Although Pacific Protector 06 – or “PP06” – was a training exercise and not a real interdiction case, the Australian Minister for Defense, Dr. Brendan Nelson, noted that the threat portrayed was “very real.” Nelson rhetorically asked, “Would you really have more than 30 countries sending their highest level military and civilian enforcement agencies to Australia for an exercise like this if it were not a real threat?”

The PP06 scenario was partially based on a 1997 conventional weapons interdiction in Australia. Yet, it is very plausible that a similar event could occur. Last summer, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted 11 successful Proliferation Security Initiative I interdictions during a nine-month period.

Initiative gains support of 70 nations

Since its establishment in May 2003, the Proliferation Security Initiative has gained the support of more than 70 nations determined to undertake effective measures for interdicting weapons of mass destruction, consistent with domestic legal authorities and international laws and frameworks. Nations who have endorsed the initiative take part in several exercises, such as PP06, and host multiple expert-level meetings every year to further develop the capacities to work cooperatively to stop WMD. Intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, customs, financial, military and other tools are at the disposal of Proliferation Security Initiative participants to prevent the proliferation of WMD-related materials.

Since early 2005, CBP has fully participated in the initiative and had established a Proliferation Security Initiative program staff within its international affairs office. CBP’s PSI program identifies the experts and resources that CBP can provide to the initiative, and conducts outreach with foreign customs and law enforcements agencies, as well as industry. CBP is able to provide a number of complementary anti-proliferation tools to the PSI with its Container Security Initiative, National Targeting Center, Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism and Automated Commercial Environment.

The scenario for exercise PP06 involved fictional intelligence received about the transport of sensitive WMD items heading for the fictional Pacific state of “Kamaria” on a civilian aircraft. As the aircraft’s flight path took it through Australian airspace, a decision was made to divert the aircraft to the Royal Australian Air Force Base in Darwin and examine the suspect cargo. In the exercise, the aircraft was portrayed by a Royal New Zealand Air Force B757 and was escorted down by two Australian F/A-18 fighters.

A combined Australian and Japanese Customs search team located radioactive material on the plane, which was then removed from the aircraft by specialist teams from the Australian Army, United Kingdom Royal Air Force, and the Singapore Armed Forces. A joint team consisting of the CBP-LSS team and an Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency Emergency Operations Unit made the final determination of the precise nature of the radioactive source.

CBP detection capabilities enter “hot zone”

The CBP-LSS team consisted of Dave Fluty, director for scientific services; Pat Donnachie, physical scientist; and Dr. Naomi Redmore, chemist. They came equipped with two Exploranium GR-135 Radiation Isotope Identifiers, and pooled their resources with the Australian team.

Working side by side, the combined group set up a “hot zone” around the radioactive material to contain any possible contamination, and used a remote camera to determine the integrity of source packaging prior to opening exterior containers. The team determined that the radiation intensity of the materials was not harmful to team members, and used its detection equipment to analyze the gamma spectrum signatures and confirm the identity of the sources. Through its technical and scientific expertise, the joint team was able to determine that two types of radioactive material were present, revealing that smugglers were attempting to “mask” their illicit sources with declared sources. The team determined that no special nuclear materials were present, and safely transported the sources to a secure location.

Full range of detection capabilities

The detection capabilities portrayed at PP06 were just a small fraction of the resources that CBP-LSS has to detect and halt illicit materials. In addition to WMD, LSS provides forensic and scientific support in the areas of crime scene investigation, trade enforcement, intellectual property rights and narcotics enforcement. LSS operates eight laboratories, each with mobile laboratories that can be used for on-site emergency response and border security operations.

A specially trained laboratory forensic “jump team” can provide crime scene investigation, documentation and testing for cases involving possible terrorist activity, and be activated at a moment's notice.

Complementing the live exercise were tabletop activities, designed to focus on the legal, diplomatic and administrative responses to a proliferation incident, and an outreach program to nations who have not yet endorsed the PSI statement of interdiction principles. Representation at PP06 included individuals from CBP’s international affairs office, the Department of Homeland Security’s domestic nuclear detection office, the State Department and a Pacific Command KC-135 refueling tanker.

PP06 successfully demonstrated the number of capabilities available to Proliferation Security Initiative endorsee states to identify and interdict WMD-related materials. Dr. Redmore from CBP-LSS noted on working with the Australian team, “We all genuinely enjoyed working with each other, and this showed in our smooth and effective operation. We hope that the countries thinking of joining the initiative noticed how well our international group meshed, and see the benefits of cooperative effort.” EB