U.S. Department of State

President Johnson and Soviet Premier Kosygin met June 23 and 25, 1967, in Glassboro, New Jersey. The situation in the Middle East was a major subject of discussion. During their meeting from 11:15 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. on June 23, Kosygin urged Israeli withdrawal to the prewar armistice lines. According to a memorandum of conversation prepared by interpreter William D. Krimer, Kosygin said that if this were not done, "hostilities were certain to break out again; the Arabs were an explosive people and no other solution to this problem was possible." He told Johnson that UAR Deputy Prime Minister Fawzi had told Secretary Rusk the previous day that if the International Court of Justice were to decide that the Gulf of Aqaba should remain open, the United Arab Republic would abide by that decision. Kosygin said that he thought this communication offered hope for a solution to the Middle East problem. He reiterated that if the problem were not solved, "they would be sure to resume the fight sooner or later. If they had weapons, they would use them. If they did not have them, they would fight with their bare hands or buy weapons and surely someone would be found to sell them these weapons." Johnson said he hoped they could prevail on both sides to agree first that they would talk to each other. He stated that the problem of security had to be dealt with as well as troop withdrawal. He said that if the United States and Soviet Union refrained from furnishing arms to Middle East countries, at most they could fight with their hands, and he expressed the hope that another armed conflict could be avoided. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Addendum, USSR, Glassboro Memoranda of Conversation) In describing the conversation later, Johnson said after Kosygin's comments about fighting "with their bare hands, if necessary," that he "leaned forward and said very slowly and quietly, let us understand one another. I hope there will be no war. If there is a war, I hope it will not be a big war. If they fight, I hope they fight with fists and not with guns. I hope you and we will keep out of this matter because, if we do get into it, it will be a 'most serious' matter." (Record of debriefing by the President; ibid., Files of Walt W. Rostow, Hollybush) For records of all meetings between Johnson and Kosygin at Glassboro, as well as related material, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIV, Documents 217 ff. A position paper and talking points on the Middle East, prepared in the Department of State, are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Hollybush, 6/67 (I), President's Meeting with Chairman Kosygin.

No record of the meeting between Rusk and Fawzi to which Kosygin referred has been found, but see Document 321.

Glassboro, New Jersey, June 23, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Walt Rostow and approved on July 5. Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko were in Glassboro with President Johnson and Soviet Premier Kosygin for their summit meeting, held at "Hollybush," the residence of the president of Glassboro State College. This meeting was held while Johnson and Kosygin had the meeting described in Document 320.

SUBJECT
Middle East

PARTICIPANTS
Secretary Dean Rusk
Foreign Minister Gromyko

Secretary Rusk opened by reporting that Foreign Minister Fawzi (UAR) had spoken at some length to him the previous evening about the desirability of limiting arms shipments to the Middle East. The Secretary emphasized this was a private conversation and he might not be speaking for his government. Nevertheless, it was interesting. He went on to point out that arms shipments become circular and cumulative. Arms competition exists in the area not only between Israel and Arab states but as between various Arab states.

Gromyko said that the UK had also raised this question.

Secretary Rusk pointed out he had raised the question of smaller arms race at the opening of Geneva conference. He asked if there is some way we can act? He asked Gromyko if he had any sense of what de Gaulle's attitude towards an agreement to limit the arms flow to the Middle East might be? Gromyko said he didn't know.

Secretary Rusk said that Fawzi had underlined that the other needs of the region were so great that it was wrong to divert resources to military purposes.

Gromyko said the arms issue should not be tied to other matters, and he added a disparaging remark about those interested in the use of military force. He went on to say we should give the matter further thought. We know the UK position, we don't know the French position. He recalled Anthony Eden raised the question in 1956, concluding however, that the arms limitation should not be tied as a string to other Middle Eastern issues.

Secretary Rusk said we could be flexible in the matter of procedures.

Gromyko then asked: When the Secretary talked of the Middle East, did he refer merely to Israel and the Arab states or did he include other countries of the region?

Secretary Rusk replied that the problem lay between Israel and the Arab states on the one hand, and as between certain Arab nations on the other. He said we both agree on the necessity of keeping nuclear weapons out of the whole area, to which Gromyko assented with a nod.

Gromyko said that until the Middle Eastern issues before the General Assembly are solved, none of the other area problems can be handled. He said he didn't know what would happen.

Secretary Rusk said some countries of the area believe regional ideas might take some of the heat out of Arab-Israeli confrontation. Fawzi had mentioned, for example, regional work in economic and social development.

Gromyko then probed further Secretary Rusk's conversation with Fawzi.

Secretary Rusk said it was very limited. They talked about the Strait of Tiran; and Fawzi thought, perhaps an answer could be found on an informal basis. It would be hard to settle it on a formal basis.

Gromyko said the distinction was artificial. It was the substance that matters.

Secretary Rusk said they also talked about arms limitation. Beyond these two matters, he was frankly discouraged by Fawzi's attitude.

Gromyko asked if Fawzi was specifically speaking for his government.

Secretary Rusk responded negatively; they had spoken on a personal basis, since there are no relations between the UAR and the US. He could not say that Fawzi's view on arms flows to the Middle East was Nasser's view. But Fawzi is an experienced and careful diplomat. He doubted that his views were wholly personal; but he just doesn't know exactly how official his statements were.

Gromyko asked: What other points were raised?

Secretary Rusk said the principal difficulty was that the UAR couldn't move to resolve any issues if it appeared that their resolution was related to military action or issues were settled because of military action. Frankly, he got the impression that making peace would not be easy. Going back to armistice lines was no solution. An armistice is inherently temporary. The Arabs claimed the rights of belligerence; that is, a state of war with Israel. That also meant Israel could take the view a state of war existed. The task was to eliminate belligerence and establish permanent frontiers. The Israeli remember that Nasser closed the Strait of Tiran by exercising his rights of belligerence: that is, a state of war with Israel.

Gromyko said the question of degree is very important here. When territory is occupied the situation is very different. If we tried to deal with this question on the basis of everything or nothing, it would be difficult or impossible to solve, so far as he could judge.

Secretary Rusk said that the Chairman's statement before the UN had emphasized that the Soviet Union regards Israel as a state. The question is: how do those who accept that view demonstrate that it is the case?

Gromyko said that the US and the USSR stand responsible for the creation of Israel as a state. Without the US and the USSR it would not have been created. He seemed to remember it had been created in the UN by only one vote. It would not have been possible unless the Soviet Union and the US had agreed. The Soviet Union had established diplomatic relations with Israel, which is the highest form of recognition. Those relations had been broken in 1956 and again in 1967 when there was a second round of aggression; but he stood by the Chairman's statement.

Secretary Rusk said: How can we establish that with sufficient clarity so that the Middle Eastern states will not constantly whip up propaganda urging the extinction of Israel?

Gromyko said you can't stop propaganda. We can't settle that. Let us be practical. Let us start with the Strait of Tiran, as Fawzi indicated.

Secretary Rusk said he could get no answer from Fawzi on Suez. On the Strait of Tiran, Fawzi would like the US and the Soviet Union to go to Israel and say the Strait of Tiran was open de facto. But the credibility of US in Israel is low on that point. That is what we told Israel 10 years ago.

Gromyko urged avoiding artificial problems.

Secretary Rusk asked if the Security Council might not assume responsibility on this question.

Gromyko said that Tiran is not simply a case of territorial waters. It is a complex case. Such cases have been dealt with through international conventions.

Secretary Rusk asked if Gromyko had seen Fawzi before or after he had seen him (between 7:30 and 9:00 p.m., June 22). Gromyko said: Before.

Secretary Rusk said Fawzi was cautious generally with him except on the question of Tiran and the arms flow to the Middle East.

Gromyko said: But he gave the answer. It would be very good to create a situation with withdrawal. Without withdrawal the situation was very dangerous.

Secretary Rusk asked if withdrawal comes about and a state of war persists, what would happen to Israel's relations with Syria and the UAR in the future?

Gromyko pointed out that Japan and the Soviet Union had ended the war and then taken 10 years to sign a peace treaty.

Secretary Rusk asked how was this done.

Gromyko said Prime Minister Hatayama had made a declaration that a state of war had ended.

Secretary Rusk said that perhaps it could be done through similar but unilateral if not joint, declarations.

Gromyko said that we should not be unrealistic. We should look for factual situations. Try to create an absence of tension by withdrawal. This was very important. Although you may not like the word, we would say that the situation should be approached dialectically.

Secretary Rusk said that some of the Latin Americans fancy themselves as lawyers. They take the view that if the UAR considers itself in a state of war with Israel, Israel cannot commit aggression against the UAR.

Gromyko said that the situation is dangerous to everyone in the Middle East, including Israel. They appear to show no concern for the future.

Secretary Rusk said that a concern for the future is precisely the issue with respect to belligerence.

Gromyko said the Arabs want peace.

Secretary Rusk said we must find a way to register that as a fact.

Gromyko said Israel is behaving as if it is more powerful than the US and Soviet Union put together.

Secretary Rusk said he thought there were forces of moderation in Israel as well.

Gromyko said the answer lay in withdrawal.

Secretary Rusk said the question was: withdrawal to state of peace or withdrawal to state of war? The issue was one of the status of relations among the states of the area rather than territory.

Gromyko said the shooting itself has stopped. Military action has stopped. But occupation is a continuation of war. It is still an application of force. This must be eliminated first. He said: you overlook--and please don't overlook--that withdrawal will create an atmosphere more favorable for consideration of other matters. Taking the view that everything must be settled or nothing, is unrealistic and dangerous.

Secretary Rusk said there will be great difficulties so long as Israel believes the Arabs feel free to pursue a policy of destroying Israel.

Gromyko said that thinking and doing are different. Some Arabs want to live in peace. It would be good if there were no propaganda; but, at the same time, if there are no attacks, the atmosphere for solution of other problems will improve. You can't solve all problems at once. Take, for example, nuclear question. We couldn't solve it all at once, so we stopped atmospheric texts. We proceeded realistically. Then we went forward to non-proliferation which, again, is only a partial step. If we are successful, who knows, perhaps we will take a further step. We haven't exhausted all the possibilities. In many fields of international life, including Middle East, we must make progress by being realistic. We must not be controlled by moods. We must rise above our sympathies.

Secretary Rusk said we have mentioned questions such as refugees, arms flows to the Middle East, regional and economic and social development. Of course they cannot all be determined at once. But no partial measure will work if one side wants to leave open the possibility of shooting.

Gromyko said what matters most is that there is no shooting.

Secretary Rusk referred again to Nasser's posture on Tiran.

Gromyko said: Let us look not to the past but to the future. Think it over. It would be good if we could get withdrawal. Israel itself would gain. You and we must accomplish this.

Secretary Rusk said we will be in touch.

Washington, June 23, 1967, noon.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. The memorandum is part 1 of 4. Drafted by Shullaw and approved in M June 28. The meeting was held in Rostow's office.

SUBJECT
Middle East Crisis

PARTICIPANTS

Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
J. Harold Shullaw, Country Director for BMI
Robert T. Grey, Staff Assistant, M

Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador
Alan B. Urwick, First Secretary, British Embassy

The Under Secretary said that he had a feeling the best chance for a Middle East settlement is in the next few weeks. This is a case where time isn't necessarily working in favor of a settlement.

The Under Secretary said that there are several recent developments which we find encouraging. The Turkish Foreign Minister told Secretary Rusk in New York that he had been approached by a number of Arabs who displayed a conciliatory mood and a willingness to move in a positive direction. Also encouraging is the moderate position being taken by Israel. The Israeli objective is peace and their territorial claims are minimal, much less than we would have anticipated. For example, they are interested in demilitarization along the Syrian border rather than occupation. The Under Secretary said that we have also had various reports that the Palestinian Arabs are willing to consider living with the Jews on the basis of an autonomous status within Israel. If the Palestinians and King Hussein can work out a solution on their own it would convert the refugee problem into an economic development matter. This would also make the problem of Jerusalem easier.

Mr. Urwick said that the UK Government has received similar reports on current attitudes among the Palestinian Arabs. He indicated some doubt whether King Hussein could afford to get out in front on this question. The Under Secretary referred to King Hussein's forthcoming visit to the US and said that the President would see him if the timing could be worked out.

The Under Secretary said that we do not know what the real status of Nasser is at the present time, whether he is in or out. Certainly Soviet efforts are being strongly directed toward saving him. We have an interesting report that the UAR is buying for cash $10 million of wheat in the US. The Under Secretary added that we are interposing no obstacles to the transaction.

