U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
11/12/1999 - 11/15/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36387 36428 36429 36430 36431 36432 36433 36434 36435 36436 36437
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36387 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: GRAND GULF REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/02/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:06[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 11/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:56[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERNEST MATHES |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/13/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CLAUDE JOHNSON R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - MSIVs LEAKING ABOVE ACCEPTABLE LEAK RATE DURING AN LLRT - |
| |
| During local leak rate testing with the plant in a refueling outage, the |
| licensee discovered excess leakage past the 'A' main steam line inboard and |
| outboard main steam isolation valves (#B21-F022A and #B21-F028A). This |
| condition exceeded the acceptable leak rate. The licensee is determining |
| corrective action. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 0331 ON 11/13/99 BY ERNEST MATHES TO JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| During additional local leak rate testing, the licensee discovered gross |
| leakage past the 'C' main steam line inboard and outboard main steam |
| isolation valves (#B21-F022C and #B21-F028C). This condition exceeded the |
| acceptable leak rate. The licensee plans to test the remaining MSIVs and |
| rebuild the leaking valves prior to plant restart. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Operations |
| Officer notified the R4DO Linda Smith. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36428 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: EATON CUTLER-HAMMER |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/12/1999|
|LICENSEE: EATON CUTLER-HAMMER |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:58[EST]|
| CITY: REGION: |EVENT DATE: 11/12/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: |EVENT TIME: [EST]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/12/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |DAN HOLODY R1 |
| |CHARLES OGLE R2 |
+------------------------------------------------+MICHAEL PARKER R3 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: PAT PATTERSON |LINDA SMITH R4 |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE |VERN HODGE (by fax) NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CDEG 21.21(c)(3)(i) DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 10 CFR PART 21 REPORT - |
| |
| Eaton Cutler-Hammer personnel identified a potential safety concern |
| involving the potential for the malfunction of the Eaton Cutler-Hammer DS |
| and DSL Class 1E circuit breakers due to the improper application of zinc |
| chromate plating to hardened parts during breaker reconditioning. |
| |
| The failure of hardened parts to maintain their design integrity due to |
| cracking and the potential for the total separation of pieces during a |
| seismic event or normal operation and their subsequent infiltration of the |
| breaker operating assembly could cause the failure of the breaker to perform |
| its design function. In addition, mechanical interlocks may not perform as |
| expected or the breaker may not be able to be charged depending on the |
| actual failure which could occur. |
| |
| The installed base of the DS style circuit breakers is spread throughout the |
| nuclear industry. However, it is unknown to Eaton Cutler-Hammer |
| specifically which utilities may have had reconditioning performed on their |
| breakers that included plating of parts. |
| |
| Eaton Cutler-Hammer recommends that a thorough inspection be conducted on |
| all breakers which may have undergone previous reconditioning activities |
| which included plating or replating of component parts. Specific attention |
| should be directed toward spiral pins, which are constructed of hardened |
| spring steel. |
| |
| See the Eaton Cutler-Hammer Part 21 report for additional details. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36429 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: EATON CUTLER-HAMMER |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/12/1999|
|LICENSEE: EATON CUTLER-HAMMER |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:09[EST]|
| CITY: REGION: |EVENT DATE: 11/12/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: |EVENT TIME: [EST]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/12/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |DAN HOLODY R1 |
| |CHARLES OGLE R2 |
+------------------------------------------------+MICHAEL PARKER R3 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: PAT PATTERSON |LINDA SMITH R4 |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE |VERN HODGE (by fax) NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CDEG 21.21(c)(3)(i) DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 10 CFR PART 21 REPORT - |
