Design Guide for Improving Critical Facility Safety 
from Flooding and High Winds
FEMA 543 / January 2007 

OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF CRITICAL FACILITIES

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents some observations on the performance 
of critical facilities during Hurricane Katrina that identify 
the various ways in which building and equipment damage, 
as well as loss of municipal services, can disrupt facility operations. 
These observations are intended to help people who own, operate, 
design, and build critical facilities to adjust their building 
designs, construction, and facility management practices to reflect 
the needs of comprehensive risk reduction.

During Hurricane Katrina, surging floodwaters and high winds 
caused considerable and often catastrophic building damage, 
forcing many critical facilities to cease operations and evacuate 
their premises even before the storm had passed. In many instances 
the continued operation of hospitals, police and fire 
stations, schools, and EOCs was severely compromised by relatively 
minor damage to the building or building-mounted equipment. 
Although the structural components of most critical facilities survived 
the hurricane, other building components performed less 
well, causing serious disruptions. 

The observations highlighted in this chapter, made by a team of 
building professionals (architects and engineers) experienced 
in hazard mitigation, document the variety and severity of the 
building damage, and the corresponding effects on facility operations. 
Field inspections and discussions with facility managers and 
other personnel served as the basis for analysis of the experiences 
of individual facilities. The descriptions of these experiences are 
accompanied with suggestions on possible mitigation measures 
that would improve hazard-resistance and protect the facility’s 
functionality in the future. A comprehensive risk assessment of the 
facility’s operation and building components and systems would 
be required before any specific mitigation measures were implemented. 
This chapter emphasizes the experiences and lessons 
learned from facility operation disruptions in particular circumstances, 
and may not be applicable to all situations. 

4.2 HEALTH CARE FACILITIES

4.2.1 BACKGROUND

Health care facilities are at the front line of community 
protection, especially during and after a natural disaster 
event. Their capacity to continue to provide services to existing 
patients, and to respond to the needs of victims following a 
disaster, depends not only on protecting the integrity of the structure 
and the building envelope, but on the facilities’ ability to 
carry out their intended functions with little or no interruption. 
Continued and uninterrupted operation of health care facilities, 
regardless of the nature of the disaster, is one of the most important 
elements of a natural disaster safety program. 
Health care facilities, especially hospitals, are usually very complex 
building systems, because they accommodate diverse and highly 
specialized services in a strictly controlled environment. Hospital 
buildings must be designed to provide appropriate spatial arrangement 
for the flawless interaction between staff, patients, and 
visitors. They also require a complex network of technological infrastructure 
to support the hospital’s functions. Even the smallest 
breakdown in this complex network can cascade into a serious disruption 
of operations.

Protecting the functionality of a hospital requires very careful facility 
planning and design that is in accordance with the most 
stringent flooding and high-wind mitigation requirements applicable 
to the site. The damage sustained by hospitals during 
Hurricane Katrina emphasized the fact that many of the Nation’s 
hospitals occupy old or inadequate buildings that may not be sufficiently 
protected against hazards. In particular, some of the 
hospitals were planned and built before mitigation against natural 
hazards became common practice. 

Considering the expanding gap between the functionality of 
aging hospitals on the one side, and the requirements of new 
technologies and the needs of a growing and aging population 
on the other, it is expected that many of the country’s hospitals 
will have to be replaced, upgraded, or rebuilt in the coming years. 
Some medical industry forecasts predict that by the end of the decade 
the United States will spend $20 billion annually for this 
purpose. Since new or rebuilt hospitals will have to last for a long 
time, the anticipated construction program provides an opportunity 
to rethink hospital planning and design, and to consider how 
to avoid hazard areas and reduce the vulnerability with improved 
hospital design.

The following observations are based on published sources at the 
time of Hurricane Katrina, and on the subsequent interviews with 
providers and regulators in both Louisiana and Mississippi. The 
damage assessments present a picture of common effects on the 
medical facilities, which are consistent across the region affected 
by Hurricane Katrina. Generous contributions by the following institutions 
and their staff are acknowledged:

 St. Tammany Parish Office of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Preparedness (Covington, Louisiana)
 Touro Infirmary (New Orleans, Louisiana)
 West Jefferson Medical Center (Jefferson Parish, Louisiana)
 Hancock Medical Center (Bay St. Louis, Mississippi)
 Garden Park Medical Center (Gulfport, Mississippi)
 Guest House of Slidell (Slidell, Louisiana)
 Slidell Memorial Hospital (Slidell, Louisiana)
 LSU Health Sciences Center (New Orleans, Louisiana)
 Charity Hospital (New Orleans, Louisiana)
 University Hospital (New Orleans, Louisiana)

4.2.2 Effects of Flooding


The damage caused by Hurricane Katrina flooding was significantly 
more serious than the damage caused by wind. Along the 
Gulf Coast, the storm surge was higher than previously experienced, 
which caught many health care providers by surprise (see 
Figure 1-2). In most places, the storm surge flooding receded in 
several hours, but in New Orleans the floodwaters remained for 
more than a week. Apart from the damage and disruption caused 
by floodwaters that penetrated the facilities’ lower levels, many 
hospitals in New Orleans were completely surrounded by floodwaters, 
which cut off all surface access.

As a result of the disrupted access, most hospitals had to manage 
on their own, without any assistance from the outside. Patients 
and visitors were stranded, along with staff that could not be relieved 
for days. The injured, and others in need of emergency 
care, could not be brought in for treatment. Family and friends 
of people stranded in the hospitals had no way of communicating 
with them. Food, water, medical, and other supplies could not be 
brought in except by small boats and helicopters, or in some instances, 
by military vehicles. The evacuation of the critically ill 
patients, and eventually others, was possible only by boat or by helicopter. 
Hospitals with dedicated or improvised elevated helipads 
managed the evacuation much better than others. 

Hospitals and nursing homes that were inundated during Katrina 
experienced the greatest damage. Hospital functions located in 
the areas exposed to floodwaters had to be shut down. In many 
cases, the elevators and other mechanical and electrical services 
were shut down by the floodwaters. 

Flooding caused considerable disruption of utility services in most 
hospitals in the New Orleans area. Sewers flooded or pumping 
stations shorted out, disabling sewage and liquid waste disposal. 

The water supply was interrupted and, in many instances, onsite 
sources were contaminated and could not be used for drinking 
purposes. Emergency generators and electrical switchgear equipment, 
as well as underground transformers flooded and were put 
out of commission.

In several instances, communications panels and other controls 
were located on the first floor and shorted out. The heat and the 
buildup of humidity in New Orleans ruined the telephone connections 
and the fire alarm systems in some hospitals, even though 
floodwaters did not contact sensitive communications equipment 
directly.

4.2.3 Effects of High Winds

In general, three types of wind damage affected the hospitals: 
damaged roof coverings, rooftop equipment, and window 
breakage. Damaged roof coverings that were either peeled off or 
punctured by wind-borne debris exposed the interior to rainwater 
penetration and additional damage. Similarly, rooftop equipment 
displaced by wind left unprotected roof openings exposed 
to rainwater penetration. Water damage ranged from saturation of 
interior surfaces, like walls and ceilings, to ruined equipment and 
considerable mold growth.

Window breakage during the storm was particularly dangerous, 
because it allowed the penetration of rainwater, and wind that can 
cause pressurization in the interior. Hospital patient rooms, however, 
faced the greatest risks from window breakage, because many 
of their occupants could not be moved away from monitors, medical 
gases, and other equipment.

4.2.4 Site Design

Although most of New Orleans is located in the lowlands that are 
protected by a system of canals and levees, the hospitals were not 
built to resist the flooding caused by levee failures. As a result of 
Hurricane Katrina and the failure of levees, only 3 out of more 
than 20 of the city’s hospitals remained open during the storm 
(see Figure 4-1). Only one of these, the Touro Infirmary, was not 
completely surrounded by water, retaining access on one side. Access 
problems affected all hospitals. West Jefferson Medical Center 
had planned to deploy their staff in two shifts, to allow the second 
shift to stay at home until the storm had passed and then come to 
relieve the staff locked down in the hospital. Because of impeded 
access, the relief staff could not get to the hospital, which put an 
added burden on the initial staff, already nearing exhaustion.

Figure 4-1:University Hospital surrounded by 4 feet of 
water

Figure 4-2: Evacuation of New Orleans by helicopter

Hancock Medical Center in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, although located 
outside of the 500-year floodplain, experienced 3-foot deep 
flooding as a result of the storm surge (see Figure 4-3). Access 
to the hospital was disrupted long before Katrina made landfall 
because, prior to the storm arrival, there was a 33-mile traffic back-
up on the road leading out of town. Access was important because 
all the functioning hospitals needed relief supplies, medical gases, 
water, and fuel for their emergency generators. In many cases, the 
only way to resupply the facilities was by air, using large Chinook 
helicopters. These helicopters are too heavy for most roof structures, 
and to use them for emergencies in the future, a second 
helipad may be necessary on the site, requiring sufficient glide angles 
for landing and takeoff of the largest aircraft.

Access to emergency services was also blocked by the water and, 
in some cases, by trees and utility lines that were knocked down. 
Once the hospitals had access restored, they were deluged by 
the injured from nearby communities. Slidell Memorial Hospital 
administered 40,000 tetanus shots in the days after the storm. 
Hancock Medical Center saw 600 to 700 patients a day for up to 2 
weeks after the surge water receded. 

Figure 4-3: The lobby of Hancock Medical Center was under 
3 feet of water.

Perhaps the most serious consequence of the impeded access was 
the way it affected the evacuation of hospitals in New Orleans. 
Serious disruptions in hospital operations required immediate 
evacuation, which could not take place because the streets were 
not accessible for up to 5 days. There was a critical need for a 
helipad, either on the roof or an equivalent landing area on a 
parking structure, with emergency lighting for night operation. 
Elevated parking structures were a great asset, providing both a 
protection for the vehicles and a convenient helicopter landing 
site on the roof. They were especially useful if the parking structure 
had an elevated pedestrian bridge to the hospital.

