U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 11, MARCH 13, 1995
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1. Promoting Democracy and Economic Growth in Haiti--Deputy Secretary
Talbott
2. The U.S. and the Netherlands: Meeting Challenges of the New
Century--President Clinton, Dutch Prime Minister Kok
3. Irish-British Joint Framework Document on Northern Ireland--
President Clinton
4. Non-proliferation Priorities for 1995--Lynn E. Davis, Fact Sheet
5. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Released--Timothy E.
Wirth, Robert S. Gelbard
6. Mexico Agreement Signing Ceremony--Treasury Secretary Robert E.
Rubin, Related Summaries, Fact Sheets
7. U.S.-Korea Bilateral Economic Relationship--Daniel K. Tarullo
8. Korea: Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
9. Treaty Actions
ARTICLE 1:
Promoting Democracy and Economic Growth in Haiti
Deputy Secretary Talbott
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC,
March 9, 1995
Mr. Chairman, Deputy Secretary Deutch and I welcome the chance to give
you a progress report on the U.S.-led, 31-nation effort that has rescued
a neighboring country from disaster, restored stability in our region,
and defended our nation's values and interests. Operation Uphold
Democracy has fully lived up to its name. It has peacefully ousted
Haiti's brutal dictators, restored its legitimate government,
established a secure and stable environment, and is now preparing to
pass the baton to a United Nations force under a U.S. commander.
We cannot yet say "mission accomplished." We have another year of work
ahead of us. But we can say, "So far, so good." This mission, while
still a work in progress, is well on its way to being a success. Twenty-
four weeks after President Clinton sent our troops to their country,
Haitians are constructing roads to advance commerce and build a civil
society rather than building boats to escape terror.
Let me briefly review how far we have come. It was nearly four years ago
that a military coup transformed Haiti's newborn democracy into a
nightmare of repression. A violent regime took power, one that crushed
its opponents and caused tens of thousands of Haitians to flee from
their shores toward ours. With the support of that regime, paramilitary
gangs assassinated opposition leaders and priests who spoke out. Murder,
mutilation, rape, and the kidnaping of children were not just officially
sanctioned--often officially perpetrated--crimes; they were instruments
of rule. They became common tools for dealing with citizens and families
suspected of supporting democracy. Meanwhile, the economy, long the
weakest in the hemisphere, plummeted deeper into ruin.
For three years, the United States and other countries around the world
tried everything short of force to remove the coup leaders and restore
Haiti's democratically elected government--persuasion, negotiation,
mediation, condemnation, sanctions--all to no avail. It was not until
last September, when the coup leaders knew that the President had
ordered U.S. armed forces into action, that they agreed to give up power
peacefully.
Think for a moment where we would likely be today had we not acted:
-- The dictators would still be in power, and their campaign of murder
and terror against the Haitian people would be continuing.
-- Tens of thousands of Haitians would be seeking refuge abroad, posing
a threat to America's borders and to regional stability as well. The
Bahamas and other small island democracies in the Caribbean would be
faced with the prospect of being overwhelmed by a mounting flood of
desperate humanity.
-- The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard would still be diverting massive
resources on an open-ended if not permanent basis to manage migrant
interdiction along our own coastline. These are resources that would
otherwise be available to reduce the flow of illegal drugs, stop
smuggling, protect our fisheries, and save lives at sea. More generally,
we would be faced with more years like 1994, when we spent nearly $300
million to deal with Haitian migrants, sanctions enforcement, and
humanitarian relief. These were the costs of non-intervention, the
recurrent costs for which--absent our willingness to use force--there
was no end in sight. Furthermore, the enemies of democracy elsewhere in
the region--coup-plotters lurking in the shadows of other capitals in
the hemisphere--would be more inclined to believe that they could act
with impunity; that they, too, like the Haitian coup leaders of 1991,
could overthrow democratically elected governments.
-- Finally, the United States and the international community would
have failed to fulfill our commitments in the face of a coup that
President Bush described as an extraordinary threat to our national
security; that Secretary of State Baker said should not stand; and that
President Clinton, the United Nations, and the Organization of American
States declared unacceptable.
Had it not been for the deployment of the U.S.-led Multinational Force
on September 19, your committee, Mr. Chairman, might well be holding a
very different sort of hearing today--ahearing to survey the damage
sustained and the damage to come as a result of a crisis allowed to
fester.
There was, of course, widespread controversy over our Administration's
decision to use force in Haiti. We understood the concern and the
skepticism; so did the President. As Commander in Chief, he considers no
responsibility more serious than the one he assumes when he sends the
men and women of the U.S. armed forces into harm's way.
Thanks in the first instance to the superb performance of American
soldiers, their officers, and Generals Shelton, Meade, and Fisher,
Operation Uphold Democracy has set a new standard for the degree of
peace and civic order that has been kept in a peace-keeping operation.
From the moment the armed services began planning, they demonstrated an
extraordinary capacity to adapt to change, to identify and understand
the problems, and to solve them effectively. When the Haitian military
dictators agreed to step down, within minutes we were able to recall our
assault forces and within hours they had shifted to a deployment posture
suitable for intervention in a permissive environment. In the months
that have passed, our military's accomplishments--which have ranged from
quelling initial outbreaks of Haitian-on-Haitian violence to disarming
the paramilitary gangs to, literally, turning the lights back on in
Haitian cities--have been truly outstanding.
From the beginning of the operation, President Clinton instructed the
military commanders on the ground that their first responsibility was to
safeguard our men and women in uniform. In the five months since our
troops entered Haiti, we have lost one brave American soldier in the
line of duty: Special Forces Sergeant Gregory Cardott, who was shot when
he went to investigate a disturbance that arose from an isolated crime
at a toll-collection point.
Mr. Chairman, while we pay tribute to the American soldiers serving in
Haiti, we must also remember that Operation Uphold Democracy is a truly
multinational effort, with participation from 30 other nations. In this
regard, I particularly want to say a few words about the contributions
of the 11 nations of the Caribbean Community. Haiti's CARICOM neighbors
took an international leadership role by calling for forceful action to
remove the coup leaders, and each of these 11 states has matched its
words with deeds by contributing soldiers or police or both to the
multinational force.
Mr. Chairman, the success to date of Operation Uphold Democracy also has
been due to the lessons that we have learned from previous experiences
in peace-keeping and other missions. From U.S. operations in Grenada and
Panama, we learned the importance of inter-service cooperation, joint
and interagency planning, and operational flexibility. In Operation
Uphold Democracy, the lifting of a U.S. Army division from a U.S. Navy
aircraft carrier took the concept of joint operations to a new level.
Mr. Chairman, just as our military forces are strengthened by the
integration of sea, land, and air power, so, too, is the force of our
diplomacy increased by the integration of unilateral with coalition and
more broadly multilateral approaches. From the Gulf War, we learned how
American leadership in multilateral fora can spur the actions of others,
reduce our burdens, and enhance our effectiveness. UN Security Council
Resolution 940 authorizing "all necessary means," the Multinational
Force, and the hand-off to the United Nations mission are all conscious
adaptations of the Desert Storm experience.
Mr. Chairman, credit for the current success of Operation Uphold
Democracy is also due to President Aristide, Prime Minister Smarck
Michel, members of the Haitian parliament, Mayor Evans Paul of Port-au-
Prince, and other democratic leaders of Haiti. And, of course, credit is
due to the Haitian people themselves. Remember, Mr. Chairman, some of
the fears and warnings that were in the air at the time when this
mission began: Some said that President Aristide would choose vengeance
over reconciliation; that Haitians would fight, rob, and slaughter each
other in a frenzy of lawlessness; and that efforts to rebuild Haiti's
democracy and economy would never get off the ground.
Instead, in overwhelming numbers, the Haitian people have heeded
President Aristide's consistent call for reconciliation. They are
joining together to begin building a new society. They have shown
immense resilience, courage--and, I might add, restraint--in the face of
enormous challenges. Moreover, they also have shown a gratifying and
richly deserved degree of appreciation for our troops. All across the
country, from Port-de-Paix to Les Cayes, our soldiers are now greeted
each day by signs bearing three simple words: "Thank you, America."