| |
| Eaton Cutler-Hammer personnel identified a potential safety concern |
| involving the potential for the malfunction of the Eaton Cutler-Hammer DS |
| and DSL Class 1E circuit breakers due to the application of incorrect torque |
| values during breaker reconditioning. |
| |
| Previous industry DS Circuit Breaker Maintenance Guidance originally |
| published by Westinghouse Nuclear Services Division in June 1993 and |
| subsequently revised in March 1999 contained incorrect torque specifications |
| for DS circuit breaker arc chute mounting bolts. Specifically, this |
| guidance as originally published, was in error by a factor of at least 2 |
| (two) regarding the DS 206 and by a factor of at least 3 (three) for the DS |
| 416 when compared to the torque values identified in the Manufacturing |
| Instructions utilized by the OEM (Cutler-Hammer) factory during the |
| manufacturing process. The current revision information while being closer |
| to the proper values is still incorrect. Multiple instances of longitudinal |
| cracks have been observed in the mounting bolt block portion of the arc |
| chute case. In addition, the "O" rings used as a retaining or capture |
| device for the arc chute mounting bolts have been damaged. Pieces of the |
| "O" rings have been found laying around the inside of circuit breakers. The |
| failure of the arc chute case to maintain its design integrity due to |
| cracking and the potential for the total separation of pieces during a |
| seismic event or normal operation and their subsequent infiltration of the |
| breaker operating assembly could cause the failure of the breaker to perform |
| its design function. Likewise, "O" ring failure could result in the same |
| final effect. |
| |
| The installed base of the DS style circuit breakers is spread throughout the |
| nuclear industry. However, it is unknown to Eaton Cutler-Hammer |
| specifically which utilities may have incorporated this erroneous |
| information into their maintenance programs. |
| |
| Eaton Cutler-Hammer recommends that a thorough inspection be conducted with |
| the arc chutes properly torqued into place on the circuit breaker. Please |
| note that the cracks may not be visible once the arc chutes have been |
| removed from the breaker. A second inspection should be conducted of the |
| "O" rings following removal of the arc chute from the breaker. |
| |
| See the Eaton Cutler-Hammer Part 21 report for additional details. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36430 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: ARIZONA RADIATION REG AGENCY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/12/1999|
|LICENSEE: COLORADO ENGINEERING & INSTRUMENTATIO|NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:22[EST]|
| CITY: PHOENIX REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 11/11/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: AZ |EVENT TIME: 09:00[MST]|
|LICENSE#: AZ 7-457 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/12/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |LINDA SMITH R4 |
| |CATHERINE HANEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: AUBREY GODWIN (by fax) | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| STOLEN MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE. |
| |
| On 11/11/99, the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency was notified by |
| Colorado Engineering & Instrumentation Company that a Campbell Pacific MC |
| series nuclear moisture/density gauge (Serial number MC-90204820) containing |
| 10 millicuries of Cs-137 and 50 millicuries of Am-241 was stolen from a work |
| site at 34th Street and Gelding in Phoenix, AZ. The gauge was in its |
| shipping container. The Phoenix Police Department (Report number |
| 1999-91880807) is investigating the theft. The licensee is offering a |
| $500.00 reward for the return of the gauge. A press announcement of the |
| reward will be made on 11/12/99. |
| |
| The Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency is investigating the radiation |
| safety issues. |
| |
| The FBI (Phoenix), Mexico, and the States of California, Colorado, Nevada, |
| Utah, and New Mexico are being notified of this incident. |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for contact information.) |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36431 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: TEXAS DEPT OF HLTH BUR OF RAD CNTL |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/12/1999|
|LICENSEE: PRICE CONSTRUCTION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:52[EST]|
| CITY: LAREDO REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 11/11/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: TX |EVENT TIME: [CST]|
|LICENSE#: TX L05205 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/12/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |LINDA SMITH R4 |
| |ROBERT PIERSON NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: HELEN WATKINS | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TROXLER SOIL GAUGE STOLEN |