4.2.5 Architectural Design

A typical hospital configuration is based on access requirements 
that usually place the emergency department on the first floor 
in order to receive walk-in patients or those brought in by ambulances. 
Clinical laboratory and imaging are frequently on the 
first floor as well, as are surgery and intensive care units in many 
smaller hospitals. All of these are vital services in the event of an 
emergency and for providing routine patient care. Location on 
the first floor frequently exposes them to additional risks from 
natural hazards, especially flooding, as became evident during 
Hurricane Katrina.

Building configuration and general shape frequently contribute to 
high-wind damage. Protrusions and projections in walls and roofs 
cause additional wind turbulence that increases uplift pressures. 
The penthouse at West Jefferson Medical Center illustrates the 
vulnerability of projections and corners to high winds (see Figure 
4-4). Large portions of metal cladding came loose because they 
were not designed or constructed to resist these loads.

Canopies, which most hospitals have over drop-off areas, are particularly 
susceptible to uplift and other damage, if not designed to 
resist the loads (see Figure 4-5). Glass-enclosed lobbies and atria, 
common to many hospitals, also proved to be a hazard, because 
of the large areas of usually unprotected glazing that could easily 
shatter under the impact of wind-borne debris. In many cases, 
these areas were closed during the storm, thereby cutting off a 
major point of access to the hospitals.

At Louisiana State University Hospital, the emergency generators 
in the basement were flooded and shut down, which put the 
entire hospital out of commission. Similarly, all the major mechanical 
equipment in Charity Hospital in New Orleans was in the 
basement, including fifteen 5,000-watt emergency generators. The 
hospital had to be evacuated soon after the basement flooded and 
the emergency power supply failed. Touro Infirmary, however, had 
the emergency power generators located on the third floor. This 
allowed them to run most of the critical systems, including the 
air conditioning, without interruption until the generators broke 
down from prolonged use and contaminated fuel supplies. 

Figure 4-4: Penthouse at the West Jefferson Medical Center

Figure 4-5: Canopy soffit damage at West Jefferson Medical 
Center

Critical operations such as emergency and surgical departments, 
recovery rooms, ICUs, and other patient bed units and laboratories 
should not be located in areas below ground or below the 
elevation of possible flooding and storm surge. These critical 
functions should be located on upper floors or in areas where 
communication between floors is easily accomplished. These areas 
should have no windows, or should have protected glazing to prevent 
window breakage and rain water penetration.

4.2.6 Building Envelope

Building envelope damage during Hurricane Katrina was widespread 
and included uplifted roof coverings and flashing, roofing 
punctured by flying debris or overturned roof-mounted equipment 
that led to extensive rainwater penetration, wall cladding 
separation, and window and door breakage.

The building envelope on the Garden Park Medical Center in 
Gulfport, a relatively new building opened in 2000, sustained considerable 
damage from 130-mph winds during Hurricane Katrina. 
The estimated wind speed may appear to have been close to the 
current design wind speed of 135 mph for this facility, but the actual 
pressures were below the current design pressures as a result 
of the 1.15 importance factor required for hospitals. Wall cladding 
consisting of EIFS was blown off in several areas, allowing 
water to penetrate wall cavities (see Figure 4-6). Extensive use of 
EIFS, despite a long track record of failure during hurricanes, 
contributed to significant damage from water penetration. EIFS is 
a popular wall cladding system, but not strong enough to prevent 
damage from wind-borne debris in cases where EIFS is applied 
over studs. In addition, EIFS design or construction deficiencies 
frequently make it insufficiently resistant to suction pressures 
caused by high winds. This is especially significant for hospitals, 
where such damage can allow water penetration and trigger serious 
disruptions in the mechanical and electrical systems and 
damage the building interior. Hospitals in hurricane-prone regions 
that have EIFS should have field testing performed to 
evaluate its attachment. 

Hancock Medical Center suffered damage to the wall sheathing 
behind the exterior brick veneer. This damage resulted from 
standing water at significant depths in various locations around 
the building. The sheathing retained moisture long enough to 
compromise its integrity through swelling, and to support the 
growth of mold and bacteria. There have been numerous examples 
of the failure of brick veneer. The reasons for this include 
corroded brick metal ties, insufficient number of metal ties installed, 
or ties not adequately embedded in the mortar. 

Many hospitals have low-slope roofs. There have been many instances 
of failure of this type of roof, frequently beginning at 
the edge flashing and progressively spreading to other parts of 
the roof. Roofs are also susceptible to puncture, as happened at 
the Hancock Medical Center and Garden Park Medical Center 
(see Figure 4-7). Rubber walkway pads were blown away and the 
roof membrane was punctured in several places by displaced 
equipment and other flying debris. As a result, a substantial 
amount of water leaked through the roof openings into the top 
floor, causing considerable damage to the interior. In addition, 
the aggregate surfacing blew off, damaging glazing on surrounding 
buildings. 

Figure 4-6: Repair of EIFS wall covering on Garden Park 
Medical Center

Hancock Medical Center lost substantial portions of its metal 
roofing. Patients had to be relocated from the top floor to lower 
floors because of roof leakage (see Figure 4-8). West Jefferson 
Medical Center lost portions of roofing on the Psychiatry building, 
when the metal roof covering partially peeled off. The leading 
edge began to peel back, but did not go any further than the edge 
flashing, so a minimal amount of water penetrated through the 
roof. The psychiatry building was not occupied at the time because 
the hospital evacuated the building before the hurricane landfall.

Figure 4-7: Roof membrane starting to peel off at Hancock 
Medical Center.

Figure 4-8: Roof damage on Hancock Medical Center

The primary cause of window breakage was wind-borne debris. 
(see Figure 4-9). West Jefferson Medical Center had 76 windows 
broken, mainly by flying aggregate. Intensive care patients had to 
be moved to the recovery room in the interior of the building and 
away from windows. The Psychiatry building had rainwater penetration 
through windows, even though they were not broken. 

Although many important hospital functions are located away 
from the exterior windows, wind-blown rain can damage expensive 
equipment even when it is located some distance from 
the broken window (see Figure 4-10). At West Jefferson Medical 
Center, the fitness center building sustained $250,000 worth 
of damage that resulted from water driven through the broken 
windows and from 30 days of high humidity, before the air-conditioning 
was restored. 

Exterior doors were often pushed in by floodwaters and blown 
open and damaged by wind pressure. Breakaway doors are particularly 
vulnerable to opening in high-wind conditions, as wind 
pressure can build up through the unsecured doors. Ground 
floor entrance doors at Hancock Medical Center had to be 
blocked by sandbags and two-by-fours, both on the inside and the 
outside, to stay closed (see Figure 4-11). The penthouse door at 
Garden Park Medical Center in Gulfport was blown off its hinges 
by strong winds.

Figure 4-9: Broken windows at Touro Infirmary
Hancock Medical Center lost numerous fan cowlings and other 
rooftop equipment, which left openings in the roof. Water penetrated 
the building through these openings, reaching the first 
floor, and damaged boilers and other equipment. Vent openings in 
the elevator penthouse in Touro Infirmary were blown off, allowing 
water penetration. The water damaged the electrical and mechanical 
equipment and controllers, shutting down the elevators.

Figure 4-10: Broken windows at West Jefferson Medical Center

Figure 4-11: Blocked doors at Hancock Medical Center

West Jefferson Medical Center lost a number of cowlings and 
other covers causing water damage to equipment in the rooms 
below the roof. Some motors were sealed and continued to work 
during the storm. 

All rooftop equipment should be safely secured to the curb 
and stay in place during a high-wind event. Equipment that 
has a high failure rate in high-wind events includes air-conditioning 
condensers, HVAC units, exhaust fans and air intake 
and exhausts. 

4.2.7 Utility Plumbing Systems

Hospitals depend heavily on municipal services and other utilities. 
While it is possible to go into a minimal function mode and still 
maintain patient safety, certain utility systems must be operable. 
In many cases, Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent flooding 
pushed hospitals beyond the limits of even a minimal function 
mode. Many had to be shut down, and the patients and staff had 
to be evacuated. In addition to the loss of electrical power, the 
most common problem in maintaining the operations proved to 
be the failure of water supply and sewer systems. 

Most hospitals lost water within a day or two following Hurricane 
Katrina’s landfall. Even when the water service was restored, 
it was suspected of contamination. Drinking water was in short 
supply in many hospitals. West Jefferson Medical Center received 
three truck loads of bottled water from a local retailer in the aftermath 
of the storm, but other hospitals suffered from serious 
shortages. A running water supply is critical for boilers to produce 
steam for sterilizing; for the chillers for the air-conditioning 
system; and for sanitary uses like toilets, washing dishes and 
linens, bathing patients, etc. The most successful hospitals had 
their own wells from which they pumped water using an emergency 
power supply. The hospitals that stayed without water and 
an emergency power supply had to evacuate patients as quickly 
as possible. As a consequence of this experience, West Jefferson 
Medical Center is planning to install two wells to provide both 
sufficient capacity and redundancy. One well will service the central 
plant boilers and chillers, and the other will be dedicated to 
hospital operations.

Potable water service will likely be shut down during and immediately 
after an event because of line breakages, lack of power to run 
pumping stations, or repair delays because of blocked roads and 
access routes. Hospitals, especially those in hurricane-prone regions, 
need a back-up water supply system in the form of:

 Wells for exclusive hospital use should be supplied with their 
own emergency generator to run the well pumps.
 Water storage or water recycling systems on site should serve as 
a back-up to the central water supply.
In many areas, the sewer system broke down shortly after the 
storm arrived, either because of loss of power required to run municipal 
pumping stations, sewage back-up or shut down of sewage 
treatment plants as a result of flooding, or because uprooted trees 
broke the sewer lines. When the water and sanitary waste systems 
were disabled, patients and staff were required to use hazardous 
waste bags (red bags) taped to buckets or toilet bowls to manage 
bodily waste. At West Jefferson Medical Center, used bags were 
stored in the hallways for several days and then buried on the hospital 
site for later disposal.

