Docs 63-70
February 9-28: Westmoreland's Augmentation Request
63. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) and the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/
Saigon, February 9, 1968, 1633Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, William C. Westmoreland Papers, #29 History File, 1-29 Feb 68 [II]. Top Secret. In telegram JCS 1529 to Westmoreland, February 7, Wheeler cautioned that the motive behind the enemy's strategy for the build-up in I Corps and especially around Khe Sanh was to compel Westmoreland to commit his troops to the area, thereby exposing the South Vietnamese Army in Saigon and other parts of the country to attack. To counter this strategy, Wheeler suggested that the 82d Airborne and one-half of a Marine division (the 6/9 Marine Division available in the Pacific Command) could be sent to Vietnam. In conclusion, Wheeler noted: "The United States is not prepared to accept a defeat in South Vietnam. In summary, if you need more troops, ask for them." (U.S. Army Center for Military History, William C. Westmoreland Papers, Eyes Only Message File, 1 Feb.-29 Feb. 1968)
MAC 01858. References: A. JCS 01590, DTG 090021Z;/2/ B. CINCPAC DTG 090359Z;/3/ C. MAC 01810, DTG 081440Z./4/
/2/In telegram JCS 1590 to Westmoreland, February 9, Wheeler suggested that Westmoreland issue a request signaling a greater urgency. "Please understand that I am not trying to sell you on the deployment of additional forces which in any event I cannot guarantee," Wheeler argued. "However, my sensing is that the critical phase of the war is upon us, and I do not believe that you should refrain from asking for what you believe is required under the circumstances." (Johnson Library, William C. Westmoreland Papers, #29 History File, 1-29 Feb 68 [II])
/3/In this unnumbered telegram to Westmoreland, February 9, Sharp accepted the possibility that "the Khe Sanh buildup might be a threat to syphon off troops from the south in order to weaken U.S. and ARVN as much as possible to facilitate attack on Saigon" and requested Westmoreland's analysis of whether the enemy might also be able to infiltrate troops inside Saigon while it simultaneously attacked the city from without. (Ibid.)
/4/In telegram MAC 1810 to Wheeler, February 8, Westmoreland, concerned about the degree to which his forces were stretched and citing the possibility that Khe Sanh could be lost, formally requested the dispatch by April to Vietnam of the troops to which Wheeler had referred. (Ibid.) Westmoreland also attempted to obtain supplemental forces to fulfill long-range requirements. In telegram MAC 1812 to Wheeler, February 8, Westmoreland detailed the areas in which an additional number of troops above the previously established ceiling of 525,000 would be utilized. (Ibid.) In replying in telegram JCS 1589 to Westmoreland, February 9, Wheeler offered the following caution against such expansion: "I believe it imperative that you hold up the front channel submission of your supplemental requirements for the coming year until at least the early part of March. I fear that, until we have fully sorted out and acted upon your immediate requirements stemming from the present situation in Vietnam, the fulfilling of those requirements could very well be jeopardized by adding your longer range requirements at this particular time." (Ibid.)
1. (U) Since references A and B concern the same general subject, I will answer them collectively.
2. (S) To put the situation in context, it might be desirable to give you my views of the enemy's strategy and the plans that he developed in Hanoi during early fall. It would seem that the enemy concluded that a protracted war was not in his long-range interest in view of the success of our ground and air actions against his forces, supplies, and facilities. He therefore decided to adopt an alternate strategy to bring the war to an early conclusion. Stemming from this strategy, there evolved a plan that I reconstruct in three phases. Phase I, which started at the end of October and was scheduled to go until the first of the year, had as its objective the seizure of selected areas in remote provinces along the Lao and Cambodian borders and consolidation of these areas pending further operations to expand his area of control. Also during this phase, he proceeded to concentrate on district towns to disrupt the political and military control structure outside the cities. During this phase, we saw the major attack on Dak To; attacks by fire on Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban Me Thuot; and major ground attacks against Loc Ninh, Bu Dop, and Song Be; and attacks against innumerable district towns and outposts. As you know, this phase achieved very limited success, resulted in large casualties to the enemy, and a failure to physically control more territory in South Vietnam. An enclave strategy would have played into his hands. The second phase, which we saw start at Tet, involved infiltration of cities to destroy the political and military control apparatus and to bring about a public uprising. In the border areas, this phase was designed to support his plan to seize control of Pleiku and Darlac Provinces which would give him de facto control of the eastern portion of the country from the Ashau Valley in western Thua Thien all the way down through War Zone C in northern Tay Ninh. The third phase, which is yet to begin, would involve consolidation of his position and strong attacks across the DMZ and against Khe Sanh with the objective of establishing military control over the two northern provinces, thereby bringing about a de facto partition of the country from wherein he would control Quang Tri and Thua Thien, western Quang Nam, western Quang Tin, and the Provinces of Kontum, Pleiku, Darlac, Quang Duc, and at least the northern portions of Phuoc Long, Bien Long, and Tay Ninh. Under the circumstances, he would have created a situation similar to that which now prevails in Laos and would therefore be in a strong negotiating position, particularly if he were successful in his design to assume control of the cities and bring about a public uprising.
3. As to the present situation, an enemy threat of major proportions is still posed north of the DMZ and around Khe Sanh. In addition, the enemy is applying considerable pressure to the Hue area and to Highway 1 north of Danang. Furthermore, he has a number of battalions directly south of Danang which pose a threat to the air field and the city. The 3d Mar Div is in good posture at Khe Sanh and south of the DMZ. The 1st Cav Div is in Quang Tri Province with two battalions in blocking positions north of Hue. A Marine regiment is securing Hue/Phu Bai and assisting in the clearing of Hue City. The Marines have made excellent progress, but the going by the ARVN in the citadel has been slow and they will probably be with it for several more days. The road over Ai Van Pass is cut, with little prospect of being opened until additional troops and engineers can be provided. Because of this situation, I am deploying by air tomorrow a battalion of the 101st Abn Div to Hue/Phu Bai to assist in the security of that important area and will be moving out by LST a second battalion of the 101st to Danang on the 12th with the mission of providing security for Highway 1 over Ai Van Pass. Also I am sending by sea an army combat engineer battalion to work on Highway 1. The controlling factor in Quang Tri and Thua Thien is logistics, now marginal at best. It is essential that we open up Highway 1 and the Marines cannot spare the forces to do the job. The situation in Hue should improve because a task force of three Vietnamese Marine battalions that are in good strength will be replacing the three understrength abn bns now fighting in the city along with elements of the ARVN 1st Div.
4. The situation in II Corps is generally favorable but there is some fighting with enemy elements in Dalat and a sizeable threat exists at Dak To. I believe we have enough forces in Dak To, but Rosson is prepared to reinforce with elements of the 173d.
5. In III Corps, fighting continues in Saigon, but this situation should be cleared up shortly, despite the fact that I expect the enemy to increase his effort there in the next several days. Today I deployed a US battalion in the area in order to energize the ARVN and to permit them to redeploy a battalion to another part of the city. North and east of Saigon there are elements of the 9th and 5th VC Divisions and further north we have the 7th NVA Div. The 5th and 9th Divisions have been hurt by recent actions and their capability is considered limited. On the other hand, the 7th Div is in fair shape, but we have been putting the pressure on them through ground raids, artillery, and air strikes during the last week, which has probably degraded their capability. Weyand has so disposed his forces that the enemy will have difficulty getting an attack off the ground and could only do so at great risk. During the last several days, Saigon has been reinforced by two Marine battalions which were deployed from the II Corps. I am planning to move the mobile riverine force into Long An on the 12th and if necessary can reinforce with troops now in the IV Corps on short notice. Finally, there is an airborne battalion at Phan Thiet which I can use to further reinforce if required. In summary, despite the deployment of two airborne battalions to I Corps, I feel that our posture in III Corps is adequate to cope with the situation.
In IV Corps, I now have five battalions of the 9th Div, to include the mobile riverine force. They have done an excellent job and in my opinion have saved the situation in My Tho and Ben Tre. Yesterday I planned to move the mobile riverine force to Long An on the 10th, but because of continued activity near My Tho I have decided to leave them in that area until the 12th.
6. The only really serious threat that faces me now is in the I Corps area, where we are limited by logistics, weather, the closure of Highway 1 and enemy initiatives. It is important that I reinforce soonest with a minimum of two battalions.
7. One of the problems that concerns me is the shortage of strength in the ARVN units. The situation was brought about by high casualties during the past week and absentees from the units because of Tet. Most of these absentees were authorized in that leaves were permitted and the troops have not been able to get back to their units. On the other hand, I think we must realistically expect desertions to be high. It is going to take some time to build the ARVN back up to strength. I have emphasized this to Pres. Thieu and urged that he proceed immediately to draft 19-year-olds, to be followed as needed by the drafting of youths of 18. Furthermore, we plan to increase the Vietnamese Armed Forces by 65,000, and Thieu has recently asked if we can support an even greater build-up. In my opinion, we will have no difficulty supporting any build-up that they can accomplish. After filling their depleted ranks, I doubt their ability to recruit and train units beyond the planned strength increase of 65,000.
8. I have now deployed to I Corps the 1st Cav Div less a brigade, plus a brigade of the 101st Abn Div. I will be deploying shortly two additional battalions of the 101st and will be prepared to deploy a third battalion with a brigade headquarters at a later time. In my opinion, this is the minimum force that I will need to insure stability of the situation in the two northern provinces, but even this may not be enough. I may have to employ the entire 101st Div and am prepared to do so, depending upon enemy actions. However, logistics is the key and this means opening Highway 1. During the next several months, I would move into the Ashau Valley and clean it out and to open up the road to Khe Sanh. On the other hand, I will have to give priority to moving against the enemy once he has committed himself. I am not happy about thinning out III Corps, but the departure of the 101st will not present an unacceptable risk; it will slow down progress that could otherwise be made in defeating main force units in the area and in supporting pacification.
9. Needless to say, I would welcome reinforcements at any time they can be made available:
A. To put me in a stronger posture to contain the enemy's major campaign in the DMZ-Quang Tri-Thua Thien area and to go on the offensive as soon as his attack is spent.
B. To permit me to carry out my campaign plans despite the enemy's reinforcements from North Vietnam which have influenced my deployments and plans.
C. To off-set the weakened Vietnamese forces resulting from casualties and Tet desertions. Realistically, we must assume that it will take them at least six months to regain the military posture of several weeks ago. I should point out in this connection that when one considers the casualties inflicted on the enemy, this is not an expected [unexpected?] price to pay.
