William F. Readdy
Deputy Associate Administrator
Office of Space Flight
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
before the
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
Committee on Science
House of Representatives
October 21, 1999
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I appreciate this opportunity to provide you with an overview of NASA's framework under which Space Shuttle upgrades are defined and prioritized. I will present a description of safety and supportability upgrades that have already been incorporated into the Shuttle. I will provide technical descriptions of planned safety and supportability upgrades, as well as the planned completion dates and the associated estimated cost at completion that NASA expects for implementing these upgrades.
NASA and the Administration place the highest priority on the safe launch, operation and return of the Space Shuttle and crew, while continuing to seek efficiencies, as we support the goal of safely flying the Space Shuttle fleet for the next decade. All aspects of the Space Shuttle program work together to enable the system to successfully meet its goals to: 1) fly safely; 2) meet the manifest; 3) improve mission supportability; and 4) improve the system.
Overview of the Shuttle Upgrades Program
In FY 1994, Space Shuttle management imposed a "freeze the design" policy on all projects within the Program. This action discontinued any major investments to upgrade the Space Shuttle with the exception of changes made to increase safety or improve the vehicle’s performance to support the assembly of the International Space Station (ISS). This policy was aligned with National Space Policy, the Agency’s Strategic Plan, and anticipated end of decade decisions on whether to develop an operational, next generation reusable launch system, or extend the life of the Space Shuttle.
NASA management subsequently concluded, however, that it was imprudent to continue with the "freeze the design" policy. This decision was based upon several factors, including the need to take advantage of technologies to improve Shuttle safety and the need for a robust Space Shuttle to assemble the ISS. In March 1996, the internal NASA policy was changed and $70 million was allotted from uncosted carryover to fund new upgrades. These upgrades will improve mission supportability consistent with the Program’s third priority (supportability covers those upgrades to improve safety, prevent obsolescence, enhance performance, reduce processing time and reduce operations costs). In 1999, the level of investment annually in these upgrades was increased to $100 million for the budget runout.
NASA’s Shuttle Upgrades program provides for modifications and improvements to the flight elements and ground facilities, including expansion of safety and operating margins. The program also includes supportability and obsolescence mitigation efforts, which combat obsolescence of vehicle and ground systems in order to maintain the program’s viability for the next decade. Additionally, the program will enable the enhancement of the Space Shuttle vehicle capabilities as well as the replacement of obsolete systems and components. Within the program, NASA addresses vendor loss, aging components, high repair cost of Shuttle-specific devices, and negative environmental impacts of some out-dated technologies. NASA has emphasized a phased approach to Space Shuttle upgrades in order to accommodate both budget realities and ISS assembly commitments.
Recently, NASA has been developing a comprehensive space transportation plan that will ensure safe, reliable, and affordable access to space in the future. NASA spends a substantial portion of its annual budget to meet its launch needs. To lower these costs, the 1994 National Space Transportation Policy (NSTC-4) calls for "government and private sector decisions by the end of this decade on development of an operational, next-generation reusable launch system." To support these decisions, NASA undertook industry-led Future Launch Studies to identify private sector options for reducing NASA’s launch costs. These studies incorporated separate efforts being undertaken by NASA, DOD and industry including: Space Shuttle safety upgrades; X-33 and other NASA technology demonstrators (X-34, X-37, and X-38), the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV); existing and future commercial launch vehicles; and the Crew Return Vehicle for the International Space Station. As part of the FY 2001 budget process, NASA and the Administration intend to use the results of these studies to develop an Integrated Space Transportation Plan that encompasses the decisions, some near-term and some far-term, required to significantly increase safety and reliability and to meet an end-date goal of transitioning NASA to lower-cost, private-sector, space transportation.
Space Shuttle Upgrades Selection Process
In February 1997, a separate Development Office was formed at NASA’s Johnson Space Center (JSC) within the Space Shuttle Program Office to select and fund upgrades. I was the first manager of this office. The resource allocation process of the current $100 million annual budget is managed by this Development Office. Potential upgrade candidates are proposed by civil service and contractor personnel within the various Space Shuttle projects (e.g., Orbiter, External Tank, Launch and Landing) at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC), JSC, and the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). After a thorough screening, engineering analysis, and cost benefit analysis, the proposed upgrades are then submitted by the Space Shuttle projects on a standardized template to the Development Office and are rated using established ground rules.
