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Global
Humanitarian Emergencies:
Trends and Projections, 1999-2000
National Intelligence Estimate
December 2001
Information
available as of 15 August 1999 was used in preparing
this report.
Scope
Note
Summary
Global
Overview
Outlook
Political
Will
Funding
This
assessment focuses on humanitarian emergencies
arising from manmade causes and/or major natural
disasters.
-
The
manmade causes we focus on
are armed conflict, repressive government
policies, sudden economic emergencies, and
technological occurrences such as Y2K.
Summary
Both the number and intensity of humanitarian
emergencies, as well as the number of people in
need, will remain at about the same high level
or even increase somewhat by December 2000- testing
the capacity and willingness of the international
donor community to respond adequately. According
to the US Committee for Refugees, roughly 35 million
people are in need of emergency humanitarian assistance.
There are twenty-four ongoing humanitarian emergencies
and new or renewed emergencies could appear in
the Balkans, Sub-Saharan Africa, Russia, and/or
Central America.
-
Humanitarian
conditions throughout the former Yugoslavia,
Haiti, Iraq, and North Korea will continue
to have a particularly significant impact
upon regional stability, as well as on the
strategic interests of major outside powers.
-
Conditions
are likely to worsen in Angola, Colombia,
Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Republic of Serbia
within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY), excluding the province of Kosovo.
The current drought in the Horn of Africa
may induce a famine as severe as that of
the mid-1980s.
In addition to the emergencies cited above, several
other major countries and regions may experience
conflict, political instability, sudden economic
crises, or technological or natural disasters-
leading to new or renewed humanitarian emergencies:
-
The
countries of Central America and the Caribbean
that were battered by hurricanes in 1998-
especially Honduras, Nicaragua, Dominican
Republic, and Haiti-remain vulnerable to
weather-induced disasters.
-
The
possibility of additional sudden economic
emergencies also cannot be discounted. In
Russia, drought threatens the grain harvest,
and unless the outlook improves, Moscow
will again need large-scale food assistance.
The overall demand for emergency humanitarian
assistance through December 2000 may exceed the
willingness of major donor countries to respond.
Overall funding for ongoing emergencies has probably
temporarily spiked upward owing to Hurricane Mitch
and Kosovo. Nevertheless, the focus on the Balkans
could detract attention and resources from other
regions with extensive humanitarian needs. Absent
major new emergencies, the longer-term funding
trend is likely to continue downward, increasing
the shortfall. Government funding is likely to
decline fastest for long-lasting conflicts where
attempts at political resolution continue to fail.
The
Changing Character of Humanitarian Emergencies
Humanitarian emergencies are being affected by
the changing practices and military capabilities
of combatants, the lasting impact of conflicts
triggered by genocide and other crimes against
humanity, and the impact of sudden economic crises:
-
Instances
of killing, injuring, and kidnapping of
aid workers are on the rise. Relief agencies
increasingly doubt whether adequate security
will be provided for their humanitarian
efforts, and some organizations are withdrawing
from particularly dangerous situations.
-
Genocidal-type
conflicts create the most intractable humanitarian
emergencies. They trigger large numbers
of refugees and IDPs, create special security
risks for neighboring states and humanitarian
workers, and place substantial demands on
resources-several billion dollars each in
the cases of Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and Kosovo.
Factors
Affecting Humanitarian Response
Democratic governments, energized by NGO pressures,
media-inspired public awareness of suffering in
selected parts of the world, changing political
and legal norms, and their own humanitarian impulses
face increasing pressures to respond to humanitarian
crises. Donor governments are
wrestling with the conditions under which they
will use military force to intervene.
Changing
Legal Norms
In recent years, the balance between the principle
of noninterference in the internal affairs of
sovereign states and justifications for international
humanitarian intervention in response to grave
violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law gradually has been shifting in favor of intervention,
particularly for those emergencies that involve
genocide or genocide-like conflict. At the same
time, the assertion of the right to state sovereignty
by some countries will continue to be a major
stumbling block to early action in a potential
humanitarian emergency.
Changing
Political Expectations
The dominance of democratic states since the
Cold War ended-together with growing popular demands
for civil liberties and/or self-determination
in authoritarian or failing states-increases pressures
for humanitarian response. This is particularly
true when outside assistance is by mutual consent,
but political support is also increasing for humanitarian
interventions backed by the threat or use of military
force in certain instances. Emergencies provoked
by genocide and other atrocities will evoke the
strongest political, NGO, and public pressures
to intervene. Some developing countries, however,
will continue to criticize what they view as donor
countries' uneven responses to humanitarian emergencies,
comparing the largesse shown in the Balkans with
the more limited aid to emergencies in the developing
world.