D. To take advantage of the enemy's weakened position by going on the offensive against him.
10. If the one-half Marine division were made available now, I would of course assign it to III MAF, for either north of Danang or in Quang Tin Province thereby releasing elements of the Americal Division for deployment further south. If the 82d Abn Div were available now, I would want it to arrive at Danang and be deployed north in the Ai Van Pass and thence to the Hue-Phu Bai area for possible operations in Base Area 117 and later perhaps in Base Area 101. This division would operate in conjunction with the 1st Cav Div. Subsequently, along with the 1st Cav Div, and elements of the III MAF, it could effect a land link-up with Khe Sanh and thence move into the Ashau Valley and clean it out. (York II) The sequence of objectives would be determined after considering the factors at the time. I envision the 82d would move by foot and road to the extent possible so as to economize on the use of helicopters. Such deployment would permit me to relieve elements, if not all, of the 101st Abn Div to return to the III Corps to assist in operations there. If the units arrive later, reference C pertains. When weather permits, it will be desirable, if not essential to establish a beach support area south of Quang Tri as outlined in reference C. This is the most effective and economical way of providing logistical support to the area. It will be feasible to support the 82d initially from Danang along Highway 1, provided necessary troops are committed to keep the road open. With the commitment of such troops, it might also be practical to put the railroad in operation and this would further increase the tonnage. However, I do not yet have a survey as to the costs and time involved in opening railroad, but I do not believe it would be a major task.
11. In summary, I would much prefer a bird in the hand than two in the bush, but would like the birds to be deployed to the I Corps area and not in the II Corps or III Corps. Elements that I have had to deploy from III Corps could perhaps be returned and therefore expand our operations in that area. It is conceivable that a six-month loan of these units would turn the tide to the point where the enemy might see the light or be so weakened that we could return them, particularly if the ARVN can rebuild itself following its recent battles and improves its fighting quality by virtue of the modern weapons it is scheduled to receive.
64. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, February 9, 1968, 11:02 a.m.-12:43 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Those attending the meeting were the President, Rostow, Rusk, McNamara, Clifford, Wheeler, Harold Johnson, Chapman, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff General Bruce K. Holloway, Moorer, Nitze, Christian, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
The President: I asked you to come here on the basis that we would hope for the best and expect the worst. I want to see what we should do in Vietnam.
We ought to look at everything that we should be doing. Get the requirements ready to do what needs to be done. Let's be fully prepared to move in the event we are required to do so.
We want to ask questions so that you can inform us of what the current situation is and so that we can determine what things we need to work on now in the event we get a call for additional help.
I want a military review of the problems confronting us if the enemy continues more of the same activities as during the past two weeks. I think we should anticipate all the surprises and determine what is going to confront us if the Viet Cong attack the cities, attack Khesanh, and pull off a few surprises elsewhere.
Two questions we will have to answer:
1. Will we have to put in more men?
2. Can we do it with the Vietnamese as they are now?
General Wheeler: During the past few days I have talked with General Westmoreland over the phone and received a number of cables from him.
Westmoreland reported the following:
--The enemy apparently will start new attacks on the 10th. That is tonight our time. This is based on communications intelligence and prisoners of war.
--The ARVN fought well. There has not been any defections that we know of.
--There is a question whether the ARVN can stand up after 12 days of heavy fighting if another series of heavy attacks occur.
--The enemy's objective may be fragmentation of the ARVN and the Government of South Vietnam. This fragmentation would be accomplished by attacks against our air bases with an effort to keep U.S. men concentrated in the north.
Intelligence communications recognize this as one objective.
--The enemy may not be ready yet to attack Khesanh, General Chapman can elaborate on that.
--Westmoreland has moved the 1st Calvary Division and elements of the 101st Airborne Division. These are his two strategic reserve elements which have been moved up North.
Those units are there to take care of contingency operations in the area.
--Westmoreland has had to use other reserve elements to deal with the fighting around Quang Tri and north of Hue.
--He is now moving by LST an airborne battalion to the Hue area. The major problem is a logistical one.
Westmoreland said he must have the use of Highway One in order to move supplies from Danang from the North and support Khesanh logistically.
--He has moved an army engineer combat battalion to clear the road area.
--He will move another battalion of the 101st to open "MACV Forward," his front headquarters. This will be done tonight our time.
--Yesterday was fairly quiet although Lang Vei was over-run and 27 U.S. men were killed. They killed 100 enemy.
--There was also an ambush on a truck convoy. It is obvious the enemy is trying to disrupt logistics.
--We are using water board craft to move supplies. The enemy is trying to disrupt this with frogmen.
The President: Are we doing all we can? Could we use civilians protected by military to help open that road? (The President also referred to civilian contractors who have been involved in construction projects.)
Secretary McNamara: I am sure that these units are being employed and I will check on this.
General Wheeler: Westmoreland needs reinforcements for several reasons. The reinforcements he has in mind are the 82nd Airborne Division and the Sixth-Ninth of a Marine division. This would total 15 battalions.
He needs these reinforcements for two reasons:
1. To prevent the ARVN from falling apart.
2. To give himself a reserve to use as quick response units to any initiatives by the enemy in Vietnam.
He said he would put the 82nd Airborne in Danang and north of Danang. That would permit him to move the 101st south and to keep Highway One open.
The Marines would give two capabilities:
1. Reinforcement in I Corps permitting amphibious forces to be available at all times.
2. Make available troops for an amphibious landing north of the DMZ if that action is decided upon.
The 82nd Airborne and the Sixth-Ninth of Marine division can only be deployed if we eliminate the restrictions on frequency of tours and length of tours in Vietnam.
Secretary McNamara: We should give some very serious thought to the proposal of scrapping the 12-month tour. It might have a very bad effect on morale.
Secretary McNamara: General Westmoreland said he needs the 82nd Division and two-thirds of a marine division. That would be 15 battalions.
In order to do that, it would be required to call up some Army divisions and the 4th Marine division.
General Wheeler: We would propose to move the 4th Marine Division to Okinawa and Hawaii for ready deployment.
The 2 Army divisions should be in the U.S. to be ready to meet any contingencies.
The JCS will address themselves to this matter this afternoon.
There are four options:
Option 1--Slow Movement--This would involve 265 aircraft and no draw down on airlift capacity in Southeast Asia.
This would put the 12,500 men in Vietnam in 15 days. The cargo would arrive in 29 days under this option. (There are 11,600 tons of cargo.) Under this option, the 5 Marine battalions would reach Vietnam in 8 days. Their cargo would get there in 17 days.
Option 2--This would involve 334 aircraft and a 70% draw down in cargo airlifts to Southeast Asia. This would put the 82nd Airborne Division in Vietnam in 6 days. The cargo would arrive in 17 days. The Marine battalions would reach Vietnam in 3 days, and its cargo in 10 days. Option 2 cuts by one-half the time as required under Option 1.
Option 3--This would involve 670 aircraft and the call up of the Air National Guard and other air squadrons. This would place the 82nd Airborne in Vietnam in 5 days (its cargo in 14 days). This option would put the Marines in Vietnam in 3 days and the cargo in 9 days.
Option 4--This would use civilian aircraft and would involve the cut down on airlift capacity to South Vietnam by 40% rather than 70%. General Holloway says the call up of Stage III craft would have no effect.
There would be considerable lost motion in refitting these civilian aircraft for military use.
General Holloway said that by leasing aircraft we could cut down on time required.
I would add a K factor to the times specified in order to alert the men and to assemble the airlift. This K factor would be plus 2 days to all times given.
If this program is followed, it will be necessary for the President to get authority to extend terms of service (to call up individual reservists) and to extend existing authority to call up reserve units past the 1968 deadline.
Based on my conversations with General Westmoreland, I believe General Westmoreland is now dictating a message to ask for early deployment of the units I have now mentioned.
The President: How many men does this represent?
General Wheeler: 25,000 men in these units plus support personnel.
Secretary McNamara: The total would run about 40,000.
Normally, each battalion has 5,000 men. If one multiplies that times the 15 battalions, the total level would be 75,000 men. The difference between the 40,000 and the 75,000 is made up by the use of overhead manpower already in Vietnam which could be placed in these 15 battalions to raise them to full strength.
The President: How many men do we have there now?
General Wheeler: 500,000.
The President: Can we speed up the other infantry battalions we have already promised?
General Johnson: We have already curtailed training to the minimum. We must give these units proper training time. They are already squeezed. One battalion is scheduled to go the last week in March. Three battalions are scheduled to go the last week in April.
Secretary McNamara: If General Johnson says that is the case then I will accept it. I would like to look more at this. Perhaps these units could be sent on short training into rear areas.
General Johnson: Mr. Secretary, there are no rear areas in Vietnam anymore.
Secretary McNamara: What we are considering is a massive force structure. I think it would be unwise to leave these forces out there if the contingencies we have discussed do not develop.
Apart from the immediate contingency I do not think we will need them. We do need to extend the tours, but this should be only temporary.
To call up the forces we are talking about would involve a total of about 120 men.
General Wheeler: This emergency is not going to go away in a few days or a few weeks. In 3 months we may still be in an emergency situation.
The enemy is not in a position to really assault Khesanh. He is going to take his time and move when he has things under control as he would like them.
The reserve divisions we are sending must have a period of training and shake down before they can perform well. I would estimate this to take about 8 to 12 weeks.
I want to point out, Mr. President, that if you do make a decision to deploy the 82nd Airborne, you will have no readily deployable strategic reserves. I know this will be a serious problem for you politically.
In all prudence, I do not think we should deploy these troops without reconstituting our strategic reserves in the United States.
The President: All last week I asked two questions. The first was "Did Westmoreland have what he needed?" (You answered yes.) The second question was, "Can Westmoreland take care of the situation with what he has there now?" The answer was yes.
Tell me what has happened to change the situation between then and now.
General Wheeler: I have a chart which was completed today based on a very complete intelligence analysis. It relates to all of South Vietnam, Laos and the area around the DMZ. It shows the following:
--Since December the North Vietnamese infantry has increased from 78 battalions to 105 battalions. Estimating there are 600 men per battalion that is approximately 15,000 men.
--We have been able to get this information by 3 means:
1. Contact with the actual units
2. Communications intelligence
3. Captured documents and POWs.
--This represents a substantial change in the combat ratios of U.S. troops to enemy troops.