So Deputy Secretary Deutch and I come before you with a sense of
confidence and optimism. But we also come with our eyes open to the
magnitude of the challenge that remains--for us and for the
international community in the coming months and, more importantly, for
the Haitian people themselves in the coming years and decades. Before
the coup of September 1991, Haiti was, as I mentioned, the poorest
country in the hemisphere. It may take until the end of this decade for
its people to work their way back even to that level.
A devastated economy is only part of the legacy with which Haiti must
cope. This is a country still struggling to banish the ghosts of its
past. Its people must learn new habits and new ways of working together
as they try to overcome a long history of social polarization, political
instability, and institutionalized brutality. As President Aristide so
frequently and memorably puts it, Haitians will have to work hard simply
to move "from misery to poverty with dignity."
But we must also place Haiti's problems in the context of the
extraordinary progress that its people have made in just five months.
All that we have given to the Haitian people is an opportunity--an
opportunity for them to resume the hard work of sustaining their
democratic institutions and building a viable market economy. But having
been given a second chance--after four long, lost years--the Haitian
people are making the most of that opportunity.
Today, thanks to Operation Uphold Democracy, the Haitian people live in
an environment that is--in relative terms--safe, secure, and free of
political violence. They have made progress in breathing life back into
democratic institutions. They have begun to jump-start their dead
economy, by initiating free-market reforms, and by seeking the
investments they need for long-term growth.
Let me examine each of these topics--security, democracy, and economics-
-in turn.
A Secure, Stable Environment
When the United States sent its troops to Haiti, our mission was to
restore the legitimate government and to create a secure, stable
environment in which it could function. Thanks to the Haitian people's
desire to end the violence that has plagued their nation and the
cooperation of our allies in the multinational force, we have been
largely successful.
A few statistics illustrate this point. When our troops arrived in
Haiti, there were an average of 10-15 serious incidents of organized
political violence reported each week. Those have virtually disappeared.
Incidents of criminal violence remain at a very low level as well: In
Port-au-Prince, there are now an average of 18 violent crimes being
reported each week--a figure far below those of other cities in the
hemisphere with populations of similar size.
The multinational force has recovered nearly 33,000 weapons through buy-
backs, by seizing caches, and by setting up roadblocks. There is no
doubt that some weapons are still in circulation. But the multinational
force made the right decision not to go door to door to try to find
every gun. That was not our mission, and it would have been impossible
and, indeed, illegal under the Haitian constitution, which protects gun
ownership within the home. Our goals were to create a generally secure
environment in which the democratic government could take hold and to
establish new civilian-controlled professional security forces as the
first line of protection for the Haitian people.
In this, we have made good progress. In the three months following the
intervention, over 3,000 recruits for the Haitian Interim Public
Security Force received transition training at a facility provided by
the Government of Haiti, funded by the Department of State, managed by
the Department of Justice, and supported by the U.S. military. Over 900
Haitian migrants received comparable training at the camps in
Guantanamo. These interim security forces are now on the streets of
Haiti--increasingly responsive to the civilian authorities and acting as
public servants, rather than as official thugs.
These interim security forces are monitored and assisted by more than
600 International Police Monitors, or IPMs, spread throughout the
country. These IPMs are police officers, provided by more than 20
countries on six continents under the leadership of former New York
Police Commissioner Ray Kelly. They are protagonists in one of the great
success stories in the annals of international peace-keeping. Recruited,
trained, and deployed in less than six weeks, the distinctive IPM
"yellow hats" have restored the confidence of the Haitian people that
police exist to serve and protect society, not to brutalize it.
In organizing the Interim Public Security Force, we have worked with the
Government of Haiti to remove individuals involved in serious human
rights abuses or narcotics trafficking. All senior officers of the
Haitian army have been released from active duty. More than 2,400 former
soldiers have been enrolled in a program of counseling and job training
funded by USAID and run by the International Office of Migration. The
Government of Haiti is continuing to pay these soldiers' salaries as
they go through the retraining process.
We have made it clear to the Government of Haiti that the decision
whether to retain a military is theirs to make. For our part, we are
ready to work with Haitian Government officials to make sure that the
process of demobilization, however far it may go, takes place in an
orderly, responsible, and equitable fashion, consistent with President
Aristide's emphasis on reconciliation.
Mr. Chairman, candidates for a permanent, civilian police force are now
being recruited and trained by our Justice Department, in cooperation
with French, Norwegian, and Canadian police, at the new National Police
Academy in Camp d'Application, Port-au-Prince. All trainees are entering
the academy on the basis of merit--their performance in the entrance
exams--rather than personal or political affiliation. We regard these
entrance exams as a crucial filter in breaking the cycle of personal and
political security forces that have dominated Haiti's history.
The first class of Civilian Haitian Police entered in January and will
graduate in May. About 350 graduates will be deployed each month,
building up to a force of at least 4,000 that will replace the Interim
Public Security Force. This new, accountable, professional, apolitical
police force will be a dramatic improvement over the violent, corrupt
security forces of the past.
For all these reasons, life in Haiti is generally secure today. The
simple activities of everyday life--street vendors plying their wares,
children going to school, and families attending church services--have
come alive again. Thousands of men, women, and children who were in
hiding or in exile--from members of parliament to mayors to clergy to
entrepreneurs--have resumed normal lives. The flood of refugees from
Haiti--which hit a high of over 3,000 per day in July of last year--has
virtually stopped. Since September 19, the Coast Guard has helped more
than 13,000 Haitians--including all but a few hundred at Guantanamo--to
return home.
Another measure of the security of the situation in Haiti is the pace at
which we are moving to turn the Multinational Force's responsibilities
over to the United Nations mission. We are right on schedule. On January
20, the MNF Commander, Major General Meade, and the member states of the
multinational force reported to the UN Security Council that "a secure
and stable environment" had been established. On January 30, the
Security Council passed Resolution 975 authorizing the UN Mission in
Haiti--UNMIH--to build up to a force of 6,000 troops and 900 police and
to take over from the Multinational Force by no later than March 31. The
process of transition already has begun, and will accelerate as we
approach the end of the month.
The United Nations mission is enabling us to continue the draw-down of
American forces in Haiti. U.S. forces reached a peak of 21,000 in early
October. Together with their colleagues from the multinational force,
they established 27 bases and made their presence felt in each of the
133 districts of Haiti. As the situation began to stabilize in November,
we started to withdraw our troops. Today, there are about 5,800 American
soldiers in Haiti. That number will be cut by more than half when the UN
mission takes up its full responsibilities.
The United Nations forces in Haiti will be commanded by an American,
Major General Joseph Kinzer, and will include about 2,500 American
troops. Two-thirds of the forces that will comprise the UN mission will
carry over from the Multinational Force, and are already on the ground
in Haiti,including the Bangladeshis, the Nepalese contingent, and the
CARICOM battalion. The contingents from Pakistan and India will arrive
later this month. I should add that the United Nations will assume the
costs for the American and international forces and the international
police--costs that the United States has largely been paying up until
now. This means that the U.S. share of the UNMIH costs will be just over
30% until October 1 and only 25% thereafter. As Secretary Christopher
noted in a broader context, when testifying before your committee in
January, "this is a sensible bargain I know the American people
support."
Our success in helping the Haitian people create a secure environment
has also helped Haitians strengthen their fragile political
institutions. Let me turn now to that subject.
Democratic and Legal Institutions
President Aristide has set the tone of tolerance and reconciliation for
his entire country. He returned to Haiti with one of the largest
democratic mandates of any political leader in the Western Hemisphere.
Yet, from the beginning, he has reached out beyond his own enormous
constituency. Through his cabinet and other appointments, President
Aristide is building bridges to all sectors of society, from the elite
families to the residents of the slums of Cite de Soleil.
Immediately upon his return, President Aristide met with parliamentary
leaders from all sides of the political spectrum to set a common,
cooperative agenda. On crucial matters--such as appointing a Supreme
Court and drafting a new police law and amnesty legislation--he has
worked with the Haitian parliament, not around them. Thanks in large
part to President Aristide's leadership, the parliament passed the first
national budget that Haiti has had in five years. He personally helped
Haiti's political factions put aside their differences and move forward
with arrangements for the national elections. Thanks to those
arrangements, Haitians will be able to go to the polls on June 4 to
elect the 83 members of the Chamber of Deputies, 18 of 27 Senators, and
2,100 local officials.
