UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
(HELSINKI
COMMISSION) HOLDS HEARING: THE 2007 TURKISH ELECTIONS
JULY 26, 2007
COMMISSIONERS:
REP. ALCEE L. HASTINGS, D-FLA.,
CHAIRMAN
REP. LOUISE M. SLAUGHTER, D-N.Y.
REP. MIKE MCINTYRE,
D-N.C.
REP. HILDA L. SOLIS, D-CALIF.
REP. G.K. BUTTERFIELD,
D-N.C.
REP. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, R-N.J.
REP. ROBERT B.
ADERHOLT, R-ALA.
REP. MIKE PENCE, R-IND.
REP. JOSEPH R. PITTS,
R-PENN.
SEN. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, D-MD., CO-CHAIRMAN
SEN.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, D-CONN.
SEN. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, D-WIS.
SEN. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, D-N.Y.
SEN. JOHN F. KERRY, D-MASS.
SEN. SAM BROWNBACK, R-KAN.
SEN. GORDON H. SMITH, R-ORE.
SEN.
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, R-GA.
SEN. RICHARD BURR, R-N.C.
WITNESSES/PANELISTS:
REP. ROBERT WEXLER, D-FLA.
SONER CAGAPTAY,
DIRECTOR,
TURKISH RESEARCH COUNCIL,
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE
ILAN
BERMAN,
VICE PRESIDENT FOR POLICY,
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL
[The hearing was held at 10:00 a.m. in Room 2226 House Office
Building, Washington, D.C., Rep. Alcee
Hastings, moderating.]
[*]
HASTINGS: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I have a tradition of trying to
start our meetings on time,
and I can assure you my colleague, Congressman
Wexler, will be along very shortly.
Good morning again to you, and thank
you for your interest in this morning's briefing on the recent
parliamentary
elections in Turkey. Obviously, when Congressman Wexler arrives, I will allow
any statement that he
wishes to make to be made at that time. I'd like to
welcome our panel of speakers: Dr. Soner Cagaptay. Did I do
pretty good?
CAGAPTAY: Pretty good.
(LAUGHTER)
HASTINGS: I told him if he
hadn't told me how to say it, I was going to mess it up real bad. Dr. Cagaptay
is the director of the Turkish Research Council at the Washington Institute.
And we welcome Mr. Ilan Berman, the
vice president for policy at the
American Foreign Policy Council.
Before we begin this morning, I'd like to
express my disappointment at the State Department's refusal to
participate
at today's briefing. An invitation was extended to them in an effort to get the
administration's view
on the elections, and they declined the offer. The
excuse given to us, despite much evidence to the contrary, was
that the
State Department does not participate in public briefings.
Regardless, we
have an excellent panel, and I'm certain this will be an enlightening briefing.
As I already
mentioned, over the next few moments we're going to examine
Turkey's parliamentary elections of this past Sunday and
what it means for
the future of U.S.-Turkey relations.
I was pleased to see that Turkey held
successful elections which were decreed as free, fair and transparent.
With
80 percent of Turkey's 42 million eligible voters turning out to the polls on
Sunday, I would say that's a
successful election, and as an American
citizen, I'm quite a bit envious that we don't have that kind of turnout in
our country.
According to the OSCE's election assessment mission, the
electoral process in Turkey was characterized by
pluralism and a high level
of public confidence underscored by the transparent, professional and efficient
performance of the election administration.
I've had the good fortune
of working with several Turkish parliamentarians in election monitoring, and I
can
tell you that when they go about the world, they perform excellently;
therefore, I'm sure that their influence was
felt in this election.
Even though Turkey held successful elections, one cannot forget some of the
reasons for these elections
being held in the first place. On Sunday I was
reading an interesting article in the Washington Post that many of
you may
have read entitled, and I quote, "Islamic Attire Dominates Debate Before Turkish
Vote," end of quote, where
a very poignant statement was made in the opening
of the article which said, "It's the head scarf, stupid."
The article goes
on to say -- I would quarrel with the author; it's always the economy, stupid,
but anyway
-- that "if it weren't for a three-foot square piece of fabric,
sometimes black and stark -- more often fancy or
lacy or rosy pink or
flowery -- Turkey's 42 million voters wouldn't be going to the polls." That's
what the article
says.
This argument, I believe, is going to be a
continuing challenge for Turkey as the Justice and Development
Party works
to find a peaceful balance between the Islamic and secular establishment.
I'd also note the rising tensions between Turkey and the Kurds in northern Iraq
where currently significant
amounts of troops are amassed along the
southeastern border. This is a very tenuous situation and could be
potentially a problem for U.S.-Turkish relations and stability in that region.
It's my great hope, and I believe it
will allow, that calmer heads will
prevail and that the tensions will ease.
Finally, Prime Minister Erdogan
has accomplished a great deal for Turkey's democracy. The first time I went
to Turkey, Prime Minister Erdogan was the mayor of Istanbul, and he did some
rather remarkable things during that
tenure. He has pursued a pro-business
agenda, which can be seen in Turkey's thriving economy, as well as continuing
to push for Turkey's membership into the European Union.
The prime
minister came from Germany at 4:00 in the morning for a meeting with me when I
was last there, and
he had been in Germany to receive a prize and at the
very same time had been told what Turkey's ascension to the
EU's
possibilities were.
What I said to him then is what I say to you now, and
that is tomorrow is today on that subject for me, and
that entry into the
European Union should be expedited. And I've also told many of my European
colleagues and my
American counterparts the same thing.
I believe that
these are all positive steps in a correct and right direction, and I look
forward to
continuing a dialogue with our Turkish partners in an effort to
strengthen this historic partnership that we've
shared over the past 50
years.
I'm going to turn the floor over to my distinguished colleague and
partner from Florida. Congressman
Wexler's and my districts abut each other
in the area that we represent, and we also are great friends of Turkey.
And
when we are not in our districts sometimes we are in Turkey. I've been there
nine times. I think Robert has
been there 99 times, but not quite as many.
Ladies and gentlemen, Robert Wexler.
WEXLER: Thank you very much,
especially to Chairman Hastings.
I just want to offer what I think is the
obvious observation that there is no one in this Congress, no one
in the
United States government -- on the elected side, at least -- that has spent more
time and effort and devotion
to engaging Turkey from the point of view of
enhancing American-Turkish relations. And there is no one who is more
expert on these matters than Chairman Hastings, and I thank him very much for
permitting me the opportunity of
speaking this morning.
Chairman
Hastings and others, I want to join you, along with many in the American public,
in expressing our
heartfelt congratulations to the Turkish people for
conducting a model election last Sunday. It was evident to
observers of the
election that the Turkish electorate unequivocally expressed its support for
strengthening Turkey's
democracy and for continuing down a path toward full
membership of the European Union.
I especially want to congratulate Prime
Minister Erdogan, Deputy Prime Minister Gul, and the Justice and
Development
Party, who increased their vote total from I believe what was 34 percent in the
2002 parliamentary
elections to 46 percent last Sunday and will now be
called upon to form a new government.
Recognition should also be given to
all of the Turkish political parties who participated on Sunday,
including
the CHP and the MHP, who will join the AKP, along with I believe it's two dozen
independently elected
candidates in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
It is clear that many Turkish voters, despite political tensions in April, by
and large gravitated to the
AKP's policies that have led to record economic
growth, as Chairman Hastings pointed out. Passage of difficult
economic and
political reform measures necessary for EU membership and willingness to raise
the sensitive issue of
the role of Islam in Turkey is part of a public
dialogue.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the current government's
policies, it is apparent that they have
represented the will of a great many
Turkish citizens -- at times to the chagrin of some American policy-makers.
This development has greatly diminished a debilitating political disconnect that
has existed between Turkey's
leaders and her population.
Chairman
Hastings spoke about visits to Turkey. My first visit to Turkey, and
particularly in Istanbul, was
in 1999. My primary impression when visiting
Turkey for the first time and meeting with a large group of young
entrepreneurs -- young men and women who were educated, patriotic Turkish
citizens who wanted very much to be a part
of an explosive economy, that
very much wanted to take Turkey's democracy to the next step, to the next level
-- and
the emotion and the impression that I learned was that I had never
been in a country in 1999 that I felt there was
such an extraordinary
disconnect between the population and the government.
And it wasn't a
political partisan divide. It was the fact that many patriotic Turks did not
identify with
their own government and with the objectives of their own
government. It baffled me at the time.