--This ratio was 1.7 to 1 in December. It is 1.4 to 1 today.
--In the DMZ and I Corps area, there is a 1 to 1 ratio. There are 79 enemy battalions in the 1st Corps area (60 North Vietnamese and 19 Viet Cong).
In the same area there are 82 Free World battalions (42 U.S.; 4 Free World; and 36 ARVN).
This is about 1 to 1.
The President: What you are saying is this. Since last week we have information we did not know about earlier. This is the addition of 15,000 North Vietnamese in the northern part of the country. Because of that, do we need 15 U.S. battalions?
General Wheeler: General Westmoreland told me what he was going to put in tonight's telegram. This is the first time he has addressed the matter of additional troops.
Paul Nitze: I was not aware of this new intelligence.
General Wheeler: The last report was that there was approximately 15,000 enemy near and around Khesanh.
As of today, our estimates range between 16,000 and 25,000. Their infantry has been built up.
In addition, Westmoreland is now faced with the problem of the impact of these recent heavy attacks on the ARVN.
We do not know what is going to happen to the ARVN after this second round of attacks. All ARVN units are on maximum alert.
But in Hue, the ARVN airborne units are down to 160 men per battalion. Their strength is far below that required.
The President: We have to get the Government of South Vietnam to increase its efforts. Why can't we get them to do as we do, call up 18 year olds and give the American people the impression that they are doing as much as we.
Secretary McNamara: When I was in Vietnam I talked with Thieu and Ky. They told me then they intended to call up 18 and 19 year olds.
The President: I saw where Senator Kennedy pointed out that the South Vietnamese voted not to call up 18 year olds.
General Wheeler: I met last night with this unnamed group chaired by Nick Katzenbach and Paul Nitze. We are pressing for the South Vietnamese to lower the age limit at least to 19 and Bunker is pushing this hard.
Secretary Rusk: We must keep in mind that they consider a child 1 year old when he is born, so, their 19 year olds are our 18 year olds.
The President: Has either House voted not to draft these men?
Paul Nitze: I am unaware of any vote on it.
Secretary McNamara: I will look into this and follow through.
The President: Are there some things that we can get the South Koreans and the South Vietnamese to do to match all of these things we are planning to do?
Walt Rostow: The men at Hue have been drawn down by the very intensive action there. What is the state of strength of the ARVN units?
General Wheeler: I do not have the answers precisely. They have been mauled. As of 11:00 p.m. our time last night, 1,698 ARVN were killed; 6,633 were wounded seriously. This totals about 10,000 ARVN lost.
Mr. Rostow: Has the enemy switched from a slow attrition strategy to a "go for broke" strategy? Would an extension of tours in Vietnam be understood as far as morale is concerned?
General Wheeler: For a temporary period we can sustain an extension of tours without losing morale. For any long period of time, however, you would face a loss of morale. We now have a rule that we will not send a man back without 25 months between tours in Vietnam.
General Johnson: We send men back now with special skills in less than 25 months.
As I see it there are two basic problems. The first is at Khesanh. The second is in the cities. What are they trying to do?
There are two postulates:
1. The enemy believed that the people would rise up. There were no withdrawal plans by the enemy.
2. The enemy suffered erosion over the last few months. They have seen a decoupling of its forces in hamlets and villages. U.S. troops have cleaned out the Viet Cong from many of the villages. So, he has concluded he must go for a psychological victory prior to negotiations.
We are in a critical stage. We expect new attacks will begin on the 10th. There are two essential questions facing us:
1. What strength does the enemy have to renew the attacks with?
2. What strength does the ARVN possess to resist these attacks?
The President: What is the ARVN strength?
General Wheeler: Approximately 360,000 men now. Total forces about 600,000.
Secretary Rusk: I have been asking for several days if there was a new order of battle. This is the first time that I have heard of this.
The President: Because of their increase of 15,000 troops, is it true that we now need 15 battalions or 45,000 men? What mobile reserve forces does Westmoreland have between now and the time he gets more men?
General Wheeler: He has the bulk of the 1st Cavalry and one brigade of the 101st Airborne. Other than that, all of his forces are dispersed to meet the enemy. We are not getting much mileage out of the Australian or South Korean troops. They must go back to their home country for their orders.
The President: Do you mean that the Australian and Korean commanders have to go back to their capital before they can be deployed?
General Wheeler: Yes sir, they remain under the operational control of their government.
Secretary McNamara: I am under the very clear impression that they have been told by their home governments to do everything possible to hold down their own casualties.
Our losses are running six times the level of Korean losses on a percentage basis.
The President: We ought to try to bring all the allied forces under Westmoreland's command.
General Wheeler: In all fairness, the allies have operated well in areas where they have been located.
The President: Does Westmoreland have enough airpower to support his troops?
General Wheeler: Yes sir, we are moving in 2 more C-130 units.
The President: How is the supply problem at Khesanh? Will artillery and rockets knock this out? Can we rely on roads?
Secretary McNamara: There is no road available up there.
General Wheeler: We moved in 214 tons of supplies yesterday with helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. As long as we use B-52's and tactical air, we will be able to keep our resupply up. They are keeping about 10 to 12 days supplies in storage.
The President: Wouldn't we have one big problem if the airfield at Khe Sanh was out?
General Wheeler: Yes, we would have to link up by road some way. Of course we can use air drops and helicopters. The air strip will be used from time to time.
The President: If you lost the air strip, would you evacuate Khesanh?
General Wheeler: That depends on the course of the fighting and their ability to resupply.
Secretary Rusk: When does the weather improve?
General Johnson: It is now beginning to improve. I have some concern about the loss of the air strip, because fixed wing aircraft carry so much more than helicopters.
Nobody can give a categorical answer. We think we have a 50-50 chance of sustaining our actions out there.
The men have 12 days of rations and 11 days of ammunition. Almost no cofram has been used.
Being cut off would hurt in the evacuation of wounded, but we can evacuate at night if necessary. This is one of the hazards you have to accept.
The President: How is the weather likely to affect actions along the border?
General Wheeler: The better the weather, the more it favors us.
The President: Have you anticipated air support from any of the communists?
General Wheeler: There is no evidence of any movement except the training flights and the Soviet bombers which were seen at Khesanh.
The President: What is his air capability if he uses it?
General Wheeler: His capability in using air is a nuisance and has propaganda value rather than any great military threat. He has 8 IL 28's.
The President: What use does he have of these?
General Wheeler: I do not know.
The President: How many MIGs does he have?
General Wheeler: We know of 23 MIG 21's. There are other MIG 15's and 17's.
Most of these MIGs are in China.
The President: Keep the MIGs in sight at all times.
General Wheeler: We are doing the best we can. Admiral Sharp is moving a guided missile ship to the Gulf of Tonkin. It carries the Talos Missile. We are also sending in ships with the Terrier Missile.
The President: Get the JCS to work up all the options and let's review them together.
I want you to hope for the best and plan for the worst. Let's consider the extensions, call ups, and use of specialists.
Dean, should we have more than the Tonkin Gulf resolution in going into this? Should we ask for a declaration of war?
Secretary Rusk: Congressional action on individual items would avoid the problems inherent in a generalized declaration. I do not recommend a declaration of war. I will see what items we might ask the Congress to look at.
The President: Where are the problems in the cities?
General Wheeler: In Hue, we have one Marine battalion operating on the south side of the river. The ARVN units at Hue have been shot down to 160 men per battalion. In Cholon there are enemy forces being met by 3 Vietnamese. There is one U.S. battalion in the race track area.
The President: What would be the impact internationally to a declaration of war?
Secretary Rusk: It might be a direct challenge to Moscow and Peking, in a way we have never challenged them before. There would be very severe international effects.
Secretary Rusk: How can we get as many Vietnamese as possible returned to duty?
General Wheeler: The men are coming back. We do not know what numbers.
Secretary Rusk: I have skeptics [am skeptical?] of the enemy's ability to hit us again. Some of them have been very badly mauled.
Secretary McNamara: There is no question that they have been hurt, but I believe they have the ability to restrike.
Clark Clifford: There is a very strange contradiction in what we are saying and doing.
On one hand, we are saying that we have known of this build up. We now know the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong launched this type of effort in the cities. We have publicly told the American people that the communist offensive was: (a) not a victory, (b) produced no uprising among the Vietnamese in support of the enemy, and (c) cost the enemy between 20,000 and 25,000 of his combat troops.
Now our reaction to all of that is to say that the situation is more dangerous today than it was before all of this. We are saying that we need more troops, that we need more ammunition and that we need to call up the reserves.
I think we should give some very serious thought to how we explain saying on one hand the enemy did not take a victory and yet we are in need of many more troops and possibly an emergency call up.
The President: The only explanation I can see is that the enemy has changed its tactics. They are putting all of their stack in now. We have to be prepared for all that we might face.
Our front structure is based on estimates of their front structure. Our intelligence shows that they have changed and added about 15,000 men. In response to that, we must do likewise. That is the only explanation I see.
General Wheeler: The enemy has changed the pattern of the war. In the past, there have been instances of terrorism, but this is the first time they have mounted coordinated attacks throughout the country.
Secretary Rusk: I have a question. In the past, we have said the problem really was finding the enemy. Now the enemy has come to us. I am sure many will ask why aren't we doing better under these circumstances, now that we know where they are.
The President: Is there anything new on the Pueblo?
General Wheeler: No, except the North Korean Prime Minister says that North Korea is ready for another war.
65. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, February 10, 1968, 3:17-5:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House. Those attending were Rusk, McNamara, Clifford, Rostow, Tom Johnson, and Christian. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE
SENIOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISORY COUNCIL
Secretary Rusk: The Korean Desk at State does not want Vance to go to Vietnam. They think it would dilute his mission to South Korea to go elsewhere.
The President: Is it true there are no nuclear weapons in Vietnam?
Secretary McNamara: It is true there are none there.
The President: Do you expect any more trouble on the nuclear matter?
George Christian: No, I think it will die down.
The President: How do you feel about Khesanh?
Secretary McNamara: There seems to be no alternative except to hold it, and put in reinforcements. I would not send the 82nd Airborne out there.
The President: Where is all this criticism of Westmoreland coming from?
Secretary McNamara: Not out of the Defense Department.
Secretary Rusk: I have heard no criticism of Westmoreland in the State Department.
Secretary McNamara: There is some difference between Westmoreland and Ambassador Lodge on search and destroy versus search and harass. Lodge feels that what we are doing is too costly and involves too many U.S. troops.