This is a record of which any executive and legislature could be proud--
even in a country less shattered, polarized, and traumatized than Haiti.
But faced with high expectations, Haiti's political leadership still
confronts daunting challenges. When President Aristide returned in
October, the national treasury was virtually empty and the government
heavily in debt to foreign lenders. Aristide's cabinet ministers took
over ministries that the dictators had stripped of basic supplies--even
plumbing. There are few professionals below the ministerial level to
implement decisions. Haiti's judicial system, which was never strong to
begin with and collapsed under the Cedras regime, must be completely
renovated.
The necessary reforms will not be accomplished overnight or by any
single person or political party. That is one reason why, from the
beginning, our primary goal has been to promote the process of
democracy. To that end, we are working with the United Nations Elections
Assistance Unit and the Organization of the American States to ensure
that the June legislative and local elections, as well as the
Presidential elections in late November, are open and fair. With this
objective in mind, the responsibilities of the UN mission will end by
February 1996, with the inauguration of President Aristide's
democratically elected successor. Let me note that the National
Democratic Institute is currently actively engaged in preparing for the
upcoming elections, and we hope that the International Republican
Institute also will become involved.
We also are working closely with Haiti's new Minister of Justice, Jean
Joseph Exume, to rebuild Haiti's legal system. We have completed a
comprehensive assessment of judicial, court, and penal facilities in the
nine provincial capitals, and a short-term training program for judges
and prosecutors is already underway.
Economic Growth
However, no matter how successful the Haitian people are at establishing
a secure environment or building democratic and legal institutions,
stability will elude them without strong, steady, broad-based economic
growth. Haiti has a per capita income of about $200 a year, making it
one of the poorest countries in the world. It also has one of the worst
infrastructures of any country in the world, including the most
expensive, least efficient port in the Western Hemisphere. Its roads are
almost non-existent, and it has among the world's fewest telephones per
capita. Bringing the economy to life will be Haiti's most difficult
task.
President Aristide has risen to this challenge by committing his
government to a far-reaching program of free-market reform. That program
includes the nearly total abolition of tariffs; a reduction of the civil
service by up to 50%; a fiscally responsible budget; and the
privatization of state-held enterprises. Other steps toward a free
market include the removal of most exchange controls, the modernization
of commercial law provisions, and a decentralization of many economic
powers of the central government. These reforms are far-sighted, based
on sound economics, and deserving of support.
The international community is doing its share by providing aid and
technical assistance to help Haiti make the transition to democracy and
a market economy. In January, international donors and lenders met in
Paris to review the progress that has been made since President
Aristide's return, and the general assessment of this progress was so
positive that the donors actually pledged $1.2 billion, nearly double
what originally had been proposed. It is anticipated that $900 million
of that $1.2 billion will be available over the next 12-15 months.
I should note that the non-American donors and lenders have provided
over 75% of these funds, making this, from an American standpoint, the
most successful instance of burdensharing in the history of the
hemisphere. In Haiti, we are demonstrating that American leadership can
leverage tremendous power and resources on behalf of a common good.
Mr. Chairman, on Tuesday I accompanied a delegation of 28 corporate
executives to Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien. The purpose of this two-
day trip was, first, to give American companies an opportunity to assess
the emerging business opportunities in Haiti and, second, to give the
Haitian Government a chance to hear more about the steps they need to
take to improve the climate for American investment. One of the
highlights of the trip was the first meeting of the U.S.-Haiti Business
Development Council, which is bringing together business and government
representatives of both countries.
Yesterday, the U.S. Agency for International Development signed an
agreement with President Aristide to provide funding and technical
assistance for Haiti's Presidential Commission on Modernization and
Economic Growth. This commission will work to identify specific
regulatory changes and commercial law reforms that will make it easier
and more profitable to do business in Haiti.
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has announced that it
is prepared to provide $100 million in finance and political risk
insurance to support American private investment in Haiti. Yesterday,
OPIC signed an agreement with the First National Bank of Boston to
create a lending facility that will make more than $65 million in
working capital and loans available. The Bank of Boston has operated in
Haiti for many years and has already identified a number of promising
investment ventures.
To complement the OPIC-Bank of Boston facility, USAID announced
yesterday that it will provide an additional $12 million in credit,
training, and marketing assistance to small businesses in Port-au-Prince
and Cap Haitien. To implement this new initiative, USAID will be working
closely with three local institutions-- the Haitian Development
Foundation, the Haitian Credit and Savings Society, and the Haitian
Women's Assistance Fund. USAID also will continue to work with the
Haitian Development Foundation on the Provincial Enterprise Development
project, which is already in place with 1,100 loans outstanding.
In addition to these initiatives, we are organizing several sector-
specific business missions to bring U.S. business executives in direct
contact with Haitian businesses and government decision-makers. These
missions will concentrate on telecommunications, power generation, light
manufacturing, and handicrafts. The telecommunications delegation will
travel to Haiti on April 20-21, and the others will follow soon
thereafter.
Mr. Chairman, there is already evidence that the Haitian private sector
is getting on its feet: More than 35 manufacturing operations have
restarted in Haiti since the beginning of the year, exports of mangos
and papayas have resumed, the construction industry is rebounding, and
cruise ships are once again bringing tourists to Cap Haitien.
In light of the great progress that has been made over the past five
months and in light of the hard work ahead, we have asked the Senate to
ratify the bilateral investment treaty with Haiti that is now before it.
That treaty would increase investor confidence and make Haiti a more
attractive place to do business. It would ensure that funds from
investment activities could be transferred freely, that American
companies would have full protection against expropriation, and that the
Haitian Government's investment approval decisions will be free of
performance requirements.
Mr. Chairman, I mentioned earlier that our intervention in Haiti made
sense for reasons of American self-interest. That includes our economic
self-interest. Of course, the operation has not been cost-free. But the
costs must be judged in context and that means, among other things,
against the costs of inaction. Since September 19, the U.S. Government
has spent about $700 million on Operation Uphold Democracy--most of
which are one-time-only-costs--instead of continuing to pay some $300
million a year for the costs of non-intervention. This investment
protects our borders, has helped consolidate democracy in our
hemisphere, and will help Haiti become a good neighbor and stable
partner in diplomacy and trade. But our intervention also does justice
to America's core values and principles as well.
The best defense of our Haiti policy is simple: We intervened because it
was in our national interest, we intervened after every other
alternative had been exhausted, and we intervened because it was the
right thing to do.
The American intervention in Haiti has been successful thus far. Now we
must see the job through and that means until the completion of the
United Nations mission 11 months from now. As I already have stressed,
we cannot solve Haiti's basic problems--the Haitian people must solve
those themselves--but we can help. Indeed, our help is essential. Only
we can lead a UN effort to maintain security in Haiti until the Haitian
Government fields a professional police force of its own, and only we
can lead the international effort to help Haiti strengthen its
democratic institutions and build its economy.
As Secretary Christopher has told the United Nations General Assembly,
Haiti now has an opportunity to take its rightful place in the growing
community of democratic states; to work with the international community
to solve the transnational problems we all face; and to become an
inspiration to other nations, not an outcast.
American leadership in Operation Uphold Democracy has shown that the
United States is willing to stand up for its own interests and for
democracy in the hemisphere and that our military is second to none in
creativity and professionalism, as well as in strength and courage. This
is an effort of which we--and you--can be proud. (###)
ARTICLE 2:
The U.S. and the Netherlands: Meeting Challenges of the New Century
President Clinton, Dutch Prime Minister Kok
Remarks prior to White House press briefing, Washington, DC, February
28, 1995
President Clinton. It is indeed a pleasure to welcome Prime Minister Kok
to the White House. Since the days of our Revolutionary War when the
Netherlands gave shelter to John Paul Jones' ships, the Netherlands has
consistently been one of our most valued and trusted allies.
I also have warm personal recognition, Mr. Prime Minister, of your
country. I last visited it a few years ago when I was governor of
Arkansas, and I hope I have a chance to visit it again. In the
meanwhile, I am glad we had the opportunity to return the hospitality
today.