Hospital design in hurricane-prone regions should also take into 
consideration the need to provide an onsite sewage-diversion and 
storage system to prevent sewer backflows from disrupting hospital 
sanitary system operations. Field observations indicate that in situations 
where the sanitary sewer system may be damaged, causing a 
disruption in service, functionality may be protected by:

 Installation of an onsite septic tank as a sanitary back-up 
system 
 Installation of backflow devices in the sanitary lines to prevent 
sewage from backing up into the hospitalm Designating, as part of the operations 
plan, a limited number 
of sanitary systems to use in the hospital, so the onsite storage 
tank does not fill too quicklym Creating holding ponds for direct pumping of 
sewage, if sufficient site area is available

4.2.8 Mechanical and Electrical Systems

Hurricane Katrina struck at a time when the temperatures during 
the daytime reached 95°F. Air-conditioning systems in hospitals 
were generally not connected to the emergency power supply, 
nor was there any flexibility to switch emergency power from one 
system to another to provide some relief. The heat build-up was a 
significant factor in creating difficult conditions for patients and 
staff (see Figure 4-12). 

Lack of air-conditioning also allowed humidity to build up, which 
caused problems with switchgear, computers, and other electronic 
equipment. In many cases dehumidifying and cooling 
could not resume for months after the event. The excessive humidity 
damaged the electronic components of mechanical 
and electrical equipment, such as fire alarm systems, elevator 
switchgear, or the telephone switchgear, as happened in Touro 
Infirmary. Mold growth in conditions of high temperatures and 
humidity caused further damage. At West Jefferson Medical 
Center, rainwater and high humidity caused considerable damage 
to the fitness center, requiring all the electrical equipment to 
be replaced. The ground floor at Hancock Medical Center was 
flooded 3 feet deep; enough to cover all electrical outlets close to 
the floor. The damage was irreparable.

Figure 4-12: Toppled HVAC equipment at Charity Hospital, New 
Orleans

Air-conditioning systems were also disrupted by a lack of water 
needed for water-cooled chillers, as happened in Garden Park 
Medical Center in Gulfport when the municipal water service 
was shut down. Loss of air-conditioning resulted in interior condensation, 
and warm and humid air interfered with the normal 
functioning of electronic medical equipment. 

Measures to provide sufficient HVAC capacity for patient-occupied 
and support areas and to protect the operation of the hospital 
from humidity-related damages include the following:

 Install emergency electrical generators with capacity to run the 
air conditioning system. This might also require water for the 
chillers if this is the method of delivering cold air. 
 Install sufficient controls in the hospital to be able to identify 
the areas with mold and mildew problems, and have them 
cordoned off quickly.
 Install HVAC duct cleanout locations, so that any mold or 
mildew that begins to grow in the ductwork can be easily 
cleaned out.
 Create air-conditioning zones (where practical), so that crucial 
operations can be cooled with a minimum amount of air-
conditioning. 

In a storm of Katrina’s magnitude, it is expected that power would 
be lost almost immediately and for a considerable period of time 
thereafter. For example, Touro Infirmary lost power within minutes 
of being hit with wind gusts of about 60 mph. Since power 
is so vital to maintaining functionality in critical facilities during 
normal periods, it is of paramount importance to provide an 
emergency power supply for all critical hospital functions.

Most hospitals store up to 72 hours of emergency fuel on site. 
In the case of Hurricane Katrina, emergency generators needed 
to run continuously for 5 days or more. Many hospitals had 
to obtain fuel for their generators from outside sources, usually 
the military. West Jefferson Medical Center got fuel from a 
nearby Navy ship. Hancock Medical Center had one of their underground 
emergency generator fuel tanks flooded, with water 
covering the fill cap and all vent openings. They could not use 
this tank, fearing that contaminated fuel would damage the 
power generators.

The capability to switch power to different locations at different 
points in time is one of the most important features of 
emergency power supply systems. However, most of the wiring 
systems in facilities affected by Hurricane Katrina were not set 
up with this capability. Emergency power in most cases was not 
available to run the air-conditioning systems. Redundancy in the 
emergency power systems that would have allowed maintenance 
and repair without disruption was lacking in most cases.

Portable generators, where they existed, were invaluable. They 
could be moved around as needed, but the problem of outside 
ventilation was difficult to overcome when the power was 
required away from vent openings. Use of generators indoors 
is extremely dangerous and should not be attempted in any 
circumstances.

More and more hospitals are dependent on computerized systems 
for patient medical records, transmission of X-ray film and other 
images, reporting laboratory results, patient physiological monitors, 
and a myriad of other uses. Once the power is lost, these 
systems are shut down unless they are on emergency power. 

Piped oxygen and nitrous oxide supplies are essential for many 
patients. With electrical systems out, pumping of medical gas 
was not possible. Most of the hospitals maintained tanks of oxygen 
that could be brought to the bedside (Figure 4-13), but 
once the emergency supplies of medical gas ran out, the patients 
at serious risk had to be evacuated. 

The experience of hospitals during Katrina indicates that the 
requirements for emergency power should have high priority. 
Generators should be located above the base flood elevation, be 
protected from flying debris, and have appropriate exhaust vent 
systems installed. Fuel storage tanks should be located above 
the flood elevation, or adequately anchored to ensure that the 
tank will not float off its foundation under pressure from rising 
floodwaters. 

Hospitals in hurricane-prone regions should store 
sufficient fuel to support running generators at full load for at 
least 96 hours (4 days). Emergency power distribution systems 
should be able to provide power to every system in the hospital, 
and have switching capabilities to shift loads to different parts of 
the hospital as needed.

4.2.10 Communications Systems

Hospitals have a variety of communications systems in addition to the 
usual telephone and e-mail systems. Many of these are for emergency 
communications with ambulances and other emergency support 
services. These include satellite telephones, government line telephones, 
ham radios, internal radio systems, nurses’ call systems, and 
wireless systems of various sorts. Communications systems are critical 
for medical uses, but during a storm like Katrina, the ability to contact 
family members and friends to check on their status meant a lot 
to both the staff and the patients. The importance of being able to get 
news from outside, to request restocking of supplies, and to arrange 
evacuation of patients became obvious in the aftermath of Katrina.

One consistent theme in damage reports was that satellite dishes 
were toppled, rendering satellite phones, one of the main sources 
of emergency communications, inoperable. Antennae used for 
emergency communications frequently broke, disconnecting the 
hospital systems from the outside world. Hancock Medical Center 
lost not only the satellite dish, but also the dish for the education 
system and its television antennae. West Jefferson Medical Center 
lost only one antenna. 

Figure 4-13: Oxygen supplies at Hancock Medical Center

External communication isn’t the only important link that 
can be broken during a hurricane. Internal communications 
(for example, from surgery to the nursing floor, or from the 
nursing floor to the supply storage areas) are critical to maintain 
functionality.

At Hancock Medical Center, the only means for internal communications 
were 5-Watt Motorola radios. These continued to work 
well, and were relied upon exclusively when the telephone switchgear 
flooded and broke down. West Jefferson Medical Center also 
used radio communication that continued to work throughout the 
storm. Cellular phones also worked, until the transmission tower 
was toppled. Hospitals that had ham radio operators bring their 
equipment in, or had a ham radio set-up in the hospital, found 
this system very important and useful. Several hospitals plan to 
have ham radios available for future emergencies. 

Charity Hospital and West Jefferson Medical Center lost their computers 
because the computer network power supplies were not 
wired into the emergency power supply grid. John Hancock Medical 
Center also lost its computers when the ground floor flooded 
(see Figure 4-14). 

Since many communication systems are dependent on external 
networks that may be out of commission, roof antennae should be 
well anchored, or mounted inside of penthouses. Satellite dish antennae 
may have to be taken down prior to a hurricane and put 
back after the storm had passed. Finally, redundancy of systems is 
important, as proven during Katrina—one system may work where 
others do not.

4.2.11 Nonstructural and Other Systems

Nonstructural systems, among others, include interior non-load-
bearing walls, ceilings, and floors. In hospitals flooded with storm 
surge, floors were destroyed and gypsum board walls were soaked. 
At Hancock Medical Center the water level reached 3 feet. The 
hospital must replace all the flooring material, rewire the outlets, 
and replace the wall sheathing at a level about 2 feet above the 
high water mark (see Figure 4-15).

In many hospitals humidity buildup damaged floor and ceiling 
tiles. Touro Infirmary had to replace 60,000 square feet of tile 
flooring and all of the ceiling tiles in the hospital because of humidity 
damage. The loss of air-conditioning at West Jefferson 
Medical Center caused the buildup of humidity in the air, leading 
to water condensation on terrazzo floors, making them very 
slippery.

Security was a major issue for most New Orleans hospitals. Members 
of the community naturally sought the hospital for shelter 
when their homes were destroyed. When the water rose, people 
trapped in the city followed the water’s edge to the Touro Infir
mary and West Jefferson Medical Center, where crowds of people 
congregated on the front doorsteps. Attempted break-ins and 
looting were reported, which prompted hospitals to barricade 
doors, post armed guards at entrances, and “lock down” so that 
no one could either enter or leave. At University Hospital, the 
doors were removed and the entrances sealed up.

Figure 4-14: Damaged computer network equipment at 
Hancock Medical Center

Hospitals that allowed families to come in with the staff for the 
duration of the storm encountered numerous problems after a 
few days. Many of the family members became restless because 
hospitals had no appropriate accommodations for them. This became 
a security problem, as it was important to keep guests away 
from the patients and their caregivers. 

Fire safety should be a concern during a storm since the fire 
risks are usually greater than at other times. Although the fire 
alarms are normally connected to emergency power, other types 
of damage made them inoperable. At Touro Infirmary, the 
build-up of humidity knocked out the electronic components of 
the fire alarm system. After the storm, 470 points needed to be 
repaired before the system was fully operational again. At West 
Jefferson Medical Center, the fire alarm system was undamaged, 
but the line to the fire station was cut. Heat-activated fire suppression 
systems continued to function where sufficient water 
pressure was available, but dry standpipes might not have been 
supplied with water in the event of a fire. Directional signs in 
many hospitals were blown away. In the rush for care after the 
hospitals were accessible, it was necessary to put up temporary 
signage to route the large volume of visitors and patients to the 
right destination. 

