposed bundled cases, the number of PCRs needed and their procurement center assignments, training of PCRs needed, timely resolution of potential bundled contract cases, and how to deal with budgeting and other constraints.",0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"NSIAD-00-103R","Space Station: Prime Contract Changes",5/11/2000 0:00:00,"In fiscal years 1998 and 1999, NASA authorized 593 changes to the space station prime contract for a total estimated cost of $897.7 million.  We found that NASA made a total of 316 undefinitized contract actions to the prime contract during fiscal years 1998 and 1999. Their total estimated cost is $879.7 million. Thus, undefinitized contract actions comprise 53 percent of all changes and 98 percent of all costs due to changes.  Federal Acquisition Regulation and current NASA policy state that work on contract changes, which have not been negotiated, should occur on an exception basis and be limited to urgent requirements. In the past, both NASA’s Office of Inspector General and we have reported concerns about NASA’s frequent use of undefinitized contract changes.  NASA officials also said they recognized that beginning work on contract changes which have not been negotiated is not the preferred way of doing business because the cost of the change is unknown while the work is being done. The officials explained that they began work on undefinitized changes to avoid delaying the space station program schedule, modify ongoing work, or reduce the cost of a change by taking advantage of other ongoing work.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Housing and Urban Development","Federal Housing Administration","RCED-00-117","Single-Family Housing: Stronger Measures Needed To Encourage Better Performance by Management and Marketing Contractors",5/12/2000 0:00:00,"In response to widespread problems with the maintenance of foreclosed single-family properties reported by HUD’s Inspector General and GAO, HUD began contracting out the management and marketing of its single-family property inventory in March 1999 and awarded a total of 16 such contracts. The contractors are responsible for inspecting, appraising, securing, maintaining, and selling the properties. HUD has found that performance deficiencies persist on the part of many of the contractors, especially in the area of property maintenance. HUD recognizes the importance of maintaining and securing its properties and assesses the performance of the contractors on this basis. However, HUD’s available incentives and enforcement methods, short of contract termination, are not strong enough to ensure that the contractors are meeting their responsibilities in this area. In its internal control report as part of its fiscal year 1999 audit of FHA’s financial statements, KPMG recommended that HUD needs to devise a method of penalizing management and marketing contractors that routinely do not comply with contract performance requirements. GAO agrees.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","multiple agencies","BLM, Park Service, Reclamation, USGS","RCED-00-139R","Department of the Interior: Outstanding Balances on Some Completed Contracts Should Be Deobligated.",5/12/2000 0:00:00,"We reviewed contracts that were completed but not closed out and had outstanding balances at the Bureau of Land Management, the National Park Service, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the U.S. Geological Survey to determine whether any of the outstanding balances were not needed for contract closeout and could be deobligated. 31 contracts at these agencies were completed but not closed out and still had outstanding balances that totaled $4.4 million at the end of calendar year 1999. We found that $607,000 in outstanding balances on five contracts was not needed for contract closeout, and procurement officials at the agencies have agreed to deobligate the balances.  The reasons why contracts had not been closed out varied. For some contracts, the agency was waiting for a final audit. For other contracts, a final invoice had not been received by the agency, or the contracts were being litigated. Outstanding balances also occurred for several reasons. For most of the contracts, the outstanding balances were being held to pay for final invoices that had not been received from the contractors or for payments of additional costs that might result from audits of the contracts. Finally, some contracts had outstanding balances because claims were pending or the contracts were being litigated. Procurement officials at the agencies agreed that the $607,000 in outstanding balances associated with five of the contracts was not needed to close out those contracts and would be deobligated.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"NSIAD-00-134","Contract Management:  DOD's Use of Recovery Auditing",6/5/2000 0:00:00,"Since the recovery auditing program began in 1996, the Defense Supply Center has collected $5.3 million of the $17.9 million in overpayments it now recognizes as valid. The Supply Center has written letters to vendors demanding payments of an additional $4.0 million and continues to negotiate with other vendors to settle disputed payments. The collection process has proceeded slowly in part because of the time and effort required to review disputed claims. In particular, the Supply Center and vendors disagree over the interpretation of contract provisions that require vendors who sell brand-name products to guarantee that prices offered to the government are as good as those offered to their most favored customers. Thirty-four of the 59 vendors who have received letters demanding payment have appealed to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. DOD is expanding its use of recovery auditing. Since June 1999, six Defense agencies have contracted for recovery audit services, and a seventh is planning to do so soon. To minimize disagreements between DOD and vendors in the future, we are recommending that, after the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals rules on the appeals, DOD examine the need to clarify price warranty provisions in its contracts. DOD concurred with our recommendation.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","multiple agencies","Report on 12 sole source contracts","GGD-00-203","Federal Advertising Contracts: Agencies Have Discretion in Setting Work Scope and Requirements.",9/8/2000 0:00:00,"Federal legislation and regulations prescribe various steps to be taken and factors to be considered in establishing contract requirements and selecting contractors. Also, agencies have broad discretion in establishing the scope of work and requirements for prospective contractors. This discretion may affect which contractors realistically can bid on a contract and win the award. Also, acquisition reforms give contracting officers additional discretion in source selection. For example, the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-106) gives contracting officers the authority to eliminate offerors by narrowing the range of offerors considered to be competitive if a contracting officer deems that there are too many to evaluate efficiently. In addition, contracting officers can consider factors beyond price in determining which offeror presents the best value. Legislation and regulations encourage contracting officers to use this discretion in order to satisfy agency requirements with regard to cost, quality, and timeliness of delivered product or service while continuing to conduct business with integrity, fairness, and openness.  We noted that selected solicitations for advertising contracts awarded to large advertising firms through full and open competition contained general evaluation criteria for prospective contractors, such as consideration of past performance. In addition, every solicitation had more specific contractor requirements such as requirements that the contractor be a full-service advertising firm or have nationwide capability. These specific contractor requirements seemed to be consistent with the scope of work requirements outlined in the solicitations.  