II. Country Assessments and Performance Measures - Tajikistan

U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
January 2006

Country Overview

Map of TajikistanCountry Facts

  • Area: 55,251 sq mi (143,100 sq km), slightly smaller than Wisconsin
  • Population: 7,163,506 (July 2005 est.)
  • Population Growth Rate: 2.15 percent (2005 est.)
  • Life Expectancy: Male 61.68 yrs., Female 67.59 yrs. (2005 est.)
  • Infant Mortality: 110.76 deaths/1,000 live births (2005 est.)
  • Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $7.95 billion (purchasing power parity, 2004 est.)
  • GDP Per Capita Income: $1,100 (purchasing power parity, 2004 est.)
  • Real GDP Growth: 10.5 percent (2004 est.)

Overview of U.S. Government Assistance

In FY 2005, the USG allocated an estimated $99.52 million in assistance to Tajikistan, including:

  • $8.06 million in democratic reform programs;
  • $4.75 million in economic reform programs;
  • $5.29 million in social reform programs;
  • $27.24 million in security, regional stability, and law enforcement programs;
  • $18.97 in humanitarian programs;
  • $1.39 million in cross-sector and other programs; and
  • Privately donated and USG excess humanitarian commodities valued at $33.82 million.

In FY 2005, a total of 162 Tajiks traveled to the United States on USG-funded exchange programs.

FY 2005 Assistance Overview


U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS

Tajikistan is a key partner in the Global War on Terrorism and plays an important role in regional stability as a northern neighbor to Afghanistan. Tajikistan's hydropower potential will help to further regional integration as Tajikistan helps to power new businesses in Afghanistan and Pakistan. With U.S. Government (USG) assistance, Tajikistan is one of the world's leaders in narcotics interdictions. The United States provides radios, vehicles, food, uniforms, and other vital supplies to the Tajik Border Forces to help Tajikistan stem the flow of illicit drugs, arms, and extremists.

KEY ISSUES

Tajikistan's stability and political pluralism has laid the groundwork for further reforms and democratization. U.S. assistance is helping to keep Tajikistan on this path with support to better the election process, improve access to the media, and improve Tajikistan's business climate. With over 50 percent of the country's population under the age of 19, the United States is also actively involved in education reform and the teaching of English to better prepare students for the working world. Tajikistan is well past its civil war conflict of the 1990's and a return to civil unrest is unlikely.

Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan has until recently been patrolled by Russian Border Forces. The United States recognized that the Russian withdrawal could have a destabilizing effect on Tajikistan and the region if the flow of narcotics, arms, and extremists increased. By providing robust assistance to the Government of Tajikistan's (GOT) Ministry of Interior, Drug Control Agency, and Border Guards, the United States is helping to provide an environment at the border that encourages legitimate trade and not criminal activities. The U.S. funded bridge over the Pyanj River will also encourage the flow of goods between Tajikistan and Afghanistan and U.S. assistance will help the GOT manage the border professionally.

Tajikistan's economy is small and many Tajikistani workers have left for jobs in Russia and elsewhere. The United States is encouraging the growth of small and medium businesses, as well as conducting hydropower studies, to help sustain Tajikistan's modest annual economic growth and provide opportunities for Tajikistan's young population. Regional integration and re-establishment of the trading links of the fabled "Silk Road" are important in guaranteeing regional stability and providing an alternative to extremism and terrorism.

A Presidential election will be held in 2006, providing another avenue for the United States to provide assistance. Tajikistan has the region's only Islamic Party and the Parliamentary elections of 2005 were a step in the right direction, but Tajikistan still has a long way to go to ensure pluralism and a real political dialogue. The USG engages Tajikistan's students, media, and government officials on issues of democracy and the importance of including all of Tajikistan's citizens in the political process.

Tajikistan has indicated a strong desire to move away from humanitarian assistance to international assistance aimed at social and economic development. The U.S. is moving in that direction, still, as the region's poorest country, poverty reduction and humanitarian aid remain key pillars of U.S. assistance. Health care, education, and food aid will continue as long as there is a need and funding remains available. These programs are an important component to the overall U.S. strategy of building goodwill and providing a future for Tajikistan's youth. At the same time, the U.S. is challenged by a perception in the GOT that some of the implementers of this assistance do not have Tajikistan's best interests in mind. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have had difficulties with visas and registration and the U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe will remain engaged in defending the work and intentions of non-governmental organizations. The Embassy does this with regular press releases and by having the Ambassador attend functions and events sponsored by NGOs. The Embassy helped organize the first-ever roundtable of GOT officials and civil society leaders.

COUNTRY PERFORMANCE MEASURES

Tajik Democratic Reform

The "radar" or "spider web" graphs below illustrate Tajikistan's democratic performance during 2004. Ratings are based on a 1 to 5 scale, with 5 representing the greatest advancement. These charts provide a disaggregated look at each of the indices and are reported to Congress on a regular basis. The gray shaded area represents 2004 performance levels, while the two dark lines indicate how each country compares in its progress vis-à-vis two standards: (1) the average of Romania's and Bulgaria's performance in each indicator as of 2002 (2002 was the year that Romania and Bulgaria - the "threshold countries" - were invited to join NATO and received favorable indications of future EU membership); and, (2) where the country stood in each indicator in 1999. Together, these charts provide a broad picture of where remaining gaps are in a country's performance, and to what extent these gaps are being filled. For more information, including a detailed explanation of each indicator shown in the graph, see USAID/E&E/PO, "Monitoring Country Progress in Central and Eastern Europe & Eurasia," No. 9 (April 2005). Found online at: www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/country_progress/.