| |
| ON 11/11/99, A TROXLER MODEL-3430 SOIL GAUGE WAS STOLEN FROM PRICE |
| CONSTRUCTION AT A CONSTRUCTION SITE IN LAREDO, TX. THE GAUGE CONTAINED 8 |
| MILLICURIES OF Cs-137 AND 40 MILLICURIES OF Am-241. THE GAUGE WAS CHAINED |
| AND LOCKED IN THE BACK OF A PICKUP TRUCK PARKED BEHIND A CONSTRUCTION ROLLER |
| AT THE CONSTRUCTION SITE. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE REPORTED THE THEFT TO THE LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENT. THE |
| LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL |
| (FILE #I-7539) ON 11/12/99. |
| |
| (CALL THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR CONTACT INFORMATION.) |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36432 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FERMI REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/12/1999|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:34[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 11/12/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:08[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MILLER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/12/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MICHAEL PARKER R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AARC 50.72(b)(1)(v) OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N Y 97 Power Operation |97 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| BOTH SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEMS/EMERGENCY RESPONSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS |
| (SPDS/ERIS) WERE OUT OF SERVICE FOR LONGER THAN 8 HOURS. |
| |
| At 1008 on 11/12/99, both SPDS/ERIS systems failed. Maintenance activities |
| were ongoing at the time of failure. In accordance with site procedures, |
| SPDS/ERIS out of service for longer than 8 hours constitutes a loss of |
| emergency response capability. Efforts to restore both SPDS/ERIS systems to |
| service are in progress. |
| |
| This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(I)(v), any |
| event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. |
| |
| At 1823, one of the SPDS/ERIS systems was returned to service. The plant |
| did not enter any LCO action statement. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36433 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HOPE CREEK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/13/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:19[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 11/13/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:45[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: HOPE CREEK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/13/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DAN HOLODY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AARC 50.72(b)(1)(v) OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN 1 HOUR - |
| |
| DURING TESTING OF THE SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM, THE LICENSEE |
| DISCOVERED THAT THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM WAS INOPERABLE FOR LONGER |
| THAN 1 HOUR. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE PLANS TO NOTIFY THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Research Reactor |Event Number: 36434 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: UNIV OF MICHIGAN |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/13/1999|
| RXTYPE: 2000 KW POOL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:01[EST]|
| COMMENTS: |EVENT DATE: 11/13/1999|
| |EVENT TIME: [EST]|
| |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/13/1999|
| CITY: ANN ARBOR REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: WASHTENAW STATE: MI |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: R-28 AGREEMENT: N |MICHAEL PARKER R3 |
| DOCKET: 05000002 |LEDYARD (TAD) MARSH NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+TED MICHAELS PM |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BECKER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NINF INFORMATION ONLY | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE NO. 21 - REACTOR OPERATION IN VIOLATION OF TECHNICAL |
| SPECIFICATION 3.5, AIRBORNE EFFLUENTS |
| |
| This is a preliminary report to inform the Commission of a violation of |
| Technical Specifications 3.5.2.a and 3.5.2.b due to improper retest of the |
| Radiation Recorder. Due to an improper range setting, the Mobile Air |
| Particulate monitors (MAP) provided incorrect lower readings of Airborne |
| Effluent Concentration (AEC) for approximately 1 week. |
| |
| On 11/05/99, the Radiation Recorder was retested following repairs. The |
| retest consisted of a channel check of the Bridge Radiation Recorder and |
| verification of signals present on the remaining 9 channels. |
| |
| On 11/08/99, the reactor was placed into operation to perform core reloading |
| activities. |
| |
| On 11/09/99, the reactor was placed into operation to perform the remaining |
| portions of the core reloading and remained in operation at zero power. At |