Capacities
of Relief Organizations
The overall capacity of international relief
organizations to respond to humanitarian emergencies
has improved modestly over time, but problems
will persist. Despite progress in strengthening
UN agencies' operations over the last decade,
rivalries among and within organizations will
continue to impede the challenging tasks of managing
humanitarian crises and undertaking longer-term
reconstruction in places such as Kosovo.
Military
Assistance
The United States, the United Kingdom, France,
Canada, Germany, and Russia are the only countries
with the long-range military airlift capability
required to deliver bulk humanitarian aid in large,
sudden emergencies, or where humanitarian access
is denied to large populations. While the capabilities
of donor governments' military forces to participate
in humanitarian emergencies remain relatively
fixed, the Kosovo crisis and the heightened public
interest in humanitarian response will place growing
demands on them.
Food
Availability
Slightly tighter world grain supplies for 1999/2000
are not likely to have a significant impact on
the availability of emergency food aid, the supply
of which can be boosted by the major food-donating
countries in response to an unexpected increase
in worldwide emergency food aid needs. However,
people targeted for emergency food aid in countries
where the host government either denies access
to organizations or diverts some of the aid for
its own needs may not receive assistance.
Outlook
While
democratic governments will continue to be responsive
to humanitarian emergencies, their willingness
to undertake major humanitarian operations-particularly
forceful interventions-is likely to remain constrained.
Over the next few years, the perception of success
or failure of NATO's military interventions in
the Balkans, particularly the costly humanitarian
and reconstruction efforts in Kosovo, will influence
the scale and scope of subsequent humanitarian
interventions.
The number of ongoing humanitarian emergencies
has increased from 21 to 24 since July 1998:
While the number of emergencies has increased,
the number of people in need of emergency humanitarian
assistance worldwide-including internally diplaced
persons (IDPs), refugees, and others in need of
such assistance-has not changed appreciably.
Ongoing
Humanitarian Emergencies
Both
the number and intensity of humanitarian emergencies,
as well as the number of people in need, are likely
to remain at about the same high level or even
increase somewhat by December 2000-testing the
capacity and willingness of the international
donor community to respond adequately. This will
be especially likely if one or more potential
emergencies develop or humanitarian conditions
deteriorate in large and populous countries such
as DROC or Ethiopia.
-
Humanitarian
conditions are likely to worsen in Angola,
Colombia, Ethiopia, Haiti, Somalia, and
the Republic of Serbia within the FRY, excluding
the province of Kosovo. Conditions in the
Republic of Montenegro within the FRY will
remain about the same or could worsen.
-
Conditions
are expected to remain about the same in
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Burundi, Croatia,
Eritrea, Georgia, Liberia, North Korea,
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Uganda.
-
Conditions
are likely to improve in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the Kosovo province in the FRY, Indonesia,
Iraq, and Rwanda.
Ongoing
Emergencies with Greatest Impact
Humanitarian
conditions throughout the former Yugoslavia, Haiti,
Iraq, and North Korea will continue to have significant
impact upon regional stability as well as on the
strategic interests of major outside powers.
- Former
Yugoslavia will continue to require
a high level of humanitarian assistance.
- Kosovo. Because of continuing
international attention and a modicum of political
stability enforced by NATO, Kosovo is likely
to experience major improvements in humanitarian
conditions. Nevertheless, reconstruction efforts
will require substantial international assistance
to provide a secure environment, return 1.5
million displaced ethnic Albanians to their
homes, rebuild housing and infrastructure, and
deliver emergency aid until farms and factories
are restored to productivity. Unlike their neighbors
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, many displaced Kosovo
Albanians will be returning to empty and damaged
houses and villages rather than confronting
displaced persons from rival ethnic groups.
-
Republic of Serbia outside Kosovo and
the Republic of Montenegro. Humanitarian
conditions, while not dire, likely will worsen
somewhat as more than 100,000 Serbs from Kosovo
add to the half million refugees from Bosnia
and Croatia already in the FRY. The FRY's ability
to provide support to Serb refugees and IDPs,
and to repair damaged infrastructure, will be
constrained by bleak economic prospects and
the potential for growing domestic political
unrest in the aftermath of the end of the conflict
in Kosovo. As long as President Milosevic remains
in power, international aid to Serbia will be
limited largely to providing humanitarian relief
rather than rebuilding the economic infrastructure,
repairing damage from NATO bombing, and integrating
refugees and IDPs.
- Conditions could also deteriorate in Montenegro
if civil war breaks out with Serbia, or if international
assistance cannot be effectively implemented.
- Improvements in Bosnia and Herzegovina
are likely to continue through 2000, with extensive
housing and economic reconstruction necessary
to overcome a range of obstacles.
