

**PART 742**

**CONTROL POLICY -- CCL BASED CONTROLS**

<b>Sec.</b>	<b>Page</b>
<b>742.1 Introduction</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>742.2 Proliferation of chemical and biological weapons</b> .....	<b>2</b>
<b>742.3 Nuclear nonproliferation</b> .....	<b>6</b>
<b>742.4 National security</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>742.5 Missile technology</b> .....	<b>9</b>
<b>742.6 Regional stability</b> .....	<b>10</b>
<b>742.7 Crime control</b> .....	<b>11</b>
<b>742.8 Anti-Terrorism: Iran</b> .....	<b>12</b>
<b>742.9 Anti-Terrorism: Syria</b> .....	<b>14</b>
<b>742.10 Anti-Terrorism: Sudan</b> .....	<b>16</b>
<b>742.11 Specially designed implements of torture, thumbscrews, and thumbcuffs; and parts and accessories, n.e.s.</b> .....	<b>18</b>
<b>742.12 [RESERVED]</b> .....	<b>18</b>
<b>742.13 Communications intercepting devices</b> .....	<b>18</b>
<b>742.14 Significant Items: hot section technology for the development, production or overhaul of commercial aircraft engines, components, and systems.</b> .....	<b>20</b>
<b>742.15 Encryption items</b> .....	<b>20</b>
<b>742.16 [RESERVED]</b> .....	<b>23</b>
<b>742.17 Exports of firearms to OAS member countries</b> .....	<b>23</b>
<b>742.18 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or Convention)</b> .....	<b>24</b>
<b>742.19 Anti-terrorism: North Korea</b> .....	<b>27</b>

**NONPROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ..... SUPPLEMENT NO. 1**

**ANTI-TERRORISM CONTROLS: IRAN, NORTH KOREA, SYRIA AND SUDAN CONTRACT SANCTITY DATES AND RELATED POLICIES ..... SUPPLEMENT NO. 2**

**[RESERVED] ..... SUPPLEMENT NO. 3**

**[RESERVED] ..... SUPPLEMENT NO. 4**

**CHECKLIST ON ENCRYPTION AND OTHER “INFORMATION SECURITY” FUNCTIONS ..... SUPPLEMENT NO. 5**

**GUIDELINES FOR SUBMITTING REVIEW REQUESTS FOR ENCRYPTION ITEMS ..... SUPPLEMENT NO. 6**

**DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS ..... SUPPLEMENT NO. 7**

## §742.1

## INTRODUCTION

In this part, references to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) are References to 15 CFR Chapter VII, Subchapter C.

*(a) Scope*

This part describes all the reasons for control reflected in the Country Chart in Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR. In addition, it includes licensing requirements and licensing policies for the following items that are not reflected on the Country Chart: specially designed implements of torture, high performance computers, and communications intercepting devices. In addition to describing the reasons for control and licensing requirements and policies, this part describes any applicable contract sanctity provisions that may apply to specific controls and includes a description of any multilateral regime under which specific controls are maintained.

*(b) Reasons for control listed on the CCL not covered by this part*

This part describes the license requirements and the licensing policies for all the “Reasons for Control” that are listed on the Commerce Control List (CCL) *except* “Short Supply” and “U.N. Sanctions”, which do not appear on the Country Chart.

**(1) Short Supply.** ECCNs containing items subject to short supply controls (“SS”) refer the exporter to part 754 of the EAR. These ECCNs are: 0A980 (Horses for export by sea); 1C980 (certain inorganic chemicals); 1C981 (Crude petroleum, including reconstituted crude petroleum, tar sands, and crude shale oil); 1C982 (certain other petroleum products); 1C983 (Natural gas liquids and other natural gas derivatives); 1C984 (certain manufactured gas and synthetic natural gas (except when

commingled with natural gas and thus subject to export authorization from the Department of Energy); and 1C988 (Western red cedar (*thuja plicata*) logs and timber, and rough, dressed and worked lumber containing wane).

**(2) U.N. Sanctions.** The United Nations imposes sanctions, short of complete embargoes, against certain countries which may result in controls that supplement those otherwise maintained under the EAR for that particular country. This part does *not* address license requirements and licensing policies for controls implementing U.N. sanctions. CCL entries containing items subject to U.N. sanctions will refer the exporter to part 746 of the EAR, Embargoes and Other Special Controls, for any supplemental controls that may apply to exports and reexports involving these countries.

*(c) Exports and reexports involving Cuba and Iran*

This part does *not* cover license requirements and licensing policies that apply to exports and reexports to embargoed destinations (Cuba and Iran). These comprehensive embargoes cover a broader range of items than those reflected in the CCL. If you are exporting or reexporting to any of these destinations, you should first review part 746 of the EAR, Embargoes and Other Special Controls.

*(d) Anti-terrorism Controls on Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria*

Commerce maintains anti-terrorism controls on Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria and Sudan under section 6(a) of the Export Administration Act. Items controlled under section 6(a) to Iran, Syria, Sudan, and North Korea are described in §§742.8, 742.9, 742.10, and 742.19, respectively, and in Supplement No. 2 to part 742. Commerce also maintains controls under section 6(j) of the EAA to Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. Items controlled to these countries under EAA

section 6(j) are also described in Supplement 2 to part 742. The Secretaries of Commerce and State are required to notify appropriate Committees of the Congress 30 days before issuing a license for an item controlled under section 6(j) to Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Sudan or Syria. If you are exporting or reexporting to Cuba, Iran, or North Korea, you should review part 746 of the EAR, Embargoes and Other Special Controls.

**(e) End-user and end-use based controls**

This part does not cover prohibitions and licensing requirements for exports of items not included on the CCL that are subject to end-use and end-user controls: certain nuclear end-uses; certain missile end-uses; certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses; certain naval nuclear propulsion end-uses; certain activities of U.S. persons; and certain exports to and for the use of certain foreign vessels or aircraft. Licensing requirements and policies for these exports are contained in part 744 of the EAR.

**(f) Overlapping license policies**

Many items on the CCL are subject to more than one type of control (e.g., national security (NS), missile technology (MT), nuclear nonproliferation (NP), regional stability (RS)). In addition, applications for all items on the CCL, other than those controlled for short supply reasons, may be reviewed for missile technology (see §742.5(b)(3) of this part), nuclear nonproliferation (see §742.3(b)(2) of this part), or chemical and biological weapons (see §742.2(b)(3) of this part), if the end-use or end-user may be involved in certain proliferation activities. Finally, many multilaterally controlled items are reviewed for anti-terrorism reasons if they are destined for a terrorism-supporting country (see paragraph (d) of this section). Your application for a license will be reviewed under all applicable licensing policies. A license will be issued only if an application can be approved under *all applicable* licensing policies.

**§742.2**

**PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS**

**(a) License requirements**

The following controls are maintained in support of the U.S. foreign policy of opposing the proliferation and illegal use of chemical and biological weapons. (See also §742.18 of this part for license requirements pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention).

**(1)** If CB Column 1 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required to all destinations, including Canada, for the following:

(i) Human pathogens, zoonoses, toxins, animal pathogens, genetically modified microorganisms and plant pathogens identified in ECCNs 1C351, 1C352, 1C353, 1C354 and 1C360; and

(ii) Technology (ECCNs 1E001 and 1E351) for the production and/or disposal of microbiological commodities described in paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section.

**(2)** If CB Column 2 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required to all destinations except countries in Country Group A:3 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) (Australia Group members) for the following:

(i) Chemicals identified in ECCN 1C350 (precursor and intermediate chemicals used in the production of chemical warfare agents).

(A) This license requirement includes chemical mixtures identified in ECCN 1C350.b, .c, or .d, except as specified in License

Requirements Note 2 to that ECCN.

(B) This licensing requirement does not include chemical compounds created with any chemicals identified in ECCN 1C350, unless those compounds are also identified in ECCN 1C350.

(C) This licensing requirement does not apply to any of the following medical, analytical, diagnostic, and food testing kits that consist of pre-packaged materials of defined composition that are specifically developed, packaged, and marketed for diagnostic, analytical, or public health purposes:

(J) Test kits containing no more than 300 grams of any chemical controlled by ECCN 1C350.b or .c (CB-controlled chemicals also identified as Schedule 2 or 3 chemicals under the CWC) that are destined for export or reexport to CWC States Parties (destinations listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR). Such test kits are controlled by ECCN 1C395 for CB and CW reasons, to States not Party to the CWC (destinations not listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR), and for AT reasons.

(2) Test kits that contain no more than 300 grams of any chemical controlled by ECCN 1C350.d (CB-controlled chemicals not also identified as Schedule 1, 2, or 3 chemicals under the CWC). Such test kits are controlled by ECCN 1C995 for AT reasons.

(ii) Software (ECCN 1D390) for process control that is specifically configured to control or initiate production of the chemical precursors controlled by ECCN 1C350.

(iii) Technology (ECCN 1E001) for the development or production of chemical detection systems and dedicated detectors therefore, controlled by ECCN 1A004.c, that also have the technical characteristics described in ECCN 2B351.a.

(iv) Technology (ECCNs 1E001 and 1E350) involving the following for facilities designed or intended to produce chemicals described in 1C350:

(A) Overall plant design;

(B) Design, specification, or procurement of equipment;

(C) Supervision of construction, installation, or operation of complete plant or components thereof;

(D) Training of personnel; or

(E) Consultation on specific problems involving such facilities.

(v) Technology (ECCNs 1E001 and 1E351) for the production and/or disposal of chemical precursors described in ECCN 1C350;

(vi) Equipment and materials identified in ECCN 2B350 or 2B351 on the CCL, chemical detection systems controlled by 1A004.c for detecting chemical warfare agents and having the characteristics of toxic gas monitoring systems described in 2B351.a, and valves controlled by ECCN 2A226 or ECCN 2A292 having the characteristics of those described in 2B350.g, which can be used in the production of chemical weapons precursors or chemical warfare agents.

(vii) Equipment and materials identified in ECCN 2B352, which can be used in the production of biological agents.

(viii) Technology identified in ECCN 2E001, 2E002, or 2E301 for:

(A) The development, production, or use of items controlled by ECCN 2B350, 2B351, or 2B352; or

(B) The development or production of

valves controlled by ECCN 2A226 or 2A292 having the characteristics of those described in ECCN 2B350.g.

(ix) Technology identified in ECCN 2E201 or 2E290 for the use of valves controlled by ECCN 2A226 or 2A292 having the characteristics of those described in 2B350.g.

(3) If CB Column 3 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required to Country Group D:3 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) for medical products identified in ECCN 1C991.d.

(4) A license is required, to States not Party to the CWC (destinations *not* listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR), for mixtures controlled by ECCN 1C395.a and test kits controlled by ECCN 1C395.b.

**(b) Licensing policy**

(1) License applications for the items described in paragraph (a) of this section will be considered on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the export or reexport would make a material contribution to the design, development, production, stockpiling or use of chemical or biological weapons. When an export or reexport is deemed to make such a material contribution, the license will be denied. When an export or reexport is intended to be used in a chemical weapons or biological weapons program, or for chemical or biological weapons terrorism purposes, it is deemed to make a material contribution. The factors listed in paragraph (b)(2) of this section are among those that will be considered to determine what action should be taken on license applications for these items.

(2) The following factors are among those that will be considered to determine what action should be taken on license applications for the items described in paragraph (a) of this section:

(i) The specific nature of the end-use, including the appropriateness of the stated end-use;

(ii) The significance of the export and reexport in terms of its potential contribution to the design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological weapons;

(iii) The nonproliferation credentials of the importing country, including the importing country's chemical and biological capabilities and objectives;

(iv) The extent and effectiveness of the export control system in the importing country and in any intermediary country through which the items being exported or reexported will transit or be transshipped en route to the importing country;

(v) The risk that the items will be diverted for use in a chemical weapons or biological weapons program, or for chemical weapons or biological weapons terrorism purposes;

(vi) The reliability of the parties to the transaction, including whether:

(A) An export or reexport license application involving any such parties has previously been denied;

(B) Any such parties have been engaged in clandestine or illegal procurement activities;

(C) The end-user is capable of securely handling and storing the items to be exported or reexported;

(vii) Relevant information about proliferation and terrorism activities, including activities involving the design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological weapons by any parties to the transaction;

(viii) The types of assurances or guarantees

against the design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological weapons that are given in a particular case, including any relevant assurances provided by the importing country or the end-user;

(ix) The applicability of other multilateral export control or nonproliferation agreements (e.g., the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention) to the transaction; and

(x) The existence of a pre-existing contract.