For the 12 sole-source contracts that we reviewed, the justifications were prepared, as required, by the procuring agencies and had the required approval at the appropriate level within the agencies.",1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Transportation",,"RCED-00-221","Mass Transit: Project Management Oversight Benefits and Future Funding Requirements",9/15/2000 0:00:00,"To meet the nation’s transportation needs, states, cities, and localities are building or planning mass transit projects to replace aging infrastructure or add new capacity. These transit projects are very costly and require large investments made available through grants from the Department of Transportation’s Federal Transit Administration (FTA).  To help lessen the risk and safeguard the federal investment in transit projects, the Congress authorized FTA to enter into contracts with competitively selected engineering firms, which serve as an extension of FTA’s limited technical staff.  The project management oversight program is designed primarily to help ensure that grantees constructing major capital projects have the qualified staff and procedures to successfully build the projects according to accepted engineering principles.  While a project is being designed, the oversight contractor reviews the grantee’s plan for managing and constructing the project. This plan is the key document that the oversight contractor and FTA use to determine whether the grantee has the technical capability to complete the project. Once FTA approves the plan, the oversight contractor monitors the project to determine whether it is progressing on time, within budget, and according to approved plans and specifications.  Today, FTA and its project management oversight contractors monitor over 100 major capital projects--those expected to cost more than $100 million, which collectively are expected to cost about $47.5 billion.  FTA’s oversight activities are supported by a statutorily limited set-aside of the funds made available annually for certain transit programs.  NOTE: The issue here is whether such a contracting arrangement could/should be considered for overseeing other types of federal grant programs where the federal government does not have or exercise a direct oversight/audit responsibility.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",,"HEHS-00-130","Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Contracting Management Needs Improvement.",9/18/2000 0:00:00,"Despite a reduction in the backlog of pending benefit determinations and projected changes in future workloads, PBGC has not taken steps to reassess its contracting and organizational structure needs. All organizations should regularly engage in analyses to ensure they have an appropriate level of skilled staff and to position them to meet workload challenges. Current trends show that PBGC should act soon to respond to a potentially different work environment in the future. During our review, management acknowledged the need to better link its decisions to contract to future workload and staffing assessments. However, no significant initiatives are under way. We believe that PBGC should undertake analyses of its staffing needs, skill levels, and organizational structure relative to current and future workloads. This type of contingency planning is consistent with the strategic planning requirements of GPRA and should allow PBGC to make systematic and orderly changes to its workforce as needed in the future while still meeting the needs of plan participants.  PBGC can do more to encourage competition in the procurement of services. Without consistent efforts to monitor the marketplace and to stimulate competition, it is difficult to ensure that PBGC obtains the best value for services it procures.  We identified areas where PBGC should consider using fixed-price rather than labor-hour contracts, which require considerable management oversight and carry more cost and quality assurance risks to the agency.  As of June 2000, about 60 percent of PBGC’s active contracts involved labor-hour pricing, under which contractors are paid at an established hourly rate for performing agreed-upon tasks. In general, labor-hour contracts require detailed reviews of the hours charged by contract staff and close monitoring by the contracting entity to ensure that quality and timeliness requirements are met. Otherwise, the contracting entity risks paying a higher price than it would under a fixed-price arrangement, as well as receiving poor performance. Accordingly, in its best practices guide for performance-based service contracting, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy encourages the increased use of fixed-price contracts and incentives to promote optimal performance.  We identified weaknesses in PBGC’s contractor oversight activities. PBGC does not centrally compile field benefit administration-specific data essential for monitoring the performance of contractors in field locations. We also identified weaknesses in PBGC’s quality assurance review process for these field offices, and in its policies and procedural guidance for PBGC employees responsible for monitoring contracts. Furthermore, we are concerned that the current organizational placement of PBGC’s Contracts and Controls Review Department (CCRD), which provides audit and internal review services to PBGC related to contracting, may affect its independence. At present, this office is located within the PBGC component that is the second-largest user of contracted services and reports to its head. Without effective contract oversight, PBGC cannot be sure that its contractors are held accountable for meeting performance requirements",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",,"T-OSI-00-17","Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Appearance of Improper Influence in Certain Contract Awards",9/21/2002 0:00:00,"Actions by a PBGC employee, as summarized in this testimony, demonstrated a lack of impartiality 4 with respect to IMRG and created the appearance of improperly influencing the award of the two contracts we investigated. As a result, we plan on referring this matter to PBGC and the Department of Justice for them to determine what, if any, additional action may be appropriate.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","multiple agencies","Report includes selected civilian agencies","GGD-00-194R","Civilian Acquisitions: Selected Agencies' Use of Criminal Background Checks on Contractor Principals to Prevent Fraud.",9/28/2000 0:00:00,"The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) generally governs all acquisitions by executive agencies and in general provides agencies’ contracting officers with guidance on how to award and administer contracts for the goods and services that their agencies need.  Before government contracts are awarded, the FAR requires that agencies determine whether prospective contractors are responsible. The purpose of the contractor responsibility determination is to help ensure that the government does business only with contractors that are found to be reliable, dependable, and capable of performing the work required under the terms of the contract. The FAR provides that no contract shall be awarded unless the contracting officer makes an affirmative determination of responsibility.  The FAR sets forth seven general standards that agencies’ contracting officers are required to use in determining whether prospective contractors are responsible. Among other things, these standards require prospective contractors to have adequate financial resources to perform the contract, the ability to comply with contract schedules, satisfactory performance records, and satisfactory records of integrity and business ethics. Although the FAR does not specifically require criminal background checks on contractor principals, agencies are not prohibited from performing such checks and may do so when they believe it is necessary or appropriate. For example, in one case, a contracting officer found a prospective contractor nonresponsible for lack of integrity based on information in a criminal investigation report.  According to HUD, GSA, and Treasury acquisition officials, responsibility determinations do not include criminal background checks on contractor principals. and their contracting officers rely on similar types and sources of information to make responsibility determinations.  