The President: What's causing the enemy to delay its attack against Khesanh?
Secretary McNamara: The bombing affected their schedule./2/
/2/The NVA did not launch any large-scale attacks against Khe Sanh for the next 2 weeks.
The President: What about the cities?
Secretary McNamara: A number of them are threatened by small guerrilla bands.
Secretary Rusk: I doubt if a second wave of attacks will be as great as the first.
The President: Should we just sit and wait?
Secretary McNamara: I think so.
Secretary Rusk: Westmoreland wants them to commit themselves before hitting them with our reinforcements. In that sense, Khesanh is bait.
The President: Does the use of tanks affect Westmoreland's defensive capability?
Secretary McNamara: No, Westmoreland did not expect the strength of attacks throughout the cities.
Because of it, he had to spread his deployment differently.
The President: What would Westmoreland want if he could have it?
Secretary McNamara: The 82nd and the Six-Ninths of a Marine Division.
The President: Don't you think it would be good to get these men on out there or nearby on Okinawa? Frankly, I am afraid to move the 82nd because of the possibility of civil disturbances here in the U.S.
Secretary McNamara: I do not think we should send the 82nd Airborne. I fear we are further involving the U.S. as a substitute for Vietnamese troops.
Secretary Rusk: I am worried about the ARVN taking six months to get back into shape.
The President: That worries me too.
Secretary McNamara: I believe it unwise for Paul Nitze to go to Vietnam. If he went, he would be called before the Congressional committee and would face press questioning. If Cy Vance goes to Vietnam, he doesn't have to say anything.
The President: Cy is the best equipped for this. He is precise, firm and positive.
Secretary McNamara: Cy would take a hardheaded view. He is a good reporter. He would bring back the views of our top people there and his own intelligent assessment.
The President: Should we increase the production of helicopters?
Secretary McNamara: Yes, we will increase the number.
I think we may want to move those 5 U.S. battalions out of the Delta. I was disappointed at the uses that we had to put U.S. troops to in Saigon. The ARVN should have been able to handle Saigon. We do not correct a situation by putting more U.S. troops in.
I think we should do 4 things:
1. Get the 50% back who were on Tet leave.
2. Try to get the ARVN to perform better.
3. Get the Vietnamese to follow their decree and draft 19 year olds as we do here.
4. See where we can relieve men for duties more essential than those they are now performing (as in the Delta).
President: What other recommendations do you have?
Secretary McNamara: The Chiefs are meeting Sunday/3/ and will be ready for their recommendations on Monday. I also have a group working on troop deployment. You will have a Wheeler plan and a McNamara plan.
/3/February 11.
Secretary Rusk: I can't find out where they say those 15,000 extra enemy troops came from. They say that these battalions came in between December and January.
The President: The Chiefs see a basic change in the strategy of the war.
They say the enemy has escalated from guerrilla tactics to more conventional warfare.
I asked the Generals last week about the necessity of defending Khe-sanh. They said it was necessary. I asked them about the security of Khesanh. They said they could defend it.
General Wheeler and all of them said it was necessary to defend it and it could be defended.
There seems to have been some movement in their position.
All I am asking is that we make sure that everything has been done. I do not want my advisors to shift from a position of sureness to a position of uncertainty. I don't want them to ask for something, not get it, and then have all of this placed on me.
I would supply Westmoreland with all he needs. Let's get him the 25,000. Senator Russell told me last night that the 82nd is all we have here./4/ But he said he would not have Westmoreland asking for the 82nd and not supplying them.
/4/The President spoke by telephone with Russell at 5:15 p.m. the previous evening. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the conversation has been found, but it is summarized briefly below.
Secretary McNamara: I am trying to devise a plan which will get you the men without the disastrous consequences of the action recommended by the JCS (call up and dispatch of the 82nd Airborne Division and the Sixth-Ninth of a Marine division).
The President: Senator Russell said we do not have anybody in the U.S. Army who compares with General Giap in guerrilla warfare.
The President: That may be true.
Clark Clifford: I hope we do not have to ask for a completely new program. This is a bad time to do it. On one hand the military has said we had quite a victory out there last week. On the other hand, they now say that it was such a big victory that we need 120,000 more men (call-up of reserves).
I would much prefer that Khesanh get real rough and then provide more men than to put them out there now after all that had been told the American people.
The President: I think it would strike morale a death blow if we extended tours in Vietnam permanently. But we may want to let Congress know that all of the things the Viet Cong have done will cost a great deal more money.
Clark Clifford: All we have heard is about the preparation the North Vietnamese have made for the attack at Khesanh. I have a feeling that the North Vietnamese are going to do something different. I believe our people were surprised by the 24 attacks on the cities last week. God knows the South Vietnamese were surprised with half of their men on holiday. There may be a feint and a surprise coming up for us.
Secretary Rusk: One regiment of enemy troops was seen moving east of Khesanh this morning. This unit may hit somewhere other than Khesanh.
The President: But I have been told that both communications intelligence and captured documents show Khesanh as their target.
It may be that Giap knows we know this and then will hit us elsewhere.
Secretary McNamara: If I were Giap I would hit Kontum or Pleiku. This would be less costly in men for him.
I do not know the precise relative strength in the area, but I do know that we will pay a heavy price. We have lost 900 men in 10 days already.
Clark Clifford: With all the attention on Khesanh, with the population in disarray, Giap may want to keep Westmoreland and 20,000 troops tied down up north. This is a very difficult time and we must watch every possibility. I do not think we really know where the blows are going to come.
In addition, I am getting a few pains in my tail about the South Koreans. They should remember that we have kept 60,000 men and lost many thousands of American lives in defense of South Korea.
It just seems to me that South Korea should know that we are over there to help them. Somehow, it seems to them that they are helping us.
We must say, wait just a minute, we are there to help you and we have been helping you for over a decade.
The President: I told Cy Vance last night that Park must understand our problems. Cy must make it clear to him that this talk of pulling out of Vietnam would cause us to pull men out of South Korea.
Secretary Rusk: When Walt was at the Policy Planning Council at State, I asked them then how does a great power like the U.S. avoid becoming a satellite of a small allied power, such as Korea.
The President: Senator Russell said we should not have Senator Fulbright and the Military Foreign Relations Committee down here. He also said we could not testify on television during war time. He said there is a big difference between Secretary Rusk's answering questions put to him by newsmen and answering questions on television asked by the members of Congress. It makes us look as though one branch of government is opposed to what the other is doing.
Clark Clifford: I do not like the idea of the President having to write Senator Fulbright a letter.
I think a dinner is better than a formal letter./5/
/5/The previous morning, the President, Rusk, McNamara, Clifford, McPherson, Rostow, Christian, and Tom Johnson had met to discuss Fulbright's request that Rusk appear before televised hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Clifford advised: "The times are too serious and the public too concerned for a public feud between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Secretary of State. I think the people are hopeful that we would be working together at times like these. I think it unwise to write a formal letter turning this down. A public session would be a disservice to the country. We should quiet the whole matter down. The Committee wants either a Roman Holiday with Dean Rusk or a confrontation with the President." (Notes of the President's Meeting with Senior Foreign Policy Advisers, February 9; ibid.)
66. Editorial Note
The North Vietnamese continued to signal an interest in negotiations with the United States through numerous channels, including one code-named Ohio. Ohio had originated in 1967 and involved contacts in Peking between the North Vietnamese Ambassador, Ngo Minh Loan, and the Norwegian Ambassador, Ole Algard. In telegram 1406 from Oslo, February 10, 1968, Ambassador to Norway Margaret Joy Tibbetts reported that Loan had told Algard the previous day that the North Vietnamese Government "presupposed" that military operations would not take place while any potential negotiations with the United States were in progress. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/OHIO) This statement appeared to represent an answer to a long-standing requirement of the Johnson administration that the North Vietnamese engage in military restraint if and when peace talks began. Loan had also invited further exchange with the Norwegian Government. In a February 10 covering memorandum transmitting this telegram to President Johnson, Walt Rostow, in commenting on this latest expression of policy from Hanoi, observed: "They may well think that, having failed to knock off the government and the ARVN, the best thing they could do would be have a cease-fire on a what-we-have-we-hold basis." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 61)
In response, the Department of State authorized Tibbetts to give to the Norwegian Government a statement to use in its discussions with the North Vietnamese. It laid out the San Antonio formula of "prompt discussions" and not taking military advantage of negotiations, as well as the corollary put forward by Secretary of Defense-designate Clark Clifford accepting "normal" levels of southward infiltration. The conclusion of the statement read: "The U.S. evaluation of Hanoi's current position takes into account Hanoi's actions as well as its words. The unprecedented offensive against most of South Viet-Nam's urban centers, which Hanoi treacherously launched in the midst of the traditional Tet holidays, causing widespread civilian casualties and suffering, was made notwithstanding the fact that we were still exploring with Hanoi its position through diplomatic channels, and that we had exercised restraint in bombing targets in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong. In this context, we cannot but weigh Hanoi's words with great skepticism and caution. These actions carry a harsh political message. The U.S. favors every effort to obtain clarification of Hanoi's position. We shall continue to evaluate all information and to pursue every possible avenue which promises to bring us closer to the resolution of this conflict through serious negotiations." (Telegram 118092 to Oslo, February 20; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/OHIO)
Algard visited Hanoi March 3-10 at the invitation of the North Vietnamese Government. He found "little new" outside of references to the formula put forth by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh the previous December. Trinh also told him that "it was now up to the Americans to take the next step" although it appeared that the United States "was not interested in negotiations." The Foreign Minister also said that the San Antonio formula could not be accepted, even in the "somewhat diluted form" rendered by Clifford. Algard concluded: "It was very difficult on the basis of these conversations to get any impression of how much Hanoi wanted a peaceful solution of the conflict and on which points they would think of concessions to make possible such a solution. They are clearly realistic enough to understand that a peace excluding Hanoi's conditions cannot come under discussion and that also from the Vietnamese side a will to compromise must be shown. At the same time I had the impression that the military advances in the south had created a certain hardening in these positions. It was clear that Hanoi because of the military advances in the south now felt that politically their position had been strengthened." (Telegram 4120 from Oslo, April 5; ibid.)
