Testimony of Joy Olson

Executive Director of the Washington Office on Latin America

on U.S. Security Assistance to Mexico

 

before the

 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere

 

October 25, 2007

 

            My name is Joy Olson and I am the Executive Director of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA).  I have close ties to Mexico.  My daughter is a Mexican citizen and I have a master’s degree in Latin American Studies from the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM).  I have followed U.S. security assistance to Mexico for more than ten years as part of the “Just the Facts” project.  WOLA has studied the drug trade and U.S. drug policy in Latin America for more than 20 years.

 

            I ask that you include for the record the just released publication, At a Crossroads: Drug Trafficking Violence and the Mexican State, written by WOLA Associate Maureen Meyer, and published by WOLA and the Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme.

 

            This hearing is on U.S. security assistance to Mexico, in the context of the just announced Mexico and Central America Security Cooperation Initiative, often referred to as Plan Mexico.  At the time this testimony is being written, the few publicly available documents and statements about the Plan provide little detail about exactly what is entailed.  It is in this context that I will provide commentary on U.S. counter-drug related security assistance to Mexico. 

 

            You have asked me to direct my remarks toward a few specific questions.   What impact will this new assistance have on joint counter-drug efforts and on U.S.-Mexican relations?  What should the package look like?  Are there lessons to be learned from past counter-drug efforts?  How will the package be received in Mexico?

 

            History is always a good place to start.  Mexican leader Porfirio Díaz once lamented that Mexico was “so far from God, and so close to the United States.”  This sentiment certainly holds true for Mexico when it comes to drugs and U.S. drug policy.  The United States is home to the world’s single largest and most lucrative market for illegal drug consumption.  Mexico is geographically stuck between U.S. cocaine consumers and the cocaine producing nations of the Andean region.  According to the U.S. State Department, about 90 percent of all cocaine consumed in the United States passes through Mexico.[1]

 

            Since the late 19th  and early 20th century, Mexico has been a producer of marijuana and some heroin for the U.S. market.  During this period Mexico largely viewed drugs as a U.S. problem.  Neither the violence associated with the cocaine trade nor consumption seriously impacted Mexico.

 

            Things changed for Mexico in the 1980s when the United States intensified interdiction efforts in the Caribbean and south Florida, to a large extent succeeding in diminishing the importance of Miami and south Florida as an entry point for cocaine.  In response, Colombian drug trafficking organizations sought new routes into the U.S. market.  The historic marijuana smuggling routes in Mexico proved a convenient alternative, and Mexican border cities became the new favored points of entry.  This shift stimulated a growing role for Mexican criminal organizations in cocaine trafficking.

 

            We see a similar pattern more recently with methamphetamine production.  Early in this decade methamphetamine production and use brought new horrors to rural America.  To counter this new drug of choice, new restrictions on pre-cursor chemicals went into effect and law enforcement cracked down on U.S.-based producers, with the consequence of shifting much of the production of methamphetamines to Mexico.

 

Lesson 1:  “Success” in one location breeds devastation in another.  So long as the U.S. market for illicit drugs remains so large and lucrative, successful disruption of drug production and trafficking displaces trafficking operations and the devastation they entail to new areas. If the envisioned plan does succeed in reducing trafficking along current routes on the U.S.-Mexico border, where will it go next?  Congress should be asking, Who will be devastated by the drug trade next?

 

            Before moving on to the current aid package there are a few more historic observations.

 

            The Mexican military has long considered its key external enemy to be the United States, which took about half of Mexican territory in the war of 1846-1848.  Until 1995, U.S.-Mexican military-to-military relations were “virtually non-existent.”[2]  What did exist was often contentious.  More generally, Mexicans found the earlier version of the annual drug certification process, whereby the U.S. passed judgment as to whether or not other countries were trying hard enough to stem the flow of drugs, to be both offensive and downright hypocritical.

Lesson 2:  Mexicans remember their history.  Security Assistance, in particular military assistance, will be likely be viewed by Mexicans with skepticism at best.