-
Although
Haiti is recovering from its
weather-induced humanitarian emergency,
escalating political unrest preceding legislative
elections scheduled for December 1999, coupled
with a further deterioration of the economic
situation, could trigger a modest worsening
of humanitarian conditions and increase
migration pressures. The Haitian Government
will continue to rely on international assistance
to resolve any humanitarian crisis.
-
Iraq's
humanitarian prospects are inextricably
linked to its relations with the international
community and a new weapons inspection regime.
Assuming the continuation of the oil-for-food
program at or above current levels and access
to people in need, humanitarian conditions
are likely to improve. The humanitarian
situation could take a turn for the worse
if the oil-for-food program and other relief
efforts were substantially cut by the UN
or by the regime or if the regime's insecurity
impelled it to step up its repression of
Shia, Kurds, and other groups to fend off
internal threats.
-
North
Korea will be a significant humanitarian
challenge because of the severity of the
food deficit, restricted international access
to those in need, and the large number of
people affected. The infusion of projected
international food aid-combined with North
Korea's harvest of 3.2 million metric tons-is
expected to meet P'yongyang's basic subsistence
needs of 4.5 million metric tons from July
1999 through at least March 2000. Even with
this aid, widespread malnutrition will persist
due, in part, to distribution problems.
Absent significant economic reform, North
Korea will remain in need of large-scale
humanitarian aid-the bulk of which will
continue to be provided by the United States,
China, and the European Union.
Other
Severe Ongoing Emergencies
Other countries are considered to be of great
concern based on the current scale of the humanitarian
crisis, the projected outlook for the underlying
causes, and/or the likelihood that the emergency
will spread to neighboring countries:
-
Angola's
humanitarian situation is deteriorating
rapidly, and conditions are expected to
worsen further-perhaps drastically-as the
civil conflict between the government and
UNITA intensifies. The number of people
in need will grow well beyond the current
figure of 3 million, while conditions for
vulnerable populations will become more
severe. Heavy fighting and the combatants'
unwillingness to provide humanitarian access
to noncombatants are putting many critical
areas out of the reach of aid deliveries
and increasing the risks for international
relief workers and IDPs alike.
-
Ethiopia
and Somalia are facing a significant
deterioration in humanitarian conditions
resulting mostly from drought but exacerbated
both by the Ethiopia-Eritrea border conflict
and by hostilities among Somalia's warlords,
which continue to hamper relief efforts
and displace civilians. A total of over
3 million people are currently in need in
the two countries; up to a few million more
could be at risk from famine by December
2000. Indeed, the current drought in the
Horn of Africa may induce a famine as severe
as that of the mid-1980s. Preoccupied with
the war against Eritrea, having limited
resources and infrastructure, and denied
access to Eritrean ports, Ethiopia may not
respond effectively to the humanitarian
needs of its population. The international
community also will be pressed to provide
extensive food aid to Somalia, where clan
leaders dominate decisionmaking in the absence
of any central government.
-
Sudan
is a long-standing and large-scale humanitarian
emergency: it has 4 million IDPs-the highest
number of any country in the world-in addition
to its almost 400,000 refugees. It is unlikely
that there will be either a breakthrough
in negotiations or a major shift in the
military balance between Khartoum and the
insurgents that would fundamentally change
the situation through December 2000. In
addition to problems resulting directly
from the fighting, the frequent droughts
in southern Sudan will have severe consequences
because the conflict often limits international
efforts to ameliorate the crisis.
Conflict may intensify or spread across clusters
of African countries:
-
DROC
Spillover. Of particular concern
is the risk of a widening conflict in DROC
which could affect the neighboring countries
of Central African Republic, Republic of
the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania,
and/or Zambia-several of which are already
experiencing humanitarian emergencies. Even
if a peace accord in DROC holds, humanitarian
conditions are unlikely to improve significantly
over the next 18-months.
-
The
conflict in Sierra Leone could
widen-or the Liberia conflict
could heat up again-spreading to neighboring
states that are now relatively stable, such
as Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Ghana and/or Senegal.
Even if a peace accord holds in Sierra Leone,
humanitarian conditions are unlikely to
improve significantly.
Potential
Concerns
In addition to the emergencies cited above,
several other major countries and regions may
experience conflict, political instability, sudden
economic crises, or natural disasters-leading
to new or renewed humanitarian emergencies (see
figure 2).
- Although
the crisis appears to be subsiding, renewed
conflict between nuclear powers India and
Pakistan over Kashmir could
expand beyond Kashmir into neighboring areas,
as it has in previous wars. A full-scale war
that extends along the border probably would
spread to the Indian state of Rajasthan and
the Indian and Pakistani states of Punjab
and displace over a million people. The conflict
also could spark even more widespread communal
fighting in other parts of India, pitting
Hindus against Muslims as it did at partition
in 1947, when 10 million people were displaced
and at least one million were killed. The
potential impact of a humanitarian emergency
in Kashmir is very high because of the potential
for a nuclear exchange
Probability:
Low
Potential Impact: Very High
- The
countries of Central America and
the Caribbean that were battered
by hurricanes last year, especially Honduras,
Nicaragua, Dominican Republic,
and Haiti, remain vulnerable
to weather-induced disasters. Greater-than-average
rainfall is projected for the 1999 rainy season.