Another part of North Vietnam's "diplomatic offensive" was the resumption of the channel through Sweden known as Aspen. In response to a scheduled visit to Stockholm by the North Vietnamese Ambassador to Moscow, Nguyen Tho Chan, the United States transmitted to Sweden the same statement given to the Norwegians for use in the ensuing discussions. Prior to the arrival of Chan's mission, both First Secretary of Sweden's Foreign Ministry J.C.S. Oberg and Ambassador Lennart Petri, Swedish representative in Peking, planned to visit Hanoi. The visit, however, was postponed at U.S. request. (Telegrams 877 from Stockholm, February 16; 883 from Stockholm, February 20; 896 from Stockholm, February 23; 901 from Stockholm, February 214; and 117383 to Stockholm, February 17; all ibid., POL 27-14 VIET/ASPEN) Additional documentation on Aspen is ibid., S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, Aspen.
67. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, February 11, 1968, 4:25-6:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. Those attending the meeting were the President, Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler, Taylor, Clifford, Helms, Rostow, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
[Omitted here is discussion of the Pueblo crisis.]
The President: Reviewed General Westmoreland's wire of February 9. (Attachment B)./2/
/2/Not attached, but printed as Document 63.
Secretary McNamara: General Wheeler will discuss Westmoreland's wire and the current situation in Vietnam.
General Wheeler:
--Very little went on yesterday in Vietnam.
--There were some small actions around Khe Sanh.
--More people were evacuated from Khe Sanh.
--A defector was picked up. He said the plan of attack was first to hit Long Vie; then to hit Con Thien; then to hit Khe Sanh at a later time.
--We had a report of Frog Missiles being mounted on the front of enemy tanks. These missiles are similar to our Honest John. They carry an 800 pound warhead. These could pose problems.
--In Hue there is still fighting in the Citadel area. We hope to clean this up within a couple of days. The outskirts of the city are clear.
--In Da Nang, there has been a hell of a scrap. Units of the NVA are leaving.
--At Dalat there is continued sniping. The situation is in hand.
--Saigon fighting continues in Cholon. There was an attempted attack on Tan Son Nhut airport last night. Over 170 weapons were captured and 100 enemy left dead.
--In IV Corps there is some skirmishing around the towns.
The Joint Chiefs are looking at the entire situation. On Friday/3/ we had not seen the Westmoreland cable. His cable put a different light on the situation we discussed at the Friday morning meeting with the President. As you will recall, on Thursday I sent Westmoreland a cable that we had discussed additional matériel but he had said nothing about additional troops. The next day Westmoreland said that he could find use for additional troops like the 82nd and some Marine units. I talked to him again on Friday morning. He said he was then dictating a cable on the current situation. This cable came in Friday afternoon. I had DePuy go over the cable thoroughly to see what it means. The key paragraph says "needless to say I would welcome reinforcements if they became available." He said he would use these reinforcements to do three things:
/3/February 9.
1. To contain the enemy offensive in the two northern provinces of I Corps.
2. To carry out his 1968 campaign plan.
3. To offset a weakened Vietnam armed forces.
The Joint Chiefs feel that we have taken several hard knocks. The situation can get worse. We do not know the ability of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong to recycle and come back to attack. We know that the enemy committed virtually all of its Viet Cong units to these most recent actions. There have been heavy casualties inflicted.
We do not know what the ability of the ARVN is to withstand recycled attacks.
Secretary McNamara: I have doubts about the ARVN strength but many of them have returned after the Tet Holidays to bring the units back up in capability.
The President: What I am interested in is that line in the Westmoreland cable "shortage of strength in the ARVN units."
General Wheeler: The ARVN are getting the men back to their units.
Walt Rostow: What about the RF and PF units.
General Wheeler: We do not know what the situation is on these units.
The President: As I see it, you have concluded that neither Bob's plan or the JCS plan is workable now, and that we should look at this whole situation tomorrow.
General Wheeler: That is correct.
Secretary McNamara: Yes, we will talk about this tomorrow.
The President: What about the supply situation and the need for more helicopters?
Secretary McNamara: We are examining the helicopter production schedules. We are in good shape with fixed wing aircraft.
The President: What about Khe Sanh?
General Wheeler: The supplies at Khe Sanh are very adequate. There is plenty of anti-tank ammo and they have used Coraform only once. We may move more C-130's in temporarily.
General Wheeler: The President may want to consider sending a small JCS staff group of intelligence, operations, and logistical advisers either with me to come back with a first-hand report of the situation. I have never found any substitute for getting first hand information.
The President: First let's see what we can do with Cy Vance. If Westmoreland really does not need additional troops, let's don't plan any troops on the basis of what we have.
General Wheeler: The situation could deteriorate. The Joint Chiefs today do not feel the President should undertake the emergency actions we proposed on Friday. Of course this situation could change.
The President: Let's meet tomorrow and see what happens.
Secretary Rusk: Should we plan on Cy Vance going on to Vietnam?
The President: Yes.
Does it concern anybody about those two divisions outside of Saigon?
General Wheeler: General Westmoreland thinks the situation is in hand./4/
/4/In telegram MAC 1901 to Wheeler, February 10, Westmoreland minimized the danger posed to Saigon by infiltration and main force attacks. Instead, he described Khe Sanh as the area where the NVA posed the major threat, since the enemy had "put too much effort into this buildup to support the diversion theory." (U.S. Army Center of Military History, William C. Westmoreland Papers, Eyes Only Message File, 1 Feb.-29 Feb. 1968)
Secretary McNamara: It is not the two divisions that I am worried about. They may be recycling to undertake a second wave. The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese may have the ability for a strong second attack.
The President: How many enemy do you estimate are available for new attacks.
Secretary McNamara: At least 60,000.
The President: Do you think they will bomb Khe Sanh?
General Wheeler: They may do one of three things:
1. Surprise us with the Frog Missiles.
2. Use MIG's and SA-2's to come south of the DMZ and try to shoot down the B-52's.
3. Use the IL-28 bombers to attack us in the South.
The President: I want to be completely clear in my mind. Is it true that General Westmoreland is not recommending or requesting additional troops now?
General Wheeler: That is true.
Secretary McNamara: That is my reading of it.
The President: Is it your judgment not to send additional troops today?
General Wheeler: Yes sir.
Secretary McNamara: Yes, that is my judgment.
Clark Clifford: How prepared are we for the second wave of attacks?
General Wheeler: The question is this. Is the government strong enough to withstand another wave of attacks? That I cannot say. Physically we are better prepared. The element of surprise is removed.
The President: What about the extent of desertions and the men on leave?
General Wheeler: We have nothing firm on desertions and on the number of men who have returned from leave.
The President: So you really don't know the state of readiness.
General Wheeler: The only ARVN reported as non-effective are the 5 airborne battalions which were shot down in the heavy fighting around Hue.
Walt Rostow: I think we should be giving considerable attention to what is happening in the countryside. The RD Cadres moved to the cities as did the Viet Cong.
If the Viet Cong go back into the countryside they may be able to make very quick recruitment drives.
If we have a diplomatic offensive, it would be very bad for the Viet Cong to control more of the countryside than they did before this offensive. It would be good to find out what the RF and the PF are doing. We also need to determine how quickly the ARVN can get back into the countryside to take over that which was previously held. I expect a diplomatic push to pressure us to negotiate.
General Taylor: I am out of tune with this meeting. I read General Westmoreland's cable differently from you.
As I read it, Westmoreland's forces are tied down. He has no reserves except some units of the 101st. The offensive in the north is against him. The enemy has 35,000 men already in the area. Westmoreland does not say anything about how he would get reserves if he were to be met with a massive engagement there. It looks to me as if he is operating on a shoestring. I still feel we do not need to do anything today. But I strongly recommend sending General Wheeler out there to get information first hand.
Clark Clifford: Would it be unusual for General Wheeler to go out there? Have you been before recently on a mission of this type?
General Wheeler: I have been out there fourteen times.
General Taylor: It is a natural military mission.
Secretary Rusk: I do not think it unwise for Wheeler to go. I must say if General Westmoreland is requesting troops in this cable he has a poor Colonel doing the drafting for him.
General Wheeler: We are not without reserves, General Taylor. He does have the First Cavalry Division up there. There are ARVN forces not committed. There are some Marines not committed.
General Taylor: What about the logistics of the situation?
General Wheeler: Westmoreland told me that he must get that road up. In bad weather he would have need of secure land LOC. Water LOC is not good this time of year.
The President: From my station, it looks as though we felt content with what was happening until the fire crackers started popping. We talked to General Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs on Friday and they felt we should send the 82nd Division and 6/9 of a Marine division.
Bob McNamara countered by saying we could pick up 12 battalions without using the 82nd by putting 4 battalions in South Vietnam and the others off the coast in LST's and in Okinawa.
Westmoreland's wire came in. I interpret it as a man who wanted 600,000 troops last year and was talked down to 525,000. Now he is saying he could use the 82nd and the portion of a Marine division because of all of the uncertainties which face him. He is concerned about the effective fighting capabilities of the ARVN.
I think we should send anything available to get the number up to the 525,000 limit. We should live up to our commitment. "Just before the battle Mother" the JCS is now recommending against deploying emergency troop units.
General Wheeler: At this time, yes sir.
The President: If the Joint Chiefs feel secure, if Secretary McNamara feels secure and if General Westmoreland doesn't ask for them, I don't feel so worried.
Secretary McNamara: I do not feel secure. But I do think it is not a shortage of U.S. battalions at issue. It is the stability of the political structure in Vietnam and a lack of motivation by the ARVN and the PF and RF.
The President: But when they are unable to do the job and when we are in a fight to the finish, then don't you think we should give the troops as they are necessary?
Secretary McNamara: Emergency augmentation is not required. We could redeploy forces already in Vietnam such as those that are operating in the Delta.
The President: If Westmoreland asks for the 82nd Division would you give them?
Secretary McNamara: No, I would not. I read this as a permanent augmentation to forces. We are carrying too much of the war there now. All this would do is to shift more of the burden on us. There is no reason to have those battalions in the Delta.
Secretary Rusk: I do not believe that the deployment of additional forces would have the same effect on deployment as would the placement of 525,000 fresh forces. There may be reasons to redeploy some of the U.S. forces there.
There are no current responsibilities between ourselves and the Vietnamese. We are spread out all over the country. There are none of the advantages of a concentration of forces. I do not think we are really getting the full benefit of our 500,000 U.S. troops there now.