However, during fiscal years 1997 through 1999, the OIGs at the Departments of Agriculture, HUD, Justice, Transportation, and VA and at GSA investigated a total of 151 contractor principals for allegedly committing fraud. Of these principals, 56, or 37 percent, were found to have committed fraud. Eight of the 56 principals who committed fraud had criminal histories",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"NSIAD-00-225","Contingency Operations: Army Should Do More to Control Contract Cost in Balkans",9/29/2000 0:00:00,"The Army should improve its management of the Balkans Support Contract. Cost reimbursement performance-based contracts are relatively new and provide great latitude in how a contractor provides requested services, and many Army and other Defense Department personnel involved in administering the contract are uncertain about their authority under this type of contract. As a result, officials at facilities in the Balkans have not been as specific as they should have been about what to expect from the contractor.  The Army should have done more to control costs. One step it should have taken was to give more consideration to costs in making decisions on the extent of services to be provided by the contractor.  They frequently simply accepted the level of services the contractor provided without questioning whether the service could be provided more efficiently or less frequently and at lower cost. We found a widespread view among Army and other Department of Defense agencies’ officials in the Balkans that they had little control over the contractor’s actions once it was authorized to perform tasks. There was a widespread desire on the part of personnel administering the contract for more training on the government’s authority and on how to apply the contract in real-world situations. Furthermore, key personnel involved in administering the contract are on rotation schedules, so they all arrive and leave at about the same time, and they deploy for relatively short periods— 6 months on average. This does not allow continuity in the contract’s administration and hinders effective contract oversight.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","multiple agencies","Generasl discussion on several contracts","GAO-02-179T","CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: Improving Services Acquisitions",11/1/2001 0:00:00,"Too frequently agencies are not clearly defining their requirements, fully considering alternative solutions, performing vigorous price analyses, or adequately overseeing contractor performance.  Testimony discussed the need for strengthening management oversight of contracting activities by establishing a Chief Acquisition Officer to provide direction and vision.  Historically, government agencies have not used performance-based contracting - a proce4ss where the agency specifies the desired results and the vendor decides how to achieve the desired outcome.  Some agencies have not identified training requirements for some segments of their acquisition workforce and/or not identified the funds needed to provide training.  Other agencies - e.g. DOD - did not provide the training to the right people at the right time or not in enough depth to help program officials implement acquisition reform.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","General Services Administration",,"GAO-02-247R","National WWII Memorial: Construction Contractor Selection",11/30/2001 0:00:00,"Whether GSA followed proper procedures for awarding the construction contract to a joint venture whose majority participant is owned by a U.S. company that in turn is owned by a foreign firm that was recently convicted of an antitrust violation.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense","Army and Defense Logistics Agency","GAO-02-165","CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: Update on DOD's Purchase of Black Berets",12/11/2001 0:00:00,"Whether DLA followed the ""Berry Amendment"" that limits DOD's purchase of certain items (including clothing) to those produced in the U.S. or its possessions.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","General Services Administration",,"GAO-02-56R","GSA's Guidance and Oversight Concerning Areawide Utility Contracts",12/17/2001 0:00:00,"The District of Columbia School System used an areawide utility contract between GSA and the Washington Gas Light Co. to perform facility modifications to district schools.  This was an inappropriate use of such a contract which was intended for utility purchases only.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority",,"GAO-02-36","Contracting Practices Do Not Always Comply with Airport Lease Requirements",3/1/2002 0:00:00,"The Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority operates the Dulles and Reagan airports under a 50 year lease authorized by the Metropolitan Washington Airports Act of 1986.  The Act requires the Authority to conduct its procurements using full and open competition to the maximum extent practical.  However, GAO found that the Authority was not using full and open competition to the maximum extent and is not using its published guidance when awarding contracts.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Bureau of Prisons",,"GAO-02-508R","Bureau of Prisons Contract Payments",3/20/2002 0:00:00,"For the contract payments reviewed, GAO found that control over contractor payments were in place and operating; any errors detected were corrected in the next payment.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"GAO-02-502","CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: DOD Needs Better Guidance on Granting Waivers for Certified Cost or Pricing Data",4/22/2002 0:00:00,"DOD does not have guidance to help buying organizations identify what type of data and analyses are needed to determine whether costs and prices on sole source contracts are reasonable; therefore contracting personnel have no criteria to decide whether to require such data to be furnished by the contractor or to grant the contractor a waiver of the requirement.  In cases where contracts are awarded without competition, the Truth in Negotiations Act requires contractors and subcontractors to normally provide the government with cost or pricing data supporting their proposed prices and certify that the data submitted are accurate, complete, and current. However, the government can waive the requirement for certified data in exceptional cases and contracting officers use other techniques to arrive at fair and reasonable prices. In 20 cases we reviewed, the contract pricing or waiver documents stated that sufficient information was available to determine the price to be fair and reasonable without the submission of cost or pricing data.  However, there was a wide spectrum in the quality of the data and analyses being used: there were situations where the analysis focused only on the bottom-line price and not the supporting costs and where the data being relied on were exceptionally old, and situations where the negotiations were based on data that were very recently certified with little change in the quantity. Further, some contracting officers involved pricing experts as well as integrated teams of government and contractor personnel, which collaboratively developed data. The government was at a higher risk in situations where there was a lot of uncertainty and at lower risk where there was less uncertainty.  Despite the range of techniques employed to arrive at a price, DOD does not have guidance that would help buying organizations draw the line between what type of data and analyses are acceptable or not and what kinds of outside assistance, such as contracting and pricing experts, should be obtained.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Health and Human Services",,"GAO-02-245","WELFARE REFORM: Interim Report on Potential Ways to Strengthen Federal Oversight of State and Local Contracting",4/23/2002 0:00:00,"Audits of contractors participating in the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program are carried out by the states or third-parties.  These audits have identified problems with unallowable costs, and bid solicitation and contract award procedures.  