The Prime Minister comes here at a very important time, when we are
seeking to work together to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War
era. One of the most vital issues we discussed is the effort to build a
more integrated, more secure Europe; to ensure that democracy and
prosperity grow strong in the years ahead. We reaffirmed our intention
to press ahead with the enlargement of NATO to include Europe's new
democracies.
The Netherlands is playing a leading role in building bridges to these
new democracies. It was the first NATO nation to host a Partnership
for Peace exercise on its own soil--something for which we are very
appreciative.
We also agreed that in parallel with this expansion, NATO must develop
close and strong ties with Russia. We share a vision of European
security that embraces a democratic Russia.
The Prime Minister and I discussed a broad range of issues, including
our interest in continuing to expand trade between our two nations. Not
many people know just how rich our partnership is. The Netherlands is
our eighth- largest trading partner. The Dutch people obviously think
the American economy is a good bet because they have invested more in
the United States than anyone except Britain and Japan. I hope this
trading relationship will continue to grow with our friendship in the
years ahead.
During our talks, we also agreed on the importance of indefinite
extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to prevent the spread
of nuclear weapons. We reviewed our joint efforts in the Caribbean where
we are working together to combat narcotics trafficking.
I want to thank the Prime Minister and all the people of the
Netherlands, especially, for the support they have given to our common
efforts to restore democracy in Haiti, a truly remarkable success story
to date. No other European nation has been as forthcoming at every stage
of this endeavor--from sending ships for sanctions enforcement, to the
police monitors in the multinational force, to the Dutch Marines, who
are part of the UN mission. Like their involvement in the peace-keeping
in the former Yugoslavia, this vital help to the people of Haiti writes
yet another chapter in the great Dutch tradition of supporting
humanitarian relief efforts in human rights around the world.
When I spoke two weeks ago at the Iwo Jima Memorial commemoration, I
admired once again the wonderful gift the Netherlands gave us in thanks
in part for our part in liberating their country in World War II--the
wonderful Netherlands Carillon. Today, I want to thank the Prime
Minister and the people of the Netherlands for renovating and updating
the carillon, which is now receiving a 50th bell. This is the gift I
have here. Now, as the Prime Minister reminded me, some of the bells are
as big as he and I are. But this 50th bell, which I assure you--it has
been over in the oval office for a day or so, and we have all lifted it-
-it is quite heavy and quite wonderful, and we thank him for this.
Bells have rung out the news of victory and liberty for centuries. As we
move forward to meet the challenges of this new century, it is fitting
that we and our Dutch friends will be reminded of the common cause we
shared 50 years ago by the sound of this beautiful new bell. May it also
be sounding 50 years from now and even beyond. Mr. Prime Minister.
Prime Minister Kok. Thank you very much, Mr. President. Let me, first
of all, express my gratitude and, too, the gratitude of Minister for
Foreign Affairs Van Mierlo to be here. Having been here at this official
working visit, this visit underlined once and again the close links and
the excellent cooperation and relationship between our two countries,
both on a bilateral basis, and also in the international framework. So I
want to thank you for that occasion.
You said three words about this bell--indeed, this is one of the
smallest ones we have. But it is number 50--number 50 in a row. This
symbolizes--with the words "Freedom" and "Friendship" on it--it
symbolizes how grateful we still are and have remained, for the way in
which the United States and the United States' soldiers participated in
liberating our continent, liberating our country. I will be proud to see
and to hear from far away, from in the Netherlands when, on the 5th of
May of this year--the day when, 50 years ago, the Netherlands were
freed, that the bells will ring--all the bells will ring. That
symbolizes, then, again, our friendship.
Coming back to the main purpose of our talks and our visit, the
President indicated the subjects that have been discussed. I think we
live in a world where cooperation, partnership, and leadership is more
necessary than ever before. In this world, we in the Netherlands
participate in European cooperation. We want to strengthen the European
Union. We want to expand the European Union. We want to offer
perspective to the people of the Central and Eastern European countries
that they can be part of our integrated European Union. We want to work
on the security architecture together with the United States.
We are convinced--Europeans--but I am even more convinced that without
transatlantic cooperation, European integration at the end will not be
successful. So we need each other. We need the United States in that
role, and we want to strengthen our identity in Europe--also in this
field, foreign policy, security policy--but together with the United
States.
I want to end by saying that especially in this time, the role in which
you, Mr. President, use the word "leadership," the way in which you are
prepared to take the lead in going in the right direction in the
universal context is impressive and encouraging because we need each
other. We need strong and good cooperation between Europe and the United
States. We need leadership.
Sometimes I am a little bit concerned about tendencies in American
society where you get the impression--but I am only here for a few days-
-you get the impression that there is a certain tendency toward
isolationism, stepping somewhat back from the international scene. That
would be very riskful, to put it mildly. That would be very riskful,
because responsibility and leadership is a necessity now and forever.
Thank you very much. (###)
ARTICLE 3:
Irish-British Joint Framework Document on Northern Ireland
President Clinton
Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
Washington, DC, February 22, 1995
I welcome today's announcement by Irish Prime Minister Bruton and
British Prime Minister Major of the launching of a Joint Framework
Document outlining their shared proposals for inclusive talks on the
future of Northern Ireland. The publication of this document marks
another significant step forward in the peace process. I congratulate
both Prime Ministers, former Irish Prime Minister Albert Reynolds, Irish
Foreign Minister Dick Spring, and British Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland Sir Patrick Mayhew, all of whom have worked hard and
risked much in the search for a new path forward to reconciliation and
lasting peace.
The Framework Document lays the foundation for all-party talks among the
British and Irish Governments and the political parties in Northern
Ireland. The talks are intended to be all-inclusive, with all issues on
the table. As the Irish and British Governments have emphasized, the
document is designed to assist discussion and negotiation on Northern
Ireland and will not be imposed on any party. The clear wish of the
people of Northern Ireland is for a lasting peace. We call upon all the
parties to examine the document carefully and move forward on the basis
of it.
The guns and bombs have been silent in Northern Ireland for almost six
months. The benefits of peace are obvious to all, and I urge the parties
to seize this opportunity. I will continue to strongly support the peace
process in Northern Ireland and to work with the Governments of Ireland
and the United Kingdom to build on today's courageous step forward
toward lasting peace. In addition, I look forward to our trade and
investment conference to be held this May as a way to underscore the
tangible benefits to peace. (###)
ARTICLE 4:
Non-proliferation Priorities for 1995
Lynn E. Davis, Fact Sheet
Lynn E. Davis
Remarks by the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security at a State Department briefing, Washington, DC, February 28,
1995.
What I would like to do is just provide you an overview of the Clinton
Administration's overall non-proliferation policies.
As President Clinton has clearly stated, preventing the proliferation of
dangerous arms is critical to our security. Non-proliferation is not an
abstract or technical subject; it is about security for all Americans.
Secretary Christopher has identified this as one of his top foreign
policy opportunities.
Our most urgent goal is the indefinite and unconditional extension of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
We are working to achieve the ratification of the START II Treaty as the
foundation for setting the arms control agenda of the 21st century. That
agenda includes negotiating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, achieving
a fissile material cutoff convention, and designing measures for
transparency in the dismantling of nuclear weapons and in the
disposition of the materials from those nuclear weapons.
We seek to bring Russian and Chinese behavior into conformity with the
global non-proliferation norms and regimes, and especially to curtail
their nuclear cooperation with Iran.
We need to implement the Agreed Framework with North Korea, and sustain
our effort to prevent rogue states--such as Iran, Iraq, and Libya--from
acquiring dangerous arms and technology.
We are expanding our efforts to track sensitive trade; and we have
programs underway to improve export controls in the New Independent
States, Central Europe, China, South Africa, and India.
We are also working to renegotiate the U.S.-EURATOM nuclear cooperation
agreement, which expires at the end of 1995 and whose lapse would
seriously affect our nuclear industrial cooperation.
Let me review several of these policies, beginning with the most
immediate and pressing goal, and that is the indefinite and
unconditional extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty will be 25 years old this weekend.