Figure 4-15: Drying of flooded ground floor at Hancock Medical 
Center

4.2.12 Summary

The General Accounting Office (GAO) report to Congress on the 
evacuation of hospitals and nursing homes noted that administrators 
should “consider several issues when deciding to evacuate 
or to shelter in place, including the availability of adequate resources 
to shelter in place, the risks to patients in deciding when 
to evacuate, the availability of transportation to move patients 
and of receiving facilities to accept patients, and the destruction 
of the facility’s or community’s infrastructure.” For new facilities, 
most of these issues can and should be addressed during 
site selection, risk assessment, and application of the appropriate 
planning and design recommendations described in this manual. 
For existing facilities, careful evaluation and consideration of the 
recommendations provided in this manual should help ensure 
greater resilience during flooding and high-wind hazard events. 
In this way, communities can continue to depend on these facilities 
both for the care of existing patients and the care of people 
in disaster emergencies.

4.3 EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES 

4.3.1 Background

Educational facilities are considered critical facilities because, 
apart from their vital role in educating children, they are 
frequently used during and after a storm as emergency shelters, 
or as staging centers by the National Guard, law enforcement 
personnel, or critical infrastructure repair crews for emergency 
operations. Educational facilities, in this case mostly K-12 school 
buildings, are generally equipped with food preparation facilities, 
well distributed sanitary facilities, and ample space for personnel 
and equipment.
 
The primary function of a place of refuge shelter is the protection 
of the occupants during a storm. This function is dependent 
on preservation of the structural integrity of the building and 
the building envelope. The failure of a structural component or 
a breach in the building envelope can lead to casualties and can 
make the buildings unusable as a recovery shelter after the storm. 

Educational facilities planned for use as place of refuge shelters 
must, above all, protect the lives and well-being of evacuees. To do 
so, they must be constructed to withstand storm surge or inland 
flooding and wind impact. This means that they must be located 
in areas that minimize these storm effects. If they are located in 
the areas subject to flooding and high-wind hazards, they need to 
be constructed to preserve full functionality, with uninterrupted 
electricity, communications, water, and sanitary service. This will 
also allow them to serve as recovery shelters. Educational facilities 
that may not have served as shelters during the storm, because 
of their proximity to the coast or their susceptibility to inland 
flooding, may be useful as recovery shelters provided they are able 
to survive the hurricane intact. 

The primary function of a recovery shelter is to provide a location 
for resources and manpower after the storm has passed, to centralize 
the command and distribution functions for recovery work 
in the community. Recovery shelters require that all building functions 
and services remain usable in the aftermath of a storm. They 
are often used by the American Red Cross (ARC), National Guard, 
or other government agencies as a distribution point of first aid, 
food, water, and other supplies. They also serve as management or 
information dissemination hubs concerning recovery efforts.

The following facilities were visited for the preparation of this 
manual:

 Charles P. Murphy Elementary School (Pearlington, Mississippi)
 Pass Christian Middle School (Pass Christian, Mississippi)
 St. Stanislaus High School (Bay St. Louis, Mississippi)
 Northbay Elementary School (Bay St. Louis, Mississippi)
 Hancock High School (Kiln, Mississippi)
 Pineville Elementary School (Pass Christian, Mississippi)
 D’Iberville High School (D’Iberville, Mississippi)
 D’Iberville Middle School (D’Iberville, Mississippi)
 Lyman Elementary School (Gulfport, Mississippi)
 East Hancock Elementary School (Hancock County, Mississippi)
 Saucier Elementary School (Saucier, Mississippi)
 Port Sulpher School (Port Sulpher, Louisiana)

4.3.2 Effects of Flooding

The most devastating damage to educational facilities during Hurricane 
Katrina was caused by the storm surge. FEMA reported 
a storm surge of 20 to 30 feet above normal tide levels. In some 
places the flooding extended up to 6 miles inland. The effect on 
coastal communities was catastrophic, because most buildings 
within a quarter of a mile of the shore were virtually washed away, 
while most of the remaining buildings beyond this area were severely 
damaged. Virtually all of the educational facilities in Pass 
Christian, Mississippi, were heavily damaged as a result of their 
proximity to the coastline. 

Inland flooding occurred in low-lying areas farther away from the 
coastline. D’Iberville Middle School had approximately 8 feet of 
water, but was not used as a shelter because the school district 
staff was aware of the potential for flooding from past experience. 
The structural integrity of the school was not compromised by the 
flooding, but the water damage to the interior was substantial (see 
Figure 4-16). 

Figure 4-16: D’Iberville Middle School was flooded to the depth 
of 8 feet

The experience of Hurricane Katrina shows that the damage 
caused by rising water generally renders shelters uninhabitable 
and useless, further aggravating the recovery process. In most cases 
the mechanical and electrical systems were disabled as a result of 
flooding, which allowed the internal temperatures to reach intolerable 
levels. Additionally, the flood-induced back-flow of plumbing 
systems created unsafe sanitary conditions in most of the facilities.

4.3.3 Effects of High Winds

Hurricane Katrina reached maximum gust wind speeds of 130 
mph at landfall, with hurricane force winds extending outward 
105 miles from the center of the storm (FEMA, 2006). Numerous 
tornadoes were also spawned by the hurricane, contributing to 
further damage as the storm moved northward. There were 11 tornadoes 
recorded in Mississippi, with 17 more in Georgia, and 4 
in Alabama. Current model building codes in the areas affected 
by Hurricane Katrina generally require buildings to be designed 
to meet 120 to 150 mph design wind speeds. Some buildings, 
however, were constructed prior to the implementation and enforcement 
of the current model codes.

Wind damage was most evident on the building envelope, especially 
roofs, walls, doors, and windows, as well as other exterior 
elements, such as walkway canopies and exposed mechanical and 
electrical equipment. The extent of the damage was dependent 
on the force of the wind, the type of construction, and the configuration 
of the buildings. Once a building envelope was breached, 
the interior of the building sustained additional damage, both as 
a result of pressurization and rainwater penetration. The most severe 
damage in the interior was observed on the least durable 
finishes, such as acoustical ceilings, wood doors and trim, and 
building contents such as office equipment, furniture, and books. 

Most of the educational facilities used as place of refuge shelters 
suffered wind damage to the roofs and windows. When a portion 
of the roof was lost or a window was broken, rainwater was able 
to enter the building, causing damage to the interior. In some instances, 
the occupants were forced to relocate to other buildings 
during the storm, because of the danger of progressive building 
failure (see Figure 4-17).

4.3.4 Site Selection

Most educational facilities that were destroyed or severely damaged 
by Katrina were located in the areas subject to storm surge 
flooding. Ideally, educational facilities used as shelters should 
not be located in floodplains, but since they must be located in 
proximity to the neighborhoods they serve, some are built on 
flood-prone sites. Even if buildings can be elevated to reduce the 
potential for damage, the surrounding area remains susceptible 
to flooding, which could prevent access and disrupt the delivery 
of emergency aid. This also underscores the need to provide multiple 
routes to and from a facility, in case of roadway blockage 
following a storm.

Pineville Elementary School near Pass Christian, Mississippi, was 
used as a place of refuge during the storm, but when the water 
rose to a depth of 2 feet, the people had to be moved by school 
buses to another shelter (see Figure 4-18). The buses were driven 
by school bus mechanics struggling to maintain control in rising 
water and 80 mph winds.

Figure 4-17: Broken windows at D’Iberville High School

The schools in Pass Christian—mostly one-story buildings located 
in mapped flood hazard areas—sustained heavy damage from 
storm surge flooding. The massive storm surge devastated parts of 
Northbay Elementary School in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, a single-
story building located in a mapped flood zone. Exterior walls 
collapsed, and most of the interior and contents were destroyed 
(see Figure 4-19).

Figure 4-18: Pineville Elementary School shelter had to 
be evacuated when the floodwaters started to rise.

Figure 4-19: Exterior walls at Northbay Elementary School

St. Stanislaus High School in Bay St. Louis, although located right 
on the coast, was on naturally higher ground, and only the first 
floors were affected by the storm surge. Within a few months after 
the storm, the second floors in some of the buildings had been repaired, 
including restored power, water, and sanitary service, and 
were back in use (see Figure 4-20).

Considerable damage occurred in low-lying areas that were 
flooded by storm surge ranging in depth from 2 to 8 feet. Such 
was the case at D’Iberville Middle School in D’Iberville, Mississippi, 
which sustained severe damage, including the destruction 
of many exterior walls, when water rose to nearly 8 feet above the 
floor. Fortunately, it was not used as a shelter, unlike the nearby 
D’Iberville High School, which is a designated shelter. The high 
school is built on higher ground and was not affected by flooding.

4.3.5 Architectural Design

Generally, educational facilities have centrally located corridors 
(with classrooms or other spaces on both sides) that have ready access 
to sanitary facilities, are at least 8 to 10 feet wide, and are free 
of all obstructions. These features make them ideally suited for 

Figure 4-20: Lower floors washed away by the storm surge at St. 
Stanislaus campus

emergency shelter use. Although there are a few exterior openings 
that can be breached by a storm, the hallways are generally 
well protected from outside elements. It should be pointed out, 
however, that in situations where the roof or the exterior walls fall, 
interior corridor walls may collapse as well. The corridors are usually 
unfurnished and readily available for a variety of functions. 
They served well as safe areas during the storm, with only a few notable 
exceptions. At the D’Iberville High School, the corridors had 
unprotected windows at each end. These windows were broken 
during the storm and it was necessary to move people into another 
building. Unfortunately, there were no enclosed walkways or 
interior corridors connecting the buildings, and it was necessary 
to go outside into the storm to reach the other building. Similarly, 
when the roof structure at Lyman Elementary School shelter 
started to fail, it became necessary to take the refugees outside before 
they could reach safety in another building (see Figure 4-21).