A change in the relationship began in 1995 when William Perry became the first U.S. Secretary of Defense to officially visit Mexico.  Both countries embarked on a new relationship that was based on their common counter-drug mission.  A sign of this relationship was increased U.S. military assistance.  Prior to 1995, the U.S. provided only small amounts of International Military Education and Training (IMET) to Mexico. 

 

            While the Mexican military remained “standoffish”[3] (the Army more than the Navy), a large training and assistance program took place.

 

U.S. Training for Mexico 1999-2006

1999

2000*

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

TOTAL

622

 

857

600

520

866

909

558

     4,932

Source: compiled from United States, Department of State, Department of Defense, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest from 2000-20007.

 

            Perry’s visit was followed by a large aid package, the centerpiece of which were 73 UH-IH helicopters.  Building on the shared counter-drug relationship, the helicopters were provided for counter-drug use.  The U.S. president’s emergency drawdown authority (506(a)(2) of the FAA of 1961) was the technical mechanism through which the transfer took place.  This is important for two reasons.  First, the authority has limitations on its use.  It can be used to provide counter-drug assistance, but it also meant that “end-use monitoring” accompanied the equipment to ensure that it was being used for counter-drug purposes.  Second, drawdowns are taken from existing stock, meaning that the helicopters were used.[4]

 

            Shortly after the transfer, conflicts between Mexico and the United States arose around the helicopters.  The helicopters were breaking down.  The U.S. government claimed that they were being overused and not well maintained.  The Mexican claimed that the helicopters were junk and that they didn’t have access to the parts needed for continuous maintenance.  The Mexican military also did not like being subject to the end-use monitoring requirements.[5]

            In a seldom, if ever seen move, the Mexican government returned all of the helicopters to the United States.  This was after the U.S. had trained hundreds of Mexican military personnel on the operations and maintenance of the helicopters.[6]  The U.S. has had a contentious history of security assistance with Mexico.

Lesson 3:  Be careful who you train, because training is the gift that keeps on giving.

 

A priority for U.S.-Mexico counter-drug training in the late 1990s was the Mexican GAFES (the Air-Mobile Special Forces Groups) who had a counter-drug role.  It is reported that members of this elite group were recruited by the Gulf Cartel to form its enforcement arm known as the “Zetas”.  One of the problems faced by Mexican officials today is that drug traffickers now seem to be using sophisticated military tactics, intelligence gathering and operational planning.  Training can be dangerous because it can make corrupt forces more effective. 

Lesson 4:  Partial police reforms and the use of the military for counter-drug operations are unlikely to have lasting positive impact – follow through is everything.  To confront drug trafficking, police and judicial institutions must function.  Bringing in the military to fight drug trafficking is a stop-gap measure at best.  Ultimately, you have to be able to investigate, arrest, and prosecute traffickers and only competent police forces and judiciaries can do that.

While Mexican President Felipe Calderón has taken dramatic steps to confront drug violence in his first months in office, he is not the first Mexican president to announce dramatic new counter-drug efforts or to use the military to fight drug trafficking.

 

President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), purged the Federal Security Directorate and elevated drug trafficking to the level of national security. President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) made efforts to purge and restructure the Attorney General’s (PGR) office. He established the Center for Drug Control Planning (Cendro) and created the National Institute to Combat Drugs. President Salinas declared drug trafficking a national security threat,[7] thus confirming an expanded role for the Mexican military to counter drug trafficking.

President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) intensified the use of the armed forces in counter-drug operations and used members of the military in civilian institutions and public security bodies, such as establishing the Federal Preventive Police whose original force included 5,000 military personnel. President Vicente Fox (2000-2006) disbanded the notoriously corrupt Federal Judicial Police, purged police forces, and did a major overhaul of the PGR’s organized crime and counter-drug offices.  He also launched “Operation Safe Mexico” to combat drug-related violence, which dramatically deployed federal police and troops to take over cities and disband local police forces.