/2/Attached but not printed.

The Ambassador expressed the opinion that it should be possible for the US and the UK to get together on a suitable resolution in the GA. Sir Patrick said that an effort should be made with the African states to encourage them to adopt a more constructive attitude, particularly in view of the possible effect on French speaking African states of General de Gaulle's denunciation of Israel.

During the June 25, 1967, meetings at Glassboro between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin, they discussed the Middle East briefly at a luncheon and more extensively in a private meeting that afternoon. During their luncheon conversation, Kosygin repeated his position that there could be no peaceful settlement in the Middle East unless Israeli forces were withdrawn from captured Arab territory. Johnson asked Kosygin whether he did not agree with the proposals he had made in his June 19 speech concerning the recognition of Israel's right to exist, the right of free passage through international waterways like the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal, and the need to do something for the refugees of this and previous wars. Kosygin said that in his view, after troop withdrawal to the original armistice lines, all other questions could be resolved. Johnson repeated that it was not enough to say "remove the troops"; the Israelis had not followed U.S. advice to refrain from taking military action, and without some arrangements to assure Israel's security, they would not follow U.S. advice to withdraw their troops. He noted that there were alarming reports of new arms shipments to the Arab countries since the cease-fire. So far the United States had refused requests to supply new weapons. The solution of the Middle East had to be found in something that would be acceptable to both sides. (Memorandum of conversation, June 25, 1:30-2:45 p.m.; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Addendum, USSR, Glassboro Memoranda of Conversation)

The discussion in their private meeting after lunch followed along the same lines, with Kosygin arguing that Israeli withdrawal had to precede any other steps toward a settlement and Johnson maintaining that it was not realistic to expect withdrawal without dealing with other problems. Johnson took the position that the Security Council would be better able to deal with the many problems involved, while Kosygin urged a General Assembly resolution on withdrawal, to be followed by Security Council consideration of other questions. (Memorandum of conversation, June 25, 1:30-6:30 p.m.; ibid.) For the complete records of the meetings, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIV, Documents 217 ff.

Washington, June 26, 1967, 2:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VII. Secret. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates it was received at 3:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

/2/A copy of the "Summary of Proceedings" of the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, released by the Office of the Secretary of Defense on June 28, is attached. A copy is also in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Middle East 385.3. The Court of Inquiry, convened by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, Commander in Chief of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, conducted classified hearings in London and aboard the Liberty in Malta June 11-17. Rear Admiral I.C. Kidd, USN, who was attached to McCain's headquarters, was president of the court. The Proceedings of the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, with covering letters of June 18 from Kidd and McCain are in the Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives Branch, Immediate Office Files of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1969 Files. Box 110, Liberty Incident, 8 June 1967, Court of Inquiry.

It has been cleared by Sect. McNamara, Deputy Sect. Vance and Under Sect. Katzenbach.

/3/June 28

They have considered whether to make it available to the Israelis beforehand. The Israelis have asked for 24 hours lead time. Cy is inclined to feel that 12 hours would be sufficient; but he does recommend that we make it available beforehand since:

--the judgment--not flatly stated in the Report--is that the attack was an accident; and
--they made available to us the report of their court of inquiry.

You will note (page 15) that the report refers to a failure in our communications which delayed a JCS message to move the Liberty farther away from the coast.

As stated on page 2: "It was not the responsibility of the Court to rule on the culpability of the attackers, and no evidence was heard from the attacking nation." Cy tells me that, in fact, the members of the court, on the evidence available to them, believe the attack resulted from a failure within the Israeli communications system and not from premeditation. But in his view, on the evidence we have, we should not so state.

Walt

/4/This option is checked.

/5/The 12-hour option is checked. A note in Rostow's handwriting states that Vance was informed on June 27 at 10:45 a.m. Katzenbach met with Harman on June 28 and gave him the report. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12 US)

Washington, June 26, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Office of the President File, McGeorge Bundy. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
Bundy's Return to Ford, and Related Subjects

1. It's time for me to raise this question and give you a recommendation on it, because I think the worst of the immediate crisis is behind us, and also because I'll be meeting my Board of Trustees this Wednesday evening and they'll need to know when and how much to expect me back. (They have been very good about these three weeks, but they're beginning to get nervous.)

2. As I see it, there has been a real need for an extra pair of White House hands these last few weeks, but I think the need for such full-time service will come to an end in another week or two. Already the pressure of special Middle East business is falling back from the level of late May and early June, and already--and properly--much of the day-to-day business is back in the direct channel from State to Walt Rostow, where it belongs. The crisis will continue, but not at the pace of the month since the Straits were closed.

3. There remains one major job which I think I can help to do--and that is to prepare a general policy paper for you and Dean to adopt or reject or modify and then give to about three people here and in State for general guidance until further notice. I suggest this because I think the old mold of Middle Eastern policy is broken forever, and I think we need new guidance. Even if you don't want to adopt a new position formally (still less publicly) I think a written paper that had some informal standing would be helpful. Anyway I think it's part of my job to give you that choice, and I hope to have the paper for you by the middle of next week.

4. Beyond that I am quite willing to be a part-time visitor over the next months if you and Dean want me, and I can always keep track of the cables by calling on Arthur in New York. But before you agree to that, you'll want to know how to arrange the work after I leave.

5. Aside from the usual things a staff man does in a crisis, I think any special usefulness I may have had in the last weeks derives from two special aspects of the situation, and I think you will want me to speak frankly about them, because when I go back to New York--or to a part-time basis--I think you'll want arrangements of some sort to deal with them.

(1) Our Middle East policy almost always requires a special balancing weight against the normal bias of Arab-minded State Department regulars. Presidents usually put a value on the rights and hopes of Israel which is greater than the normal reactions of the State machinery. This is not centrally a matter of the Abe Feinbergs or even the Arthur Krims. It is a matter of the considered choice of Presidents, on wider grounds of national sympathy and interest. Unfortunately the Department has learned to mistrust this White House attitude (for reasons that go back to Truman's recognition of Israel and have had occasional justification in the work of heavy-handed agents of the Jewish community like Mike Feldman) so that they often weight their advice to emphasize the considerations against any pro-Israel course. That makes a White House counter still more necessary. This is a job which Walt is too kind and busy a man to handle, and yet it is hard for any junior officer over here to deal with it, because Dean Rusk himself has always been mildly responsive to the standard Departmental bias. Dean's capacity to weigh other points, when they have some standing with the President, is excellent. Thus on your five-point speech to the Educators, he was a first-rate critic of my drafting, and eliminated much that was not wise, but he would not have been the man to turn a Departmental draft into a position that was right for you.

So one conclusion I reach is that you'll need a Middle East watcher here when I leave. I nominate McPherson, and I'll suggest ways and means further on.

(2) [15-1/2 lines of source text restricted on privacy grounds]

So I conclude that you need a different arrangement in the State Department. I think the right way is to give the day-to-day job back to Luke Battle, with direct accountability to Dean and Nick, both of whom should be fully informed and empowered to give policy advice to you. (I put Nick into it in this way because he has a more active policy mind than Dean, because he is a man with a full sense of the President' s view, and finally because Nick is damned good at top-level Congressional work with liberals, which is critically important in this case.)

Let me say about Battle that I am really much impressed by his work on this crisis. It has been balanced and skillful at every stage I have seen. I know there has been criticism of him on the Hill, but I believe that he'll do better there with some encouragement--and anyway I think our position there is now pretty solid, thanks to what you yourself have done and said.

6. This new arrangement can be set up, if you want, by reassigning both my present responsibilities and Gene Rostow's, at the same time (about two weeks from now)--Rostow's back to Battle, and mine to McPherson--both within the regular framework of White House and State Department business. I think you should discharge the Special Committee (though you can keep it on standby if you want). But I would empower Harry to deal with this one in the same way that Francis Bator deals with Europe, and of course you'd want him to keep the closest touch with Walt, as I have been doing, since Walt is the man who handles your in-and-out box on foreign affairs, and there should be only one. Then if you want to continue my appointment on a part-time basis as a consultant, you'd have insurance against any sudden flare-up that might lead to criticism because we had let up too soon on our special arrangements.

7. I want you to know that I have found these last weeks absolutely fascinating, and that I take it as a great honor to have been asked back for this period. If I think it is time to get back to Ford, it is not just because of my obligation there; it is also because in the long pull you'll get better results from a more regular arrangement. This one is going to go on for a long, long time.

Tel Aviv, June 27, 1967, 1150Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12 ISR. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to US Mission Geneva, and USUN. Received at 9:03 a.m.

/2/Telegram 215923 to Tel Aviv, June 24, expressed concern that in the aftermath of the recent hostilities, the Israeli Government might be impelled toward reassessing its policy toward acquisition of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and requested the Embassy's estimate of the impact of recent events on Israeli nuclear and missile policy. (Ibid.)

1. In light of history it may very well be that what has happened [up] to now will be seen to have had considerably less effect on ultimate Israeli nuclear and missile intentions than what happens in coming weeks and months. Obviously if Israel is able to achieve durable peace with its neighbors any reason for, and indeed any rationale for, going nuclear would be undermined.

2. We have not discussed subject with Israelis since crisis began. In my many talks with GOI officials during this period they have not adverted to it once. There has been no press speculation on subject. With complete Israeli absorption in winning war and coping with post-war problems I think it unlikely that any basic decisions in this regard have been taken in past several weeks.

3. Still, subject must be on minds of many responsible Israelis. Israel has come through a harrowing experience in which its national existence was in jeopardy. It did so by dint of its own efforts, a fact of which Israelis are proud and from which they draw lesson that they must continue to rely increasingly on themselves. If peace proves impossible and only another nebulous state of armistice results, making another clash possible, then prudent assumption would seem to be Arabs next time may be better. Israelis, who have technical capability to build bomb, would, it may be argued, be foolish not to produce extra-conventional weapons against enemies whose total conventional military capabilities conceivably could outstrip Israel's within another decade. If powerful nation such as Soviet Union is rearming Arabs this could reinforce Israeli conviction it irrational to eschew nuclear weapons production. (In this connection we doubt Israelis give credence to stories Chinese providing nuclear weapons to UAR. If they did they would very likely have mentioned it to us.)

4. We have seen in recent weeks increase of popularity of Dayan, who has been associated with those favoring the nuclear weapons development. If his star continues to rise, and that of his associates Peres and Ben-Gurion (who made the decisions to build Dimona), then, if outlook for Israeli security appears still uncertain, it would seem fair surmise that Israel might be led closer to nuclear route and development of necessary vehicles for nuclear weapons.

5. In this latter connection if French arms embargo continues and delivery of Dassault missile is precluded, quite possible effect would be to stimulate Israeli missile production.

6. All of foregoing necessarily speculative comment dwells on darker side of picture. In spite of this I do not believe that there is any compelling reason at present time for change in GOI policy of abstinence from nuclear weapons and missile production. (This is not to say Israel will not keep its nuclear technology at sufficiently high level to permit it to have option of producing nuclear weapons if changed circumstances seem make this imperative.) Financial considerations will be an inhibiting factor. For military and occupied area demands will be great for some time to come. And in spite of scare it got Israel has won great military victory that will give it time to make its decisions rationally and deliberately. Much, perhaps everything in this regard as in so much else, will depend on degree Arab readiness to come to terms.

Barbour

New York, June 27, 1967, 1630Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Received at 12:43.

5935/Secto 27. Following are main points of an hour's conversation which I had with Dr. Fawzi of Egypt this morning.

1. I asked him about Cairo's attitude toward "longer run" relations between Egypt and the US. I told him that those relations had been deeply injured by the false charge that US aircraft had taken part in attacks on Egypt. I asked him whether the Egyptian Government now contemplated informing other Arab governments privately that their earlier information on this matter was incorrect. I emphasized the importance of this point because it had been the basis on which a number of them had broken relations with the US even though some were relatively remote from the Israeli question itself. Fawzi was vague, said it would take time and rather indicated that relations would depend on our attitude on present issues. I emphasized that maintenance of diplomatic relations was not seen by us as conditional in character and that the structure of diplomacy exists for the discussion of disagreements and cannot be conditioned upon agreement.

/2/See Documents 320 and 321.