For hurricane shelter safety, it would be beneficial to have all of 
the buildings connected with enclosed corridors, to allow safer 
movement between buildings during a storm. Other components 
of the building envelope would have to be sufficiently resistant 
to wind and wind-borne debris impact to protect the occupants 
and the services they need. School corridors in particular should 
either have impact-resistant (or protected) windows or none at all. 
All exterior doors should also be designed to meet hurricane wind 
loads and wind-borne debris impact requirements, as described in 
Section 3.4.3.1).

Figure 4-21: Collapsed portion of the Lyman Elementary School Building

4.3.6 Structural Systems

Most of the educational facilities observed were one-story buildings 
with concrete slab-on-grade foundations constructed using 
concrete masonry load-bearing walls and steel-framed roofs. 
The roof joists were supported either by masonry walls or steel 
beams. Some facilities, like the East Hancock Elementary School, 
used pre-engineered systems consisting of rigid steel frames supporting 
a standing seam metal roof. Pass Christian Middle School 
and Saucier Elementary School used structural steel frames 
with standing seam or built up roofs. St. Stanislaus High School, 
located on the coast, had a concrete structural frame where the 
first floor was heavily damaged by the storm surge, but the foundations, 
concrete structure, and the upper floors survived. This was 
because the buildings on campus were located on higher ground 
than the surrounding area. 

The storm surge exerted tremendous forces on the buildings in its 
path, first as the water rose, and again when it receded. The forces 
were strong enough to knock down exterior masonry walls, as happened 
in the Northbay, Charles B. Murphy, Pass Christian, and 
Plaquemines Parish schools (see Figure 4-22). In most cases, the 
main structural components survived with little or no damage. 

Figure 4-22: Damaged exterior walls at Charles B. Murphy 
Elementary School

Designing the connections between structural components according 
to loads is critical to maintaining the load path and 
the structural integrity of school buildings in hurricane-prone 
regions. 

4.3.7 Building Envelope

Newer educational facilities located some distance from the coast 
sustained mainly wind-induced damage to the building envelope, 
primarily to roof coverings and windows. Facilities located along 
the coastline were hit by the storm surge that destroyed most of 
the building envelope on the ground floor, including large sections 
of exterior walls. The walls collapsed under flood loads that 
exceeded all expectations. 

At Charles P. Murphy Elementary School, many of the infill masonry 
walls were displaced, and the concrete slabs on grade were 
uplifted and severely cracked in several classrooms (see Figure 
4-23). A similar slab failure also occurred at D’Iberville Middle 
School. The cause of this type of failure was an increase in upward 
hydrostatic pressure below the slab, causing it to burst upward.


Figure 4-23: Cracked concrete floor slab at Charles B. Murphy 
Elementary School

The St. Stanislaus High School campus consists of several buildings 
that used different exterior wall systems, including masonry 
and precast concrete panels. The masonry walls on the first floor 
were heavily damaged by the storm surge, but it appears that 
the precast concrete panels withstood the force of the hurricane 
much better (see Figure 4-24). Large sections of the exterior masonry 
walls at St. Stanislaus, as well as in Northbay Elementary in 
Bay St Louis and Port Sulphur schools in Plaquemines Parish, collapsed 
under the pressure from storm surge (see Figure 4-25).

Figure 4-24: Precast concrete paneling at St. Stanislaus High 
School

Figure 4-25: Collapsed exterior masonry wall at Port 
Sulphur school campus

The exterior brick veneer walls at the Pass Christian Middle School 
and at St. Stanislaus cracked and separated from the wall framing 
under the impact of storm surge (see Figure 4-26). This kind of 
damage usually results from a failure of brick ties that did not 
manage to hold the brick in place. In many cases these attachments 
can corrode and allow the brick veneer to move under lateral pressure. 
Such damage allows the penetration of water into the interior, 
where additional damage to building contents is inevitable.

The wind-induced damage was limited primarily to the roof components 
at the edge, such as flashing and coping. More substantial 
damage occurred on a building at St. Stanislaus campus and at 
Harrison 9th Grade gym, where large sections of metal roof covering 
were blown away (see Figure 4-27). The standing seam metal 
roof panels peeled back and away from the roof framing, exposing 
the interior to rainwater and additional wind damage. 

Typically, glazed doors, windows, and roof coverings are the 
building envelope components most susceptible to damage caused 
by wind-borne debris. Although glass or shutters designed to resist 
such wind-borne debris are available, none of the educational 
facilities had protection on the windows and doors. The corridor 
windows at D’Iberville High School were broken during the storm, 
which prompted the complete evacuation of the building.

Figure 4-26: Cracked brick veneer at St. Stanislaus High School

For buildings located in flood hazard areas, especially areas not 
subject to storm surge, elevation well above the predicted flood 
level is the most effective damage-reduction measure. Dry floodproofing 
may be used to provide some degree of protection, 
although if floodwaters rise higher than the designed level of 
protection, the damage can be catastrophic. This technique, generally 
feasible for flood depths of only 2 or 3 feet, is expensive 
and difficult to implement on existing buildings. Depending on 
the expected depth of water, local soil properties, and the size 
and location of openings, the facilities can be designed to limit 
water infiltration through the walls, openings, and conduits, and 
prevent envelope failure due to excessive hydrostatic pressure. 
Dry floodproofed buildings must have detailed emergency plans, 
with clear instructions for deployment of devices and other measures. 
Lack of periodic maintenance can render floodproofing 
measures ineffective.

Another alternative for minimizing structural damage to existing 
buildings is to provide wet floodproofing. This approach, which is 
not allowed for new construction, allows water to flood the lower 
floors protected with water-resistant materials and finishes that 
can be easily cleaned and restored.

Figure 4-27: Metal roof covering peeled away at a St. Stanislaus 
campus building

4.3.8 Utility Systems

Educational facilities are typically not equipped with emergency 
back-up systems, but are mostly dependent on municipal water 
and sanitary systems. The breakdown of municipal water and 
sewer services, caused by power outages which shut down water 
treatment plants and pumping stations, adversely affected most of 
the facilities. Although a few of the facilities affected by Hurricane 
Katrina were served by onsite wells and some had septic systems, 
lack of power prevented their full use. The sanitary sewer system 
backed up under pressure from floodwaters and, together with 
the loss of water service, created great difficulties inside facilities 
used as shelters. 

The sanitation problems, especially the unpleasant odors that permeated 
the facilities, combined with high humidity and heat, 
posed a serious health risk. At the D’Iberville High School, the 
loss of water prompted volunteers to haul buckets of water from a 
nearby ditch to be used for flushing the toilets. After the storm had 
passed, portable toilets and showers were brought in by the ARC. 

4.3.9 Mechanical and Electrical Systems

Most mechanical systems depend on the exterior equipment 
mounted on the roof or attached to the exterior walls. The exposed 
equipment is the most vulnerable element in the system, 
because it is commonly damaged by floodwaters, strong wind, 
and wind-borne debris. Rooftop equipment, such as air-handling 
units and exhaust fans, typically were not adequately anchored 
to meet the hurricane-force winds and were frequently damaged 
or toppled. Through-wall fan coil units installed below classroom 
windows at the Charles P. Murphy Elementary School in Pearlington 
were ruined by rising floodwaters (see Figure 4-28). 

As a result of HVAC failures, conditions in shelters became very 
unpleasant because of the heat build-up and the lack of ventilation. 
The interior temperatures and humidity rose to unbearable 
levels because of the hot weather that followed Hurricane Katrina. 
Without the advantage of sufficient natural ventilation, the 
atmosphere quickly became stuffy. Undamaged mechanical equip
ment, especially HVAC systems, was not operational because of 
the power outage and the lack of emergency power supply. At 
D’Iberville High School, the principal reported using a generator 
to run a large portable box fan in the corridors to provide some 
relief. The same generator also provided power for night-time 
lighting in the corridors.

The Harrison County School District office was one of the few 
buildings equipped with a generator, and for that reason it was 
used as an EOC. It served as a command center and provided 
sleeping and dining facilities for emergency crews. The success of 
this experience reinforces the importance of having emergency 
power generator systems and a sufficient fuel supply. Emergency 
generators should be in a protected enclosure and at an elevation 
high enough to prevent flooding.

4.3.10 Nonstructural and Other Systems

It is essential to the operation of educational facilities used as 
place of refuge and recovery shelters that communications systems 
remain operational. The place of refuge shelters had a 
variety of communications systems at their disposal at the beginning 
of the storm. This included the phone system, cellular 
telephones, school system radios, and police and fire radios. 
These systems proved to be unreliable during the storm when 
antennae and utility lines were damaged. Immediately after the 
storm, all communications had to be handled through messengers, 
until portable antennae were brought to restore both cell 
phone and radio service. The Harrison County school board 
is now considering the purchase of satellite phones to be used 
during emergencies.

Figure 4-28: Damaged HVAC unit at Charles B. Murphy 
Elementary School

Nonstructural components and contents of educational facilities 
sustained the greatest damage from flooding. At D’Iberville 
Middle School, all interior wood doors, frames, trims, casework, 
fan coil units, and furniture typically suffered severe damage 
from water exposure. 

The majority of interior walls were constructed of un-reinforced 
concrete masonry. Portions of these walls and some exterior non-
load-bearing walls at Charles P. Murphy Elementary School were 
knocked down by the storm surge (see Figures 4-29 and 4-30). If 
the buildings had been occupied during the storm, people could 
have easily been injured by falling debris. Although many of these 
walls are used as partitions and are consequently not load-bearing, 
their mass poses a threat to life and property should they collapse. 

Figure 4-29: Damaged non-load-bearing walls at Charles 
B. Murphy Elementary School

4.3.11 Equipment and Auxiliary Installations

School equipment is not necessarily important for the operation 
of emergency shelters, except for kitchen and dining facilities. 
Schools that sustained flooding damage usually had all their food 
preparation and refrigeration equipment ruined. The equipment 
stored outside consists mainly of buses and other vehicles. 