 

Graph shows electoral process, 1.8; civil society, 2.3; independent media, 1.8; governance/public admin,1.8; rule of law, 1.8; average of Romania and Bulgaria, 2002; corruption, 1.5.

The graph shows Tajikistan's democratic reform scores in 2004* (the gray shaded area) as compared to the average of Romania's and Bulgaria's democratic reform scores in 2002 (the bold line) when they were invited to join NATO and received favorable indications of future EU membership.

*Actual 2005 not yet available.

 

Graph shows electoral process, 1.8; civil society, 2.3; independent media, 1.8; governance/public admin,1.8; 1999;  rule of law, 1.8; corruption, 1.5.

The graph shows Tajikistan's democratic reform scores in 2004* (the gray shaded area) as compared to its democratic reform scores in 1999. For example, compared to 1999, Tajikistan showed progress in only one indicator.

 

*Actual 2005 scores not yet available.

Tajik Economic Reform

The "radar" or "spider web" graphs below illustrate Tajikistan's economic performance during 2004. Ratings are based on a 1 to 5 scale, with 5 representing the greatest advancement. These charts provide a disaggregated look at each of the indices and are reported to Congress on a regular basis. The gray shaded area represents 2004 performance levels, while the two dark line indicates how each country compares in its progress vis-à-vis two standards: (1) the average of Romania's and Bulgaria's performance in each indicator as of 2002 (2002 was the year that Romania and Bulgaria - the "threshold countries" - were invited to join NATO and received favorable indications of future EU membership); and (2) where the country stood in each indicator in 1999. Together, these charts provide a broad picture of where remaining gaps are in a country's performance, and to what extent these gaps are being filled. For more information, including a detailed explanation of each indicator shown in the graph, see USAID/E&E/PO, "Monitoring Country Progress in Central and Eastern Europe & Eurasia," No. 9 (April 2005). Found online at: www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/country progress/.

Graph shows private sector share, 2.0; share of employment in SMEs, 3.0; export share of GDP, 2.0; FDI per capita cumulative, 0.5; GDP as percent 1989 GDP, 1.5; 3 year avg inflation, 3.0; average of Romania and Bulgaria, 2002; external debt percent GDP, 2.5.

The graph shows Tajikistan's economic reform scores in 2004* (the gray shaded area) as compared to the average of Romania's and Bulgaria's economic reform scores in 2002 (the bold line) when they were invited to join NATO and received favorable indications of future EU membership.

 

*Actual 2005 scores not yet available.

 

 

Graph shows private sector share, 2.0; export share of GDP, 2.0; FDI per capita cumulative, 0.5; GDP as percent 1989 GDP, 1.5; 3 year avg inflation, 3.0; 1999; external debt percent GDP, 2.5.

 

The graph shows Tajikistan's economic reform scores in 2004* (the gray shaded area) as compared to its economic reform scores in 1999. For example, since 1999, Tajikistan has progressed in four out of the six indicators in this sector.

 

*Actual 2005 scores not yet available.

 

FY 2005 Country Program Performance

 

Democratic Reform

Although still an authoritarian state, Tajikistan's political system remains more pluralistic than that of other countries in the region. Tajikistan is the only country in Central Asia with a legally-recognized Islamic party, one which also holds positions in government. Two new political parties were registered this year, but critics say the pocket parties were created to support the President. However, as Tajikistan prepares for the presidential election in 2006, President Rahmonov and the ruling party are utilizing subtle and not so subtle tactics to harass and silence the opposition, illustrating that the country still has some ways to go before a democratic political culture can be said to exist, as confirmed by flawed parliamentary elections in February 2005. Opposition party leaders face questionable criminal charges, including the October 2005 sentencing of Mahmadruzi Iskandarov of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan to 23 years of imprisonment. While the charges in this case could be viewed as credible, Iskandarov's extradition from Russian and lack of access to family and legal representation is a clear abuse of government power. Additionally, Cabinet reshuffles continue to diminish the role of the opposition in the government structure.

While there is a flourishing civil society and a restricted but energetic group of private media outlets, both demonstrate a strong reluctance to engage the GOT on controversial or overtly political issues. In 2005, several media outlets were forced to close, including Nerui Sukhan newspaper, Ruzi Nav newspaper, and the independent TV station Somoniyon in Dushanbe. As the presidential election draws closer, the GOT has refused to register several independent media organizations.

Tajikistan is moving away from violent conflict. Although there are ethnically-diverse border regions, areas of high population density, lack of social and physical infrastructure to meet demand, and declining economic opportunities, the potential for conflict is minimal. Tajikistanis, in general, only recently emerged from a civil war and freshly remember the associated hardships. Many elements of society are working diligently to reintegrate Tajikistan into the Central Asian region and are committed to building internal stability.