Since much of the rehabilitation work was
makeshift, especially in remote rural areas,
it will be in jeopardy in storms much less
powerful than Mitch. Serious economic disruptions
in the region would further increase illegal
migration into Mexico and the United States.
Probability:
Low
Potential Impact: High
- The
aftermath of the Kosovo crisis continues to
threaten the fragile inter-ethnic accommodation
between The Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia's (FYROM) Slavic
majority and ethnic Albanian minority. Macedonian
Slavs are sympathetic to their Serb kinsmen
and wary of the transiting Kosovar Albanian
refugees, while ethnic Albanians in the FYROM
are extending material and moral support to
the Kosovars. These developments could undermine
the governing coalition of Slavs and ethnic
Albanians. The coalition's survival will depend
on the further integration of the Albanian
minority into economic and political institutions,
the ability of Slavs and ethnic Albanians
to insulate themselves from destabilizing
pressures from Serbs and Kosovar Albanians,
and whether the government allocates promised
international aid fairly. Should the inter-ethnic
accommodation fall apart, FYROM could plunge
into civil conflict, creating a humanitarian
emergency affecting a significant percentage
of the country's two million people and threatening
the stability of the Balkan region as a whole.
Probability:
Low
Potential Impact: High
- While
democratic elections in Nigeria
earlier this year have reduced political polarization
somewhat, the tasks facing the new government
are immense. In particular, the government
will be challenged to address the bloody ethnic
conflict in the oil-rich Niger Delta region,
where dispossessed ethnic minorities expect
a "new deal" in the form of increased
access to oil revenues and massive government
rehabilitation programs. Both will be very
difficult for the government to deliver, given
the influence of the military, the weak state
of the country's economy, and the need to
stick to tough fiscal targets to re-establish
Nigeria's credibility with the IMF and private
investors. Although unlikely, a boiling over
of discontent in the Delta, displacing hundreds
of thousands of people and leading to widespread
refugee flows into neighboring countries,
cannot be ruled out.
Probability:
Low
Potential Impact: Medium
- In
Russia, drought threatens the
grain harvest. Russian agricultural specialists
have reduced their estimate for the grain
harvest this year from 70 million metric tons
to 50-55 million tons, slightly above the
record low of 48 million tons last year. Wheat
output may fall more than 3 million tons short
of demand. Recent scattered rains have helped,
but the outlook for the harvest could worsen
sharply if the drought continues. Unless the
outlook improves, Moscow will again need international
food assistance.
Probability:
Medium
Potential Impact: Low
In addition to these country- and region-specific
potential emergencies, more generalized conditions
in the current international environment might
result in humanitarian crises:
-
Additional
sudden economic emergencies cannot
be discounted. The 1997-98 global financial
crisis eroded the margins of safety that
separate hundreds of millions of people
from poverty in dozens of "emerging
market" countries. In addition, the
legacy of the crisis has made many countries
more vulnerable to the social impact of
natural disasters. While the global financial
system is recovering from the crisis, and
while some countries have experienced a
faster rebound of production than anticipated,
many economies remain in recession. Moreover,
financial markets remain wary of the emerging
market countries, and the possibility of
a significant rise in global interest rates
could further undermine recovery.
Looking
Ahead
The Changing Character of Humanitarian
Emergencies in the 1990s
The preponderance of ethnic and communal conflicts
within and across national boundaries since the
Cold War's end has increased the number and changed
the character of humanitarian emergencies. According
to the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs:
Since the late 1980s, the total number of IDPs
has exceeded the number of refugees due to the
increasing number of internal conflicts (see figure
5).
The
Potential Humanitarian Impact of the Y2K Problem
The
Y2K computer problem will affect hardware, embedded
processors, and software throughout the world,
including basic infrastructure such as telecommunications,
power plants, and water systems. All countries
are likely to experience some Y2K disruptions,
and many countries will suffer a breakdown of
at least part of their basic infrastructure.
Y2K-related
disruptions have the potential to cause or exacerbate
humanitarian crises. These include prolonged outages
of power and heat, breakdowns in urban water supplies,
military miscalculations due to failures in early
warning systems, malfunctions in nuclear power
plants, serious food shortages, and environmental
disasters resulting from failures in safety controls.
