Appendix C: Conference Discussion Papers

• Operational Issues Papers
• Technological Issues Paper
• Institutional Issues Paper

Operational Issues Discussion Papers

Welcome to Irvine. Thank you for taking the time from your busy schedules to participate in this opportunity to set a national direction for traffic incident management programs.

There are three areas of effort at this conference. Institutional, Operational, and Technology. This paper is focused on Operational issues in the field at and around traffic incidents of all kinds, but, all three will overlap. Based on our experiences, there are lots of opportunities to improve in all three areas.

There are two papers attached that we developed as a result of our four years of providing facilitation at IM workshops around the United States and in other countries. Please take time when it is convenient to look them over. We would appreciate your input or opinions on the content and we will update them as needed to maintain a current reflection of the incident management issues.

Traffic Incident Management Operations Priority Issues

Prior to this conference, we were asked to develop a short paper on the most important issues. After looking through all the notes, papers, reports, and publications we have gathered in the workshops, we offer these as the most critical issues at the scene or around incident scenes.

Responder Safety

With the exception of the attack of September 11, 2002, traffic incidents are one of the most dangerous tasks responders handle. In 1999, over half of officers killed in the line of duty died in traffic crashes. According to USDOT, nearly 10,000 police cars, 2,000 fire trucks and three thousand others (ambulances, service patrols, tow trucks, etc.) were struck going to or at traffic incidents. This year started with the first firefighter death at a crash scene on January second when he was hit by a truck while putting flares out to warn traffic.

In 2001, 21 state troopers died in the line of duty. One was shot, three died in aircraft crashes and the remaining 17 died in traffic related incidents.

We can and should focus significant effort to improve these numbers. Training, equipment, research, policy development, updated statutes, and performance standards are all outputs that could improve responder safety.

Secondary Crash Prevention

Studies have indicated crashes secondary to other incidents range from 14 to 30 percent of all crashes. USDOT estimated that 18% of deaths on freeways were secondary crashes. The authors are personally aware of secondary crashes in the recent past that have killed 13, 7 and 4 respectively. The four were killed two weeks ago when they slammed into the back of a parked semi in the middle of the roadway. The road had been closed for over 6 hours for a previous car accident and traffic was stopped with lights off conserving fuel when this crash occurred miles from the original incident. Was there traffic control? Why was the road closed so long? Were the responders taking into consideration secondary crashes in managing the original crash scene? These are just a few of the questions that professional response managers should be asking when these tragedies.

This is another area where significant improvements can be made to eliminate secondary crashes. Research, studies, training, and policy development can have a positive impact on reducing the number and severity of secondary crashes.

Traffic Control

Traffic control for all incidents that close or severely impact traffic movement on one or more lanes is vitally important. Proper use of traffic control devices such as signs, cones, Variable message signs, Highway advisory radio, and other devices can improve traffic flow through or around scenes. Proper use of detour routes, better on scene traffic control, and continuous monitoring of the impact of the incident can decrease secondary crashes, improve responder safety, and decrease motorist delays.

Improper traffic control can be a major liability. The new Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) outlines requirements for traffic control as it always has, but now defines incidents as requiring temporary traffic control consistent with temporary work zones.

Manual traffic control at incidents can move up to 50% more traffic smoothly past the incident while increasing responder safety. Think to crash scenes you have passed by. Was traffic control in place, was someone in the right place making sure traffic was under "Positive Control" as it passed the actual incident location?

Traffic control can and should be a consistent part of even short-term incidents. A multi-agency approach is required here to make sure all responders understand and use the basic procedures required for the safe movement of traffic.

Incident Site Management

Good site management procedures can dramatically improve safety, traffic flow, clearance times, and even agency image. Proper positioning of response vehicles, early deployment of tow trucks, setting proper priorities, practicing good emergency light discipline, and working together is necessary for good site management.

Even though agencies may respond to similar traffic incidents on a frequent basis, multi-agency efforts to streamline the process are unusual. Responders can individually improve certain aspects of site management but a consolidated effort is necessary to make comprehensive improvements.

Liability can be an issue here also. If vehicles remain blocking roadways after they could have been moved, secondary crashes can result in claims or law suits against the response agencies and individuals.

Quick Clearance

Early efforts in incident management by the Federal Highway Administration resulted in the finding that quick clearance is the most effect method to decrease responder injuries, decrease secondary crashes, improve mobility, and improve public image of response agencies. Quick clearance should be a policy and can be supported by laws that reduce liability for responders taking aggressive actions to open roadways.

There are a large number of actions that can be undertaken by individual and multi-agency groups to improve the process. They include law and policy changes, training, interagency agreements, changing the priorities of on scene responders, streamlining investigative procedures, updating towing regulations and procedures for their use, and setting challenging performance standards for clearance times.

Conclusion

These issues are only the "Tip of the Iceberg". During this conference we will need your input to identify additional issues, develop recommendations and set priorities. Thank you for taking the time to attend and participate in this process.

Return to "Operations Papers"

Advanced Incident Management Practices

Incident Management (IM) programs have been developed in nearly every urban area and in most states. Due to a variety of impacts such as political pressure, budget restraints, institutional resistance, and lack of a clear mandate, programs have a wide range of styles and success rates.

We have found that there are some states with very good parts of an overall program, but not one state with all the parts. We found good equipment, motivated personnel, good procedures, appropriate laws, and good leadership, but not all in the same state at the same time. We have also found a number of challenges yet to be overcome in most programs.

To help senior managers get a better feel for what is occurring in the IM field, we have gathered information on the programs and taken an objective look at several of them to see how they really work. We have been totally honest in our comments in the hopes it will help start an open dialog for future improvements.

This briefing paper is a summary of the Executive Overview that was developed for Legislators, Directors of transportation agencies, Chiefs of Police, Chiefs of Fire Departments, and owners of towing businesses who are key to the success of IM programs. Without their understanding and support, programs will not reach their full potential.

Service Patrols

Service patrols are universally accepted as the most effective tools for IM. From our experience, the most successful are operated with DOT employees, have multi-purpose vehicles with a variety of safety equipment including arrow boards or variable message boards. They double as incident response vehicles for collisions, spills and crash investigations. They have direct police radio contact and operate out of the Traffic Operations Center, (TOC), if there is one. There is coverage in major cities 24 hours a day or 12 to 13 hours, M-F, and they have an on call program for nights and weekends. They are successful in becoming a true part of the incident management decision-making process at incident sites.

Private providers of service patrol programs also do a good job. They are, however, restricted in their activities by the public agencies that manage them. They are seldom allowed to do the same activities as IM personnel working for a department of transportation, and they don't represent the DOT at large incident scenes. Often, they are not allowed to communicate directly with the police officers handling the freeway and that restricts timely and accurate communications.

24-Hour Incident Response

Coverage and response during peak traffic periods is normally very good. During off peak hours and weekends, response may be very slow by DOT personnel. In highly congested cities, this may be when the most severe incidents occur and they may impact peak traffic if not handled properly. Inconsistent response can contribute to secondary crashes, decreased trust from other response agencies, increased liability, and generate negative media coverage.

Inconsistent response also pertains to the use of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) applications. If ITS systems such as Variable Message signs, (VMS) are operated effectively only during peak periods, the public will soon become disenchanted with poor service during non-peak hours. If systems are continuously used for non-emergency information such as upcoming construction closures or safety messages, they will lose their effectiveness.

The urban areas are not the only places needing response services from DOT. The best programs have select rural maintenance personnel on call with take home vehicles equipped for most contingencies. During the workday, they are part of the maintenance program but may respond quickly to any blocking incidents the police cannot handle alone. They should have pagers, cell phones, and be well trained. They should participate in multi-agency training whenever possible. Incident response must be their priority when they are needed.

Given that response times will increase on weekends due to call-outs, transportation agencies should still provide the same level of service on Sunday morning as they do on Thursday afternoon. Several highly embarrassing incidents have been well publicized when DOT failed to respond adequately on their day off. Freeways operate 24 hours per day as do the police and fire. DOT should be funded, staffed, equipped, trained, and prepared to do the same.

Communications Interoperability

In every workshop, communications between agencies and between responders is a big issue. Responders who routinely work with each other at incident scenes, cannot communicate by radio. Traffic Operations Center, (TOC) personnel cannot talk to the police directly. They also do not have access to the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) information from the emergency 911 centers. The emergency dispatch centers do not have access or control of cameras that could help them manage response to emergencies on the transportation systems.

These Communications challenges are even more important since the events of September 11, 2001. Transportation systems and national security have suddenly become linked in a manner we didn't expect. The ability to link the systems police and transportation agencies have for management of their particular disciplines is a significant opportunity to increase security against terrorism. If additional attacks do occur, massive response or evacuation of cities will require a complete system for use by emergency operations personnel and transportation officials to be effective.

Agencies should strive to link these systems as soon as possible. They should then establish an interagency training program to ensure they work well together and understand each other's priorities.

Interagency Agreements

Probably the most important agreement is an open roads policy developed and signed by police and transportation agencies. New agreements should include input and support from the fire departments. Response protocols should also be covered between different agencies. For example, some service patrol programs are not allowed to clear accident vehicles from roadways until a police officer arrives while others are. Mutual aid agreements are also important to share resources and save time. Equipment in a construction zone should be available to help clear roadways and this agreement should be set up at the start of construction.

