Testimony for the House Foreign Affairs Committee
February 28 , 2007
Richard Holbrooke
Mr Chairman,
It is a great honor to appear again before this committee, which, as I will never forget, was the very first committee I ever testified to, back in 1977. But the pleasure is far greater today, because your new Chairman is a man who has been a close friend and advisor for many years, not only of me, but of my wife. His career is well-known to all of you, but his influence, often exercised in low-key and subtle ways, is less well understood. While I was at the United Nations, he was by far the most helpful member of the House in dealing with issues of immense complexity, including fixing the arrears problem. His role in deepening understanding of the most vital issues of national security, on a bipartisan basis whenever possible, has been huge.
This has been true on the crises we face in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran. This Committee has an opportunity—indeed, I would suggest, an obligation—to address these issues urgently, and it is with this in mind that I appear before you today, just after a trip to northern Iraq and Turkey.
Let me start with a statement that I never thought I would make: the situation in Iraq today is worse than it ever was in Vietnam. I speak as a veteran of three years of service as a civilian in Vietnam and four more years working on the problem at the Johnson White House, the State Department, the Pentagon, and the 1968-69 Paris Peace Talks. Never, in the years since, did I imagine that anything would, or could, be worse. But Iraq is—and this is compounded by the fact that we are waging a second war, in Afghanistan that is also not going well, although I believe strongly that it is still salvageable and must be turned around. What makes these two wars all the more disastrous for our nation is that the major beneficiary is the country between them, Iran. First we got rid of regimes they despised, the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. Then, even as we got tied down in protracted insurgencies in both countries, Iran fattened its coffers with high-priced oil, backed two dangerous anti-Israeli movements, Hamas and Hezbollah, quietly supported extreme anti-American movements within Iraq, and exported the most virulent brand of anti-Semitism since the Holocaust. And last but certainly not least—they are defying the world and developing a nuclear capability.
But the idea of leading a broadly-based international coalition to negotiate directly with Iran has been rejected by this Administration, even though just such a course has been recommended by almost every foreign policy expert and the Baker-Hamilton Commission. This is doubly remarkable in light of the recent breakthrough by Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill in his talks with the North Koreans. The model he used, with the full backing of President Bush and Secretary Rice, was simple and elegant, and deftly bridged the rather public internal disagreement within the administration: Hill conducted a bi-lateral negotiation within a multi-party forum, the Six-Party Talks. This put the other four countries, especially China, in the position exerting pressure on North Korea while allowing the U.S. the negotiating flexibility to reach an agreement. I might note that the 1995 Dayton negotiations that ended the war in Bosnia, in which Chris Hill was my senior political deputy, followed a similar structure, with the EU and, importantly, the Russians, represented at a high level, but with all the critical discussions being simply between the U.S. and the warring Balkan parties.
The North Korean agreement raises anew the question: why doesn’t this administration try a similar approach with Iran? Mr Chairman, I am unable to answer this question with authority, because, like the Baker-Hamilton Commission and countless experts, I am simply baffled. I hope that your Committee will focus in future hearings on this issue. Of course, the other side, the Iranians, might not respond; the internal situation there has become increasingly unclear, and perhaps a power struggle greater than we can see from afar is underway that would make a positive Iranian response unlikely. I am fully prepared for that. But, as the story of Nixon-in-China reminds us, opening a door can sometimes produce results previously unimaginable. The breakthrough in North Korea, so strongly opposed by many people within and close to the administration, further illustrates that. Finally, let me stress my belief that as long as we are tied down in Iraq, it will be virtually impossible to deal with Tehran, while Iran can continue to raise the price for us in Iraq with relatively low-cost, deniable actions.
Let me turn therefore to Iraq itself. I must start with a simple, but critical, proposition: all Americans want success in Iraq. I do not question the patriotism or motives of those with differing points of view, and I regret the outrageous assertion that opponents of the war are aiding and abetting the enemy. But the United States and President Bush face the most difficult choices imaginable, and we must be honest about these issues if we are to contribute to their solutions. A long term American presence in Iraq is inconceivable, for obvious military and political reasons. Yet most experts believe that a rapid withdrawal is likely to result in an even worse bloodbath than the one already going on, as well as further gains for Iran and al-Qaeda. The United States is perceived in the rest of the Arab world, which is overwhelmingly Sunni, as backing the Shiites, thus increasing our problems with the very Arab nations we have traditionally been closest to. Yet there is no gratitude among Shiites, nor should we expect any. They want everything in Iraq, after having been the suppressed majority for over 400 years. What the United States unleashed, we can no longer control. Perhaps the additional troops being rushed to Iraq can delay a far worse bloodbath for a while, but no surge will turn the tide, and—as everyone knows—sooner or later the United States will leave Iraq.
The question, therefore, is not whether, but how and when we redeploy in Iraq. How do we redeploy in a “responsible” manner, and avoid the chaotic end in Vietnam in 1975? How do we protect our vital national security interests in the rest of the vast and vital region that stretches from the Mediterranean to the Himalayas? How do we deal with the estimated 6,000al-Qaeda now operating in western Iraq, as a result of American politics?
The first thing that must be done is to define our vital national interests —something that has been sorely lacking. Time does not permit a full review today of what these would be, but I suggest that you consider hearings focused on this precise issue in order to help educate the American people. While oil and energy resources are often put at the top of any list, we cannot allow ourselves to be blackmailed because of energy. In any case, remaining in Iraq hardly helps us, or anyone else, on oil. There is plenty of oil there, but it will not flow to the rest of the world in significant quantities until there is peace and stability, and, in any case, American has never been dependent on Iraqi oil.
