51. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, October 15, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 71 D 273, USSR. Confidential. Initialed by Hughes.
SUBJECT
Khrushchev Era Ends
TASS announced late today that 70-year-old Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev has been replaced as First Secretary of the CPSU and as Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers on grounds of age and health.
Move Sudden. All indications suggest that the move was sudden and forced upon Khrushchev. Not only was he divested of his top party and state jobs, but he lost his job on the Presidium of the Party. It is within the realm of possibility that Khrushchev indeed suffered a sudden deterioration in his health for he has evidently been in a less than perfect state of health for some time. Embassy Moscow has reported that the CPSU Presidium insisted that he take his latest vacation and that he severely restrict the number of visitors he received. However, his removal from the CPSU Presidium while the apparently still paralyzed Kozlov stays on suggests that his departure might not have been entirely voluntary.
Possible Reasons For Removal. There have been increasing signs of disenchantment with Khrushchev's rambunctious, shotgun initiative style of leadership. He himself admitted in August that "some comrades" objected to his revealing the subject of the next Party plenum. Domestically, the precipitating cause may have been Khrushchev's latest efforts to alter significantly the pattern of resource allocation away from the heavy industry-military complex towards the consumer and agriculture. Pravda on October 2 printed a truncated version of a Khrushchev speech on the subject which suggests that the issues were far from resolved.
Little Immediate Change in Domestic Policy Foreseen. The published statements of both Brezhnev and Kosygin have not revealed any significant divergence from Khrushchev's views, nor are they like several other Presidium members reputed to be "hard-liners." This may well be only the preliminary solution. If history repeats itself, the leadership will be preoccupied with further resolving the succession and the direction of policy change will be expressed in further personnel shifts. The reported sacking of Khrushchev's son-in-law as Editor of Izvestiya, the failure of two close Khrushchev supporters--Shelest and Rashidov--to show up at a recent Moscow reception suggests that such shifts are in the offing. Khrushchev's position as chairman of the RSFSR Party Bureau will presumably have to be filled. The 1962 bifurcation of the Party into political and economic hierarchies left the Central Committee in a state of uncertainty which will open the way for considerable political maneuvering in the coming weeks.
Foreign Policy Issues. There are no discernible foreign policy issues critical enough, or on which disagreement appeared serious enough, to have served as the motivation for Khrushchev's ouster. While there may have been dissatisfaction with his China policy, Chinese personal attacks against him probably worked to solidify support in his favor. It is possible that Khrushchev may have been contemplating some radical new proposals on a foreign policy issue, perhaps Germany, but on balance we believe this unlikely.
Implications for Soviet Policy. Initially, at least, the new leadership is likely to be preoccupied with the internal problem of consolidating its own position and relatively cautious about actively engaging in negotiations with the West. Indeed, we have already been in a period of hiatus in East-West negotiations while the Soviets seemed to be waiting out the American election campaign. Moreover, there have been reasons to suppose that some of Khrushchev's disarmament policies may have had opposition at home, in particular his initiative for a unilateral cut in the size of Soviet forces and an apparent intention to extend the idea of "mutual example" to troop deployments in Europe. Moscow's refusal at the Geneva disarmament conference even to move on an issue such as the creation of a technical working group on nuclear delivery vehicles may also have reflected a freezing of Soviet disarmament policy (after signs of motion in June) resulting from internal disagreements.
If, as seems likely, Khrushchev's ouster was primarily based upon conflicts over allocation of economic resources, it would seem that the resultant policies would militate against further Soviet moves on disarmament issues in coming months.
The new leadership is likely to wish to avoid tests of strength with the West at least until after it feels that its internal position is consolidated. We would expect the new regime, even if it may feel that Khrushchev's policy on the German question was faulty, at least to delay any new crisis over Berlin. Similarly, we doubt that the regime will be prepared to make any early moves on such issues as overflights of Cuba. However, the succession period could generate sudden and unpredictable pressures on the new leadership, and we cannot rule out the possibility either of adventurous action or of some dramatic initiative toward improving relations with the West. Nevertheless, it is more likely that the new leaders will seek to keep things on an even keel rather than risk adding to their existing problems.
Effect on Sino-Soviet Relations. It does not seem likely that Khrushchev's ouster will effect any basic or longlasting change in Moscow's posture toward Communist China. There may, however, be a slight and temporary easing of the dispute as Peiping holds its fire to see how the Soviet scene jells, and as the new Soviet leadership also marks time to see if Khrushchev's removal offers any real prospects for an adjustment with the Chinese. In particular, the Soviets may temporarily call off their push for an international communist conference to condemn the Chinese--a course that has always confronted them with great difficulties and is unsure of success. In any case, the retirement of Khrushchev will be interpreted by the Chinese as a victory for their policies. The new Soviet leadership will have to make clear as quickly as possible to the world communist movement just how it intends to meet the Chinese Communist challenge.
Effect on Eastern Europe. Any change in the Soviet leadership automatically becomes a source of instability in Eastern Europe. The peoples and leaders of these countries will probably adopt a wait and see attitude toward the new rulers. Unless a clear line emanates soon from the Kremlin, dissident elements within Eastern Europe may seek to take advantage of the situation, especially since some satellite leaders, e.g., in Czechoslovakia, have relied heavily on Khrushchev's blessing to bolster their strength.
52. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, October 16, 1964, 4 a.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 USSR. Confidential; Flash. Received in the Department of State at 11:04 p.m. on October 15.
1148. We find it difficult believe that Khrushchev was removed from all party and govt responsibilities "for reasons of age and health" as announced by CC-CPSU tonight. Important to note that he was ousted not only from premiership and first secretaryship slot but also from membership in Presidium. Kozlov has been paralyzed and mentally ill for over a year and is still member of Presidium; Kuusinen retained his membership until his death at age of 83--far more advanced than Khrushchev's 70. In any case, Khrushchev apparently was in good health--although perhaps not spirits--when Palewski saw him at Gagra two days ago. After that he returned by air to Moscow, arriving on the afternoon of the 13th. Presumably he would not have done this unless convoked personally to the Central Committee meeting on the 14th, since a really ill man's "request to be relieved" could have been considered in his absence. Thus if there any "illness" involved it could not be any sudden crisis or deterioration, but something more chronic or slow-moving. This would not have required such precipitate action, embarrassing to the visit of the Cuban President and to the full exploitation of the "Voskhod" flight. We cannot therefore accept the published explanation.
It is also not credible that Khrushchev would have chosen willingly to retire from all leadership activity for any other "personal" reasons at a time when most of the foreign and bloc policies with which he is identified were such failures or are in such a mess that he must inevitably be made the scapegoat by any successors. His belligerent posture on Berlin in the 1958-60 period was an egregious failure; his Cuban venture of 1962 equally so. His economic and agricultural policies have paid few dividends and have, in the main, simply resulted in compounding the Soviets' economic dilemma and in the process placed severe strains on Soviet resources. But, above all, his personal vendetta with Mao, with the attendant strain on Soviet relations with bloc parties, both in and out of power, has substantially weakened the world Communist movement and the Soviet role as its vanguard. Beyond this, Soviet posture has suffered from Khrushchev's recent gaffes in his impromptu remarks to visiting delegations and journalists--particularly his flat statement that the Soviets would not withdraw from the UN regardless of the outcome of Article 19 issue. All of this must add up to a sorry record, indeed, in the eyes of his comrades.
It is, therefore, hard to escape the conclusion that Khrushchev has been jettisoned by his colleagues. Just why and how this occurred is far from clear at the moment. The keys would seem to lie mainly in the person of Brezhnev, whose ambitions Khrushchev has been obviously trying to frustrate and in the problem of the Sino-Soviet split--in what way and what proportions we cannot determine at this point.
At the moment we would not, as result of change in top command, expect any major change of policies except in area of Sino-Soviet dispute. We would guess that one of first results would be shift in tactics on conference issue closer to position held by PGI/2/ and Rumania.
/2/Presumably a reference to the PCI (Partito Communista Italiana), the Italian Communist Party.
In other major areas of foreign policy--particularly attitude toward US--we anticipate no basic change. In this connection, I am impressed in retrospect by tenor of remarks by Polyansky and Dymshits to me this evening at Afghan reception; both took considerable pains to impress upon me desirability continued improvement our bilateral relations after recovering from "shock" at initial exchange re "exciting news"--Embtel 1146./3/
/3/Dated October 15 (9 p.m.), it reported that three usually reliable correspondents in Moscow had stated that Khrushchev had been "forced out" or "stepped down". (Ibid., POL 15-1 USSR)
To complete narrative of evening's developments, I should add that huge portrait of Khrushchev noted earlier on Hotel Moskva was removed shortly before midnight. Banners, slogans, and portraits of cosmonauts and Lenin--but none of other Soviet leaders, past or present, are now being erected in Red Square in anticipation of Saturday ceremonies honoring latest space heroes. Meanwhile, city is quiet and there is no evidence of unusual activity by crowds, police, or military./4/
/4/Circular telegram 664, October 16, sent information and guidance on Khrushchev's fall based on the Embassy's reports to all U.S. posts. (Ibid.)
Kohler
53. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, October 16, 1964.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President. Top Secret. For another account of the meeting, see Document 54. The memorandum is dated October 17.
SUBJECT
Meeting of an Executive Group of the National Security Council, 16 October 1964
1. A special meeting of a small group of members of the National Security Council was convened at the White House at 1030/2/ on 16 October 1964 to discuss the change of government in Moscow. In attendance were the President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Ball, Under Secretary Thompson, McGeorge Bundy, the DCI, and the undersigned. After some preliminary discussions, a great deal of which related to the Presidential campaign and the President's schedule of activities, the DCI discussed the fall of Khrushchev and his replacement by Brezhnev and Kosygin, referring to the picture-chart showing the place of the various Soviet leaders in the party and government structure in the USSR. Then the DCI mentioned as probable cause of Khrushchev's downfall his somewhat erratic personal behavior and statements in recent months, failure in his Communist party leadership (bringing on the bitter Sino-Soviet split and difficult relations with the satellites as well as Communist parties in Western Europe), and the bitter controversy over allocation of economic resources, centering in a dispute over priority for consumer goods versus military programs.