Media partnerships and agreements are also very important. Some areas have radio contact with media pilots, get help with managing queues, and share cameras. Generally, the closer you work with them, the better the relationship, and the stronger your program will be.

None of these solutions are any good unless the agreements are known by all employees and in some cases, the public. What good is a quick clearance law if the public is not aware of it? The authors recently read an open roads agreement that had been signed by agency directors six months earlier. Several state police officers in attendance had never heard of it. In one state, which has a "Steer it Clear it" law, officers we talked to weren't aware of the law. Still others disagreed with the law and openly resisted having lanes cleared of minor crashes until they arrived, and some kept lanes closed until they completed their paperwork.

Some officers will not call a tow truck until they are close to completion of their accident reports. In one city, the officers did not request tow trucks until they had been on scene for over 40 minutes. By the time they responded and cleared the vehicles, it was well over an hour per incident.

If you want to see a very good interagency agreement between State Transportation and Patrol agencies, get a copy of the "Joint Operations Policy Statement" from Washington State.

Reduced Liability For Incident Management

Most responders are reluctant to be aggressive about clearing roadways. Responders that have adapted aggressive clearance procedures, save millions in lost time for the public and face the same or even less litigation than the others.

Some of the biggest cases pending have to do with secondary crashes where deaths occurred in the queue behind previous incidents. Make sure you are getting the traffic control to these scenes quickly and it is focused on protecting the queue. In some of our workshops, responders have indicated there is nothing you can do about secondary crashes so they do nothing to protect the queue. That can be a liability problem for your agency when serious secondary crashes occur. This approach also indicates training is lacking in a large number of agencies.

Proper traffic control is also required for long-term incidents and that requirement is becoming more of a liability issue. A recent change in Chapter 6 of the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) has placed incident management in the same category as temporary work zones. That change could mean increased liability if emergency traffic control is not improved to meet work zone standards quickly. A good rule that is consistent with the MUTCD is initiate additional traffic control measures if the first responders estimate the scene will take more than one hour.

Rarely has a state ever paid even small amounts for quick clearance. By the way, the American Trucking Association, American Automobile Association, and the North American Insurance Institute either support or are neutral on aggressive clearance. We have found that doing the job aggressively while using good common sense is better, liability wise, than being indecisive and worrying about liability. Push, pull, or drag it off. Take pictures before and after removal. All police, IM or service patrol trucks should have cameras and should also take pictures of any potential liability issues, (roadway edges, signing, roadway damage, etc.) Some carry the disposable cameras and do not develop the film unless it is needed. When it is, they let the requestor pay for development.

Quick Clearance Policies

Whether based on policy or law, quick clearance is a very good program to implement. By making it mandatory that you must get out of the road when in a minor collision, you prevent further delays and collisions. This also sends a message to the responders that clearance is a priority. Responders are also reducing their exposure to potential injuries when they clear roads quickly.

Is it important? California Legislators passed the quick clearance law in 1999 with unanimous support. The message is clear. Open roads are a very high priority.

Clearing congested freeways doesn't mean moving everything to the shoulder and then sitting there for extended periods to finish accident reports etc. Move the whole mess to an exit, crash investigation site, or parking lot. Traffic will recover quicker and responders will be in a safer environment to complete their tasks. A recent truck crash in another state was removed quickly and expertly to the shoulder, but sat there and continued to back up traffic for over two additional hours while a brake inspection was completed. That inspection could have been done off of the freeway at a safe location not effecting traffic flow.

Truck Crashes Require Unified Actions "Between The White Lines"

The QUICK CLEARANCE policy should give clear guidance on how to handle truck wrecks. Cargo removal can take hours if not handled properly. It is the public's road and operated by the transportation authority. If possible, the truck owner and towing company should take part in the process, but it is a DOT responsibility to focus on quick clearance by any reasonable means.

"Unified Actions" means exactly that. When a truck with a placarded load (HazMat) overturns, a wide range of responder decisions impact the proper handling of the recovery. In one city, good coordinated incident management leads to a 90-minute total incident including recovery and removal of the truck and cargo.

In another city, the almost identical incident takes 17 hours with an entire freeway closed. In the first city, the responders work together and evaluate alternatives. The towing company and truck owner recommend recovery of the truck while it is loaded and outline how they will accomplish that for the police and fire incident commanders. Their approach is approved and the recovery is accomplished quickly as well as safely. They already had the trust of the fire departments and police due to their working relationships and previous multiple agency participation in exercises.

In the second city, the truck owner is not allowed to be at the command center, the police call for a tow truck off the rotation list and the tow driver has never recovered a vehicle and load like this. The fire incident commander and police decide to "Error on the side of safety" and thousands of motorists are left stranded for hours. The truck owner has the ultimate liability for the recovery and, with the approval of the incident commander, should have input into the recovery process.

If the load material is not hazardous, use whatever means necessary to clear the traveled portion quickly. Push, pull, or drag, with tow trucks, front-end loaders, or response trucks.

Just to be clear, and to follow the law in most states, it is DOT not the police who should have the final say so on clearance when the debris or load materials is "Between the White Lines". The police enforce and investigate; the DOT operates, maintains and repairs the roadways. Good working agreements and prior coordination are required to make this work properly.

Once the lanes are cleared, the trucking company and towing company can assume responsibility for remaining clearance needs as long as it won't cause significant traffic impact. By having DOT be a more active player, police are able to focus on their more important tasks; investigations and enforcement.

Use your equipment, towing equipment or contracted equipment, but don't wait. Delays increase the potential for responder injury, secondary crashes and are too costly to the motoring public. DOT should be part of the decision-making process at major crashes and is often the only agency that has the interests of the motorist caught in the queue as a priority.

Clean Up Of Fuel Spills

Another area of significant performance variance is clean up of small amounts of petroleum products such as diesel and motor oil. Spills on road surfaces should be handled as quickly as possible. Fuel can be cleaned up from the road surface with any absorbent material by anyone at the scene. Contrary to some opinions, a contractor should not be required for spills on the road surface and there is more danger in keeping the roads closed. Secondary crashes and more exposure to responders from errant traffic are a significant safety issue when closures are extended. Clean it up, package it, leave it for the contractor, or put it in the wrecked vehicle if it is fuel or motor oil.

If the spill gets into drains, waterways, or causes other environmental hazards, follow the rules you have established but still clean the lanes quickly. Fire, towing or DOT responders in several states arrive at the incident fully prepared to plug leaks and clean up roadway spills to open roads quickly. Good for them. Other states close roadways, increase exposure of responders to injuries and leave thousands stranded to wait for a contractor to be called out to do the same thing. These delays can result in more responder exposure to being injured, increase liability, secondary crashes, and embarrassment to the response agencies when programs from one state or city are compared to those from others.

A recent new documentary in one Eastern city compared how crashes were handled there to how they are handled in Chicago. They criticized the Police, DOT, and elected officials when they found Chicago cleared them all hours quicker than in their city. They interviewed senior leaders who blamed the problem on lack of funding. That is partially true, but lots can be done to fix the problems with existing funds.

Multiple Agency Training

The NHI Incident Management workshops are a good opportunity to gage the amount of training that is conducted with other agencies. In one we recently conducted, police and fire responders were openly amazed at what DOT had to offer. They had no idea what a TOC was or what it did. They had never considered having DOT participate in the exercises they regularly have with other response agencies.

To be truly effective in IM, these training sessions are necessary. DOT should talk to police and fire agencies and make sure they know DOT wants to participate. Get involved in the emergency management program in your county that is responsible for disaster preparedness. They are a great source of multiple agency training opportunities. They also foster team building, and will include DOT as an emergency response agency and a community resource.

Another common response is that agencies have never trained for highway emergencies with each other. Routine accidents block our roadways everyday, yet, they are not handled with a systematic approach, Truthfully, and most responders have given it little thought. It is a come as you are, park where you want, and do what we do. A little work in this area with, a commitment to follow up in their agencies can vastly improve clearance times and reduce congestion. When major events occur, such as overturned tanker trucks, you really find out who is well prepared, and who isn't.

Think back at crash scenes you have driven past and see if you recall being partially blinded by excessive emergency lights, seeing responders standing around, no traffic control, emergency vehicles blocking lanes that could be open, and an appearance of a general lack of organization. If so, you are, unfortunately, not alone.

Agency Program Evaluation

If you are told it is working well, have someone evaluate the records and make sure. Sometimes certain individuals get it done quickly and we think everyone is doing the same. Not true. I know of areas where serious incidents may be cleared through the efforts of one key responder in 60 to 90 minutes while others will take 5 to 7 hours. Some questions to ask;

• Do you have a published goal for clearance times?
• Do you regularly evaluate closures looking for ways to reduce the time they take?
• Have you looked at how ITS and other tools have shortened (or maybe lengthened) clearance times?
• Do you give positive recognition and reinforcement to employees who excel in effective incident management?

Just as an example, "Total Station" surveying systems have been credited with reducing the time it takes to investigate fatal or criminal crashes. Not always true. It takes time to get them to the site and 20 minutes to set them up. Then, they often measure 5 to 10 times the points they used to. It is our personal observation and that of several officials, that total station does not reduce clearance time in most cases. It does allow them to produce better diagrams that are seldom used in a criminal case.