Multiple
and simultaneous emergencies on a global scale
would quickly overwhelm national and international
institutions responsible for providing humanitarian
relief. Furthermore, some relief organizations
probably will be hindered by Y2K failures in their
communications, records-keeping, and transport
capabilities.
Although
Y2K remediation is not technically challenging
in principle, it is costly, time-consuming, and
labor-intensive. Many firms and governments have
difficulty managing such a large-scale task. The
private sector and governments in some countries
are developing contingency plans to manage the
impact on the general population, but these efforts
are often poorly funded.
Civilians have increasingly become key targets
for combatants on all sides. War has become as
much about displacing people as moving borders,
creating an ever deeper chasm between the military
goals of combatants and humanitarian aims. The
extent of atrocities against noncombatants has
apparently intensified, while humanitarian organizations
are increasingly viewed as biased by one side
or another, exposing relief workers to retaliation.
Changing
Combatant Practices
Combatants
are employing starvation, slaughter and various
civilian and military technologies to expel or
kill civilians. Techniques include demonstration
killings and maiming (as in Sierra Leone), systematic
rape (Bosnia and Herzegovina), instigation or
encouragement of atrocities through radio broadcasts
(Rwanda), the wholesale expulsion of civilians
(Kosovo), and the use of civilians as human shields
(Kosovo).
-
The
increasing ferocity of conflict is facilitated
by the wide availability, at very modest
prices, of an array of light and medium
weapons. Everything from weapons, to ammunition,
to training and support packages is for
sale or rent.
-
Refugee
and IDP camps have been used as bases for
operations by combatants in Liberia, Pakistan,
and DROC, as they were in earlier conflicts
along the borders of Rwanda and Cambodia,
and in Central America-increasing the risks
for camp populations and relief workers
alike.
Combatants
Manipulating International Opinion
In
conducting their campaigns, political and military
leaders of combatant groups are becoming attentive
to the ways in which outside powers react to other
combatant leaders, as well as to the prospects
that they will be held accountable for illegal
behavior under international law. The growing
prominence of human rights in international politics
and law, however, will incline combatants to attempt
to conceal their atrocities and to deny humanitarian
access. Combatants also will attempt to publicize,
or even concoct, atrocities by the other side.
Combatants
Increasingly Well-Armed
The
halting pace of the economic transitions in the
newly independent states of the former Soviet
Union has sparked an aggressive marketing competition
that now dominates the global arms market. The
availability of relatively inexpensive weapons
plays a key role in facilitating or perpetuating
conflicts that cause humanitarian emergencies
throughout the world:
-
In
Africa, the scene of many complex emergencies,
small arms are readily available; for example,
AK-47s can be had in the Great Lakes region
for as little as $12.
Increasing
Risks to Aid Workers
During
the 1990s, humanitarian aid workers have increasingly
been targeted by combatants as they operate in
"harm's way" in the midst of internal
conflict. The fact that humanitarian organizations
are increasingly operating in areas where there
is no clear recognized governmental authority
means they have to negotiate access with multiple
parties, leaving them vulnerable to manipulation
for political purposes. Instances of killing,
injury and kidnapping of aid workers, as well
as looting and blackmail are on the rise:
Genocidal or genocide-like conflicts aimed at
annihilating all or part of a racial, religious,
or ethnic group, and conflicts caused by other
crimes against humanity-such as forced, large-scale
expulsions of populations-are likely to generate
the most intractable humanitarian needs:
-
Genocidal
conflicts such as those in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Rwanda, mass killings on a somewhat
smaller scale, such as in Burundi and DROC,
and mass expulsions in Kosovo evoke the
most visceral emotional responses from victims
and perpetrators alike. The political, economic,
and social conditions that provoke such
conflicts are likely to persist.
-
Such
conflicts also destroy any semblance of
civil society and provoke or hasten economic
decline. In some instances, they are a by-product
of war or state failure; in others a cause,
further expanding the scale and scope of
the ensuing humanitarian emergencies.
-
Such
humanitarian emergencies typically produce
especially large numbers of refugees and
IDPs to feed and house, as in Rwanda, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.
Responding to the large numbers of refugees and
IDPs triggered by a genocidal or genocidal-like
conflict imposes large political and security
risks. Such conflicts will place substantial demands
on available resources-several billion dollars
each in the cases of Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and Kosovo-and require substantial security for
military personnel, civilian officials, and humanitarian
relief workers.
Sudden economic downturns can combine with natural
or technological disasters to accentuate or create
humanitarian emergencies in developing countries
lacking the infrastructure and government capacity
to cope with them. These types of humanitarian
emergencies are often exacerbated by other factors-such
as deep ethnic, social, and political fissures-raising
their costs and delaying their recovery.
-
The
past year saw a sharp increase in the number
of people needing aid due to natural disasters.