But Sunday's elections, Mr.
Chairman, reinforced the fact that whether one here in America may agree or
disagree with Prime Minister Erdogan or with Deputy Minister Gul or with any of
the individuals that are leading the
government, it is clear that Prime
Minister Erdogan represents a significantly large measure of the public will in
Turkey.
And that needs to be respected, and I would argue even
congratulated, because it is only when in a democracy
the majority of people
feel as if the government in fact responds to the public will that in fact
democracy will
flourish. I think it is an opportunity for the
American-Turkish relationship to be enhanced, to grow stronger,
understanding that at times there will be different positions and different
views.
The only NATO country bordering Syria, Iraq and Iran, Turkey has
hundreds of its troops on the ground in
Lebanon, maintains a strong
relationship with Israel -- an extremely important relationship -- and it is an
essential component of the east-west energy corridor, providing America and
Europe with a critical alternative
energy supply route, other than gas and
oil coming from the volatile Middle East and Russia.
Furthermore, Turkish
cooperation is essential for our troops in Iraq. A substantial majority of the
military assets used by American troops are flown into Turkey and then
transported to Iraq. For example, 74 percent
of air cargo into Iraq
transits through the Incirlik Air Base.
And I would respectfully point out
for all of us here in the Congress and in the American public -- whether
you
agree with the president's position in Iraq or whether you disagree, as I do and
Chairman Hastings does -- that
we need to understand that as we begin -- and
I believe -- to swiftly remove our troops from Iraq in a responsible
way the
very pivotal role that Turkey will play to enable the most efficient and safe
redeployment of our troops in
Iraq.
And it's not just Iraq. Even in
Afghanistan an enormous percentage of the resources, the assets, the
munitions that ultimately go to our troops in Afghanistan and NATO's troops in
Afghanistan travel through Turkey.
This relationship and this cooperation,
particularly at a time when our troops are in the field in Iraq and
Afghanistan, should never be underestimated.
I'm confident that Prime
Minister Erdogan's government will continue to be deeply involved in bringing
stability to Afghanistan and will continue to oppose Iran's nuclear weapons
program. To this end I urge Prime
Minister Erdogan's government to
reconsider expanding its energy relationship with Iran at a time when the United
States and Europe are seeking to isolate Iran over its dangerous nuclear
aspirations.
Despite the high level cooperation between the United States
and Turkey, it's undeniable that relations have
been strained at times.
Most alarmingly, a recent Pew poll indicates that only 9 percent of Turks have a
favorable
opinion of the United States. Incredibly, that is down from 12
percent in last year's Pew poll. That same Pew poll
suggests that 77
percent of Turks see the United States as a potential military threat to their
country.
I don't doubt the findings in the poll; I'm sure they're
accurate. But I know that every time I visit
Turkey, there even is a
disconnect between the poll numbers and when you meet individual Turks. And
when they ask
you where you're from and you say the United States, and
oftentimes in limited English, they'll say, "Good, good.
United States.
Good."
Well, sometimes I think -- and Chairman Hastings, I think you have
the same impression -- we can learn more
from cab drivers in a country than
you can from any polls, good as they may be. And every time I step into a cab
or
step into a cafe or just to get a cup of coffee in Turkey, it's almost
the same reaction. "Where are you from?"
"The United States." And there's
always -- at least in my experience -- a positive initial reaction on a
people-to-people level.
What I think these polls are showing -- and I
don't doubt, again, their accuracy -- is a disconnect between
the Turkish
people and what they perceive to be the political and governmental goals of the
United States. That's
something that should never be underestimated in its
importance, but I think it needs to be put into perspective.
Mr. Chairman,
the greatest challenge facing the United States and Turkey is the chaos ensuing
in Iraq and
the ongoing violence perpetrated by the Kurdistan Workers Party,
the PKK, which is engaged in horrific acts of
violence. Since only 2004,
the PKK has killed and injured more than 1,500 people in Turkey.
Given
America's leading role in Iraq, there is undoubtedly a perception in Turkey that
America has not done
enough to remove the threat of the PKK terrorists whom
we know are based in northern Iraq. And while it might be
difficult for
Americans to admit that, the truth of the matter is the Turkish people have a
good point. They're
right. The United States hasn't done enough to mitigate
the threat from the PKK.
I share the people's frustration with what
appears to be America's inaction at times and the pains felt by
the Turkish
people as a result of the PKK terror. To this end it is critical that the
United States, Iraqi leaders
and Iraqi Kurdish regional leaders do more to
address the PKK threat.
While I strongly support the appointment of
General Ralston as the PKK special coordinator by the Bush
administration,
and I believe he is exceptionally qualified and exceptionally committed to
addressing the issue and
he was kind enough to testify at the Europe
subcommittee and gave a very strong presentation recently, I think it is
still undeniable that while the United States largely occupies stretches of area
with our military in Iraq, we have
not done enough to mitigate the PKK
threat.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, Turkey's historical elections and
democratic progress presents an opportunity
-- I believe, a very wonderful
opportunity -- for the United States to renew its relationship with Turkey.
While
Turkish parliamentarians still must go through a political process to
choose a new president in the coming weeks, it
is incumbent on the United
States to embrace our longstanding ally and create the conditions that will lead
to
continued dialogue and cooperation between our two companies.
And
if I may say one other thing, in one of my more recent visits to Turkey, I think
at times there's a
discrepancy between America's global interests and what
Turkey perceives to be her regional interests. And while
allies can agree
to disagree civilly, and that is fair and legitimate, I also think that those
who are so interested
in Turkey in this country should give great
credibility and hope to the aspirations of Turkish regional policy.
I may
not always agree with the individual direction that Turkey may be taking in her
regional policy, but
if you look at it from a broader perspective, a Middle
East -- Iraq, Iran, Syria -- that is more influenced by
Turkey rather than
Iran or rather than ultimately Saudi Arabia or rather than extreme Islamic
thought and ideology,
a region that is more influenced by Turkey must
unconditionally be in the better interests of the United States,
even though
we don't absolutely agree with whatever direction Turkey may be advocating in
that precise moment.
Turkey is a democratic, moderate, secular country
where a majority of the citizens believe in the Muslim
faith, and to the
degree that that nation can enhance its relations with America, move closer to
Europe and play a
more prominent role in a very volatile region, by
definition that is good for America. And it's also good for our
closest
ally there, Israel. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for permitting me to
testify.
HASTINGS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Tell us how you
really feel.
(LAUGHTER)
I'd like to take this opportunity to recognize
-- and if she wishes, to have her make any comments -- a
member of the
Helsinki Commission who recently was elected vice chair of the second basket in
the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe's Parliamentary
Assembly. I used to be the president of the Organization for
Security in
Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, and I always say if you can say that, you ought
to be president. But
please welcome to our hearing Hilda Solis.
Hilda, if you'd just stand and be recognized -- we appreciate you being here.
Thank you, and I recognize
it's an extremely busy day for all of us. I hope
you can stay as long as you can, but we certainly understand if
you must
leave.
I would invite also our staffers who are standing on the wall to
take these. If other persons come, then
you might relieve yourselves rather
than continue to stand and make yourselves tired.
Our first witness at our
briefing is Dr. Soner Cagaptay. He is a senior fellow and director of the
Washington Institute's Turkish Research Council.
Dr. Cagaptay has written
extensively on U.S.-Turkish relations, Turkish domestic politics and Turkish
nationalism, publishing in scholarly journals such as Middle East Quarterly,
Middle Eastern Studies, and Nations and
Nationalism. He frequently writes
commentary in major international print media, including many in the America
media, Voice of America and BBC as well.
He's a historian by training and
wrote his doctoral dissertation at Yale University on Turkish nationalism,
has taught courses at Yale and Princeton on the Middle East, Mediterranean and
Eastern Europe and his spring 2003
course on modern Turkish history was the
first offered by Yale in three decades.
Dr. Cagaptay is a recipient of
numerous honors, grants and chairs, among them the Smith-Richardson, Mellon,
Wright, and Leylan fellowships, as well as the Ertegun chair at Princeton. He
also serves as chair of the Turkey
Advanced Area Studies Program at the
State Department Foreign Service Institute.
Dr. Cagaptay, you have the
floor.
CAGAPTAY: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the commission
for inviting me to appear at this very
timely and important hearing on
Turkey after the elections.