General Taylor: We may want to provide General Westmoreland with new strategic guidance. Let us not fight this war on the enemy's terms. We need to do what we should to get reserves and wait for favorable weather./5/
/5/In a memorandum to the President, and in a paper entitled "Enemy Scenario of the Future?", both February 10, Taylor suggested that Westmoreland concentrate on the security of the urban areas, avoid major combat actions under disadvantageous conditions that might give the enemy an opportunity for "victory," build up reserves for a counter-offensive beginning in March, and maintain Rolling Thunder operations at maximum levels. Johnson read the memorandum and asked Rostow to give copies to Clifford, Rusk, and McNamara for "their eyes only." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 8I, 1/67-12/68, Taylor Memos-General)
The President: Who deployed the U.S. troops in the Delta?
General Wheeler: This was part of General Westmoreland's battle plans submitted last year.
General Taylor: I think that it may be necessary now to outline our objectives. We should ask General Westmoreland to get set for a major offensive in a particular area when the weather breaks.
The President: I would be glad to get from you any suggestions on redeployment or any other strategic advice.
Secretary Rusk: I tend to expect Westmoreland and our troops to do everything all at once. I think we need to get clearly in mind what our priorities are.
General Taylor: I think our objective should be to clear the cities first and to recruit forces there to put in reserve.
Clark Clifford: How many men of the 525,000 do we have out there now?
Secretary McNamara: 500,000.
The President: What about a reordering of our priorities at this time?
Secretary McNamara: Not now while we are in the middle of this.
Secretary Rusk: No I would not recommend it while we are in this situation.
The President: It seems that Westmoreland has inherited this thing by stages. Let's re-evaluate the overall strategy after this is over. The Joint Chiefs and you do not feel that you should recommend deployment of more men at this time? Is that correct?
Secretary McNamara: This is correct.
The President: What about the re-evaluation of supplies.
General Wheeler: The men are satisfied.
The President: Well, it looks like we are generally content with the situation today.
Secretary Rusk: We will meet tomorrow and see how this thing shapes up.
Secretary McNamara: Westmoreland has not asked for troops to avoid defeat. If he does, I recommend deployment of those there.
General Taylor: The function of an overall headquarters is to give strategic guidance. I think we need to give thought to what that new guidance should be.
The President: I am inclined to leave the situation as it is based on your judgments. I think we should tell Westmoreland that if he really isn't asking for more troops and find out if that interpretation is correct. In my mind I think he really wants more troops. I would favor Cy Vance going out there and taking a hard look at all of this.
Secretary McNamara: I would also send Cy there. I think we could send General Wheeler out there if it weren't for this being splattered all over the front page.
General Taylor: I will make one more plea. I think it is important to get a first hand report from General Wheeler after he gets first hand military judgment from his military commanders out there. There is no substitute for that.
Secretary Rusk: I received excellent response last night to a speech I made to a group of Secondary School Principals./6/
/6/The previous evening Rusk spoke at the 52d Annual Convention of the National Association of Secondary School Principals in Atlantic City, New Jersey. For text of the speech, which included comments on the Tet offensive, see Department of State Bulletin, March 4, 1968, pp. 301-304.
Director Helms: I am not satisfied on our intelligence on RF, PF and ARVN units. I disagree with Bob McNamara about U.S. units being placed with ARVN units. My information is that ARVN fights better with U.S. units around them. The U.S. forces provide the ARVN with the courage they need.
The President: What is the real difference? What makes the North Vietnamese fight so well, with so much more determination than the South Vietnamese?
Director Helms: I think it is a combination of good training and good brain washing. There is a certain heroism about dying for this cause. The North Vietnamese have been damn good fighters for fifteen years. They are well trained, well equipped and well disciplined. Their system eliminates all doubt from their mind.
The President: For a moment let us assume that the ARVN are not doing their part. What is the alternative?
Secretary McNamara: We should not do their job for them. Let them fight it out for themselves.
Secretary Rusk: I think you get better performance when the U.S. troops and the ARVN are billeted together.
The President: Buzz, what is the evaluation of the military effect of this wave?
General Wheeler: There are always pluses and minuses in anything like this. The ARVN has performed and behaved well. No unit defected. They took heavy casualties. Their morale seemed to improve because of the casualties. Destruction has been very bad. Many towns are in shambles and there was one completely flattened.
The President: Are you concerned about the refugees?
General Wheeler: Bob Komer has turned his entire effort into refugee care. Our people are working with the ARVN, sharing food with the Vietnamese and doing all they can.
I think the civilian populace of Vietnam was appalled by the destruction and the cruel, cruel atrocities caused by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. But we are not better off than we were on January 15.
Secretary McNamara: We need to get the Vietnamese to do more by insisting that they do what they should do. We should refuse to do what they must do. Their Congress has yet to pass a single bill.
The President: Get working on a combined authority by which General Westmoreland would take over responsibility for all allied units and then let's address ourselves to the problem of the Vietnamese. Let's go to work on them. I want them to live up to that decree of drafting 19 year olds.
The President: Should we still not say anything publicly (in the form of a Presidential speech)?
General Taylor: We do need to say that there has been a change of strategy on the part of the enemy brought about by losses inflicted on him by the old strategy.
(The issue of the Presidential message was left for consideration at a later time.)
68. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (Sharp) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Saigon, February 12, 1968, 0612Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs a-z. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Limited Distribution. In the attached covering memorandum transmitting a copy of the telegram to the President, February 12, 9:35 a.m., Rostow wrote: "Herewith Westy's message loud and clear and, in my judgment, correct."
MAC 01975. Subject: Assessment of situation and requirements.
1. Since last October, the enemy has launched a major campaign signaling a change of strategy from one of protracted war to one of quick military/political victory during the American election year. His first phase, designed to secure the border areas, has failed. The second phase, launched on the occasion of Tet and designed to initiate public uprising, to disrupt the machinery of government and command and control of the Vietnamese forces, and to isolate the cities, has also failed. Nevertheless, the enemy's third phase, which is designed to seize Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces has just begun. This will be a maximum effort by the enemy, capitalizing on his short lines of communication, the poor weather prevailing in the area for the next two months, and his ability to bring artillery and rocket fire to bear on installations from positions in the DMZ and north and from Laos to the west. Furthermore, he can bring armor to bear on the battlefield. It is clear that the enemy has decided he cannot "strike out" in this phase as a matter of face. We can therefore expect him to exert on the battlefield the maximum military power available to him. In addition, we must expect him to try to regain the initiative in all other areas.
2. If the enemy has changed his strategy, we must change ours. On the assumption that it is our national policy to prohibit the enemy from seizing and permanently occupying the two northern provinces, I intend to hold them at all cost. However, to do so I must reinforce from other areas and accept a major risk, unless I can get reinforcements, which I desperately need.
3. To bring the maximum military power to bear on the enemy in Quang Tri and Thua Thien and to prevent the gradual erosion of these two provinces, I must open up Highway 1 from Danang and Highway 9 to Khe Sanh. These two tasks are not unreasonable, provided that I can divert the troops to provide security and commit the engineers to the task. I therefore must make a down payment in troops in order to provide the logistics to support in fully adequate fashion troops now deployed and reinforcements that will be required. First, it will require a Marine regiment or an Army brigade to secure the Ai Van Pass from Quang Tri to Hue/Phu Bai. Another regiment or brigade will be required between Hue and Quang Tri. Finally, a third regiment or brigade will be required to secure Highway 9 to the Khe Sanh area. I cannot afford to divert troops now deployed in that area for the purpose and am therefore forced to deploy the 101st Abn Div from the III Corps; this is now in the process and will be done as fast as transportation can be made available. Even the commitment of the 101st will put me in no better than a marginal posture to cope with the situation at hand.
4. This has been a limited war with limited objectives, fought with limited means and programmed for the utilization of limited resources. This was a feasible proposition on the assumption that the enemy was to fight a protracted war. We are now in a new ball game where we face a determined, highly disciplined enemy, fully mobilized to achieve a quick victory. He is in the process of throwing in all his "military chips to go for broke." He realizes and I realize that his greatest opportunity to do this is in Quang Tri-Thua Thien. We cannot permit this. On the other hand, we must seize the opportunity to crush him. At the same time, we cannot permit him to make gains in the other Corps areas, and I am obligated to maintain the minimum essential troops in these areas to insure stability of the situation and to regain the initiative. Equal in priority to the enemy is the Saigon area and a high risk in this area is unacceptable. I now have approximately 500,000 US troops and 60,981 Free World military assistance troops. Further contributions from the Thais and Koreans are months away. I have been promised 525,000 troops, which according to present programs will not materialize until 1969. I need these 525,000 troops now. It should be noted that this ceiling assumed the substantial replacement of military by civilians, which now appears impractical. I need reinforcements in terms of combat elements. I therefore urge that there be deployed immediately a Marine regiment package and a brigade package of the 82d Abn Div and that the remaining elements of those two divisions be prepared to follow at a later time. Time is of the essence./2/
/2/In telegram MAC 1924 to Wheeler, February 11, Westmoreland wrote: "Additional forces from CONUS would be most helpful in permitting us to rapidly stabilize the current situation. Their deployment would underscore our determination and will certainly speed the completion of our mission." He noted that the forces would be deployed initially in the northern part of the country and only later to the southern part of South Vietnam. (Ibid., William C. Westmoreland Papers, #29 History File, 1-29 Feb 68 [II])
5. I must stress equally that we face a situation of great opportunity as well as heightened risk. However, time is of the essence here, too. I do not see how the enemy can long sustain the heavy losses which his new strategy is enabling us to inflict on him. Therefore, adequate reinforcements should permit me not only to contain his I Corps offensive but also to capitalize on his losses by seizing the initiative in other areas. Exploiting this opportunity could materially shorten the war.
6. If CINCPAC concurs, request that the Secretary of Defense and Commander in Chief be informed of my position./3/
/3/In an unnumbered telegram to Westmoreland, February 12, Sharp stated his concurrence in the deployment of additional forces to the I Corps area. "If enemy actions reflect his desperation, these additive forces can assist in delivery of a decisive blow," he added. "If his strength and determination have been underestimated we will need them even more." (Ibid., National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs a-z) In a February 12 memorandum to the President, Rostow discussed the means of countering the continuing enemy assault in northern South Vietnam: "So far as U.S. and world opinion are concerned, there is only one satisfactory answer: a clear defeat of the enemy in I Corps, while rallying the South Vietnamese to get back on their feet elsewhere. Moreover, I Corps is--or should be--our kind of battle. It has guerrilla elements, but is much more nearly conventional war. It should be our kind of war if Westy is not strapped for men, aircraft, and supplies. Only such a demonstration is likely to permit us to end the war on honorable terms. Therefore, I am for a very strong response to Westy's cable. Only you can make the political assessment of what it would cost to call up the reserves; but that would be the most impressive demonstration to Hanoi and its friends." (Ibid.)
