CHAPTER 3
THE SHUTTLE DECISION

America's Next Decades in Space: A Report of the Space Task Group. Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, September 1969. This seminal report published just months after the first moon landing describes NASA's plans for the future. It offers several important recommendations relative to the development of the Shuttle. It emphasizes the need for continued exploration of space and the requirement for economy and reusability of spacecraft. This was couched in terms of supporting a space station for planetary exploration. All of these activities would support practical as well as scientific programs. The plan emphasizes the establishment of a space station by 1976 that would be supported by a Shuttle.

Aspin, Les. "The Space Shuttle: Who Needs It?" The Washington Monthly. September 1972, pp. 18-22. The author, a Democratic Congressman from Wisconsin, suggests that the Shuttle was the result of NASA's desire to continue as a separate entity. He notes that while the DOD and HUD are critical components of government, the same is not the case with NASA and space exploration. It is a luxury that can be expended when economic pressures require it. He argues that the agency has lived on public relations, and that Congress has enjoyed this glitter as well. He is skeptical of the necessity of the Shuttle and chalks its support up not to legitimate requirements but to NASA "puffery."

Barfield, Claude. "Space Report/NASA Gambles its Funds, Future on Reusable Space Shuttle Program." National Journal. 3 (13 March 1971): 539-51. Discusses efforts by NASA to obtain approval of the Space Transportation System. It describes the conceptualization of the program and its emphasis on practical benefits over national prestige. This was a significant and necessary alteration because of the changes in the national economy and international relations. The author concludes that NASA had no option but to develop the Shuttle if it were to remain a well- funded agency. Barfield asserts that the ten months after this article appeared would be critical to the Shuttle program, as forces lined up on both sides of the issue.

Barfield, Claude. "Technology Report/Intense Debate, Cost Cutting Preceded White House Decision to Back Shuttle." National Journal. 4 (12 August 1972): 1289-99. An excellent account of the investigations and controversy preceding the Nixon Administration's endorsement of a new Space Transportation System.

Barfield, Claude. "Technology Report/NASA Broaden's Defense of Space Shuttle to Counter Critic's Attacks." National Journal. 4 (19 August 1972): 1323-32. Another well-researched and well-written article on the Shuttle debate in the early 1970s.

"Correcting the Mistakes of the Past: A Conversation with John Logsdon." Space World (August 1986): 12-18. In this interview, Logsdon argues that the Shuttle neither guarantees routine access to space, nor is inexpensive. This, says Logsdon, was due to unrealistic expectations about the Shuttle's capabilities. Performance would have been better had the designers concentrated on transporting Shuttle-unique payloads. Logsdon claims that basically the same thing is happening to the Space Station. Other topics covered are the role of the President, the Office of Management and Budget, and Congress in the U.S. space program, and the Soviet space program.

Dooling, Dave. "Space Shuttle: Crisis and Decision." Spaceflight. 14 (July 1972): 242-45. This is an interesting article, written very early in the Shuttle program, about the decision to build the spacecraft. It describes some, but not all, of the political machinations involved in the decision.

Draper, Alfred C.; Buck, Melvin L.; and Goesch, William H. "A Delta Shuttle Orbiter." Astronautics & Aeronautics. 9 (January 1971): 26-35. This is an excellent technical review of the reasons for developing a delta-wing versus a straight-wing or lifting body orbiter. The authors were engineers for the Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory, and their arguments contributed to the decision to change to a delta configuration, giving the military the 2000 mile crossrange capability it needed for military missions.

Economic Analysis of New Space Transportation Systems: Executive Summary. Princeton, NJ: Mathematica, Inc., 1971. This study presents an economic analysis of alternative space transportation systems. It indicates that the expendable systems represent modest investments, but the recurring costs of operation remain high. The Space Shuttle and tug system requires a substantial investment but would substantially reduce the recurring costs of operation. Economic benefits and costs of the different systems are also analyzed.

Farrar, D.J. "Space Shuttle and Post Apollo." Aeronautical Journal. March 1973. pp. 157-62. This article, written by the Coordinating Director of Post-Apollo Studies for the British Aircraft Corporation, is concerned with the relationship of the Apollo program to the Shuttle effort and the role of international cooperation concerning the development of the new spacecraft. The author sees all manner of opportunity for British use of the Shuttle and urges close cooperation in the program's execution.