What I'd like to do for the sake of our
discussion today in our briefing is to focus on two issues --
mainly,
Turkish domestic politics after the elections and Turkish electoral relations
after the elections.
In terms of Turkish domestic politics following last
Sunday's elections, I share -- Congressman Wexler is
not here any more --
his adulation for the Turkish democracy. After all, this is a case of a liberal
secular
democracy in a predominantly Muslim country, and yet we have seen
another smooth transition, despite much domestic
political turbulence in
Turkey last May.
So it does indeed look like as yet another case of the
democracies that we know around the world. And I
should also add that it
looks like all of these democracies -- indeed, our democracy already as well --
because the
electorate seems to be split in the middle. While 47 percent of
the population voted for the ruling party, 37
percent voted for opposition
secular leftist nationalists. So indeed it is important for us to watch Turkish
politics in the days coming ahead.
In this regard, with the country
being split into two opposing political views, I think the election outcome
is probably the best outcome in terms of political stability, because what we
see is that the ruling party, AKP,
emerged with 340 seats in the 500-member
parliament.
That means they can form a stable, lasting government, and in
Turkish politics, generally, single-party
governments have done much better
than coalition governments. We've seen examples of that in the 90s both in
terms
of economic performance as well as in terms of reform, so that's quite
promising for Turkey.
Another reason why I think the election results
promise stability is because the party, although it has
emerged with 340
seats in the 550-seat parliament, does not have the majority needed to elect the
next president.
The first mandate, the first job of the parliament is to
elect the president.
In the Turkish system, the president, who has limited
powers -- the chief executive is the prime minister --
is elected in the
parliament. There is a two-thirds majority that's required for electing the
president, and the
AKP is short of that majority, so that actually puts the
AKP in the position of having to seek for a consensus
candidate, a
compromise candidate.
And I think the outcome is therefore the best
outcome in terms of short-term political stability, because on
the one hand
you have a stable government and on the other hand, you have the need for this
government to talk to
the opposition to find the consensus candidate.
So hopefully, the two camps of the Turkish political spectrum, the AKP camp and
the nationalist secular
camp, will have to seek a compromise candidate,
bridging the gap of Turkish politics.
Having said this, I think what we're
also facing is a new Turkish government, therefore, one with a popular
mandate -- a landslide popular mandate, indeed -- which opens up the avenue for
a new phase in the U.S.-Turkish
relationship.
So in the second part of
my testimony here, I'd like to look at the likely course of the U.S.-Turkish
relationship over the next year. And in this regard, the issue I'd like to
focus at is the issue that I think is
most important for our bilateral ties
today, the issue of PKK, also known as Kurdistan Workers Party, a group that
is currently carrying out attacks inside Turkey, but also from its bases in
northern Iraq, an issue that now I think
cannot be ignored anymore in the
sense that it has become the most important factor shaping the course of
U.S.-Turkish relationship.
In fact, I think the picture on the PKK is
bigger than that. It's not just about U.S.-Turkish relationship.
I think
the PKK indeed brings not only Turkey and the U.S., but also Iraq and Iran
together. And I'd like to
explain that a little bit, but before that some
background on what this organization is about.
The PKK emerged as a group
carrying out terror attacks inside Turkey in the 1980s. This was the background
of the Cold War, and it was supported by at that time the Soviet Union,
which felt Turkey would face the Soviet
Union at its southern flank, the
south border of the Soviet Union, with anger.
And I think one of the
reasons the Soviet Union supported the PKK was because this was the Cold War and
Turkey not only neighbored the Soviet Union, but with the exception of
Norway north of the Arctic Circle, Turkey was
the only country that actually
bordered the Soviet Union from NATO.
So you can imagine the importance of
that country for strategic and intelligence purposes. And you can
imagine
how much that would anger the Soviets and what it could mean to destabilize this
country.
The PKK then emerged as a group with Soviet patronage based in
Syria with training camps in Lebanon, a
client state of a client state -- in
other words Lebanon being a client state of Syria and Syria being a client
state of the Soviet Union. The attacks continued into the 90s.
After the
end of communism, though, the PKK switched to a nationalist ideology and used
some other
opportunities to carry out attacks into Turkey from other
countries in that region. It based itself at that time in
Iran. Iran
provided the PKK with a number of camps, and it became a haven of anti-Turkish
activity.
That all made sense within the context of Iranian and Turkish
regimes. If you think of them, Iran and
Turkey are neighboring countries,
but they are also almost diametrically opposed regimes. One is a democracy and
secular; the other one is a theocracy and an authoritarian regime. And I
think, therefore, Iran's efforts to use
the PKK as a destabilizing factor
were also important in this regard for its support for PKK.
The United
States at this time, I think, saw the PKK not only as an issue of terror, but
also as a way of
fighting a successful public diplomacy to win Turkey's
heart.
There was much American support extended to Turkey in this period
against the PKK -- intelligence and what
have you -- but the most important
step came in the late 1990s when, according to reports, the United States helped
Turkey capture the leader of PKK, Abdullah Ocalan. He was captured after a
long chase across Europe after he was
kicked out of Syria following Turkish
pressures and sent to jail.
And this, I think, is an important event for
us to look at, because it also tells us how the PKK behaves
today. Ocalan's
elimination did not mean the elimination of the membership of this entire group,
but yet it
crippled the group's ability to hurt Turkey.
The PKK is
what I call an old generation of terror groups in the sense that it's very
hierarchical. It's
top-down, and it's leadership-based, unlike the new
generation terror groups such as Al Qaida, which are horizontal,
cell-based
and can do autonomous stuff without necessarily having to be an organic link
with the quote-unquote
"leadership."
The PKK is very different. Its
leadership is fundamental to the way it acts, because it is, as I said
earlier, basically a Marxist-Leninist group with Maoist legacy, which means the
cult of the leadership is
fundamentally important.
Ocalan, therefore,
was the brain of the organization, finding the PKK refuge and safe haven and
guns and
allies and money, and his capture meant that the brain of the
organization was taken out, despite the fact that the
body was still there.
And the PKK, as a result of that, declared a unilateral cease-fire, pulled most
of its
members out of Turkey, and Turkey went into a period of quiet for the
first time since the mid-1980s.
What this meant for Turkey was a dramatic
improvement in its human rights record. Now that there was no
more fighting
and terror attacks, the country was able to discuss issues that had been
considered taboo, and it
started debating the issue of what to do with Kurds
and their demands.
This came at the same time with the start of Turkey's
EU accession process. It became a possibility in 1999
when the EU declared
that Turkey would be treated as other candidate countries that submitted
applications, and it
became more of a reality in 2002 and 2004 when the EU
started gradually accession talks with the country.
That was the chief
driving factor behind the reforms of liberalization and further democratic
consolidation.
But the EU factor being a catalyst, I think the landmark
event, the watershed event was the capture of Ocalan. It
opened up
political space in Turkey that had not existed before. It made the incredible
amount of reforms possible.
Issues that would have been considered
taboo became possible to discuss in Turkish media. In fact, as a
result of
that, no taboos remained in Turkish media. And finally, the much-publicized
reforms under Kurds,
including broadcasting in Kurdish language, became
possible, as well as education in Kurdish became possible.
All of that
took place within the background of the peace and quiet after the PKK's leader
was captured and
the organization was so crippled that it basically went
inactive. That lasted until 2004.
Since 2004 we have seen the PKK
resuming its old behavior, and hence, it is now posing challenges once again
not only to Turkey, but also to U.S.-Turkish relationship, because the PKK is
acting out of northern Iraq, which is
technically under American control.
So it has actually now become part of U.S.-Turkish relationship in ways that it
was not.
The PKK's resort to violence has caused a massive amount of
casualties, according to State Department's
Country Report on Terrorism --
last year's report. Its violence caused 600 casualties last year, and not a day
goes
that you hear news of yet more Turks killed by this group and its
terror attacks.
And as a result of that, the political atmosphere in the
country looks more like the 1990s now than like the
period between 1999 and
2004 when there was no violence and much was done in terms of political reform.
So I think
in this sense the organization's comeback has had a negative
impact on Turkey's democratic liberalization and
consolidation, though it
has not stopped the process.
But the second impact of the PKK, before I
wrap up, is to look at this regional picture that I suggested
existed
earlier. It's how the PKK brings Turkey, Iran, Iraq and the United States
together.