President Clinton will speak tomorrow evening at the Nixon Center
conference to underscore the U.S. commitment to that treaty and to
making it permanent when it comes up for review in mid-April of this
year.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty represents one of the great success stories
in arms control and non-proliferation. The treaty has helped prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons, promoted technical cooperation in the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and served as the basis for nuclear
disarmament efforts.
We are working to achieve a majority in favor of the indefinite
extension, going into the April review conference, and we believe we
will achieve that goal. But this is not assured, and so we have mounted
a major diplomatic effort, led by Vice President Gore and Secretary of
State Christopher. Entering the review conference with a majority in
hand, we will build on that to achieve overwhelming support.
To succeed, we must convince uncommitted parties that a permanent Non-
Proliferation Treaty is the best way to ensure their security and global
peace. At the same time, we approach the conference with the United
States and Russia having taken significant steps toward nuclear
disarmament, making good on their part of the bargain under Article VI
of the Non- Proliferation Treaty. Significant reductions in nuclear
weapons have occurred and will continue. Four of the five nuclear powers
are observing a nuclear test moratorium, and we are making real progress
toward the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Central to our overall arms control efforts is the START II Treaty,
which stands as a historic achievement in the scope of its reductions
and in its measures to promote strategic stability. We are on track to
ratification in the United States, and our ratification will help the
process along in Russia. Following START, we will turn to the Chemical
Weapons Convention and seek its ratification as our priority.
Let me now turn just briefly to our policies with Russia, where we have
an extensive non-proliferation agenda and a set of shared, common goals.
These shared, common goals include working together to promote the
indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and also to put in
place the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
I also would like to announce that bilateral negotiations with the
Russians will begin shortly on ways of ensuring that the process of
dismantling nuclear weapons and the disposition of their nuclear
materials will be transparent and irreversible. This was a goal that we
set for ourselves at the summit in September, and we have now agreed
with the Russians to begin these negotiations. Ambassador Jim Goodby
will lead the U.S. delegation.
One of the most significant, and perhaps least reported, non-
proliferation achievements is the contract we negotiated for the U.S.
purchase by the United States Enrichment Corporation of 500 mt of
Russian highly enriched uranium over the next 20 years. Highly enriched
uranium extracted from nuclear weapons coming out of the warheads from
the countries of the former Soviet Union will be converted to low-
enriched uranium suitable for commercial power reactor fuel.
Beginning next month--starting in March--the first deliveries will
occur. By purchasing low-enriched uranium, the U.S. can ensure that the
weapons material will be used solely for peaceful purposes.
But Russia and the United States have a serious disagreement over our
non-proliferation policies toward Iran. We have conveyed our strong
opposition to their proposed sale of nuclear reactors to Iran. From the
first days of this Administration, we have sought to prevent any nuclear
cooperation with Iran by any country around the world, and we were
successful in preventing the sale of a heavy-water reactor.
Now the Russians are going ahead with light-water reactor sales, which
will provide Iran with nuclear expertise and a nuclear infrastructure
that will aid their crash program already underway to acquire nuclear
weapons. Russia's security interests are not served by Iran acquiring
nuclear weapons, and we are seeking to convince Russia's leaders to
forego any nuclear cooperation with Iran.
We also are pressing the People's Republic of China for more responsible
behavior in trade in nuclear and chemical weapons technologies,
following on from the important step the Chinese took last October to
ban exports globally of ground-to-ground missiles with the
characteristics controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime. But
the Chinese, too, are seeking to sell nuclear reactors and conventional
arms to Iran. Again, our goal is to convince the Chinese that their
security depends on preventing the spread of dangerous arms to these
countries. Moreover, we will not be able to pursue our own peaceful
nuclear cooperation with the Chinese unless the Chinese are willing to
accept the guidelines for trade that are carried out by the other
nuclear suppliers.
Let me finish by returning to the U.S.-EURATOM Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement. We are fast approaching the time when the agreement between
the United States and EURATOM will lapse, with serious commercial costs
for our nuclear industries. Under United States law, a necessary element
of an agreement is that the United States have "consent rights" over
reprocessing and similar nuclear activities under this agreement. We
have emphasized to the Europeans that the United States will not use
consent rights to interfere in EURATOM's civil nuclear program. But
these need to be part of our agreement.
We would be sending a most unfortunate signal were our countries not
able to find a way to continue nuclear cooperation, especially as we
approach the Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference.
So, in conclusion, the Clinton Administration's non-proliferation agenda
is wide-ranging and involves both a global approach to reinforcing the
international norms against the proliferation of dangerous weapons and
technologies and a regional approach to root out the causes of
insecurity which produce incentives for acquiring such weapons and
technology.
Fact Sheet: Ratification of the Convention on Conventional Weapons
Released by the State Department, Washington, DC, March 6, 1995.
On May 12, 1994, the President submitted the Convention on Conventional
Weapons* to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. The
convention was concluded at Geneva on October 10, 1980, and was signed
on behalf of the United States on April 8, 1982. It entered into force
on December 2, 1983, and to date, a total of 42 States have become
parties.
__________
*The full title is the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be
Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects.
__________
The convention is designed to restrict, for humanitarian reasons, the
use in armed conflicts of specific types of conventional weapons. The
most important element of the convention is the Landmines Protocol--a
set of restrictions on the use of landmines.
During the past decade, the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel
landmines (APL) has caused heavy casualties among the civilian
population, particularly in internal armed conflicts in the third world.
These mines pose an enduring threat to post-war reconstruction around
the world. They continue to take thousands of innocent civilian lives
every year, even in those countries where conflicts have ceased.
The submission of the convention to the Senate is part of the
Administration's comprehensive program to deal with this serious
problem. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on
September 26, 1994, President Clinton called for the eventual
elimination of APL. As a first step toward this ultimate goal, the
President proposed that countries join the U.S. to negotiate an
international control regime to regulate the production, export, and
stockpiling of APL.
The United States also has urged countries that manufacture APL to adopt
export moratoria similar to that already adopted by the United States.
We are providing demining assistance to mine-plagued countries in
Africa, Asia, and Central America. We will play a leadership role in an
international meeting on mine clearance, to be hosted under UN auspices
in mid-1995, to solicit greater international contributions to mine-
clearance programs in those countries that must contend with this
serious problem. We have encouraged all countries to become party to the
convention and to join with us in adopting amendments to the Land-mines
Protocol to broaden its scope and tighten its restrictions.
Provisions of the Convention. The convention is the latest in a series
of international agreements governing the conduct of armed conflicts,
including the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The purpose of these agreements
is to reduce the suffering caused by such conflicts and to provide
protection to the victims of war, including the civilian population and
members of armed forces who have been wounded or captured. The United
States has traditionally been at the forefront of efforts to improve
this area of law and took an active part in the negotiations that
produced this convention.
The convention contains three protocols, each of which deals with a
particular type of conventional weapon. Protocol I prohibits the use of
any weapon, the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments which,
in the human body, would escape detection by X-rays. We are not aware of
any significant current attempt to develop or produce such a weapon, but
the prohibition is desirable from a humanitarian viewpoint and in no way
constrains U.S. military options.
Protocol II (the Landmines Protocol) contains a detailed set of
restrictions on the use of landmines and booby-traps, including:
-- Requirements for the recording of the location of minefields and the
disclosure of their location after the cessation of active hostilities;
-- Special restrictions on the use of mines delivered by aircraft or
artillery;
-- Additional requirements relating to the use of certain mines and
booby-traps in areas containing concentrations of civilians; and
-- Prohibitions on types of booby-traps thought likely to pose
unnecessary danger to civilians.
These restrictions are by no means a complete answer to the problem of
the indiscriminate use of landmines. However, their observance in the
conflicts of the past two decades could have substantially reduced the
carnage that occurred where large numbers of mines were laid without
proper marking and recording, often for the sole purpose of causing
casualties among civilians.
Protocol III contains various restrictions on the use of incendiary
weapons. The most significant of these is a prohibition on using air-
delivered incendiary weapons to attack targets located within a city,
town, or other concentration of civilians. Certain concerns have been
raised about the acceptability of these restrictions from military and
humanitarian points of view. For example, the concern has been expressed
that the use of air- delivered incendiaries may be needed to
eliminate chemical or biological facilities without exposing the nearby
civilian population to the massive release of dangerous substances.