7. I have discussed this message in detail with Amb Bunker and he concurs./4/
/4/In concluding his assessment of Westmoreland's request in memorandum CM-3003-68 to the President, February 12, Wheeler noted: "While the decisions and requests made in his message of today are his, he has consulted closely with Ambassador Bunker, General Abrams and Mr. Komer who all agree as to the validity of his assessments and request for additional troop strength." (Ibid.)
69. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, February 12, 1968, 8:29 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and McNamara, February 12, 1968, 8:29 a.m., Tape F68.02, Side A, PNO 4. No classification marking. Prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
McNamara: We've just had a message from Westmoreland/2/ that's quite different from the interpretation we were placing on the message last night./3/ He states categorically he wants six battalions immediately. I just wanted you to know this. The Chiefs are meeting now. We'll of course be back sometime later today. My view hasn't changed a bit from what it was last night. I think it'd be a mistake to call up the reserves and plan on permanent augmentation of our forces out there above the planned 525. I do think, given this kind of a message, we ought to place six battalions either out in Vietnam or along the shores, in a sense, as an emergency supplement to meet a contingency and do it damn fast. But I think to go to the Congress for legislation to call up the reserves to plan on permanent augmentation to take over further the job of the South Vietnamese would be in error. In any event, that isn't the reason for my call. The reason for my call is simply to alert you that we had this message that just came in.
/2/Document 68.
/3/See Document 67.
President: Yeah, Bob. I didn't quite understand. I felt like I was in the ring yesterday with a boxer and I didn't know who I was boxing. I was--I was about to agree with the thought that you had expressed. That is what I was trying to adjust to yesterday and the day before.
McNamara: Yes.
President: And then it seemed like we moved from our position--I mean, you did. I never have felt that we ought to go with this whole thing that you outlined at this stage. We might be called to even do that and more if the situation required it.
McNamara: That's right, that's right.
President: But I thought that if we would in effect--if you could do with him what you had done on the 525, where you've got a greater proportion of combat troops than supply troops and where you reduce the total numbers a good deal, and where you didn't have to bust up the 82d [Airborne Division] and send it out, that that was an alternative that we ought to try to find. Now I gather that when you all re-interpreted the message that you didn't think that was justified. That's still the viewpoint I have. Between the Chiefs of Staff, I did not share the approach that Buzz had the day before. I did more or less look favorably, although I hadn't hardened, and concluded--as you could see last night, I went along. But on the alternative that you were attempting to evolve--now, that's where I would like to come out if we could. So, A--I don't have a position of deserting my commander in time of war. B--I don't have a position of deserting my home folks and acting imprudently or getting involved where I can't pull out. I did like the LST idea for several reasons. I didn't have the feeling, they may be right, but I did like the Okinawa idea. I thought that you wouldn't have all the uproar if they were in Okinawa even for a short time and they'd be close in an emergency, but it ought to be treated more or less as an emergency instead of a regular permanent operation.
McNamara: Well, Mr. President, I think that's the plan that we ought to try to push through. I'm going to have great difficulty on it because the Chiefs and the Marines don't want to send these Marine battalions. They're--in my opinion, they're available for an emergency assignment. I actually had with me last night, and I didn't want to bring it up because there was so much opposition among the Chiefs to it. I have a full paper on this, as I told you I would have, and I strongly believe it can be done. In any event, the purpose of the morning call is to tell you that Westy's come in for an immediate requirement for six. We'll get to work on it. I'll try and work it out the way on Friday/4/ I told you the way I thought it should be worked out.
/4/February 9.
President: Does he give any more justification? Does he have any alarming--
McNamara: Yeah, yeah. Well, I wouldn't say alarming, but I'll read you a couple of lines here. [McNamara read portions of telegram MAC 1975.] So, that's the essence of it. Now, on this question of replacing military with civilians, you asked me on Friday or Saturday to look into that civilian contractor situation--Saturday, I guess you asked about it./5/ I did. I cleared with Buzz Wheeler this morning and I sent to Westmoreland a cable suggesting to him that he replace certain of his construction battalions outside of the I Corps area with civilians. I said I've got $50 million in a contingency allowance that I'm making available to him for this purpose and encouraged him to use as many civilians under those civilian contractors as he wants. We can replace one construction battalion--one military construction battalion--a month with a thousand civilians at a cost of $750,000 a month. So I urged him to go as far as he wanted to in that way. We went down from 50,000 construction civilians to about 17,000, just about what you told me on Saturday. So I think we can do more than we have in that area. But based on what he says here, and I've only read you a portion of the cable, Mr. President, I'm inclined to believe that as Commander in Chief you can't very well deny him these six battalions at this time. But neither do I think that we ought to obtain them by calling up the reserves and going to Congress for legislation. So I'll try to work something out on that basis. I'm sure the Chiefs will not immediately accept that kind of alternative.
/5/See Document 65.
President: Well, we'll meet on it, I guess, this afternoon./6/ You'll meet this morning, won't you?
/6/See Document 70.
McNamara: That's right, we will, Mr. President.
President: Okay. Bye.
70. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, February 12, 1968, 1:45-3:08 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. Those attending the meeting were the President, Helms, Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, Wheeler, Clifford, Christian, and Tom Johnson. The first part of the meeting was a luncheon held in the Family Dining Room until 3:20 p.m.; from then until 3:50 p.m., the participants met in the Oval Office. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
SENIOR FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS
The President: Just now I said in a speech that we should keep in mind that President Lincoln lost 600,000 men and faced all of the division and adversity in this country that is imaginable. He said then "we have got to stick it out." I said today, "so will we."/2/ One man told me this morning that it doesn't look like the same person wrote the Westmoreland wire today and the one Friday./3/ What reaction do you have to it?
/2/Earlier in the day, the President attended a ceremony at the Lincoln Memorial in honor of President Lincoln's birthday. (Ibid.) In remarks at the ceremony, Johnson stated: "Sad, but steady--always convinced of his cause--Lincoln stuck it out. Sad, but steady, so will we." For full text of the President's remarks, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 218-219.
/3/Taylor made this comment in a February 12 memorandum to the President, noting that "this new one is clear, crisp and sounds an unambiguous call for additional help in minimum time." Taylor concurred in Westmoreland's desire to create reserves for use in I Corps and recommended that the President approve "the dispatch without delay of the additional forces which General Westmoreland requests." (National Defense University, Maxwell Taylor Papers, Clifford Study Group-Tet 1968)
Secretary Rusk: It looks to me like Westmoreland wants to take advantage of an opportunity to exploit the situation. I do not read it as a desperate need. He wants to shorten the war with it, and that has a certain attractiveness to all of us. It bothers me that we do not know what is happening to the South Vietnamese and their determination.
I don't appreciate Thieu saying he needed more American troops. I would think he would be looking for more ways to get more of his own men.
But if six battalions will help him exploit this opportunity, I am for sending them without a permanent commitment.
Secretary McNamara: I read the Westmoreland cable differently from Dean. I read that he needs these six battalions in order to avoid defeat at Khe Sanh.
If he only wanted them to take advantage of the opportunity to do more, I would also send them.
I recommend today the following:
1. Send him the units he has requested.
2. Send the troops for the period of the emergency only, not a permanent augmentation./4/
/4/In JCSM 91-68 to McNamara, February 12, the JCS examined plans for the emergency augmentation of MACV but recommended that the deployment of reinforcements be deferred until measures were undertaken to reconstitute the strategic force posture through reserve call-ups. However, the 82d Airborne and the 6/9 Marines would begin preparations for possible deployment. See The Pentagon Papers: The Senator Gravel Edition, pp. 539-542.
3. Send General Wheeler out to meet with Ambassador Bunker, General Westmoreland and Cy Vance.
The President: Where will these units come from?
Secretary McNamara: It will include a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division and Marine units.
The President: Do these units have Vietnam veterans in them?
Secretary McNamara: We will screen out the Vietnam veterans, those we can.
The President: How long will this take?
Secretary McNamara: 14 days.
General Wheeler: 14 days is correct.
The President: Are there any U.S. troops in the area we can use?
General Wheeler: No, sir.
Secretary McNamara: There is one battalion on the way.
General Wheeler: General Chapman wants to return that battalion to Hawaii because it includes some 17-year olds and it was operating in the area on an exercise only.
The units will be sent from the following locations:
One battalion from Camp Pendleton.
Units from Camp Lejeune.
The 82nd Airborne from Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Possibly some army from Fort Benning.
The President: How many men does that total?
General Wheeler: 3800 from the 82nd and 6500 from the Marines, for a total of 10,300.
The President: Does that give Westmoreland what he needs?
General Wheeler: Yes, sir.
Secretary McNamara: The loss of one brigade of the 82nd will not affect our ability to handle severe disturbances.
Clark Clifford: I would like to get some answers to several questions. In General Westmoreland's cable he says, "If the enemy has changed his strategy, we must change ours." What change in strategy has the enemy made?
General Wheeler: The enemy has been on a protracted fighting basis. Now he seeks to "grab" for immediate success. I think the enemy overestimates the degree of support in the Vietnamese populace and underestimates our strength.
General Wheeler: He is taking both actions concurrently. He is attacking the cities and also launching conventional attacks for the first time.
Clark Clifford: In his cable, General Westmoreland also points out that it is national policy to keep the enemy from seizing and holding the two northern provinces. Hasn't that been the situation all along?
General Wheeler: General Westmoreland believes that it would cost more to withdraw and go back later than to stand and fight now. But he does know we can trade space for time and troops if necessary.
Clark Clifford: General Westmoreland says in his cable that he cannot hold without reinforcements. What change has taken place to keep him from holding?
General Wheeler: There have been wide-spread attacks in the South. General Westmoreland is unsure of the ARVN strength as a result of these attacks. He must also hold open Highway 1 and Highway 9. He has more troops committed around Saigon than he has in the past. He says that he cannot take more forces from the South without risk.
Secretary Rusk: Couldn't he take more out of the Delta?
General Wheeler: He does have contingency plans, both for taking units from the Delta and for, if necessary, withdrawal from Khesanh. But these are contingency plans only.
Clark Clifford: General Westmoreland also says that we are now in a new ballgame with the enemy mobilized to achieve quick victory. Is that something new?