The status of women has declined significantly since the breakup of the Soviet Union, leading the USG to recognize gender as a key cross-cutting objective in its programs. Economic hardship has resulted in labor migration of men to Russia, leaving many female-headed households and leading to declines in girls' attendance at school. In response, USG-funded programs in democratic reform promote increased roles for women through political party and NGO development.

In the political realm, the goal of stability can be overplayed. There is no question that the current Government is popular. In fact, it is popular enough to withstand the scrutiny of a free press and a more robust multi-party political system. However, ostensibly in the interest of stability, the GOT continues to restrict press freedoms and limit the activity of political opponents.

U.S. ASSISTANCE PRIORITIES

In order to strengthen civil society, the USG provides training, assistance, and small grants to NGOs. USG assistance also supports independent television, radio and print media with training, legal assistance, and production of a weekly news program. Civic education and political processes, local government, and legal education are additional priorities for Tajikistan. An anti-trafficking in persons (TIP) program works on prevention and drafting of anti-TIP legislation as well as increased prosecution of traffickers. Exchange programs are also vital to acquaint young Tajikistanis, government and business leaders with American institutions and values.

PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

While the overall assessment suggests political reform in Tajikistan has reached a plateau, the past year saw limited signs of progress in the democracy sector. The Social Democratic Party (the last major opposition party to be legally recognized) was finally registered, enabling it to participate in the 2005 parliamentary elections. However, the GOT prosecuted two members of the party following the parliamentary elections, detained another member, and intimidated others. The success of the USG's new local government project prompted the GOT to request USG assistance in drafting a new local government law. Drawing on experiences in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the USG-funded technical assistance team helped draft two pieces of legislation that offer hope of direct elections for local governing councils. The civic education program secured strong commitment from the Ministry of Education through a Memorandum of Understanding, which provides the USG unlimited usage of the civic education textbook in schools and provides for civics education teacher training during the academic year. As a result, the program reached over 9,790 students in 138 schools. A weekly USG-supported news program, Nabzi Zindagi (The Pulse of Life), was broadcast over 17 radio stations, reaching a potential audience of more than 1.5 million citizens.

USG-funded conflict prevention programs seek to enhance collaboration and communication between communities and local government structures, and experiment with other ways to create and strengthen participatory mechanisms within and among communities. The program targets Sugd Oblast and the Rasht Valley and focuses less on infrastructure projects and more on economic development; training for youth to become leaders among their peers and a mobilizing force for community change; providing a range of services to facilitate business development; and encouraging a stronger link between the private sector, local authorities, and citizens for problem-solving. This brought our previous infrastructure and social project focus to a new level of potential conflict prevention. Perceived levels of tension and conflict within targeted communities are less than those encountered in communities not under the conflict prevention programs, as skills are imparted to promote mutual understanding and problem solving.

MEASURES OF PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS

In order to determine how U.S. Government assistance affects a country, U.S. embassies set targets for improvement called "performance indicators." Data for these indicators are collected by research institutes, embassies and international organizations. By examining data over time, U.S. policymakers better understand whether specific assistance programs are making their intended impact and, if necessary, how to adjust these programs to improve the impact.

Please find below two important indicators in the area of Democratic Reform. In the charts, the "Baseline" refers to a starting point from which to measure progress or regression over time. The embassy and its partner organizations then agree on a "Target" figure that they hope to achieve as a result of U.S. assistance programs. The "Rank" figure is the resulting measurement. "CY" stands for "calendar year," or January 1 to December 31, while "FY" stands for "fiscal year," the period of the U.S. budget that runs from October 1 to September 30 of the following year.

Performance Indicator: Civil Society Index. Assesses the growth of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), their organizational capacity and financial sustainability, and the legal and political environment in which they function; the development of free trade unions; and interest group participation in the policy process. (7-point scale: 1 indicates a very advanced NGO sector, 7 indicates a weak NGO sector) Source: Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2005. The 2005 rank is based on 2004 data. Found online: www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htm.

CY 2003 Baseline

CY 2004 Rank

CY 2005 Target

CY 2005 Rank

5.0

5.0

4.75

4.75


There has been no change in the civil society sector since the 2004 rank, which was based on 2003 data. The GOT has put increasing pressure on opposition parties and has sought to limit political debate in the press. Visa and registration problems have hampered non-governmental organizations like Freedom House and the National Democratic Institute. For civil society to develop, public debate on the issues confronting Tajikistan is vital.

Performance Indicator: Independent Media Rating. The Freedom House rating addresses the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, editorial independence, the emergence of a financially viable private press, and Internet access for private citizens. Measurement is on a 7-point scale, with 1 being the best, 7 being the worst. The 2005 rank is based on 2004 data. Source: Freedom House Nations in Transit 2005. Found online: www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htm.

CY 2003 Baseline

CY 2004 Rank

CY 2005 Target

CY 2005 Rank

5.75

5.75

5.50

6.00

Press freedoms deteriorated in 2005. True debate on politically charged issues is limited and self-censorship is practiced by journalists. Politically risky subjects, such as the extradition and trial of Democratic Party leader Iskandarov, is muted and restrained. USG assistance seeks to promote advocacy for a free press and for NGO registration.