HHS is ""aware"" of contracting problems identified by such audits but is not knowledgeable of the specific nature of the problems or the extent they occur because HHS does not analyze these reports in a comprehensive manner.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","General Services Administration",,"GAO-02-560T","Contract Management: Roles and Responsibilities of the Federal Supply Service and the Federal Technology Service",4/11/2002 0:00:00,"FSS and FTS are the principal GSA programs that assist agencies in acquiring products and services. FSS is responsible for a much wider range of business lines than FTS, yet both do billions of dollars in business. Both programs are funded by the fees they charge customers, and both receive only minor amounts of appropriated funding.  FSS and FTS are similar in that they provide a broad range of IT products and services and access to many of the same vendors. They differ in that one provides a full range of support services to help agencies manage acquisitions while the other simply provides access to flexible, convenient contract vehicles. Some would suggest that maintaining overlapping procurement programs gives rise to inefficiencies and others that doing so provides agencies desirable flexibility. As these programs have grown in size and significance and as more agencies take on similar programs, it is becoming increasingly critical to answer this question.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"GAO-02-630","Acquisition Workforce: Department of Defense's Plans to Address Workforce Size and Structure Challenges",4/30/2002 0:00:00,"As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, DOD reported its actions and plans to implement the task force’s recommendations. The report shows that DOD has made progress laying a foundation for reshaping its acquisition workforce. For example, DOD is working to remove barriers to its strategic planning initiative; continuing with an effort to test various human capital innovations; and has begun making significant changes to its acquisition workforce-training program. We did not assess the effectiveness of these initiatives, but they do target key Task Force concerns. Additionally, DOD recognizes the need as well as the substantial challenges involved in implementing a strategic approach to shaping the acquisition workforce. Consequently, DOD views implementation of these initiatives as long-term efforts with specific outcomes taking years to achieve. Regarding DOD’s efforts to implement the Task Force’s specific recommendations, DOD’s report generally provides information about actions taken to implement them and their status. However, for many initiatives, DOD did not clearly describe the actions it has taken or when they occurred, or identify all planned actions and schedules for completing the initiatives.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"Army Audit Agency","Army",,"97-2","Contract Security Requirements",10/21/1996 0:00:00,"Procedures for ensuring the validity of requirements for sensitive compartmented information in Army contracts needed improvement.  First, requirements for sensitive compartmented information weren't always necessary.  As a result, the Army may have paid as much as $128.5 million for excess industrial security.  Second, the security aspects of contracts containing requirements for sensitive compartmented information security weren't adequately monitored.  Specifically, 4 of the 5 activities reviewed weren't adequately monitoring about 75 percent of the contracts reviewed.  For the most part, commands had not designated contract monitors and, when designated, the monitors weren't being trained.  Third, procedures for closing out contracts with these requirements were adequate, but generally weren't followed.  For 20 of 33 contract reviewed, contract monitors didn't follow established procedures.  For example, contractor personnel kept their access to sensitive material an average of 6 months after they needed it to perform contracted work.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOHQ Docs","523733","Mike"
"General Accounting Office","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"GAO-02-642R","NASA Contract Payments",5/23/2002 0:00:00,"We did not find that NASA had a significant or systemic problem with overpayments or underpayments during fiscal year 2001. Contractors and vendors responded to our request for payment information on 108 of the 110 contracts and purchase orders we selected for review. Only one respondent reported an overpayment that met our definition of a payment error. The error occurred on a contract selected specifically because of its high-dollar disbursements and resulted from an incorrect calculation made by a NASA procurement official and a miscommunication between NASA and the contractor. The error was identified by the contractor and corrected promptly. The dollar amount of the error ($570,171) was insignificant—about 0.2 percent— relative to total disbursements of almost $258 million on this contract in fiscal year 2001. The controls that NASA put in place to prevent and detect payment errors appeared to be properly designed. These controls ranged from automated system edits to supervisory review and postpayment audits.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"GAO-02-635","DOD Contract Management: Overpayments Continue and Management and Accounting Issues Remain",5/30/2002 0:00:00,"DOD contractors’ responses to our survey indicate that they have millions of dollars in overpayments and underpayments on their records, and based on DFAS Columbus records, they are continuing to refund overpayments— about $488 million in fiscal year 2001. Contractors cited progress payment liquidation errors as a primary reason for the overpayments and underpayments. They usually did not include debt due to contract administration actions—the reason for the majority of contractor refunds according to DFAS Columbus records—in their reported overpayments. Additional overpayments and underpayments could be identified when audits of the over 3,200 contracts requiring some level of reconciliation, as of September 30, 2001, are completed by DFAS Columbus. Contractor debt, regardless of cause, is likely to continue due to DOD’s complex contract management and payments processes. Even when payment discrepancies are identified, they are not always promptly resolved.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"GAO-02-624","Military Housing: Management Improvements Needed as the Pace of Privatization Quickens",6/21/2002 0:00:00,"Although DOD has awarded contracts to construct or improve about 16,000 units and has plans to privatize an additional 96,000 units by the end of fiscal year 2006, privatization projects are not supported by reliable or consistent needs assessments, and the overall requirement for military family housing is not well-defined. Accurate requirements determinations can help DOD to construct and maintain government housing, whether privatized or not, only at installations where the local communities cannot meet the military’s family housing needs. With its housing requirements uncertain, the department may be entering into long-term privatization contracts to construct additional housing or replace or renovate existing inadequate military housing that may not be needed.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense","Department of Veterans Affairs","GAO-02-872T","VA and Defense Health Care: Potential Exists for Savings through Joint Purchasing of Medical and Surgical Supplies",6/26/2002 0:00:00,"VA and DOD have not awarded joint national contracts for medical and surgical supplies as envisioned in their memorandum of agreement, and it is unlikely that the two departments will have joint national contracts for supplies anytime soon. The lack of progress VA and DOD have made in jointly contracting for medical and surgical supplies has, in part, been the result of their different approaches to standardizing medical and surgical supplies. These differing approaches—VA’s national approach of selecting specific items for all its facilities to purchase and DOD’s regional approach that allows each of nine geographic regions to individually standardize specific items—increase the possibility that VA and DOD regions could select and standardize different items for purchase and thereby minimize the opportunities for national joint procurements. Other impediments to joint purchasing have been incomplete VA and DOD procurement data and the lack of a means for identifying similar high-volume, high-dollar purchases. VA and DOD are making improvements to their automated information systems, which should enhance their ability to identify items for standardization. However, neither VA nor DOD could confirm that their enhanced systems will contain compatible data that will allow the two departments to readily exchange procurement information—a key capability for facilitating standardization and joint procurement.