(3) BIS will review license applications in accordance with the licensing policy described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section for items not described in paragraph (a) of this section that:

(i) Require a license for reasons other than short supply; *and*

(ii) Could be destined for the design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological weapons, or for a facility engaged in such activities.

(4) License applications for items described in paragraph (a) of this section, when destined for the People's Republic of China, will be reviewed in accordance with the licensing policies in both paragraph (b) of this section and §742.4(b)(7).

***(c) Contract sanctity***

Contract sanctity dates are set forth in Supplement No. 1 to part 742. Applicants who wish that a pre-existing contract be considered in reviewing their license applications must submit documentation sufficient to establish the existence of such a contract.

***(d) Australia Group***

The Australia Group, a multilateral body that works to halt the spread of chemical and

biological weapons, has developed common control lists of items specifically related to chemical and biological weapons. Australia Group members are listed in Country Group A:3 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR). Controls on items listed in paragraph (a) of this section are consistent with lists agreed to in the Australia Group.

***(e) License application requirements and instructions***

(1) Supplement No. 1 to Part 748 of the EAR provides general instructions for completing license applications. When preparing applications for items controlled for chemical and biological reasons, pay particular attention to the instructions contained in paragraphs (e) and (f) of the Supplement that apply to entering "Quantity" and "Units," respectively, on license applications. Paragraphs (e) and (f) require that, if an item is licensed in terms of "\$ value" (refer to the "Unit" paragraph within the appropriate ECCN), the unit of quantity commonly used in the trade must also be shown on the license application. In such cases, Section 750.7 of the EAR provides that the quantity of commodities authorized is limited by the total dollar value as shown on the approved license and not by the quantity specified thereon. Although the EAR do not place a specific limitation on quantity in such cases, the total quantity that may be exported or reexported is limited, to a significant degree, by the fact that the EAR do not provide a shipping tolerance for items licensed by "dollar value" (see Section 750.11(b)(1) of the EAR) and require that the "unit price" indicated on the license application reflect the fair market value of the items listed on the application (see paragraph (g) of Supplement No. 1 to Part 748 of the EAR).

(2) Unique application and submission requirements for chemicals, medicinals, and pharmaceuticals are described in paragraph (a) of Supplement No. 2 to Part 748 of the EAR.

## §742.3

**NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION***(a) License requirements*

Section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 requires BIS to identify items subject to the EAR that could be of significance for nuclear explosive purposes if used for activities other than those authorized at the time of export or reexport. ECCNs on the CCL that include the symbols “NP” or “NP 2” in the “Country Chart” column of the “License Requirements” section identify items that could be of significance for nuclear explosive purposes and are therefore subject to licensing requirements under this part and under section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. These items are referred to as “The Nuclear Referral List” and are subject to the following licensing requirements:

**(1)** If NP Column 1 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required to all destinations except Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) member countries (Country Group A:4) (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR).

**(2)** If NP Column 2 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the applicable ECCN, a license is required to Country Group D:2 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) except India.

**(3)** Other nuclear-related license requirements are described in §§744.2 and 744.5 of the EAR.

*(b) Licensing policy*

**(1)** To implement the controls in paragraph (a) of this section, the following factors are among those used to determine what action should be taken on individual applications:

(i) Whether the items to be transferred are appropriate for the stated end-use and whether that stated end-use is appropriate for the end-user;

(ii) The significance for nuclear purposes of the particular item;

(iii) Whether the items to be exported or reexported are to be used in research on, or for the development, design, manufacture, construction, operation, or maintenance of, any reprocessing or enrichment facility;

(iv) The types of assurances or guarantees given against use for nuclear explosive purposes or proliferation in the particular case;

(v) Whether any party to the transaction has been engaged in clandestine or illegal procurement activities;

(vi) Whether an application for a license to export or reexport to the end-user has previously been denied, or whether the end-user has previously diverted items received under a general license, a License Exception, or a validated license to unauthorized activities;

(vii) Whether the export or reexport would present an unacceptable risk of diversion to a nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity described in §744.2(a) of the EAR; and

(viii) The nonproliferation credentials of the importing country, based on consideration of the following factors:

(A) Whether the importing country is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) or to a similar international legally-binding nuclear nonproliferation agreement;

(B) Whether the importing country has



all of its nuclear activities, facilities, or installations that are operational, being designed, or under construction under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards or equivalent full scope safeguards;

(C) Whether there is an agreement for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy between the U.S. and the importing country;

(D) Whether the actions, statements, and policies of the government of the importing country are in support of nuclear nonproliferation and whether that government is in compliance with its international obligations in the field of nonproliferation;

(E) The degree to which the government of the importing country cooperates in nonproliferation policy generally (e.g., willingness to consult on international nonproliferation issues); and

(F) Information on the importing country's nuclear intentions and activities.

(2) In addition, BIS will review license applications in accordance with the licensing policy described in paragraph (b) of this section for items *not* on the Nuclear Referral List that:

(i) Require a license on the CCL for reasons other than “short supply;” and

(ii) Are intended for a nuclear related end-use or end-user.

(3) For the People’s Republic of China, the general licensing policy for applications for those items that would make a direct and significant contribution to nuclear weapons and their delivery systems is extended review or denial.

(4) License applications for items described in paragraph (a) of this section, when destined to the People’s Republic of China, will be reviewed

in accordance with the licensing policies in both paragraph (b) of this section and §742.4(b)(7).

**(c) Contract sanctity**

Contract sanctity provisions are not available for license applications reviewed under this section.

**(d) Nuclear Suppliers Group**

Most items on the Nuclear Referral List that require a license under NP Column No. 1 on the Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) are contained in the Annex to the “Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material, and Related Technology” (the Annex), as published by the International Atomic Energy Agency in INFCIRC/254/Revision 1/Part 2. The adherents to INFCIRC/254/Revision 1/Part 2, which includes the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines, have agreed to establish export licensing procedures for the transfer of items identified in the Annex. Items that are listed as requiring a license under NP Column No. 2 on the Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) are not included in the Annex and are controlled only by the United States.

**§742.4**

**NATIONAL SECURITY**

**(a) License requirements**

It is the policy of the United States to restrict the export and reexport of items that would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other country or combination of countries that would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States. Accordingly, a license is required for exports and reexports to all destinations, except Canada, for all items in ECCNs on the CCL that include NS Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License

Requirements” section. A license is required to all destinations except Country Group A:1 and cooperating countries (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740), Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia for all items in ECCNs on the CCL that include NS Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section. The purpose of the controls is to ensure that these items do not make a contribution to the military potential of countries in Country Group D:1 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) that would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States. License Exception GBS is available for the export and reexport of certain national security controlled items to Country Group B (see §740.4 and Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR).

**(b) Licensing policy**

**(1)** The policy for national security controlled items exported or reexported to any country *except* a country in Country Group D:1 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) is to approve applications unless there is a significant risk that the items will be diverted to a country in Country Group D:1.

**(2)** Except for those countries described in paragraphs (b)(5) through (b)(7) of this section, the general policy for exports and reexports of items to Country Group D:1 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) is to approve applications when BIS determines, on a case-by-case basis, that the items are for civilian use or would otherwise not make a significant contribution to the military potential of the country of destination that would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States.

**(3)** To permit such policy judgments to be made, each application is reviewed in the light of prevailing policies with full consideration of all aspects of the proposed transaction. The review

generally includes:

- (i) An analysis of the kinds and quantities of items to be shipped;
- (ii) Their military or civilian uses;
- (iii) The unrestricted availability abroad of the same or comparable items;
- (iv) The country of destination;
- (v) The ultimate end-users in the country of destination; and
- (vi) The intended end-use.

**(4)** Although each proposed transaction is considered individually, items described in Advisory Notes on the Commerce Control List are more likely to be approved than others.

**(5)** In recognition of efforts made to adopt safeguard measures for exports and reexports, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Russia are accorded enhanced favorable consideration licensing treatment.

**(6)** The general policy for Cambodia and Laos is to approve license applications when BIS determines, on a case-by-case basis, that the items are for an authorized use in Cambodia or Laos and are not likely to be diverted to another country or use contrary to the national security or foreign policy controls of the United States.

**(7)** For the People’s Republic of China (PRC), there is a general policy of approval for license applications to export, reexport, or transfer items to civil end-uses. There is a presumption of denial for license applications to export, reexport, or transfer items that would make a direct and significant contribution to the PRC’s military capabilities such as, but not limited to, the major weapons systems described in Supplement No. 7 to Part 742 of the EAR.

*(c) Contract sanctity*

Contract sanctity provisions are not available for license applications reviewed under this section.

*(d) [RESERVED]*

## §742.5

**MISSILE TECHNOLOGY***(a) License requirements*

(1) In support of U.S. foreign policy to limit the proliferation of missiles, a license is required to export and reexport items related to the design, development, production, or use of missiles. These items are identified in ECCNs on the CCL as MT Column No. 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section. Licenses for these items are required to all destinations, except Canada, as indicated by MT Column 1 of the Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR).

(2) The term “missiles” is defined as rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicle systems (including cruise missile systems, target drones, and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms (kg) payload to a range of at least 300 kilometers (km). See §746.3 of the EAR for definition of a “ballistic missile” to be exported or reexported to Iraq.

*(b) Licensing policy*

(1) Applications to export and reexport items identified in ECCNs on the CCL as MT Column No. 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section will be considered on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the export or reexport would make a material contribution to the proliferation of

missiles. Applications for exports and reexports of such items contained in Category 7A or described by ECCN 9A101 on the CCL will be considered more favorably if such exports or reexports are determined to be destined to a manned aircraft, satellite, land vehicle, or marine vessel, in quantities appropriate for replacement parts for such applications. When an export or reexport is deemed to make a material contribution to the proliferation of missiles, the license will be denied.

(2) The following factors are among those that will be considered in reviewing individual applications.

(i) The specific nature of the end-use;

(ii) The significance of the export and reexport in terms of its contribution to the design, development, production, or use of missiles;

(iii) The capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the recipient country;

(iv) The nonproliferation credentials of the importing country;

(v) The types of assurances or guarantees against design, development, production, or use of missiles that are given in a particular case; and

(vi) The existence of a pre-existing contract.

(3) **Controls on other items.** BIS will review license applications, in accordance with the licensing policy described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, for items *not* described in paragraph (a) of this section that:

(i) Require a validated license for reasons other than short supply; and

(ii) Could be destined for the design, development, production, or use of missiles, or

for a facility engaged in such activities.

(4) License applications for items described in paragraph (a) of this section, when destined for the People's Republic of China, will be reviewed in accordance with the licensing policies in both paragraph (b) of this section and §742.4(b)(7).

**(c) Contract sanctity**

The following contract sanctity dates have been established:

(1) License applications for batch mixers specified in ECCN 1B117 involving contracts that were entered into prior to January 19, 1990, will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(2) License applications subject to ECCN 1B115.b or .c that involve a contract entered into prior to March 7, 1991, will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(3) Applicants who wish that a pre-existing contract be considered in reviewing their license applications must submit documentation sufficient to establish the existence of a contract.

**(d) Missile Technology Control Regime**

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) members are listed in Country Group A:2 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR). Controls on items identified in paragraph (a) of this section are consistent with the list agreed to in the MTCR and included in the MTCR Annex.