Now we have all looked at how the PKK should bring Turkey and
the United States together, because the PKK is
active in northern Iraq.
From the Turkish perspective, this is American territory and whether or not
people allow
this kind of activity to happen, the fact that it is taking
place is making a lot of Turks very angry.
Congressman Wexler referred
earlier to shades of anti-Americanism in Turkey, and I think the most
significant driving factor of that anti-Americanism is exactly this issue that
there are attacks being carried out
from northern Iraq.
And what is
more important is that in the war on terror the PKK is an important factor in
the way the Turks
look on the war on terror, because their view is that the
Turks help the United States in the war on terror in
places such as
Afghanistan.
Turkey has twice held the leadership of the International
Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, but they
don't get any kind of
support or help against the PKK themselves from the United States, which is also
a terror
problem.
So from the Turkish perspective for many Turks that
you talk to on the street -- cab drivers -- you get the
view that they think
there are two standards. Al Qaida is a terror problem, but the PKK is not, and
they can't
quite understand why that is the case, given un-forthcoming U.S.
action against the PKK.
That's not where it stops, unfortunately. There
is also the issue of how the PKK is in a way poisoning
Turkish-Iraqi
relations -- more importantly, Turkish-Iraqi-Kurdish relations. Because the
group is based in
northern Iraq and because it's been active in northern
Iraq, attacking from that area into Turkey, this has also cut
into Turkey's
ability to develop better ties -- political, especially, with the Iraqi Kurds.
The two large Kurdish parties, KDP and PUK, are largely pro-Western and
secular parties, so they would be
Turkey's natural allies. Yet we can't see
that kind of an alliance forming, because it's a fact that the PKK
functions
in northern Iraq (inaudible) are attacks into Turkey, and I think from the U.S.
perspective, what could be
an alliance of two U.S. allies is therefore not
coming forth because of this thorn that is there in their
relationship that
needs to be taken out.
There is otherwise a thriving, booming economic
relationship between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds. Turkey's
investments in
northern Iraq are supposed to be in a range of $3 billion -- that's investments,
not trade. If you
add trade, it's at a bigger number. And yet what is
preventing a thriving economic relationship from turning into a
good
political relationship is the PKK issue, which has been around and been
simmering for a long time.
There's a third issue, which I think is even
more important, and it's how the PKK issue also brings Iran
into the
picture. We're much familiar with how it's poisoned Turkey's relations with
Iraqi Kurds and the United
States, but not necessarily this third point. I
think this should be emphasized as well.
Iran, ironically, which supported
the PKK and provided it with camps in the 1990s, is now the country that's
fighting the PKK. And Iran's change of behavior is not because it likes Turkey
suddenly or it feels sympathies for
Turkey's secular democracy or it has
changed its internal attitudes toward Turkey, but I think it sees that there's
an opportunity for it to use the PKK as a matter of public diplomacy. And I
use "public diplomacy" in quotation
marks. It's not exactly public
diplomacy, but it's what's being done.
Iranians have realized that, given
un-forthcoming U.S. action against PKK, many Turks are very angry with
the
United States, and that anger remains there. They've also realized that this is
an area for them where they can
actually step in and carry out actions
against the PKK and win the Turks' hearts. And this is exactly what they're
doing.
Since 2004 -- and this is when the Iranians changed their minds;
exactly when the PKK started violence again
and the Iranians realized that
this was an avenue for them to make inroads into Turkish public opinion --
Iranians
not only stopped supporting the PKK -- in other words, they had
driven out PKK camps that existed in their territory
since the mid-1990s --
but they also started actively fighting PKK both in Iran and inside northern
Iraq, according
to media reports.
It is ironic that every time -- and
this is something I've sort of made a habit of watching -- the U.S.
State
Department says the right things on how we are together with Turks in the
fighting of the PKK and we will
deliver security, promising the right
things, that same day the Iranians bomb PKK camps.
So this is how you read
the news in the Turkish press: front page, big headlines "Iranians Have Bombed
PKK
Camps" - 12th page, one column, "The U.S. has said they'll support
against the PKK." And I think in this regard
Iranians, to use a term, walk
the walk and they make it as if the Americans are only talking the talk. And
that's a
huge problem.
If you look at the recent Pew Center poll that
was mentioned, around 64 percent of the Turks now regard the
United States
as a problematic country, I think, largely because of the PKK issue. And guess
the number of Iranians
who have the same attitude: 6 percent.
So
this, I think, is a huge wedge issue right now. It is driving not only a wedge
between Turkey and the
United States, but it's also bringing Turkey and Iran
quite closely together.
Before I finish, Mr. Chairman, what I'd like to do
is look at what ought to be done as a policy-maker. I
think action against
the PKK at this stage is absolutely a must. It is no more a suggestion, in the
sense that now
there's a new government in Turkey.
I think it is
possible for any government to open a new page in their relationship, both on
bilateral ties,
but also for Turkish public perception, and this is the
right moment, the opportune moment for the United States to
take action
against the PKK.
If such action cannot be taken by the United States,
there are many other ways of carrying that out,
including through the Iraqi
Kurds, who have much to benefit from better relations with Turkey. In fact, the
PKK
exists in areas of responsibility of the Iraqi Kurds, so it would be
ultimately their task to decide what they could
do with this organization,
given their resources and their policy options.
But it would not only
improve their relations with Turkey, but it would also improve Turkey's
relationship
with the United States. And it would also stop the PKK from
being a wedge issue between Turkey and Iran.
So I think at this stage the
most rational policy suggestion, given how things are on the ground, is that
the Iraqi Kurds should take a more active and personal interest in the PKK
problem. It's not something they can
avoid anymore. It is actually an
issue that would bring them much closer to Turkey than anybody can imagine.
I would like to stop here with this brief expose. I know there are many issues
to be discussed later on. I
believe my colleague will go into some of those
questions. But I think this is an opportune moment for the new
phase in
Turkish-U.S. relations with a new government. And I'll now submit the floor to
my colleague.
HASTINGS: Thank you very much. And before going to Mr.
Berman, I would say to the media and our audience
that when Mr. Berman
finishes, in the tradition of the briefings, we will turn to the media for any
questions that
might be put, and then to the audience. And we would invite
our witnesses to be responsive to them, if they will.
Ilan Berman is vice
president for policy of the American Foreign Policy Council. He's an expert on
regional
security in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Russian
Federation. He's consulted for both the United States
Central Intelligence
Agency and the United States Department of Defense and provided assistance on
foreign policy
and national security issues to a range of governmental
issues.
He is a frequent guest on radio and television and lots of
writings and publications. He is the author of
"Tehran Rising: Iran's
Challenge to the United States" and co-editor with Michael Waller of
"Dismantling Tyranny:
Transitioning Beyond Totalitarian Regimes."
Mr.
Berman, you have the floor.
BERMAN: Thank you very much. And let me just
start by thanking you, Chairman Hastings, and thanking the
members of the
commission for holding this briefing and inviting both myself and my colleague,
Dr. Cagaptay, to come
speak before you.
This is, I think, a very
important time. Without rehashing too much of what's been said before, I think
this is a very important time, because the Turkish elections set the stage
for what could potentially be a new
conversation between Washington and
Ankara on security issues, on domestic issues. It's not the end of the
conversation; it's the start of one.
And I think it's worthwhile to walk
through, first, some general observations about the election and also,
then,
the issues that are unresolved, that are upcoming.
First of all, this was
arguably the most anticipated and the most controversial election in Turkish
recent
history. The results of that vote as a direct correlation have very
serious implications, both for the future
disposition of Turkish domestic
politics and also for the state of the relationship between the United States
and
Turkey.
By any yardstick, the outcome of the election was a major
victory for the Justice and Development Party, the
AKP, and a serious blow
to the country's secularist forces. The AKP swept to power in 2002 with 34
percent of the
electoral vote. They widened that lead by 12 percent and
secured 340 or 341 seats in the country's 550-seat
parliament.
This
growing popularity, I think, should be seen as a barometer of what's going in
Turkish society as a
whole. Last year's Pew Poll attitude survey found that
close to half of Turks now identify themselves as primarily
Muslim, and that
is up from just a third of those people polled when the AKP took power in 2002.
And as such, the
AKP's growing popularity is a good barometer of what's
going on within Turkish society as a whole.