Economic Reform

Economic growth slowed slightly this year to 7.8 percent (down from 10.2 percent in 2003), but is still above average in comparison with other former Soviet Union countries. However, this growth does not totally reflect economic conditions, as Tajikistan has the smallest GDP of the region. According to World Bank estimates, Tajikistan's total external debt continues to grow, owed mostly to Russia, the World Bank, and Uzbekistan, and is just over $1.05 billion. Total debt at the end of 2005 is expected to be $1.124 billion. Nonetheless, external debt has declined to 65 percent of GDP, in part due to a $299 million debt-asset swap with Russia in 2004. During the last few years, the GOT has entered into a number of other agreements with Russia to further reduce the debt in exchange for military base rights, investment rights, and equity positions in several hydropower projects. Approximately one-third of total government revenues are required to service the country's debt. Economic conditions are further reflected by the fact that 64 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, with 36 percent living in extreme poverty.

With peace and improved security raising hopes for the future, Tajikistan is still struggling to restructure and reorient its public and private institutions. While the country's leadership recognizes the need for fundamental reforms, the under-financed and poorly-staffed line ministries are often unable to develop or implement the changes that are needed. Efforts to reform also are hampered by strong vested interests and oligarchs embedded within the government structures. Despite improved tax collection, all levels of government lack the resources needed to adequately finance social services. The weak judicial system is unprepared to cope with the demands of a market economy and corruption is a pervasive problem that inhibits the growth of private businesses. Deteriorated infrastructure, declining social services, and a largely subsistence (and somewhat criminalized) economy further limit the potential for economic growth. Some reforms, such as farm privatization, have been poorly implemented, and others, such as banking and taxes, have only just begun. Banks are reluctant to adopt international standards or allow for international competition because they fear competition and lower profits if they lower their exorbitant interest rates. USG-funded programs help educate financiers of the economic benefits for all concerned of having increased available capital. In such an environment, the impact of reform will be slow, as new legal and regulatory regimes are developed and the modestly expanding economy allows only incremental increases in social sector spending.

U.S. ASSISTANCE PRIORITIES

The USG assistance strategy to foster economic growth combines support for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), business education, microfinance, and the agricultural sector with policy reform. This includes judicial and commercial law reform, support to the Ministry of State Revenues for tax reform, assistance to the National Bank for banking sector reform and microfinance legislation development, as well as an update of the land tenure legislation. The USG also provides assistance to water user associations in Tajikistan to help farmers manage the Soviet-era irrigation networks, improve on-farm management, and increase agricultural production. All Embassy sections are working to create a business climate that is conducive to attracting firms committed to international standards. Feasibility studies help to show the Tajikistanis themselves the real opportunities that exist in Tajikistan in the hydropower, mining, communications, and textile industries.

PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

Significant progress was made in FY 2005 in economic reform, but much more remains to be done. In general, the GOT is moving broadly to complete the transition to a market economy. USG assistance activities specifically help to modernize tax administration, strengthen banking supervision, and draft or revise commercial legislation. Work with the National Bank to bring supervisory standards closer to compliance with international norms is helping raise public confidence in the banking system, and will be critical to mobilizing domestic savings for investment. The USG's partnership with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to expand commercial bank lending to SMEs is starting to have real impact. The GOT continues to press on its commitment to adopt International Accounting Standards (IAS) by the end of 2005, essential to attracting foreign investment. A USG-developed training and certification program has now recognized Certified Accounting Practitioners and has established IAS-based accounting curricula in 15 colleges and universities in the country. In addition, assistance from USG-funded expertise continues to prepare the Government for World Trade Organization (WTO) accession.

Improving management of Tajikistan's significant water and energy resources is critical to the country's economy. The new project to create and put in place effective, viable, and sustainable irrigation Water User Associations (WUAs) successfully registered 11 associations in selected areas of Tajikistan. They are given greater responsibility for operation and management of their irrigation-drainage systems and are already making long overdue repairs to the infrastructure systems. Sustainable and viable WUAs are the best hope to reduce organization and management costs and to increase productivity of land and water resources. The Central Asia Farmer-to-Farmer Program will continue to provide volunteer technical assistance to selected commodity and activity sectors and geographic areas. Activities in this sector support the Presidential Initiatives Water for the Poor and Clean Energy. Another new project is AgFin+, the objectives of which are to support pilot groups of farmers to move products to markets, resulting in increased farmer incomes and stimulating investment in the agriculture value-chain. The USG will assist farmers to: 1) complete business plans and market linkages, 2) secure financing, 3) receive off-season trainings, and 4) position appropriate resources to deliver on-farm support during the growing season. It is too soon to report on results.

USG assistance programs have also helped to monitor the investment climate, advocate for U.S. firms with the Tajik Embassy in Washington, and identify promising business sectors.

MEASURES OF PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS

In order to determine how U.S. Government assistance affects a country, U.S. embassies set targets for improvement called "performance indicators." Data for these indicators are collected by research institutes, embassies and international organizations. By examining data over time, U.S. policymakers better understand whether specific assistance programs are making their intended impact and, if necessary, how to adjust these programs to improve the impact.