3. I then referred to his earlier comment about the Strait of Tiran. Fawzi told me that in addition to the US he had discussed the opening of the Strait with the USSR, France, Britain, India and Yugoslavia. I said that opening the Strait could not be as private and secret as he had suggested at his last meeting because ships cannot move in secret and that any arrangement on the Strait would have to be public. I recalled that the original request by Egypt for a removal of a portion of UNEF did not include removal of the UN contingent from Sharm al-Sheikh. Did he anticipate that a UN force would return to Sharm al-Sheik? He said not UNEF but possibly a contingent of UNTSO whose functions would have to be enlarged to cover this point. He said UNEF was dead but that "maybe" UNTSO could do something about this. He confirmed that their original request for a removal of a portion of UNEF had not included Sharm al-Sheik.

4. Fawzi pressed hard for a simple resolution on withdrawal with UN observation of withdrawal. He made no point of condemnation or of reparations. I pressed him equally hard on the necessity for returning to peace and not to a state of war. I told him of Gromyko's remark that Japan and the Soviet Union had eliminated the state of belligerence even though they still do not have a peace treaty. He said formal action of this sort would be extremely difficult and would set the situation back because of Arab public opinion. I reminded him that Egypt could mold Arab public opinion and that the Arabs would probably follow an Egyptian initiative to stabilize peace in the area.

5. He then said if there were a withdrawal resolution the General Assembly could go into all of these other questions in a subsequent resolution. But when he used language on various points which might be in such a second resolution it was quite clear that they have not come very far on recognizing the existence of a state of Israel and the removal of the state of belligerence.

6. He called attention to increasing Egyptian newspaper discussion of new approaches and said that this could not have happened even a few weeks ago. What conclusion he wanted me to draw from that he did not say.

7. My impression is that the Egyptians realize that the General Assembly will insist upon doing more than calling for a withdrawal. He was trying to separate these other issues from withdrawal as such. This represents perhaps some movement but not enough. I made no commitments whatever but simply told him that I would discuss the views he expressed with Ambassador Goldberg and our delegation. At the end he told me that he was seeing Gromyko at 3:30 this afternoon prior to my meeting with Gromyko tonight.

Rusk

New York, June 27, 1967, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S/S on June 29. The memorandum is part II of II. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in New York.

SUBJECT
Middle East

After lengthy discussion of the nonproliferation question, the conversation turned to the Middle East.

Ambassador Goldberg opened the conversation on the subject by stressing that the U.S. wanted to seek common ground. As things stood today, it appeared that no resolution proposed thus far would carry. He stressed that the U.S. was prepared to work hard to find common ground, noting that as in the Security Council common ground in the General Assembly usually emerged once the U.S. and the USSR had found it.

The Secretary suggested that it might be more profitable now to discuss the substance of peace in the Middle East. He thought that a few very short statements could describe that substance. Both the U.S. and USSR agree that it is in their interest to have peace in the Middle East and not to be drawn into an adversary role or hostile posture vis-à-vis each other. Both the U.S. and USSR also agree that Israel has the right to exist. The U.S. and USSR agree that no state of war should exist between Israel and its neighbors. They agree that the refugee problem must be solved. They agree that priority should be given to economic and social development in the area rather than to projects which could be conducive to war. Both the USSR and the U.S. agree that their influence in the area is not unlimited and that they are faced with a very complicated situation. Finally, they agree that there should be freedom of maritime passage to international waters. The Secretary wondered if these statements, to which Mr. Gromyko did not object, might not constitute a basis for peace.

/2/See Document 327.

The Secretary pointed out that the suggested formulations for withdrawal called for withdrawal to the armistice line rather than to national territory; in other words, withdrawal would continue the state of suspended war. It would be an improvement if one talked about withdrawal to national territory. In this connection, in talking about armistice lines the Arabs put aside the point that Israel was to have access to Suez, and they evidently do not have that in mind when they talk about armistice. The U.S. believed that it was very important that the third struggle in the area be the last one. While there may be contentions or claims, there must be no state of belligerency. It was impossible to ask Israel to act as if there were peace when Egypt exercised the rights of belligerency. The Secretary said he often heard that withdrawal was a precondition--precondition to what?

Mr. Gromyko said it was precondition to peace; in fact, withdrawal in itself was peace.

Ambassador Goldberg said that peace could perhaps be built on the following formula: prompt disengagement, withdrawal, and termination of belligerency. One could not have withdrawal in the middle of a war; this had been tried before but had not worked. In the past there had been withdrawals and war started again. He wondered if Mr. Gromyko disagreed with this formula.

Mr. Gromyko said that the very fact of the presence of Israeli forces in Arab territory constituted aggression. Even if the guns were silent, war persisted. So from that standpoint Ambassador Goldberg was close to the truth. On the other hand, his statement contained a contradiction inasmuch as he spoke of peace while opposing withdrawal. This contradiction should be eliminated. The U.S. seems to avoid the conclusion that withdrawal, together with what could be done with respect to Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran, would change the atmosphere in the area and create better conditions for solution of other problems. Any solution of those problems was impossible in the present situation. Moreover, the present situation was fraught with dangers for tomorrow.

Ambassador Goldberg commented that his formula took care of Aqaba since it called for termination of belligerency, which had been the basis for UAR action on Aqaba. Mr. Gromyko said that others might have a different interpretation.

Mr. Gromyko continued that progress seemed to be hindered by an accumulation of suspicions, sympathies, and antipathies. Perhaps Ambassador Goldberg's pessimistic assessment was the result of this situation. What the U.S. and USSR should do was to consider the problem from the standpoint of their vital interests and rise above all suspicions and other emotional aspects of the situation. Neither the U.S. nor the USSR wants hostilities between Israel and the Arabs, and no one could dispute that the chances for peace would improve if there were withdrawal. It would be dangerous to approach the situation with pessimism and resignation. One should not underestimate the possibilities for common understanding, which could be achieved if we wanted peace; the Soviet Union definitely wants peace and wants to work for it.

Ambassador Goldberg wondered why Mr. Gromyko disliked his formula. He noted that he had derived it from Mr. Kosygin's statement that all nations must have the right to live; nations could not live except in peace, and this was the common ground between us. He pointed out that in expressing his pessimism about the present situation in the UN he did not mean that the U.S. and USSR should not seek common ground. On the contrary, he was eager to seek such ground.

Mr. Gromyko said that as far as Israel's right to existence was concerned, Mr. Kosygin's statement was sufficiently clear and he did not believe that even the Israelis had any doubts on this score. As to Israeli/Arab relations, the best way towards a settlement would be withdrawal and then everything else would fall into place.

Noting that he was in no position to speak for Israel and that he did not expect Mr. Gromyko to speak for the Syrians, the Secretary wondered if Syria would refrain from resuming the artillery positions and from shelling the low land on the Israeli side if Israel were to withdraw from the hills it now occupies. The Secretary noted in this connection that as far as he knew there was no serious territorial problem between Israel and Syria and that the main problem was the fact that the Syrians had been shelling Israeli territory.

Mr. Gromyko said he also did not know of any territorial claims; moreover, the Soviet Union knew that the Syrians had no aggressive intentions. Perhaps some leaders in Israel did not like the fact that the hills in question were higher than their own heads, but that was their problem. As to the specific question posed by the Secretary, he was not in a position to speak for the Syrians and the question should be asked of them directly.

When the Secretary pointed out that this was not merely a question of risk but rather of experience on the part of the Israelis, Mr. Gromyko said that it was not the hills that were at fault but rather those who had started the war. He reiterated, however, that the question should be addressed to the Syrians directly.

Pointing out that he was not raising the question of responsibility or blame, the Secretary said that in his view the closing of the Straits of Tiran was a unique act of war. Nasser had based this action on the state of belligerency; his action was therefore a belligerent act.

Mr. Gromyko said the question now was how to approach a peaceful settlement. In his view, withdrawal was the best approach and it was hard to conceive what else could be done. In advocating this approach the USSR did not proceed from any selfish interests--all it wanted was restoration and maintenance of peace. While it was true that many Soviet ships had been using Suez and now had to take the more expensive route around the Cape, the USSR was not the only one in such a position. He wanted to reiterate that all the USSR was interested in was peace and to express the view that if the U.S. shared this objective peace could be ensured.

The Secretary expressed the hope that both sides would continue working during the next several days in order to find common ground. He also hoped that the Soviet side would not discourage flexibility on the part of the Arabs; he counseled Mr. Gromyko not to be more Arab than the Arabs themselves.

Mr. Gromyko said the Secretary had no reason to be concerned in this respect. On his part, he hoped that the U.S. would be flexible and would not raise rigid conditions which would create obstacles in the way toward agreement.

The meeting ended at 10:15 p.m.

Washington, June 27, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 6/28/67. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

/2/Bundy and Rostow both sent memoranda to the President on June 27 with recommendations for his June 28 meeting with King Hussein. Rostow suggested telling the King that Johnson could not get the Israelis out of the West Bank unless Hussein was prepared to take serious steps in return, that Hussein should not rely on anyone else to solve this problem for him but that if he was willing to seek a solution, others could help as intermediaries, with economic resources, and with persuasion of the other party. (Ibid.) Bundy seconded Rostow's recommendations, commenting, "our main purpose must be to let him down as gently as we can from his present conviction that you must pull his chestnuts out of the fire for him." He advised the President to "stay within the State talking points and not press the King toward bargaining with the Israelis (along the lines of the State covering memo)--unless he gives you an opening." (Ibid., Country File, Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 6/28/67)

/3/Attached but not printed.

/4/Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations and former Ambassador to Jordan William B. Macomber, Jr.

The talks with King Hussein could be crucial to the process of achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The King is approaching a fork in the road. It should not be impossible for him to choose the right course. If he does so, that fact would be a real beginning, breaking up the hitherto rigid Arab line against peace. If he is convinced that such a peaceful solution is impossible, the tide could run in the wrong direction from our point of view.

The Soviets are already consolidating Nasser in Egypt. Nasser is in touch with us, but we doubt that he will have an acceptable deal to offer. Therefore the Jordanian problem remains the most hopeful opening for us.

There is a difference of view between those who counsel moving ahead with Jordan now, and those who advise waiting for the dust to settle. We recommend taking advantage of the King's presence to open the possibility of prompt action on his part with Israel, directly or through an intermediary--perhaps the Shah, perhaps an American. Our stake in the possible success of these negotiations, difficult as they will be, makes it advisable to consider an American intermediary if the King requests one. A delay, which the Israelis favor, could result in freezing the situation on the West Bank into a pattern of Israeli control which it would be nearly impossible to change later.

The problems between Israel and Jordan--the West Bank and Jerusalem--are more difficult than any of the other issues between Israel and her neighbors, except for the overriding and fundamental problem of obtaining Arab recognition for Israel's right to exist. But there are also greater opportunities, because a Jordan-Israel solution would hold out the hope of transforming the refugee problem, and that of Jerusalem, which are at the heart of the conflict.

Our talks with Israeli representatives in New York and here persuade us that the Israelis are willing to make a pretty favorable deal with King Hussein, provided he accepts the idea of peace. You should not, we think, sponsor or propose any particular bargain, or be drawn into the details of any possible plan. But we do recommend that you be prepared to advise and encourage King Hussein to explore the possibility of negotiations with the Israelis, directly or through an intermediary. (You should know that the King has negotiated secretly with the Israelis in the past, e.g., meeting Eban on the Riviera. This information is of the greatest sensitivity.)

The basic territorial problem dividing Israel and Jordan is the West Bank area. The West Bank was part of the Palestine Mandate given up by the British in 1947. It came under Jordanian control as a result of the hostilities in 1948, and the subsequent declaration of Palestinian notables of their wish to adhere to Trans-Jordan. We have never recognized Jordanian sovereignty over the West Bank; instead we have recognized the area as being under Jordanian control pursuant to the General Armistice Agreement. We have taken an even more reserved position about Jordanian control in the Old City of Jerusalem and about the whole position in Jerusalem. Our Ambassador to Jordan, for example, does not show the flag while driving in the Old City. A memorandum on the history and legal position of the area is included as a Background Paper in your book.

The Israelis tell us they have not yet finally made up their minds on the position they will take with regard to the West Bank generally, and Jerusalem in particular. So far, we have advised them not to take unilateral actions, nor to present the world with a fait accompli.

The Israelis point out that they have a national security interest in keeping the West Bank out of unfriendly or aggressive hands; that they tried to prevent King Hussein from entering the war and sought a cease fire even after he had taken offensive action; and that their occupation of the West Bank was unanticipated and is unwanted. They were particularly aggrieved by his attack in Jerusalem, where they took heavy casualties because they refrained from the use of air power. On the other hand, they say, these events occurred, a new situation has emerged, and they are still not clear what policy King Hussein represents today. They stress that the City of Jerusalem cannot be divided again, and that the Holy Places must be accessible to all.