As described in At a Crossroads, the new report by WOLA and the Beckley Foundation, whatever benefits these efforts may have brought were short-lived:

“In each of these cases, the security efforts succeeded in generating a temporary sense of improved security citizen through purges of corrupt officers, the creation of new forces, and a visible reliance on the military that resulted in short-term tactical victories. An important number of major drug kingpins have also been captured in recent years.  Ultimately, these efforts have faltered in the face of basic laws of drug supply and demand. New traffickers and new organizations take the place of old ones, “clean” soldiers and police officers are easily corrupted, and robust supply keeps drugs flowing through Mexico and over the border into the United States.”[8]

Many a Mexican president has announced radical restructuring of police forces, but none as yet been able to effectively change the reputation and practice of the Mexican police.

Lesson 5:  Specialized counter-drug units outside of broader police reform and anti-corruption efforts are unlikely to have lasting positive impact. Effective police reforms must be comprehensive and institutional.

 

There is a vast reserve of experience, both in Mexico and in U.S. counter-drug work with other Latin American countries, regarding the formation of specialized counter-drug policing units.  The theory behind the formation of the units is that to take down cartel leaders, you need a small cadre of police who are highly trained and free of corruption.

 

The GAFES/Zetas example used earlier is one example of what can go wrong with this approach. Guatemala is probably the most dramatic example of what’s wrong with a strategy that puts too much emphasis on specialized units.  In Guatemala, the specialized counter-drug police has to be recreated every couple of years.  The pattern one sees is this:  an enormous investment is made in a specialized group, they may enjoy some tactical victories, the group becomes obviously corrupt and the whole unit is disbanded.

 

The challenge is establishing reformed police forces with functioning internal and external oversight mechanisms to ensure accountability and to continually monitor and root out corruption.

 

Lesson 6: While the violence created by drug trafficking must be addressed, cracking down on “cartels” may well increase violence.  Apart from probable short-term disruptions in trafficking, there should be no expectation that this package will stem the flow of drugs into the United States.

 

Since January, there have been 2,113 drug related killings in Mexico.[9]  In 2006 there were 2,500 such killings. Most analysts believe that disruptions in the Mexican drug “cartels” caused by the arrest of their leaders, actually contribute to escalating the violence.  There are fights for power within cartels and between trafficking organizations for the control of lucrative routes.  Likewise, tactical successes in arresting, prosecuting or extraditing key drug leaders may cause a temporary disruption in the flow of drugs, but the enormous profits entailed in drug trafficking means that their roles will be filled sooner or later by others willing to do the job.  The next generation of leadership may prove less clever or less vicious than their predecessors, but they may prove to be even more violent, more corrupting, and more difficult to bring to justice.  History suggests that the disruptions in the flow of drugs that such turmoil may cause will not last long.  Indeed, to the extent that supply disruptions are large enough to create shortages and drive up prices, stronger price incentives to supply the market are created.

The new assistance package

In terms of the package announced on Monday, there are signs that the Bush administration has drawn on some of the history lessons described above.  But the old adage, “the devil is in the details,” certainly applies in this case and thus far, the public description of the aid package is light on detail.

We are encouraged that the assistance is being provided through the State Department rather the Pentagon, and we hope that this reflects a belief that the military is not suited to address what is a public security problem.  When more details are available, one of the criteria that should be used in assessing the potential long-term impact of the plan is whether the funding is appropriate to the mission.  Is the assistance being directed toward the civilian institutions with responsibility for investigating, arresting, and prosecuting traffickers, or toward the military?  If it is the latter, what are the long-term strategies in place to strengthen civilian law enforcement bodies to effectively do their jobs and replace the military in counter drug work?

While understanding that surveillance equipment and expertise is needed to go after organized crime, we hope that any assistance on this matter is accompanied by accountability mechanisms, court orders and civil rights protections.  Mexico has a long and recently active history of wiretapping for political ends.