Fletcher, James C. "Are SKYLAB and the Space Shuttle Worth the Investment?" Government Executive. January 1974. pp. 38- 40, 42. This is a logical defense of both the Shuttle and Skylab programs written by the NASA Administrator. He justifies the Shuttle on the basis of cost savings ($1 billion per year for operations) and versatility, and its ability to serve as an excellent platform for scientific research, to mate humans and machines in a reliable and meaningful way, to mix scientific and practical applications, to provide a space rescue capability, to be used for Department of Defense projects, to foster aerospace technology, to facilitate international cooperation, and to provide the key to U.S. supremacy in space.

GAO Report on Analysis of Cost of Space Shuttle Program. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1973. This is a set of hearings held by the House subcommittee on Manned Space Flight on 26 June 1973 concerning the GAO report on the feasibility of the Shuttle versus two alternative methods of launch operation.

General Accounting Office. Analysis of Cost Estimates for the Space Shuttle and Two Alternate Programs. Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1973. This report reviews the costs associated with the use of a fully reusable Shuttle, a partially reusable Shuttle, and a fully expendable launch system. It finds that the partially reusable Shuttle is cost effective with a rigorous flight schedule over several years.

General Accounting Office. Cost Benefit Analysis Used in Support of the Space Shuttle Program. Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1972. This 53-page report describes the process by which NASA developed its Shuttle cost-effectiveness argument. This analysis was seen as a factor in the presidential decision to press ahead with development of the spacecraft.

Gibson, T.A. and Merz, C.M. Impact of the Space Shuttle Program on the Economy of Southern California. Space Division, North American Rockwell, SD 71-7662, September 1971. Discusses the probable impact on regional employment and production in Southern California through the awarding of prime contracts for the Space Shuttle program. The paper concludes that this region, with a heavy concentration of aerospace industries, would find a "highly favorable and widely diffused" economic impact from such contracts.

Gillette, Robert. "Space Shuttle: Compromise Version Still Faces Opposition." Science. 175 (28 January 1972): 392-96. Reviews the controversy surrounding the decision to build the Shuttle, especially the configuration debate that took place within the government before the presidential announcement of 5 January 1972. Gillette also notes that in spite of presidential support, the Shuttle had its share of critics in Congress and that it could be tabled by the legislative branch. For one, Congress questioned the argument for the cost-effectiveness of the Shuttle. Gillette is skeptical of the Shuttle and calls the program "NASA's ferryboat to the future."

Guilmartin, John F., Jr., and Mauer, John Walker. A Shuttle Chronology, 1964-1973. Houston, TX: Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, 1988. 5 Volumes. This is a comprehensive and detailed chronology of the development of the Shuttle, divided into separate sections concerning various aspects of the program and organized chronologically within them. It suffers from some repetition, but still has much valuable information and many reference notes.

Hechler, Ken. Toward the Endless Frontier: History of the Committee on Science and Technology, 1959-1979 (Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, 1980). Contains the best account to date of Congressional wrangling over the Shuttle, and demonstrates the bipartisan nature of both Shuttle support and opposition.

Heiss, Klaus P., and Morgenstern, Oskar. Mathematica Economic Analysis of the Space Shuttle System. Princeton, NJ: Mathematica, Inc., 1972. This is a three volume study of the economic value of the Shuttle. It found that the major economic potential for the Shuttle in the 1980s would be the lowering of space program costs due to the reuse, refurbishment, and updating of satellite payloads. This is based on a partially reusable, stage-and-a-half Shuttle. It uses sophisticated statistical models to show the measure of economic viability of the system.

Heiss, K.P. "Our R and D Economics and the Space Shuttle." Astronautics & Aeronautics. 9 (October 1972): 50-62. This lengthy article is an economic analysis of the effect of R&D projects on the Shuttle.

Holden, Constance. "Space Shuttle: Despite Doubters, Project Will Probably Fly." Science. 180 (27 April 1973): 395, 397. This short article deals with the debate in Congress over the NASA budget for FY 1974, especially as it relates to the funding to be expended on the Shuttle. It describes the efforts of critics, among them space scientists who saw the Shuttle as eating into their programs, to kill or at least delay the program. There is an explicit tie between the Shuttle debate and that surrounding the recently cancelled Supersonic Transport, with the author asserting that the two programs are comparable.