There is a good deal of talk in Israel and among Palestinian Arabs about the possibility of an autonomous Arab State on the West Bank, federated with Israel, and of comparable status for the Gaza Strip. Both Dayan and Ben Gurion have suggested such an approach. Some Palestinians are reported to be interested in the possibility. There are rumors of possible meetings of Arab notables. There is always a possibility that such meetings could be stage-managed by the Israelis to come up with a statement or even a declaration calling for a separation of the West Bank from Jordan. Such a procedure would follow that of Jordan in annexing the West Bank in the first place.

There would be political danger if Israel tried to set up a semi-autonomous Arab State on the West Bank by unilateral action. Such a step would make general Arab-Israeli peace more difficult to imagine, and would create a new Arab grievance.

We do not see any possibility that King Hussein could negotiate with Israel, and then accept a state of peace with Israel, unless he retained political control over the West Bank area, subject at most to minor boundary rectifications, and an international solution for Jerusalem.

But it is possible that over time an economic link could develop between Israel and Jordan as a whole. This would leave the two states of Israel and Jordan politically independent but with open cooperative economic relationships. A development of this kind should make it easier to solve the issue of Jerusalem, which could become a focus of economic exchange, rather than a salient on a nervous frontier. It could transform the refugee problem into a problem of regional economic development. And by providing an economic opportunity for the refugees, it would begin to relieve the other Middle Eastern states of the burden of the idea that somehow, some day, Arab loyalty requires them to help liberate Palestine and restore the refugees to their rightful property.

/5/Evron stated in a June 24 conversation with Rostow that there was increasing thought in Israel about an economic link to Jordan that would leave the two states politically independent but with open cooperative economic relationships. Rostow reported the conversation to the President in CAP 67579, June 24. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 32)

We should have no illusion: the odds are against Hussein accepting this sort of package at an early date. But it is worthwhile encouraging him to explore the possibilities.

The Israelis would probably accept some such approach in the near future. They might even accept a less ambitious solution that left the West Bank in Jordanian hands, except for an agreement on Jerusalem.

If the present situation continues very long, however, King Hussein should understand that his risks with regard to the West Bank probably increase. At the moment, he could probably get political control of most of the West Bank, in exchange for a favorable long-term economic arrangement, and a new status, perhaps condominium, in Jerusalem. Later on, such a deal might well become more difficult.

Nicholas deB Katzenbach

Washington, June 27, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 6/28/67. Secret. Sent through Walt Rostow.

SUBJECT
Military Aid Policy in the Middle East

After fighting broke out, we stopped all aid shipments to countries that broke relations with us. For those that did not break, we let the pipeline flow beyond the depot but blocked new approvals. Now in order to get back into business with the moderates, State and Defense recommend a number of selective exceptions to that "no-new-approvals" policy.

/2/Attached but not printed.

The one new program to be negotiated would be the $14 million in credit you approved for Morocco's King Hassan in February. Though this might include APC's and transport aircraft, the lead time on those items ranges from 18 to 36 months.

The most controversial item on the list is the sale of 100 APC's to Israel, but you've been over that many times.

/3/Reference is to the paragraph added after the options at the end of the memorandum.

In Libya, we are still hoping to spin out our talks on Wheelus and would go ahead with one C-47 aircraft and a variety of spares, commo and automotive equipment. We would hold the 10 F-5 aircraft we've agreed to sell until we see how the base talks go. Bob McNamara wonders whether we might leave our domestic flank open to go ahead with anything when the Libyans have just asked us to leave Wheelus, but he does not feel strongly. Nick Katzenbach thinks going ahead would improve our negotiating position.

McNamara also wants to flag the problem of domestic reaction to any relaxation of our ban now such as Senator Church's speech. I don't feel these programs are visible enough or military enough to cause a big ruckus--except for the Israeli APC's if they leak. He doesn't feel strongly about Morocco and Tunisia and recognizes that Saudi Arabia is a case by itself. My own view is that the list is pretty carefully drawn to exclude troublesome items and we have to go ahead with the Arabs if we're going to let Israel buy.

McG. B.

/4/Neither option is checked. On June 30 Rostow sent a message to the President at the LBJ Ranch saying that it was important to have his decisions that day on three items that could be funded with FY 67 money. They were: the sale of a C-130 to Saudi Arabia, the $9.9 million weapons maintenance and repair program in Saudi Arabia, and the $14 million credit sale for Morocco. He also noted that all Israeli military aid was suspended until Johnson's decision and added: "Evron asked me about this today, but after their move on Jerusalem you may be in no hurry." A handwritten note by Jim Jones on Rostow's message indicates that Johnson approved the three fiscal year items. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Arms Limits)

/5/The words following "Jordan program" to this point are handwritten.

/6/Concerning the sale of 18 F-104s to Jordan, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 283.

Washington, June 28, 1967, 1:30-3:10 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Noforn; Nodis. Drafted by Burns. The time is from the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library)

SUBJECT
Prospects for solution of the Middle East Crisis

King Hussein accompanied by Foreign Minister Tuqan and Chief of Staff Amir Khammash were invited to the White House for a working luncheon with President Johnson on June 28. During the luncheon prospects for solution of the Middle East crisis were discussed. The major participants in the discussion were King Hussein, the President, Mr. McGeorge Bundy and Mr. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach.

The King adhered to the public line he had previously expressed at the UN and emphasized the necessity of his obtaining the return of the West Bank.

The King noted that the Arabs were at a major turning point. They could opt for what amounted to a settlement with Israel, to be followed by concentration on economic development; or the Arabs could opt to make no settlement and to re-arm for another round. Hussein favored the first course.

Hussein said that it is his intention to try to sell this position to the other Arabs, since there could be no real stability in the Middle East unless all the Arabs opt for what amounts to a settlement with Israel. Hussein stated that he had some reason to hope for success with the other Arabs in this regard. He pointed out that he, as the Arab leader who had had nothing to do with bringing about the confrontation, who had fought the hardest, and who had lost the most, was now in a unique position to speak for a moderate course. (He told Ambassador Burns on the plane coming down from New York that he had met in New York with Atassi of Syria. Hussein said Atassi had not disagreed with his position that a moderate solution was the only sensible one, though Atassi did observe that the Syrian Government could already be too much prisoners of their own propaganda to make this possible.)

Mr. Katzenbach and Mr. Bundy made the following points to the King:

a) The US believes that a peaceful solution is the only solution and all US efforts would be bent towards that end. We realize that if a peaceful solution is to be a lasting solution it must be a just solution.

b) The realities of the situation appear to exclude the possibility (which has appeal for Hussein) that a peace could be imposed on Israel and the Arabs from some outside higher source.

c) A settlement between the Arabs and Israelis would have to be in essence bilateral, though there were options in terms of modalities to get around some of the current irreconcilabilities of the Arab and Israeli positions. (For example, a mediator in place of direct Arab-Israeli negotiations.)

d) The US has never had the influence with Israel that the Arabs thought we had, and in point of fact we now have less influence with Israel than ever. With this caveat the Arabs could count on us to use all of our influence and efforts to insure that a just settlement were arrived at, if the Arabs have the will for a settlement.

e) Only a settlement could inspire the USG, the Congress and the American people to be willing to render economic aid which the area so desperately needs. We are no longer interested in financing activities which do not lead to, or are not part of, a final solution to the Middle East problem.

f) Our guarantee of territorial integrity applied essentially to final boundaries rather than to current armistice lines.

In reply to questions designed to ascertain what King Hussein would settle for with respect to Jordan in connection with a peaceful settlement, King Hussein replied that he could not answer such questions until he had had an opportunity to consult with all the Arab leaders. It was apparent from the conversation, however, that Jerusalem was likely to present the most serious problem. In reply to Mr. Bundy's question as whether Hussein would accept demilitarization of the West Bank, Hussein replied that if there were a peaceful settlement with Israel the problem would be academic and would largely take care of itself. Mr. Bundy pointed out to King Hussein that until peoples who have been traditional enemies have had the opportunity to live in peace for awhile it probably would be necessary to have a demilitarized area.

In reply to the question on his position on free passage of Tiran and Suez, Hussein said this would give no problem to Jordan but obviously would to other Arab states.

The luncheon conversation ended with the King making a statement along the following lines: "The first thing I must do is to try to convince all the Arab leaders to adopt a moderate solution. Only if this fails could I consider whether it would be feasible to pursue a solution on my own."

/2/No record of their private conversation has been found.

Mr. Bundy replied that he understood General Khammash's problem and that obviously General Khammash understood ours. He said this is a very delicate and ticklish problem. He asked the General to keep in close touch with us, since decisions in this regard could only be arrived at in the light of the situation which comes to pass with each unfolding day.

The President and King Hussein met alone for about twenty minutes. When they returned to the other members of the party, the President said that he and the King had discussed nothing new that had not already been discussed at the lunch.

The President then suggested that the King meet alone with Mr. Bundy and Mr. Katzenbach. This meeting lasted for about forty minutes.

The tone of the meeting was marked by seriousness, moderation, and sympathetic frankness.

No part of this memorandum should be revealed to any foreign national by any addressee. Such disclosure could seriously jeopardize any possibility of a peaceful solution to the present crisis. If it is decided to communicate any part of the above to a foreign government, it will be done in Washington.

Washington, June 29, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VII. Confidential. A copy was sent to Bundy.

SUBJECT
The Situation in New York

/2/The Yugoslav representative introduced a draft resolution sponsored by 15 countries on June 28. For text, see UN document A/L.522.

/3/The U.S. draft resolution, submitted on June 20, declared that the General Assembly's objective was a stable and durable peace in the Middle East and called for achieving that objective through negotiated arrangements, with appropriate third-party assistance, based on (a) mutual recognition of the political independence and territorial integrity of all countries in the area, encompassing recognized boundaries and other arrangements, including disengagement and withdrawal of forces, that would give them security against terror, destruction and war; (b) freedom of innocent maritime passage; (c) a just and equitable solution of the refugee problem; (d) registration and limitation of arms shipments into the area; and (e) recognition of the right of all sovereign nations to exist in peace and security. For text, see UN document A/L.520; also printed in Department of State Bulletin, July 10, 1967, pp. 51-52.

/4/Circular telegram 218514, June 29, asked the 85 embassies to which it was sent to make an urgent approach at the highest appropriate level on the basis of the recommendations in telegram 5965 from USUN, June 29, which asked recipient embassies to approach the foreign ministries in their respective capitals and urge their support of a projected Western European-Latin American draft resolution and/or opposition to the Yugoslav draft resolution. (Both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

The Tabor resolution is likely to have 50 to 60 votes for and 35 to 40 "nay" votes. The opposition votes the other side can count on are a good deal firmer than ours. If both resolutions fail of two-thirds, the General Assembly is expected to start looking for a lower common denominator, such as a call to send a high-level mediator. In any case, the effort for settlement will go back to the Security Council.

There is an Arab-sponsored resolution focusing on Jerusalem that is likely to be pushed through to a quick vote. Its thrust is to declare that any Israeli measures to incorporate Jerusalem are regarded as "invalid." Justice Goldberg and Joe Sisco are talking with other delegations about minor changes to soften the "invalid" declaration slightly. They have not yet recommended a position to Washington, but probably will propose that we vote in favor, regardless of the outcome of their efforts. The resolution is likely to pass overwhelmingly in any case.

ND

Washington, June 30, 1967, 6:13 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Drafted by Wolle and Eugene Rostow, cleared by Handley, and approved by Rostow. Repeated to London, Paris, Amman, The Hague, Jerusalem, and USUN.

/2/On June 27 the Knesset approved three bills authorizing extension of Israel's laws, jurisdiction, and public administration over the Old City of Jerusalem and other newer areas in the eastern portion of the city which had been under Jordanian control since the General Armistice Agreement of 1949. On June 28 the Israeli Government took administrative action under the legislation to extend its municipal services and controls over the entire city of Jerusalem.

/3/The texts of the statements issued by the White House and the Department of State on June 28 are printed in Department of State Bulletin, July 17, 1967, p. 60.