Whether you like it or not,
this is a trend that's taking place within Turkish politics. It's very hard to
fight it. In fact, we shouldn't fight it. The AKP election is, therefore, a
logical evolution.
The strong showing that they had in the polls, though,
doesn't mean that there are no constraints to their
rule. To the contrary,
the significant gains by two other political factions -- the Cumhuriyet
Republican People's
Party and the Conservative National Movement Party, CHP
and MHP, respectively -- mean that the AKP will now face
greater opposition
within the parliament than it did previously.
It's useful to remember that
as part of Turkey's parliamentary system, there is a 10 percent threshold that
parties have to reach, have to cross in order to have representation in the
parliament. In 2002 during the
elections, there was only one party, the
CHP, that crossed that threshold along with the AKP.
Today there are at
least two additional ones, and there's also a smattering of independent
candidates that
gained representation by circumventing that requirement and
by running as independents. And the AKP will now have
to deal with these
added variables.
These are more variables that are in play in the internal
political discourse in the parliament today than
there were previously. And
as such, I second Dr. Cagaptay's assertion that this is actually a formula for
stability. What you want is checks and balances. And you have the more
possibility counter-intuitively, of course,
but you have more chance for
checks and balances now with the AKP garnering more popular support than you did
before
in 2002.
But if the AKP was the biggest beneficiary of Sunday's
poll, the biggest loser was, of course, the country's
military itself. It's
useful to remember that back in April the Turkish General Staff ignited a
national political
firestorm when it issued a not so subtle warning to the
AKP that it was still willing, as it had in the past on
several occasions,
to intervene in the country's political process to restore secularism.
And
that ignited a fierce national debate over the country's future political
direction that dovetailed very
nicely with the AKP's victory. And as such,
the fact that the AKP chartered very substantial gains in Sunday's
election
-- gains that exceeded even the assumptions of the most optimistic of observers
-- should be interpreted at
least in part as a backlash to the military's
political interference.
It was simply a not so subtle slap on the wrist to
the Turkish General Staff. Essentially, business as
usual is not business
anymore. You can't carry out the same sort of politics that you did before.
So, as I said, this isn't the end of the discussion; this is just the
beginning of a different one. And
here it's useful to talk about issues
that are going to be, I think, decisive both in the internal context and the
external one, vis-a-vis the United States in the near term. There are a lot of
them, but I'll focus on six.
The first is the question of the Turkish
president. The Turkish presidency is actually not comparable to
the
presidency in other parliamentary democracies. The Turkish presidency is a
major center of power. It has the
ability to appoint cabinet officials, to
draft laws and convene referendums. And as such, it is a very attractive
political prize.
Back in May, Prime Minister Erdogan floated a package of
constitutional reforms that attempted to seize
control of that office by
submitting it to a public vote to have the public directly elect the president,
rather
than the current process in which the parliament elects the
president. That proposal was quickly vetoed by the
sitting president, Ahmet
Sezer, who deemed that there was no justifiable or acceptable reason for such a
step.
But the issue is not settled. The proposed measures were referred
to the constitutional court, and now
there's a referendum scheduled for
October 21st, when it is expected to pass handily.
There's an expectation
that the transformation of the president's office from a parliamentary elected
to a
popular elected office is going to be approved, come that referendum in
October.
And that creates a situation where the political contest over
this office may be mooted now -- there's
obviously going to be some back and
forth between the AKP and the CHP and the MHP over a compromise candidate; one
hopes there will be anyway -- but the political contest over this is not over.
If this referendum passes, which we think it will, there will be a renewed
political contest over the
position of the president between Islamist and
secularist forces within the Turkish body polity.
The second issue that
should be of concern is the issue of what's been called stealth Islamization.
Since
it took office in late 2002, the Islamist AKP has been accused by many
of attempting to orchestrate a creeping coup
against Turkey's established
secular order.
Now, the AKP is fully aware of this controversial image,
and it's trying very hard to shed it. Ahead of
Sunday's poll, it took pains
to enlist and then to run a number of candidates that were not religious --
demonstrably so -- as a way of muting its Islamist credentials.
And since
the election, Prime Minister Erdogan has been quick to announce his commitment
to preserving
secularism. But as a practical matter, the track record of
the last several years in which we've seen a concerted
assault against
secular institutions, including the military, including the judiciary, including
the media, provides
a fairly deep-seated impulse on the part of the AKP to
erase the dividing lines between mosque and state.
Now this is, as
Congressman Wexler said, an internal discussion. We certainly can have opinions
about it,
but it's ultimately for the Turks to decide.
But where it
becomes significant for the U.S. is that the outcome of Sunday's election was it
would be hard
to see it as anything other than a popular endorsement of this
policy. And as a result, the Islamization drive can
be expected to expand
and strengthen in the months and years ahead, with all sorts of implications for
Turkey's role
as a partner of the United States.
The third and related
issue is the upsurge in anti-American and anti-Semitic sentiment that you've
seen in
Turkey over the last several years. In the latest global attitude
survey, as Congressman Wexler said, only 9
percent of Turks polled expressed
positive views of the United States.
Now, in 2002, right around the time
when the AKP first took power, the number of Turks that expressed
positive
views of the United States was at around 43 percent. This doesn't mean that the
AKP is causally involved
in this decline. Obviously, the situation in Iraq
has a pretty big role to play, but the AKP can be said to be
complicit in it
for a couple of reasons.
First of all, party officials have studiously
avoided speaking out publicly in favor of either the United
States or
Israel, even while they conduct diplomatic and strategic contacts behind the
scenes. And they also fail
to curb the growing anti-American and
anti-Semitic invective that emanates from the country's Islamic center, that
center of the country's media over which the AKP has a fairly substantial amount
of power and leverage.
So the AKP has tended to -- if the question is, as
Soner said, walking the walk and talking the talk -- the
AKP has walked the
walk very quietly away from the scenes, but they haven't talked the talk about
partnership with
the United States or about partnership with Israel. They
have studiously avoided the opportunity to do so.
The fourth issue is an
eastward tilt that we've seen in Turkish foreign policy. Now, anybody who's
been to
Turkey knows that Turkish officials and politicians talk all the
time about the issue of strategic debt, about the
fact that as a result of
Turkey's geopolitical orientation and strategic geography, Turkey needs to look
both east
and west.
As a practical matter, though, the AKP has shown a
clear preference for looking to the east rather than to
the west. Since
taking office in 2002, under the guise of what they've called a quote, unquote
"independent foreign
policy," Ankara has drifted towards accommodation with
traditional rivals in the Middle East like Syria and Iran and
at the same
time has shown a considerable cooling of its ties with both Europe and the
United States.
And this state of affairs should be deeply alarming for
policy-makers here, because a Turkey ever more
closely aligned with regimes
that are hostile to the United States and to American objectives in the Middle
East
will not be -- indeed, it can't be -- a reliable ally in the war on
terror.
So this is, I think, a very important trend to watch, because the
closer Turkey becomes aligned with
countries like Iran, the less likely they
will be to supplement, or be willing to supplement, American efforts in
the
Middle East.
The fifth issue is attitudes towards Europe. And again, it's
just my opinion, but I think what we're on the
cusp of is a significant
readjustment of Turkish attitudes towards Europe and EU accession in general.
Turkey has been seeking to join the European Community of Nations for some
two decades, and particularly
since 2005, when the EU opened formal
accession talks. But now you can see, and it's pretty evident, that there's a
deep sense of distrust with Europe among all three of the country's political
power centers -- the Islamists, the
secular nationalists and the military.
Publicly, the AKP has expressed all sorts of glowing praise for European
membership, but on my recent trip
-- I was in Turkey a couple of months ago
-- I had an observer say something very interesting to me. He said that
the
AKP is more interested in the process, but not the end goal, which is that
they're using the tools of European
accession -- reconfiguration of the
relationship between the military and the state or a reconfiguration between the
powers of the judiciary and the state -- as a tool to increase its own power
at the expense of its chief political
rival, which is the Turkish military.
Secular forces and the Turkish General Staff have soured on the European
Union for the same reason. They
now perceive -- at least in the connotation
that I've had, it's come across loud and clear -- that EU accession
criteria
are a poison pill of sorts by which the AKP is progressively altering the
character of the Turkish state.
And that goes a long way towards
explaining why in the latest Pew survey less than a third of Turks now
support EU accession as an absolute goal. A lot of them support it with
reservations and qualifications, but this
is down from pretty high positive
ratings just a decade ago.