/2/The President's Daily Diary indicates that the meeting began at 10:51 a.m. and lasted no later than 11:22 and was held in the Cabinet Room. (Johnson Library)
2. Secretary Rusk said that he and Ambassador Thompson agreed with this general analysis and emphasized he felt the President should make sure there was no anxiety in the U.S. over this change of the Soviet leadership since American policy is made in Washington not Moscow. Our attitude should be that we are prepared for whatever comes and will continue on a steady course. We do not know whether the new Soviet leaders will be better or worse than Khrushchev. We should not adopt the view that they are likely to be worse. After all, it was Khrushchev who brought on the Berlin crisis and the Cuba missile crisis in 1962. Our approach should be watchful but steady, and we should be ready to cooperate with Moscow in steps toward international peace if the new leaders wish to move in this direction.
3. It was generally agreed that this should be the U.S. position provided that Ambassador Dobrynin, who was scheduled to see the President at 1130 hours,/3/ took the cordial and reassuring position that everyone at the meeting thought he was likely to adopt.
/3/See Document 55.
4. Secretary Rusk also said that the thin majority of the Labor Government in the UK was likely to be bad for decisive policy-making in the broader interests of the UK and NATO community. No one suggested that there was anything in particular that we could do about this, and Bundy observed that about all he could suggest was that the President should make a phone call suggesting a meeting after the U.S. election since Harold Wilson couldn't be kept away from the White House anyway and that the President might as well take the initiative.
5. The President said that he had decided it would be wise for him to cancel part of his campaign plans and stay in Washington for several days to deal with all of these complicated new developments in national and world affairs. He said that he wanted Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and the DCI to surface some of these key issues, at least for the benefit of the Congressional leadership, to show that the President and his Administration were attending to business even at the expense, if necessary, of some political campaigning.
[Here follows discussion of the Chinese nuclear explosion.]
Ray S. Cline
Deputy Director (Intelligence)
54. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, October 16, 1964, 10:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President. Secret. The memorandum was drafted by McCone on October 16. A typed note at the top of page 1 reads: "(Mr. Cline will furnish M/R on the 10:30 meeting in Cabinet Room this date) (Following is DCI's M/R covering period Cline not in the meeting)." Cline's memorandum for the record is Document 53.
SUBJECT
Meeting in Cabinet Room--10:30--16 October 1964
In answer to a question from the President, I first pointed out by reference to the organization chart furnished by OCI that Kosygin had been elevated to Chairman of the Presidium and thus Head of Government. Brezhnev as Soviet Party First Secretary is the head of the Communist Party apparatus which controls the Presidium. I said that little is known of the relationship of Kosygin to Brezhnev. Both are known to be capable and well-trained for their respective responsibilities but probably lack a strong following which would make possible effective and dynamic leadership. I therefore surmise that the arrangement would be temporary and that eventually one or the other, or possibly some other individual, would evolve as the leader of both the Presidium and the Party. I recalled that this was the evolution in the years following Stalin's death.
I made the judgment that the explanation of Khrushchev's age and health was a cover and that his removal from power was because of an issue, the nature of which we could not accurately judge. I noted that Khrushchev's behavior in the past several months as evidenced by his rather odd and inconsistent statements to Drew Pearson, Bill Benton, to the Japanese Foreign Minister and to the Heads of Government in the Scandinavian countries must have displeased members of the Presidium and exposed him to attack by them. In addition his strong advocacy of a program giving consumer needs the highest priority had apparently met with resistance from the military. Also there unquestionably was deep distress over Moscow's loss of leadership of the World Communist movement as evidenced by the independence of the satellites, the actions of the Communist Parties in France and Italy, the Sino-Soviet split and all the rest. Any one or all three of these matters could be the cause of Khrushchev's removal./2/
/2/At a meeting of the National Security Council the next day, McCone stated that "undoubtedly his [Khrushchev's] efforts to remold their economy and change the priority from heavy industry and military to consumer goods was the 'straw that broke the back' and caused his removal." (Memorandum for the Record by McCone, October 17; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President)
I then said that Brezhnev and Kosygin were logical candidates for the two positions and obviously were Khrushchev's choice. If Khrushchev remained a member of the Presidium, I would expect a continuation of all of his policies; however with his precipitous removal from the Presidium I would assume that an issue of great depth arose and therefore we could expect a change in Soviet policy along some line and it would probably be directed towards regaining their leadership of International Communism which would involve straightening out the differences with the Chinese, but this was merely a matter of conjecture.
55. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 16, 1964, 11:30 a.m.-12:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, Memos of Conversation. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Thompson. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) For the President's brief account of the conversation, see The Vantage Point, p. 469. For Dobrynin's account, see In Confidence, pp. 128-129. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 1131, October 16 at 6:59 p.m. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 USSR)
SUBJECT
Call on The President by Ambassador Dobrynin
PARTICIPANTS
The President
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
The Ambassador said he had asked to come in under instructions to inform the President of the governmental changes which had been made in the Soviet Union. He read a statement that was virtually identical with the TASS statement announcing the new appointments and the resignation of Khrushchev./2/
/2/For text of the TASS statement, October 16, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 644.