In Pass Christian, many of the school buses stationed in the town 
were destroyed by the storm surge (see Figure 4-31), although some 
of them were used during the storm to move people from Pineville 
Elementary School to another shelter because of rising water.

The Harrison County School District moved all of its buses farther 
inland before the storm, which ultimately proved prudent and allowed 
the buses to remain available for use after Katrina. In the 
aftermath, Harrison County School District had no fuel supply to 
operate the buses or other vehicles. Several years ago, the school 
district opted to issue gasoline cards to the bus drivers to fill up at 
various gas stations rather than at a central depot. After the storm 
there were few gas stations operating, and it became a time-consuming 
process to get fuel for any vehicle. In the future, Harrison 
County School District intends to have its own gasoline supply 
available on generator power to ensure that school vehicles are 
kept operational.

Figure 4-30: Interior damage at Charles B. Murphy Elementary 
School

4.3.12 Summary

Educational facilities intended to serve as emergency shelters, 
together with accompanying parking lots and access roads serving 
these shelters, should be located inland, away from the coast, and 
on high enough ground to avoid flooding. Educational facilities 
that are built closer to the shore because of the school district 
boundaries should be constructed with the first floor above the 
highest expected storm surge level. These educational facilities 
should not be used as shelters during a hurricane, but could 
serve as relief centers after the storm, as long as they do not 
sustain significant damage. No educational facilities should be 
constructed within the immediate area along the shore, where 
waves are the strongest.

Based on observations, the most resilient school buildings are 
built using reinforced concrete structural systems, or reinforced 
masonry construction. The best performing roof decks were 
cast-in-place concrete, precast concrete, or concrete topping 
over metal deck. Reinforced concrete or reinforced concrete 
masonry exterior and interior walls, including precast concrete 
panels and tilt-up concrete wall panels, seem to have sustained 
the least flood damage. Other observations indicate that the 
following measures may help reduce the damage in hurricane-
prone regions:

Figure 4-31: School bus washed away by the storm surge

 Doors should be designed to meet the positive and negative 
design wind pressure and impact resistance, as recommended 
in Section 3.4.3.1. Windows should use impact-resistant glazing 
or shutters.
 Educational facilities that will be occupied during a hurricane 
or needed within a few weeks afterwards should be equipped 
with an emergency generator.
 All shelters should have protected communications systems 
linked to the EOC.
 Exterior corridors should be enclosed to allow full access 
between buildings, so that no one is forced to go outside 
during a storm to get to another area of a building.
 All educational facilities intended for use as evacuation shelters 
should be designed according to FEMA 361 guidelines.

4.4 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES 

4.4.1 Background

Emergency response facilities include EOCs, police stations, 
and fire rescue stations. All of these facilities are 
considered critical because they must remain functional 
to manage response and recovery operations during and after 
a hazard event. EOCs function as incident command centers 
for coordination and support of all emergency activities. The 
command and response personnel must remain on duty, in full 
readiness for action both during and in the aftermath of a disaster. 
In addition to personnel and resources, EOCs house the 
information and communications systems that provide feedback 
to the emergency managers to help them make decisions about 
efficient and effective deployment of resources. They also relay 
information to local residents, shelters, media, and other first 
responders, while providing Continuity of Government (COG) 
and Continuity of Operations (COOP).
Police and fire rescue facilities are critical to disaster response, 
because an interruption in their operation as a result 
of building or equipment failure may prevent rescue operations, 
evacuation, assistance delivery, or general maintenance 
of law and order, which can have serious consequences for the 
community.

While each of the three types of emergency response facilities 
is used for different operational purposes and their needs are 
different, most of them require and depend on the following 
facilities:

Back-Up Communications Equipment: Conventional communications 
that rely on radio towers with repeater systems cannot be relied 
upon during high-wind events, because of the high probability 
that the towers will lose power, as occurred in many jurisdictions 
in Mississippi and Louisiana. All facilities need back-up communications 
systems such as very high-frequency (VHF) and ham 
radios, and adequate back-up communications equipment.

Accommodation Space: Adequate space for all the essential personnel 
to work, with provisions made for continuous operations, 
such as sleep areas, kitchens (with supplies for all duty personnel), 
laundry facilities, and shower facilities for all such personnel. It 
should also be noted that many residents view the local fire station 
as a point of shelter, and will seek it as a refuge when winds and 
conditions become dangerous in their own homes. 

Situation Rooms: “Meeting rooms” in which to conduct local government 
business as well as confer with community members, 
media, and government officials, and for press conferences and 
dissemination of information.

Safe Equipment Storage: Patrol and rescue vehicles and other equipment 
must be adequately protected from flood waters, wind-borne 
debris, and driving rain, and be accessible and readily available for 
emergency use.

The observations included in this section are based on the examination 
of the following facilities:

 Harrison County EOC (Gulfport, Mississippi)
 Jackson County EOC (Pascagoula, Mississippi)
 New Orleans EOC (New Orleans, Louisiana)
 Hancock County EOC (Bay Saint Louis, Mississippi)
 Orleans District Levee Board Police Department (New 
Orleans, Louisiana)
 New Orleans Police Department (New Orleans, Louisiana)
 Gulfport Police Department (Gulfport, Mississippi)
 Pass Christian Police Department (Pass Christian, Mississippi)
 New Orleans Fire Department (New Orleans, Louisiana)
 Gulfport Fire Department (Gulfport, Mississippi)
 Pass Christian Fire Department (Pass Christian, Mississippi)
 Cuevas Volunteer Fire Department (Pass Christian, 
Mississippi)
 Back Bay Fire Company #3 (Biloxi, Mississippi)

4.4.2 Effects of Flooding

Flooding during Hurricane Katrina, especially the impact of the 
storm surge and levee failures, caused heavy damage that disrupted 
the long-term functional capabilities of the emergency 
response system. 

The facilities damaged by rising water were generally rendered 
uninhabitable after the water receded. As a result, the 
emergency response teams were forced to relocate the operations 
elsewhere. Evacuation and relocation was common among 
damaged fire rescue and police facilities and affected their operations 
on many levels. Firstly, relocating farther away from their 
service areas meant that the response time to emergency calls increased 
substantially. Secondly, the response teams were forced 
to operate from temporary accommodations with inadequate facilities 
that were frequently overcrowded. Thirdly, new facilities 
lacked adequate supplies and services for the extra personnel, 
which required numerous improvisations, further hampering the 
operations.

4.4.3 Effects of High Winds

The highest gust wind speeds during Hurricane Katrina were typically 
below the design wind speeds for this area, which range 
from 120 to 150 mph. Despite this, many emergency response facilities 
sustained damage that disrupted their operations, and in a 
few cases shut down the facility. Most of the damage was confined 
to the building envelope. Portions of metal roofing were lifted 
and peeled off; aggregate roof surfacing was blown off, becoming 
wind-borne debris; and roof-mounted equipment, including communication 
towers and antennae, were toppled or broken. Metal 
wall-cladding panels detached or peeled off on a number of facilities, 
exposing the interior to pressurization and rainwater 
penetration. Doors and windows were damaged by wind-borne debris, 
allowing the penetration of wind-driven rain. 

4.4.4 Site Selection

Ideally, the emergency response facilities should not be located in 
a floodplain or a site exposed to other types of hazards. However, 
emergency response facilities, especially fire rescue and police stations, 
must contend with geographic limitations pertaining to size 
and adequate coverage of their service areas that frequently place 
them in hazardous locations. Many of the facilities flooded during 
Katrina were located in designated floodplains. However, this 
fact alone does not explain the catastrophic damage sustained by 
facilities such as the police and fire stations in Pass Christian, Mississippi 
(see Figure 4-32), because most of the facilities damaged 
by flooding were built above the minimum required elevations. 
The primary reason for the widespread damage is the catastrophic 
nature of the flooding, caused by extremely high storm surge and 
the failure of levees in New Orleans. 

In locations where the emergency response facilities were built to 
a higher standard than required by local regulations, the adverse 
effects of Katrina were substantially reduced. The Jackson County 
EOC occupies the second floor of a municipal building located 
in Pascagoula, Mississippi. An examination of the storm surge 
flooding associated with different hurricane scenarios indicated 
that the site would be inundated during a Category 3 hurricane. 
Consequently, the county decided to design the building to be 
approximately 4.5 feet above BFE (see Figure 4-33). During Hurricane 
Katrina, floodwaters rose to about an inch below the level 
of the lowest floor. The building was not evacuated prior to the 
storm, because it was believed that flooding would not exceed the 
maximum levels recorded during Hurricane Camille. As floodwaters 
started to rise, the decision was made to evacuate most of the 
occupants to another building across the street. Despite this action, 
the EOC operations were not hampered significantly. 

The Pass Christian police and west side fire station were less fortunate, 
as the storm surge flooding at these sites far exceeded the 
base flood elevation. It was estimated that the storm surge wave 
that hit the police building was at least 15 to 20 feet high, which 
rendered the building and the equipment stored inside totally unusable. 
The facility is currently looking at an alternative site on 
higher ground as a possible site for relocation and construction of 
a new station. 

The headquarters of the New Orleans Police Department had 
approximately 2- to 3-foot deep water on the first floor, and a completely 
flooded basement (see Figure 4-34). The surrounding 
areas were also under water, isolating the facility and preventing 
its normal operation. All operations had to be transferred to other 
police facilities in the city.

Figure 4-32: Police station in Pass Christian

The Hancock County EOC in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, is located 
on naturally high ground outside mapped flood hazard areas. 
Nevertheless, the floodwaters inundated the ground level, damaging 
the interior finishes and practically destroying all equipment 
and contents (see Figure 4-35). Most of the EOC’s operations were 
transferred to an alternate location prior to Katrina’s landfall, 
most likely because the facility is mapped as part of an evacuation 
zone in case of a hurricane.