Nor is promotion of democracy a top priority, at this time, in Iraq or its neighbors. Now, Mr Chairman, you and I have both spent much of our lives supporting democracy and human rights around the world; indeed, it is one of the issues that first brought us together. But the oath we take when we enter government service calls on us to preserve and protect the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic. We can deplore the behavior of regimes in nations from Burma to Zimbabwe, and we should use whatever influence we have to call them to account for their treatment of their own people. If the opportunity arises, we should act to promote a peaceful transition to popular rule, as we did in the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, Chile, and Central and Eastern Europe. But we cannot intervene everywhere, and in any case, military action is unlikely to produce the popularly-based governments that we prefer. Those who supported the initial action in Iraq did so because the American people were misled on the issue of Weapons of Mass Destruction, because Saddam was a monster, because we believed that the administration was competent, because they asserted a link between Saddam and 9/11, and because when American troops are in harm’s way, our first instinct is to support them. But not—I repeat, not—to impose democracy in a country that had never known it, that was torn by ancient sectarian divisions, and that should never have been created within its present boundaries to begin with.
The consequences of these monumental mistakes have created a new set of consequences. With al-Qaeda now entrenching itself in western Iraq, and Sunnis and Shiites tearing each other apart, with Americans caught in the middle, what should we do?
The president’s answer was the surge, which is really a mini-escalation. To my mind, 21,000 more troops are either too few or too many. They are not enough to turn the tide, but they significantly deepen our involvement in a war that cannot be won through military means. American casualties will increase, and the escalation increases the risks that the ultimate American exit from Iraq will be a precipitous one.
At this point, it is clear that all our choices in Iraq are bad. Given these circumstances, I have come to the conclusion that, however difficult and painful, we should try to manage a careful, phased re-deployment of American troops, rather than face a situation in the not-too-distant future that would force our hand. This is, to some extent, what the British decided to do with their announcement last week; more British withdrawals seem certain once the Prime Minister changes later this year. The South Koreans are following much the same pattern.
Such a re-deployment would take approximately a year, if done properly. It could start relatively soon, if President Bush would consider it—and present it--not as a defeat, but as an opportunity to salvage something from the wreckage that is now Iraq. The United States could leave some troops behind for specific tasks related directly to our own national security—first, pursuit of the al-Qaeda network in western Iraq; second, helping stabilize the situation between Turkey and the Kurds of northern Iraq; third, possibly training Iraqi forces. American troops long ago achieved their original objective—the removal of Saddam Hussein—but they should not, nor will they be able to, stay indefinitely to oversee the creation a government, in President Bush’s words, “of national unity. . . .that can defend itself.” Such a government is, in fact, not possible in Iraq today, except perhaps under another brutal dictatorship. Senator Biden and Les Gelb have proposed a solution to this conundrum that I have supported: an Iraqi version of the Dayton Agreement that would create stronger regional governments within a single federal state. The Kurds already have their own self-administered region in northern Iraq, while SCIRI, the most powerful Shiite political group, wants something similar for the south and east. Yet both the Administration and the Baker-Hamilton Commission opposed Biden-Gelb. Perhaps they did not understand it, or perhaps the open Saudi Arabian opposition prevented it from getting the attention it deserved. But time is running out for the United States to play an important role in this or any other solution. If we wish to influence the political future of Iraq we must seek to do so now, while American troops are still there. Time is not on our side, and anti-American feelings continue to grow, even among those who owe their freedom from a murderous dictator to the bravery and skill of American troops.
Beyond Iraq, we must focus first on two states, Turkey and Israel, the two democracies, and our two closest allies, in the region. Turkey remains our indispensable NATO ally, the front-line state of the post-Cold War era. Yet it has gone from strongly pro-American six years ago to violently hostile today. This is a long term disaster for both nations, and must be reversed. As for Israel, the issues are obvious, and lie beyond today’s hearings. But it must be said that Israel has not benefited from the Iraq war as some in both the U.S. and Israel once hoped and predicted. On the contrary, Iraq has only increased the isolation and dangers to Israel.
Another issue, closely related, is the Kurdish question. In this regard, Mr Chairman, I would like to submit for the record my recent article in The Washington Post, based on my trip to Turkey and northern Iraq.
I wish to close with a few words about Afghanistan. It is inexcusable that this vital front in the war on al-Qaeda was allowed to languish for so long. When I warned of this danger in a column in The Washington Post almost a year ago, I was called by two of the Administration’s most senior officials and told I was “too pessimistic.” Today, re-reading it, I think I was rather too optimistic—although I was not optimistic at all. Mr Chairman, we must win this war, or else Osama bin Laden will return and start again to plot attacks on our homeland without the pressure he now faces as he hides in caves on the Pakistan border. This will require more troops, more resources, and more support from our NATO allies. That, in turn, will require effective American leadership, something that has been lacking in recent years. It will also require bipartisan support for much larger economic assistance programs, and a complete re-evaluation of the drug eradication programs, which, despite their enormous cost, have been a colossal failure. Once again, Mr Chairman, I believe your Committee can play a leadership role in getting Afghanistan right—before it is too late. ……. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.