3. Rostow said GOI actions on Jerusalem had knocked entire UNGA situation into cocked hat. Weeks of effort there had vanished in smoke. We are instructing Ambassador Barbour to seek clarification GOI action on Jerusalem. Our plea is that GOI make clear publicly it does not regard any step it has taken as irrevocable and final position. Harman and Minister Evron insisted that GOI steps do not constitute annexation but only municipal fusion. Said word "annexation" does not appear in legislation. Rostow stressed hope GOI would make clear publicly its action does not constitute annexation and does not prejudice future negotiations about status of Jerusalem as a whole.

4. Harman referred to Yugoslav-Indian resolution introduced in UNGA and said it being interpreted in corridors as signal for war. Said para 3. calls on member states to act directly to apply its provisions thus authorizing direct use of force to achieve Israeli withdrawals. GOI considers this very serious. Rostow said he had not heard this interpretation and would discuss matter with Deputy Assistant Secretary Popper and Ambassador Goldberg.

5. Harman said GOI convinced there is much at stake in current UNGA proceedings and believes situation can be held if USG continues strong effort it has been making. He wished confirmation USG would continue focus on main situation. (Implication was we should not get sidetracked onto Jerusalem issue.) Rostow confirmed our continued concentration on main strategy and tactics but repeated conviction that GOI actions on Jerusalem caused sharp setback to possibility success. Noted that Secretary's feeling evening June 28 was this might cause loss thirty votes.

6. Rostow said that King Hussein's talk with President was not totally negative. King is in difficult position and knows it, but nothing should be done to interrupt possibility of his coming around ultimately to more moderate position.

/4/Printed from an unsigned copy.

JCSM-374-67

Washington, June 29, 1967.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 2468, Middle East 092. Secret; Sensitive.

SUBJECT
US Military Interests in the Near East (U)

/2/Not printed. (Ibid.)

2. (S) For the purposes of this paper, the Arab world includes the following countries: Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Sudan, United Arab Republic, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Bahrein, the Trucial States, and the Federation of South Arabia.

3. (S) The most significant impact of such a polarization would be the creation of an environment in which further conflict and military hostilities between the Arab world and Israel would be almost certain. As a result, the United States would be placed in the position of becoming deeply involved by providing direct political, economic, and military support to Israel or having to abandon its policy toward the continued existence of Israel. In addition, future conflicts in an environment of increasing polarization would increase the danger of direct US-USSR confrontation. The increased USSR influence with the Arab nations would cause a reduction in the political freedom of action the moderate Arab states, such as Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, had enjoyed in the more ambiguous situation prior to the present crisis. This situation would probably eliminate their restraining influence on the radical Arab states and could cause the United States to provide military assistance to Israel in view of the increased threat of a more united Arab world.

4. (S) A polarization of this nature would be most detrimental to US interests in the Middle East. The most significant interests having military implications which would be seriously affected are:

a. Promotion of the Western orientation of nations of the Middle East.
b. Elimination or reduction of Soviet influence in the Middle East.
c. Security of the southern flank of NATO.
d. Retention of access to air and sea routes.
e. Retention of base rights and communications-electronics facilities.
f. Retention of access to Middle East oil.

5. (S) The impact of such a polarization on US military interests in the Arab world includes the following:

a. Loss of US military influence in Arab nations.

b. Increase of Soviet influence in the area through stronger ties with the radical Arab nations and establishment of an influential position in the moderate nations of Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia where little or no USSR influence exists.

c. Loss of certain important port facilities, base rights, and non-Defense Communications System (DCS) communications-electronics facilities in the Arab states which, coupled with loss of intelligence collection inputs from defense attache and clandestine sources, would have a most serious and adverse bearing on the national security interests of the United States.

d. Probable denial of Arab oil and a requirement for alternative oil resources for Southeast Asia and Europe, resulting in increased costs of POL.

e. Extension of the sea LOC to support military operations in Southeast Asia.

f. Loss of supporting facilities for MIDEASTFOR in Arab countries will extend the LOC.

g. Loss of the cooperation of Libya and Morocco and increased Soviet influence in those countries would have an adverse effect on the US strategic position on the southern littoral of the Mediterranean.

6. (S) The impact of such a polarization on Turkey and Iran would also have a direct bearing on US military interests in the area. These might include the following:

a. Execution of contingency operations for east Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia would be severely handicapped if the use of Turkish and/or Iranian bases and the required overflight rights were denied.

b. Probable requests for additional US aid from Turkey and Iran because of the increased threat.

c. Reassessment by Turkey of its role in NATO.

d. Creation of divisive pressures in CENTO based on ethnic and religious orientations and differing reassessments of the threat to their individual interests.

e. Possible loss of communications-electronics facilities in Turkey and Iran coupled with a loss of intelligence collection inputs which would have a further serious and adverse bearing on the national security interests of the United States.

7. (S) The impact of such a polarization on US military interests in other neighboring areas would be as follows:

/3/Letter from the Under Secretary of State, dated 8 May 1967. [Footnote in the source text. For text of Katzenbach's letter, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXIV, Document 337.]

b. The need for US bases in the Indian Ocean would be significantly increased. Development of US facilities there would need to be accelerated.

c. An increase in requirements for use of South African facilities.

d. An improved posture for expansion of Soviet influence into other African regions.

8. (S) In the event of such a polarization, Israel probably would provide base and overflight rights.

/4/Appendix A, "U.S. Military Interests in the Near East," is attached but not printed.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

New York, June 30, 1967, 0336Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Received at 12:17 a.m. Passed to the White House at 1:05 a.m. Rostow sent the text to the President in CAP 67610, June 30, noting that Hussein was trying to reconcile the simple withdrawal resolution with non-belligerence. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 32)

5985. Hussein Approach on GA Res.

During dinner which he was hosting for departing Japan Amb Matsui, Goldberg received call from Bundy indicating King Hussein wished consult US urgently on non-aligned res calling for withdrawal Israeli forces. Since he could not leave, Goldberg sent Buffum to Waldorf who was received immediately by King accompanied only by Chief Protocol Rafai.

King said he had been meeting during evening with other Arab leaders. Based on these discussions, he said he was greatly concerned that if non-aligned res fails, this would play into hands of extremists. Conclusion that would be drawn, he argued, would be that UN offers no hope for Arab case and that there would be strong tendency to look outside UN for solution, giving Communists ready-made opportunity to exploit. He said he knew we were working against this res, that its chances of adoption were narrow and hoped we could find way to modify our position so that it would be permitted to pass.

Rafai sought to maintain that since res contained para calling for ultimate SC consideration of other aspects of problem this should help meet our concern about issues related to withdrawal of Israeli forces.

Buffum said he wished to inform King frankly that we were in fact solidly opposed to non-aligned res since it was unrealistic and would not be implemented by Israel. In our view, withdrawal issue, which is important principle that we support, is intimately related to another equally fundamental issue, namely, termination of belligerence. US did not consider it reasonable to expect a state which commanded a militarily superior position in wartime would abandon that position while its opponents continued to say that the war goes on. Pronouncements by certain Arab leaders that Israel has no right to exist and that they are intent on Israel's destruction makes it obviously impossible for Israel to withdraw.

At same time, Buffum said we recognized Arab states can probably not issue formal renunciation of state of belligerency, nor would they be likely to sit down in the same room and negotiate with Israelis. Judging from many general debate statements, large number of delegations shared this view. It seemed to us that a practical way to get at the problem would be to have the UN despatch a special emissary to the area and seek to work out agreed arrangements with the states concerned which would result in withdrawal of Israeli forces. Buffum indicated that number of UN dels, according to our information, were developing a third party res which would reflect the foregoing concept.

King did not demur at any of these points. He said that he recognized Israel would not withdraw troops immediately upon adoption of non-aligned res, but he felt that once this principle established private arrangements could be worked out satisfying Israel's security requirements permitting it to withdraw.

Buffum responded that we did not read situation this way; that we considered equitable approach would be to mention both withdrawal and termination of belligerence and let UN rep proceed to work out the details.

Hussein then suggested we submit our ideas as amendments to non-aligned res. Buffum replied that we had already made these same points in previous discussions with some of sponsors, particularly Indians, and they had not been accepted. It was clear to us, he said, that necessary 2/3rds vote to secure adoption of amendments could not be obtained over Arab objections. Accordingly, Buffum suggested, if King considered these points legitimate, most effective way they could be incorporated would be for Jordan to propose them to its Arab colleagues privately. Buffum said Arabs had come to look on our approach as pro-Israel and that Jordan itself obviously in far better position to advance these ideas if it really interested.

Hussein acknowledged this was true and said he would be in touch with his Arab colleagues to see if revision of res could be obtained to meet our views. He asked that we use our influence not to have other texts introduced tomorrow until we had consulted with Jordanian del first. Buffum agreed. King expressed appreciation for consultation.

Late evening, Rafai called Buffum to say first contacts already undertaken with other Arabs and looked promising. He said King was determined to use his newly-won status in Arab world for constructive purposes. He felt, based on first discussions, that revised text would go in which included provision for UN rep and which would make "appropriated references" to UN Charter. Buffum said that exact language would be determining factor and that we attached great importance to equating termination of belligerency with withdrawal of forces. Buffum added that if Jordan desired our affirmative vote it would provide us text before it is tabled and not present us with fait accompli as non-aligned mbrs had done. Rafai said this could be worked out with Jordanian del tomorrow and expressed hope that at least text would be improved substantially enough so that we would no longer have to oppose it, even though we might decide to abstain.

Rafai asked that we not reveal tomorrow morning that we had advance indication what changes were being considered in non-aligned text.

Goldberg

Washington, July 1, 1967, 5:49 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret. Drafted by Country Director for Saudi Arabia William D. Brewer, cleared by Davies, and approved for transmission by Robert L. Bruce (S/S). Repeated to Dhahran, Beirut, Amman, Tripoli, Tunis, and Rabat.

100. The following is an uncleared memcon FYI only Noforn subject to revision upon review.

/2/Rusk met with the Ambassador at 4:40 p.m. on June 30. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)

/3/Rusk's meeting with Saqqaf on June 22 was reported in telegram Secto 22 from New York, June 23. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: 1966-1972, Entry 3051B, CF 196)

3. Sowayel noted failure USG publicly give unequivocal support Israeli withdrawal would provide opportunity for socialists and communists to exploit. Russians are already talking in language which mobs understand, but USG has not taken position which gives moderates ammunition vis-à-vis their own public opinion. Terms like "territorial integrity" lack impact on masses. Secretary responded USSR no doubt had short-run advantage because of its ability of being extreme.

4. Noting that, except for Old City, where we had publicly criticized GOI unilateral action, there seemed no serious territorial issues, Secretary said status boundary lines was very important. Did they connote peace or war? Nasser's provocation in closing Gulf of Aqaba was act supreme folly. Egypt could not be at war with Israel without Israel being at war with Egypt. If only this state of belligerency could be removed, could make enormous difference. Secretary commented that Russians had told us they had eliminated their state of war with Japan many years before peace treaty achieved. There ought to be way for Arabs to do this with Israel even though no direct agreements feasible. This would be in Arab interest since it would protect Arabs as well as Israel. This connection, Secretary said that there were those with considerable international legal background who felt that, as long as UAR maintained state of war against Israel, Israel could not "commit aggression" against UAR.

5. Sowayel described current Arab scene as "field of phrasing" between radicals and moderates. Former were showing themselves better at this and moderates had to do something. Even in Saudi Arabia mobs had been a problem in Dhahran. Secretary asked whether mobs were satisfied with extent of Soviet support. Sowayel responded mobs were unsophisticated and did not look behind Soviet slogans. Fact that Israel had had no right to attack was central issue on which masses had to be satisfied before specific problems could be taken up.

6. Secretary observed it difficult condemn only one side for acts of war. Saudi Ambassador admitted Nasser had provided provocation. Secretary noted Soviets themselves now reportedly pulling away from idea of condemnation of Israel by special UNGA.

7. Sowayel again stressed USG must say something publicly on central issue in order support its Arab friends. Statements on Jerusalem had been helpful but general comment necessary. He thought President's five principles very good but this was not moment to try implement them. Noting difficulty USG satisfy masses stirred up by Cairo Radio, Secretary wondered whether moderate regime such as SAG could ask even privately who were their friends. Sowayel replied Saudis knew who were their friends, to which Secretary suggested this should not be lost sight of when chips are down.

8. In conclusion, Secretary inquired whether Arabs able accept idea of elimination state of war with Israel. Sowayel responded

affirmatively but wondered what conditions might be. Stressed again that most important thing from standpoint Arab moderates was evidence of clear and unequivocal USG support for principle Israeli withdrawal.