Figure 4-33: Jackson County EOC

Figure 4-34: New Orleans Police Department Headquarters

Site characteristics and landscaping contributed significantly to the 
extent and type of damage sustained by these facilities. The Gulfport 
Fire Station #5 in Gulfport, Mississippi, experienced significant disruption 
because of downed trees. One tree fell on the roof, causing 
minor damage, while two vehicles parked outside were severely damaged 
by the fallen trees. Furthermore, it took approximately 12 
hours of cutting the trees before firefighters were able to open 
the access road and start responding to emergency calls. This experience 
also underscores the need to provide multiple routes into 
and away from a site, in order to have redundancy and minimize the 
possibility of isolation as a result of roadway blockage.

The experience during Hurricane Katrina proved the efficacy of 
preventive evacuation of equipment and personnel to a safe and 
secure location. It also proved wise to organize back-up facilities in 
other locations or in adjacent jurisdictions to serve as alternative 
command and operation centers. Emergency response facilities 
that did so were better equipped to respond to citizens’ needs immediately 
after the storm. 

4.4.5 Architectural Design

Many buildings used as emergency response facilities were not 
initially designed for that purpose, or for operations under emergency 
conditions. During and after Hurricane Katrina, most of 
them experienced significant problems, irrespective of the level 
of damage. Some of these facilities are located in existing buildings 
designed as regular office space. These facilities performed 
poorly, and although they were able to adapt to the circumstances, 
they did not operate as efficiently as those designed for their particular 
functions.
 
Figure 4-35: Hancock County EOC

For example, EOC facilities in New Orleans were placed into civic 
center offices, which were not equipped with kitchens, showers, 
and other facilities essential for the smooth and continuous operation 
of an EOC (see Figure 4-36). As a consequence, the facility 
had to be relocated immediately after Katrina because the available 
accommodations were insufficient and poorly equipped. 
Some of the buildings occupied by first responders were originally 
designed for a different purpose and subsequently converted to 
their current use. 

Figure 4-36: New Orleans EOC in the City Hall building

Generally, any building, whether new or old, that is used as an 
emergency response facility should be carefully reviewed for compliance 
with the requirements for uninterrupted operation of 
the facility. Particular attention should be paid to issues that have 
historically caused problems in building or operational performance, 
such as: 

 Roof systems not designed for high winds and debris impact
 Rooftop equipment
 Unprotected exterior glazing
 Large, sectional and rolling doors not designed for high winds
 Communications towers
 Large roof overhangs
 Lack of facilities for an extended length of stay, especially 
emergency sanitary facilities and power supply
Basements are another design feature with a high damage potential, 
especially when important services and facility functions are 
located there. The basement at the New Orleans Police Department 
completely flooded, and all the essential equipment located there 
was severely damaged, crippling the facility for a long time. Observations 
indicate that essential functions and service equipment should 
be transferred from flood-prone basements to safer locations.

The relatively new Back Bay Fire Company #3 station in Biloxi, 
Mississippi, was built in 1996, and yet its design does not reflect 
the current needs of its occupants. The spaces are too small to accommodate 
the duty shifts. The kitchen is inadequate for longer 
stays, while the sleeping area has unprotected, large, storefront-
type windows that represent a serious hazard in high-wind 
situations (see Figure 4-37). These minor architectural deficiencies 
may be amplified during the times of crisis and adversely 
affect the operation of the facility, especially if combined with 
other building component failures.

4.4.6 Structural Systems

Concrete and reinforced masonry have traditionally been the most 
robust structural systems for hurricane-prone areas, since they 
have a much higher reserve structural strength than other systems. 
During high-wind conditions, the added weight of the concrete 
helps counteract the uplift forces, while the mass and depth of concrete 
and masonry walls provides reserve structural strength that 
prevents the walls from being breached during high winds and 
flood conditions. However, with precast concrete elements, attention 
to design and construction of connections is important. This 
was generally confirmed during Hurricane Katrina. 

The Jackson County EOC, located in Pascagoula, Mississippi, was 
built in 1977 and is an example of a structurally well-designed facility. 
The structure is composed of cast-in-place concrete, and 
performed remarkably well (see Figure 4-38). Although the EOC 
is located on the second floor of the building, water only came 
within 1 inch of the ground floor, which is approximately 4 to 5 
feet above the surrounding grade. Other structural systems proven 
to be resistant to flood and wind loads are steel or concrete frames 
that are covered with precast concrete panels. These systems have 
very high reserve capacities that perform extremely well during 
high winds and storm surges. 

Figure 4-37: Back Bay Fire Company #3

In contrast, pre-engineered metal buildings performed less well. 
Although the main structural components of most of these buildings 
remained standing, suffering only light damage, the rest 
of the building components were not able to resist the forces of 
storm surge. Two prime examples of these buildings are the Pass 
Christian Police Department Headquarters and the Gulfport Fire 
Department Station #7 (see Figures 4-32 and 4-39). Both of these 
buildings were severely damaged and all equipment stored inside 
was destroyed. 

Based on the observations, many existing structures can be retrofitted 
to perform better during high winds. Although such 
retrofits may be expensive and generally have limited capacity to 
strengthen the structure, they definitely increase the overall structural 
resistance. For example, roof decking can be retrofitted with 
additional connections to provide increased uplift resistance. Furthermore, 
roof decks should be attached securely to make the 
building diaphragm work as a unit and transfer loads adequately 
to the walls, while simultaneously preventing the deck from being 
pulled from the structure during high winds. 

Figure 4-38: Reinforced concrete building for Jackson County EOC

4.4.7 Building Envelope

When the building envelope is breached, the interior is no longer 
protected from the outdoor environment and the whole building 
is exposed to additional forces that may cause its progressive 
collapse. 

The Gulfport Police Department Headquarters and the Pass 
Christian Police Station are the prime examples of building envelope 
failure. Both buildings, located near the coast, were exposed 
to the storm surge that crushed the lightly built exterior walls and 
destroyed everything in the interior. Fire Station #7 was breached 
by the storm surge, and practically the entire building envelope 
was washed away, except for the roof deck. What remained of the 
building was just a shell (see Figure 4-40). The duty personnel and 
most of the vehicles were relocated to other facilities until a trailer 
was provided as a temporary place of operations. 

On the other hand, the Gulfport Police Department Headquarters 
building, constructed with heavy concrete masonry 
walls, sustained no significant damage to the building envelope. 
The building only required restoration of flooded building 
components. 

Figure 4-39: Gulfport Fire Station #7

Longbeach Police Station sustained heavy damage to its roof 
trusses, metal roof, and siding that allowed wind and rainwater 
to saturate the interior of the building. The police officers had 
to scramble to evacuate the prisoners and valuable records before 
they abandoned the building in the middle of the storm (see 
Figure 4-41).

Figure 4-40: Exterior walls on the Gulfport Fire Station #7 
washed away by the storm surge

Figure 4-41: Longbeach Police Station

Third District Fire Station in New Orleans is a newer one-story, 
structural steel-framed building with brick veneer walls, metal 
fascia panels, steel roof deck, rigid plastic foam roof insulation, 
and metal roof panels. The estimated maximum wind speed at 
this location during Hurricane Katrina was significantly lower 
than the design wind speed. Nevertheless, a large portion of the 
metal roof covering was blown off the apparatus bay (see Figure 
4-42). In some areas, the architectural metal wall panels with 
standing seams covered by snap-on battens were still in place, 
but the batten covers had broken away. In other areas, the batten 
covers were still attached, but they had lifted—it appeared that fatigue 
cracks occurred along the standing seams (see Figure 4-43). 
Battens like these are frequently susceptible to blow-off, which allows 
water infiltration and may lead to panel blow-off. Both the 
battens and separated panels may become dangerous wind-borne 
debris. This station was occupied at the time of the storm, but 
because of the extensive damage to the interior, apparatus bay 
doors, and the equipment, it could not be used and was consequently 
evacuated. 

Figure 4-42: Metal roof and wall panels peeled off the Third 
District Fire Station in New Orleans

Although the estimated wind speed in Bay St. Louis was slightly 
lower than the design wind speed, the wind blew off most of the 
roof membrane from the Hancock County EOC, located in the 
city (see Figure 4-44). The damage was initiated with the separation 
of metal edge flashing that had an uncleated vertical face. In 
addition to roof damage, the hardware on the exterior door failed 
and the door blew inward. As a result of rainwater penetration and 
flooding, most of the interior was ruined. Although most of the 
facility operations were moved before hurricane landfall, the remaining 
building occupants had to be evacuated during the event. 

Jackson County EOC in Pascagoula experienced similar damage 
to its roofing when the metal edge flashing peeled off and lifted 
portions of the roof membrane. However, the roof damage did 
not cause water damage, because the cast-in-place reinforced concrete 
roof deck was capable of resisting rainwater penetration. 
The building’s reinforced concrete walls and roof deck resisted 
the wind loads very well. The walls and roof deck were also extremely 
resistant to wind-borne debris, as was the exterior glazing 
retrofitted with shutters that protected the openings.

The edge flashing on low-slope roofs that usually initiates 
the peeling of roof membranes can be easily retrofitted with 
additional screws, to prevent it from uplifting and causing a progressive 
failure of the roofing system.

Figure 4-43: Lifted batten covers on Third District Fire Station 
metal roof

Fire stations are especially susceptible to breaches of the building 
envelope, because of their large sectional and rolling doors that 
are usually not strong enough to resist wind forces, and even less 
so the hydrodynamic forces of storm surge. The apparatus bay 
doors failed in many fire stations affected by flooding. (see Figures 
4-39 and 4-45).

Water and wind from the storm were able to penetrate the buildings 
when the doors were breached, causing subsequent damage 
to other systems and equipment. Large doors should be designed 
to withstand wind pressures and windborne debris impact as recommended 
in Section 3.4.3.1.

All doors and windows can also be replaced with modern, impact-
resistant systems that would reduce the chances of building 
pressurization and rainwater infiltration, which resulted in heavy 
losses to equipment and contents during Katrina. Rooftop units 
that were blown off and damaged the building envelope by puncturing 
the roof covering should be securely anchored to prevent 
such damage in the future. 