Therefore, the President has directed that this part of the convention
be given further study by the interagency community and has not
submitted it to the Senate at this time.
U.S. Proposals To Improve the Convention. One important part of the U.S.
strategy on landmines is to encourage substantial improvements in the
substance and scope of the Land-mines Protocol. A formal Review
Conference will be held from September 25 to October 13, 1995, in Vienna
to consider possible amendments. The U.S. is pressing for the following
changes:
-- The expansion of the scope of the protocol, which is presently
limited to international armed conflicts, to encompass internal armed
conflicts as well. It is in these internal conflicts--such as in
Cambodia and Angola--that the greatest civilian casualties have
occurred.
-- A requirement that all remotely delivered mines--that is, those
delivered by aircraft, rocket, or artillery--be equipped with self-
destruct devices to ensure that they do not remain a danger to civilians
long after the conflict is over. These devices would have a specified
maximum lifetime and reliability standard and would have a backup self-
deactivating feature--e.g., a battery that exhausts itself--to ensure
that they do not detonate even if the self-destruct device fails.
-- A requirement that any APL without self-destruct devices and backup
self-deactivation features be used only within controlled, marked, and
monitored minefields. These minefields would be protected by fencing or
other safeguards to ensure the exclusion of civilians. Such minefields
could not be abandoned--other than through forcible loss of control to
enemy military action--unless they were cleared or turned over to
another State that had committed to maintain the same protections.
-- A requirement that all mines be detectable using commonly available
technology. This would greatly simplify the burden and risks of
demining.
-- A requirement that the party laying mines assume responsibility for
them, including a duty at the end of active hostilities to clear them,
maintain them in controlled fields to protect civilians, or turn them
over to another State that has committed to maintaining the same
protections. Where the party laying the mines no longer controls the
territory in which they were laid, it would have a duty to provide
assistance to ensure their clearance, to the extent this is permitted by
the State in control of the territory in question.
-- The addition of an effective verification mechanism, including the
possibility of fact-finding inspections by a verification commission
where credible reports of violations have been made. If violations are
found to have occurred, there would be a possibility of reference to the
UN Security Council for action, as well as individual criminal liability
for persons who willfully or wantonly put the civilian population in
danger.
The U.S. already has made progress in marshalling support from other
States for these changes. However, we will be seriously hampered in this
effort if we do not ratify the convention in time to be a full
participant at the September 1995 review conference. Specifically, under
the terms of the convention, we will not become a party to the
convention until six months after we deposit our ratification, which
means that we must do so by mid-March 1995.
(###)
ARTICLE 5:
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Released
Timothy E. Wirth, Under Secretary for Global Affairs; Robert S. Gelbard,
Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs
Opening statements at a State Department press briefing, Washington, DC,
March 1, 1995
Under Secretary Wirth. The context in which we are making this delivery
to the Hill today is the requirement that is found in the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, which requires the President to submit to the
Congress a determination of counter-drug cooperation of major drug
producers or drug transit countries.
Nations must either have fully cooperated with the United States or
taken adequate steps to achieve compliance. If a nation is decertified--
in other words, if we do not certify that they are fully in compliance
or are taking adequate steps--decertification then triggers a reduction
in U.S. aid and opposition to loans in various MDB-- multilateral
development bank--activities. Decertification can be waived if the
President determines that it is in our national interest to do so. So
that is the legal framework in which we find ourselves.
Second, to put this in the overall framework of administration policy,
this certification-decertification analysis and process are part of the
overall effort by this Administration to counter the very dangerous and
increasingly threatening around-the-world menace of narcotics.
Our policy has a variety of elements to it. It includes interdiction of
narcotics coming into the country--major efforts that are made in
cooperation with other countries to interdict supplies coming into the
United States; working with host countries on crop eradication and
economic development; working with host countries to develop
institutions of legal accountability and the rule of law; major elements
of law enforcement here at home and abroad; and a broadened set of
domestic prevention and treatment programs here in the United States.
These are all part of the major commitments by this Administration to
increase the pressure domestically and internationally in this very,
very dangerous area of narcotics.
We must have the cooperation of drug-producing and drug-transit
countries, and, over the last two years, our focus and pressure on drug-
transit and producing countries has become more and more intense.
In last year's certification process, the President made very hard
decisions, holding drug-producing and transit countries to extremely
high standards. His message was clear: No more business as usual on
international narcotics. We will all be held to stringent and honest
standards.
This year, the Administration has gone further. The President has called
for all governments in the hemisphere to renew their counter-narcotics
efforts. He did so again at the Miami summit. He proposed changes to
domestic law to permit the U.S. Government to continue to support drug
interdiction in the Andes, and just last month he asked Congress for
major budget increases in this year of spartan budgets to support both
domestic and international counter-narcotics efforts.
The President has asked the principal drug-producing and transit
countries throughout the world to join with us in fighting the narcotics
monster. In some cases, this has meant making frank and honest
assessments about the performance of other governments. Some of them may
find or have found this process to be painful, but we cannot solve
problems without first identifying and being honest about them.
For our friends, I want to assure you that we will cooperate fully with
you in your struggle against illegal drugs. But we cannot do so if we
avoid the hard truths, nor can we hide behind the polite formalities of
traditional diplomacy.
We acknowledge our own shortcomings. We accept responsibility for our
own failures. But we must publicly identify those areas in which we
believe our friends must also take more effective measures. It is good
law enforcement policy, it is good foreign policy, and it is the law.
Most importantly, for those of us in this Administration, this is
extraordinarily important for 250 million Americans who see all around
them a scourge of crime, reinforced by the deep penetration of narcotics
in so many places in the United States. So we are responding to that
need first and foremost.
Let me now turn the podium over to Assistant Secretary Robert Gelbard,
who is Assistant Secretary for programs related to narcotics and crime.
As I think all of you know, Assistant Secretary Gelbard is a career
foreign service officer. He was ambassador to Bolivia. He was Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Latin America and is one of the very best and
toughest foreign service officers, who has done a terrific job with this
bureau. Bob.
Assistant Secretary Gelbard. Good afternoon. As Under Secretary Wirth
said, today President Clinton sent to Congress his decision on narcotics
certification for 29 major drug-producing and transit countries. The
State Department also sent Congress its annual International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report. You will be getting this report, which
describes the anti-narcotics efforts of over 140 countries, including
all countries that have received U.S. assistance for anti-narcotics
purposes in the past two years.
Before I talk about the specific decisions, let me go into a bit more
detail about the two-stage certification process. First, as Under
Secretary Wirth said, the Foreign Assistance Act requires that the
President identify a list of the major drug-producing and transit
countries as defined in the law. The current list was based on
information from last year's International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report as well as other sources.
The President transmitted the list of 29 major drug-producing and
transit countries to Congress on February 2. The current list, for the
first time, includes Vietnam, Taiwan, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic
and omits Belize--listed in previous years. All of the countries on the
list are subject to the second stage of the process--the certification
determinations. Including them on the list per se is not a judgment of
their efforts against narcotics. It is a recognition that a large
quantity of illicit narcotics is produced in or transits through the
country.
For the 29 countries on the list, the President must determine whether,
during the previous calendar year, they cooperated fully with the United
States or took adequate steps on their own to meet the goals and
objectives of the 1988 UN Convention on Drug Trafficking.
The law provides the President three certification options:
First, he may certify that a country is cooperating with the United
States and/or is taking adequate steps on its own to meet the goals and
objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.
Second--alternatively--he may deny certification.
Third, for a country whose counter-narcotics performance does not
qualify for certification, he may make a vital national interests
certification. This is done when U.S. national interests require that
the United States be able to cooperate, provide foreign assistance, or
vote for assistance from the multilateral development banks despite the
country's failure to meet full narcotics certification standards.
If the President determines that full certification or vital national
interests certification is appropriate, foreign assistance remains
unchanged. However, if the President denies certification, most
categories of assistance are immediately cut off. This means halting
most forms of aid under the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export
Control Act and financing through the Export-Import Bank. The U.S. also
is obliged to vote against any loans to the country in the multilateral
development banks.