Please find below two important indicators in the area of Economic Reform. In the charts, the "Baseline" refers to a starting point from which to measure progress or regression over time. The embassy and its partner organizations then agree on a "Target" figure that they hope to achieve as a result of U.S. assistance programs. The "Rank" figure is the resulting measurement. "CY" stands for "calendar year," or January 1 to December 31, while "FY" stands for "fiscal year," the period of the U.S. budget that runs from October 1 to September 30 of the following year.

Performance Indicator: Economic Reform Index. USAID/EE/PO, Monitoring Country Progress in Central and Eastern Europe & Eurasia. This indicator was drawn from EBRD Transition Report 2005. (Scores range from 1 to 5, with 5 being the most advanced.) EBRD Economic Reform Index includes components on small-scale and large-scale privatization; trade liberalization; price liberalization; corporate governance; competition policy; banking; and non-banking financial reforms. The 2005 rank is based on 2004 data.

CY 2002 Baseline

CY 2004 Rank

CY 2005 Target

CY 2005 Rank

2.23

2.30

2.50

2.45


Tajikistan continues to implement broad economic reforms and integrate into the global marketplace. However, some of the key infrastructure improvements, including attracting a Western air carrier and building an international hotel remain undone. American firms have had trouble with large contracts and believe that other western investors should be wary of investing in Tajikistan. Tajikistan is looking for major hydropower investors and has attracted international firms to study Tajikistan's hydropower potential. The country still needs a good base of SMEs to reduce poverty and provide employment. U.S. assistance programs have focused on SME development, micro loans, regulatory reform and feasibility studies in such promising sectors as mining, telecommunications and hydropower.

Performance Indicator: Agriculture, value added ( percent of GDP). This indicator measures the net output of the cultivation of crops and livestock production, as well as the forestry, hunting, and fishing sectors, as a percentage of GDP. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. Found online: www.worldbank.org.

CY 2002 Baseline

CY 2003 Percentage

CY 2004 Percentage

29 percent

23 percent

24 percent

The agriculture sector contributes to over 25 percent of Tajikistan's GDP with cotton being its largest export. However, Tajikistan's cotton production has declined significantly since the fall of the Soviet Union, and the GOT is working to diversify its crops in order to ensure food security. U.S.-funded programs have assisted the GOT in re-writing land management policies to assist in agriculture production. In addition, USG-funded Water User Association's and Farmer-to-Farmer programs help farmers increase the productivity of land and water resources and provides technical assistance. The USG-funded Cochran program sends Tajik agriculture specialists to the United States for training in modern agricultural methods. Participants always provide positive feedback and benefit from the exchange of ideas. The United States could improve assistance by providing funding for renovation of Tajikistan's dilapidated infrastructure. In addition, developing a cotton grading facility in-country would help increase cotton export revenues for Tajikistan. Assistance to develop Tajikistan's textile industry for the regional market would boost Tajikistan's economy significantly.

Social Reform and Humanitarian Assistance

The GOT is moving broadly to improve social services. The GOT is revamping health care financing and reorienting the health structure to place greater emphasis on preventive health care. Furthermore, the GOT is taking steps to address infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria. Although much progress has been made in health reform, more needs to be accomplished to establish an accountable and transparent health care system. In education, budgetary constraints are a major obstacle to bringing in the reforms needed to maintain Tajikistan's historically high levels of education, but efforts are being made to reform the curriculum, strengthen teacher training, and explore new mechanisms for sector financing. USG-funded heath programs in Tajikistan directly support these reform agendas, while also funding programs that provide direct support to communities and the provision of social services.

Food security remains a critical issue in Tajikistan, as evidenced by high rates of chronic malnutrition. The most recent National Nutrition Survey showed that the number of children subject to severe acute malnutrition increased by 2.5 times this past year. Per capita caloric intake is 1,927 Kcal, well short of minimum recommended standards and less than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa. All income groups are affected by food insecurity: the poorest 20 percent of the population only meets 53 percent of its nutritional requirements while the richest 20 percent fairs only minimally better by meeting 76 percent. Among all groups, particularly in the rural and outlying urban areas, women and children disproportionately bear the brunt of poor health and nutrition conditions.

U.S. ASSISTANCE PRIORITIES

USG-funded social sector programs focus on pressing the GOT to accept recommendations for health care reform through delivery of quality primary health care, promotion of healthy lifestyles, infectious disease control, and improving the lives of mothers and children. By developing a relationship with the Ministry of Health, the USG engages the GOT in critical reform areas that are not currently being addressed by social policy. The USG seeks to bring the GOT more closely aligned with international standards of healthcare practice and promotes open and transparent methods for surveillance and prevention of diseases and illnesses. USG efforts in education focus on improving the quality of and access to basic education by developing teacher trainers at school-based training centers and in-service institutes, working with communities to prioritize education needs and come up with solutions, and building school director and education administrator management capacity.