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","multiple agencies","Information applicable to all federal agencies","GAO-02-866T","Commercial Activities Panel: Improving the Sourcing Decisions of the Federal government",6/26/2002 0:00:00,"The Panel concluded that there are some advantages to the current system. (1) A-76 cost comparisons are conducted under an established set of rules, the purpose of which is to ensure that sourcing decisions are based on uniform, transparent, and consistently applied criteria. (2) The A-76 process has enabled federal managers to make cost comparisons between sectors that have vastly different approaches to cost accounting. (3) The current A-76 process has been used to achieve significant savings and efficiencies for the government. Savings result regardless of whether the public or the private sector wins the cost comparison. The Panel’s report noted that both federal employees and private firms complain that the A-76 competition process does not meet the principles’ standard of a clear, transparent, and consistently applied process. In the Panel’s view, the most serious shortcoming of the A-76 process is that it has been stretched beyond its original purpose, which was to determine the low-cost provider of a defined set of services. During its year-long study, the Panel identified several key characteristics of a successful sourcing policy. (1) The Panel heard repeatedly about the importance of competition and its central role in fostering economy, efficiency, high performance, and continuous performance improvement. (2) The Panel was consistently reminded about, and fully agrees with, the importance of ensuring accountability throughout the sourcing process, providing the workforce with adequate training and technical support in developing proposals for improving performance, and assisting those workers who may be adversely affected by sourcing decisions. (3) Sourcing policy is inextricably linked to the government’s human capital policies.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Air Force",,"GAO-02-617","Defense Inventory: Air Force Needs to Improve Control of Shipments to Repair Contractors",7/1/2002 0:00:00,"The Air Force and contractor personnel have largely not complied with Department of Defense and Air Force inventory control procedures designed to safeguard material shipped to contractors, placing items worth billions of dollars at risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. The following items identify inadequate procedures and departures from required procedures: (1) The inventory control points have not sent quarterly reports on the status of shipped material to property administration officials at the Defense Contract Management Agency. Without the quarterly reports, these officials cannot independently verify that contractors have accounted for government-furnished material. (2) Contractors receiving shipped material have not (a) properly entered the receipt of shipments into their records and into the inventory control points’ reporting systems or (b) routinely reported shipment discrepancies. These failures impair the Air Force’s ability to account for shipments worth millions of dollars. (3) The Air Force has not followed up on shipments that contractors have not confirmed as received, leaving the exact status of the shipments uncertain. (4) The Air Force has not provided adequate program oversight because it does not request and analyze data on contractor shipment discrepancies to identify the extent and cause of discrepancies so that corrective action may be taken. This lack of oversight impedes the Air Force’s ability to improve its supply operations and to determine which activities are responsible for lost or misplaced items.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","National Aeronautics and Space Administration",,"GAO-02-945T","NASA Management Challenges: Human Capital and Other Critical Areas to be Addressed",7/18/2002 0:00:00,"Much of NASA’s success depends on the work of its contractors’ on which it spends the greatest part of its funds. But for many years, NASA has not been able to effectively oversee contracts, principally because it has lacked accurate and reliable information on contract spending and it has placed little emphasis on end results, product performance, and cost control. NASA has addressed many acquisition- related weaknesses, but key tasks remain, including implementation of a new integrated financial management system.  We are continuing to monitor NASA’s progress in addressing contract management weaknesses; we are currently assessing the extent to which NASA’s management of the financial management system acquisition is in accordance with effective system acquisition practices and is designed to support NASA’s decision-making needs and external reporting requirements.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Housing and Urban Development",,"GAO-02-869T","HUD Management: HUD's High-Risk Program Areas and Management Challenges",7/24/2002 0:00:00,"Effective management of acquisitions is crucial to HUD’s success in meeting its mission and addressing its high-risk single-family mortgage insurance and rental housing assistance program areas. Ineffective oversight of contractors adversely effects HUD’s ability to carry out its mission and to deliver key services and exposes HUD’s programs to the additional risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. HUD faces the challenge of ensuring that, where it relies on contractors to perform its mission, it will hold these contractors accountable for results. Holding contractors accountable for results requires processes and practices in place to effectively monitor contractors’ performance, an acquisition workforce with the right workload, training and tools to carry out its mission, and programmatic and financial management information systems that support HUD’s efforts to ensure accountability in its acquisitions. HUD has undertaken a number of actions over the past few years to (1) improve the processes and practices in place to effectively monitor contractors’ performance, (2) improve the training and professional development of it acquisition workforce, and (3) improve its contracting information systems. While progress has been made, our recent and  ongoing work suggests that HUD is still experiencing difficulties in each of these areas and thus faces continued challenges in its ability to hold contractors accountable for results.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","multiple agencies","NASA, NIH, Transportation, Commerce, and OMB","GAO-02-734","Contract Management: Interagency Contract Program Fees Need More Oversight",7/25/2002 0:00:00,"OMB guidance directs agencies with GWACs or franchise fund programs to account for and recover fully allocated actual costs and to report on their financial results. Agencies are supposed to identify all direct and indirect costs and to charge fees to ordering agencies based on these costs. However, some GWAC programs have not identified or accurately reported the full cost of providing interagency contract services. Thus, there is no assurance that their fees accurately reflect their costs. Because OMB has not required agencies to submit annual financial reports summarizing program results that include a description of the agencies’ indirect cost allocation methodologies, it was unaware that not all agencies are following its guidance. Most of the contract service programs we reviewed reported an excess of revenues over costs in at least one year between fiscal years 1999 and 2001. The exceptions were the GWACs at Commerce and Transportation, which reported losses each year during this period. The Schedules program has produced exceptionally high earnings, with revenues exceeding costs by more than 53 percent—for a total of $151 million— during the 3-year period. OMB’s guidance further directs that agencies transfer GWAC earnings to the miscellaneous receipts account of the U.S. Treasury’s General Fund. However, the way agencies operate their revolving funds conflicts with OMB’s guidance. Agencies that operate their GWACs under revolving funds have used GWAC earnings to support other programs within the revolving fund or to maintain fund operations. They have not transferred any GWAC earnings to the Treasury.