Speaking without notes, the Ambassador went on to say that he had been instructed to inform the President that the general foreign policy of the Soviet Union had been set forth by the Twentieth, Twenty-first, and Twenty-second Party Congresses and that this policy remained unchanged. He said that the Soviet Government would, in the future, adhere steadfastly to this course. He said that this meant the pursuit of peaceful coexistence and the relaxation of tensions. The Ambassador said that the Soviet Government would seek the peaceful settlement of current problems and would continue its efforts to achieve disarmament and to strengthen the United Nations. He said that the Soviet Government counted on other governments to show respect for the sovereignty and independence of other nations.
The President expressed his appreciation for this personal report. He said it was his aim to achieve better understanding with all nations. He said that the quest for peace by this Government had never been more determined than it was now. The President said that there was always some concern when there were changes in governments, but he was not as excited or alarmed as the Soviets probably would be if we had a change of government here in January. He said he looked forward to seeing more of the Ambassador and appreciated the fact that relations with him had always been based on candor and friendliness. He felt that he could speak frankly to the Ambassador and thought that the Ambassador felt the same way.
The President referred to the death of our beloved President Kennedy who had been doing all he could in seeking peace and pointed out that he had continued the same course. Mr. Khrushchev's resignation for reasons of health was not as great a shock as had been the death of our President, but he hoped that the Soviets would maintain the same continuity of a peaceful policy. If the President had another term, perhaps we could make progress on the objective of easing tensions in the field of disarmament and in turning down our military activities. He said he wished to make clear that we don't want to bury the Soviet Union but, on the other hand, we were not going to be buried by them. The President thought there was no reason for us to be frightened of each other. He was prepared to go to bed in the same room with the Ambassador without a pistol, and thought the Ambassador felt the same way. The problem was how to get our peoples to understand this.
The President quoted Charles Lamb, who, after reading a book, threw the book down and said, "I don't like that man." When he was asked if he knew the author, he said he did not and that if he did, he would probably like him. The President said in his experience in Government, he had often felt the same way about people but when he got to know them, he usually found his assumptions about them had been in error. The President wanted to meet the needs of our people rather than spend our money on military preparedness. He referred to the hot line and the Test Ban and stressed the importance of getting away from old antagonisms. Perhaps the Soviet Union could lead us to a more blessed world. The President said his guard was up, but his hand was out.
The President said he would like to stress to the Ambassador two words. The first of these was "peace." In this country we had many things to do rather than make bombs. We needed more schools, hospitals, and roads, and he did not like spending fifty billion dollars a year in preparing to destroy somebody. Our mission was peace.
The President said the second word he wished to stress was flexibility. He told the Ambassador the story of the experience he had as a young Congressman when in a public meeting he had been unable to get the representative of a power company to do what the people wanted and had finally lost his temper and told the man to go to hell. He said everyone had applauded except one old man who was a lawyer. This man took him aside and pointed out that it was one thing to tell a man to go to hell and a different one to make him go there. The man said he had spent two months getting this particular meeting organized and that it had been destroyed in two minutes. It was necessary to be flexible. The President said he had told Chancellor Erhard that Adenauer had given him the impression that the Communists would eat him up before breakfast, but that he was not scared about this. He said he had told Chancellor Erhard that in determining his policy he should endeavor to put himself into the Soviet shoes and to examine what their concerns were.
The President then referred to the missile crisis in Cuba and said that at that time neither side knew what would happen. It was an embarrassing business for both sides; for us because of the presence of these missiles so near to us, and for the Soviets because they were obliged to remove them. The point, however, was that in this situation we had been a little flexible and, for that matter, so had the Soviets. The President did not question that the Soviets wanted peace as we did, but we both had problems. The Soviets would have to bend a little bit and so would we.
The President said he had been proud when the Soviets had their recent success in space. It was true that we were competitive people and he would have liked to have achieved this first, but he looked on such things as this as being for the benefit of mankind. He said we were not going to be provocative and he was not going to try to be elected on the basis of denouncing the Soviet Union. He thought our system was best and he knew that the Ambassador thought their system was best. We could not see everything alike and he pointed out that every man did not want the same woman for a wife, some liked blondes, some liked brunettes, and some redheads.
The President said that the Soviet Union had the capacity to kill a hundred million Americans and we had the capacity to kill a hundred million Russians, but this was not what he wanted to do. The President referred to his early experiences as a young man when he had to work with his hands and feet, but what he wanted to do now was to use his heart and head. The President said that if Goldwater won the election, we would perhaps have to try to calm him down, but the important thing was that the American people wanted peace. The President said that in his travels around the country whenever he talked about peace and the Test Ban, he had a wonderful response from his audiences. While he had no doubt about Soviet desire for peace, he had some doubts about their flexibility. He referred to the problem of the United Nations and said that some way must be found to deal with this problem. The President said he was willing to go anywhere and talk to anyone if this would be fruitful. The President said that the remarks he was making to the Ambassador represented his genuine feelings; they were not the result of any briefing, but said that the things he had been saying represented the views of his advisers and he mentioned Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Mr. Bundy, and Ambassador Thompson.