The USG is implementing a $60 million, five-year food aid program for Tajikistan through the Food Aid Consortium for Tajikistan (FACT), comprised of CARE, Counterpart, Mercy Corps, and Save the Children. The Development Assistance Program began in March 2005, and focuses on increasing food security in rural areas of Tajikistan. The activities will meet the immediate needs of the target population by fulfilling immediate dietary requirements and will address underlying causes of food insecurity. The FACT program enhances community and household resilience to shocks and strengthens the capabilities of individuals through improvements in health, nutrition, household food production, and education.

PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

The USG continues to work closely with the Ministry of Health to develop new health care financing mechanisms to improve services and reduce corruption. The first steps to introduce a basic healthcare benefits package and fee-for-services reform were rolled back by the GOT while it examined the impacts on the extreme poor. However, work to respond to immediate threats posed by malnutrition and such infectious diseases as TB, malaria, and HIV/AIDS made strong advances this past year. The successful nutrition monitoring and supplementation program in southern Tajikistan continued to track the health of tens of thousands of nutritionally-vulnerable children in southern Tajikistan, and provided supplemental feeding to children in need. This program is being complemented by a maternal and child health/reproductive health activity that will reach 330,000 women and children in the same province. Local health committees have already been established in 200 communities under this new project. The Roll-Back Malaria Program has successfully established surveillance centers in all four provinces and provided equipment and training to lab technicians to correctly diagnose malaria. The TB Directly-Observed Treatment Short-course (DOTS) strategy was successfully expanded under a new program begun in early FY 2004. TB and malaria control, although still in early phases, have begun to build capacity and improve the fledgling health system's ability to respond. A brochure targeting prostitutes with HIV/AIDS prevention information also includes referrals to USG-funded NGOs focused on fighting trafficking-in-persons, taking advantage of the opportunity for this important linkage. The USG-funded Youth Power Centers provided at-risk youth with quality drug demand reduction services, positive social support, and healthy alternatives to heroin/opiate use. Peer education sessions show improved knowledge and risk perception regarding drugs and drug use.

In education, the USG invested substantial effort in the capacity of pilot schools and pilot rural clusters located in strategic regions of Tajikistan to serve as professional training and resource centers for surrounding schools. The pilot/cluster model employed will maximize the spread of interactive teaching methodologies and effective management practices while building ownership among schools for the process and its end results. Community involvement initiatives were well received by all stakeholders at the pilot sites, successfully promoting the school-community partnership, a concept that was largely missing under the Soviet system. The USG has a Tajikistan-specific Global Development Alliance (GDA) relationship with the Aga Khan Foundation to leverage the organization's long history of education programming in Gorno-Badakhshan to improve primary education and to expand programming into neighboring oblasts. Additionally, the USG has established a GDA with Nike Corporation, through which approximately $2 million in sports equipment has been provided to thousands of Tajik children involved in sports leagues.

With regard to food security, to date, the FACT has received 47.5 percent of the approved food allocations under the program for FY 2005, the initial year of the program. Due to delays in the availability of commodities, CARE and Save the Children provided their activities with internal loans to forward fund critical elements of the program. Of the commodities imported for monetization, all of the wheat flour and 54 percent of the vegetable oil has been sold and the funds have been distributed among the FACT members. Due to delays encountered in the receipt of commodities, the FACT has not achieved all results agreed upon under the DAP in its first year of implementation. The FACT is negotiating with USAID's Office of Food for Peace to lower expectations about intended results, to bring them in line with reduced commodity shipments.

A total of 686 metric tons (MT) of food was distributed as supplementary rations to 8,276 vulnerable households (families with pregnant or lactating women and/or children under five) in the districts of Baljuvon, Khovaling, Muminobod, Yovon, and Varzob. In Yovon and Varzob districts, the FACT used 5.3 MT of food as an incentive for women to obtain antenatal check ups. Food incentive (16.5 MT) was also used to promote the participation of medical health staff and health volunteers in programming efforts. Working in close collaboration with the Ministry of Health, FACT partners also provided iodized salt to beneficiaries, as part of their food rations, to help achieve the goals of the national de-worming campaign.

A total of 1,335 MT of food was distributed for school feeding to 64,605 children (including pre-schoolers), in the districts of Kulyab, Vose, Hamadoni, Vakhsh, Yovon, and Varzob. Additionally, 2,458 girls received take home rations (a total of 70 MT) in Yovon and Varzob districts as an incentive to attend school regularly. The FACT also distributed 2,510 kg of iodized salt to 37 pre-schools and 170 schools in the districts of Kulyab, Vose, Hamadoni, and Vakhsh, along with 9,840 bars of soap. In FY 2006, the FACT will begin school health and nutrition activities; teachers and nurses were identified in FY 2005 to manage these activities.

MEASURES OF PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS

In order to determine how U.S. Government assistance affects a country, U.S. embassies set targets for improvement called "performance indicators." Data for these indicators are collected by research institutes, embassies and international organizations. By examining data over time, U.S. policymakers better understand whether specific assistance programs are making their intended impact and, if necessary, how to adjust these programs to improve the impact.