**§742.6**

**REGIONAL STABILITY**

**(a) License requirements**

The following controls are maintained in support of U.S. foreign policy to maintain regional

stability:

(1) As indicated in the CCL and in RS Column 1 of the Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR), a license is required to all destinations, except Canada, for items described on the CCL under ECCNs 6A002.a.1, a.2, a.3, .c, or .e; 6A003.b.3 and b.4; 6A008.j.1; 6A998.b; 6D001 (only “software” for the “development” or “production” of items in 6A002.a.1, a.2, a.3, .c; 6A003.b.3 and .b.4; or 6A008.j.1); 6D002 (only “software” for the “use” of items in 6A002.a.1, a.2, a.3, .c; 6A003.b.3 and .b.4; or 6A008.j.1); 6D991 (only “software” for the “development,” “production,” or “use” of equipment controlled by 6A002.e or 6A998.b); 6E001 (only “technology” for “development” of items in 6A002.a.1, a.2, a.3 (except 6A002.a.3.d.a.2 and 6A002.a.3.e for lead selenide focal plane arrays), and .c or .e, 6A003.b.3 and b.4, or 6A008.j.1); 6E002 (only “technology” for “production” of items in 6A002.a.1, a.2, a.3, .c, or .e, 6A003.b.3 or b.4, or 6A008.j.1); 6E991 (only “technology” for the “development,” “production,” or “use” of equipment controlled by 6A998.b); 7D001 (only “software” for “development” or “production” of items in 7A001, 7A002, or 7A003); 7E001 (only “technology” for the “development” of inertial navigation systems, inertial equipment, and specially designed components therefor for civil aircraft); 7E002 (only “technology” for the “production” of inertial navigation systems, inertial equipment, and specially designed components therefor for civil aircraft); 7E101 (only “technology” for the “use” of inertial navigation systems, inertial equipment, and specially designed components for civil aircraft).

(2) As indicated in the CCL and in RS Column 2 of the Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR), a license is required to any destination except Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for items described on the CCL under ECCNs 0A918, 0E918, 2A983, 2D983 2E983, 8A918, and for military vehicles

and certain commodities (specially designed) used to manufacture military equipment, described on the CCL in ECCNs 0A018.c, 1B018.a, 2B018, and 9A018.a and .b.

(3) As indicated on the CCL, a license is required for the export or reexport to Iraq or transfer within Iraq of the following items controlled for RS reasons on the CCL: 0B999, 0D999, 1B999, 1C992, 1C995, 1C997, 1C999 and 6A992. The Commerce Country Chart is not designed to determine RS licensing requirements for these ECCNs.

**(b) Licensing policy**

(1) Applications to export and reexport items described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the export or reexport could contribute directly or indirectly to any country's military capabilities in a manner that would alter or destabilize a region's military balance contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States.

(2) Applications to export and reexport commodities described in paragraph (a)(2) of this section will generally be considered favorably on a case-by-case basis unless there is evidence that the export or reexport would contribute significantly to the destabilization of the region to which the equipment is destined.

(3) For terrorist-designated countries, the applicable licensing policies are found in parts 742 and 746 of the EAR

(4) See §746.3(b) of the EAR for the applicable licensing policies for items controlled for RS reasons to Iraq.

**(c) Contract sanctity**

*Contract sanctity date:* March 21, 2003. This contract sanctity date applies only to items controlled under ECCNs 2A983, 2D983 and

2E983 destined for countries not listed in Country Group E (Supplement 1 to part 740). See parts 742 and 746 for the contract sanctity requirements applicable to exports and reexports to countries listed in Country Group E.

**(d) U.S. controls**

Although the United States seeks cooperation from like-minded countries in maintaining regional stability controls, at this time these controls are maintained only by the United States.

**§742.7**

**CRIME CONTROL**

**(a) License requirements**

In support of U.S. foreign policy to promote the observance of human rights throughout the world, a license is required to export and reexport crime control and detection equipment, related technology and software as follows:

(1) Crime control and detection instruments and equipment and related technology and software identified in the appropriate ECCNs on the CCL under CC Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section. A license is required to countries listed in CC Column 1 (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR). Items affected by this requirement are identified on the CCL under the following ECCNs: 0A978, 0A979, 0A984, 0A987, 0E984, 1A984, 1A985, 3A980, 3A981, 3D980, 3E980, 4A003 (for fingerprint computers only), 4A980, 4D001 (for fingerprint computers only), 4D980, 4E001 (for fingerprint computers only), 4E980, 6A002 (for police-model infrared viewers only), 6E001 (for police-model infrared viewers only), 6E002 (for police-model infrared viewers only), and 9A980.

(2) Shotguns with a barrel length greater than or equal to 24 inches, identified in ECCN 0A984 on

the CCL under CC Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section regardless of end-user to countries listed in CC Column 2 (Supplement No. 1 part 738 of the EAR).

(3) Shotguns with barrel length greater than or equal to 24 inches, identified in ECCN 0A984 on the CCL under CC Column 3 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section only if for sale or resale to police or law enforcement entities in countries listed in CC Column 3 (Supplement No. 1 part 738 of the EAR).

(4) Certain crime control items require a license to all destinations, except Canada. These items are identified under ECCNs 0A982, 0A985, and 0E982. Controls for these items appear in each ECCN; a column specific to these controls does not appear in the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR).

(5) See §742.11 of the EAR for further information on items controlled under ECCN 0A983, which require a license to all destinations, including Canada.

**(b) Licensing policy**

Applications for items controlled under this section will generally be considered favorably on a case-by-case basis unless there is civil disorder in the country or region or unless there is evidence that the government of the importing country may have violated internationally recognized human rights. The judicious use of export controls is intended to deter the development of a consistent pattern of human rights abuses, distance the United States from such abuses and avoid contributing to civil disorder in a country or region.

**(c) Contract sanctity**

Contract sanctity date: August 22, 2000. Contract

sanctity applies only to items controlled under ECCNs 0A982, 0A985 and 0E982 destined for countries not listed in CC Column 1 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR).

**(d) U.S. controls**

Although the United States seeks cooperation from like-minded countries in maintaining controls on crime control and detection items, at this time these controls are maintained only by the United States.

**§742.8**

**ANTI-TERRORISM: IRAN**

**(a) License requirements**

(1) A license is required for anti-terrorism purposes to export or reexport to Iran any item for which AT column 1 or AT column 2 is indicated in the Country Chart column of the applicable ECCN or any item described in ECCNs 1C350, 1C355, 1C395, 2A994, 2D994 and 2E994. See paragraph (a)(5) of this section for controls maintained by the Department of the Treasury. See §746.7 of the EAR for additional EAR license requirements that apply to Iran.

(2) [RESERVED]

(3) The Secretary of State has designated Iran as a country whose Government has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

(4) In support of U.S. foreign policy applicable to terrorism-supporting countries, the EAR imposes anti-terrorism license requirements on exports and reexports to Iran pursuant to sections 6(j) and 6(a) of the Export Administration Act.

**(i) Section 6(j) anti-terrorism controls.**

Section 6(j) requirements apply to all exports and reexports destined to the police, military or other sensitive end-users of items listed on the Commerce Control List (Supp. No. 1 to part 774 of the EAR) for which any listed reason for control in the applicable ECCN is NS (national security), CB (chemical or biological weapons proliferation), MT (missile proliferation), NP (nuclear weapons proliferation) or an Export Control Classification Number ending in "18" (military related items). BIS may not issue a license for a transaction subject to section 6(j) controls until 30 days after the notification described in Section 6(j)(2) of the Export Administration Act is delivered to the committees of Congress specified in that section. License applications for all other items controlled under section 6(a) are also reviewed to determine whether section 6(j) applies.

**(ii) Section 6(a) anti-terrorism controls.**

Section 6(a) requirements apply to all exports and reexports regardless of the end user of items described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section.

**(5)** Exports and certain reexports to Iran are subject to a comprehensive embargo administered by the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). If you wish to export or reexport to Iran, the Government of Iran or any entity owned or controlled by that Government, you should review part 746 of the EAR and consult with OFAC. Please note that authorization from OFAC constitutes authorization under the EAR and no separate license or authorization from BIS is required.

***(b) Licensing policy***

**(1)** The Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of October 23, 1992, requires BIS to deny licenses for items controlled to Iran for national security (section 5 of the 1979 EAA) or foreign policy reasons (section 6 of the 1979 EAA), absent contract sanctity or a Presidential waiver.

License applications for which contract sanctity is established may be considered under policies in effect prior to the enactment of that Act. Otherwise, licenses for such items to Iran are subject to a general policy of denial.

**(2)** License applications for items controlled under section 6(a) of the EAA will also be reviewed to determine whether requirements of section 6(j) apply. Whenever the Secretary of State determines that an export or reexport could make a significant contribution to the military potential of Iran, including its military logistics capability, or could enhance Iran's ability to support acts of international terrorism, the Secretaries of State and Commerce will notify the Congress 30 days prior to the issuance of a license.

***(c) Contract sanctity***

Section 6(f) of the Export Administration Act requires that a report be delivered to Congress before foreign policy based export controls are imposed, expanded or extended. Consistent with section 6(p) of the Export Administration Act, certain exports or reexports in fulfillment of contracts entered into before such delivery of the report applicable to a particular license requirement or licensing policy may be subject to the license requirements and licensing policy that were in force before the report was delivered. License applicants who wish to have their application considered under such pre-existing requirements or policy must include evidence of the pre-existing contract with their license applications.

***(d) U.S. controls***

Although the United States seeks cooperation from like-minded countries in maintaining anti-terrorism controls, at this time these controls are maintained only by the United States.

## §742.9

**ANTI-TERRORISM: SYRIA****(a) License requirements**

(1) If AT Column 1 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required for export and reexport to Syria for anti-terrorism purposes.

(2) The Secretary of State has designated Syria as a country whose government has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

(3) In support of U.S. foreign policy against terrorism, BIS maintains two types of anti-terrorism controls on the export and reexport to Syria of items described in Supplement No. 2 to part 742.

(i) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742, if destined to military, police, intelligence or other end-users in Syria, are controlled under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, as amended (EAA).

(ii) Items listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 destined to other end-users in Syria, as well as items to all end-users listed in (c)(6) through (c)(8), (c)(10) through (c)(14), (c)(16) through (c)(19), and (c)(22) through (c)(44) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742, are controlled to Syria under section 6(a) of the EAA.

**(b) Licensing policy**

(1) Applications for export and reexport to all end-users in Syria of the following items will generally be denied:

(i) Items that are controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons to any destination. These are items that contain CB Column 1, CB Column 2, or CB Column 3 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(ii) Military-related items controlled for national security reasons to any destination. These are items that contain NS Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section in an ECCN on the CCL *and* is controlled by equipment or material entries ending in the number “18.”

(iii) Items that are controlled for missile proliferation reasons to any destination. These are items that have an MT Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(iv) All aircraft (powered and unpowered), helicopters, engines, and related spare parts and components, except that parts and components intended to ensure the safety of civil aviation and the safe operation of commercial passenger aircraft will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, with a presumption of approval. These are items controlled to any destination for national security and missile technology reasons and items controlled to Syria for anti-terrorism purposes. Such items contain an NS Column 1, NS Column 2, MT Column 1, or AT Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL. Note that, consistent with the general rule that applies to computing U.S. parts and components content incorporated into foreign made products, all aircraft-related items that require a license to Syria will be included as controlled U.S. content, except for ECCNs 6A998, 7A994, and 9A991.d, for purposes of such licensing requirements.

(v) Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and crypto-logic items controlled to any destination for national security reasons. Such items contain



an AT Column 1 and an NS Column 1 or NS Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(vi) Explosives detection equipment controlled under ECCN 2A983.

(vii) “Software” (ECCN 2D983) specially designed or modified for the “development”, “production” or “use” of explosives detection equipment controlled by 2A983.

(viii) “Technology” (ECCN 2E983) specially designed or modified for the “development”, “production” or “use” of explosives detection equipment controlled by 2A983.