Ambassador Dobrynin said that people everywhere wanted peace.
The President agreed and, referring to recent public opinion polls on the election, said that his lead over Goldwater was higher with women than with men because women particularly wanted peace. He urged Ambassador Dobrynin to inform the new Government of these frank statements of his views. He said he would not be a push-over but he had had all the shooting he wanted and referred to his wartime experiences. When our destroyer had been shot at in the Gulf of Tonkin, we had responded, but had done so responsibly. We could not allow ourselves to be shot at on the high seas. The President said a good many people wanted him to go north in Viet-Nam and he mentioned Nixon, Rockefeller, and other Republican leaders and said there were some in his own Party. What the President wanted in Viet-Nam, however, was for the people there to be left in peace. We wanted to get out but he would not turn these people over to someone attempting to dominate them by force. The independence of this area was our aim and he thought this was what we had agreed to. He said he thought the Soviets had even greater problems than we with the trouble-makers in this area.
In conclusion, the President said there were many changes taking place. There was apparently a new British Government now, a new Soviet Government, and the German Government was fairly new. He supposed that in time there would be new leadership in France and perhaps even in the United States, but in the United States we were following a policy of peace and flexibility and would continue to do so. He would be glad to see or talk to the Ambassador at any time that he had problems and he looked forward, after the election if he were returned, to getting on to making progress along the lines he had indicated.
56. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy/)/1
Washington, October 16, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VI. Secret.
McGB--
SUBJECT
The Changes in Moscow
For what it is worth, this is my view of the Soviet scenario.
(1) I am struck by the coincidence of the overthrow of Nikita with the Chinese test and more particularly, the French Communist Party's declaration of independence.
(2) I think Ambassador Kohler was right in his message this morning pointing out Nikita's lack of success in handling major issues./2/ But a theme that seems to dominate the others is the Chinese-Soviet split with the consequent problems raised not only in Moscow and the satellites, but also reaching deep into the Communist Parties outside the bloc. The problem is clearly a festering one and continuing along this Khrushchevian course, it is conceivable that the hierarchy felt that the situation was certain to worsen.
/2/Document 52.
(3) This suggests at least two possible alternatives. A decision to try to paper over the problem with Peking and thereby attempt to slow down the deterioration; or a decision to bring the problem to rapid decision, letting the chips fall where they may, but ending the uncertainty and consequent confusion and conflict.
(4) In either circumstance, it is not difficult to postulate the hierarchy's need to eliminate Nikita. If the papering over course was to be followed--and this will be tested by what the new regime does or does not do about the forthcoming December meeting--then Nikita had to be replaced by a leadership more palatable to Peking.
(5) On the other hand, if the decision is to break quickly and cleanly with Peking, Nikita's tactics were unsuitable and new hands and leadership were needed.
(6) Significant in all this is the new government's attempt to reassure other governments (Western governments) of Soviet intentions to continue on the Khrushchevian course of peaceful co-existence. If Moscow enters a more serious stage of conflict with Peking, then there is a need to batten down the hatches. This perhaps would also be true if Moscow wanted to try papering over its problems with Peking. But in the latter contingency Moscow has to be ambidextrous for peaceful co-existence with the West is not compatible with Moscow-Peking cooperation.
(7) In any event, it is clear that for the moment we are going to see a slow down in Soviet diplomacy, at least as far as East-West relations are concerned, until the government shakes itself down and the leadership takes hold.
(8) Over the longer term, two-headed leadership is improbable. It couldn't work in this country, and is even less likely to work in the Soviet Union. It is only convenient during the interregnum when time is needed to establish leadership. At this juncture, the odds are in Brezhnev's favor. He controls the important lever of power. However, the Soviet game also includes coalitions and divisions, and the shape of the possible coalitions is not clear. I would go slowly in suggesting that Podgorny is the most likely successor. He may be, but no one really knows.
(9) From our viewpoint, it is important to indicate to the new government our intention to continue along the course we have been going. This is the only one that makes any sense and permits us to deal with the urgent and crucial issues facing both of us.
David Klein/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
57. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 USSR. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, London, and Paris.
Moscow, October 17, 1964, 8 p.m.
1176. Embtel 1148./2/ While we believe our initial analysis of Khrushchev's downfall remains essentially valid, some refinement, as result further reflection and on basis additional indicators--especially today's Pravda leader--now seems warranted.
/2/Document 52.
With new team moving to establish itself we are seeing beginnings of exposition of its position, from which it possible to read something of anatomy of change which has occurred.
As key statement thus far, Pravda leader serves general function of assuring Soviet population and other readers of legitimacy of new leadership and of essential continuity of national policies and goals. This is, in a sense, paralleled by statements Soviet Ambassadors in West are now making to host governments concerning continuity of policy. We would suspect that new leadership is in communication as well with bloc leaders--particularly on matters of direct bloc significance and interest.