And the sixth issue -- and this is the decisive
one -- is the Kurdish issue. Turkey's current threat
environment envisions
a threat from three interrelated fronts. The first is the (inaudible) class
Kurdish minority
in the southeast of Turkey itself, of which the Kurdish
Workers Party, the PKK, is the most active opponent.
The second is across
the border in northern Iraq, where the Kurdish dominated regional government is
said to
condone anti-Turkish activities and even possibly to assist in them,
although the evidence there is anecdotal.
The third and the fourth fronts
are the Kurdish enclaves in neighboring Syria and Iran, respectively.
Of
these, far and away the most important and the most acute at the moment is the
situation in northern
Iraq. So far the Turkish military has stopped short
of decisive military action against PKK elements that are
operating out of
northern Iraq. Instead, they have created a number of temporary security zones
on the Iraqi border
as a way of interdicting cross border activities.
But Turkish officials make very, very clear to anybody who will listen that is a
step that isn't a permanent
solution, and more decisive measures are
necessary. And how Turkey chooses to ultimately do this is going to have a
decisive impact on Turkish-Iraqi relations and on Turkish relations with
Washington.
And here I think it will be very hard to overstate the gravity
of the situation for these two reasons.
First of all is a credibility
issue. As Soner said, the upsurge in PKK activity against the Turkish citizenry
is
undermining confidence in both the Turkish military and the Turkish
government in providing security for the Turkish
citizens.
And as all
of you know, security is the cardinal duty of every government, so the idea
that the Turkish
military simply can't seal that border because of political
considerations with the United States and anything else
is, I think, a very
detrimental fact that is making its way now into the Turkish media.
The
second issue is what happens as a result of the fact that the Turks are
constrained. International law
-- if I may digress for a second, because I
am a lawyer -- posits a tri-fold duty to any country. It's a duty to
prevent hostile acts from within their territory from emanating outward and
hurting neighbors by doing one of three
things: either legislating, making
essentially terrorist activity criminalized; and then enforcing those
(inaudible); police action, or if you're unable to do that, by looking for
international assistance.
The situation in Iraq currently doesn't meet any
of those three standards. There is a lot of reason to
suspect that the
Kurdish regional government has a very good handle on what the PKK are doing,
and they're simply
not acting against them. And more than anything else,
the central Iraqi government, which has the cardinal
responsibility for
this, isn't forcing the Kurdish regional government to act.
And the
coalition has said for its part under the international law of occupation, if
the Turks cross over
the border, we'd then be forced to defend the Iraqis,
which creates this sort of nightmare scenario of if Turkey
chooses to defend
itself, we may be seeing the first internal NATO war, which is I think a very
important point
that's often missed in the press.
The stakes on this
go far beyond Iraq. The stakes on this extend to alliance cohesion within NATO
itself.
And because we have not moved decisively against the PKK, it's
empowered other countries to do so. There's an old
Russian proverb for
those of you that know it (SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN), which means, roughly, "A sacred
place does not
remain empty for long."
And I think the same thing is
happening in terms of Turkish counter-terrorism policy. Since 2004, when
Turkey and Iran signed a mutual security accord in which they each pledged to
combat the main terrorist threat of
the other -- remember, there's a
reciprocal agreement here; it's not just that the Iranians are combating the
PKK,
although they are; the Turks have pledged to combat the Mujhadin Khalq,
which is a terrorist group under U.S.
federal law, but it is the main armed
opposition group to the Iranian regime. So there is a sense of one hand
washes the other.
But since then, the Iranians have been walking the walk.
And it's created a situation where Turkish
counter-terrorism interaction
with the United States is now overshadowed by the growing strategic bonds
between
Turkey and Iran. And they tend to manifest themselves not only on
the terrorism front, but on other fronts as well,
such as the recent energy
deal.
So if there is an issue that will be able to change the current
tenor of Turkish-U.S. relations, the issue
of PKK activity in northern Iraq
is it. And there are ways to actually do that. Soner mentioned moving
decisively
against the PKK. I think there's also an opportunity here to
create, because the coalition has greater authority
over northern Iraq today
than it did in early May as a result of the security arrangement that they
signed in late
May.
There is an ability to create a security mechanism
that can actually serve as a buffer that can supplement
the types of
activities the Turks are doing and will also mute the impulse of the Turkish
military for intervention
in Iraq, because the result of that would be
catastrophic for the U.S.-Turkish relationship.
The problem here, though,
is that the time is running out, and because this happens to be a briefing issue
in the Turkish body politic, both the AKP and the Turkish military tend to
understand the need for decisive action
against the Kurds in northern Iraq.
This tends to be an issue where the hourglass is running out, so I'll stop
here. Thank you.
HASTINGS: Thank you both very much for a very
comprehensive perspective with reference to the briefing
matter at hand.
I'd invite any member of the media that might wish to put a question to our
witnesses to do so at
this time. Yes, ma'am? And would you say who you
are?
(OFF-MIKE)
You're asked to use the microphone so that the --
yes, you can come over.
(UNKNOWN) My name is Yasmin Chundra (ph), and I'm
with the Turkish press with Hurriyet and Semantric (ph),
and my question is
to Dr. Cagaptay.
Soner, at the beginning of your remarks, you said this
election outcome was in a way the best outcome in the
short term that has
created a stable government as it's also made it necessary for that government
to seek consensus
in the parliament because of the distribution of the
seats. And I think you mentioned the necessity of a consensus
candidate for
the presidency as well.
Well, since yesterday in Turkey it looks like
Foreign Minister Gul is very likely to become the next
president with the
maybe passing endorsement of MHP, because they also announce that they will go
and sit in the
parliament, even if they might be not working for him.
If Mr. Gul becomes the president, as is widely expected in Turkey now -- or
let's say if he runs, as is
widely expected now, how do you think the
military will react to it, given what they did on April 27th when Mr. Gul
was running?
And secondly, if Mr. Gul becomes the president, which is also
widely expected in Turkey, how do you think
that would affect the
U.S.-Turkish relations, especially within the White House and the presidency?
As you well know, Mr. Sezer, the current president was never invited to the
White House. There was not much
of a dialogue between the White House and
Chang Payah (ph) during Mr. Sezer's term.
Given the fact that Mr. Gul is
very well known in this town -- he was the foreign minister for many years,
and he has a very good rapport with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, for
example -- how would that change the
bilateral dialogue? Thank you.
CAGAPTAY: That might be a hypothetical question, so my answer is also going to
be hypothetical.
First of all, I don't think it's not that President Sezer
was never invited; it's that he never came. In
other words he's president
for the last seven years and is known to not like pomp and receptions and gala
dinners,
and he's someone who does not travel overseas or appear at
reception sort of events. That's, I think, beside the
point, but he's not
someone who traveled much anyway.
Much of what they're discussing is
hypothetical, because the presidential elections are not going to take
place
this month; they're going to take place next month. Remember that the
parliament is now to elect the
president, but before that it has to elect a
speaker first. Before that, it has to convene, and the parliament is
likely
to convene on August 3rd, Monday. Is that Monday? Yes.
It will take it,
then, 10 days or so at least to elect a speaker. And then it will start the
presidential
election process on August 13th. It has 30 days to elect a
president, including a 10-day waiting period in the
beginning, so the
earliest round could be in late August, in which you're going to need a
two-thirds quorum.
It's very likely that some opposition deputies will be
in the parliament, but they're not going to vote for
the candidate, so we're
going to wait for the second or the third round. The way it goes is in the
first round, you
need two-thirds. In the second round, you need two-thirds.
In the third round, you can meet the majority. And AKP
has the majority,
so in the third round it will elect a president, which will be sometime in early
to mid-September.
So I think we're so far down the road, and I think
the next month and a half of Turkish politics is going to
look like a
century. That's why I canceled my vacation plans. I think every day is going
to last as long as a
month. It's going to be an incredibly intense period,
and I think that the signs that we see today I would not
consider to be
mature signs. I think those are mostly trial balloons.
People are
basically testing the political environment, trying to see how, A, the media, B,
the business
community, C, the opposition parties, D, the military, E, the
European Union, F, the United States will respond to
the likely candidacy of
Abdullah Gul, and I think it will be a composite of these six that will
determine the AKP's
final posture.
So that, I think, is the furthest I
can see in the century that's lying ahead of us.