Please find below two important indicators in the area of Social Reform and Humanitarian Assistance. In the charts, the "Baseline" refers to a starting point from which to measure progress or regression over time. The embassy and its partner organizations then agree on a "Target" figure that they hope to achieve as a result of U.S. assistance programs. The "Number" figure is the resulting measurement. "CY" stands for "calendar year," or January 1 to December 31, while "FY" stands for "fiscal year," the period of the U.S. budget that runs from October 1 to September 30 of the following year.

Performance Indicator: Infant Morality. Number of deaths of children under one year of age per 1,000 live births. Source: United Nations Statistics Division Millennium Development Indicators. Found online: www.millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd.

CY 1995 Baseline

CY 2000 Number

CY 2003 Number

95

93

92

With USG support, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) piloted use of WHO's internationally-recognized definition of live birth (often referred to as "international live birth definition," or ILBD), which provides a broader definition of live birth than that currently being used in Tajikistan. The ILBD allows for internationally-comparable statistics and interventions to reduce infant mortality, potentially saving thousands of lives. The USG worked with the Government of Tajikistan on legal and regulatory support for the adoption of ILBD nationwide, planned for 2006. Appropriate interventions were identified to decrease infant mortality, and 360 health professionals from pilot sites were trained on the WHO-recommended criteria. These introductory activities to date have saved the lives of 26 newborns who would have been pronounced dead under the previous criteria.

The USG's work to improve the quality of health care for children and to ensure safe motherhood also impacts infant mortality. In 2005, USG-funded maternal and child health programs surpassed all expectations by ensuring that 92 percent of health facility staff are able to correctly manage deliveries, a significant increase from last year's 35 percent, and more than doubling the target set for 2005 of 45 percent. During 2005, USG programs trained 112 health care providers on integrated management of childhood illnesses (IMCI) while 10 health facility managers were trained in IMCI monitoring and evaluation. The USG reached the most vulnerable communities in Tajikistan with prevention and early identification of malnutrition and by increasing access to primary health care in 19 districts of Tajikistan. This program was aimed at reducing the immediate effects of malnutrition by tackling its underlying causes: lack of clean water and sanitation facilities; poor access to PHC, reproductive health, and family planning services; and improper breastfeeding practices. The results of this intervention included improved breastfeeding practices and knowledge, with 99.6 percent of women in target areas breastfeeding their babies, 56 percent of women breastfeeding for over one year, and 88 percent of women reporting that breast milk is the best food for infants. The program screened 85,702 children for malnutrition, exceeding the original target. The USG's Healthy Family maternal and child health project trained 210 health care providers in basic lifesaving skills, to increase the likelihood that women who suffer complications during pregnancy and childbirth will receive necessary treatment. The project conducted educational family planning activities in a total of 78 villages, reaching approximately 1,500 women during the year. Visiting nurses and community volunteers conducted 2,899 health education sessions, helping 39,052 women, men, and young people to learn and adopt positive behaviors related to safe motherhood.

Performance Indicator: Tuberculosis (TB) Incidence per 100,000. Number of newly diagnosed tuberculosis cases, all forms during the given calendar year. Source: World Health Organization, European Health For All Database. Found online: www.data.euro.who.int/hfadb/.

CY 2000 Baseline

CY 2002 Number

CY 2003 Number

44.91

62.91

64.81


The USG continued its program of technical assistance to an expanded national TB control program in 2005. The USG's regional implementing partner for TB control, Project HOPE, entered its second year as Principal Recipient of the country's $2.5 million TB grant from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria (GFATM). As a result, the national program on Directly Observed Treatment Short-course (DOTS) increased its coverage of the population from 17 percent to over 50 percent while maintaining good treatment outcomes in USAID pilots (85.3 percent). The USG facilitated the creation of an Interagency Coordination Committee and thematic working groups on TB drug management and related health education activities involving the Government of Turkmenistan, donor agencies, and NGOs. WHO data on incidence for 2004 is not yet available, while the National TB program (NTP) reports TB incidence for 2004 to be 66.6 per 100,000. NTP data has historically differed from WHO data, and is not considered reliable. The increase in incidence reported between 2000 and 2003 was caused by increasing capacity of the Tajik health system to diagnose and report cases of TB.

In 2005, the USG expanded its TB DOTS pilot sites to Khatlon Oblast, including its innovative work with the use of patient kits provided by the Global Drug Facility. The USG joined other partners in conducting Tajikistan's first knowledge attitudes and practices survey on TB; it will be used to prepare a national TB communications strategy. The USG's work with the World Food Program (WFP) on providing incentives to TB patients to adhere to their DOTS regimens prompted WFP to extend food support for TB control programs until 2007, while offering to subsidize operational costs of organizations expanding the program. In this environment, The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention continued to collect reliable, case-based information on TB incidence, working with its Electronic Surveillance Case Management software and the MOH to analyze these data at national and oblast levels. Three additional pilot sites were included for TB data collection and analysis in 2005, and data on 1,500 patients were added to the database. This database enables TB decision-makers to have access to valid, consolidated data for program analysis and monitoring.

Security, Regional Stability and Law Enforcement

Tajikistan's law enforcement abilities are hampered by a lack of government resources, but the country continues to be a leader in narcotics interdictions, a key regional priorities. The GOT's commitment to regional security, and its willingness to work with international donors on border security, counternarcotics and counterrorism continues to yield positive results, such as increased narcotics interdiction operations and coordinated operations with Afghanistan.