| 1840, a reactor startup to 20 kW was performed for rod testing followed by |
| continued operation at 2 MW. |
| |
| On 11/11/99 at 1037, the health physics staff reported that during the |
| weekly checks of the MAPs, the indication in the control room was 25 - 30% |
| of the locally indicated count rates. A review by the Assistant Manager for |
| Operations and the Shift Supervisor concluded that the MAPs were operational |
| and that 24 hours were allowed for review of the operability determination. |
| |
| On 11/12/99 at 0738, the Reactor Manager was notified of the discrepancy |
| between the local and control room readings for the MAPs and, at 0900, |
| ordered a reactor shutdown. A review board reversed the operability |
| determination and determined that this incident is reportable as per |
| Technical Specification 6.6.2.a. |
| |
| Safety Implications: It has been determined that the pool floor MAP was |
| indicating one half the actual reading and that the stack MAP was indicating |
| one fifth the actual reading. In this condition, the AEC necessary to |
| exceed the alarm setpoint had been increased by a factor of two and five, |
| respectfully. These decreased indications and increased alarm set points |
| would have still allowed for the MAPs to notify the operator upon release of |
| a significant quantity of particulate radioactivity which would have |
| threatened to increase the yearly averaged AEC. The area radiation |
| monitoring system and gaseous activity detectors would have also provided |
| the operators an indication of a significant release. A review of the count |
| rates recorded showed that, during this period, the effluent from the |
| facility did not exceed the normal particulate release of less than 1% of |
| the AEC specified in 10 CFR Part 20. |
| |
| Corrective Action: The Radiation Recorder was repaired and fully channel |
| tested or channel checked. Review of this event is ongoing and will include |
| Reportable Occurrence No. 19, "Reactor Operation with In-Operable Alarm |
| Circuit on the Bridge Radiation Monitor." Further corrective actions will |
| be presented in the required followup report. Analysis of the isokinetic |
| sampling locations is in progress. |
| |
| The licensee considers this event to be significant due to its similarity |
| with Reportable Occurrence No 19. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36435 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOK REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/13/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:01[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 11/13/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:55[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRUCK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/13/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MICHAEL PARKER R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |LEDYARD (TAD) MARSH NRR |
|NINF INFORMATION ONLY |DAVIDSON IAT |
| |ROSANO IAT |
| |GAGNER PAO |
| |JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TWO INJURED PERSONNEL TRANSPORTED TO THE LOCAL HOSPITAL WITH GUNSHOT WOUNDS |
| |
| At 1055 on 11/13/99, the Shift Manager requested an off-site ambulance to |
| transport two people from the Cook Plant indoor rifle range to the Lakeland |
| Hospital. Local law enforcement personnel were using the Cook Plant indoor |
| rifle range when a weapon inadvertently discharged. The bullet ricocheted |
| off the concrete floor striking one person in the lower leg. A second |
| person was also hit in the leg by either a piece of the bullet or some |
| concrete debris. Responding Emergency Medical Technicians reported that the |
| injuries were not life threatening and that both officers were in good |
| spirits. |
| |
| The rifle range is located on Cook Plant controlled property, outside the |
| restricted area. The personnel involved, Benton Township Police Officers, |
| are not employees or contractors at the Cook Plant and do not have |
| unrestricted access. Michigan State Police are investigating this |
| accidental shooting. |
| |
| The Resident Inspector was notified. The licensee does not plan on a press |
| release at this time. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36436 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/13/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:39[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 11/13/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 11:45[EST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/13/1999|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |MICHAEL PARKER R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |ROBERT PIERSON NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SISLER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 4-HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE - VACUUM SWEEPER FIRE/LOSS OF ONE CONTROL |
| (GEOMETRY) |
| |
| At 1110 hours on 11-13-99, Emergency Forces responded to report of a vacuum |
| sweeper fire in X-326 Process Building. The Fire Department reported light |