(ix) Commercial charges and devices controlled under ECCN 1C992.

(x) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers containing ammonium nitrate, controlled under ECCN 1C997.

(xi) Technology for the production of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355.

**(2)** Applications for export and reexport to Syria of all other items described in paragraph (a) of this section, and not described by paragraph (b)(1) of this section, will generally be denied if the export or reexport is destined to a military end-user or for military end-use. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**(3)** Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2), of this section, applications for Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis if:

(i) The transaction involves the reexport to Syria of items where Syria was not the intended

ultimate destination at the time of original export from the United States, provided that the exports from the U.S. occurred prior to the applicable contract sanctity date (or, where the contract sanctity date is December 16, 1986, prior to June 18, 1987).

(ii) The U.S. content of foreign-produced commodities is 20% or less by value; or

(iii) The commodities are medical items.

***Note to paragraph (b) of this section:***  
*Applicants who wish any of the factors described in paragraph (b) of this section to be considered in reviewing their license applications must submit adequate documentation demonstrating the value of the U.S. content, the specifications and medical use of the equipment, or the date of export from the United States.*

**(4)** License applications for items reviewed under 6(a) controls will also be reviewed to determine the applicability of 6(j) controls to the transaction. When it is determined that an export or reexport could make a significant contribution to the military potential of Syria, including its military logistics capability, or could enhance Syria’s ability to support acts of international terrorism, the Secretaries of State and Commerce will notify the Congress 30 days prior to issuance of a license.

***(c) Contract sanctity***

Contract sanctity dates and related licensing policies for Syria are set forth in Supplement No. 2 to part 742. Applicants who wish a pre-existing contract to be considered must submit sufficient documentation to establish the existence of a contract.

***(d) U.S. controls***

Although the United States seeks cooperation

from like-minded countries in maintaining anti-terrorism controls, at this time these controls are maintained only by the United States.

(e) General Order No. 2, Supplement No. 1 to part 736 of the EAR, sets forth special controls for exports and reexports to Syria. General Order No. 2 supersedes the provisions of paragraphs (a) through (d) of this section.

### §742.10

#### ANTI-TERRORISM: SUDAN

##### (a) License Requirements

(1) If AT column 1 or AT column 2<sup>1</sup> of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required for *export* to Sudan for anti-terrorism purposes.

(2) If AT column 1 or AT column 2 of the Commerce Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required for *reexport* to Sudan for anti-terrorism purposes, *except* for ECCNs 2A994, 3A992.a, 5A991.g, 5A992, 6A991, 6A998, 7A994, 8A992.d, .e, .f, and .g, 9A990.a and .b, and 9A991.d and .e. In addition, items in these ECCNs are not counted as controlled U.S. content for the purpose of determining license requirements for U.S. parts, components or materials incorporated into foreign made products. However, the export from the United States to any destination with knowledge that they will be reexported directly or indirectly, in whole or in part to Sudan is prohibited without

---

<sup>1</sup> AT column 1 refers to items controlled to Iran, Sudan, and Syria for anti-terrorism purposes. AT column 2 refers to additional items controlled to Iran and Sudan for anti-terrorism purposes. In addition, items included in ECCNs 2A994, 2D994 and 2E994 are controlled to Iran for anti-terrorism purposes.

a license.

(3) The Secretary of State has designated Sudan as a country whose government has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

(4) In support of U.S. foreign policy against terrorism, BIS maintains anti-terrorism controls on the export and reexport to Sudan of items described in Supplement No. 2 to part 742.

(i) Items described in paragraph (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 if destined to military, police, intelligence or other sensitive end-users in Sudan are controlled under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, as amended (EAA).

(ii) Items listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 destined to other end-users in Sudan, as well as items to all end-users listed in (c)(6) through (c)(14) and (c)(16) through (c)(44) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 are controlled to Sudan under section 6(a) of the EAA.

##### (b) Licensing policy

(1) Applications for export and reexport to all end-users in Sudan of the following items will generally be denied:

(i) Items that are controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons to any destination. These are items that contain CB Column 1, CB Column 2, or CB Column 3 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(ii) Military-related items controlled for national security reasons to any destination. These are items that contain NS Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL and is controlled by equipment or material entries

ending in the number “18.”

(iii) Items that are controlled for missile proliferation reasons to any destination. These are items that contain a MT Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(iv) All aircraft (powered and unpowered), helicopters, engines, and related spare parts and components. These are items controlled to any destination for national security reasons and items controlled to Sudan for anti-terrorism reasons. Such items contain an NS Column 1, NS Column 2, or AT Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL. Note that, consistent with the general rule that applies to computing U.S. parts and components content incorporated in foreign made products, all aircraft-related items that require a license to Sudan will be included as controlled US content for purposes of such license requirements.

(v) Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and crypto-logic items controlled to any destination. These are items that contain an NS Column 1, NS Column 2, AT Column 1 or AT Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(vi) Explosives detection equipment controlled under ECCN 2A983.

(vii) “Software” (ECCN 2D983) specially designed or modified for the “development”, “production” or “use” of explosives detection equipment controlled by 2A983.

(viii) “Technology” (ECCN 2E983) specially designed or modified for the “development”, “production” or “use” of explosives detection equipment controlled by 2A983.

(ix) Commercial charges and devices controlled under ECCN 1C992.

(x) Technology for the production of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355.

(xi) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers containing ammonium nitrate, controlled under ECCN 1C997.

(2) Applications for the export and reexport of all other items described in paragraph (a) of this section, and not described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, will be denied if the export or reexport is destined to a military end-user or for military end-use. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of this section, applications for Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis if:

(i) The transaction involves the reexport to Sudan of items where Sudan was not the intended ultimate destination at the time of original export from the United States, provided that the exports from the U.S. occurred prior to the applicable contract sanctity date.

(ii) The U.S. content of foreign-produced commodities is 20% or less by value; or

(iii) The commodities are medical items.

*Note to paragraph (b) of this section: Applicants who wish any of the factors described in paragraph (b)(4) of this section to be considered in reviewing their license applications must submit adequate documentation demonstrating the value of the U.S. content, the specifications and medical use of the equipment, or the date of export from the United States.*

(4) License applications for items reviewed under 6(a) controls will also be reviewed to determine the applicability of 6(j) controls to the

transaction. When it is determined that an export or reexport could make a significant contribution to the military potential of Sudan, including its military logistics capability, or could enhance Sudan's ability to support acts of international terrorism, the appropriate committees of the Congress will be notified 30 days before issuance of a license to export or reexport such items.

**(c) Contract sanctity**

Contract sanctity dates and related licensing information for Sudan are set forth in Supplement No. 2 to part 742. Applicants who wish a pre-existing contract to be considered must submit sufficient documentation to establish the existence of a contract.

**(d) U.S. controls**

Although the United States seeks cooperation from like-minded countries in maintaining anti-terrorism controls, at this time these controls are maintained only by the United States.

**§742.11**

**SPECIALLY DESIGNED IMPLEMENTS OF TORTURE, THUMBSCREWS, AND THUMBCUFFS; AND PARTS AND ACCESSORIES, N.E.S.**

**(a) License requirements**

In support of U.S. foreign policy to promote the observance of human rights throughout the world, a license is required to export any commodity controlled by ECCN 0A983 to all destinations including Canada.

**(b) Licensing policy**

Applications for such licenses will generally be denied to all destinations.

**(c) Contract sanctity**

The contract sanctity date is November 9, 1995. Contract sanctity will be a factor in considering only applications for export to the NATO countries, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.

**(d) U.S. Controls**

Although the United States seeks cooperation from like-minded countries in maintaining controls on implements of torture, at this time these controls are maintained only by the United States.

**§742.12**

[RESERVED]

**§742.13**

**COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTING DEVICES; SOFTWARE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTING DEVICES**

**(a) License requirement**

(1) In support of U.S. foreign policy to prohibit the export of items that may be used for the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications, a license is required for all destinations, including Canada, for ECCNs having an "SL" under the "Reason for Control" paragraph. These items include any electronic, mechanical, or other device primarily useful for the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications (ECCN 5A980); and for related software primarily useful for the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications, and software primarily useful for the "development", "production", or "use" of devices controlled

under ECCN 5A980 (ECCN 5D980); and technology primarily useful for the “development”, “production”, or “use” of devices controlled under ECCN 5A980 (ECCN 5E980). These licensing requirements do not supersede the requirements contained in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended (18 U.S.C. Section 2512). This license requirement is not reflected on the Commerce Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to Part 738 of the EAR).

(2) “Communications intercepting devices” are electronic, mechanical, or other devices that can be used for interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications if their design renders them primarily useful for surreptitious listening even though they may also have innocent uses. A device is not restricted merely because it is small or may be adapted to wiretapping or eavesdropping. Some examples of devices to which these restrictions apply are: the martini olive transmitter; the infinity transmitter; the spike mike; and the disguised microphone appearing as a wristwatch, cufflink, or cigarette pack; etc. The restrictions do not apply to devices such as the parabolic microphone or other directional microphones ordinarily used by broadcasters at sports events, since these devices are not primarily useful for surreptitious listening.

**(b) Licensing policy**

(1) License applications, except for those applications for which a license is required for both SL and AT reasons, will generally be approved for exports or reexports requiring a license for SL reasons when the exporter or reexporter is:

(i) A provider of wire or electronic communication services or an officer, agent, or employee of, or person under contract with such a provider, in the normal course of the business of providing that wire or electronic communication service; *or*

(ii) An officer, agent, or employee of, or a person under contract with, the United States, one of the 50 States, or a political subdivision thereof, when engaged in the normal course of government activities.

**NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (b)(1):** *For SL reasons, license applications will generally be denied to countries that are subject to controls for AT reasons.*

**NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (b)(1)(i):** *The normal course of the business of providing a wire or electronic communications service includes any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of the service or to the protection of the rights and property of the provider of that service.*

(2) Other license applications will generally be denied for exports or reexports requiring a license for SL reasons.

**(c) Contract sanctity**

Contract sanctity provisions are not available for license applications involving exports and reexports of communications interception devices.

**(d) U.S. controls**

Controls on items classified under ECCNs 5A980, 5D980, and 5E980 are maintained by the United States government for foreign policy purposes.

## §742.14

**SIGNIFICANT ITEMS: HOT SECTION  
TECHNOLOGY FOR THE  
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION OR  
OVERHAUL OF COMMERCIAL  
AIRCRAFT ENGINES, COMPONENTS,  
AND SYSTEMS**

*(a) License requirement*

Licenses are required for all destinations, except Canada, for ECCNs having an “SI” under the “Reason for Control” paragraph. These items include hot section technology for the development, production or overhaul of commercial aircraft engines controlled under ECCN 9E003.a.1. through a.12., .f, and related controls.

*(b) Licensing policy*

Pursuant to section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, foreign policy controls apply to technology required for the development, production or overhaul of commercial aircraft engines controlled by ECCN 9E003.a.1. through a.12, .f, and related controls. These controls supplement the national security controls that apply to these items. Applications for export and reexport to all destinations will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the export or reexport is consistent with U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. The following factors are among those that will be considered to determine what action will be taken on license applications:

- (1) The country of destination;
- (2) The ultimate end-user(s);
- (3) The technology involved;
- (4) The specific nature of the end-use(s); and

(5) The types of assurance against unauthorized use or diversion that are given in a particular case.

*(c) Contract sanctity*

Contract sanctity provisions are not available for license applications reviewed under this §742.14.

*(d) [RESERVED]*

## §742.15

**ENCRYPTION ITEMS**

Encryption items can be used to maintain the secrecy of information, and thereby may be used by persons abroad to harm U.S. national security, foreign policy and law enforcement interests. The United States has a critical interest in ensuring that important and sensitive information of the public and private sector is protected. Consistent with our international obligations as a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the United States has a responsibility to maintain control over the export and reexport of encryption items. As the President indicated in Executive Order 13026 and in his Memorandum of November 15, 1996, exports and reexports of encryption software, like exports and reexports of encryption hardware, are controlled because of this functional capacity to encrypt information, and not because of any informational or theoretical value that such software may reflect, contain, or represent, or that its export or reexport may convey to others abroad. For this reason, export controls on encryption software are distinguished from controls on other software regulated under the EAR.

