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> February 1
Event Notification Report for February 1, 2008
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
01/31/2008 - 02/01/2008
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 43938 |
Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: ECS CAROLINAS, LLP
Region: 1
City: CHARLOTTE State: NC
County: WAKE
License #: 060-0253-3
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: J. MARION EADDY III
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
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Notification Date: 01/28/2008
Notification Time: 15:09 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2008
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2008
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
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Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (FSME)
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Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
"N.C. Radiation Protection Section was notified on 28 January 2008 by the RSO for ECS Carolinas, LLP Charlotte office that one of their portable moisture/density gauges (Humboldt Model 5001) was damaged at a construction site in Charlotte, NC. The gauge contains two sealed sources: (1) Cesium-137, 10 milliCuries (nominal) and (2) Americium-241:Beryllium, 50 milliCuries (nominal). Serial numbers for the gauge and the sources were not immediately available.
"The RSO responded and performed confirmatory measurements on the device using a hand-held GM survey instrument. The gauge handle was detached from the source rod and index rod and the case has some minor damage. The index remained attached to the gauge and the source rod remained within the shield. The RSO's survey confirmed that the Cesium-137 source is still contained within the shield. The licensee also performed a survey of the area where the gauge was initially struck and readings were at background levels (approx. 0.05 mR/hr). The readings at one meter from the gauge were approx. 0.4 mR/hr (consistent with the TI [Transportation Index]) and at one foot were approx. 2-3 mR/hr.
"The licensee has been in contact with the manufacturer and has received instructions on packaging and returning the device to Humboldt Scientific (Raleigh, NC). The device has been transported back to the licensee's storage facility and will be returned to Humboldt's Raleigh facility later this week."
North Carolina has assigned Event Report ID No. NC-08-03. |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 43939 |
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: SLADDEN ENGINEERING
Region: 4
City: PALM DESERT State: CA
County:
License #: 6318-33
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONELLE KRAJEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
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Notification Date: 01/28/2008
Notification Time: 15:53 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2008
Event Time: 06:51 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2008
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
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Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (FSME)
GONZALEZ (EMAIL) (CNSN)
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This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.
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Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE NOTIFICATION - STOLEN MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE
"At 0651 on January 28, 2008, the licensee contacted the State of California Warning Center /OES to report that a nuclear density gauge (CPN, model MC1, serial number MD40807529 - containing [10] milliCuries Cesium 137 and [50] milliCuries Americium 241:Beryllium) was stolen along with the company vehicle that the gauge was secured within (2005 Toyota Tacoma - Ca license 7W04195). The gauge was inside the locked transport case. The transportation case was locked and secured to the bed of the vehicle with chains and two independent locks. The gauge handle was also locked. This was reported to the Palm Desert Police Department (T08028025). The last leak test was performed on December 17, 2007 and was negative for removable contamination."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 43947 |
Rep Org: BRIDGEPORT HOSPITAL
Licensee: VARIAN CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: BRIDGEPORT State: CT
County:
License #: 06-01060-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID S WISHKO
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
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Notification Date: 01/31/2008
Notification Time: 10:46 [ET]
Event Date: 01/30/2008
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2008
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
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Person (Organization):
NEIL PERRY (R1)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
PART 21 GROUP E-MAIL ()
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Event Text
POTENTIAL INOPERABLE SAFETY FUNCTION
"In regard to Part 21.21 Notification of failure to comply or existence of a defect and its evaluation, [the licensee notified] the NRC of a defect that was detected on the Varian, Mammosource unit, Gammamed Plus (M1), ID#H64E168.
"The defect noted was the following:
"A daily check is performed to verify when the source guide tube is disconnected from the unit head, the source will not extend. This test is performed as recommended on p. 73 of the ESTRO Booklet No.8, ' A Practical Guide to Quality Control of Brachytherapy Equipment'. Disconnecting the tube (i.e. the lock that connects the source guide tube to the turret of the Mammosource) the dummy wire or the source wire should have been prevented from extending out. If the disconnect is within 2 mm of being connected the wire does extend out. This was documented on a check film using the Mick PerinaDoc phantom. As recommended in the Varian GammaMed HDR User Manual, P. 6-20, Varian BrachTherapy service was called.
"Notification:
"Varian Corp. was notified of this problem on 1/30/08 and a service engineer will be sent to the site to adjust the light sensor that communicates whether the source guide tube is connected. We are continuing treatment with two independent physicists verifying before treatment that the source guide tube is connected properly and securely." |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 43948 |
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: D. DUNCAN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
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Notification Date: 01/31/2008
Notification Time: 18:06 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2008
Event Time: 15:44 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2008
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
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Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
M/R |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
0 |
Hot Shutdown |
Event Text
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM IN RESPONSE TO TRIP OF BOTH REACTOR RECIRC PUMPS
"At 1544 EST 01/31/2008, the reactor mode switch was taken to shutdown in response to the trip of both reactor recirc pumps. All control rods fully inserted into the core. The lowest reactor vessel water level reached was 157 inches. Reactor water level is being controlled in the normal band using CRD.
"The cause of the reactor recirc pump trips are under investigation at this time. There was no maintenance or testing in progress that would explain the pump trips.
"At the time of the scram all ECCS systems and Emergency Diesel Generators were operable with the exception of Division 1 RHR. Division 1 RHR Surveillance testing was in progress. Surveillance testing is complete. Division 1 RHR is available with administrative activities remaining before it will be declared operable. Isolations and actuations occurred as expected. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Any event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical."
Decay heat is being removed to the main condenser via the turbine bypass valves. The electric plant is a normal shutdown lineup. No SRVs lifted during the reactor scram.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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