| smoke in the area. Dry extinguishing agent was used to put out a smoldering |
| fire. The smoldering fire was verified extinguished at 1124 hours. There |
| was no activation of any safety system during this response. All air |
| samples were less than detection. |
| |
| At 1145 hours, during the air quality and radiological assessment, it was |
| reported to the incident Commander that a GP container failed on a favorable |
| Geometry Vacuum Cleaner. This constituted a loss of one control (geometry) |
| of NCSA PLANT012.A01. Interaction (spacing) was maintained throughout this |
| event. |
| |
| Initial assessment of the GP container attributes the failure to a chemical |
| reaction that occurred inside the container. All maintenance and cleanup |
| activities utilizing Favorable Geometry Vacuum Cleaners in X-326 Side Purge |
| have been stopped pending further evaluation. |
| |
| 1) Safety Significance of Events: |
| |
| The safety significance of this event is low. The GP container is a |
| favorable geometry container made of polyethylene. This container was less |
| than 1/2 full on a favorable geometry vacuum cleaner. The nominal |
| enrichment of the Side Purge piping is less than 10%, and the maximum |
| credible enrichment is 40% based on historical operation. The material in |
| the container reacted with moisture in the air. This reaction generated |
| heat which melted the container and caused the container to break into two |
| pieces. The spilling of a full GP container on to a concrete floor |
| reflected by a sprinkler discharge was analyzed by NCSE-PLANT 006.E03 and |
| found to be subcritical for up to 80% enriched optimally moderated |
| material. |
| |
| 2) Potential Criticality Pathways Involved (Brief scenario(s) of how |
| criticality could occur): |
| |
| The potential pathway to criticality is that a full container is spilled, |
| and then another container or piece of equipment is brought within 2 feet of |
| the spill. |
| |
| 3) Controlled Parameters (Mass, Moderation, Geometry, Concentration, |
| Etc.): |
| |
| The controlled parameters for this event are geometry and interaction. |
| |
| 4) Estimated Amount, Enrichment, Form of Licensed Material (include process |
| limit and % worst case of critical mass): |
| |
| The estimated amount of material is unknown, but the container was known to |
| be less then 1/2 full. The GP container dimensions are nominally 5 inches |
| inside diameter and 24 inches tall. The nominal enrichment of the Side |
| Purge piping is less than 10%, and the maximum credible enrichment is 40% |
| based on historical operation. |
| |
| 5) Nuclear Criticality Safety Control(s) or Control System(s) and |
| Description of Failures or Deficiencies: |
| |
| The material being vacuumed generated heat which melted the GP container |
| causing a failure of the geometry control spilling the fissile material on |
| to the floor. A spill from a full container has been shown by calculations |
| to be subcritical. The present configuration is a slab with no material |
| greater than an inch in depth. |
| |
| The NRC resident Inspector was notified. The Department of Energy |
| Representative will be notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36437 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: WAUPACA FOUNDRY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/13/1999|
|LICENSEE: WAUPACA FOUNDRY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:27[EST]|
| CITY: TELL CITY REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 11/13/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: IN |EVENT TIME: 15:30[CST]|
|LICENSE#: 48-15031-01 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/13/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |MICHAEL PARKER R3 |
| |ROBERT PIERSON NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GREUBEL | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NDAM DAMAGED GAUGE/DEVICE | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| TWO INDUSTRIAL GAUGES CONTAINING Cs -137 WERE OVERHEATED AT A FOUNDRY. |
| |
| THE WAUPACA FOUNDRY REPORTED THAT TWO TN TECHNOLOGIES MODEL-5200 DEVICES |
| CONTAINING 100 MILLICURIES OF Cs -137 PER DEVICE WERE OVERHEATED AT A |
| FOUNDRY. THESE DEVICES WERE MOUNTED 10' APART ABOVE ONE ANOTHER ON THE SIDE |
| OF A CUPOLA (A TALL SILO TYPE TANK WHICH IS USED TO MELT IRON). THE CAUSE |
| OF THE OVERHEATING OF THESE TWO GAUGES WAS CAUSED WHEN THE IGNITION SOURCE |
| FOR THE CUPOLA WAS INADVERTENTLY IGNITED WITHOUT COOLING IN PLACE FOR 3.5 |
| HOURS. THE CAUSE OF THIS COULD POSSIBLY BE DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR, BUT THEY |
| ARE STILL INVESTIGATING. THERE IS NO APPARENT DAMAGE TO THE SOURCE |
| CONTAINERS, BUT A SURVEYED @ 15' MEASURED 3.5 mR WHEN THE NORMAL READING IS |
| APPROXIMATELY 0.2 mR. THEY HAVE ISOLATED THE AREA AND HAVE CONTACTED THE |
| MANUFACTURER WHO IS SENDING A TEAM TO THE SITE. |
| |
| (CALL THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR CONTACT INFORMATION.) |
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