One study indicted less than 20% of criminal investigations for accidents are ever used in court. Another study compared fatality investigation closures before and after acquiring "Total Stations". Fatality investigation closures averaged one hour longer with the "Total Station".

Some police go through the entire investigative process even if they know it won't be a criminal case because they are concerned about civil liability. Having police use a "Triage" technique can help them eliminate some delays when it becomes clear there will not be felony charges.

Some of the more responsive police agencies are doing several things to reduce the impact on traffic and improve the safety of their responders. If crashes are on major freeways, they send more personnel, prioritize tasks, use new technology such as laser, GPS or Photogrammetry, or mark roads for measuring later. Good police agencies figure out how to avoid long closures and how to prevent secondary crashes. As a result, they expose their own personnel to much less risk of injury in secondary crashes.

A past FHWA study indicated quick clearance is the most effective means of reducing congestion. We totally agree. Hopefully, you won't get to the point that some states have where the media is chastising them for poor management of incidents.

Evaluation can take many forms, but for our purposes, it is focused on a few key issues. Are you conducting training for personnel that must respond to emergencies on a regular basis? Are training objectives clearly stated? Are your resources and those of other key agencies deployed properly? On two occasions state police had printouts of response times that showed in one area they took twice as long to respond as other areas. As far as we could determine, they had not looked into changing zone lines or moving personnel to correct this disparity. The staffing adjustments have been made and response times are nearly 50% improved.

From a DOT perspective, is your response times on weekends acceptable? Police often say it's easy to get help from DOT on weekdays but when needed at night or on weekends, as one east coast police officer stated, "Forget about it". Take a look at this and it may save you future embarrassment.

Good equipment must be readily available to responders. Does a supervisor have to go unlock a shop for employees to have access to needed resources? Have you set response standards? As part of one states efforts, they got the state police to agree to a goal of two hours maximum lane closures for criminal traffic investigations. In return, the DOT promised faster and better response to help with traffic control. Hopefully you have or are working toward an agreement like this.

Always include a major incident review in this process. If there is a school shooting that wounds one, everyone evaluates it for prevention and response in the future. We usually don't do a good job of this on major transportation emergencies on our highways.

Legislative Or Administrative Actions

We have discussed quick clearance issues already. Establishing liability exemptions to facilitate quick clearance of load materials and trucks reduces the reluctance many responders have to act decisively. This can be accomplished through policy, but some agencies want this placed into law. Some states have passed this legislation as a companion to 'Move It' quick clearance laws.

Additional effort is needed in nearly every state for updating towing regulations. Although this is primarily a regulatory issue, DOT can play a significant role. Regulations for large tow trucks were developed over 40 years ago. At that time, legal truck weights were much lighter than today. The best tow trucks available were rated for 25 tons. Now rotator and fixed boom hydraulic tow trucks have 35 to 70 ton capacity, yet they are on rotation lists with older 25-ton units. There is little incentive for a towing company to spend $400,000 on a new rotator when he has alternate calls with other companies with old trucks.

One state has resolved the problem by having DOT call for a rotator for all overturned, blocking trucks. They also allow the towing company to charge a higher price ($500.00 per hour) for this equipment. As a result, there are now five rotators in that area available to clear roads quickly.

Tow bills using older trucks that take longer and require more personnel are often several thousand dollars. Consequently, the trucking company pays more and the road stays closed longer. The best way to resolve this is to try and get the state police to develop a new recovery class of tow with a minimum of 35 tons. Old tows would still tow disabled trucks, but they would not be used to relocate or upright overturned trucks blocking roadways.

One state DOT refused to grant a minor weight waiver to allow a 60-ton rotator tow truck to clear truck wrecks. This equipment can often do this task in minutes where regular big tow trucks often take hours. Use your authority to make it work instead of preventing it from happening.

Several other barriers to progress are blamed on laws or policies. Police in one city indicated it was against the law to allow the service patrols on their radio channel. One city said the law required all deceased persons be removed by the Medical Examiner only, even if the road was blocked and long delays could be expected before they arrived. Another state said they are required to leave all emergency lights on when along side a freeway even though it can be a safety hazard. If you know of or have laws or policies that restrict good incident management, work to change them.

Incident Command For Roadway Emergencies

Incident command of roadway emergencies is a challenge in several areas of the nation. Incident Command Systems (ICS) or more recently Incident Management Systems (IMS) are established methods to manage emergencies. Based on old military principals of command and control, and formalized by fire departments, this flexible structure is put in place to incorporate all response agencies into the process.

A newer version that is in place in some cities is called "Unified Incident Command." In this approach, there is still a single incident commander, but the representatives of the other response agencies are involved in the decision making process. It is not who is in charge as much as it is who is in charge of what.

Unfortunately, in some areas it appears more time has been spent on WHO is in charge than on HOW to be in charge. A good incident commander is a facilitator of the process and genuinely considers the input of others in making decisions. A good traffic incident commander talks directly to the representatives of other agencies and is able to understand and incorporate the priorities of others into the decision making process.

Most importantly, the incident commander has the experience and training to deliver professional leadership that leads to effective management of all types of transportation incidents. All too often, the incident commanders do not have a good understanding of the total picture and often have never attended multiple agency training for transportation incidents. They may not understand the differences between operating on city streets compared to operating on major freeways.

Anyone who is going to be put into the traffic incident command position in their particular agency should attend a good multi-agency traffic incident management course before they assume those responsibilities. They should also have a good working knowledge of the incident command process so they can fit into that process immediately upon arrival at a traffic incident scene.

Planning For Incident Management In Construction Projects

During many of the workshops, members of response agencies comment on the difficulty of accessing scenes in construction zones. They also comment on the higher than average number of incidents that occur in those zones.

Planning for construction should contain input from the fire, police and towing industries. Sometimes, relatively inexpensive actions can be taken early to reduce incident impact during construction. This input from response agencies needs to take place early in the construction staging and maintenance of traffic planning.

It is common for service patrols to be used in construction zones to reduce response times. Does the agreement allow them to remove accident vehicles before the police arrive? Are they equipped to handle minor diesel spills and other debris cleanup? Have police and fire been consulted and informed about the duties of the service personnel?

It is also common to employ police officers to maintain a high visibility to keep traffic slowed to a reasonable rate. Does that agreement require them to clear lanes rapidly by use of their push bars? Do they take enforcement action or merely sit with emergency lights on? Have you considered having them sit with emergency lights on may not be a proper use of emergency lights and may actually de-sensitize motorists to the meaning of emergency lights? Are they protected by attenuator trucks or parked in coned off areas where they are vulnerable to out of control motor vehicles?

Numerous areas use portable Dynamic Message signs, Highway Advisory Radio, and regular media releases to keep motorists informed. Can the signs and HAR be changed quickly when incidents occur? Who has control of them during non-construction hours? Some areas now use temporary closed circuit video cameras that the service patrol can monitor to speed up detection and response. Can they tape incidents at police, fire or DOT request?

What about the other response agencies that are affected by the project? Has someone met with the fire departments to plan response routes when ramps are closed or restricted? Have temporary landing sites been identified to allow for patient air evacuation? Has the construction been scheduled to allow for at least one open emergency lane or shoulder on at least one side of the median barrier? Has the entire construction zone been made an impound zone or immediate tow zone, to remove abandoned vehicles? Have temporary turning points or median openings been included in the plan to allow towing and emergency vehicle access? Is there an agreement with the contractor that his equipment and personnel can be diverted to clear an incident on a time and materials basis? Is it have temporary accident investigation sites been identified and the locations made known to all response agencies?

Is there an agreement in place that specifies who is on call for issues in the work zone on weekends or holidays? Are the emergency agencies provided with updated callout lists for resident engineers or key contractor contacts when DOT doesn't have a 24-hour operations center? Are they equipped and trained to provide effective IM support? Are they within a reasonable distance to have a good response time?

Other Issues

Clearance times can be dramatically reduced for major collisions. A plan, training, multiple agency commitment, and resources are required. Police can prioritize tasks, use new technology, and demonstrate an urgency to get it cleared up. DOT help is needed quickly when major roads are closed or severely restricted for crash investigation and clean up. They can have equipment and supplies readily available, prioritize tasks, and provide proper traffic control for the other agencies. All responders should operate with a sense of urgency to complete tasks and get roadways restored to normal use as soon as possible.

Investigative times can also be reduced. A new program called photogrammetry is being used in at least 8 states that allow measurements and diagramming to be done strictly from photographs. In one state, the technical investigator using this along with the right priorities was is able to complete a criminal crash investigation in 40 minutes. One group of 32 investigators worked on priorities on scene and determined there were only 5 tasks that had to be completed with the lanes blocked. We also ask that the lanes not be closed until police are totally prepared to do the investigation in a timely manner. That means traffic control is in place, the tools and personnel needed are on scene, poised to work quickly, and everyone is focused on priority tasks.

Intermittent closures can also be used effectively. Instead of closing lanes traffic was traveling in when the first officers arrived, only close then for the short period needed to complete measurements or other tasks. Having the right personnel in place to accomplish these tasks can reduce closures of those lanes to as little as 20 minutes.