9. Comment. FYI. In subsequent discussion with DeptOff, Sowayel went so far as to suggest it would meet need Arab moderates for USG take strong public stance on withdrawal, while at same time privately assuring GOI that such public position could be disregarded. End FYI.

Rusk

JCSM-379-67

Washington, July 1, 1967.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 2467. Top Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation on the source text indicates that it was received in the office of the Secretary of Defense at 1431 hours, July 1; another notation, July 17, indicates the Secretary saw it.

SUBJECT
USS Liberty Incident (U)

/2/The "Report of the JCS Fact Finding Team: USS Liberty Incident, 8 June 1967," undated, consisting of an introduction, findings of fact, recommendations, and 6 annexes, one of which includes 77 messages, is attached to the source text as Appendix B. A copy is also in JCS Files, 898/392. The fact-finding team was headed by Major General Joseph R. Russ, USA.

2. (TS) This report contained 17 recommendations and attributes the fact that the USS Liberty did not receive time-critical messages to a combination of:

a. Human error.
b. High volume of communications traffic.
c. Lack of appreciation of the sense of urgency regarding USS Liberty movement and location.

/3/Appendix A, "Comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Recommendations Made by the Fact Finding Team," is attached but not printed.

4. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have referred the report to the Services and the appropriate Joint Staff agencies and directorates for further study and recommendations. You will be apprised of the status of the follow-up actions.

5. (U) A copy of the report is contained in Appendix B hereto for your information.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Tel Aviv, July 2, 1967, 1130Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Jerusalem, and USUN. Received at 9:25 a.m. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC, and CINCSTRIKE at 10:55 a.m.

/2/Telegram 218573 to Tel Aviv, June 29, instructed Barbour to register U.S. opposition to any unilateral action by Israel to assert de jure control over occupied territories. (Ibid.)

/3/Document 333.

/4/Telegram 3 from Tel Aviv, July 1, reported that before receiving telegrams 218573 and 219964, Barbour had discussed the subject of Jerusalem with the Israeli Minister of Justice and several other officials and had strongly deplored the "precipitate issuance unification ordinance re Jerusalem." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

1. I conveyed position State's 218573 to p.m. Eshkol last evening.

2. As to effect of Knesset's enabling legislation on occupied territory other than Jerusalem, Eshkol categorically assures me there no intention take any steps to extend jurisdiction as authorized those enactments to any of occupied territories. FonOff legal adviser takes some exception to the quote from Oppenheim on grounds that Jordanian and Egyptian sovereignties were never extended West Bank or Gaza but GOI not disposed argue point further. Dayan's remarks at press conference that Israel seeks restore life as much as possible to normal relying to maximum on local Arab authorities still remains policy of GOI those areas.

3. However, as to Jerusalem, GOI adamant. It is attempting to reorganize the municipal council by the inclusion of Arab members and otherwise is prepared to use the maximum number of available Arab civil servants from the former Old City governate, but the only really negotiable issue is the holy places. I emphasized Unsec Rostow's comments to Harman (State's 219964), effect on UNGA situation, and particularly the hope GOI would make public its action does not prejudice future negotiations about status of Jerusalem as a whole. Response is that holy places are negotiable. Further clarification not forthcoming.

Barbour

Washington, July 3, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15 UAR. Top Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

SUBJECT
The Current Situation in the UAR and its Bearing on UAR Approaches to the US

and France

/2/See footnote 2, Document 311.

/3/A message received on June 24 stated that the "director," who was presumed to be head of UAR intelligence Salah Nasr, was ready to fly to Rome to meet with a presidential emissary for negotiations on the basis of "de facto" recognition of Israel, Israeli withdrawal to the June 4 borders, guarantee of the borders by a UN force, free passage in the Strait of Tiran, compensation for civilian damages in Arab countries during the war, and a pledge by the United States and other Western countries for a 30-year plan of economic development for the UAR. The U.S. reply stated that Ambassador to Italy G. Frederick Reinhardt would be willing to meet in Rome for discussions. (Telegram 215944 to Rome, June 24; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VII) A subsequent message stated that Salah Nasr had persuaded President Nasser to allow negotiations with the United States to proceed, on condition that they be handled by Fawzi and Rusk. (Memorandum to Katzenbach and Walt Rostow, July 5; ibid.) Further documentation concerning these overtures is ibid. and in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US.

Military. There appears to be fairly serious disaffection in the military. Figures given by various sources on the number of military officers dismissed ranges from 200 to 750; the truth probably lies somewhere between two figures. Many of those dismissed probably have been ousted not because of "incompetence," but because their loyalty to the regime was suspect; this would explain why some of them are reported to have been put under house arrest. These developments tend to support earlier reports of disaffection among the military; they lend credibility to reports that the military pressured Nasser into his June 9 resignation. The military appears to be the only center of effective opposition to Nasser. There is a report that there has been considerable resistance within the army to purge of these "incompetents."

There are also reports of popular resentment against the military and their performance. This resentment appears to be fed by the stories told by the defeated troops returning from the front.

Civilian Administration. A good source has reported that as of June 20 Cairo was confused and disorganized and that the whole machinery of government was dislocated. Nasser's reorganization of the government on June 19 probably was done to halt this trend by bringing the government machinery more directly under his control. Nasser now appears to be trying to cope simultaneously with disaffection in the army, rising discontent among the public and the administration, momentous foreign and Arab policy problems, and staggering economic ones. To judge from reports, the load is becoming almost too great for him to cope with and he is grasping at straws. Nasser's subordination of the UAR's pressing economic needs to his political objectives has put the UAR economy in a parlous state. His closing of the Suez Canal, his urging the Arab states to break relations with the US and the UK, and his inciting the Arab oil producing states to cut off oil to the US and the UK are designed to force the West and the world community to pressure Israel to give up the gains it has made since June 5. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that these measures are hurting the UAR much more than they are damaging Nasser's intended targets and they are beginning seriously to threaten his regime. The USSR, apparently, is unable and/or unwilling to take up the economic slack. Therefore, Nasser may feel that he may have to make some concessions to the West in order to get the necessary economic aid.

Forces of the Left and the Right. The setback seems to have caused a reaction against socialism in at least some quarters in the UAR. It probably is connected with the feeling that the USSR has let the UAR down. This reaction probably has emanated from middle-class elements and from similar elements in the armed forces. They probably are opposed to 'Ali Sabri and his Arab Socialist Union forces. The coloration of the government formed by Nasser on June 19 appears to show a desire on the part of Nasser to soften criticism from these rightist elements. It probably was designed also to attract support from the US.

On the other hand, there reportedly have been arrests of rightist elements in the administration and in the army, indicating that the ASU, 'Ali Sabri and his associates are still able to act against their rivals. The rightists apparently had been attempting to arouse into action the anti-revolutionary and anti-communist forces in the UAR. The USSR apparently is trying to pressure Nasser into letting it carry the ball for the Arabs in the international arena. The Soviets undoubtedly feel that he bungled the job as he bungled the military confrontation with Israel. The USSR probably is resupplying the UAR with arms more in hope of keeping up their credit with the UAR military than with Nasser. Yet to abdicate to anyone else the political role of championing the Arabs against Israel would be unbearable for Nasser. Furthermore, Nasser seems to feel that the Soviets would not be above selling him out, and he probably suspects that they may have Algeria and Syria in mind as replacements for the UAR. The Egyptian communist leadership appears to believe that it is now in a position to exert more influence on UAR policies. This leadership is reported to be advocating the UAR's maintaining a violent anti-Western line and keeping pressure on the Arab oil-producing countries to deny oil to the West. To this end, it is likely that Soviet propaganda will continue to allege collusion between Israel on the one hand and the West and its regional allies on the other. The Soviet aim, however, would probably not be to provoke renewed Arab-Israeli hostilities.

Nasser is struggling with the burden of having to fight on many different fronts, both internal and external. He probably has become suspicious and distrustful of many of the members of his old guard who, he feels, have failed him. But at the same time he is in extremis, and probably is inclined to let them do what they can to salvage the situation. We do not believe that Nasser as yet has become a figurehead. For one thing, we cannot identify any leader or group of leaders who would be manipulating Nasser and who might have been behind the note to the French Government. (See Part II) Such a group probably would have its nucleus in the armed forces, and there might be leftist as well as rightist groups of this nature. In the absence of better intelligence on conditions in the armed forces, we cannot say to what degree organized anti-Nasser trends exist.

Part II

These documents appear to fall into two groups: 1) Those that emanate from GID Director Salah Nasir, either explicitly or inferentially. It seems likely, as observed in the commentaries on them, that the "Director" and the "friend" refer to Salah Nasir himself; 2) The document of June 18 that was submitted to the French on June 20 by the UAR Embassy in Paris. It is less clear who the people behind this document are.

The documents attributable to Salah Nasir show an evolution in his attitude from June 9 to June 27 as follows:

From June 9 through 23 Salah Nasir was afraid for his own position, presumably as a result of the purges and the arrests of "rightists" being carried out in both military and civilian circles in the UAR. The source of a TDCS reporting events as of June 20 claimed that Salah Nasir himself had been dismissed and put under house arrest. While incorrect, the report is indicative of the type of rumors that were circulating and of the general atmosphere of uncertainty.

Salah Nasir's main concern on the policy side was that the US should assume a more pro-Arab position in the UN, etc., to prevent the USSR from monopolizing the role of champion of the Arabs in their dispute with Israel. This could well reflect the concern of Nasser himself, who clearly has been worried over this prospect. Salah Nasir may have been delegated by President Nasser to lay the groundwork for an improvement in US-UAR relations.

On June 24 there was a decided shift in Salah Nasir's line. In the aide-mémoire given to Secretary Rusk by Fanfani on that date, and in Salah Nasir's June 25 conversation with [name not declassified], Salah Nasir reiterates that he is talking to [name not declassified] with Nasser's knowledge, but that Nasser did not know of his approach to the US through the Italians. Salah Nasir now gives the clear impression that he is talking less as a spokesman for Nasser and more on his own initiative. The subject of Salah Nasir's proposals shifts from that of asking for a pro-Arab stance by the US to a presentation of the concessions that Salah was willing to make in order to get a Western pledge of 30-year economic aid to the UAR. On June 25, Salah Nasir admitted that he couldn't go to Rome to meet with a US plenipotentiary if Nasser refused, but said that if Nasser didn't approve the trip, he (Salah) wanted to continue the discussions with [name not declassified]--apparently whether Nasser agreed or not. For the first time, Salah Nasir expressed disdain for President Nasser.

On June 26 (in the report [1 line of source text not declassified]) there is the first clear indication of a seditious attitude by Salah Nasir. The report states that Salah Nasir, supported by the dismissed Marshal Amir, is determined to take extreme anti-Nasser action in favor of the West. Nasser could be got rid of and the transition carried out by Zakariya Muhi al-Din, Salah Nasir, and their friends behind the scenes. This group, he claimed, had the armed forces and the intelligence services solidly in their hands. On the same day, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reported that Salah Nasir had said that President Nasser "flinched" at the idea of de facto recognition of Israel presented to him as a necessary step by Salah Nasir. This suggests that the conditions for the negotiations were not dictated by Nasser, but were left to Salah Nasir to draw up. However, Nasser didn't object to pursuing the negotiations. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] report stated that Salah Nasir, Zakariya Muhi al-Din, and 'Amir wanted to use the proposed negotiations as a first step to unseat Nasser.

This proposal, which is dated June 18, contains the same general elements as those in the note purportedly drafted by an unidentified group of high UAR military and civilian officials on June 18 and presented by the UAR Embassy to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 20. These common features are 1) Recognition of Israel, 2) Free passage for Israel through the Strait of Tiran, 3) Request for economic aid, and 4) Request that negotiations be conducted with a personal emissary of Presidents Johnson and de Gaulle respectively and not through normal diplomatic channels. However, there are also differences. Salah Nasir's proposals, which include Israeli compensation to Arab civilians, are noticeably less liberal than those contained in the June 18 note submitted to the French. Furthermore, the authors of the June 18 note designate Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, the influential editor of the Cairo daily al-Ahram, as the person to deal with the personal emissary whom it requests de Gaulle to send. Salah Nasir, on the other hand, talking to Brommel on June 23, specifically rejected Haykal as "an opportunist with little influence" and designated himself as negotiator with the Americans. This fact suggests that someone other than Salah Nasir is speaking for the authors of the June 18 note to the French.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that both the Paris note and Salah Nasir's proposal go back to a single inspiration. This inspiration probably is President Nasser himself. The Yugoslav correspondent Milenkovic, writing in the Belgrade paper Borba (Belgrade tel. 3704, June 23, 1967 LOU), after the formation of the new UAR Government on June 19, noted that there was a realization in Cairo that only through negotiations and "crucial concessions" to Israel on the subjects of navigation and recognition could Israel be induced to give up its territorial gains made at the UAR's expense. There probably was also a realization, both before and after Podgorny's visit of June 22, that the UAR could not get from the USSR the economic aid it desperately needed; this aid could come only from the US or France, and concessions would have to be made to them also.