Figure 4-44: Roof damage at Hancock County EOC

4.4.8 Utility Plumbing Systems

Failures of public utility systems during Katrina were very common. 
Many first responder facilities were forced to improvise short-term 
solutions until public utilities were restored. The Gulfport Fire Department 
Headquarters was able to back-feed water into its lines by 
isolating the building’s water supply lines from the public municipal 
supply system. They then fed water directly into the building’s 
water lines in order to have water to shower and wash during the 
two weeks that they were without water in the facility. This capability 
should be considered for all emergency response facilities, as 
it minimizes disruption of basic sanitary functions. 

In many facilities, flooding caused sewage to backflow into buildings, 
causing sanitary crises that directly affected their operations. 
Valuable time was spent cleaning up the facilities instead of 
helping others. To prevent this from occurring in future events the 
installation of backflow inhibitors (check valves) is recommended.

The Pass Christian Fire Department managed the loss of sanitary 
systems with plastic bags and buckets, while the staff at the Gulfport 
Police Department was able to acquire and use portable toilets 
and bottled water until public utility systems were restored. The 
Jackson County, Mississippi, EOC is equipped with a pressurized 
underground tank for toilets and washing, which supported the occupants 
during the 3 to 4 weeks that the facility was without water.

Figure 4-45: Damaged apparatus bay doors at Port Sulphur 
Volunteer Fire Department. 

The Cuevas Volunteer Fire Department in Pass Christian, Mississippi, 
was equipped with an underground septic tank, a drain 
field, and a well, and did not experience significant disruptions in 
its plumbing and fresh water systems. These independent septic 
and fresh water systems do not rely on public municipal systems, 
and are preferred where possible as they virtually eliminate the 
chances of disruption during widespread outages.

4.4.9 Mechanical and Electrical Systems 

Hurricane Katrina also affected facilities by damaging or destroying 
mechanical systems. Hurricane season occurs in the 
warmest months of the year, and many of these facilities were not 
designed to allow natural ventilation. For example, the New Orleans 
Police Department Headquarters Building is a multi-story 
building where the main circuitry for the HVAC system, which was 
located in the basement, was severely damaged by the flood. Since 
the building was designed as a closed structure, natural ventilation 
was a problem (see Figure 4-46). All the equipment located in the 
basement needed to be completely rebuilt or replaced before the 
building could be occupied again. In the interim, the entire department 
was forced to relocate its operations to other facilities in 
the city, placing a strain on facilities not intended to house additional 
personnel and take on additional responsibilities.

The inability to air-condition buildings because of damaged 
mechanical and electrical systems allowed internal temperatures 
and humidity to reach intolerable levels, and in many buildings 
mold began to form.

Loss of electrical power during and after Hurricane Katrina affected 
all other essential facility systems. Examples of this were 
evident at all of the sites visited. Utility, mechanical, and communications 
systems became partially or completely unusable, either 
because emergency power was not available, or it had to be rationed 
as a result of overload or breakdown of generators.

Cuevas Volunteer Fire Department, located inland at Pass Christian, 
Mississippi, was without municipal power for approximately 
2 to 3 days, but, since its generator functioned properly, their operations 
were only slightly affected by the storm. In contrast, the 
indoor generator and electrical panel at the Back Bay Fire Company 
#3 in Biloxi, Mississippi, became submerged in the flood, 
even though the generator was mounted several feet above the 
finished floor. The water flooded the building, putting all the mechanical 
and electrical equipment, including the generator, out 
of commission. As the water continued to rise, the firefighters and 
the local residents that sought refuge in the station had to climb 
to the top of fire engines until the floodwaters receded.

The New Orleans District 3 Fire Department Headquarters lost 
power as a result of flooding. The generator was located outside 
at grade level, and was ruined when approximately 2 feet of water 
flooded the area (see Figure 4-47). The firefighters were forced to 
relocate to the nearby West Bank facility for 4 months, until power 
was restored at the headquarters building. 

Facilities that escaped deep flooding were typically operational 
immediately upon restoration of power. The Gulfport Fire Department 
Station #1 had water barely enter the station, and was able 
to get by on their generator for 3 days until municipal power was 
restored. Although their radios worked intermittently, they were 
able to perform their search and rescue duties and use their newly 
acquired chainsaws to help clear the roads of debris.

Figure 4-46: Fixed windows on New Orleans Police Department 
Headquarters

The need to provide a back-up generator at a safe and elevated location 
is confirmed by the experiences during Hurricane Katrina. 
Many facilities were without power because of the low elevation 
and subsequent flooding of their generators. Jackson County EOC 
had its emergency power station elevated and protected in a separate 
enclosure, which allowed the facility to operate without 
interruption (see Figure 4-48). 

Figure 4-47: Generator mounted at grade level damaged by 
flooding

Figure 4-48: Jackson County EOC’s elevated generator 
enclosure

4.4.10 Communications Systems

It is essential for the operation of emergency response facilities 
to keep their communications systems intact. Loss of communication 
capability prevents their primary function of responding to 
community needs and adversely affects their ability to coordinate 
their actions. If the communications system malfunctions or becomes 
unavailable, the coordination between command centers 
will be hindered, affecting management of the response and recovery 
operations during and after an event. Many jurisdictions 
in New Orleans and along the Gulf Coast were cut off from each 
other and could not communicate, even with their own departments. 
For example, one police officer from the Orleans District 
Levee Board Police Department was in the heart of New Orleans 
when the city was flooded, and had no way of communicating with 
the senior officials in his department. He worked for days with the 
officers of the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) assisting 
the remaining residents in the city. For a period of days, he and 
his partners from NOPD were operating without communications 
capabilities of any sort until the military arrived and issued them 
new radios. It took approximately 2 to 3 weeks for communications 
to be re-established in a manner that resembled normalcy.

The command and communications center for the police and fire 
rescue departments in Pass Christian, Mississippi, was located in 
the police department building, and was crippled as a result of the 
destruction of their headquarters (see Figure 4-49). The landline 
communications at the Jackson County, Mississippi, EOC continued 
to function for a day or two, and other communications 
systems only experienced minor problems. The building was used 
during and after the storm.

Hurricane Katrina experience indicates that alternative forms of 
communication need to be available during and in the aftermath 
of a storm. High-frequency and ham radios that do not rely on repeater 
systems should be in place, along with detailed instructions 
and plans for their use in emergencies. Emergency power supply 
for communications systems must be available at all times. This 
relatively low-cost solution would reduce the loss of communications 
during and after future events.

4.4.11 Equipment and Auxiliary Installations

Specialized equipment such as vehicles, rescue equipment, and 
fire pumps were the most common types of equipment lost during 
Hurricane Katrina. Damage to vehicles and other equipment seriously 
affected the operations, and frequently prevented speedy 
rescue and response efforts. 

In many cases throughout Mississippi and Louisiana, the vehicles 
were stored immediately outside on facility parking lots while most 
of the specialized equipment was stored inside in apparatus bays. 
In other cases, as in Pass Christian, Mississippi, the police department 
stationed its vehicles in a remote location that was thought 
to be safe, but the entire area flooded and all vehicles were rendered 
useless. In Pass Christian the fire department, located 
approximately a quarter of a mile from the coastline, had four 
firefighting trucks and two rescue trucks ruined during the storm, 
hampering firefighters’ efforts in responding to emergencies that 
required the use of their equipment. Gulfport Police Department 
and the New Orleans District Levee Board Police Department deployed 
their vehicles all over the area to ensure that the vehicles 
would be available on short notice after the storm.

Figure 4-49: Broken communications masts at Pass Christian 
Police Station

For the 2006 hurricane season, Pass Christian emergency response 
plans include the evacuation of all vehicles to a staging site away 
from the coastline, and away from trees and other objects that may 
become wind-borne debris. This geographic distancing of vehicles 
from the coastline (and the area affected most by the storm and 
its surge) will protect key equipment and reduce the impact of a 
future storm by allowing the first responders to be mobile shortly 
after the event. It should be noted, however, that many jurisdictions 
in low-lying areas do not have safe staging sites at higher 
elevations or away from the coastline. 

Based on conversations with many emergency response crews that 
were affected by Katrina, the protection of their equipment and 
vehicles was a main consideration prior to the storm. Many jurisdictions 
throughout Mississippi and Louisiana decided to spread 
their vehicles out to many locations thought to be safe, in order to 
be certain that at least some of them would remain operational. 
This practice proved prudent and enhanced their abilities to respond 
in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. The vehicles 
should be sheltered in an area that is safe from flooding hazard 
and easily accessible after the event. 

4.4.12 Summary

Emergency response services are at the backbone of a community’s 
ability to protect and save the lives and property of its citizens 
in any crisis. The provision of these services depends on the uninterrupted 
operation of emergency response facilities during 
and after a hazard event. This means not only that the buildings 
that house the crews and equipment must survive the onslaught 
of flooding and high winds with minimal damage, but that all the 
equipment and systems necessary for emergency operations must 
remain fully functional. 

Hurricane Katrina showed that emergency response facilities 
have a better chance of protecting their operations if they occupy 
solidly constructed buildings with sufficient reserve structural 
capacity that cannot be easily overwhelmed by a storm of this magnitude. 
It also showed that facilities with functional generators 
were better equipped to respond after the storm than those that 
were left completely without power. Since the facilities cannot operate without 
adequate emergency power supply, all electrical 
systems should be connected to power back-ups, and emergency 
generators should be elevated and protected against floodwaters 
and wind-borne debris. 

Mechanical systems need to be located in a sheltered area, where 
they will not be damaged by wind and flooding. Plumbing systems 
should be equipped with backflow inhibitors to prevent sewage 
from entering the structure during a flood. Provisions should also 
be made to allow the isolation of the building’s water supply, so 
that it is possible to feed water directly into the building’s water 
lines until municipal water supplies are restored. 

Finally, the lines of communication between community command 
centers and individual facilities must remain functional at 
all times. The basic communications systems need to be protected 
against the effects of flooding and high-winds as much as possible, 
but as this storm showed, system redundancy is still the best 
policy. In the event of damage, the facilities should have alternative 
means of communication that do not depend on local systems 
and networks that could be damaged in the storm.

[End of Chapter 4]