The law also gives Congress 30 calendar days, if it chooses, to overturn
the President's certifications by enacting a joint resolution.
This year, the President certified 18 of the 29 countries as fully
cooperating with the United States in counter-drug efforts and/or taking
adequate steps on their own to meet the goals and objectives stated in
the 1988 UN Convention on Drugs.
Those certified as cooperating fully are: The Bahamas, Brazil, China,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hong Kong, India,
Jamaica, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuela,
and Vietnam.
Both Laos and Panama received vital national interests certification
last year but have now been certified by the President as fully
cooperating.
The President granted vital national interests certification to six
countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Lebanon, Pakistan, Paraguay, and Peru.
Colombia, Pakistan, and Paraguay were fully certified last year.
The President denied certification to five countries: Burma, Iran,
Nigeria, Syria, and Afghanistan. Last year, Afghanistan received a vital
national interests certification.
Before I take your questions, I would like to explain the reasoning
behind some of the decisions that have generated interest.
Around the world, we are working in countries where drugs are produced
to stop them at the source. In transit countries, we are working to stop
the traffickers' movement of drugs. In both producer and transit
countries, we are working to halt money laundering and spill-over drug
use.
Each country is different and each has an area where we try to focus our
counter-narcotics assistance to obtain the greatest impact. Often, these
problem areas are the most difficult to handle, either politically or
practically. If we want to hurt the traffickers, we must hit them in
areas most critical to their operations.
Certification decisions are based on a country's performance. We welcome
and applaud all efforts against drug trafficking and production.
However, we expect producer nations to take action against production,
we expect transit nations to take action against trafficking, and we
expect money-laundering nations to take action against the misuse of
their financial systems.
Over the past two years, we have developed an aggressive Western
hemisphere strategy to focus on the drug source countries. There has
been some real progress, but, as the President's decisions reflect, we
still need to do more.
Peru and Bolivia together produce more than 80% of the world's coca. In
1994, both countries made significant progress in law enforcement
operations--seizing drugs and arresting traffickers. However, both
failed to take any significant steps in the area of greatest importance-
-reducing the cultivation of coca. Because of this, the President
certified Peru and Bolivia only on the basis of vital U.S. national
interests.
In contrast, the fundamental issue in Colombia is strong, serious law
enforcement. The world's largest cocaine trafficking organizations are
based in Colombia, and they threaten Colombia's very social and
political institutions. Colombia needs an aggressive policy to capture
and prosecute major drug-traffickers. They need a judicial system and
process that really punishes drug-traffickers with sentences
commensurate with their crimes rather than just slaps on the wrist. They
need money laundering and asset forfeiture laws and laws which actually
function properly to attack the wealth of the traffickers.
In his annual review, the President recognized these shortcomings and
certified Colombia based on vital U.S. national interests.
Heroin use is also on the rise in the United States. The President's
certification decisions reflect our growing concern for this problem.
Burma, the world's largest producer of heroin, has not reduced opium
cultivation and was again denied certification.
Afghanistan was denied certification this year because of a 39% increase
in opium production with no effort to stop it.
Nigeria's heroin trafficking and courier organizations now span the
globe. It also was denied certification this year, as last year. That
said, we do acknowledge that Nigerian anti-narcotics efforts stepped up
at the close of the year, and we hope the trend will continue during the
course of 1995.
In Pakistan, we have recently seen some positive efforts to stop the
cultivation of opium poppies, but the President gave Pakistan a vital
national interests certification based on modest overall counter-
narcotics efforts during the course of 1994.
The drug industry is powerful, but the collective political will of
countries around the world to stop drug trafficking is more powerful. By
effectively addressing all elements of the drug trade in each country,
including demand for drugs in the United States, we can cripple the drug
traffickers.
The President recognized this fact in his decisions and employed very
stringent standards. The certification process was subjective and
careful. The drug issue remains an important part of our foreign policy
and our bilateral relations with all countries, especially, though, with
the major drug-producing and transit nations.
Our message to countries that did not receive full certification is that
this Administration is serious about defeating the drug business and
expects the same from all of them. The United States will continue
counter-narcotics cooperation but expects serious efforts in all major
producing and transit countries against their most important problem
areas.
[BOX]
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
Copies of the 1995 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report may
be purchased from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC
20402 (tel. 202-512-1800). The cost is $35.00, and the order number is
044-0000-02430-6.
You may access the report electronically through the Department of State
Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) in the gopher menu selection
"Publications and Major Reports." DOSFAN is accessible three ways on
the Internet:
-- Gopher: dosfan.lib.uic.edu
-- URL: gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/
-- WWW: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ dosfan.html
The report also is available, on a fee basis, through the GPO's Federal
Bulletin Board Service (BBS). New users must establish a GPO credit card
account, using either MasterCard or Visa, at least 24 hours in advance
of downloading files.
The computer modem access number for BBS is 202-512-1387.
Telecommunications software settings are 8 bit, no parity, and 1 stop
bit (speeds are 1200-9600 baud). The minimum charge to download a file
(up to 50 kilobytes) is $2; a full megabyte costs $15. Technical
questions regarding the BBS should be directed to 202-512-1530. (###)
ARTICLE 6:
Mexico Agreement Signing Ceremony
Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, Related Summaries, Fact Sheets
Secretary Rubin
Statement at a Mexico agreement signing ceremony, Washington, DC,
February 21, 1995.
Secretary Ortiz, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: At the
outset, I want to compliment Secretary Ortiz and members of his team for
the dedication they have shown over the past weeks in resolving Mexico's
economic problems. They have demonstrated a willingness to make
important and fundamental changes in Mexico's economic policy.
Today, we are signing four agreements that will serve American economic
interests with respect to jobs and standards of living, and American
interests with respect to illegal immigration and national security, by
assisting the stabilization of the Mexican economy.
Our country has an enormous stake in helping Mexico restore prosperity
over time. Mexico and the United States have been close friends for
years. Mexico is a proud nation with a rich heritage, and we share more
than just a border. We share culture, history, and common interests.
Mexico has a problem, and we have responded to that problem.
Mexico is a model for countries whose economies are entering the global
financial system, and its difficulties threatened to spill over into
other emerging markets. That could reduce or even reverse progress in
countries that can become our greatest export opportunities--
opportunities that create American jobs. Beyond economics, we also have
significant security interests in continued progress in those countries.
Under these agreements, Mexico should be able to take the steps
necessary to end its liquidity crisis, and, in time, the Mexican
economy--which is fundamentally sound--should stabilize. U.S. financial
support, together with that of the IMF, will assist Mexico as it pursues
the difficult but necessary steps to restore its stability. The ultimate
success of this program depends on Mexico, and Mexico has made it clear
that it intends to take tough measures to turn the situation around.
What has been accomplished took a great deal of courage--on the part of
Mexico's leadership to commit to the kind of stringent economic medicine
this program requires; on the part of President Clinton, who asked that
we act decisively to advance America's interests; and on the part of the
bipartisan leadership of Congress, which has been supportive of this
effort.
This plan came about when the President recognized that the legislative
process would not be completed in a timely fashion and that we had to
move quickly to stem the threat, not just to our interest in the
hemisphere, but to our broader interests globally.
The four agreements we are signing today provide the framework and the
specific legal arrangements under which our support will be made
available. In addition to the funds which will be provided by the IMF,
we will utilize $20 billion from the Economic Stabilization Fund to
provide loans, swaps, and guarantees to Mexico.
Ten billion dollars will be made available in stages between now and the
end of June 1995 as Mexico meets agreed-upon conditions. Three billion
dollars will be made available on the effective date of the agreements.
Using the same terms and conditions, another $10 billion will become
available--as needed and in stages--beginning in July.
The support of the United States is dependent on a determination that
Mexico and its central bank are pursuing the policies to which it agreed
in accepting International Monetary Fund support.
Mexico has committed to cut government spending and go slightly into
surplus this year, pursue a tight monetary policy and allow the real
supply of domestic credit to contract, provide timely transparency in
its financial operations, and continue privatization and other
structural reforms.
Our agreements build upon what Mexico has agreed to undertake for its
support from the IMF. The disbursement of funds by the United States
will follow our determination that Mexico is pursuing sound policies.