The recently published Red Cross Annual
World Disasters Report states that, in 1998,
5.5 million people needed aid after disasters
such as floods and earthquakes. The 1998
number is a nearly ten-fold increase over
the 1992 figure.
-
Natural
disasters such as flooding and earthquakes
in places such as Central America, Africa,
and parts of Asia have a particularly severe
impact because of high urbanization, isolated
rural populations, and poor infrastructure,
complicating aid delivery and recovery.
Democratic governments, energized by NGO pressures,
media-inspired public awareness of suffering in
selected parts of the world, changing political
and legal norms, and their own humanitarian impulses,
face increasing pressures to respond to humanitarian
emergencies. Donor governments' military forces
and international relief organizations will be
challenged to respond to the ongoing and potential
emergencies outlined above.
There are two broad categories of humanitarian
response:
Donor governments are wrestling with the conditions
under which they will use military force to intervene
in humanitarian emergencies. In general, assertion
of the right to noninterference by some countries
will continue to be a major stumbling block to
early action in a potential humanitarian emergency.
Governments that provoke, inflame, or tolerate
a given humanitarian emergency are for political
or economic reasons often reluctant to admit the
existence of IDPs, grant asylum to refugees from
neighboring countries, or consent to the delivery
of outside assistance-unless they find they can
exploit the humanitarian relief operations for
political or financial gain.
International
Legal Norms
In
recent years, the balance between the legal principle
of noninterference in the internal affairs of
sovereign states and various legal justifications
for international intervention in response to
threats to international peace and security, grave
violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law, and crimes against humanity has been shifting
somewhat in favor of intervention. This is particularly
the case for those emergencies that might devolve
into genocidal or genocide-like conflict. These
shifts in legal principle are, however, by no
means conclusive.
-
UN
agreements are being interpreted more broadly.
Article 2 of the UN Charter enshrines
the principle of noninterference in the
internal affairs of member states, but Articles
55 and 56 also call on members to take joint
or individual action to promote observance
of human rights, which are being defined
increasingly broadly. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights enacted in 1948 and the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, with their Additional
Protocols of 1977, further define the obligations
of states party to these treaties to protect
human rights and punish violators and also
expand the international community's obligations
to intervene toward this end.
-
The
principle that noncombatants have a right
to humanitarian assistance has been established.
Pursuant to the Gulf War and the crisis
in Northern Iraq, UN General Assembly Resolution
46/182 in December 1991 established the
reciprocal principles that noncombatants
in a humanitarian emergency have the right
to assistance and that states have the obligation
to permit humanitarian organizations to
enter their territories in order to help
those in need. This paved the way for the
establishment of a UN Emergency Relief Coordinator
and subsequently the UN's Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which
has since been merged into the Office of
the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA).
-
Abusive
governments are no longer protected by state
sovereignty. The creation in the early
1990s of international criminal tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda
has clearly established that international
law extends to individual criminal behavior
formerly shielded by state sovereignty.
Establishment of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) in 1998 further enshrines this
principle, although the nonparticipation
of the United States and other states such
as China underscores concerns about the
protection of state sovereignty and the
potential for malevolent countries to abuse
the ICC in practice.
The UN Security Council continues to authorize
or endorse peacekeeping missions primarily to
address the security needs of a country or region
and remains hesitant to establish operations for
the primary purpose of ensuring the delivery of
humanitarian assistance. Nonetheless, during this
decade the Council has increasingly cited intervention
for the purpose of ensuring humanitarian assistance
as one justification for the international peacekeeping
missions on its agenda.
-
Many
UN operations established in the late 1980s
and early 1990s-notably UNAVEM I in Angola
and UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia-were
re-mandated in the late 1990s to play a
more prominent role in coordinating, facilitating,
and supporting humanitarian activities.
-
While
the Council has authorized fewer UN peacekeeping
operations since 1995 than in the early
1990s, it has authorized regional organizations
and coalitions of the willing to undertake
them under the authority of Chapters 7 and
8 of the Charter. Since 1997, the UN Security
Council has authorized or endorsed non-UN
operations for humanitarian objectives in
Albania, the Central African Republic, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Kosovo, and
Guinea-Bissau.
-
Concomitantly,
since the mid-1990s, NATO, the Organization
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
have also recognized egregious humanitarian
abuses in their respective regions as a
legitimate target for collective response.
Changing
Political Norms
The
post-Cold War political, military, and economic
dominance of democratic states-together with the
growing drives for civil liberties, democracy,
and/or self-determination in authoritarian or
failing states-creates pressures on behalf of
humanitarian response. This is particularly true
when such outside assistance is by mutual consent.
In certain instances, public and political support
is also increasing for military interventions
to pursue humanitarian objectives.
-
The
revolution in information technologies and
the increased economic, cultural, and intellectual
permeability of national borders is eroding
the ability of inept or venal governments
to mask humanitarian emergencies and to
escape international attention.