Burden of Pravda leader lies in strong if general assertion of main line of party in classical terms with emphasis on continuity of drive toward Leninist goals, with people, party and collective leadership moving together. In this connection, we are struck by renewal of reference, along with 20th and 22nd, to Twenty-first Party Congress--still ignored as recently as previous day--possibly designed to show leadership as heirs to entire range of recent party decisions. Tone of declaratory portions of statement is exhortatory and includes call for solidarity which, however, in less strident terms than previous such appeals and may imply confidence that its position and control established.
Beyond thematic function, statement bears on number of policy areas to shed some light on line or tactics of new leadership:
1. Foreign policy statement essentially repeats previous coexistence line, with inclusion of references to strengthening defense potential of USSR and safeguarding integrity of frontiers. This not only calculated to reassure Soviet military and dissuade any who might contemplate attempt exploit change but should give pause to speculation that strategy, as opposed to tactics, toward Chinese may be shifting. At same time, reference to safeguarding security of entire socialist community, while not new, is reminder to Chinese and world at large that Soviet commitment remains valid.
2. Position statement on international Communist conference stands almost alone in Pravda leader as explicit expression of policy on specific issue. This quick declaration seems clearly to demonstrate urgency and fundamental importance of issue as factor in leadership change.
Declaration on conference noteworthy for (1) silence on preparatory meeting (2) reference to universality of attendance and (3) broadened catalogue of aims, which should make it acceptable to all including Italians, Rumanians, and possibly Chinese.
There is no hint--and we believe it would be basic mistake to read signs--to shift in strategy on or lines of policy on Chinese issue. What statement does is to open options to new leadership which Khrushchev's actions had foreclosed. Above and beyond fact that he personally, as Chinese devil, represented bar to any cooling of dispute, series of Soviet actions had left little choice to forcing December 15th meeting in spite almost inevitable failure to achieve declared Soviet purpose. Recent protestations new statement opens possibility that leadership can (1) leave schedule as it presently stands pending reaction from other parties and make renewed private appeal to all parties to attend upcoming meetings with special efforts to placate Rumanians, Cubans, Indonesians, Vietnamese etc. or (2) use Khrushchev's removal as excuse to postpone conference till more propitious time or, conceivably decide to drop whole idea as Khrushchev mistake. Publication today of resolution adopted by French CP plenum October 9 and 10, would tend to suggest that for time being new leadership favoring first option.
Key, however, lies in very fact that options are now available along with greater possibilities to repair relations with bloc and other major parties, while gaining breathing space to deal with underlying and continuing power struggle with Peiping.
3. Treatment of Khrushchev's faults could relate primarily to economic-administrative problems. It appears likely that some Khrushchevian economic policy or perhaps even specific economic-administrative proposition may have been important factor in formation of a coalition against him. Possible that such proposal or policy may have been advanced by Khrushchev or discussed at length at the recent mysterious meeting of the Presidium, Council of Ministers and top party and economic leaders of the country reported Embtel 957./3/
/3/Dated October 2. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 12 USSR)
It would be in keeping with Khrushchev's character and past performance on economic-administrative matters to have thought up some sweeping radical reorganization of economic management or shift in emphasis of allocation of resources and to have aired it at the enlarged economic meeting or sometime before as something he intended to accomplish at the November plenum. This proposal might have been so radical, at least it might have threatened to gore so many oxen that it facilitated organization of anti-Khrushchev coalition of power in Central Committee during Khrushchev's absence on vacation almost immediately after meeting.
While a drastic Khrushchevian administrative proposal might have been averted, there is some indication that conservatives may have opposed his "consumer oriented" line. In this connection, absence in the Pravda October 17 editorial of any references to individual or consumer welfare which have been Khrushchevian stock phrases may be significant. Only positive economic references may be read as reminders of the grim slogans of an earlier period: construction of material-technical basis of communism inseparably linked to Communist education (as opposed to material incentives); and the emphasis is on sacrifice and achievements of labor and the construction of new enterprises. On other hand, conservative emphasis may simply reflect the closing of ranks on most hallowed traditional party grounds as immediate aftermath of palace coup and that the initial conservatism may soon give way. This latter thesis would seem to be supported by Kosygin's personal identification with consumption sector and light industry.
Quick and vigorous attack on Khrushchev (which adds some new words to lexicon of denunciations) erases any doubt that new leaders determined to destroy him and use alleged sins to help justify shifting tactics and explain away continuing difficulties over which they may trip. It is surely opening gun in effort to undermine his personal popularity and justify removal to population, which particularly necessary if no conspicuous changes or improvements become apparent to them. Mirrored against the action taken against Khrushchev, words of condemnation seem to support conclusion (reftel) as to origins and causes. Along with other indications discussed above, these bring us again to see his removal as triggered by complex of factors of which struggle with Chinese and difficulties with bloc and world CP movement on one hand, and internal economic problems and issues on other hand, predominant. Concern over other failures or blunders and irritation over Khrushchevian tactics and behavior played additional role of greater or lesser importance to the various former colleagues who brought him down.
Kohler
58. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, October 17, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VI. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text, but according to the Department of State copy it was drafted by Owen on October 16 and cleared by Davis and Thompson. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 USSR)
SUBJECT
Khrushchev's Replacement: Significance for U.S.-Soviet Relations
We can only conjecture as to the significance for U.S.-Soviet relations until we have more solid information as to the circumstances and rationale of the event, and until we can observe the revised Soviet leadership in action.