Nasser, however, appears to have realized that he could not hope to get the required aid in his own name. Therefore, he may have delegated one group to deal with the French, as he had delegated Salah Nasir to deal with the Americans. This hypothesis would explain his long delay in deciding whether to sanction Salah Nasir's trip to Rome to talk with a US representative--Nasser was waiting to see the results of the approach to de Gaulle.

The anti-Nasser sentiments expressed in the case of the approaches to the US and France probably should be received with caution. They may have been designed, along with the effusive promise of pro-Western policy orientation, to "sweeten" the proposals in the eyes of the recipients. The note to the French does not talk of getting rid of Nasser; this idea is expressed only by the source who gave the copy of the note to Guest, and even then (as in the case of Salah Nasir) it is postponed into the future. Furthermore, the note stresses that Haykal, with whom the French representative was to negotiate, is a "confidant of President Nasser." Haykal is not known to have defected from Nasser. Salah Nasir's anti-Nasser attitude may have similarly been designed for its effect on the US. We have only his word that he has a group--including 'Amir and Zakariya Muhi al-Din--behind him. He gives the impression of being mainly concerned with the preservation of his own position. It is clear that he has some kind of a mandate from Nasser to negotiate with the Americans, and he undoubtedly is convinced that his position will be a lot safer if he is able to extract aid from the US.

Any aid extended to the UAR as a result of these approaches to France and the US probably would tend to perpetuate Nasser in power, We do not yet seem to have a clearly-identifiable group of anti-Nasserists who appear capable of taking and continuing the exercise of power. Nasser is an extremely adroit manipulator of men and their ambitions, and as long as he remains at the top it is difficult to believe that he could be a mere figurehead controlled by some group behind the scenes. Nagib learned this to his disadvantage some thirteen years ago. As long as Nasser or any other rulers of the UAR are in a position to play the USSR off against the US, it is unlikely that they would recognize Israel, although they might hold out to the West the prospect that they would do so in return for Western support. Nasser and others in the UAR may now also feel they can make Soviet control of the UAR a main issue in their bargaining for aid from the West. Even if the West supplies the aid, however, the UAR would still have to play ball with the Soviets because it is utterly dependent on them for arms and the High Dam. Hence, any talk of orienting the UAR's policy completely toward the West would seem quite unrealistic.

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Committee, Minutes of the Control Group Meetings. Confidential. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene V. Rostow initialed the memorandum, which he sent to Bundy with a handwritten note of July 4 stating that Rusk and Katzenbach had not yet cleared the idea or the text. Bundy's handwritten note on the memorandum states that he had cleared it.

SUBJECT
UNGA Voting on Jerusalem

It is possible that we will be confronted July 4 or July 5 with the need to take a quick decision on a General Assembly resolution on Jerusalem. The elements of the problem are as follows.

/2/The tabs are attached but not printed, The Pakistani draft resolution was introduced initially in the General Assembly on July 1. A revised version with six sponsors was introduced on July 3; for text, see UN document A/L.527/Rev.1.

/3/The Yugoslav/Indian resolution was initially submitted on June 28; see footnote 2, Document 332. Revised versions, with 17 sponsors, were introduced on June 30 and July 3. For text of the July 3 version, see UN document A/L.522/Rev.2.

/4/The Latin American resolution was initially submitted on June 30 by the representative of Trinidad and Tobago on behalf of a Latin American group; it was subsequently revised and sponsored by 20 countries. As revised, it requested Israel to withdraw from the territories occupied as a result of the recent conflict and requested the parties in conflict to end the state of belligerency, to endeavor to establish conditions of coexistence based on good neighborliness, and to have recourse in all cases to the procedure for peaceful settlement indicated in the Charter. For text, see UN document A/L.523/Rev.1.

2. The Yugoslav/Indian resolution does not mention Jerusalem, but it calls upon Israel immediately to withdraw all its forces to the pre-June 5 positions, and it requests the Security Council to examine all aspects of the Middle Eastern situation. Presumably the passage of the Yugoslav/Indian resolution would denote withdrawal from Jerusalem as well as other conquered territory. However, since the Jerusalem problem is in a sense separable from the Middle Eastern problem as a whole, we should have to expect that a separate resolution on Jerusalem would be pressed.

3. The final paragraph of the Latin American resolution reaffirms "the desirability of establishing an international regime for the city of Jerusalem, to be considered by the General Assembly at its 22nd Session" (fall 1967). If the Latin American resolution were to receive a two-thirds majority, the Assembly would probably not adopt any other language on Jerusalem.

We are also preparing to have language on Jerusalem we could support introduced as amendments if we fail to get a satisfactory compromise text from the consultative process.

/5/The proposed revision stated that the General Assembly declared it could not recognize any unilateral action as determining the status of Jerusalem, called on the Israeli Government to desist from any formal action purporting to define permanently the status of Jerusalem, and requested the Secretary-General to report on the situation and implementation of the resolution, with no deadline. (Telegram 40 from USUN, July 4; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

5. But if--as is more likely--we ultimately have to vote on the original Pakistan text, or something close to it, we shall need a high level decision.

6. Our position on Jerusalem is that we have never recognized unilateral action by any of the States in the area as governing the international status of Jerusalem.

The background for this conclusion is (a) that the Israelis are in Jerusalem, as they are in other territory taken during the recent hostilities, as the occupying power under the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council; (b) that the occupying power has the duty under international law to conform its administration as closely as possible to existing local law; (c) that Israeli action to establish a unified municipal administration for the city of Jerusalem cannot be regarded and will not be recognized as a valid annexation, or a permanent change in the legal status of Jerusalem in any other sense; at most, it can be considered an interim administrative measure to provide a more convenient and efficient occupation regime for the areas formerly under Jordanian control, using Jordanian police and other officials where possible.

The Government of Israel has now publicly and officially retreated from its original position, and has endorsed our view that their unified administration of Jerusalem is not an annexation.

We have continued to stress our opposition to any unilateral efforts to change the permanent position in Jerusalem or elsewhere, and to insist that such change be accomplished only by internationally effective action, taking full account of international interests.

/6/Barbour commented in telegram 4 from Tel Aviv, July 1, that the "overriding consideration would seem to be free access to and protection of religious sites," and that a secondary factor involved the "legitimacy of Israeli territorial acquisition." Concerning the latter, he thought the crucial point was "whether we have any real alternatives to making the best of a potentially good situation." He argued that the Israeli occupation followed Jordan's attack on Israel, that there was every reason to believe the Israelis would safeguard legitimate international interests, and that the Arab inhabitants would benefit materially. He recommended that "we should contemplate eventual US acquiescence in Israeli exercise of sovereignty over united Jerusalem, with maximum negotiable safeguards for the Holy Places." (Ibid. POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Against this background, we believe it would not be possible for us, consistently with the position we have already taken, to support a resolution along the lines of the Pakistan text. At most, we should recommend abstention if we fail in our efforts to obtain a Jerusalem text we could support. The language of the Pakistani Resolution not only declares that what the Israelis have done is invalid (whereas we would be inclined to recognize the validity of Israeli action if viewed as no more than administrative action of the occupying power), but also calls on Israel to rescind all the measures taken. Construed literally, this would require sealing up the wall, turning off the water, disconnecting the electricity, and reversing all other steps taken to unify Jerusalem.

Moreover, it is unrealistic to expect any useful report on implementation within one week.

USUN agrees with this recommendation.

1. That we urge USUN to continue its efforts to alter the Pakistan resolution or, in the alternative, to have comparable amendments proposed.

/7/Neither the approve nor disapprove option is checked.

Washington, July 4, 1967, 1528Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, U.S. Position--Discussion. Secret. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 12:04 p.m. A handwritten note of July 4 by Jim Jones on the telegram indicates that the President approved releasing the $2 million mentioned in paragraph 3, agreed with everything in the message, and wanted to express his gratitude for the job Bundy had done. An attached note indicates that Bundy was notified at 2:20 p.m. July 4.

CAP 67658. For the President from McGeorge Bundy.

We have had a relatively quiet holiday weekend so far and I see nothing that requires your decision in the next few days. Here is where things stand right now:

1. The General Assembly will probably vote today on the Yugoslav and Latin American resolutions, unless there is a successful compromise effort. We seem to have the votes to prevent a really bad result, and I think both the Department and the New York people are doing a fine job.

2. There is a tricky specific problem of a separate Pakistani resolution condemning Israel for actions in Jerusalem. We cannot vote for it in its present form, because it assumes that the Israeli measures do affect the international status of Jerusalem whereas our position is that they are merely administrative actions which do not have this effect. Ours is a much more practical way of keeping heat on the Israelis, and it has already produced a considerable withdrawal by Eban. Our record would be badly tangled from a legal point of view if we were to vote for the current Pakistani draft. Yet we would like to have a record of approving some such protest if possible. In this situation we are tying to get the Paks to accept a modification which would be consistent with our own position. Then we could vote for the resolution and make a little money with moderate Arabs. The situation is highly tactical and the decision to vote for the resolution or to abstain will have to be made on the basis of the fine print as the hours roll along. I think the Department is in good control of this one, and there is no difference on the objective.

3. We continue to look for little things that can give some encouragement to the more reasonable Arabs. In this connection I plan to approve a $2 million budget support grant to Jordan tomorrow. This action is consistent with the language we all used with Hussein and represents a commitment initially made some months ago after the November raid by Israel. It already has your approval as of that time and I believe its release now is consistent with your general directives to us. Nevertheless I inform you of it so that it can be held up if you wish.

4. We are also reviewing tourist policy, and there will probably be a recommendation for renewal of permission for the Lebanon as soon as we have a chance to check reactions to the General Assembly voting and as soon as the Embassy in Beirut is prepared to share responsibility for making such a recommendation. Newspapers today indicate that Lebanese authorities are admitting our tourists even though their passports are not valid for that country. They want the money. We still do not plan tourist permission for the countries which broke relations.

5. The most interesting contest on the scene at the moment is not the well-publicized skirmishing near Suez, but the battle for Libyan oil. The Libyan Government had decided to renew shipments to the European continent, and the labor organization has called a general strike aimed particularly at shipments to West Germany. The result of the tug-of-war will have a great deal to do with the severity of any oil crisis this summer. It is a situation in which we have almost no influence, and in which the quieter we are the less likely we are to rock the boat. As I review the general problem in this holiday period, I am inclined to think this rule applies to the crisis as a whole and underlies your own success in dealing with it.

/2/A July 12 memorandum from Bundy to the Special Committee states that the President had agreed to his request to devote part of his time to the work of the Ford Foundation in New York, that Battle would serve as the Committee's Deputy Executive Secretary, and that McPherson would be a member of the Committee. (Ibid., Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VIII) An August 24 memorandum from Bundy to Rusk states that it was understood from recent conversations between them and the President that the Special Committee would remain available if needed and his appointment as Executive Secretary should lapse, but that he would remain available for consultation, and his appointment as Special Consultant should continue. (Ibid., Country File, Middle East, Vol. I)

New York, July 5, 1967, 1717Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated Immediate to Moscow. Received at 1:55 p.m. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC, and CINCSTRIKE at 2:35 p.m. Rostow sent the text to the President at the LBJ Ranch in CAP 67668, noting, "Herewith the Russians ask for forty-eight hours to try to salvage something from their setback. We are going along because it can't effectively be opposed." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VII)

58. Subject: GA--Middle East.

/2/Regarding the Yugoslav draft resolution, see footnote 2, Document 332 and footnote 3, Document 340. After Cuban and Albanian amendments (UN documents A/L.525 and A/L.524) to the draft resolution were defeated by overwhelming majorities, the Assembly voted on the unamended draft resolution. It received 53 votes in favor to 46 against (including the United States), with 20 abstentions, and was not adopted, having failed to receive a 2/3 majority. For the Latin American resolution, see footnote 4, Document 340. It received 57 votes in favor (including the United States) to 43 against, with 20 abstentions, and was not adopted, having failed to receive a 2/3 majority.