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","multiple agencies","DOE, NASA, VA, GSA, and HHS","GAO-02-737","Acquisition Workforce: Agencies Need to Better Define and Track the Training of Their Employees",7/29/2002 0:00:00,"DOD and the military services’ definitions of their acquisition workforce include contracting officers, contracting officer representatives, and contracting officer technical representatives along with other disciplines that play a significant role in acquisitions, such as program managers, industrial specialists, and financial administrators. Civilian agencies generally include only contract and procurement specialists, contracting officers, and contracting officer representatives in their acquisition workforce definitions. Acquisition officials in two of the five civilian agencies we reviewed explained that use of a broader definition would be difficult given that they do not have the authority to establish and monitor training for other functional areas. DOD and the civilian agencies have developed specific training requirements for their acquisition workforce. They have also developed a variety of mechanisms to track the training of acquisition personnel. Three of the civilian agencies are awaiting implementation of a more sophisticated Web-based government-wide management information system to help them track training, but the deployment of this system has been delayed considerably. Lastly, all agencies we reviewed said they had sufficient funding to provide current required core training for their acquisition workforce; however, some expressed concerns about funding training for future requirements and career development, particularly because of budget cuts made recently at the Defense Acquisition University (DAU).",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Customs Service",,"GAO-02-908","Customs Service Modernization: Third Expenditure Plan Meets Legislative Conditions, but Cost Estimating Improvements Needed",8/9/2002 0:00:00,"We determined that the cost estimate in the third expenditure plan is questionable because Customs is still in the process of addressing our recommendation for having an effective cost estimating program. While the full impact of the weaknesses in the process used to derive the estimate was indeterminable, an inflated labor rate led to an overestimate of about $36 million for designing, developing, and deploying ACE increment 1 release 2. Because the expenditure plan includes a management reserve of 10 percent of the funding requirement, the management reserve is also overstated by about $3.6 million. According to an ACE prime contractor executive, the overstatement is offset by a corresponding understatement in the estimated number of labor hours, which the official attributed to Customs’ not having a complete set of requirements at the time that the plan’s estimate was derived. Customs also arranged for an independent cost estimate by another contractor, which led to an estimate that was $77.9 million lower than the expenditure plan cost estimate. Customs and support contractor officials stated that this independent estimate is incomplete and reflects a misunderstanding by the cost estimate contractor of the scope of work to be performed. Customs is currently determining the cause of the variance.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Office of Management and Budget",,"GAO-02-1022R","Commercial Activities Panel: Use of Numerical Goals",8/9/2002 0:00:00,"Your letter of August 5, 2002 asked me to address whether two OMB initiatives are consistent with the sourcing principles recommended by the Commercial Activities Panel (the Panel) in its April 30, 2002, report entitled Improving the Sourcing Decisions of the Government. The two initiatives are: 1) the Administration’s “performance target” that federal agencies compete or directly convert to private-sector performance specified percentages of their full-time equivalent positions listed under the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act (FAIR) by specified dates, and 2) section 640 of S. 2740, the Fiscal Year 2003 Treasury and General Government Appropriations bill, which would restrict the availability of funding for the use of numerical goals, targets, or quotas for public-private competitions or direct conversions. As discussed in detail in this report, I do not believe that, based on their current design, either of these initiatives is fully consistent with the sourcing principles adopted by the Panel.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Energy",,"GAO-02-798","Contract Reform: DOE Has Made Progress, but Actions Needed to Ensure Initiatives Have Improved Results",9/13/2002 0:00:00,"Poor performance by DOE contractors and inadequate DOE management and oversight of those contractors led us to conclude in 1990 that DOE’s contracting practices were at high risk for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Subsequently, DOE began its contract reform initiative to improve the performance and accountability of its contractors. Although DOE has undertaken a number of reforms over the years and has monitored its progress in implementing those reforms, it has no good measure of the results of the reforms. Aside from individual examples of good or poor performance on specific projects, DOE cannot tell, for example, if the contract reforms have resulted in better performance by its contractors or more favorable contract terms for the government. Limited evidence we developed suggests that contractors managing DOE’s major projects are performing no better in 2001 than on similar projects in 1996. DOE faces a fundamental challenge to ensuring the effectiveness of its contract reform initiative—developing an approach to managing the initiative that is more consistent with the best practices of high-performing organizations. DOE’s practices in managing its contract reform initiative, as well as its other initiatives such as project management, that could also help to improve contractor performance, fall short of the best practices followed by high-performing organizations. Unless DOE strengthens the way in which it manages initiatives such as contract reform, DOE may not be able to fully realize the benefits of these initiatives and ensure that its programs are adequately protected from fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.",0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"GAO-02-345","Information Technology: Greater Use of Best Practices Can Reduce Risks in Acquiring Defense Health Care System",9/26/2002 0:00:00,"DOD has appropriately given attention and priority to employing certain acquisition best practices, including those related to managing system requirements and test events, aligning the system architecture with the DOD military health system enterprise architecture, and proactively managing project risks. Such practices better position the department for successfully acquiring CHCS II. Nevertheless, management can be improved upon. For example, performance-based contracting methods are not being used to ensure contractor accountability. Until this is changed, acquisition risks will remain higher than they need to be. DOD’s recent progress on CHCS II is due in part to its attention and commitment to adopting certain acquisition management best practices, such as those governing requirements management. We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for similarly pursuing improvements in CHCS II investment and other acquisition management controls.