One possible solution; ask the police to send only their very best to investigations blocking major roadways. During the years the Chicago Bulls were winning championships, they wouldn't sit Michael Jordan on the bench in a critical game. The police should use the same approach. It is really frustrating and embarrassing to have investigators reading the directions to the "Total Station" in the middle of a blocked freeway because they haven't had enough training or experience to use it effectively.

Agency Leadership

In every NHI class, employees want to know what their leaders want, will they be supported, and what actions are they allowed to take. They are reluctant to do what is necessary due to a lack of guidance. Provide it to them in writing and be supportive when they are trying to make improvements. Hype the successes and innovation and give them positive feedback. This was the organizational climate that cultivated many of the nations most successful incident management programs.

Return to "Operations Papers"

Changing the Language of Incident Management Operations

Introduction

Arland "Ted" Smith, and John O'Laughlin, each have over 30 years of Incident Management (IM) experience. They have worked with several states on IM issues, written portions of the latest version of the FHWA IM handbook, and taught NHI IM courses throughout the nation. They have presented over 100 workshops including "Executive Incident Management" Briefings in 10 states.

Ted and John have determined that producing long-term major improvements in incident management operations on roadways requires a different approach, and most importantly, a different language. This paper was developed to highlight the phrases we have collected from others, developed personally, and gathered from previous documents on incident management. We recommend selecting a few to use when discussing these issues, especially when trying to improve IM operations

The different approach is simply emphasizing the responder's safety instead of traffic congestion or pollution as the reason for clearing all incidents quickly. We have used this approach in seminars with police, fire, transportation and towing responders and have gotten a far better reception than before. All responders who have experienced close calls at incident scenes do understand they are safer when not out there and want to learn techniques that improves their ability to clear incidents effectively and quickly.

All of these terms are valuable for liability purposes. If agencies adapt policies based on these approaches and responders use them as the basis for their actions, they will experience less liability than if they delay taking appropriate action.

We have also found that catch phrases supported with factual information are easier to remember and even become part of the normal conversations about IM. We offer the following terms for your consideration and hope there are some you will use on a regular basis as we strive to improve the delivery of incident management services.

"In The Interest Of Safety"

We strongly advocate the use of this phrase over the other similar one "Error on the side of safety." We see this as being more applicable to managing incidents and means always taking all safety issues into consideration when making decisions at incidents.

It means opening lanes quickly adds to everyone's safety. It also means always maintaining an awareness of the entire incident impact, not just at the incident itself.

Long road closures are bad for everyone. Responders are exposed to danger for longer periods of time. Motorists are exposed to the dangers of secondary crashes. A 1998 USDOT report indicated approximately 18% of fatalities on freeways are secondary to other incidents. A large number could be prevented if decisions were made to protect the queue, divert traffic and clear incidents quickly.

The first fire fighter killed in the nation this year was struck by a tractor-trailer approaching a previous crash on an icy interstate. Better responder training may have prevented that tragic death.

In 2001, there were 21 state police officers killed in the United States. One died of gunshot wounds, 3 died in aircraft crashes, and 17 died in traffic related incidents. In the interest of all responder's safety, we should concentrate more training on multi-agency incident response and the benefits of quick effective procedures. By emphasizing safety over mobility, we will gain more respect and support from all the personnel who put themselves in jeopardy when they respond to roadway emergencies.

"Between The White Lines"

This phrase is used to emphasize the need to handle the traveled portion of the roadway differently than the shoulder or areas next to the roadway. It is also used to highlight the need to have strong working relationships between the enforcement and transportation agencies.

Police enforce and investigate. Transportation agencies operate and maintain. Sometimes these distinctions are blurred and sometimes transportation agencies have little control over what happens on the roadways. They should have a strong say in what occurs on the traveled portion and should work closely with police, fire, towing and others to make sure the proper balance is taking place between the needs of all agencies at incidents.

Clean up should also be handled with the priority going to the traveled portion of the road first. If there is a diesel or other fuel spill, clean up the road surface quickly with available resources and save the clean up companies for the recovery of product from drains or soil.

"Between the White Lines" also means expediting the removal of all incidents from the lanes by the most expeditious means. Patrol cars or service patrols with push bumpers or tow straps should remove wrecked vehicles to the shoulder instead of waiting in the road for tow trucks.

"Positive Traffic Control"

Probably anyone who reads this has been delayed due to crashes. You creep along and finally reach the incident. As you pass, you see several responders standing around and no one directing traffic. What impression does it leave with you?

The cover of this document illustrates traffic control at an incident scene by a DOT employee. He is keeping a constant presence and continuously directing traffic past the scene. His efforts are appreciated by passing motorists and they leave the scene knowing someone was focused on getting them safely through the incident. There were serious injuries in this crash and the driver had to b extricated form the wreck. The entire scene was cleared completely in 21 minutes from first report.

Having someone, and it can be any responder, continuously directing traffic at the right location can increase traffic flow by up to 50 percent. If motorists are ignored, they go through the scene at the rate of the slowest "Rubbernecker". By putting one responder in their line of sight when they try and look at the wreck, they are directed to move smoothly past the scene.

This technique is also an added safety device for the responders on scene. They can work without concern from traffic when they know someone is constantly watching the traffic for erratic behavior or someone getting too close to the responders. If traffic must be stopped to allow repositioning of emergency vehicles or personnel, the traffic controller is close to the incident core and can easily get directions from the incident commander.

Cones are also used to help identify the route for the motorists. They are an early warning device, especially at night, and can wake up drowsy motorists and allow responders reaction time when they hear the cones get hit.

"Responder Mobility"

This is a phrase that really catches the attention of Firefighters.

Urban areas all experience varying degrees of congestion related to incidents. Responders are impacted by that congestion as much and sometimes more than normal motorists. To maintain consistent response times requires a transportation system that doesn't let any types of incidents close major roadways. Events such as suicidal jumpers on bridges, bomb threats, hazardous materials spills, or barricaded subjects can result in large and long closures. When hey occur, fire departments and other response agencies cannot reach emergency calls in acceptable time fames.

We strongly recommend to all response senior personnel that closures do have a negative effect on response to other emergencies and should be kept to a minimum whenever possible.

Responder mobility also has to do with getting to incidents on congested roadways in an acceptable time. When first responders block additional lanes, they are creating a longer and more difficult trip for other responders coming to assist at the same incident. First responders in congested environments should not take additional lanes but should do everything possible to minimize the impact on traffic at least until all the needed resources reach the scene.

We all have the responsibility to continually inform other response agencies of the need for keeping ingress routes open for others. We can improve response times and clearance times through emphasizing "Responder Mobility."

"50 mph Rule"

On a recent long closure for a truck crash, a freeway had traffic backed up for several miles. After the lanes were finally cleared, the traffic started to move again. Several trucks were parked in the lanes and the drivers were asleep in the truck sleeper compartments. Officers had to go truck to truck to wake them up.

Had these truckers known of the closure far enough in advance, they could have taken alternate routes or stopped in safe locations for their prescribed rest breaks. They would not have been stuck in the back up and a number of other motorists would not have been stuck there either. The 50 MPH rule means giving wide dissemination of closure information, even to other states. For every hour the closure is estimated to last, provide notice to drivers far enough away that they can avoid the closures.

This process can also prevent secondary crashes by keeping motorists aware of pending congestion. It will reduce the size of the queues and make them easier to manage. This process also improves the image of the agencies involved by demonstrating that providing motorist information is important.

"15 Minute Rule"

This rule is taken from the procedures used in command posts for large emergencies. Frequent updates and briefings are used to keep everyone properly informed. By applying this process to traffic incidents and having it done every 15 minutes, we improve the overall on scene communications and coordination significantly.

The 15-minute rule also provides the leader of each response agency the opportunity to update others on their progress. It eliminates confusion and allows for better use of resources and prioritization of tasks. By participating in these frequent exchanges, responders get to know others and learn their priorities.

One step in this process is assessing the scene at the 15-minute point to see what can be done to improve scene safety, improve traffic movement, and determine an estimate of length of event. This information is shared with each response agency at the scene, traffic control personnel near the scene and with dispatch centers.

The Phoenix Fire Department uses a version of this and has the dispatcher put out a 15- minute notification to the personnel on scene. They then respond with the status of the event and the estimate of time left on scene. This process also keeps everyone aware of how long they have been at the incident.

Space Safety Or I=TWZ

I=TWZ means incidents are now considered to be temporary work zones in the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) and meet those traffic control standards over a period of time. In the definitions, it appears that requirements for more than minimal traffic control is required if the incident will be there more than one hour. This change should be reviewed by all transportation agencies and response agencies to see how it impacts their operations at incident scenes.

Space safety has several meanings all related to giving responders enough opportunity to escape injury should something go wrong. Large police agencies that deal with traffic enforcement have changed the violator approach to the non-traffic side of the vehicle. That will reduce the number of officers struck by cars. Some police agencies have also instructed officers to park further back from vehicles on the shoulders of freeways. That will allow more time to escape should the vehicle be struck from behind.

Higher speeds means traffic control devices need to be started further from the incident. The speed of traffic, not the speed limit should be considered in determining how long the taper is for lane closures. High speeds can allow vehicles with the "D" Drivers (drowsy, drunk, drugged, distracted) to hit traffic control devices and then responders or their vehicles if the devices aren't placed far enough away. All responders should carry a number of cones in their vehicles to serve as traffic control and early warning devices.