In view Goldberg's expressed doubts that substantive gap could be bridged, conversation then focused on other ways to conclude the Assembly in circumstances where GA had taken some action. Two possibilities were discussed: (a) a possible initiative by the Secretary General, which would be taken note of by the GA, to "send a distinguished special representative to the area to make contact with those directly concerned about the situation"; and (b) a simple resolution which would transmit the GA proceedings to the Security Council which would give further consideration to this matter.

Dobrynin said he would report this to Moscow.

Regarding a possible UN emissary, Goldberg said we felt it should be a genuine neutral such as a Swiss.

Comment: Of interest is the fact that the Soviets sent Dobrynin rather than Fedorenko to see Goldberg. It is also the first time during the course of the special GA that we have had a specific indication from the USSR of a desire to try to work out something with us. We noted other Soviet reps in corridors this morning touching base with other dels and we assume they probably taking similar line re delay with them. We, of course, must continue to be on guard that this is just a Soviet ploy to try to recoup something from the diplomatic defeat they have suffered at GA and which will give some difficulty in the parliamentary situation. However, since it was direct bilateral request to us, and since specific need for guidance from Moscow was mentioned, it would seem to me we have no alternative but to go along with request for delay. Confirming Secy-Sisco telecon, we will agree at appropriate time to requested delay.

Following are the two possibilities which Goldberg and Dobrynin discussed:

The first is a possible statement by the Secretary-General which he would make and which would be taken note of by the GA.

"Having heard the debates on this question, and on the basis of broad consultations, I sense that it would be desirable and generally acceptable for the Secretary-General to send a distinguished special representative to the area to make contact with those directly concerned about the situation and report through the SYG to the SC."

Second is possible GA resolution remanding matter to Security Council.

"The General Assembly,

"Taking note of the views expressed and the resolutions considered by the General Assembly at this extraordinary session, recommends:

"1. That the records of the proceedings be remitted to the Security Council for its further consideration of the matter;

"2. That the Security Council as a matter of urgency deal with the situation in the Middle East."

Alternative 1 was a US draft. Alternative 2 was proposed by Goldberg but incorporates some suggestions made by Dobrynin, specifically, para referring to resolution before GA came from him. He also suggested addition of word "further".

Goldberg

New York, July 5, 1967, 6:30-7:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VII. Confidential. The meeting was held at the Plaza Hotel. Rostow initialed the top of page 1.

PARTICIPANTS
Foreign Minister Eban
Ambassador Harman
McGeorge Bundy

I met with Foreign Minister Eban at my suggestion in order to have an informal discussion of the situation as we both saw it after the General Assembly vote, and on the eve of his departure for Israel. (In the course of the conversation it appeared that he had not yet definitely decided when he would return to Israel because of residual uncertainties about maneuvering in the General Assembly.)

After an exchange of gossip about the General Assembly vote (centered mainly on an agreed view of the Soviet and French performances), we turned to the future. I said to the Foreign Minister that I thought there were great lessons for both our countries in the recent experience. I said that while I had not been in Washington in May, I could well believe that he would have found our position disconcerting, in that we could not give assurances of the breadth and precision which Israel wanted at a critical hour. I said that in my judgment the President was absolutely right not to give such assurances, but that the experience must be instructive to both sides as to the limits on the meaning of the executive assurances which have been given to Israel over the years. I said that on our side a major conclusion from this experience was that both of us would have been in really terrible trouble (for Israel obviously a matter of life and death) if our common assessment of the real military balance in the Middle East had not been right. I said that to me this moment of crisis had revealed more clearly than ever what I had slowly learned in 1961-66, namely that there is a very high American interest in insuring effective defensive strength to Israel as against her Middle Eastern neighbors. If and only if Israel can defend herself, we can avoid a truly agonizing choice. I said that I believed that the real policy of the United States for several years had been to accept this responsibility and that the events of May and June 1967 simply made it a more compelling necessity for us, in that our interest in Israel's self-defense was even greater than before the crisis, while her ability to rely on others was less. Eban seemed to accept this proposition, although he indicated that the Israelis have not given up hope of reestablishing military supply channels in Western Europe.

I said that while I had not talked to President Johnson in precisely these terms, I thought I could predict that he would agree to what I had just said, but that he would surely add a most important proviso: namely, that if we were to have continuing and effective understanding on a matter as important as the basic defensive strength of Israel, we would also have to have a parallel degree of understanding on other issues. I named four as examples:

the future of Jerusalem;
the future of the Arabs now under Israel's military control;
the continuing desirability of avoiding Soviet arms supply to Jordan;
and the nuclear problem.

I said that if I knew President Johnson at all, I could predict that he would insist on candid and effective discussion of these issues as well as the military issues and that I did not think any major arms deal could be handled satisfactorily in isolation.

In his response Eban made no comment on nuclear matters, and my guess is that we'll have to poke very hard to get what we need on this question.

On my other 3 examples Eban was more helpful. He said that in the light of the June battles, U.S. arms for Jordan would be a matter of real emotional difficulty, but he agreed that they were certainly preferable to Soviet arms. He also agreed on the importance of framing an effective policy toward Arabs now within the Israeli military lines, and he was quite frank in saying that no such policy yet exists. I think that his own personal judgment is beginning to lean against any solution that would involve an end of Jordanian sovereignty over the West Bank--he spoke of the attractions of such a new Palestinian entity, but he also spoke with feeling of the danger that it would simply become for Israel what Algeria became for France. Eban also dissociated himself firmly from Dayan's reputed remarks about Gaza being a part of Israel, though both he and Harman emphasized their view that it was not part of Egypt either.

On Jerusalem, Eban was quite forthcoming and seemed to agree that it was important to work out agreed arrangements for the Holy Places which might well include some form of sovereignty for representatives of Christians and Moslems over their Holy Places. He seemed to agree that in the case of the Moslem Holy Places the Jordanians might be the appropriate custodians.

Indeed I found Eban more forthcoming on the subject of Jordan than I had expected. He recognizes the economic difficulties of Jordan and the importance of tourism. He and Harman argued that in conditions of peace Jordan could have more tourist revenue than ever, even without administrative jurisdiction over the old city. They both spoke warmly of the possibilities of economic cooperation between Jordan and Israel, including access to the Mediterranean for Amman.

I then said to Eban that of course in the long run the relation of Israel to the UAR was the central question and he agreed. He said they had always hoped that some day there would be ways and means of settlement with Egypt. Eban said that he was going home to think about ways and means of establishing some contact with Nasser (parenthetically we agreed that while the political situation in Cairo is obscure, the record of the last fifteen years would suggest that Nasser was not a man to bet against in any Egyptian political struggles). Eban emphasized as he has before that the Israelis want very little from Egypt except peace and free passage, but both he and Harman quite firmly included the right of passage through Suez as one of their requirements.

Eban also speculated on the possibility that there might be a relatively early solution with the Syrians simply because the Israeli demands there are minimal and the Soviets might press their clients to be the first to achieve Israeli withdrawal.

I used the occasion of Eban's remarks on Egypt to remind him that there is very little the United States can do to help anyone with the UAR. I said that our bargaining in the past with Nasser had always included a heavy element of U.S. economic assistance, and that I could see no prospect whatever of any such assistance in the near future. The Congress and the public would not stand for it, even if, against all our current expectations, there should be a good case in terms of the situation on the ground. I also pressed Eban gently on the question of the Israeli troops at Suez. If it were a necessary condition for an early opening of the Canal, would the Israelis consider a limited withdrawal? He gave me no direct answer but suggested that it might depend on whether the Egyptians would stay where they now are or would plan to follow the Israelis back across the desert.

I also exchanged informal thoughts with Eban on the "modalities" of reaching agreement with the Arabs. I said that we thought there might be virtue in a three-act play, in which the first act would be private negotiations, the second an Israeli withdrawal, and the third a public peacemaking on the basis agreed on in the first act. The advantage of such an arrangement would be that it would protect Arab pride. Eban did not seem to find this a difficult proposition. He said that a variant might be to get half way to agreement and then half way to withdrawal, but that in either case the Israelis would not be taking any unacceptable risk because if the Arabs did not keep to their private bargains or half-bargains, it would be easy in the current situation for Israeli forces to reoccupy their present positions.

I ended the meeting as I had begun it with renewed emphasis upon the importance of working in parallel on all these issues together. Harman had earlier emphasized the importance of aircraft, and I told him that while we understood the problem, we did not think it needed settlement in the weeks immediately ahead, and that once we had made a decision we would be able if necessary to supply the aircraft rapidly. I repeated my view that the President would certainly not wish to separate this issue from the others and that we should keep in touch on all of them together. Eban referred to the most recent exchange between the President and Eshkol and said he thought his Government fully understood this point.

I then said a few words to Eban about my private feelings, as one citizen, about the quality of Israelis soldiers and orators, and we parted friends.

Washington, July 5, 1967, 8:55 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Popper and Eugene Rostow, cleared by Meeker and in substance by Davies, and approved by Rostow. Also sent to the U.S. Missions at Geneva and USUN and repeated to Jerusalem.

1508. Subj: Jerusalem Resolution in UNGA.

/2/General Assembly Resolution 2253 (ES-V), adopted July 4, 1967. Concerning the Pakistani draft resolution, see footnote 2, Document 340.

2. During last three weeks US Government has issued series of statements expressing our views on Jerusalem. On June 19, President said: "There must be adequate recognition of the special interest of the three great religions in the Holy Places of Jerusalem". A White House statement on June 28 said that the President "assumes that before any unilateral action is taken on the status of Jerusalem there will be appropriate consultation with religious leaders and others who are deeply concerned . . . The world must find an answer that is fair and recognized to be fair. That could not be achieved by hasty unilateral action and the President is confident that the wisdom and good judgment of those in control of Jerusalem will prevent any such action." Later on the same day, after an announcement of Israeli action to place Jerusalem under a unitary administration, the Department of State issued a further statement reading as follows:

"The hasty administrative action taken today cannot be regarded as determining the future of the Holy Places or the status of Jerusalem in relation to them.

The United States has never recognized such unilateral actions by any of the States in the area as governing the international status of Jerusalem.

The policy of the United States will be governed by the President's statement of June 19 and the White House statement this morning.

/3/Concerning the June 28 statements, see footnote 3, Document 333.

3. In line with USG views on Jerusalem, we voted in favor of the Latin American resolution in UNGA on July 4, which would have reaffirmed "the desirability of establishing an international regime for the City of Jerusalem, to be considered by the General Assembly at its 22nd Session (Fall 1967)". Unfortunately, this resolution did not receive a two-third majority and failed of adoption.

4. At this point, GA took up Pakistani resolution on Jerusalem which declared (1) that measures taken by Israel in Jerusalem are invalid; (2) called upon Israel to rescind these measures and desist from action that would alter the status of Jerusalem; and (3) asked Secretary-General to report to GA and SC on implementation of resolution within one week. US sought amendment to Pakistani resolution to bring it into line with USG position on Jerusalem as indicated earlier. Regrettably, our suggested changes were not accepted. Since Pakistani resolution as voted contained elements that were unrealistic and appeared unlikely to produce any constructive results (such as provision for SYG report within seven days), we abstained in voting on this resolution.

5. Although we did not feel we could vote for Pakistani resolution, we also did not oppose and vote against it. We agreed with Pakistani resolution in sense of its expressing Assembly concern over situation that would arise if unilateral measures were taken permanently to alter status of Jerusalem. US abstention on this resolution should be interpreted as indicative of our own concern.

/4/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 24, 1967, p. 112.

(a) Israelis are in that city, as they are in other recently occupied territory, as a result of hostilities last month.

(b) Israel may thus be said to be an occupying power with duty under international law to conform its administration as closely as possible to existing local law.

(c) Israeli action to establish a unified municipal administration of Jerusalem cannot be regarded and will not be recognized as a valid annexation, or a permanent change in legal status of Jerusalem in any sense.

(d) It should be considered an interim administrative measure to provide a more convenient and efficient occupation regime for area formerly under Jordanian control, using Jordanian police and other officials wherever possible.

(e) Government of Israel has made it clear that it does not claim that its unified administration of Jerusalem is an annexation.

7. In spirit of statements already made by US defining our public position, we intend to work toward equitable settlement of Jerusalem problem developed through consultation among all concerned.

Rusk