Holder, William G., and Siuru, William D., Jr. "Some Thoughts on Reusable Launch Vehicles." Air University Review. 22 (November-December 1970): 51-58. Discusses one of the central problems that led to the development of the Shuttle, the quest for cost-efficient launch vehicles through the development of reusable systems. It sets the stage for the Shuttle debate and decision.

Hotz, Robert. "The Shuttle Decision." Aviation Week & Space Technology. 31 July 1972. p. 7. This editorial applauded the 5 January 1972 decision of President Richard Nixon to proceed with the development of the Space Shuttle. It does not analyze how the decision was made so much as cheer the nation's commitment to leadership in the space age.

Howell, Craig. "The Shuttle Walks a Tightrope." New Scientist. 59 (9 August 1973): 321-23. Reviews the history of budget difficulties for the development of the Space Shuttle. The author believes that if the Bureau of the Budget does not supply NASA with the full funding needed to maintain the space program at its present level, NASA will sacrifice whatever is necessary to keep the Shuttle going. Suggests that it is important that the Shuttle program be funded at close to the optimum rate because speeding up or slowing down from that rate will increase costs. The consequences of a significant cost overrun or a suspension of the Shuttle are examined, with the author predicting serious repercussions.

Hunter, Maxwell W., II, Miller, Wayne F., and Gray, Robert M. "The Space Shuttle Will Cut Payload Costs." Astronautics & Aeronautics. 10 (June 1972): 50-58. This article, written by three engineers from the Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., argues that while the Shuttle is not being designed solely for the purpose of reducing operating costs, it does take advantage of technological developments during the first decade of spaceflight to achieve a quantum leap in the capabilities of the spacecraft. The article discusses at length the parameters of the effort to develop the Shuttle, analyzing costs and estimating possible returns. The result, the authors believe, would be a great improvement over earlier space operations as well as a reduction in operating costs.

Kyger, Timothy B. "Lunar Eclipse: President Nixon, Public Opinion, and Post-Apollo Planning." Bachelors of Public Administration Thesis, University of San Francisco, 1985. This thesis attempts to determine to what extent public opinion influenced Nixon's decision to severely curtail NASA's space program. It concludes that adverse public opinion in 1969 about the future of the space program weakened congressional support for the recommendations of the Space Task Group, which in turn lessened Nixon's own endorsement of these recommendations.

Layton, J. Preston. "Our Next Steps in Space: A Status Report on New Space Transportation Systems." Astronautics & Aeronautics. 10 (May 1972): 56-65. Because of the efforts of NASA to develop the Space Shuttle the AIAA convened an ad hoc panel to assess the new space transportation system. This article reviews the efforts of the nation to build the Shuttle up to this early date, describing some of the various concepts and tracing the chronology of the Shuttle decision.

Levine, Arthur L. The Future of the U.S. Space Program. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. Chapters six and seven of this book deal almost exclusively with the post-Apollo space policy struggle and contain good descriptions and a useful early analysis of the emergence of the Shuttle as the NASA program of the 1970s.

Logsdon, John M. "The Decision to Develop the Space Shuttle." Space Policy. 2 (May 1986): 103-19. Surveys the policymaking process within government on the Shuttle program. In response to the Challenger accident Logsdon asserted that the Space Shuttle decision essentially set up the program for a disaster. He reviews the decision, announced on 5 January 1972, to develop a specific Shuttle design. Logsdon believes it was a bare-bones funding strategy for the program and chides the bureaucracy for politicizing the process. This decision was influential in NASA's inability to deliver routine and inexpensive space transportation. According to NASA plans in 1969, the Shuttle was to consist of two reusable components. After launch, the booster stage would be flown by its crew to a landing near its launch site, while the orbiter would continue on into space. As a result of budgetary restrictions, Logsdon asserts, these plans had to be abandoned. The result, after very extended evaluations and negotiations, was the Shuttle design in its current form, which was characterized by smaller development costs but substantially larger operating costs. This article is very similar to Logsdon's other studies on the subject and reflects on the Challenger disaster in relation to the policy decisions over the life of the Shuttle program.