HASTINGS: All right.
Next question?
OK. Yes, ma'am?
(OFF-MIKE)
Yes, if you would.
(UNKNOWN): I'm from Cox Newspapers. My question is for either of the
panelists. Both Robert Wexler and
Hastings said that the elections were
overall good for the United States' relationships with Turkey. Is it good
because the elections were democratic, fair and balanced, or is it good because
of who was elected and that would be
helpful?
BERMAN: A little of
both, I think. It's certainly very good that there was very high participation,
as
Chairman Hastings said -- much higher than we can expect in the United
States. There's an animated, involved body
politic.
And it's good not
because of who was elected, but because a range of views was elected, and there
is an
ability to have these forces fight it out in the politic sphere to a
great extent -- at least in the parliamentary
side -- than there was
recently, because what you had from 2002 until 2007 was that even though the AKP
came into
power with 34 percent of the popular vote, they had a super
majority in the parliament.
And so you have a very interesting place where
in absolute terms their popularity increased, but in terms of
the ability of
other parties to check them, that's actually become more powerful now than it
was before.
CAGAPTAY: First of all, I was born and raised in Istanbul, so
you're going to seem un-Turkish. I could not
vote in these elections, so I
have no personal stakes involved.
My take on it is that this is good, as I
said earlier, because it shows that, despite much political
turmoil, Turkey
is a functioning liberal democracy. We had six months of incredible tensions --
demonstrations by
millions of Turks against the ruling party, intervention
by the supreme court, the constitutional court in the
presidential election
process, a warning from the military with a spate of words after that that went
back and forth
literally for months between the government and the
opposition parties.
It's encouraging that, despite this kind of incredible
uncertainty, that Turkey has once again gone through
its period of
elections. This is the 16th time since Turkey became a multi-party democracy
when the Cold War
started. And that's why I think it's a good outcome.
Turks are a mature people who believe in democratic
traditions and can
handle any kind of political crisis.
HASTINGS: Thank you.
Yes, sir?
And then you, ma'am.
Yes, sir?
(UNKNOWN): I'm not a member of
the media, though.
HASTINGS: Is the lady from the media?
(OFF-MIKE)
Then let's have the gentleman come forward, if you would.
And then
you, you, then you.
XULAM: My name is Kani Xulam. I'm with the American
Kurdish Information Network. Yesterday's Indiyet
(ph), a Turkish daily, has
an article by Ajet Knelkran (ph), a Turkish columnist. She quoted from the
victory
speech of Prime Minister Erdogan, saying that one people, one flag,
on homeland and one state. And then she
compared that -- she reminds her
readers -- to the Nazi slogan, "Ein Stadt, ein Volk, ein Fuhrer," and then she
translated that for her readers: "One state, one people, one leader."
Germany, as we know, didn't like the Jews and took measures to take care of
them. Turkey is allergic to the
words "Kurd" and "Kurdistan" and equates
their freedom with its own debts and unhappiness. How can you, Congressman
Hastings, as an African American member of this Congress, sing the praises of
Turkey, a racist state that practices
the jenko laws (ph)? Thank you.
HASTINGS: Well, you put the question to me, and what I can say to you is I've
been to Turkey nine times,
and I didn't experience personally as much racism
in Turkey as I do in Washington, D.C. But I gather that I'm
looking from an
international perspective with reference to other countries.
I don't think
I would be able to go anywhere if I was going to use racism as the barometer for
interaction
and dialogue with governments. I know very few totally
tolerant, totally accepting governments. Toward that end
Turkey fits into
the category. If you wish that I should name a few, the last time that I was
overtly discriminated
against -- more than once -- was in Germany. The time
previous to that was in Denmark.
So racism is everywhere, and my job is to
try and carry not only to Turkey, but to Iraq and to Iran the
notion that
none of us have any absolute designs on how governments function, but all of us
should be mindful and
tolerant.
When I am there, I use my civil rights
experience in speaking with my interlocutors and informing them that
they
should get beyond the period that I lived in my life here in America.
I
cite, for example, Cyprus always is not on the table in some of these
discussions, but I sat with both
leaders of the Cypriot Turks and the Greek
Cypriots, and I said to them. I used my personal experience. These two
men
grew up together, and I'm referring to Mr. Denktash and his counterpart at that
time. They grew up together,
and I see no reason whatsoever why they should
not be able to come together.
It is very easy to take the view that we
shouldn't do business with anybody because their policies are the
antithesis
of tolerance. Then I would gather that we ought to take off all of our Chinese
clothes and get rid of
all of our Russian gas and go on about our business.
No society that I've ever been in or known did not have some
form of racism.
I'll accept your question in the spirit that it's offered, but for people
like me who recognize Turkey and
recognize the Kurdish part of Iraq and the
need for them to get beyond their differences and be about the business
of
establishing a meaningful dialogue with each other, I haven't given up hope on
all of these countries all over
the world, that somewhere along the lines
there may be a reduction in the tensions that are produced because of
alleged differences.
We are all God's children -- some god, however you
look at it -- and in light of that, it would be wise for
all of us to reduce
the notions that we have of prejudice and intolerance toward others because of
their religion,
their national origin, or their race.
So I appreciate
your question, but I'm very comfortable going to Turkey, but I have a hell of a
hard time
catching a cab sometimes in New York.
The lady over here.
And then you, sir.
CHOULDJIAN: Elizabeth Chouldjian with Horizon
Armenian Television. My question is to you, Mr. Berman.
Clearly, as Ms.
(inaudible) also mentioned, we've seen democratic elections in Turkey. There's
no question
about that. That's a step forward and what not.
But Mr.
Berman, you have painted a picture since the coming in of the AKP party that
clearly as an American
I'm concerned about. The Turkish government appears
to be closer to Iran and Syria than it's ever been before,
according to your
statement.
It has not been even talking the talk when it comes to
Turkish-U.S. relations and Turkish-EU relations and
in fact has been
manipulating the EU process in all of this in terms of human rights issues, in
terms of trying to
set up its own future in Turkey.
So my question, I
guess, is should we as Americans not be concerned about this? How close of an
ally is
Turkey compared to, let's say, five years ago when the AKP party
came in?
And isn't this in fact going to spell for us a much darker future
in terms of U.S.-Turkish relations, given
the fact that very likely, based
on everything I've heard, whoever the next president party is -- likely, an AKP
party supporter and following the same line as what we've been seeing in the
last several years?
BERMAN: Well, that's a fairly loaded question, but
let me answer it however I can.
I think there is ample reason to be
concerned about the AKP party's intentions. I think that the current
political climate creates an ability to put greater checks and balances on their
ability to achieve those objectives
than otherwise.
I am concerned by
the rising anti-Americanism, by the sort of growing proximity between the AKP
party and
Iran and Syria, but Turkey is going to be, for the foreseeable
future, a pivotal ally in the Middle East both in
terms of Iraq and sort of
the broader strategic picture that we're looking at.
We need to have a
number of levers that will more positively engage Turkey, whether it's on
security in
northern Iraq or other issues that will incentivize them to play
a more constructive role in U.S. policy. The
problem that we've had so far
is that we simply haven't begun to talk on the U.S. policy side.
Chairman
Hastings and Congressman Wexler should be commended for their continued interest
in Turkey, but
that interest isn't really echoed in the executive branch, as
near as I can tell. And there's been very little
attention paid not only by
the State Department, although there are people like Deputy Assistant Secretary
Matt
Bryza who spend a lot of time on Turkey, but in the larger picture, we
really haven't paid Turkey the attention that
it deserves in terms of its
role in U.S. interests.
Ever since the Turkish parliament voted down the
referendum authorizing a northern front against Saddam
Hussein's regime,
we've had this sort of chilling tie that both sides have been working to
correct, but we simply
haven't been able to overcome it.
Given this
political situation and the propensity of the AKP party to look elsewhere if
we're not engaged,
the case for engagement is greater now than it was ever
before.
CHOULDJIAN: May I ask a follow-up, sir?
HASTINGS: I'd like
for Dr. Cagaptay to give a response, and then of course, the follow-up and then
what
will likely be our final question will come from the young man who had
his hand up.
Yes, Dr. Cagaptay?
CAGAPTAY: It seems to me that what
we're debating is in terms of the relationship and the future effort and
if
the United States should be worried about it. The answer to that lies in
analyzing where the relationship is
today.