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Health Care Financing Administration",,"GAO-01-176R","Medicare+Choice: Oversight Lapses in HCFA's Review of Humana's 1998 Florida Contract",11/27/2000 0:00:00,"Because of a series of contractor oversight lapses, HCFA did not identify discrepancies in Humana's contract submission and discrepancies between the contract and the prescription drug benefit the plan offered.  Further, HCFA staff responsible for reviewing marketing materials and HCFA's independent auditor also did not identify these discrepancies.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense","General Services Administration","GAO-01-125","CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: Not Following Procedures Undermines Best Pricing Under GSA's Schedule",11/28/2000 0:00:00,"DOD contracting officers were not following GSA's established procedures intended to ensure that fair and reasonable prices were obtained when using the Federal Supply Schedule.  The FAR does not provide guidance about GSA's special ordering procedures for obtaining fair and reasonable prices under FSS contracts and GSA's guidance is not clear.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Veterans Affairs",,"GAO-01-207R","Inadequate Oversight of Laundry Facility at the Department of Veterans Affairs  Albany, New York, Medical Center",11/30/2000 0:00:00,"GAO found that there was inadequate oversight of the contract for operating the laundry facility at the VA medical center in Albany, NY.  There was no separation of duties of the COTR and the VA Quality Assurance Evaluator who allowed the contractor to deviate from contract terms.  As a result, the contractor may have been overpaid.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"GAO-01-309","CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: Excess Payments and Underpayments Continue To Be a Problem at DOD",2/22/2001 0:00:00,"In FY2000, contractors returned almost $1 billion in excess payments, most of which stemmed from contract administration actions such as finalizing overhead costs, or correcting the rate of progress payments.  About 40% of these repayments had not been made within the required 30 days after identification.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Environmental Protection Agency",,"GAO-01-302","SUPERFUND: EPA's Contract Cost-Estimating Initiatives Show Promise and Should Be Monitored",3/2/2001 0:00:00,"Prior reviews had indicated that EPA was not generating independent cost estimates but was accepting the contractors' estimates as the price to be awarded for the work.  EPA has since completed a study of its cost-estimating processes and developed a training program and estimating tools.  Further improvement could be achieved by extending the training to more employees, keeping cleanup cost data updated and current, and analyzing data from on-going and completed projects for use in estimating new projects.",0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense","Office of Federal Procurement Policy","GAO-01-517","CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: Benefits of Simplified Acquisition Test Procedures Not Clearly Demonstrated",4/20/2001 0:00:00,"During a test of the use of simplified acquisition procedures for purchase of commercial items up to $5 million, government buyers did not always demonstrate that prices obtained using the simplified procedures were fair and reasonable on sole source contracts.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"GAO-01-695T","CONTRACT MANAGEMENT:  Purchase of Army Black Berets",5/2/2001 0:00:00,"Because of severe time constraints imposed by the Army Chief of Staff, DLA failed to perform adequate market research to identify potential sources for the army berets and without full and open competition, subsequently awarded contracts to foreign suppliers after waiving the requirements of the Berry amendment requiring domestic procurement of military clothing.  Further, DLA did not consult the DOD Small and Disadvantaged Business Office to identify potential small business suppliers.",0,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"GAO-01-742T","DEFENSE HEALTH CARE: Lessons Learned from TRICARE Contracts and Implications for the Future",5/17/2001 0:00:00,"GAO testified that the challenges to DOD in redesigning its TRICARE contracts to overcome prior and existing problems are to address the degree of prescriptiveness, the process for and frequency of contract adjustments, the size of the contracts and their impact on the level of competition, and whether the contracts provide the right incentives and predictability to obtain needed efficiencies.",1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Health and Human Services","Health Care Financing Administration","GAO-01-616","MEDICARE: Opportunities and Challenges in Contracting for Program Safeguards",5/18/2001 0:00:00,"While HCFA has issued numerous task orders to the 12 medicare program safeguard contractors (PSCs), the approach has been to issue these orders ad hoc rather than as a result of a long-term strategy for determining how to use the PSCs.  As a result, HCFA may not be able to determine how best to use the PSCs to satisfy its requirements for program security.  HCFA has not established clear, measurable criteria for assessing the PSCs' performance on individual task orders.  HCFA identified broad, undefined dimensions for evaluating the PSCs' performance based on the HIPA Act of 1996 but has not developed criteria to rate contractor performance in these dimensions.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","multiple agencies","DOD, DOE, and DOT","GAO-01-753T","CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: Trends and Challenges in Acquiring Services",5/22/2001 0:00:00,"GAO's work in several agencies as well as work by other oversight agencies continues to identify examples of long-standing problems in service contracting, including poor planning, inadequately defined requirements, insufficient price evaluation, and lax oversight of contractor performance.  The report cites examples of each problem area that occurred in one or more of the agencies highlighted in the testimony.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Health and Human Services",,"GAO-01-623","Anti-Drug Media Campaign: Aspects of Advertising Contract Mismanaged by the Government; Contractor Improperly Charged Some Costs",6/25/2001 0:00:00,"The HHS Program Support Center awarded a cost-reimbursement contract before sufficiently determining (as required) that the contractor had an adequate accounting system to support a cost-reimbursable contract.  HHS also failed to obtain the required statement from the contractor that would have disclosed the companies cost accounting practices.  HHS contract administrator did not resolve billing problems as they arose and did not audit the contractor when it was determined that the contractors accounting system and timekeeping procedures were deficient.",0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","Department of Defense",,"GAO-01-801","CONTRACT MANAGEMENT:  DOD's Profit Policy Provision to Stimulate Innovation Needs Clarification",7/26/2001 0:00:00,"The FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act mandated that DOD review its contract profit guidelines to determine if modifying those guidelines would provide more incentive to contractors to increase innovative approaches to addressing weapon system requirements.  GAO found that innovation profit incentives should be applicable to contracts for research and development of technologies early in the acquisition process where innovation is desirable, but these contracts are typically awarded based on competition and have only studies as deliverables.  As such, these contracts are excluded from the provisions of profit negotiation.  Innovation incentives should not be used when technologies should be mature and innovation is not desirable.  Therefore, DOD should clarify when to use innovation based profit incentives.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"General Accounting Office","General Services Administration","District of Columbia","GAO-01-963","District of Columbia: D.C. Public Schools Inappropriately Used Gas Utility Contract for Renovations",9/28/2001 0:00:00,"The District of Columbia School System misused a GSA areawide utility contract with the Washington Gas Light Co. to renovate D.C. schools.  These renovations included painting, plumbing, and electrical work; boiler, air conditioning, and heating repairs; playground upgrades; bathroom renovations; and refurbishing flagpoles.  These actions occurred due to a complete breakdown of internal, management, and oversight controls which resulted in the contractor either performing or overseeing work that was totally out of the scope of its contract.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"GAOWeb",,"Paulina"