Logsdon, John M. "From Apollo to Shuttle: Policy Making in the Post Apollo Era." Unpublished partial manuscript, Spring 1983, copy in NASA History Office Reference Collection. This is a detailed and insightful study of the political process involved in the decision to build the Space Shuttle in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It represents a more detailed discussion of the same subject, with essentially the same conclusions, that Logsdon presented in his articles on the Shuttle.

Logsdon, John M. "Shall We Build the Space Shuttle?" Technology Review. October-November 1971. The author, one of the leading analysts of space policy, prepared this article at the same time that NASA was trying to win approval of the Shuttle program from the Nixon administration. Logsdon reviews the issues at play in Washington in 1970-1971 and how they affected the funding question. He finds that the only comparably-sized space program, Apollo, operated in an environment in which political and economic decisions were strikingly different from those affecting the Shuttle. A key point was that presidential support for Apollo was omnipresent and cast an overarching shadow on all policy issues. Such was not the case for the Shuttle; support for it was at best ambivalent and at some extremes perhaps contentious. Logsdon also contends that the political process, with officeholders constantly seeking popular support and reelection every 2, 4, or 6 years, means that they want payoffs in their programs within those time constraints. The process is ill-suited to fostering long-term technological programs with results only coming in future decades.

Logsdon, John M. "The Space Shuttle Decision: Technology and Political Choice." Journal of Contemporary Business. 7 (1978): 13-30. In a detailed, scholarly, and convincing article, Logsdon reviews the policymaking process for the Shuttle. His principle conclusion is that "the Shuttle was approved, as a means of operating in space, without any extensive debate over what the goals of space operations in the 1980s might be" (p. 27). While much debate over technological designs and Shuttle configurations resulted from the process, the requirement for its operation was not firmly established. The author suggests that one of the strengths of the American system is that there is give and take over issues and pragmatic compromise to achieve results that are acceptable to the widest range of viewpoints, but that in the heavily technological arena it is of questionable virtue. The result was the development of a Shuttle that might not meet the needs of the nation.

Logsdon, John M. "The Space Shuttle Program: A Policy Failure." Science. 232 (30 May 1986): 1099-1105. In a thoughtful article, Logsdon contends that the decision to build the Shuttle emerged from a murky policymaking process that did not properly analyze the approach or gauge the operational capability and, more importantly, compromised the funding levels so badly that serious technological compromises resulted as well. He notes that NASA allowed its Shuttle hopes to be held hostage by political and economic forces. The program gained its support on a cost- effective basis, rather than on scientific, technological, or other grounds. This ensured that the budget-cutters would hack away at the program every year. It also suffered from a lack of strong support from key political figures. There were no Kennedys or Johnsons to champion the Shuttle and the result was a politicization of the process and what Logsdon calls a "policy failure."

Mathews, Charles W. "The Space Shuttle and its Uses." Aeronautical Journal. 76 (January 1972): 19-25. This article assesses the development of a reusable Shuttle system, noting that it was made practicable by the availability of improved, staged combustion engines and durable, thermal protection systems. The two stage launch configuration with fully-reusable boosters and orbiter elements is considered to be the best design solution, and size specifications for such a vehicle are examined as a function of launch costs. Significant vehicle characteristics are explained in terms of cargo bay dimensions, cross-range maneuvering capability, mission duration requirements, engine characteristics, and acceleration constraints. The Shuttle flight activities that Mathews foresees include satellite deployment and recovery, research, and space station support operations. Phases of the development program are also outlined, and structural details of several candidate Space Shuttle concepts are illustrated.

Merz, C.M., Gibson, T.A., and Seitz, C. Ward. Impact of the Space Shuttle Program on the National Economy. Space Division, North American Rockwell, SD 71-478, March 1971. This paper reports on the results of a study to determine the overall impact of an $8.6 billion Space Shuttle program on the national economy. Factors examined was the value of production by industry, the amount of employment by industry, and the effect of foreign trade. The estimated impact on these areas was then compared with the probable impact caused by similar expenditures in residential construction and consumer spending. The study concludes that the economic impact of the Space Shuttle program compares very favorably with the benefits stemming from similar investments in residential construction or an increase in consumer spending.