It seems certain that Khrushchev has been forced out against his will. All indications thus far suggest an orderly transition of power to his top lieutenants and long-time associates, Brezhnev, Kosygin and Mikoyan. They probably will share their power with the other members of the Party Presidium for at least an interim period. Their new preeminence may be transitory.
Of the numerous problems which may have contributed to Khrushchev's ouster the relatively most critical at the moment is, in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the competition for influence in International Communism, Soviet relations with bloc parties and key parties outside the bloc. In the short term the new regime's probable granting of priority to this problem above others argues for the continuance of Soviet policies directed at the gradual improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations or as a minimum the avoidance of actions which could severely strain those relations. On the other hand, we should expect no early major Soviet initiatives in U.S.-Soviet relations.
The foregoing assessment is consistent with what we know of the personalities and past actions of Brezhnev, Kosygin and Mikoyan. None of these politically sophisticated individuals is associated with inflexible Stalinist attitudes toward the United States. It must be noted, however, that we as yet have no measure of any alignments of forces within the Presidium which could condition their policy positions vis-รก-vis the United States. Should there continue to be serious divergences of opinion within the top Party leadership contributing to an atmosphere of indecision, this would support the maintenance of the status quo in U.S.-Soviet relations.
Benjamin H. Read/2/
/2/Hawthorne Mills signed for Read.
59.Intelligence Memorandum/1/
[document number not declassified]
Washington, October 17, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VI. Secret. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency.
IMPLICATIONS OF KHRUSHCHEV'S DOWNFALL
1. The first public acts of Khrushchev's successors were to reassure the Soviet people and the world that they have no intention of repudiating fundamental doctrines and policies developed since the 20th Party Congress in 1956. In one sense, this is hardly surprising, for the policies and programs symbolized by de-Stalinization at home and peaceful coexistence abroad represented prudent adjustments to post-Stalin realities in both domestic and foreign affairs. But in a higher political sense, the public expression of fidelity to the "Leninist line worked out at the 20th and 22nd Party Congresses," followed by assurances to the US and other foreign governments that Soviet foreign policy will be unchanged, commit the new leaders to continue the broad policy lines of the Khrushchev era. These pronouncements also serve notice to the Chinese Communists that they should have no illusions that the USSR may now be disposed to abandon or compromise the "principled" positions it has long defended against Peiping's assaults.
2. The announcements that the Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet Presidium had "granted" Khrushchev's request to be relieved of his duties were clearly intended to emphasize that normal constitutional procedures had been scrupulously observed in handling the transfer of authority. This, and the invocation of the party congress lines, suggest that, in the period immediately ahead, the new leaders will concentrate on consolidating their domestic position and refrain from any major foreign initiatives, both in the contest with Peiping and in relations with the West.
3. The key to Moscow's policies over the longer term, of course, lies in the unanswered question as to what precipitated Khrushchev's downfall at this time. As in all major turning points in Soviet history, it would be vain to attribute this coup to any single event or issue. Khrushchev unquestionably aroused the resentment and enmity of many powerful and ambitious men during the long and eventful period of his leadership. There must have been many officials in the upper reaches of the Soviet party and administration who strongly believed that some of his policies and innovations were not only misguided but reckless and damaging to the long-range interests and strength of the Soviet state. These officials were obliged to endure the disruptive effects of Khrushchev's ill-advised ventures in economic policy and organization, many of which were hastily reversed or abandoned. In the foreign policy field, there is no question that some of Khrushchev's colleagues felt that certain of his major ventures subjected Soviet security to needless risks for highly dubious objectives and that his penchant for bluff and intimidation damaged the nation's prestige and the credibility of its basic objectives without yielding significant gains.
4. A survey of Khrushchev's recent conduct of Soviet foreign policy and his strategy in dealing with the Chinese, however, leads us to believe that there were no differences within the leadership on these questions serious enough to have precipitated the move against Khrushchev. This does not mean, of course, that the indictment of Khrushchev's leadership did not include criticisms of his handling of foreign ventures, such as the Berlin offensive of 1958-62 and the Cuban crisis. But it seems unlikely that charges of failure or ineptitude on specific policies or tactics extended to sharp differences over fundamental objectives of long-established Soviet policies which are deeply rooted in the USSR's national security and political interests.
5. Khrushchev's downfall, in our view, was the product of an accumulation of what might be termed personal-political resentments and dissatisfaction with his leadership, combined with a climatic showdown on basic issues of economic planning, management and personnel having a direct bearing on the long-term structure and direction of the Soviet economy and military posture. The strength of these feelings was evident in Pravda's 17 October denunciation of "subjectivism and drifting in Communist construction, hare-brained scheming, immature bragging and phrase-mongering, commandism," and intolerable "armchair methods, personal decisions, and disregard for the practical experience of the masses."