*(a) Licensing requirements and policy*

**(1) Licensing requirements.** A license is required to export or reexport encryption items (“EI”) classified under ECCN 5A002.a.1, a.2, a.5,

a.6 and a.9; 5D002.a or c.1 for equipment controlled for EI reasons in ECCN 5A002; or 5E002 for “technology” for the “development,” “production,” or “use” of commodities or “software” controlled for EI reasons in ECCNs 5A002 or 5D002 to all destinations, except Canada. Refer to part 740 of the EAR, for license exceptions that apply to certain encryption items, and to § 772.1 of the EAR for definitions of encryption items and terms. Most encryption items may be exported under the provisions of License Exception ENC set forth in §740.17 of the EAR. Before submitting a license application, please review License Exception ENC to determine whether this license exception is available for your item or transaction. For exports and reexports of encryption items that are not eligible for a license exception, exporters must submit an application to obtain authorization under a license or an Encryption Licensing Arrangement.

**(2) Licensing policy.** Applications will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis by BIS, in conjunction with other agencies, to determine whether the export or reexport is consistent with U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. Encryption Licensing Arrangements (ELAs) may be authorized for exports and reexports of unlimited quantities of encryption commodities and software to national or federal government bureaucratic agencies for civil use, and to state, provincial or local governments, in all destinations, except countries listed in Country Group E:1 of Supplement No. 1 to part 740. ELAs are valid for four years and may require post-export reporting or pre-shipment notification. Applicants seeking authorization for Encryption Licensing Arrangements must specify the sales territory and class of end-user on their license applications.

*Note to paragraph (a): Pursuant to Note 3 to Category 5 Part 2 of the Commerce Control List in Supplement No. 1 to part 774, once mass market encryption commodities and software*

*have been reviewed by BIS and the ENC Encryption Request Coordinator (Ft. Meade, MD) and released from “EI” and “NS” controls pursuant to §742.15(b) of the EAR, they are classified under ECCN 5A992 and 5D992 respectively, and are thereafter outside the scope of this section.*

**(b) Review requirement for mass market encryption commodities and software exceeding 64 bits:**

Mass market encryption commodities and software employing a key length greater than 64 bits for the symmetric algorithm (including such products previously reviewed by BIS and exported under ECCN 5A002 or 5D002) are subject to the EAR and require review by BIS and the ENC Encryption Request Coordinator (Ft. Meade, MD), prior to export or reexport. Encryption commodities and software that are described in § 740.17(b)(2) of the EAR do not qualify for mass market treatment. A new product review is required if a change is made to the cryptographic functionality (*e.g.*, algorithms) or other technical characteristics affecting mass market eligibility (*e.g.*, performance enhancements to provide network infrastructure services, or customizations to end-user specifications) of the originally reviewed product. However, a new product review is not required when a change involves: the subsequent bundling, patches, upgrades or releases of a product; name changes; or changes to a previously reviewed encryption product where the change is limited to updates of encryption software components where the product is otherwise unchanged.

**(1) Procedures for requesting review.** To request review of your mass market encryption products, you must submit to BIS and the ENC Encryption Request Coordinator the information described in paragraphs (a) through (e) of Supplement No. 6 to this part 742, and you must include specific information describing how your

products qualify for mass market treatment under the criteria in the Cryptography Note (Note 3) of Category 5, Part 2 (“Information Security”), of the Commerce Control List (Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of the EAR). Review requests must be submitted on Form BIS-748P (Multipurpose Application), or its electronic equivalent, as described in §748.3 of the EAR. See paragraph (r) of Supplement No. 2 to Part 748 of the EAR for special instructions about this submission. Review requests that are not submitted electronically to BIS should be mailed to the address indicated in §748.2(c) of the EAR. Submissions to the ENC Encryption Request Coordinator should be directed to the mailing address indicated in §740.17(e)(1)(ii) of the EAR. BIS will notify you if there are any questions concerning your request for review (e.g., because of missing or incompatible support documentation).

**(2) Action by BIS.** Once BIS has completed its review, you will receive written confirmation concerning the eligibility of your items for export or reexport as mass market encryption commodities or software classified under ECCN 5A992 or 5D992. If, during the course of its review, BIS determines that your encryption items do not qualify for mass market treatment under the EAR, or are otherwise classified under ECCN 5A002, 5B002, 5D002 or 5E002, BIS will notify you and will review your commodities or software for eligibility under License Exception ENC (see §740.17 of the EAR for review and reporting requirements for encryption items under License Exception ENC). BIS reserves the right to suspend your eligibility to export and reexport under the provisions of this paragraph (b) and to return review requests, without action, if the requirements for review have not been met. Thirty days after BIS registers your review request, you may export or reexport these mass market encryption products, without a license, to government and non-government end-users located in most destinations outside the countries listed in Supplement No. 3 to part 740 of the EAR

(certain destinations and persons may require a license for anti-terrorism (AT) reasons or for reasons specified elsewhere in the EAR), unless otherwise notified by BIS (e.g., because of missing or incomplete support documentation or conversion to License Exception ENC review.) The thirty days does not include any time that your review request is on hold without action.

**(3) Exclusions from review requirements.**

The following commodities and software do not require review prior to export or reexport as mass market products.

**(i) Short-range wireless encryption functions.** Commodities and software not otherwise controlled in Category 5, but that are classified under ECCN 5A992 or 5D992 only because they incorporate components or software that provide short-range wireless encryption functions (e.g., with a nominal operating range not exceeding 100 meters according to the manufacturer's specifications). Commodities and software included in this description include those designed to comply with the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 wireless LAN standard (35 meters) for short-range use and those designed to comply with the IEEE 802.15.1 standard that provide only the short-range wireless encryption functionality, and would not be classified under Category 5, part 1 of the CCL (telecommunications) absent this encryption functionality. Certain items excluded from review by this paragraph may also be excluded from review under paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of this section (personal area networks) or paragraph (b)(3)(iii) of this section (commodities and software that provide “ancillary cryptography”).

**(ii) Wireless “personal area network” items.** Wireless “personal area network” items that implement only published or commercial cryptographic standards and where the cryptographic capability is limited to a nominal operating range not exceeding 30 meters



according to the manufacturer's specifications. See Nota Bene of the definition for “personal area network” in §772.1 of the EAR.

(iii) “**Ancillary cryptography**”. Commodities and software that perform “ancillary cryptography.” See Nota Bene of definition of “ancillary cryptography” in §772.1 of the EAR.

(4) **Commodities and software that activate or enable cryptographic functionality.** Commodities, software, and components that allow the end-user to activate or enable cryptographic functionality in encryption products which would otherwise remain disabled, are controlled according to the functionality of the activated encryption product.

(5) **Examples of mass market encryption products.** Subject to the requirements of the Cryptography Note (Note 3) in Category 5, Part 2, of the Commerce Control List, mass market encryption products include, but are not limited to, general purpose operating systems and desktop applications (e.g., e-mail, browsers, games, word processing, database, financial applications or utilities) designed for use with computers classified as ECCN 4A994 or EAR99, laptops, or hand-held devices; commodities and software for client Internet appliances and client wireless LAN devices; home use networking commodities and software (e.g., personal firewalls, cable modems for personal computers, and consumer set top boxes); and portable or mobile civil telecommunications commodities and software (e.g., personal data assistants (PDAs), radios, or cellular products).

#### §742.16

[RESERVED]

#### §742.17

### EXPORTS OF FIREARMS TO OAS MEMBER COUNTRIES

#### (a) *License requirements*

BIS maintains a licensing system for the export of shotguns and related items to all OAS member countries. This action is based on the Organization of American States (OAS) Model Regulations for the Control of the International Movement of Firearms, their Parts and Components and Munitions (OAS Model Regulations) which were developed to assist OAS member countries to implement the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (Firearms Convention)<sup>2</sup>. Items subject to these controls are identified by “FC Column 1” in the “License Requirements” section of their Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) on the Commerce Control List (CCL). If “FC Column 1” of the Commerce Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated for a particular country, a license is required for export to that destination. Licenses will generally be issued on an Import Certificate or equivalent official document, satisfactory to

BIS, issued by the government of the importing country is also required for the export of such items to OAS member countries.

#### (b) *Licensing policy*

Applications supported by an Import Certificate or equivalent official document issued by the government of the importing country for such items will generally be approved, except there is a policy of denial for applications to export items

---

<sup>2</sup> Status of Convention as of April 13, 1999 had not entered into force.

linked to such activities as drug trafficking, terrorism, and transnational organized crime.

**(c) Contract sanctity**

Contract sanctity provisions are not available for license applications under this §742.17.

**(d) OAS Model Regulations**

The OAS Model Regulations on which regulations are based are designed by OAS member countries to combat illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials in North and South America because of their links to such activities as drug trafficking, terrorism, and transnational organized crime.

**(e) OAS member countries to which firearms controls under this section apply**

The OAS member countries include: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

**(f) Items/Commodities**

Items requiring a license under this section are ECCNs 0A984 (shotguns with a barrel length 18 inches or over and related parts, and buckshot shotgun shells), 0A986 (shotgun shells, and related parts) and 0A987 (optical sighting devices). (See Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 of the EAR.)

**(g) Validity period for licenses**

Although licenses generally will be valid for a

period of two years, your ability to ship items that require an Import Certificate or equivalent official document under this section may be affected by the validity of the Import Certificate or equivalent official document (see §748.14(f) of the EAR).

**§742.18**

**CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  
(CWC OR CONVENTION)**

States that are parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, also known as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or Convention), undertake never to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, transfer, or use chemical weapons. As a State Party to the Convention, the United States is subjecting certain toxic chemicals and their precursors listed in Schedules within the Convention to trade restrictions. Trade restrictions include: a prohibition on the export of Schedule 1 chemicals to States not Party to the CWC; a prohibition on the reexport of Schedule 1 chemicals to all destinations (both States Parties to the CWC and States not Party to the CWC); license requirements for the export of Schedule 1 chemicals to all States Parties; a prohibition on the export of Schedule 2 chemicals to States not Party to the CWC; and an End-Use Certificate requirement for exports of Schedule 3 chemicals to States not Party to the CWC. Exports of CWC chemicals that do not require a license for CW reasons (e.g., exports and reexports of Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals to States Parties to the CWC) may require a license for other reasons set forth in the EAR. (See, in particular, the license requirements in §742.2 of the EAR that apply to exports and reexports of precursor chemicals controlled by ECCN 1C350, for CB reasons. Also note the end-use and end-user restrictions in part 744 of the EAR and the restrictions that apply to embargoed countries in part 746 of the EAR.)

*(a) License requirements*

**(1) Schedule 1 chemicals and mixtures controlled under ECCN 1C351.** A license is required for CW reasons to export or reexport Schedule 1 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C351.d.5 or d.6 to all destinations including Canada. CW applies to 1C351.d.5 for ricin in the form of Ricinus Communis Agglutinin<sub>II</sub> (RCA<sub>II</sub>), which is also known as ricin D or Ricinus Communis Lectin<sub>III</sub> (RCL<sub>III</sub>), and Ricinus Communis Lectin<sub>IV</sub> (RCL<sub>IV</sub>), which is also known as ricin E. CW applies to 1C351.d.6 for saxitoxin identified by C.A.S. #35523-89-8. (Note that the advance notification procedures and annual reporting requirements described in §745.1 of the EAR also apply to exports of Schedule 1 chemicals.)

**(2) Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals and mixtures controlled under ECCN 1C350, ECCN 1C355, or ECCN 1C395.**

(i) *States Parties to the CWC.* Neither a license nor an End-Use Certificate is required for CW reasons to export or reexport Schedule 2 or 3 chemicals and mixtures controlled under ECCN 1C350, ECCN 1C355, or ECCN 1C395 to States Parties to the CWC (destinations listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR).