There is much
anti-Americanism in Turkey, absolutely. That's the case. But on the other
hand, there is
also a thriving relationship. In fact, I would say
"thriving" is not the word. It's a booming relationship. There
is so much
cooperation going on in many areas. Iraq is the key area.
It's not known
to a lot of us because much of it does not get written up in the press, but if
you ever go
the field -- Iraq or Turkey -- and talk to people or just watch
what's happening, you're going to realize that kind
of cooperation taking
place in Iraq between Turkey and the United States is incredible.
And by
"incredible," I mean the following. There was a vote in March 1, 2003, which
failed in the Turkish
parliament. That was a vote so that Turkey would open
up a northern front to help the war in Iraq, and that vote
failed.
The
people that I talk to in the U.S. military are suggesting that Turkish support
to the United States now
exceeds what Turkey would have delivered according
to the March 1st accord, if it had passed. In other words what
Turkey is
doing has gone beyond what was asked for originally.
And Congressman
Wexler referred to earlier in his comments about how three-quarters of all
logistics aid
going to both Iraq and Afghanistan is going through Turkey,
and that's the part that we can see. There's a lot that
we're not able to
talk about or read in the media, and I think that's part of that thriving
relationship.
Afghanistan is the second front, which is not on our radar
screen as much as Iraq is. I think the Turkish
contribution is perhaps even
bigger than Iraq, because Turkey actually has troops, had troops in Afghanistan.
It is
the only country that has led the international force in Afghanistan
twice, including the United States, and it's
the only country that has had a
permanent presence there since the beginning of the war.
The energy issue
is a third area of cooperation. Turkey is now actually helping both the United
States and
the EU diversify from its access to dependence to Middle East oil
by providing channels and outlets such as the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline
into Azerbaijan and from there with outlets into the Caucasus for gas and energy
projects.
The list can go on and on and on, so the bottom line is
there is a booming relationship. Unfortunately, I
don't think that the
government has done a good job of explaining that relationship or standing
behind it, and in
the second term, now that it has a clear mandate, it can
do a better job in that in terms of explaining to the Turks
and standing
behind this booming and thriving relationship.
The flip side of it is two
years of jargon again -- why the Turks are walking the walk, but not talking the
talk. The flip side of it is that here we have the PKK issue, which is
where we're saying a lot, but we're not
doing enough. If only we could
bring the two visions together, delivering and talking at the same time, I think
that we could take this relationship to the next level.
HASTINGS:
Very quickly.
CHOULDJIAN: Of course. But following up, at the end of the
day, if you look at the scenario now, isn't it
the negative reaction, let's
say, of Turks to the U.S. in Turkey today -- isn't it in some way enhanced by
the AKP
party, the fact that that they aren't talking positively about the
U.S. and Turkey, the fact that they're not
talking about Israel, the fact
that they're not doing everything that they need to be doing within Turkey in
order
to bolster this relationship?
We're asking the U.S. to go to
Turkey and say, "Turkey, be our friend; stand with us," and whatnot. And yet
on the other side, the leadership there, which appears to be the leadership in
the foreseeable future, doesn't seem
to be reciprocating, and yet we're
supposed to be going all these extra miles in order to befriend them in this
case.
The concern is what are they supposed to be doing? In the larger
scheme of things, we're seeing a country
in that area that doesn't
necessarily fit within U.S. interests at the moment, given the fact that they
continue to
go into northern Iraq, given the fact that they continue to have
a blockade with a neighboring country, Armenia, and
given the fact that
they're having difficulties in terms of meeting even the basic tenets that the
EU is setting to
join the EU, which we all want to see.
So in that
sense, what's the future looking at?
HASTINGS: Well, you know, also a
certain part, a bit of what you have said is not only loaded, I'll take it
off of our witnesses.
The simple fact of the matter is that the EU
continues to move the ball, and that needs to be dealt with.
Their
incrementalism allows that those that would embrace Turkey in a meaningful way
are precluded from doing so.
The accession of Turkey -- let's use economic
circumstances as a poor example. Turkey's gross domestic
product is more
than the last 10 countries that entered the EU, and yet they're precluded, and
there are good
economic reasons.
Turkey also an extraordinary amount
of problems, and I recognize that. But in geopolitics -- now, this
briefing
will style globalization, and it also was styled as something to look at
Ataturk's legacy.
Geopolitics will allow that there are very few in the
way of permanent friends in the world, and a lot of
times they're not
permanent enemies either. Who would have thought that we would have a trade
agreement with
Vietnam? You think about it.
Or somewhere along the
lines it has to be clearly understood that we live in a great big old world that
is
morphing into things that we are not quite ready for. I raise China
again. And I might add, I have no axes to
grind. I've been to China
perhaps more times than any other country in the world. But the simple fact of
the
matter is, China is not a democracy, secular or otherwise, and yet we do
an immense amount of business with China.
So I don't want us to get out of
the notion that sitting there in the Bosporus Straits looking right over
into Asia, being in a position where, if you look at some of Turkey's losses,
they lost, because of the Iraq
intervention, an extraordinary stream of
trade -- never mind all of this other kind of thinking.
I don't want us to
get down this path of thinking because a country internally may be changing into
whatever
it is that the majority feels that we should all of a sudden don't
perceive them as friends.
If you took Britain's statement, you would find
that they spoke favorably of this election. Even if you
look at the State
Department -- and let me quote the State Department since I criticized them
earlier for not
attending this briefing -- "A U.S. State Department
spokesman congratulated the Turkish people on holding what he
said was a
free and fair election."
I will point out that we have had a very good
working relationship with Prime Minister Erdogan and his
government and that
we have faith in Turkey's secular democracy. As the former president of the
parliamentary
assembly and its now president emeritus, I have no greater
supporters than the parliamentarians from both parties,
AKP and otherwise,
when I go into that particular region.
Turkey is very influential in the
Balkans. Turkey has immense oil and gas matters of significant interest
to
those of us here. Sure, its domestic politics are going to change. There are
some who would argue that there
are Islamist designs. I think their social
fabric is going to change.
But the last time I looked, the social fabric
of the United States sure did change when we got more
concerned about
whether Lindsay Lohan got drunk or Anna Nicole's baby was born than we have the
issues that we're
briefing you today.
Thank you, ma'am.
You,
sir?
(UNKNOWN): Mr. Chairman? My question is for Chairman Hastings.
It's a two-part question. It won't be too
long.
The first part is:
As Turkey is recognized as a democracy -- some have stated as a liberal secular
democracy or whatnot; it is, however, still a democracy -- how important is
the democracy in Turkey for us here in
the United States?
And part
two, knowing that, my understanding of secularism is the difference between
government and the
military. Should the military -- and I think it's
probably I wouldn't say more important, but it is an issue that
has not been
presented here today, other than the PKK situation -- if there is a situation
where the military might
intervene with the anti-democratic situation that
is current, should the U.S. be involved?
HASTINGS: When the military took
action in previous times in Turkey's history, the United States didn't get
involved. Sovereigns all have internal disputes, and Turkey is entitled to
theirs, just like we're entitled to
ours.
The ultimate question that
you asked is one that's very easy to answer, particularly as the chair of the
Helsinki Commission. Sixteen elections later, Turkey still stands, and to
date, aside from the intermittent
violence that seems to stem from those who
have centuries of agendas
That said, this commission has as a part of its
inherent mission, not only as it pertains to Turkey, but in
the entire OSCE
sphere, and I might add America's premise, to advance democracy anywhere and
everywhere in the
world. We are not successful in each instance in that
regard, but Turkey's democracy is particularly important.
Now, if the
military were to take action, I'm certain that that would give extraordinary
heartburn. Both
our witnesses have addressed this subject, and it is
something that must be attended.
I think ultimately what we are crying out
for and what this briefing, if nothing else, has produced from the
stellar
witnesses that put forward rather comprehensively what their views are about how
to best go about handling
matters as they arise in Turkey is first to have
mutual respect, clearly define America's strategic interests, work
cooperatively within the framework of dialogue, and enhance our diplomatic
relations, not only with Turkey, but with
other areas of the world.
If
there is anybody here who thinks that the Iraq problem can be solved without
Turkey being at the table,
then I have a bridge in Brooklyn that I'll see
you.
Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. The briefing is concluded.
[Whereupon the hearing ended at 11:32 a.m.]
END
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