Traffic control must be improved to reduce the number of secondary crashes, injuries to responders and response vehicles being struck.

Traditionally, local transportation agencies haven't been heavily involved in incident management programs. With the change in the MUTCD, local agencies will have added responsibility to support emergency agencies during lengthy closures. This will be especially important on major arterials when traffic volumes are high. A new program in Maricopa County, Arizona, is an example of being prepared to provide proper after-hours traffic control on arterials.

Fatigued commercial drivers are also a hazard to responders. A large truck traveling 75 miles per hour can take nearly 1000 feet to stop when the driver is not fully alert. Commercial vehicles are involved in an average of 14 fatalities per day nation wide. Better traffic control at incident scenes can reduce that number by alerting the drivers early enough to slow or stop safely.

"It Takes Iron To Move Iron"

Towing regulations have lagged behind the rapid changes in truck types and weights. Most tow regulations were written over 40 years ago and have not had significant changes to the heavy-duty class since then. When the rules were written, trucks and trailers had steel frames, weighed a maximum of 37 tons, and traveled at lower speeds.

Today's trucks often weigh over 50 tons, travel faster, and are mostly made of aluminum to maximize cargo weight. When they are involved in collisions, there is often more damage and they are difficult to remove to restore traffic.

Tow truck regulations in nearly every state should be updated from a 25-ton class tow to a minimum of 35 tons. New tows in the 50 to 70 ton class are far better and will clear roads much faster in the right hands. They do cost up to $400,000, and operators are reluctant to buy them if they have to compete with old outdated equipment for the same calls. In the right hands also means the operators need training and experience before they can be truly effective in opening roadways.

States should give strong consideration to establishing a recovery class of tows. Utah has upgraded to a recovery class and required that the company have at least two large hydraulic or rotator tow trucks, with additional equipment to expedite clearance of trucks and their loads. This has allowed them to vastly decrease the time required to clear roadways.

Training and certification is also needed to ensure the towing company is sending qualified and experienced operators. Utah again is a leader having just begun a certification program that will require all tow drivers to take a training and certification course within the next three years. Other states do have voluntary certification programs and they are often supported by the tow industry.

One significant operational issue must be overcome to keep recoveries to a minimum time length. That is the tendency of the tow company and truck owner to want to minimize damage in the removal process. When a truck crashes at a high enough speed to overturn, and the responders want to slide it off the roadway before unloading or uprighting, they are doing the right thing. The damage is already done. Roads should rarely remain blocked to unload or upright a truck unless the cargo is hazardous.

"Target Acquisition"

The every year, approximately 10,000 police cars, 2,000 fire trucks, and 3,000 other response vehicles are struck at or going to incidents. 59% of the officers that died in the United States in 2000 were killed related to traffic. Target Acquisition means several things. Drunks and others who are impaired may drift toward and collide with vehicles displaying bright lights. There are frequent cases that responders have been struck on purpose by enraged or mentally unstable motorists. The bright lights also blind motorists passing emergencies and they try and pay more attention to the incident than to their driving.

All responders, regardless of their jobs, should wear proper reflective garments when working at incidents scenes, especially after the hours of darkness. Reduce the ability of becoming a target by being seen when necessary and by controlling the environment and taking away driver's opportunities to inadvertently or intentionally strike a responder.

Target Acquisition also has meaning related to terrorism attacks. Their approach is generally to inflict as many casualties as possible while striking at something symbolic. We sometimes create great opportunities for them by closing roadways and backing solid traffic onto bridges, into tunnels, or onto urban elevated structures. Maintaining mobility as a top priority is a means of defense against potential terrorist activities.

"Dignity In Death"

Another area needing updating are the rules and laws that govern medical examiners and coroners. Delays in removal of deceased victims or traffic collisions can keep roadways closed for additional minutes or even hours. The rules are based on the duties to investigate all deaths. If you have "Organ Donor" on your driver's license your wishes to try and make something positive out of a tragedy may go unheeded due to these old rules.

There are some organs that can be transplanted successfully after death if the victim is properly taken care of and transported rapidly to a proper facility. Even if the success rate is low, I would certainly choose to have my family have the opportunity to tell the medical professionals to go ahead and try than to find out my remains were left along side a roadway for hours.

"Dignity in Death" also means that the deceased, their family and on lookers should be treated with compassion and respect. Bodies should not be covered and left in the roadway or in the sight of others any longer than necessary. Police will often argue that they are part of a crime scene and have to be left there. If there is any sign of life they aren't left there, why should that change when they are deceased? There are certainly exceptions for circumstances such as hit and run fatalities, but generally they can be moved within a short period of time.

Oklahoma City has one of the best medical examiners policies we have seen. They exempt traffic crashes from keeping the deceased at the scene. They can and should be transported immediately according to this policy.

Years ago, delays in getting someone to respond and removed deceased persons from traffic crashes prompted the head of Emergency Medical Response in Chicago declared "Nobody dies on my highways". He established a policy that all bodies would be removed expeditiously to a medical facility that has the only authority to declare death. This policy affectively reduced the length of closures on Chicago freeways.

"Agree To Agree"

Interagency agreements such as open roads policies, quick clearance agreements, shared real time data, and shared resources can be important in the improvement of delivery of services. Shared data can significantly improve the delivery of the proper resources to the proper locations. Imagine the responders having onboard, or at least direct video in their dispatch centers, showing the incident location and details. That process alone can reduce the number of vehicles and types of vehicles responding to the incidents. It can also get them to the incidents sooner by giving more detailed locations and traffic conditions.

Response protocols can be as simple of getting agreements on how many and what types of response vehicles will deploy for traffic incidents and how they will be situated on the roadway. They can be as comprehensive as the recently signed agreement between the Washington State Patrol and Washington Department of Transportation. This agreement covers all the interagency activities and defines who has what role related to all types on interagency activities.

Regardless of all the Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) being deployed, most motorists in their cars are going to rely on their radios to get information about changes in traffic conditions. That source is generally commercial radio unless there are Highway Advisory Radio (HAR) systems in place that are actually kept up to date.

Transportation, police and traffic media have some excellent partnerships throughout the nation that cooperate to provide good information to motorists. They communicate directly, they share space and real time data, and they share costs. Media aircraft with police radios help the responders with an eye in the sky. The pilots get better details to share with motorists. In Chattanooga, Tennessee, the media traffic reporter provides aerial photographs of all serious crashes free of charge to the police to assist with investigations.

Mutual aid agreements are routine between fire departments in adjacent jurisdictions. They are not as common between police agencies unless they have joint drug task forces, or tactical teams. They are virtually non-existent for general police services, including investigation of felony or fatal collisions.

Interagency agreements for incidents can be determining who is closer and having them responsible for immediate response even if it is not in their actual jurisdiction. It can also be similar to the agreement in South Dallas, Texas where the Sheriff has taken over patrol responsibilities for 7 communities that had a small part of the loop freeway system. This program has reduced response times and clearance times dramatically because the officers are out there all the time and have become experts at operating on that roadway.

"Training, Training, And More Training"

Major arterials and freeways, especially high-speed corridors require a different set of skills and abilities for responders to maintain their safety. Any response agency that enters freeways for incidents should have a training program designed for proper safety techniques on that system. If they don't, they may have someone become part of the huge number of casualties that occur on freeways every day.

Training together with the other agencies that respond to roadways can help each responder understand and respect the priorities of others. Opportunities should not be missed to share ideas and information with each other. All too often, the only contact the senior managers of the agencies may have is when something goes wrong and there is a disagreement between the agencies. The natural tendency is defend the actions of the people in your organization, even if they could have done better. That further detracts from good interagency coordination.

Having an incident team in the region that meets on a regular basis can reduce the misunderstandings that occur when responders only have part of the information. They can also work together to identify problems and develop collective solutions. Having a segment of training in each of these meeting focused on local issues, is a valuable way to get participation.

Training for specialists should also be more balanced. Technical accident investigators may have weeks, even months of technical training and never get one hour about the hazards of keeping roadways closed. Fire command personnel are trained extensively on the safety of their personnel and never have it balanced with the needs to reduce secondary crashes. Towing companies are often paid by the hour and resist hurrying up because it costs them money. By having them get lanes open and then do recovery, they still earn the same and traffic is restored sooner.

There are numerous examples of great results as the result of training. Working together, agencies in San Antonio and South Dallas have cut clearance times by more than 50%. They credit training as a key to that improvement.

We hope that something in this paper is significant to you and you can use it in your Incident Management program. Please feel free to contact either or us should you need further information.

Return to "Operations Papers"

Overview

In any operation, and especially in Incident Management, information sharing is a powerful tool that facilitates improved inter-agency coordination. It is not the "end all" to operational issues in traffic incident management, but one of a set of tools available to the practitioners and managers of IM activities. In 1996, the San Diego InterCAD Project was initiated as the first in a series of "Early Start" projects for the Southern California Priority Corridor Showcase Program. The operational goal of this project was to improve IM operations through improved inter-agency communications. The scope of the project did not include on-scene voice communications but rather focused on communications between agency automated systems such as Computer Aided Dispatch and Advanced Transportation Management Systems. InterCAD enjoyed some early deployment success but the original objectives have not been fulfilled due to a series of institutional, technical and operational issues. Given the intense current interest in this integration goal, and its potential to improve IM operations, a Case Study of InterCAD is timely and will provide useful insight on the problems to avoid in the integration of public safety communications systems with transportation management systems.