-
These
factors also enable disadvantaged groups
in countries suffering from internal conflicts
or repression, such as in the former Yugoslavia,
Iraq, and Turkey, to press for better treatment
and self-determination and to solicit outside
support and intervention.
-
The
spread of globalization, concern about human
rights, and the increasing numbers and influence
of nongovernmental organizations around
the world heighten public awareness of humanitarian
emergencies.
Looking
Ahead
Capacities for Humanitarian Military Assistance
The Kosovo crisis and the heightened public interest
in humanitarian response will place growing demands
on military capabilities for humanitarian assistance.
However, the capabilities of donor governments'
military forces to participate in humanitarian
emergencies have not changed substantially in
recent years.
-
The
United States, the United Kingdom, France,
Canada, Germany, and Russia remain the only
countries with the long-range military airlift
capability required to deliver bulk humanitarian
aid in large, sudden emergencies, or where
humanitarian access is denied to large populations,
most recently in Kosovo.
-
The
ability of developing countries to participate
in humanitarian operations varies widely;
most countries lack specialized logistic,
transport, engineering, military police,
and medical personnel to sustain such forces.
-
In
the last few years, the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France, among other
states, have launched training activities
to enhance African capabilities to respond
to humanitarian crises and peacekeeping
challenges. The US African Crisis Response
Initiative (ACRI) seeks to train several
rapidly deployable, interoperable battalions
from stable, democratic countries in Africa
to a common standard based on NATO peacekeeping
doctrine and procedures.
Looking
Ahead
Capacities of International Relief Organizations
The international response to humanitarian emergencies
is carried out through a loosely organized and
loosely coordinated network of inter-governmental
and nongovernmental relief organizations. These
are supported by governments that provide financial
and in-kind resources, undertake political and
diplomatic initiatives, and, in some instances,
dispatch military forces for humanitarian assistance
or forceful intervention on behalf of civilian
populations. The overall capacity of international
relief organizations to respond to humanitarian
emergencies has improved modestly over time, but
problems are likely to persist:
-
There
has been some progress in strengthening
UN agencies' capacities for pre-crisis preparedness
and rapid response over the last decade.
In recent years, humanitarian agencies have
developed several networks and interactive
databases that have significantly improved
their abilities to provide assistance.
-
Limited
coordination among the various humanitarian
agencies, however, continues to hinder the
effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.
OCHA, for example, has had difficulty establishing
a coordinating role, despite the 1997 Secretariat
reforms pertaining to humanitarian response.
Relief
Agencies Wary of Operating in Hostile Environments
As
humanitarian relief workers are put at increasing
risk from local governments and political authorities,
and outside states provide uneven security, many
aid workers have called for greater use of outside
military force to ensure their physical security.
-
Agencies
received some military assistance, but not
protection, in eastern Zaire after July
1994, and received no protection in eastern
Zaire/ DROC in 1996-97.
Overall, relief agencies have come to doubt whether
the UN, regional organizations, or international
military coalition forces will provide adequate
security for ongoing humanitarian operations.
Therefore, most humanitarian organizations have
begun to prepare themselves better to work in
hostile environments: they are buying thick-skinned
vehicles; taking security awareness and defensive
driving courses; hiring security directors from
among retired Western military officers, and acquiring
more security guards. Even the ICRC-which usually
will not accept any military escort-now sometimes
hires local guards for its own facilities and
equipment.
In the absence of adequate security, increasing
numbers of UN agencies, NGOs and the ICRC sometimes
temporarily withdraw from particularly dangerous
situations. In the 1990s, relief workers have
pulled out of Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Chechnya, eastern DROC, Liberia, northwest Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, and Somalia due to increased security
risks.
The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
reported that in 1998, food aid totaled 8 million
metric tons (MMt)--up 10 percent from the previous
year--of which emergency food aid amounted to
almost 3 MMt. The increase, following a four-year
decline, was due to higher food aid needs, particularly
in Asia; a bumper world grain harvest in 1997/98;
high stock levels in donor countries; low grain
prices; and a commitment on the part of the major
donors to increase their food aid donations. Total
food aid-which includes food aid for humanitarian
emergencies as well as for chronic food deficits-remains
far below the peak level of 17.3 million metric
tons in 1993 (see figure 7)-when demand also approached
a peak.
According to the most recent USDA estimates, total
world grain production (wheat, coarse grains,
and milled rice) for 1999/2000 will be 1.840 billion
tons, down from 1.848 last year and down from
the record 1997/98 harvest of 1.876 billion. This
is still a bumper crop, with wheat at 570 million
tons, coarse grains at 880 million, and a forecast
record 390 million ton rice crop. World oilseed
production (soybeans, cottonseed, peanut oil,
sunflower seed oil, etc.) is forecast at a record
298 million tons.