U.S. ASSISTANCE PRIORITIES

The United States provides security and law enforcement assistance, targeted primarily on border control. The USG directly supports the Tajik Drug Control Agency (DCA) with salaries for its employees via assistance administered through the United Nations Office of Drug Control. The USG provided emergency food and other assistance for the Tajik Border Guards in the Winter of 2005 at the request of the GOT.

PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

Border Management, with total allocations of $2.5 million to date to strengthen Tajik-Afghan border control. The major objective is to assist Tajik law enforcement agencies to upgrade their capacities to identify and intercept drug traffickers; facilitate the storage and destruction of seized drugs; promote more effective analysis of seized narcotic substances; and promote effective use of drug-scenting dogs. The U.S. Department of State funds two major UN Office of Drug Control projects in Tajikistan.

USG funding to the GOT's Drug Control Agency totals approximately $3.2 million to date and an additional $3.4 million to be budgeted in FY 2005. The major objective is to stand up a professional anti-drug agency, capable of coordinating national efforts and working with international law enforcement agencies.

The Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Assistance Program has provided $4.2 million in basic commodity assistance to date including uniforms, trucks, communications, power, and shelters with $1.2 million in planned assistance for FY 2005. The program focus is on detecting the transit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), although equipment provided to the Tajikistan Border Guards has benefits for all border security issues. In addition, the USG funds civilian research by former weapons scientists in order to prevent the proliferation of WMD expertise.

The U.S. Department of State also provided $600,000 last year through the International Office of Migration (IOM) for a pilot project to provide border security training focusing on detecting passport and visa fraud. The Tajikistan portion of the regional project aims to reduce both illegal migration and narcotics trafficking through better management of land border crossings.

In April 2005, border officials from Afghanistan and Tajikistan met for the first time in Kabul at a bilateral meeting facilitated by the Combined Forces Command. This meeting provided an opportunity for both countries to share intelligence and begin to establish the relationships needed for day-to-day border management. In May 2005, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began construction of a $33 million bridge linking Tajikistan and Afghanistan. This bridge will serve as a focal point for future cooperation, training, and border liaison meetings.

The U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) provides administrative and program support for the U.S. Department of Justice Senior Law Enforcement Advisor who is responsible for assessing, coordinating, and building the operational capacity of the Tajikistani Border Guards, Drug Control Agency, and the Ministry of Interior.

The USG also supported smaller security-related projects in Tajikistan, including funding for the Ministry of Interior's Criminology Department, human rights training at the Police Training Center, and enhancing the capacity to investigate and prosecute trafficking-in-persons.

The U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe coordinates USG security and law enforcement assistance through the Border Law Enforcement Working Group (BLEWG). The U.S. Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, Defense, and other USG agencies are represented.

MEASURES OF PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS

In order to determine how U.S. Government assistance affects a country, U.S. embassies set targets for improvement called "performance indicators." Data for these indicators are collected by research institutes, embassies and international organizations. By examining data over time, U.S. policymakers better understand whether specific assistance programs are making their intended impact and, if necessary, how to adjust these programs to improve the impact.

Please find below two important indicators in the area of Security, Regional Stability and Law Enforcement. In the charts, the "Baseline" refers to a starting point from which to measure progress or regression over time. The embassy and its partner organizations then agree on a "Target" figure that they hope to achieve as a result of U.S. assistance programs. The "Rank" figure is the resulting measurement. "CY" stands for "calendar year," or January 1 to December 31, while "FY" stands for "fiscal year," the period of the U.S. budget that runs from October 1 to September 30 of the following year.

Performance Indicator: Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework Rating. Highlights constitutional reform, human rights protections, criminal code reform, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. (7-point scale: 1 is the highest, 7 is the lowest). Source: Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2005. The 2005 rank is based on 2004 data. Found online: www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htm.

CY 2003 Baseline

CY 2004 Rank

CY 2005 Target

CY 2005 Rank

5.75

5.75

5.50

5.75


Although the indicator remains unchanged, very recent USG-funded efforts have led to the introduction of new legislation to reform the judicial system and provide judges with the tools they need to research past case and modernize their operations with computer systems. USG rule of law programs are aimed at youth education on legal affairs, domestic violence legislation and judicial reform.

Performance Indicator: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. The score relates to the perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, academics and risk analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). Source: Transparency International. The 2005 rank is based on 2004 data. Found online: www.globalcorruptionreport.org/index.html.

CY 2003 Baseline

CY 2004 Rank

CY 2005 Target

CY 2005 Rank

1.8

2.0

2.0

2.1


Corruption remains a major problem in Tajikistan. However, the USG is helping to train GOT ministries in hiring and vetting personnel to ensure that a culture of corruption is not perpetuated. There have been arrests and convictions of corrupt officials, but day-to-day corruption is tolerated because of the low salaries of most GOT officials. The acceptance of cronyism and nepotism is a cultural norm that can only be reversed through education and exposure to Western practices. This is another fundamental reason for the importance of U.S. exchange programs.

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