(ii) *States not Party to the CWC.*

(A) *Schedule 2 chemicals.* A license is required for CW reasons to export or reexport Schedule 2 chemicals and mixtures controlled under ECCN 1C350.b, ECCN 1C355.a, or ECCN 1C395 to States not Party to the CWC (destinations *not* listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR).

(B) *Schedule 3 chemicals.*

(1) *Exports.* A license is required for CW reasons to export Schedule 3 chemicals and

mixtures controlled under ECCN 1C350.c, ECCN 1C355.b, or ECCN 1C395.b to States not Party to the CWC (destinations *not* listed in Supplement No. 2 to Part 745 of the EAR), *unless* the exporter obtains from the consignee an End-Use Certificate (issued by the government of the importing country) prior to exporting the Schedule 3 chemicals and submits it to BIS in accordance with the procedures described in §745.2 of the EAR. Note, however, that obtaining an End-Use Certificate does not relieve the exporter from the responsibility of complying with other license requirements set forth elsewhere in the EAR.

(2) *Reexports.*

(i) *Reexports from States Parties to the CWC.* Neither a license nor an End-Use Certificate is required for CW reasons to reexport Schedule 3 chemicals and mixtures controlled under ECCN 1C350.c, ECCN 1C355.b, or ECCN 1C395.b from States Parties to the CWC (destinations listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR) to States not Party to the CWC. However, a license may be required for other reasons set forth elsewhere in the EAR. In addition, reexports of Schedule 3 chemicals may be subject to an End-Use Certificate requirement by governments of other countries when the chemicals are destined for States not Party to the CWC.

(ii) *Reexports from States not Party to the CWC.* A license is required for CW reasons to reexport Schedule 3 chemicals and mixtures controlled under ECCN 1C350.c, ECCN 1C355.b, or ECCN 1C395.b from a State not Party to the CWC (a destination *not* listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR) to any other State not Party to the CWC.

(C) *Technology controlled under ECCN 1E355.* A license is required for CW reasons to export or reexport technology controlled under ECCN 1E355 to all States not Party to the CWC

(destinations *not* listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR), except for Israel and Taiwan.

**(b) Licensing policy**

**(1) Schedule 1 chemicals and mixtures.**

(i) *Exports to States Parties to the CWC.* Applications to export Schedule 1 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C351.d.5 or .d.6 to States Parties to the CWC (destinations listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR) generally will be denied, *unless* all of the following conditions are met:

(A) The chemicals are destined only for purposes not prohibited under the CWC (i.e., research, medical, pharmaceutical, or protective purposes);

(B) The types and quantities of chemicals are strictly limited to those that can be justified for those purposes;

(C) The Schedule 1 chemicals were not previously imported into the United States (this does not apply to Schedule 1 chemicals imported into the United States prior to April 29, 1997, or imported into the United States directly from the same State Party to which they now are to be returned, i.e., exported); *and*

(D) The aggregate amount of Schedule 1 chemicals in the country of destination at any given time is equal to or less than one metric ton *and* receipt of the proposed export will *not* cause the country of destination to acquire or to have acquired one metric ton or more of Schedule 1 chemicals in any calendar year.

(ii) *Exports to States not Party to the CWC.* Applications to export Schedule 1 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C351.d.5 or .d.6 to States not Party to the CWC (destinations *not* listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the

EAR) generally will be denied, consistent with U.S. obligations under the CWC to prohibit exports of these chemicals to States not Party to the CWC.

(iii) *Reexports.* Applications to reexport Schedule 1 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C351.d.5 or .d.6 generally will be denied to all destinations (including both States Parties to the CWC and States not Party to the CWC).

**(2) Schedule 2 chemicals and mixtures.**

Applications to export or reexport Schedule 2 chemicals and mixtures controlled under ECCN 1C350.b, ECCN 1C355.a, or ECCN 1C395 to States not Party to the CWC (destinations *not* listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR) generally will be denied, consistent with U.S. obligations under the CWC to prohibit exports of these chemicals to States not Party to the CWC.

**(3) Schedule 3 chemicals and mixtures.**

(i) *Exports.* Applications to export Schedule 3 chemicals and mixtures controlled under ECCN 1C350.c, ECCN 1C355.b, or ECCN 1C395.b to States not Party to the CWC (destinations *not* listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR) generally will be denied.

(ii) *Reexports from States not Party to the CWC.* Applications to reexport Schedule 3 chemicals and mixtures controlled under ECCN 1C350.c, ECCN 1C355.b, or ECCN 1C395.b from a State not Party to the CWC (a destination *not* listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR) to any other State not Party to the CWC generally will be denied.

**(4) Technology controlled under ECCN 1E355.**

Exports and reexports of technology controlled under ECCN 1E355 will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

***(c) Contract sanctity***

Contract sanctity provisions are not available for license applications reviewed under this section.

**§742.19****ANTI-TERRORISM: NORTH KOREA*****(a) License requirements***

(1) All items on the Commerce Control List (CCL) (i.e., with a designation other than EAR99) that are controlled for anti-terrorism reasons require a license for export or reexport to North Korea. This includes all items on the CCL containing AT column 1 or AT column 2 in the Country Chart column of the License requirements section of an ECCN; and ECCNs 0A986, 0A988, 0A999, 0B986, 0B999, 0D999, 1A999, 1B999, 1C995, 1C999, 1D999, 2A994, 2A999, 2B999, 2D994, 2E994, 3A999, and 6A999. See also part 746 of the EAR.

(2) The Secretary of State has designated North Korea as a country whose Government has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

(3) In support of U.S. foreign policy on terrorism-supporting countries, BIS maintains two types of anti-terrorism controls on the export and reexport of items described in Supplement 2 to part 742.

(i) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 are controlled under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, as amended (EAA), if destined to military, police, intelligence or other sensitive end-users.

(ii) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 destined to non-sensitive end-users, as well as

items described in paragraph (c)(6) through (c)(45) to all end-users, are controlled to North Korea under section 6(a) of the EAA. License applications for items reviewed under section 6(a) controls will also be reviewed to determine the applicability of section 6(j) controls to the transaction. When it is determined that an export or reexport could make a significant contribution to the military potential of North Korea, including its military logistics capability, or could enhance North Korea's ability to support acts of international terrorism, the Secretaries of State and Commerce will notify the Congress 30 days prior to issuance of a license. (See Supplement No. 2 to part 742 for more information on items controlled under sections 6(a) and 6(j) of the EAA and §750.6 of the EAR for procedures for processing license applications for items controlled under EAA section 6(j).)

***(b) Licensing policy***

(1) Applications for export and reexport to all end-users in North Korea of the following items will generally be denied:

(i) Items controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons to any destination. These items contain CB Column 1, CB Column 2, or CB Column 3 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(ii) Items controlled for missile proliferation reasons to any destination. These items have an MT Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(iii) Items controlled for nuclear weapons proliferation reasons to any destination. These items contain NP Column 1 or NP Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(iv) Items controlled for national security

reasons to any destination. These items contain NS Column 1 or NS Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(v) Military-related items controlled for national security reasons to any destination. These items contain NS Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section in an ECCN on the CCL *and* are controlled by equipment or material entries ending in the number “18.”

(vi) All aircraft (powered and unpowered), helicopters, engines, and related spare parts and components. Such items contain an NS Column 1, NS Column 2, MT Column 1, or AT Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL. (Not including parts and components for safety-of-flight, which will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis in accordance with paragraph (b)(2) of this section.)

(vii) Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and crypto-logic items controlled any destination. These are items that contain an NS Column 1, NS Column 2, AT Column 1 or AT Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(viii) Submersible systems controlled under ECCN 8A992.

(ix) Scuba gear and related equipment controlled under ECCN 8A992.

(x) Pressurized aircraft breathing equipment controlled under ECCN 9A991.

(xi) Explosives detection equipment controlled under ECCN 2A983.

(xii) “Software” (ECCN 2D983) specially designed or modified for the “development”, “production” or “use” of explosives detection

equipment controlled by 2A983.

(xiii) “Technology” (ECCN 2E983) specially designed or modified for the “development”, “production” or “use” of explosives detection equipment controlled by 2A983.

(xiv) Commercial charges and devices controlled under ECCN 1C992.

(xv) Computer numerically controlled machine tools controlled under ECCN 2B991.

(xvi) Aircraft skin and spar milling machines controlled under ECCN 2B991.

(xvii) Semiconductor manufacturing equipment controlled under ECCN 3B991.

(xviii) Digital computers with an Adjusted Peak Performance (APP) exceeding 0.0004 Weighted TeraFLOPS (WT).

(xix) Microprocessors with a processing speed of 0.5 GFLOPS or above.

(xx) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers containing ammonium nitrate, controlled under ECCN 1C997.

(xxi) Technology for the production of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 Chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355.

(2) Applications for export and reexport to North Korea of all other items described in paragraph (a) of this section, and not described by paragraph (b)(1) of this section, will generally be denied if the export or reexport is destined to a military end-user or for military end-use. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Applications to export or reexport humanitarian items intended for the benefit of the North Korean people; items in support of United

Nations humanitarian efforts; and agricultural commodities and medical devices will generally be approved.

**(3)** Applications for export and reexport to North Korea of items described in paragraphs (c)(12), (c)(24), (c)(34), (c)(37), (c)(38), and (c)(45) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 will generally be denied if the export or reexport is destined to nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses. Applications for non-nuclear end-users or for non-nuclear end-uses, excluding items described in (c)(24)(iv)(A) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742, will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**(4)** License applications for items reviewed under section 6(a) controls will also be reviewed to determine the applicability of section 6(j) controls to the transaction. When it is determined that an export or reexport could make a significant contribution to the military potential of North Korea, including its military logistics capability, or could enhance North Korea's ability to support acts of international terrorism, the Secretaries of State and Commerce will notify the Congress 30 days prior to issuance of a license.

---

**NONPROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS**

---

**NOTE:** *Exports and reexports of items in performance of contracts entered into before the applicable contract sanctity date(s) will be eligible for review on a case-by-case basis or other applicable licensing policies that were in effect prior to the contract sanctity date. The contract sanctity dates set forth in this Supplement are for the guidance of exporters. Contract sanctity dates are established in the course of the imposition of foreign policy controls on specific items and are the relevant dates for the purpose of licensing determinations involving such items. If you believe that a specific contract sanctity date is applicable to your transaction, you should include all relevant information with your license application.*

- (1)** The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran or Syria of dimethyl methylphosphonate, phosphorous oxychloride, thiodiglycol, dimethylamine hydrochloride, dimethylamine, ethylene chlorohydrin (2-chloroethanol), and potassium fluoride is April 28, 1986.
- (2)** The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran or Syria of dimethyl phosphite (dimethyl hydrogen phosphite), methyl phosphonyldichloride, 3-quinuclidinol, N,N-diisopropylamino-ethane-2-thiol, N,N-diisopropylaminoethyl-2-chloride, 3-hydroxy-1-methylpiperidine, trimethyl phosphite, phosphorous trichloride, and thionyl chloride is July 6, 1987.
- (3)** The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran or Syria of items in ECCNs 1C351, 1C352, 1C353 and 1C354 is February 22, 1989.
- (4)** The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran of dimethyl methylphosphonate, phosphorus oxychloride, and thiodiglycol is February 22, 1989.
- (5)** The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran or Syria of potassium hydrogen fluoride, ammonium hydrogen fluoride, sodium fluoride, sodium bifluoride, phosphorus pentasulfide, sodium cyanide, triethanolamine, diisopropylamine, sodium sulfide, and N,N-diethylethanolamine is December 12, 1989.
- (6)** The contract sanctity date for exports to all destinations (except Iran or Syria) of phosphorus trichloride, trimethyl phosphite, and thionyl chloride is December 12, 1989. For exports to Iran or Syria, paragraph (2) of this Supplement applies.
- (7)** The contract sanctity date for exports to all destinations (except Iran or Syria) of 2-chloroethanol and triethanolamine is January 15, 1991. For exports of 2-chloroethanol to Iran or Syria, paragraph (1) of this Supplement applies. For exports of triethanolamine to Iran or Syria, paragraph (5) of this Supplement applies.
- (8)** The contract sanctity date for exports to all destinations (except Iran or Syria) of chemicals controlled by ECCN 1C350 is March 7, 1991, except for applications to export the following chemicals: 2-chloroethanol, dimethyl methylphosphonate, dimethyl phosphite (dimethyl hydrogen phosphite), phosphorus oxychloride, phosphorous trichloride, thiodiglycol, thionyl chloride triethanolamine, and trimethyl phosphite. (See also paragraphs (6) and (7) of this Supplement.) For exports to Iran or Syria, see paragraphs (1) through (6) of this Supplement.
- (9)** The contract sanctity date for exports and reexports of the following commodities and technical data is March 7, 1991:
  - (i)** Equipment (for producing chemical weapon precursors and chemical warfare agents) described in ECCNs 2B350 and 2B351;



(ii) Equipment and materials (for producing biological agents) described in ECCNs 1C351, 1C352, 1C353, 1C354, and 2B352; and

(iii) Technology (for the development, production, and use of equipment described in ECCNs 1C351, 1C352, 1C353, 1C354, 2B350, 2B351, and 2B352) described in ECCNs 2E001, 2E002, and 2E301.