The proposal also includes support for strengthening Mexico’s judicial system.  A key component of this support should be promoting a comprehensive reform of Mexico’s criminal justice system.   The persistence of corruption and impunity within the criminal justice system encourages police and other security agents to take matters into their own hands and contributes to a lack of trust in the justice system, legal bodies and police forces.  An effective system would ensure efficient investigations and adequate collection of evidence while respecting due process guarantees.  More support should be considered for the work and proposals being put forward by the Mexican Network for Oral Trials (Red de Juicios Orales), supported by USAID Mexico’s Rule of Law program.

In conclusion

One of the biggest impediments to effective drug control is that policymakers have difficulty thinking past the current fiscal year.  Long-term thinking is needed to address the problem. WOLA believes that, drug consumption is the heart of the drug chain and needs to be addressed as a public health issue.  It is not a war that will be won or lost through a supplemental package.  Impacting production, trafficking or consumption means taking the long view and devising policies that attempt to reduce the harm created by drugs at each level. 

 

This Mexico package should be seen as an opportunity to make a long-term investment aimed at reducing the violence and corruption in Mexico fed by the drug trade.  Experience has shown that all roads lead back to the need for functioning police and justice systems with oversight and accountability mechanisms that reduce the likelihood of corruption and promote effective investigations.  Assistance geared toward these reforms should be the primary component of any aid package. 

 

            For Mexico, gaining real traction for such important reforms would be a significant accomplishment, and it is certainly in the United States’ own interests to support such efforts.  But for all the welcome talk of the aid package as a cooperative agreement to address a mutual problem, it remains to be seen whether the United States is prepared to address issues within our own borders – drug consumption, weapons trafficking, money laundering – that greatly exacerbate the problems confronting Mexico.  How can Mexico succeed in reducing corruption and confronting violence when the drug trafficking organizations are awash in drug-related profits and have ready access to guns from U.S. markets?  What steps is the U.S. taking to expand and improve the nation’s addiction treatment system?  What measures are being taken to strengthen enforcement of regulations governing U.S. gun sales, particularly in border areas, to make it more difficult for weapons sold in our country to be illegally trafficked into Mexico?  What is being done to more effectively combat money laundering in the United States?

 

There is no quick-fix to the drug-related violence plaguing Mexico.  This new cooperation package can play a role in helping Mexico restore public security through supporting reforms of the police and justice systems.  However, if Congress and the Administration are not careful, the United States may miss this opportunity and simply throw money at the problem, or worse yet, further empower corrupt individuals and reinforce unaccountable institutions.

 


[1] U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2007.

[2] U.S. White House, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), Report to Congress Volume I, “U.S.-Mexico Counterdrug Cooperation” (Washington, DC, September 1997).

[3] WOLA interview with Pentagon anti-drug official, Washington DC, 1 March 2004.

[4] Joy Olson and Adam Isacson, Just the Facts:  A Civilian’s Guide to U.S. Defense and Security Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, The Latin America Working Group. 1999 Edition.

[5] United States General Accounting Office, Drug Control: Update on U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Activities, Statement of Benjamin F. Nelson, Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, document number GAO/T-NSIAD-99-98 (Washington: March 4, 1999): 3 <http://www.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=gao&docid=f:ns99098t.txt>, Adobe Acrobat (pdf) format <http://www.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=gao&docid=f:ns99098t.txt.pdf>.

[6] Based on data compiled from United States, Department of State, Department of Defense, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999 (Washington: 1999).

[7] Chabat, Jorge, “Mexico, the Security Challenge,” in Jordi Diez (ed), Canadian And Mexican Security in the New North America: Challenges And Prospects. School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University. Kingston, Montreal: Queen’s-McGill University Press, 2007.

[8] Maureen Meyer, At a Crossroads: Drug Trafficking, Violence and the Mexican State, The Beckley Foundation and the Washington Office on Latin America, October 2007.

[9] “Llegan a 2 mil 113 las ejecuciones en el país,” El Universal, October 11, 2007.