InterCAD Project Background

The San Diego InterCAD (San Diego Regional Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) Interconnect) project, designed to facilitate improved incident management in San Diego County's portion of the Southern California ITS Priority Corridor, was begun in the fall of 1995. By summer 1996, the California Division of FHWA had approved the Federal Work Plan. InterCAD was originally envisioned as a two-phase project, leading to implementation in more than one region within the Priority Corridor.

As part of the local match funds required to receive federal funding for the project, the San Diego motorist aid call box authority, known as the Service Authority for Freeway Emergencies (SAFE), provided operating fund reserves to complete Phase 1 of the InterCAD project. Phase 2 of the project was funded from the FHWA FY 96 Priority Corridor Showcase budget administered by the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG).

The Phase 1 participants in the InterCAD project included San Diego Police Department (SDPD), San Diego Sheriff's Department (SDSD) and the Border Division of the California Highway Patrol (CHP). Phase 2 of InterCAD was planned to incorporate the new Caltrans Transportation Management Center (TMC) when that facility's new Advanced Transportation Management System (ATMS) became operational. Other public safety agencies within San Diego County, including fire and EMS, also planned to join the project in Phase 2. A similar project, Inland Empire InterCAD, had been proposed for Riverside and San Bernardino counties as part of the Showcase Increment II funding request – this project was not funded and was subsequently cancelled. Thus far, the only agencies on the InterCAD Phase 2 network include Caltrans District 11 TMC, Heartland Fire Communications (an East San Diego County Joint Powers Agency for fire/EMS communications) and the Federal Fire Department (a unified department consisting of local US Navy and Marine Corps base fire departments).

InterCAD Issues

Regional ITS information sharing projects typically suffer from the following barriers:

• Institutional inertia – resistance to change
• Lack of understanding of the other agency's needs and "hot buttons"
• "Not Invented Here" syndrome
• Lack of a regional "vision"
• Lack of known and respected "champions"
• Technical limitations: legacy, closed systems
• Lack of a regional communications plan
• Security concerns – especially critical with public safety systems
• Lack of participation in ITS integration dialogue by public safety CAD vendors

At one time or another InterCAD has experienced all of these issues to some degree. In the following paragraphs some of the more critical are highlighted.

Institutional

As with all projects of this type, the major issues revolved around difficulties with institutional considerations. Law enforcement agencies had difficulties assuring themselves that the InterCAD system had adequate security safeguards. The security issue stalled the project for almost a year and gradually law enforcement agencies lost interest in participation. At a critical point in the project's life cycle, several agencies switched CAD vendors, which combined with an over-reliance on one CAD vendor to develop a workable CAD integration solution, struck a severe blow to project progress. Communications managers were understandably preoccupied with getting critical new CAD systems operational and much less interested in regional interoperability. Although senior law enforcement executives in the County had been briefed on the project early on, they were not kept apprised of the ongoing issues. Their counterparts in the fire service and EMS agencies were never briefed.

The project champion, a senior uniformed law enforcement communications commander, retired, and there was no leadership to fill the void. Since there was only one champion, his departure led to an onset of a Not Invented Here syndrome and a lack of qualified and motivated senior personnel to assume responsibility. The leadership mantle passed from law enforcement to fire/EMS, thus the focus of the project changed in mid-stream. At this point the project gained two fire service advocates that kept the project alive.

Technical

As mentioned above, an over-reliance on a single CAD vendor to solve the technical integration issue with host CAD systems, led to a technical stalemate when that vendor lost several contracts to upgrade key law enforcement and fire/EMS CAD systems in the region. Although the technical solution proposed by that vendor was effective and implementable, new CAD vendors were not made project stakeholders when they became the new agency consultants. As a result, new CAD systems were not designed to take advantage of the InterCAD architecture. There appeared to be no compelling reason for agencies to deal with InterCAD issues when they had more than enough to handle with just converting to new CAD systems.

One of the more challenging technical problems that had to be solved was the methodology to convert internal CAD incident representation on dissimilar CAD systems into a common language for regional dissemination over the InterCAD network. At the time there was no generally accepted standard to accomplish this objective, therefore the InterCAD project defaulted to a plain English representation of major incident record details such as location, incident type, response status, etc.

As a result of the above, the InterCAD project today consists of workstations that are installed in the three agencies listed earlier – these workstations are connected using a messaging protocol called MQSeries from IBM and a Switched Multimegabit Data Service (SMDS) network provided by the local wire line telephone carrier. The workstations are not connected to the host CAD systems as was originally envisioned, but operate as standalone terminals in the centers involved. For an integration project this is not an operationally satisfactory solution, since CAD and TMC operators do not typically have time to enter incident information on two different systems. See Figure 1.

The SMDS network that is currently operational for InterCAD has never been given an official "green light" for security by law enforcement agencies. In retrospect, the use of a law enforcement-sanctioned network such as the San Diego Automated Regional Justice Information System (ARJIS) would have been a strategically more acceptable choice than a private network. The prospect of increased support costs and reluctance to deal with additional bureaucracy drove the decision to use a more readily available and cheaper communications alternative.

Figure 1. Existing InterCAD agency architecture (typical).

Operations

Although the InterCAD project had a reliable source of local match funding for Phase 1 and what initially appeared to be a sufficient federal funding level for Phase 2, technical difficulties with the change of CAD vendors and uncertainty in how to approach integration with the evolving Priority Corridor Showcase network, led to a significant funding shortfall that has not yet been addressed. The one CAD vendor who prototyped the initial technical solution lost a significant amount of money in the process and was not able to recoup this loss before losing several local CAD contracts to other vendors. The eventual funding shortfall can be at least indirectly attributed to not involving a broader segment of the CAD industry as stakeholders in public safety-transportation integration projects in general, and this project in particular.

InterCAD Lessons Learned

Were the InterCAD Project to be reinitiated today (and it yet may be), the lessons learned from the original project experience and from the current public safety/ITS dialogue would be applied to greatly increase the chances of project success. The lessons learned and potential solutions will be discussed from institutional, technical and operational perspectives.

Institutional

Issue: Lack of senior public safety management buy-in to support regional public safety and transportation information sharing and operational integration.
It is quite clear that there is a need to build a clear and convincing case for the benefits of public safety participation in regional information sharing and the resulting positive impact on incident management. This case must be presented to senior executive levels of local public safety agencies – this means executive management, not senior technical personnel. However, senior technical personnel must be engaged in the dialogue in parallel because their support is no less critical to long-term success. The business case must highlight the benefits of information sharing, a realistic security assessment (as opposed to a blanket statement that information sharing is inherently insecure), and the need to engage CAD vendors in a meaningful dialogue on interoperability.

Issue: Ensuring multiple agency champions for regional information sharing.
The lack of "champions" is one of the most critical impediments to a project of this nature, because without champions at agency executive and senior management levels, political support for mainstreaming the required changes will not be forthcoming. Mainstreaming is in turn critical to build a funding base that can support regional integration efforts on a continuing basis. The most difficult champions to recruit will be from some segments of the public safety community (traditional police agencies as opposed to Highway Patrol or State Patrol agencies) because traffic incident management is not always high on their list of priorities – yet when these champions emerge, they typically have greater local political support than transportation managers thus the payoff is worth the recruitment and outreach effort. Multiple champions, or project "sponsors", are virtually required where dissimilar types of agencies are involved. Ideally this means champions from the Highway Patrol/State Police, Local Police, Fire, EMS and Transportation agencies as a minimum. In the case of InterCAD, this approach would have kept the project on the "front burner" and prevented the eventual loss of interest. In most agencies, there is at least one key person who can be convinced of the value of information sharing if he/she is approached with facts, case studies and success stories.

Issue: Multi-dimensional project outreach.
The following tactics have proven useful in other projects and may be even more crucial to success in projects involving the integration of public safety systems:

Executive level outreach brochures, particularly targeted to senior public safety officials, should be used, outlining benefits to their communities of sharing information with transportation centers and other public safety agencies (the transportation community already has numerous such materials dealing with incident management and its benefits).

A Concept of Operations, outlining the business case for regional integration and a conceptual view of how an integrated regional system would operate, should be prepared early in the project life cycle. The approach to this document should be from the layman's (read elected official) perspective.

Requirements Workshops should be conducted, involving all appropriate agencies to develop a sense of teamwork in the region and a collective buy-in to realistic information sharing requirements. These workshops must be supported by executive management of public safety and transportation agencies. A particular effort should be made to involve multiple CAD vendors in this effort.

Technical

Issue: The need to fully integrate information sharing into all regional systems as opposed to the "separate workstation" approach.
Full integration has two prerequisites: (1) a means to enable screen-to-screen communications between center operators (i.e. no double entry of incident data) and (2) a common language to express critical data being exchanged between dissimilar "host" systems (the word "host" is taken to mean either a CAD system, an ATMS system or a Transit Management System). Screen-to-screen communications means that an incident initiated in one CAD system is accepted into another CAD system (or an ATMS system) transparently to the receiving operator. The receiving operator can then choose to accept or reject the incident, and if it is accepted, it becomes a new incident within the receiving system (more on this later).