**(10)** The contract sanctity date for license applications subject to §742.2(b)(3) of this part is March 7, 1991.

**(11)** The contract sanctity date for reexports of chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C350 is March 7, 1991, except that the contract sanctity date for reexports of these chemicals to Iran or Syria is December 12, 1989.

**(12)** The contract sanctity date for reexports of human pathogens, zoonoses, toxins, animal pathogens, genetically modified microorganisms and plant pathogens controlled by ECCNs 1C351, 1C352, 1C353 and 1C354 is March 7, 1991.

**ANTI-TERRORISM CONTROLS: NORTH KOREA, SYRIA AND SUDAN  
CONTRACT SANCTITY DATES AND RELATED POLICIES**

***NOTE:** Exports and reexports of items in performance of contracts entered into before the applicable contract sanctity date(s) will be eligible for review on a case-by-case basis or other applicable licensing policies that were in effect prior to the contract sanctity date. The contract sanctity dates set forth in this Supplement are for the guidance of exporters. Contract sanctity dates are established in the course of the imposition of foreign policy controls on specific items and are the relevant dates for the purpose of licensing determinations involving such items. If you believe that a specific contract sanctity date is applicable to your transaction, you should include all relevant information with your license application. BIS will determine any applicable contract sanctity date at the time an application with relevant supporting documents is submitted.*

**(a) Terrorist-supporting countries**

The Secretary of State has designated Cuba, North Korea, Sudan and Syria as countries whose governments have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (EAA).

**(b) Items controlled under EAA sections 6(j) and 6(a)**

Whenever the Secretary of State determines that an export or reexport to any of these countries could make a significant contribution to the military potential of such country, including its military logistics capability, or could enhance the ability of such country to support acts of international terrorism, the item is subject to mandatory control under EAA section 6(j) and the Secretaries of Commerce and State are required to

notify appropriate Committees of the Congress 30

days before a license for such an item may be issued.

**(1)** On December 28, 1993, the Secretary of State determined that the export to Cuba, North Korea, Sudan, or Syria of items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this Supplement, if destined to military, police, intelligence or other sensitive end-users, are controlled under EAA section 6(j). Therefore, the 30-day advance Congressional notification requirement applies to the export or reexport of these items to sensitive end-users in any of these countries.

**(2)** License applications for items controlled to designated terrorist-supporting countries under EAA section 6(a) will also be reviewed to determine whether the Congressional notification requirements of EAA section 6(j) apply.

**(3)** Items controlled for anti-terrorism reasons under section 6(a) to North Korea, Sudan and Syria are:

(i) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) to non-sensitive end-users, and

(ii) The following items to all end-users: for North Korea, items in paragraph (c)(6) through (c)(45) of this Supplement; for Sudan, items in paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(14) and (c)(16) through (c)(44) of this Supplement; and for Syria, items in paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(8), (c)(10) through (c)(14), (c)(16) through (c)(19), and (c)(22) through (c)(44) of this Supplement.

**(c)** The license requirements and licensing policies for items controlled for anti-terrorism reasons to Syria, Sudan, and North Korea are generally described in §§ 742.9, 742.10, and 742.19 of this part, respectively. This Supplement provides guidance on licensing policies for North Korea, Syria, and Sudan and

related contract sanctity dates that may be available for transactions benefitting from pre-existing contracts involving Syria, and Sudan. Exporters are advised that the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control administers a comprehensive trade and investment embargo against (See Executive Orders 12957, 12959 and 13059 of March 15, 1995, May 6, 1995 and August 19, 1997, respectively.)

**(1) All items subject to national security controls.**

(i) [RESERVED].

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis, unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity date is available for items valued at \$7 million or more to military end-users or end-uses. The contract sanctity date for all other items for all end-users: December 16, 1986.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

**(2) All items subject to chemical and biological weapons proliferation controls.**

Applications for all end-users in North Korea, Syria, or Sudan of these items will generally be denied. See Supplement No. 1 to part 742 for contract sanctity dates for Syria. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993), or unless an earlier date for any item is listed in Supplement 1 to part 742.

**(3) All items subject to missile proliferation controls (MTCR).** Applications for all end-users in North Korea, Syria, or Sudan will generally be denied. Contract sanctity provisions for Syria are not available. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

**(4) All items subject to nuclear weapons proliferation controls (NRL).**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or end-uses to Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity date is available.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for export and reexport to non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity date is available.

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-

users in North Korea will generally be denied.

**(5) All military-related items, i.e., applications for export and reexport of items controlled by CCL entries ending with the number “18”.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for all end-users in Syria will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea will generally be denied.

**(6) All aircraft (powered and unpowered), helicopters, engines, and related spare parts and components.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for all end-users in Syria will generally be denied.

(A) There is no contract sanctity for helicopters exceeding 10,000 lbs. empty weight or fixed wing aircraft valued at \$3 million or more; except that passenger aircraft, regardless of value, have a contract sanctity date of December 16, 1986, if destined for a regularly scheduled airline with assurance against military use.

(B) Contract sanctity date for helicopters with 10,000 lbs. empty weight or less: April 28, 1986.

(C) Contract sanctity date for other aircraft and gas turbine engines therefor:

December 16, 1986.

(D) Contract sanctity date for helicopter or aircraft parts and components controlled by ECCN 9A991.d: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea will generally be denied.

**(7) Heavy duty, on-highway tractors.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**(8) Off-highway wheel tractors of carriage capacity 9t (10 tons) or more.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-

military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**(9) Large diesel engines (greater than 400 horsepower) and parts to power tank transporters.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iii) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**(10) Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. A license is required for all

national security-controlled cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment to all end-users. Applications for all end-users in Syria will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of any such equipment will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of any such equipment will generally be denied.

**(11) Navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for exports of navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such

equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

#### **(12) Electronic test equipment.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for electronic test equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other electronic test equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28,

1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

#### **(13) Mobile communications equipment.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for mobile communications equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other mobile communications equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**(14) Acoustic underwater detection equipment.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. A license is required for acoustic underwater detection equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991, to all end-users. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for acoustic underwater detection equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses to Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**(15) Portable electric power generator.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *North Korea*. Applications for military

end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**(16) Vessels and boats, including inflatable boats.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. A license is required for national security-controlled vessels and boats. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for vessels and boats that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea of these items will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**(17) Marine and submarine engines (outboard/inboard, regardless of horsepower).**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. A license is required for all marine and submarine engines subject to national security controls to all end-users. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for marine and submarine engines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea of these items will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

#### **(18) Underwater photographic equipment.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for underwater photographic equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other underwater photographic equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

#### **(19) Submersible systems.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such systems will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for submersible systems that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other submersible systems: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such systems will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan



for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

**(20) Scuba gear and related equipment.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users and end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iii) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

**(21) Pressurized aircraft breathing equipment.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iii) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

**(22) Computer numerically controlled machine tools.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users

or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for computer numerically controlled machine tools that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other computer numerically controlled machine tools: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

**(23) Vibration test equipment.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for vibration test equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other vibration test equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**(24) Digital computers with an APP of .00001 WT or above, assemblies, related equipment, equipment for development or production of magnetic and optical storage equipment, and materials for fabrication of head/disk assemblies.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity dates for items that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other items: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*.

(A) Computers with an APP exceeding 0.0004 WT: Applications for all end-users will generally be denied.

(B) Computers with an APP equal to or less than 0.0004 WT: Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**(25) Telecommunications equipment.**

(i) A license is required for the following telecommunications equipment:

(A) Radio relay systems or equipment operating at a frequency equal to or greater than 19.7 GHz or “spectral efficiency” greater than 3 bit/s/Hz;

(B) Fiber optic systems or equipment operating at a wavelength greater than 1000 nm;

(C) “Telecommunications transmission systems” or equipment with a “digital transfer rate” at the highest multiplex level exceeding 45 Mb/s.

(ii) [RESERVED]

(iii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for exports of telecommunications equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other telecommunications equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iv) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(v) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

## (26) Microprocessors.

(i) Operating at a clock speed over 25 MHz.

(A) [RESERVED]

(B) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(1) Contract sanctity date for microprocessors that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(2) Contract sanctity date for all other microprocessors: August 28, 1991.

(C) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(ii) With a processing speed of 0.5 GFLOPS or above.

(A) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these items will generally be denied.

(B) [RESERVED]

## (27) Semiconductor manufacturing equipment.

For Syria, Sudan, or North Korea, a license is required for all such equipment described in ECCNs 3B001 and 3B991.

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for semiconductor manufacturing equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28,

1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other semiconductor manufacturing equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

**(28) Software specially designed for the computer-aided design and manufacture of integrated circuits.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such software: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such software will generally be denied. Applications

for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**(29) Packet switches. Equipment described in ECCN 5A991.c.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for packet switches that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other packet switches: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28,

1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**(30) Specially designed software for air traffic control applications that uses any digital signal processing techniques for automatic target tracking or that has a facility for electronic tracking.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other such software: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such software will generally be denied.

Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**(31) Gravity meters having static accuracy of less (better) than 100 microgal, or gravity meters of the quartz element (worden) type.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for gravity meters that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other such gravity meters: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**(32) Magnetometers with a sensitivity lower (better) than 1.0 nt rms per square root Hertz.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such magnetometers that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such magnetometers: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**(33) Fluorocarbon compounds described in ECCN 1C006.d for cooling fluids for radar.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such compounds will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such fluorocarbon compounds that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such fluorocarbon compounds: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such compounds will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**(34) High strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such fibers will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210 that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other high strength organic and inorganic fibers

(kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such fibers will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**(35) Machines described in ECCNs 2B003 and 2B993 for cutting gears up to 1.25 meters in diameter.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other machines: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-

users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**(36) Aircraft skin and spar milling machines.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for aircraft skin and spar milling machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other aircraft skin and spar milling machines: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)

have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.

**(37) Manual dimensional inspection machines described in ECCN 2B996.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such manual dimensional inspection machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such manual dimensional inspection machines: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-

users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**(38) Robots capable of employing feedback information in real time processing to generate or modify programs.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such robots that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such robots: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.



**(39) Explosives detection equipment described in ECCN 2A983.**

(i) Explosives detection equipment described in ECCN 2A983, controlled prior to April 3, 2003 under ECCN 2A993.

(A) [RESERVED]

(B) *Syria*. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(C) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(D) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these items will generally be denied.

(ii) Explosives detection equipment described in ECCN 2A983, not controlled prior to April 3, 2003 under ECCN 2A993.