Mueller, George E. "The New Future For Manned Spacecraft Developments." Astronautics and Aeronautics. 7 (March 1969): 24-32. Argues for the advantages to be gained by placing a permanent space station in orbit, and the necessity of building a Shuttle to transport materials to the Space Station at low cost, by the NASA head of spaceflight. The Shuttle envisioned by Mueller has many of the advantages of a commercial airplane and would be able to carry payloads into orbit at the cost of about $5 per pound.

Myers, Dale D. "The Shuttle: A Balancing of Design and Politics." Issues in Program Management, Summer 1992, pp. 42-45. Analyzes the various cost considerations that influenced the decision to build the Shuttle. Lack of adequate operational models and overly optimistic cost-effectiveness estimates characterized the early planning stages. This and the emphasis of development over operation were major causes of the Shuttle's later problems, the article asserts.

"NASA in Trouble with Congress, Executive, Scientists." Nature. 231 (11 June 1971): 346-48. Describes the difficulties between NASA and the other branches of government over the funding of the Shuttle, delineating very well the differences between the Apollo program, which had a Presidential mandate, and the Shuttle, which had reluctant support at best. Concludes that only because of DOD involvement did the Shuttle gain sufficient support to go forward. It ends: "In staking its future to the Shuttle, perhaps a necessary move, NASA had made a devil's pact with the military, ignored the advice of the scientific community and risked antagonizing its supporters in Congress by sacrificing peripheral projects. The gamble is a dangerous one, but at least if it fails NASA will end with a bang, not a whimper" (p. 348).

NASA Space Shuttle Summary Report. Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, rev. ed., 31 July 1969. Summary report of efforts to define the proposed Space Shuttle. It should be used in conjunction with the longer 4- volume report described immediately below.

NASA Space Shuttle Task Group Report. Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1969. 4 Volumes. This multi-volume report, written by a joint NASA/DOD study group, was the foundation of NASA's early efforts to define the Space Shuttle program. Volume one contains the summary and makes a strong case for the development of "A versatile Space Shuttle system that can transport effectively, a varying mix of personnel and cargo to low earth orbits and return, could be the keystone to the success and growth of future space flight developments for the exploration and beneficial uses of near and far space." The second volume deals with "Desired System Characteristics," the third with "Vehicle Configurations," and the fourth with "Program Plans." Originally issued on 19 May 1969, it was revised and reissued on 12 June 1969. It projected the first operational flight of a Shuttle by 1980, and proposed three options for a Shuttle: fully- reusable, one-and-one-half stage or drop tank concepts, and expendable boosters plus reusable orbiter.

NASA Space Task Group. Technology Program Plan. Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1969. This report, issued on 26 June 1969, is an outgrowth of Space Task Group studies and emphasizes five areas: aerodynamics/configuration selection, integrated electronics system, expendable tank construction, propulsion, and thermal protection. This plan contains specifics of development for these five areas since they are critical for the timely development of the system. Subcommittees in each of the five areas develops action plans for technology harnessing that are laid out in this work.

NASA Space Task Group. The Post Apollo Space Program: Directions for the Future. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 1969. A seminal document in the development of the Shuttle, this work analyzes of the possibilities for the development of a reusable spacecraft at the time that NASA is seeking a follow-on program for the lunar expeditions. It was generated by the presidentially appointed group considering the best direction for the U.S. space program after the Apollo program. It recommends a goal of a balanced human space flight and science with five policy goals: (1) expand the space applications program to realize potential benefits, (2) enhance the defense posture of the U.S. through the exploitation of space techniques for military missions, (3) increase knowledge of the universe through a strong program of lunar and planetary exploration, astronomy, physics, and earth and life sciences, (4) develop new systems and technology for space with emphasis on reusability, commonality, and economy, and (5) promote a sense of world community through a program providing opportunity for broad international participation.

The Next Decade in Space: A Report of the Space Science and Technology Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee. Washington, DC: President's Science Advisory Committee, March 1970. This important report reviews the development of the space program in the United States through the moon landing and projects some future objectives for the President. There is some discussion of the space transportation system and the report concludes: "A Space Shuttle will allow large payloads to be assembled in orbit, with consequent advantages for manned flight. This may provide the line of evolution towards systems for long-duration flights or to a greater variety of manned activity should this be desirable" (p. 37). It also notes that the development of reusable systems is critical to lowering costs for orbit. It recommends that NASA continue efforts to develop the Shuttle and aim for a decision on it by fiscal year 1972. It does not support NASA's two other post- Apollo goals: a human mission to Mars and a space station.