The Development Office evaluates and scores the proposals on how well they meet Program goals and objectives of flying safely, meeting the manifest, improving mission supportability, and improving the system. Candidate upgrades are those that have been submitted to the Development Office by the individual projects, but have not been formally evaluated or approved by the Upgrades Review Board. Final approval of upgrades requires the approval of the Space Shuttle Program Manager. Approval of candidate upgrades is an ongoing activity, with the Upgrades Review Board meeting on a monthly basis. This Board is comprised of representatives from all Space Shuttle projects and project contractors. As the upgrade project definitions matures, budget and management responsibility are transferred out of the Development Office and becomes part of each applicable project office’s sustaining engineering or operations activities. The Space Shuttle program is responsible for Phase I and II upgrades, as well as additional study activities.
Space Shuttle Phase I Upgrades
Phase I upgrades are defined as improvements that greatly increase Shuttle safety and/or increase vehicle performance in support of ISS assembly and utilization. All Phase I upgrades are either complete or very near completion. Examples include:
Phase II upgrades are defined as high-value, low-impact, and incremental upgrades that can be implemented at relatively low cost, without impacting the Shuttle flight manifest. To maintain the Shuttle as a viable space transportation system, Phase II upgrades are a necessary part of the Shuttle program until it is replaced. Additionally, when the Orbiter Atlantis returns to flight early next year, it will take advantage of numerous implemented Phase II upgrades. Examples are:
High Priority Safety Upgrades
NASA recognizes that we must always be vigilant when it comes to safety and flight hardware. Therefore, I want to underscore our position that in order to maintain and continue to improve robustness in the Space Shuttle, NASA continually evaluates shuttle systems performance, processing practices and potential upgrades. The purpose of each of these activities is to increase the safety and supportability and improve the overall Space Shuttle program reliability.
After careful review and analysis, the Space Shuttle program has recommended two high priority safety upgrades for implementation, and a third high priority safety upgrade for testbed development and further study:
Additional Studies of Potential Upgrades
Additional studies are being conducted in several areas such as the Space Shuttle’s Thermal Protection System (TPS) lower surface tile upgrades, propulsion system, and hazard protection during processing. Completion of these studies is vital to successfully supporting our safety efforts.
NASA has identified additional candidate safety upgrades that are high-value, major system upgrades, and reflect more extensive implementation impact and cost. These upgrades could affect the Shuttle configuration and/or modify the vehicle moldline. Studies relating to these upgrades [e.g. Separable Crew Escape Pod, a reuseable first stage, or a Fifth Segment Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM)] are on-going, and will be factored into the overall considerations of the Integrated Space Transportation Plan. As part of the Integrated Space Transportation Plan, a number of technologies are being considered that could benefit Shuttle, such as non-toxic Orbital Manuvering System/Reaction Control System (OMS/RCS), electromechanical actuation and advanced TPS materials.
A list of safety upgrades and their impact on risk is provided as Addendum 2.
Conclusion
The Space Shuttle continues to prove itself as the most versatile, robust, and reliable space vehicle in use today. Each element was engineered, designed, and built with redundant systems to mitigate risk. NASA continues to find efficiencies in operations, while at the same time the measures of Shuttle safety and performance continue to improve. I am proud of the NASA-contractor team that made this happen.
The numbers are dramatic. The ascent loss-of-vehicle risk has been reduced from 1/78 (post–Challenger) to 1/438 today. Since 1992, the Space Shuttle costs have decreased by about 38% when adjusted for inflation, and performance (lift capability) to the International Space Station has improved by about 60%. As the Space Shuttle program continues to look for efficiencies, we will also look for opportunities to improve the system, including reducing the standard manifest time period and simplifying the payload review process to enhance flexibility required to meet our customer requests.
NASA will always maintain the highest vigilance toward safety of flight and we will not fly a mission until we are satisfied that the vehicle is ready to carry it’s crew and cargo safely into space. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I look forward to answering your questions.