General Wheeler: This thing has been building up for some time. There has been the greater build-up around the DMZ. There is a new determination for major attacks coupled with the Tet actions. Prior to now, the enemy has fought a piece-meal war.
Clark Clifford: General Westmoreland's telegram has a much greater sense of urgency in it. Why is that?
General Wheeler: General Westmoreland realized that his earlier low-key approach was not proper based on a full assessment of the situation.
Clark Clifford: General Westmoreland makes it clear that he cannot permit the enemy to make gains in other areas. He does not want to permit a reduction in strength elsewhere.
But he has now sent what is clearly an urgent message.
General Wheeler: General Westmoreland has been conservative in his troop requests in the past. Now he finds that his campaign plan has been pre-empted by enemy action.
Secretary Rusk: Can it only be done by additional U.S. forces? Can't we press them to brigade U.S. troops with Vietnamese?
General Wheeler: Before I answer that I need to know what you mean by brigading.
Secretary Rusk: By putting one battalion of U.S. troops with one battalion of ARVN.
Clark Clifford: General Westmoreland said it was time to open up key roads, Route 9 and Route 1. Can we use civilians under military protection to do some of this work?
Secretary McNamara: I authorized General Westmoreland to use whatever civilians he wished to use. I do not think he would want to use civilians in I Corps.
The President: I want a cable sent to Cy Vance to tell him to examine this./5/ We should put civilian road and construction experts to work and replace military construction personnel so they may be sent up north.
/5/Vance was going to South Korea, and the possible visit to South Vietnam was a suggested side trip. In a February 12 memorandum to McNamara and Rusk, Rostow outlined the issues Vance should raise in Seoul and Saigon. In Saigon Vance would explore with the GVN its mobilization plans for the ARVN, the use of civilian contractors to release military engineering units, a new combined command structure, strategic guidance to Westmoreland, and Buttercup. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S) In a February 12 memorandum to Rusk, Bundy sent a more detailed draft of instructions for Vance's possible visit to Saigon. (Ibid.)
General Wheeler: Westmoreland wants combat troops in construction brigades. Frankly I think he has underestimated what is needed to open and hold those two roads.
The President: Let's try to use what is out there if possible. I wanted Cy Vance to talk with him about it.
I am worried about the North Vietnamese Air Force and the possibility that many of our choppers will be destroyed.
Clark Clifford: I learned with great surprise that General Westmoreland does not have authority to control Korean and Australian forces. If he is short of men, can't Cy Vance get an understanding with President Park for greater utilization of the Korean troops in Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk: I think we should strongly consider a combined Allied Command with President Thieu as Commander in Chief and General Westmoreland as Chief of Staff.
Secretary McNamara: There are benefits to this with the Vietnamese. We have not moved in this direction because of the political problems.
General Wheeler: We have a similar thing to that in Thailand. On this, I think we need to get the advice of Ambassador Bunker.
The President: I would sure try to do this for maximum control of the South Koreans, the Australians and the South Vietnamese.
Clark Clifford: Are there any U.S. troops in the area of Japan, Hawaii or Okinawa we could use?
General Wheeler: Zero.
Clark Clifford: From a psychological standpoint, this would be a good time to get more Thais and South Koreans.
The President: Get Cy Vance to tell the South Vietnamese that we are accelerating our program and they need to accelerate theirs. In addition ask Cy to see what he can do about getting that extra division moving from Korea to Vietnam. What is the hold-up?
Secretary McNamara: They say equipment, but the equipment is on the way. The Thais cannot possibly be ready before July 1.
General Wheeler: All of our military people in Thailand say July 1 is the earliest time.
Secretary McNamara: The Koreans would send a division if they wanted to.
The President: What actions are the South Vietnamese taking on getting those extra 65,000 men?
Walt Rostow: The Cabinet on Sunday/6/ voted to do two things. The first is to call back veterans. The second is that they moved the date to begin the drafting of 18 and 19 year olds. They moved back from April 1 to March 1 the drafting of 19 year olds. They moved back the drafting of 18 year olds from July 1 to May 1.
/6/February 11.
The President: What is our average draft age?
Secretary McNamara: It's either 20.2 or 20.4 years.
The President: Get me the exact answers on that, Buzz.
What is our situation with equipment? I hear we lost quite a bit out there lately.
Secretary McNamara: That was a misleading report that you received today. We have had 57 choppers destroyed and 48 choppers which will require replacement. There will be between 97 and 137 to be replaced this month. We are shipping this month 246.
The President: How about observation planes?
Secretary McNamara: We are fine on those.
The President: I want to ask all the questions that I possibly can now so that we get answers to them before a situation develops and we didn't have them. I hope all of you see what has happened during the last two weeks. Westy said he could use troops one day last week. Today he comes in with an urgent request for them.
I want to look at all of these things now. I want to anticipate that more will happen to us than we had planned. I have very serious concerns about our equipment.
Frankly, I am scared about Khesanh.
I worry about that runway going out or those C-130s being knocked down. I think if the weather gets bad and if the runway gets knocked out we are going to have a hell of a problem on resupply. Then I guess we will have to use helicopters. I am afraid they will pick off the helicopters. So I want you to check the number of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft.
If we lose this big build-up we can't endure many losses. And we can look if we are out of ammunition, or out of fuel or didn't have medicine. I would feel better to get the answers here now. I have a mighty big stake in this. I am more unsure every day.
Secretary Rusk: Is General Westmoreland aware that he can choose his own place to fight?
The President: I want a crash program to get these men out there just as fast as they can. Dick, how do you feel about all of this?
Dick Helms: I have been meeting this morning with twelve of my top CIA people who have been in Vietnam. They believe the war is in a critical phase. They think Westmoreland should get the troops if he needs them. We cannot even find some of the forces. I am a believer in the old axiom "A stitch in time saves nine."
General Taylor: In my view, this is an urgent situation. The element of time bothers me. General Westmoreland seems to believe that he has time to open the roads. He seems to believe he has time to do all of the other things that are necessary. And I get the feeling that many of us here today feel the same way. I do not. This offensive could open up today. We should assume in our planning that it will open up tonight. I think Westmoreland's request is reasonable and we should act quickly to meet it.
The President: Do all of you feel that we should send troops?
Secretary McNamara: Yes.
Secretary Rusk: Yes.
Director Helms: Yes.
General Wheeler: Yes.
General Taylor: Yes.
Mr. Rostow: Yes./7/
/7/In a memorandum to the President at 11:45 a.m. that day, Rostow urged "a very strong response" to Westmoreland's request, a response that included calling up the reserves, since such an action "would be the most impressive demonstration to Hanoi and its friends." (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs a-z)
The President: Is there any objection?
(There was no objection.)
General Wheeler: We will close these forces in Vietnam in 14 days.
The President: Is that the minimum time?
General Wheeler: Yes, it is.
The President: There is no schedule you can improve upon?
General Wheeler: We will move as quickly as possible.
We should maintain our current level of resupply to Southeast Asia. The Joint Chiefs will use these 62 aircraft which are normally withheld for emergencies. This is an emergency.
MAC and TAC will operate in war-time rates. We are utilizing voluntary civilian air lift.
We propose to call up the Air Force National Guard and Reserve C-124 squadrons. This will be augmented by 112 reserve aircraft and 48 Air National Guard aircraft. This would total about 10 squadrons.
The President: How many men?
Secretary McNamara: 2,000 to 3,000 men.
The President: Well, let's do it. Could you tell the Air Transport Association we will need to call up civilian aircraft?
General Wheeler: The Joint Chiefs feel that if you deploy these men there should be a call-up of the reserves.
If we send a brigade of the 82nd Airborne, we should call up two brigades from the Army National Guard. This would total about 30,000 men.
General Chapman feels that if we deploy this Marine unit, we should call up the Fourth Marine Division, one RLT now and the rest of the Fourth Division subject to call at any time.
The Marine reserves will be ready to go within two months.
The President: I want you and Bob McNamara to get together and come in with an agreed recommendation as to whom to call-up. Let's not decide on that today. Go back and agree on what to call.
We must move as soon as we can. I was ready Friday. The clock is ticking. We may waste valuable time and money, but it is better to have them there when they are needed than to need them there and not have them.
General Wheeler: I will call now and get my men drafting the order.
(General Wheeler left the room.)
The President: What is the status of Buttercup?/8/ I see where Ky agreed on the release of prisoners. Get Vance to follow through.
/8/See Document 6.
Walt Rostow: President Thieu also has agreed to this.
Secretary McNamara: My position on Vietnam is very clear. I do not think it wise to go to the Congress asking for additional legislation. I do not think the call-up is necessary.
The President: Well, if you can not agree with the Joint Chiefs on what is needed, then submit to me a minority viewpoint and your separate recommendations.
Secretary McNamara: Do you want General Wheeler to go to Vietnam?
The President: No, I want him here. I don't want anybody substituting for him at a time like this. I feel better with him here.
My feeling is that if the Vietnamese aren't able to carry the load alone we will have to do it rather than let them all get defeated. I think Westmoreland is confronted with a defeat or a victory.
[Omitted here is discussion of Korea.]
The President, Dick Helms, George Christian, General Wheeler and Tom Johnson then went to the office where the President showed charts reflecting the ratio of enemy KIA to friendly KIA.
The President said that General Ridgway had told him that we are not prepared for another major problem elsewhere in the world. He said our preparedness is not that adequate.
The President said he would rather have more than is needed in Vietnam than to need something and not have it available./9/
/9/In telegram JCS 1695 to Westmoreland, February 12, Wheeler described this meeting and noted the sense of the participants about Westmoreland's position: "A. You could use additional U.S. troop units, but you are not expressing a firm demand for them; in sum you do not fear defeat if you are not reinforced. B. You are concerned as to the possible status of the ARVN as a result of recent combat actions. C. You are concerned about the reliability of your logistic system into northern I Corps Tactical Zone and believe that you must control and use Highway 1 through the Ai Van Pass. D. Additional forces would give you increased capability to regain the initiative and go on the offensive at an appropriate time." (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs a-z) In his reply, telegram MAC 2018 to Wheeler, February 12, Westmoreland wrote: "I am expressing a firm request for additional troops, not because I fear defeat if I am not reinforced, but because I do not feel that I can fully grasp the initiative from the recently reinforced enemy without them. On the other hand a set back is fully possible if I am not reinforced and it is likely that we will lose ground in other areas if I am required to make substantial reinforcement of I Corps." (Ibid.)
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