A common language means that when <10-36> in one system is a "felony want", and in another system it is "time check", the intent of the sending center is resolved into a system-independent language so that the receiving center can properly interpret the incident. Failure to accomplish this technical goal in a consistent manner has obvious officer safety impacts and makes public safety agencies (especially law enforcement) very nervous. The importance of developing a common "language" to support IM operations cannot be overstated. The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) and its Incident Management Working Group (IMWG) are attempting to address this issue through publication of vocabulary standards encompassing all aspects of Incident Management.

In Phase 1, InterCAD actually had a very effective design for ensuring screen-to-screen communications through the use of a "pseudo console" approach. Since CAD systems typically send messages from one console to another (e.g. from a Call Taker to a Radio Dispatcher), the CAD vendor established a "pseudo" console that was actually a substitute for an external communications channel. When the CAD operator sent an incident report or incident update message to an allied agency (or TMC), the CAD system routed the message to the pseudo console address that was actually a serial communications port attached to the MQSeries Messaging Server connected to that CAD system. Figure 2 shows how this worked in theory for InterCAD. The Messaging Server handled inter-system messaging overhead tasks and removed that responsibility from the "host" CAD and ATMS systems. The MQSeries approach for host system integration was a sound technical and security decision in that it allowed the sending agency to "push" selected CAD data to one or more recipient agencies at the dispatcher's discretion. Further, the MQSeries approach used transmit and receive message "queues" that allowed message exchange to operate independently from host system processing. Other distributed processing solutions that "pull" data from sometimes sensitive databases are inherently less secure.

As mentioned earlier, the "common language" issue is approaching at least a partial solution as the IEEE 1512 Emergency Management-Transportation Management Data Dictionary and Message Set Standards mature. Balloting for these standards will be completed in 2002 and as joint public safety/transportation IM programs are initiated, these standards will play a major role in determining implementation requirements. Another form of common language is the Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) Interface Definition Language (IDL) being used for regional architectures in many major metropolitan areas (Southern California Corridor, Phoenix, Portland, Salt Lake City, Gary-Chicago-Milwaukee Corridor, Atlanta and parts of the I-95 Corridor, among others). Standard IDL is being developed as part of the National Transportation Communications ITS Protocol (NTCIP) Center-to-Center CORBA Profile (NTCIP Standard 2305). Figures 3 and 4 show how the IEEE 1512 or CORBA IDL might be used in conjunction with a message passing protocol such as MQSeries to exchange data from dissimilar systems.

Issue: Operations support for new regional information sharing systems.
Ultimately, as regional information sharing architectures near deployment, the following products would greatly facilitate the adoption and operational use of such systems, especially by smaller agencies with limited internal staff technical support:

Implementation guidance for regional communications networks and what steps are typically needed by agencies and centers to connect to these networks – this guidance should also discuss capacity assessment.

Implementation guidance on integration technologies – presented in an executive level overview format as well as in more detail for planners and implementers. This should include information relative to costs and technical risks of the major integration alternatives and the advantages and disadvantages of each.

Implementation guidance on the IEEE 1512 EMC-TMC data element and message set standards including ways in which the standard can be applied in those regions where object oriented technology (CORBA) is being used for regional integration. The standard as currently formulated is not immediately adaptable to the CORBA integration approach. Further, considerable outreach to CAD vendors is needed to make these standards implementable. The public safety CAD vendor community is just now being made aware of the existence of these standards and their significance to future CAD system deployments.

Operations

Issue: Recognizing the inherent differences in public safety dispatch and TMC operations
The key to maximizing success in the integration of public safety and transportation operations to support incident management is recognizing the strengths and weaknesses that each type of system brings to the table. A dispatch center's primary function is to take calls from the public and allied agencies and dispatch the response to those calls. Once officers are on scene, the dispatcher communicates via radio to receive the latest information from those on scene. Officers on scene and their dispatchers often do not have an appreciation for overall "situational awareness" in the transportation system as a result of the incident, but they have the best information from the scene itself. Many CAD systems do not have map displays and few dispatch centers have real-time CCTV video available. TMC's on the other hand, are designed to manage the overall transportation picture in the region by integrating several sources of information including real-time sensors, CCTV video and links to other TMC's. TMC's are often not the first to learn about incidents and until their own personnel are on scene, do not have detailed information about the incident. It would seem then, that the "marriage made in heaven" would be the integration of these two types of systems. Figure 5 illustrates this issue.

Issue: Working out "bugs" in operational integration.
Many projects lack a consensus Operational Concept Document in the early stages of their life cycle, or, as in the case with InterCAD, the OCD was incompletely thought out and did not involve agency operations personnel in its preparation. The thinking and brainstorming process that occurs during OCD preparation is invaluable for developing the later inter-agency agreements that will be needed to operate regional information sharing systems. One specific example that was partially addressed during InterCAD early working group discussions was how to handle the automatic transfer of incidents. Typically, dissimilar systems maintain independent and usually incompatible ways of describing and tracking incidents, e.g. log ID numbers. InterCAD participants found that each agency that handles a multi-agency incident must have access to all incident numbers currently active in the various systems. In addition each agency must maintain a different life cycle of the incident – the originating agency may choose to close the incident before an assisting agency. An agency may already carry an open incident in their CAD system that duplicates an incident number received from another agency. Many of these types of issues can be described and discussed in the OCD, even if final resolution is not attained. The OCD and its resulting dialogue can pay big dividends during system definition and design.

Issue: Understanding the roles and responsibilities of regional IM agencies
Understanding the roles and responsibilities of local agencies in responding to incidents is crucial to developing an approach to the integration of information to support regional incident management. This is an issue best handled during the development of the Operational Concept Document. Each agency has specific needs and constraints and these must be individually considered in developing a regional approach to information sharing. State Highway Patrol, local police agencies, County Sheriff's, fire services, EMS services, County Medical Examiner (Coroner) and transportation agency needs do not always coincide and yet it can be safely said that each of these entities can use better information, disseminated in a more timely manner that best supports their individual needs. Transportation agencies need more timely input of evolving incident data into their ATMS systems; public safety agencies need access to real time congestion data and video that provide dispatchers and the officers and units under their control with improved situational awareness; Medical Examiners need more timely notification of existing or potential fatalities and the location of incidents; fire services need transportation network data and information from mutual aid agencies to better coordinate response to major fires, and the list goes on. In general the potential for improved coordination of local agency IM operations is limited only by the imagination and willingness to think "outside the box" of these agencies.

Summary

The InterCAD San Diego Project was born in 1995 as part of the Southern California ITS Priority Corridor Showcase Program. Its inspiration was a desire to eliminate the confusing and time consuming practice of exchanging telephone information between dispatchers of different agencies during incidents in which mutual support was required. In the ensuing years, InterCAD has had some successes but the original goals of fully integrating public safety agencies with each other and with the regional Transportation Management Center have not been met. Currently only two fire/EMS agencies and the TMC are connected to the InterCAD network and there are no internal connections to host CAD systems. However the project architecture is an approach that has been proven in other applications.

The major institutional requirement for future such projects in other regions is the identification of multiple project champions from all segments of regional public safety and transportation agencies and a vigorous campaign to enlist executive level law enforcement and other public safety agency support. One of the major missing technical elements is an understanding of the compelling need for integration and active participation by the public safety CAD vendor community. A cooperatively developed Operational Concept Document will go along way towards working through operational issues and should lead to effective regional agreements for information sharing. The potential benefits of an InterCAD or similar project to regional Incident Management are no less compelling now than in 1995, and indeed are now even more so in the light of recent initiatives in the US DOT/US DOJ ITS Public Safety Program.

Introduction And Overview

Traffic incident management is the planning and coordination of people and material resources to safely address and quickly clear disruptions and distortions to the flow of traffic on our nation's highways. Traffic incident management encompasses the development and application of specific practices and tools, often involving the careful interaction of multiple agencies and functions.

Practices may include methods for determining command and control roles and responsibilities at an incident scene, means for administering towing and recovery services to clear stalled and crashed vehicles, and various approaches for parking emergency response vehicles and controlling passing traffic at the scene of an incident.

Tools include fire apparatus, crash measurement equipment, service patrol vehicles, and other equipment that support effective traffic incident management practices. An increasingly vital set of tools involves interpersonal and interagency communications networks and devices that can share voice, data, and video information between traffic incident responders and managers.

Creating, and refining the effectiveness of traffic incident management practices and tools typically require the existence of a traffic incident management program. Traffic incident management programs are more than just collections of successful traffic incident management practices and tools, which may address a static set of issues at one point in time. A traffic incident management program is an ongoing, administered, multi-agency interjurisdictional, and inter-organizational approach that is used to address a changing set of issues over time. These traffic incident management programs can exist at varying levels of formality, and can go through various stages of development. They most often are deployed at the regional or state levels.