O'Leary, Brian. "The Space Shuttle: NASA's White Elephant in the Sky." Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. 29 (February 1973): 36-43. This essay is highly critical essay of the Space Shuttle. The author notes that the principal problems with the Shuttle include its questionable role in competing national priorities; the lack of a clear definition of NASA's goals for the Shuttle; the uncertainties of the recurring costs; the question of payload subsystem refurbishments; the secondary social and economic costs of the Shuttle; and the probability that the Department of Defense will become the primary user of the Shuttle and therefore drive the configuration and costs. O'Leary based his arguments on an oral presentation he made before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences when it was considering the 1973 budget. He summarized the skepticism of many within the scientific community. The article is an interesting critique but contains no scholarly references.

Pace, Scott. "Engineering Design and Political Choice: The Space Shuttle, 1969-1972." M.S. Thesis, MIT, May 1982. Detailed academic study of the interplay of engineering design and political factors during the early stages of Shuttle development. During this period the concept went from a rocketplane take-off and landing proposal to the take-off-like-a-rocket and land-like-a- glider system that was developed. Although interesting, it is nonetheless a thesis and not the product of a mature historian.

Redford, Emmette, and White, Orion F. What Manned Space Program After Reaching the Moon? Government Attempts to Decide, 1962-1968. Syracuse, NY: The Inter-University Case Program, January 1971. Limited edition study of the efforts of NASA and other government agencies to determine what policies and programs it should pursue for the future space program. It is especially helpful as a statement of where leaders thought the U.S. should be going at the very time the debate over the development of the Shuttle was taking place.

"Reusable Space Shuttle Effort Gains Momentum." Aviation Week & Space Technology. 27 October 1969, pp. 22-24. Useful article describing the efforts up to that point to "sell" the idea of the Shuttle based on its cost efficiencies.

Selection of Papers Presented at the Space Shuttle Symposium, Smithsonian Museum of Natural History, Washington, DC, October 16-19, 1969. (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1969). An exceptionally important collection of papers that discusses the origins, development, and promise of a reusable Shuttle for entrance into and recovery from earth orbit. Individual essays deal with a wide variety of subjects, everything from the development of launch vehicles to the potential for a space station.

Shaver, R.D., Dreyfuss, D.J., Gosch, W.D., and Levenson, G.S. The Space Shuttle as an Element in the National Space Program. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, October 1970. This report for the United States Air Force assesses the role of the proposed Space Shuttle in policy and technological issues. It especially examines the economic justification and potential funding problems of the Shuttle as advanced by NASA to the President in September 1969. It suggests that the concept of a two-stage, fully-reusable launch vehicle that can place a 40,000- to 50,000-pound payload in polar orbit would show a net savings of $2.8 billion by 1990. To achieve this, however, the government would have to fund NASA at the peak of $7 billion in 1975, about double NASA's 1970 budget. The authors conclude that viewed over the long term, the Shuttle had definite merit, but its immediate economic justification depended on the pace that was finally adopted for the national space program.

"Space Shuttle: NASA Versus Domestic Priorities." Congressional Quarterly. 26 February 1972, pp. 435-39. This short article discusses the issues relative to the political football of the Shuttle. It quotes at length the pros and cons of the system from key Congressional and Executive Branch personnel as they understood the issue at the time of Nixon's approval of the Shuttle.

Truax, Robert C. "Shuttles--What Price Elegance?" Astronautics & Aeronautics. 8 (June 1970): 22-23. This is an important "minority report" on the Shuttle's modus operandi as it was being designed and before it was approved as a program by President Nixon. It argues that the necessity of a fully-reusable Shuttle is a chimera. Traux argues for an expendable or partially reusable lower stage and a reusable orbiter, but he contends that there was no necessity of making it a winged or lifting body vehicle. Instead, a ballistic craft would do just as well and be recoverable in the ocean and reusable. That would cut down development costs drastically, but since splash-downs were "inelegant" NASA was committed to a winged spacecraft that "could be an unparalleled money sponge."