Nevertheless, a drawdown of world grain reserves
accumulated during the last three years may be
necessary to meet projected 1999/2000 consumption
needs. Slightly tighter world grain supplies for
1999/2000 are not likely to have a significant
impact on the availability of emergency
food aid, the supply of which can be boosted
by the major food donating countries in response
to an unexpected increase in worldwide emergency
food aid needs.
The overall "demand" for emergency humanitarian
assistance through December 2000 is likely to
exceed the willingness of major donor countries
to respond. Governments will continue to prioritize
humanitarian emergencies according to their national
interests. Only some "supply" components
of humanitarian assistance-notably food-are likely
to be adequate. The capacity of international
humanitarian aid organizations to respond will
continue to be limited by resources and hostile
environments.
The decisions of countries to respond to humanitarian
emergencies will depend upon whether or not their
national interests outweigh competing domestic
priorities, a potentially negative political reaction
at home, and the dangers and substantial costs
involved in providing such assistance.
-
Over
the next few years, the perception of success
or failure of NATO's military interventions
in the Balkans, particularly the costly
humanitarian and reconstruction efforts
in Kosovo, will establish a benchmark for
subsequent humanitarian intervention.
National governments-principally the OECD countries-provide
the bulk of financial resources for emergency
humanitarian relief. These funds are provided
to UN organizations, the ICRC, NGOs, and recipient
governments through bilateral grants. The data
provided by various international agencies concerning
funding for humanitarian emergencies is fragmentary,
often noncomparable, and sometimes contradictory
(see Table 1.)
Although overall funding for ongoing humanitarian
emergencies has probably temporarily spiked upward
owing to the crises in Central America and Kosovo,
the longer-term funding trend is likely to continue
downward absent new emergencies. Hurricane Mitch
and Kosovo-like the earlier cases of Bosnia and
Herzegovina or Rwanda-probably elicited considerable
resources that normally would not go into the
humanitarian assistance pipeline.
Table 1
Annual Official Development Assistance
(ODA)
and Humanitarian Emergency Aid Provided
by
Development Assistance Committee Members
|
|
1990
|
1991
|
1992
|
1993
|
1994
|
1995
|
1996
|
1997
|
ODA |
58.1 |
60.1 |
60.8 |
56.5 |
59.2 |
58.9 |
55.4 |
48.3 |
Humanitarian Aid |
2.5 |
4.8 |
4.7 |
5.2 |
>6.0 |
>4.2 |
>3.8 |
|
(Percent of ODA) |
(4.3) |
(8.0) |
(7.7) |
(9.2) |
(~10) |
(~ 7) |
(~ 6.8) |
|
At the same time, there is evidence
that the preoccupation with the Balkans is at
least temporarily threatening the overall resources
available for responding to other humanitarian
emergencies. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) is concerned that support for Kosovo is
diverting relief efforts from protracted humanitarian
emergencies in other countries. For example, in
1998, 93 percent of the UN appeal for Kosovo was
funded, but only 41 percent of the Great Lakes
appeal was funded-down from 84 percent in 1997.
The same pattern of largesse toward Kosovo and
parsimony toward Sub-Saharan Africa is evident
so far this year according to the UN High Commissioner.
Funding of UN Consolidated Appeals-one component
of overall funding--declined from 79 percent in
1994 to 54 percent in 1998 (see figure 8). As
of early June 1999, the UN had received only 30
percent of the $1.7 billion requested for humanitarian
emergencies this year.
In the future, donor countries are likely to focus
their funding for humanitarian response even more
on crises of strategic or regional importance:
Absent several major new emergencies, the longer-term
funding trend is likely to continue along a path
of gradual decline:
-
There
continues to be interest on the part of
some major donors in shifting funds from
emergency assistance to post-conflict reconstruction
or "peacebuilding" assistance.
The World Bank has also expanded its post-conflict
programming assistance. Should more major
donors move in this direction, funding for
traditional emergency response probably
would decline.
In the future, major donations from the private
sector are likely to provide an increasing share
of the funding for humanitarian emergencies. Continuing
economic growth in some developed countries enables
private organizations and wealthy individuals
to play larger roles in funding a number of public
purposes, including large-scale humanitarian assistance.
In some countries, such as Nigeria, there is increasing
pressure for foreign investors to provide "preemptive"
humanitarian support.
Footnote
1
The figures cited in this paper
for the total number of people in need of emergency
humanitarian assistance worldwide were pro-vided
by the US Committee for Refugees (USCR). Because
this paper focuses only on those emergencies in
which 300,000 people or more people are in need,
the totals listed for individual countries will
not add up to the USCR’s worldwide total of roughly
35 million.
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