Despite the fact that much of the discussion about traffic incident management focuses on operations and technology, there is widespread agreement that significant improvements require departures from "business as usual". The "institutional" changes go beyond improved practice in the field. They involve fundamental changes in certain aspects of the involved agencies including:

• Agency objectives and priorities
• Organizations, roles, relationships
• Human and financial resources
• Professional values, culture and conventions

Since the agencies involved in traffic incident management (law enforcement, fire and emergency response, transportation, towing) have different missions and legal status, it is important to identify critical differences and the way in which they can be resolved for improved coordination and integration. These differences extend to the agencies' cultures which may be response-oriented or project-oriented, may have different approaches to chains of command and communications, may place varying emphases on traffic safety and responder safety; or may be more focused on business and economic development relative to pure public interest.

Underlying a focus on institutional change and collaboration is the idea that measured progress can be made – simultaneously improving public safety and convenience – through evaluation of improved procedures, technology and improve coordination among agencies -- based on an awareness of state of the practice. There appears to be widespread agreement that, in general, ad hoc approaches based on cooperation, energy and good intentions of dedicated staff in the field -- while valuable – cannot be counted on in the long run. Improved procedures need to be explicitly described and formalized among agencies. In addition, ongoing working relationships between agencies and the individuals within them must be grown and nurtured.

The Ten Key Institutional Challenges For Traffic Incident Management

Understanding the correlations between traffic incident management and institutional issues can be approached through two basic questions.

• What institutional aspects and issues limit, preclude, or enable effective traffic incident management practices and tools?
• What is institutionally conducive to the successful implementation of ongoing traffic incident management programs?

Experience in the field and publications reviewing the state of the practice indicate that institutional issues and challenges identified through the above questions tend to fall into three basic categories.

Policy

Policy refers to the agencies stated mission(s), established by law or administrative action: what is the agency trying to do and how. Key dimensions of policy include:

• Traffic incident management program justification
• Agency priority of traffic incident management
• Policy maker understanding
• "Concept of Improvement" within performance effectiveness

Program Resources

Resources covers the agencies capability to execute its responsibilities including how the agency is organized, staffed and funded and where there is an "authorizing environment" of laws, regulations and traditions that supports or inhibits agency activities, location of responsibility in agency. Key factors include:

• Resource availability and allocation
• Constraints of law and local jurisdictions

Relationships

Traffic incident management is, by its nature a multi-jurisdictional activity. Police, fire and emergency response and transportation each have specific responsibilities. However, the effectiveness of the combination of responsibilities depends on interactions. These relationships are affected by:

• Agency culture differences
• Coordination of roles among agencies
• Stakeholder involvement
• Sustainability of multi-agency cooperation

Institutional Challenges And Improving Traffic Incident Management

In the material that follows each of these ten key institutional dimensions is presented. An overview of traffic incident management practice around the country indicates that there appears to major differences in the apparent effectiveness of traffic incident management programs (based on the very few performance analyses that have been conducted). The gap between average and best practice should be a source of concern

For each of the ten issue areas, the situation that exists in the average setting around the country is described. For comparison, "best practice" is then described. Best practice refers to the situation that exists in a few regions that have focused on this particular dimension and have attempted to produce a more effective approach. In general, best practice is associated with the following:

• Long-term sustained program (mainstreamed)
• Multi-agency cooperation and leverage
• Concept of progress (continuous improvement)

Some characteristics of institutional effectiveness evident in these regions are then described. Admittedly, there is no single best way to form and sustain traffic incident management programs. The most practical and productive approaches will vary from region to region. However, there seem to be fundamental "Characteristics of Effectiveness" that consistently underpin successful and continuously improving traffic incident management practices, tools, and associated programs. By understanding these Characteristics of Effectiveness – and what is required to attain them locally – we can identify national actions that are needed to overcome associated challenges.

The State Of Play And Best Practice – Institutional Approaches – Ten Issue Areas

1. Traffic Incident Management Program Justification – How Are Traffic Incident Management Programs Justified To Key Decision Makers?

Average Situation.
Traffic incident management is often part of the agency's routine mission and responsibility; it does not have to be justified. The benefits of are not measured and performance is not measured; the pay-off from improving practice are therefore not known.

Best Practice
Benefits of traffic incident management are measured and demonstrated and disseminated to decision-makers and the public.

Characteristics of Effectiveness

• Study of needs and benefits at various levels of effort to support increased efforts
• Development of performance measurement and analyses to guide improvements
• Introduce terrorism-related emergency response (weapons of mass destruction) modifications to standard procedures as appropriate

2. Agency Priority Of Traffic Incident Management – How Important Is Traffic Incident Management As A Function Within An Agency?

• TQM and reorganization mechanisms and strategies include explicit recognition of Traffic incident management as core business area in goals and objectives, resource tradeoff
• Middle level staff leadership sensitizes leadership to key issues (up-management) so that functions are recognized in upper levels of organizational structure, and across multiple business areas
• Incorporation of traffic incident management responsibilities into career paths through management and staff position descriptions, individual performance assessment, and professional development
• Agency celebration and awards for individual and team traffic incident management accomplishments

3. Policy Maker Understanding – How Well Are Traffic Incident Management Practices, Tools, Programs, And Benefits Understood By Policy Makers And Senior Managers?

• Senior management exposure to program activities, benefits
• Establishment of executive committee within and among agencies
• Public awareness/outreach efforts (multiagency)
• Reporting and accountability mechanisms to keep decision-makers aware of program and performance

• Systematic reviews of potential contributions of new procedures, based on an understanding of the state of the practice knowledge
• Use of performance measurement to indicate areas of potential improvement
• Introduction of new technology (ITS, Interoperable communications)
• Development of standards

5. Resources – How Are Financial And Human Resources For Traffic Incident Management Programs Prioritized And Allocated?

• Dedicated funding for traffic incident management
• Interagency of support of resource requests of individual agencies
• Resource-sharing among agencies
• Shared funding for specific improvements

• Conduct coordinated multi-agency legislative discussions to develop interagency consensus
• Agencies cooperate on "campaign" for improvements
• Develop regional, statewide law, compacts focused on improved practice (quick clearance, open road, towing, coroner requirements)
• Clarify understanding of liability constraints via legal research

7. Agency Culture Differences – How Are Cultural Differences Between Agencies, Functions, And Professions Addressed?

Average Situation
Each agency possesses a culture with accepted conventions that are not well understood by other stakeholders. The priorities of other agencies are implied and guessed, and can be used to polarize viewpoints and prospective partners.

Best Practice
Cultural differences between agencies, functions, and professions are understood and respected. Agency priorities are explicit, and their understanding between agencies is used to enhance their mutual effectiveness.

Characteristics of Effectiveness

Average Situation
Roles are defined informally on a case-by-case basis, and may even vary within a function by personality or jurisdiction. Conflicts regarding roles may be partially resolved on site, and are disregarded after the clearance of an incident.

Best Practice
All stakeholders and partners recognize the Incident Management System. Administrative roles within a traffic incident management program are similarly formalized and committed to by participating agencies.

Characteristics of Effectiveness

Average Situation
Key stakeholders can be uninvolved for extended periods, except as needed. Stakeholder involvement is determined by the strength of personalities, or the size of an agency.

Best Practice
The full spectrum of stakeholders are involved in program development and administration. Participation in decision-making is appropriately scaled based upon organizational and individual roles and expertise.

Characteristics of Effectiveness

Average Situation
The level of attention paid to traffic incident management practices and effectiveness depends upon recent events, or the personality of a strong program champion. The same problems must frequently be revisited and re-solved.

Best Practice
Roles and relationships are formalized and ongoing. The level of institutional energy applied to continuously improving traffic incident management effectiveness is consistent, and is adapted to meet a growing set of challenges.

Characteristics of Effectiveness

There are several unifying values that cut across the Characteristics of Effectiveness listed above.

Through the breakout sessions, we will seek the experts' reaction to these Characteristics of Effectiveness. The purpose of this dialogue will seek to understand why these characteristics are not more universally and uniformly evident within metropolitan regions and rural transportation corridors. Specifically, we will use the breakout sessions to seek answers to the following questions

1. What additional Characteristics of Effectiveness need to be recognized?

2. What limits the attainment of these Characteristics of Effectiveness locally?

3. What limits the attainment of these Characteristics of Effectiveness nationally?

4. How can these limitations be overcome locally or regionally?

5. What national actions might support the Characteristics of Effectiveness?

The list below is a straw man "starter" list for the final question in the breakout discussions. The list illustrates both the range and prospective depth of national actions to encourage Characteristics of Effectiveness within traffic incident management programs.

• Designated national process or federal entity to develop model regional compacts, model state legislation – promulgation with local government associations
• National research on legal issues, precedents and experience (ex: liability and risk)
• Focus on terrorism/WMD emergency response needed modifications to conventional traffic incident management practice
• General consensus on traffic incident management priorities and issues at the national association level (USDOT Public Safety Working Group?)
• Peer and association networking (national organization?)
• National executive level outreach
• Federal supported joint training (modules in existing programs)
• Focused research and technology development program including demonstration projects and pursue in existing research agendas (FSHRP, National R & T, etc)
• Identify traffic incident management applications for modified highway design features
• Formalize relationships with national equipment vendors to better define technology and equipment needs
• Identify key entities involved in relevant interoperability of standards and pursue dialogue and resolution
• Performance measurement support
• Build traffic incident management explicitly into federal funding programs

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