6. The catalyst which appears to have brought these disparate forces and issues to a head was Khrushchev's attack, culminating in his late September speech at the Kremlin meeting on a new long-term economic plan, on the entrenched economic traditionalism and vested interests which he believed had long frustrated his program of economic reform. This attack, in the eyes of powerful elements in the party and in the industrial and military establishment, threatened to upset the existing balance of influence and resources which these elements, by a kind of tacit agreement, were determined to maintain. As Ambassador Kohler noted in September 1963, a stalemate exists among the rival claimants to Soviet resources. He viewed the Soviet economy as becoming increasingly similar to the American economy in that there is a variety of entrenched interests which compete in the allocation of limited resources. In Kohler's view, these rival claimants had imposed sharp limitations on any radical departures in economic policy and, particularly, on any substantial diversion of resources to the consumer sectors. In his judgment, Khrushchev at best could only freeze the existing structure of allocations and rely on the annual increments in GNP for investments in his favorite programs, such as the rapid expansion of the chemical industry.
7. In his talks with Secretary Rusk and Undersecretary Harriman in the summer of 1963, Khrushchev indicated that he intended to freeze investments in all sectors of the economy other than chemistry and agriculture. However, by the late summer of 1964, Khrushchev apparently had made the critical decision to [go?] far beyond this strategy and to mount a fundamental attack on traditional economic doctrine and the existing division of resources. The breaking point thus came when, in late September, he made his major bid to break the stalemate and to force through a definitive reorientation and overhaul of the economy in which the "main task" would be to ensure a "more rapid development of the consumers goods industry." In contrast with this unequivocal demand for preferential development of consumer industries, Khrushchev had assured the Central Committee plenum last February that consumer requirements would continue to bow to defense needs in line with traditional policy. The thrust of the late September speech, however, strongly implied that defense priorities would be downgraded indefinitely under the new long-term plan. Khrushchev also asserted that traditionally defense-oriented heavy industries must increasingly contribute to consumer production. The first concrete manifestation of this new direction appeared in the party-government decree of 5 September which outlined Khrushchev's program for accelerating poultry production and designated the State Committee for Aviation Technology to organize the necessary production of machines and equipment.
8. In addition to this demand for a major reorientation in economic priorities, Khrushchev may have been planning other far-reaching actions at the Central Committee meeting scheduled for some time in November and at the semi-annual Supreme Soviet session anticipated in December. These may have included important personnel changes in the party and administration. This is an area in which he apparently had temporized for a long period. The large accumulation of "dead wood" at high levels has long been obvious. Khrushchev, moreover, has frequently complained about obstructionists and bureaucrats, although these remarks probably were not aimed at members of the top leadership. Within the party presidium, however, there are a number of aging, sickly, or apparently ineffective members. Fear of being ousted from places of authority and privilege may well have been one of the factors that forged the anti-Khrushchev alliance.
9. If these were, in fact, some of the considerations which precipitated Khrushchev's downfall, it seems likely that his successors will be inclined to pursue a cautious domestic policy of consolidation and status quo, avoiding any challenge to entrenched interests and the existing balance of internal power and resources. It also seems unlikely that there will be any sharp departures in other areas of domestic policy, such as regime attitude toward the intelligentsia. The new leaders probably will develop their initial gestures to reassure the Soviet people that they need have no fear of any reversion to more repressive policies.
10. It is difficult to see how the changeover in Moscow could produce any basic change in attitude toward China. It is possible that the new leaders, in the initial period of consolidation, may wish to revert to Khrushchev's pre-1963 policy of temporizing in order to avert a formal schism in the Communist movement. But it seems unlikely, particularly in the aftermath of China's successful nuclear detonation, that the Peiping leaders would accommodate the Russians on such an option. The new regime probably will find their hands forced by the Chinese and that they will be no more able to temporize than was Khrushchev.
11. The Chinese have not confined their assaults to Khrushchev himself but have denounced his entire "clique." There is no reason to believe that Brezhnev and Kosygin may be disposed to try to work toward a reconciliation. In his speech in East Germany on 6 October, Brezhnev attacked the "splitting policy of those who--for the sake of their chauvinist aims--try to divide, to undermine the unity of the socialist countries" and he specifically endorsed the "impending international forum of Communists"--presumably a reference to the December preparatory meeting. Kosygin was less direct in his 3 October speech on the 15th anniversary of East Germany, denouncing the "absurd theories of the contemporary left-wing opportunists who advocate the establishment of isolated national economies" and restrict economic contacts between socialist countries.
12. Although it is possible that the new leaders questioned the wisdom of Khrushchev's moves to bring the conflict with Peiping to a head, it is doubtful that they would be willing to accept the political costs of deferring or abandoning proposals for a preparatory meeting and for a full-scale conference next year. The Pravda article of 17 October stated specifically that "our party, as hitherto, will pursue an active line for the convocation of an international meeting of all Communist parties to discuss topical problems of the struggle for peace . . . and for the consolidation of the unity of the Communist movement on the immutable principles of proletarian internationalism." Khrushchev's successors must expect the Chinese to exploit his downfall as a repudiation of his stand in the Sino-Soviet conflict. [1 line of source text not declassified] sources close to the Chinese government regard Moscow developments as a "big victory" and believe the December meeting "inevitably" will be postponed.
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