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2000-139","Controls Over the Integrated Accounts Payable System",6/5/2000 0:00:00,"Controls over vendor payment operations did not ensure that vendor payments were properly supported and represented valid payments.  Our review indicated that approximately 176,000 of the 306,939 contract and miscellaneous payments made between April 1 and June 30, 1999, lacked, to various degrees, support required by regulations implementing the Prompt Payment Act.  The determination that a payment was not supported did not mean that the payment was invalid or fraudulent. However, documentation to support payments is a key internal control, and deficiencies in that documentation increase the risk of error and fraud.  The internal control structure of vendor payment operations needed further improvements to ensure that documents were adequately controlled and payments were properly supported.  As a result, the DFAS Denver Center could not ensure that improperly supported and erroneous payments would be detected and corrected before payment.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","94220",
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2001-034","Army Healthcare Enterprise Management System",1/16/2001 0:00:00,"The Fort Sam Houston Information Technology Business Center did not appropriately fund or plan the procurement of the Enterprise Management System and a potential violation of the Antideficiency Act occurred because they used Army FY 1998 operation and maintenance funds to pay for the Enterprise Management System lease expenses in FYs 1999 and 2000.  In addition, the Information Technology Business Center inappropriately used Army operation and maintenance funds instead of procurement funds to pay for a capital lease and Enterprise Management System installation costs.The Information Technology Business Center also arranged a questionable lease agreement for the Enterprise Management System and incurred $176,112 in unnecessary finance charges and General Service Administration service costs.  Information Technology Business Center supervisors did not adequately identify and address potential ethics violations that occurred during the procurement of the Enterprise Management System.  In addition, Information Technology Business Center employees were placed in a position of increased risk for potential violations of ethics laws and regulations.  The Information Technology Business Center had material management control weaknesses over planning and funding of the Enterprise Management System, interagency acquisitions, reporting of employee financial interests, and resolutions of potential conflicts of interest.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","94219",
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-008","Controls Over the Computerized Accounts Payable System at Defense Finance and Accounting Service Kansas City",10/19/2001 0:00:00,"""DFAS Kansas City made 17,983 payments from May 1 through July 31, 2000, and approximately 16,605 of these payments did not meet all the documentation or other requirements imposed by OMB regulations implementing the Prompt Payment Act.  The fact that a payment was not supported did not mean that the payment was invalid or fraudulent, but indicated management’s failure to enforce the requirements necessary for proper support.  As a result, DFAS and Marine Corps managers assumed an increased risk that payments were not being made in compliance with the Prompt Payment Act and that improper payments may have been made.
The structure and business practices of the vendor payment office at DFAS Kansas City did not provide efficient and effective controls over vendor payments.  As a result, DFAS Kansas City did not ensure that improperly supported and erroneous payments would be detected and corrected before payment.
""",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","94218",
"Defense IG","Department of Defense",,"D-2002-150","Procedures for Selecting Contractor Personnel to Perform Maintenance on Army Aircraft in Bosnia",9/18/2002 0:00:00,"DynCorp International had reasonable procedures for selecting and screening its personnel and provided an acceptable level of maintenance support in Bosnia under the DoD contract.  DynCorp International was not required by the contract or task orders to establish specific personnel hiring practices or conditions for employment; hired sufficient and qualified personnel, evaluated them for technical proficiency, and instructed them on proper conduct; and proved to be suitable and capable to perform the requirements of the contract. DoD acquisition officials reviewed the contractor’s suitability and capability to perform the contract during the source selection evaluation process and properly monitored DynCorp International’s performance on the task orders for aircraft maintenance in Bosnia.  Contracting officials did not and, as a general rule, do not, address the moral character of a contractor’s employees.  In February 2002, DynCorp imposed additional requirements not required under the contract on its overseas employees regarding personnel behavior.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Dallas Docs","94400",
"Agriculture IG","Agricultural Marketing Service",,"01001-3-Ch","National Fluid Milk Processor Promotion Program",9/23/1998 0:00:00,"The USDA/IG review disclosed that the Milk Processor Promotion Program Board entered into contracts without competition, could not provide contract documents for 37 of 108 contracts awarded, made payments that exceeded contract limits, and took no action when contract performance reports were not provided as required.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57200","Rick"
"Agriculture IG","Agricultural Marketing Service",,"01801-1-KC","Controls Over Pork Checkoff Funds",3/31/1999 0:00:00,"Projects were begun without contracts or without appropriate signatures and the AMS prime contractor (National Pork Producers Council) ignored USDA contract requirements for veterans preference when awarding subcontracts.",0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57204","Rick"
"Agriculture IG","Food and Nutrition Service",,"27010-8-KC","Child and Adult Care Food Program, Oversight of Sponsor",12/28/2001 0:00:00,"The USDA Food and Nutrition Service and the Colorado Department of Health had not collected funds overpaid to a program contractor",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs"," 57225","Rick"
"Agriculture IG","Food and Nutrition Service",,"27010-6-KC","Child and Adult Care Food Program, Wildwood, Inc., Phase II",11/21/2001 0:00:00,"A prior USDA/IG audit issued in March 2000 identified (1) a lack of controls necessary to safeguard federal funds from fraud or unauthorized use, (2) financial systems inadequate to account for federal funds, (3) an insecure financial computer system, and (4) comingling of federal funds.  Similar problems were found during this audit.",1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57239","Rick"
"Agriculture IG","Forest Service","Audit also included the Natural Resources Con. Ser","50601-1-TE","Controls Over Unliquidated Obligations",3/30/2001 0:00:00,"Because of weaknesses identified in previous audit reports, this audit focused on unliquidated obligations at the Forest Service and Natural Resources and Conservation Service.  This audit also found problems with controls over unliquidated obligations and identified six questionable obligations out of 17 tested.",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,"Denver docs","57190",