(A) [RESERVED]

(B) *Syria*. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.

(C) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for reexports by non-U.S. persons: March 21, 2003.

(D) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.

**(40) “Software” described in ECCN 2D983 specially designed or modified for the “development”, “production” or “use” of explosives detection equipment.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for reexports by non-U.S. persons: March 21, 2003.

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.

**(41) “Technology” described in ECCN 2E983 specially designed or modified for the “development”, “production” or “use” of explosives detection equipment.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for reexports by non-U.S. persons: March 21, 2003.

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.

**(42) Production technology controlled under ECCN 1C355 on the CCL.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in

Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied.

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

**(43) Commercial Charges and devices controlled under ECCN 1C992 on the CCL.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied.

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these items will generally be denied.

**(44) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers containing ammonium nitrate, under ECCN 1C997 on the CCL.**

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: June 15, 2001.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied.

(iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all end-users in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: June 15, 2001.

**(45) Specific processing equipment, materials and software controlled under ECCNs 0A999, 0B999, 0D999, 1A999, 1C999, 1D999, 2A999, 2B999, 3A999, and 6A999 on the CCL.**

(i) *North Korea*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(ii) [RESERVED]

---

**[RESERVED]**

---

---

**RESERVED**

---

---

**CHECKLIST ON ENCRYPTION AND OTHER “INFORMATION SECURITY” FUNCTIONS**

---

1. Does your product perform “cryptography”, or otherwise contain any parts or components that are capable of performing any of the following “information security” functions?

(Mark with an “X” all that apply)

- a. \_\_\_\_\_ encryption
- b. \_\_\_\_\_ decryption only (no encryption)
- c. \_\_\_\_\_ key management / public key infrastructure (PKI)
- d. \_\_\_\_\_ authentication (e.g., password protection, digital signatures)
- e. \_\_\_\_\_ copy protection
- f. \_\_\_\_\_ anti-virus protection
- g. \_\_\_\_\_ other (please explain) : \_\_\_\_\_
- h. \_\_\_\_\_ **NONE / NOT APPLICABLE**

2. For items with encryption, decryption and/or key management functions (1.a, 1.b, 1.c above):

- a. What symmetric algorithms and key lengths (e.g., 56-bit DES, 112 / 168-bit Triple-DES, 128 / 256-bit AES / Rijndael) are implemented or supported?
- b. What asymmetric algorithms and key lengths (e.g., 512-bit RSA / Diffie-Hellman, 1024 / 2048-bit RSA / Diffie-Hellman) are implemented or supported?
- c. What encryption protocols (e.g., SSL, SSH, IPSEC or PKCS standards) are implemented or supported?
- d. What type of data is encrypted?

3. For products that contain an “encryption component”, can this encryption component be easily used by another product, or else accessed by the end-user for cryptographic use?

---

**GUIDELINES FOR SUBMITTING REVIEW REQUESTS FOR ENCRYPTION ITEMS**

---

Review requests for encryption items must be submitted on Form BIS-748P (Multipurpose Application), or its electronic equivalent, and supported by the documentation described in this Supplement, in accordance with the procedures described in §748.3 of the EAR. To ensure that your review request is properly routed, insert the phrase “Mass market encryption” or “License Exception ENC” (whichever is applicable) in Block 9 (Special Purpose) of the application form and place an “X” in the box marked “Classification Request” in Block 5 (Type of Application) - Block 5 does not provide a separate item to check for the submission of encryption review requests. Failure to properly complete these items may delay consideration of your review request. BIS recommends that review requests be delivered via courier service be sent to:

Bureau of Industry and Security  
U.S. Department of Commerce  
14th Street and Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.  
Room 2705  
Washington, D.C. 20230

For electronic submissions via SNAP-R, support documents not readily attached in PDF format must be sent to:

Bureau of Industry and Security  
Information Technology Controls Division  
Room 2093  
14th Street and Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20230.

In addition, you must send a copy of your review request and all support documents to:

Attn: ENC Encryption Request Coordinator  
9800 Savage Road, Suite 6940  
Fort Meade, MD 20755-6000.  
If you intend to rely on the 30 day registration provisions of the regulations, express mail

certification of these documents is needed.

**(a)(1)** State the name(s) of each product being submitted for review and provide a brief non-technical description of the type of product (*e.g.*, routers, disk drives, cell phones, chips, etc.) being submitted.

**(2)** Indicate whether there have been any prior reviews of the product(s), if such reviews are applicable to the current submission. For products with minor changes in encryption functionality, you must include a cover sheet with complete reference to the previous review (Commodity Classification Automated Tracking System (CCATS) number, Application Control Number (ACN), Export Control Classification Number (ECCN), authorization paragraph) along with a clear description of the changes.

**(3)** Describe how encryption is used in the product and the categories of encrypted data (*e.g.*, stored data, communications, management data, internal data, etc.).

**(4)** For mass market review requests, describe specifically to whom and how the product is being marketed and state how this method of marketing and other relevant information (*e.g.*, cost of product and volume of sales) are described by the Cryptography Note (Note 3 to Category 5, Part 2).

**(5)** Is any “encryption source code” being provided (shipped or bundled) as part of this offering? If yes, is this source code publicly available source code, unchanged from the code obtained from an open source web site, or is it proprietary “encryption source code?”

**(b)** State that a duplicate copy has been sent to the ENC Encryption Request Coordinator.

**(c)** For review requests for a commodity or

software, provide the following information:

(1) Description of all the symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithms and key lengths and how the algorithms are used, including relevant parameters, inputs and settings. Specify which encryption modes are supported (*e.g.*, cipher feedback mode or cipher block chaining mode).

(2) State the key management algorithms, including modulus sizes, that are supported.

(3) For products with proprietary algorithms, include a textual description and the source code of the algorithm.

(4) Describe the pre-processing methods (*e.g.*, data compression or data interleaving) that are applied to the plaintext data prior to encryption.

(5) Describe the post-processing methods (*e.g.*, packetization, encapsulation) that are applied to the cipher text data after encryption.

(6) State all communication protocols (*e.g.*, X.25, Telnet, TCP, IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.16, SIP ...) and cryptographic protocols and methods (*e.g.*, SSL, TLS, SSH, IPSEC, IKE, SRTP, ECCN, MD5, SHA, X.509, PKCS standards...) that are supported and describe how they are used.

(7) Describe the encryption-related Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that are implemented and/or supported. Explain which interfaces are for internal (private) and/or external (public) use.

(8) Describe the cryptographic functionality that is provided by third-party hardware or software encryption components (if any). Identify the manufacturers of the hardware or software components, including specific part numbers and version information as needed to describe the product. Describe whether the

encryption software components (if any) are statically or dynamically linked.

(9) For commodities or software using Java byte code, describe the techniques (including obfuscation, private access modifiers or final classes) that are used to protect against decompilation and misuse.

(10) State how the product is written to preclude user modification of the encryption algorithms, key management and key space.

(11) License Exception ENC 'Restricted' commodities and software described by the criteria in §740.17(b)(2) require licenses to certain "government end-users." Describe whether the product(s) meet any of the §740.17(b)(2) criteria. Provide specific data for each of the parameters listed, as applicable (*e.g.*, maximum aggregate encrypted user data throughput, maximum number of concurrent encrypted channels, and operating range for wireless products). If the §740.17(b)(2) parameters are not applicable to the commodity or software, clearly explain why, (*e.g.*, by providing specific data evaluated against the §740.17(b)(2) thresholds.)

(12) For products which incorporate an open cryptographic interface as defined in part 772 of the EAR, describe the Open Cryptographic Interface.

(d) For review requests for hardware or software "encryption components" other than source code (*i.e.*, chips, toolkits, executable or linkable modules intended for use in or production of another encryption item) provide the following additional information:

(1) Reference the application for which the components are used in, if known;

(2) State if there is a general programming interface to the component;

(3) State whether the component is constrained by function; and

(4) Identify the encryption component and include the name of the manufacturer, component model number or other identifier.

(e) For review requests for “encryption source code” provide the following information:

(1) If applicable, reference the executable (object code) product that was previously reviewed;

(2) Include whether the source code has been modified, and the technical details on how the source code was modified; and

(3) Include a copy of the sections of the source code that contain the encryption algorithm, key management routines and their related calls.

(f) For step-by-step instructions and guidance on submitting review requests for encryption items, visit our webpage at [www.bis.doc.gov/Encryption](http://www.bis.doc.gov/Encryption) and click on the navigation button labeled “Guidance”.



---

**DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS**

---

**(1) Battle Tanks:** Tracked or wheeled self-propelled armored fighting vehicles with high cross-country mobility and a high-level of self protection, weighing at least 16.5 metric tons unladen weight, with a high muzzle velocity direct fire main gun of at least 75 millimeters caliber.

**(2) Armored Combat Vehicles:** Tracked, semi-tracked, or wheeled self-propelled vehicles, with armored protection and cross-country capability, either designed and equipped to transport a squad of four or more infantrymen, or armed with an integral or organic weapon of a least 12.5 millimeters caliber or a missile launcher.

**(3) Large-Caliber Artillery Systems:** Guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of a gun or a howitzer, mortars or multiple-launch rocket systems, capable of engaging surface targets by delivering primarily indirect fire, with a caliber of 75 millimeters and above.

**(4) Combat Aircraft:** Fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft designed, equipped, or modified to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons, or other weapons of destruction, including versions of these aircraft which perform specialized electronic warfare, suppression of air defense or reconnaissance missions. The term “combat aircraft” does not include primary trainer aircraft, unless designed, equipped, or modified as described above.

**(5) Attack Helicopters:** Rotary-wing aircraft designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing guided or unguided anti-armor, air-to-surface, air-to-subsurface, or air-to-air weapons and equipped with an integrated fire control and aiming system for these weapons, including versions of these aircraft that perform

specialized reconnaissance or electronic warfare missions.

**(6) Warships:** Vessels or submarines armed and equipped for military use with a standard displacement of 750 metric tons or above, and those with a standard displacement of less than 750 metric tons that are equipped for launching missiles with a range of at least 25 kilometers or torpedoes with a similar range.

**(7) Missiles and Missile Launchers:**

(a) Guided or unguided rockets, or ballistic, or cruise missiles capable of delivering a warhead or weapon of destruction to a range of at least 25 kilometers, and those items that are designed or modified specifically for launching such missiles or rockets, if not covered by systems identified in paragraphs (1) through (6) of this Supplement. For purposes of this rule, systems in this paragraph include remotely piloted vehicles with the characteristics for missiles as defined in this paragraph but do not include ground-to-air missiles;

(b) Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems (MANPADS); or

(c) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) of any type, including sensors for guidance and control of these systems, except model airplanes.

**(8) Offensive Space Weapons:** Systems or capabilities that can deny freedom of action in space for the United States and its allies or hinder the United States and its allies from denying an adversary the ability to take action in space. This includes systems such as anti-satellite missiles, or other systems designed to defeat or destroy assets in space.

**(9) Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR):** Systems that support military commanders in the exercise of authority and direction over assigned forces across the range of military operations; collect, process, integrate, analyze, evaluate, or interpret information concerning foreign countries or areas; systematically observe aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means; and obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area, including Undersea communications. Also includes sensor technologies.

**(10) Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs), including “smart bombs”:** Weapons used in

precision bombing missions such as specially designed weapons, or bombs fitted with kits to allow them to be guided to their target.

**(11) Night vision equipment:** Any electro-optical device that is used to detect visible and infrared energy and to provide an image. This includes night vision goggles, forward-looking infrared systems, thermal sights, and low-light level systems that are night vision devices, as well as infrared focal plane array detectors and cameras specifically designed, developed, modified, or configured for military use; image intensification and other night sighting equipment or systems specifically designed, modified or configured for military use; second generation and above military image intensification tubes specifically designed, developed, modified, or configured for military use, and infrared, visible and ultraviolet devices specifically designed, developed, modified, or configured for military application.