The Mexican commitment to provide weekly and monthly information on
their monetary and fiscal situation will provide financial markets with
appropriate information and permit monitoring of Mexico's economic
policies.
Finally, repayment is backed by the revenues from the export of crude
oil and petroleum products, in a binding agreement signed by the United
States, the Mexican Government's oil company--PEMEX--and the Government
of Mexico.
U.S. funding should enable Mexico to meet its tesobono [treasury bond]
obligations and successfully refinance and restructure its short-term
debt. The U.S. funding will support Mexican efforts to strengthen its
banking system by reducing pressure derived from maturing dollar-
denominated certificates of deposit and other dollar- denominated
obligations. By eliminating Mexico's short-term debt problem and
strengthening the Mexican banking system, the U.S. financial package
will enable Mexico to support stable exchange rates. New access to
private capital will allow Mexico to continue to refinance less
expensively.
From the beginning, we have said that this program could work only if
Mexico took the difficult steps needed to reestablish stability and put
itself on the road to long-term economic health. I believe they have
made that commitment. In fact, Mexico has already begun to implement the
policies needed to stabilize its economy. This is the key, and the
policies announced by the Mexican Government are ones we support.
As I have previously made clear, our approach to the situation in Mexico
also involves contributions from other countries and multilateral
institutions.
The IMF has approved up to $17.8 billion in stand-by--that is, medium-
term--assistance, subject to Mexico's meeting appropriate economic
conditions. Already, $7.8 billion has been disbursed to Mexico and an
additional $10 billion is scheduled to start in July of this year.
Second, the other G-10 countries, through the Bank of International
Settlements, are expected to provide $10 billion in short-term
assistance--an amount that amply meets Mexico's needs for short-term
credit.
The IMF recently advised us that it is seeking additional short-term
credit from non-G-10 countries as part of the $10 billion portion of the
IMF stand-by arrangement. Since the short-term funds from the BIS are
considered adequate, we do not believe additional short-term funds are
useful. Of course, medium-term participation in the IMF financing
facility would be valuable.
Based on our conversations with a number of countries, we fully expect
that little or no short-term monies will be forthcoming. Under these
circumstances, we also fully expect the additional $10 billion of
medium-term money previously authorized by the IMF will be provided.
We begin today the important work of helping Mexico restore its economy.
It will not happen overnight, nor will it be easy. But in the final
analysis, Mexico has chosen the right course, and so have we.
This agreement protects America's national interests, and it protects
the funds we are making available while providing Mexico the support it
needs at this crucial time in its history.
Summary of Agreements
Text of Summary of Agreements released by the Department of the
Treasury, February 21, 1995.
Four basic documents embodying commercial agreements between the United
States and Mexico implement the Mexican economic stabilization package:
-- The Framework Agreement serves as an umbrella accord. It broadly
defines the terms and conditions for provision of U.S. resources to
support Mexican economic stabilization. Each of the financing agreements
is consistent with the provisions of the Framework Agreement. The
Framework Agreement references the economic policies Mexico has
announced that it will pursue, the conditions on eligibility for
financing, how satisfaction of these conditions will be determined, how
U.S. resources may be used, and how the U.S. will be repaid.
-- The Medium-Term Exchange Stabilization Agreement specifies the terms
and conditions for medium-term (up to five years) swap transactions
between the U.S. and Mexico. Under the agreement, for every purchase by
Mexico of dollars for pesos, Mexico will deposit a corresponding amount
of pesos in a Treasury account at the Banco de Mexico. The agreement
also specifies the interest rate the U.S. will charge Mexico for the
swaps, which will cover the U.S. risk for the transactions. Above
specified threshold levels, additional swap transactions will bear
increased rates of interest.
-- The Guarantee Agreement specifies the terms and conditions for
guarantees of debt securities issued by Mexico. Under this agreement, no
guarantees may be issued for payments of principal and interest due more
than 10 years after issuance of the guaranteed debt securities. The fee
structure for the guarantees is intended to cover the U.S. Treasury's
risk for the guarantees, and, as in the case of the medium-term swaps,
will increase with greater outstanding use to encourage Mexico to seek
regular private sources of finance.
-- The Oil Proceeds Facility Agreement establishes a mechanism to
provide an assured source of repayment of U.S. resources. Under the
agreement, Petrolcos Mexicanos (PEMEX) will instruct its foreign
customers to make payments for exports of oil, oil products, and
derivatives into an account at a U.S. bank. That bank, in turn, will be
under irrevocable instructions to transfer funds to a Bank of Mexico
account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), beginning after
the effective date of the agreements. As long as Mexico meets its
obligations, those funds will be freely available for use by the Bank of
Mexico. If Mexico fails to repay the U.S. under any of the financing
agreements, the Department of the Treasury--through the FRBNY--would be
entitled to set off its claims against the Bank of Mexico account.
Fact Sheet: The Utilization of U.S. Funding Under the U.S.-Mexico
Framework Agreement
Text of a fact sheet released by the Department of the Treasury,
February 21, 1995.
Under the U.S.-Mexico Framework Agreement, the United States will make
available up to $20 billion from the U.S. Treasury's Exchange
Stabilization Fund. These funds will help the Mexican Government move
aggressively to resolve its current financial crisis.
Significant Levels of Support
-- The United States Government has committed $20 billion to the
Mexican support program.
-- Ten billion dollars will be made available in stages between now and
the end of June 1995, as Mexico meets agreed-upon targets; $3 billion
will be made available immediately on the effective date of the
agreement.
-- Another $10 billion will be made available as needed and in stages
beginning in July, based on the same terms and conditions.
Program Addresses Mexico's Key Financial Problems
-- U.S. funding will enable Mexico to meet its tesobono obligations and
successfully refinance and restructure its short-term debt.
-- U.S. funding will support Mexican efforts to strengthen its banking
system, including reducing pressure derived from maturing dollar-
denominated CDs and other short-term obligations.
U.S. Funding Will Reposition The Mexican Economy
-- By eliminating Mexico's short-term debt problem and strengthening
the Mexican banking system, the U.S. financial package enables Mexico to
support stable exchange rates.
-- This plan lets Mexico gain new access to private capital which will
allow Mexico to continue to refinance less expensively.
Funding Mechanisms Encourage Longer-Term Investment
-- U.S. support will be available as both short- and medium-term swaps
and through a program of loan guarantees.
-- To date, only short-term swaps have been available to Mexico. As
part of the agreement, the U.S. will now begin to provide medium-term
swaps as well.
-- The Mexican Government will also be able to use U.S. funds to
guarantee longer-term bonds. A first issue of U.S. guaranteed bonds is
anticipated during the second quarter of 1995.
Fact Sheet: United States Support for Mexico
Text of a fact sheet released by the Department of the Treasury,
February 21, 1995.
Overview
Support. The United States and Mexico have signed agreements
implementing the $20-billion support package put forward by President
Clinton to protect United States jobs, exports, immigration interests,
and security concerns threatened by Mexico's liquidity crisis.
Conditions. Mexico has announced an aggressive economic program which it
intends to follow in order to restore financial stability. U.S. support
is being extended to bolster that effort, by enabling Mexico to meet
short-term obligations and restructure its debt.
Safeguards. These agreements set up transparency requirements,
notification methods, evaluation procedures, and other mechanisms to
safeguard United States interests. Under these accords, proceeds from
crude oil and oil product exports will serve as assured sources of
repayment of Mexico's obligations to the United States.
Forms and Use of United States Support
Three Forms of Support. These agreements cover three forms of support
for Mexico:
-- Short-term swaps through which Mexico borrows dollars for 90 days;
-- Medium-term swaps that will extend dollars to Mexico for up to five
years; and
-- Guarantees through which the United States will back Mexico's
obligations on government securities for up to 10 years. The United
States backing will convince investors to lend money to Mexico for
longer terms at lower interest rates.
Use of Support. Mexico will use the dollars the U.S. provides or the
funds raised with U.S. guarantees to retire, refinance, or restructure
short-term obligations. This will allow Mexico to shift its borrowing to
more stable, long-term sources of finance.
Financial Plan. Mexico has developed a financial plan with which the
United States concurs that will govern how Mexico uses U.S. support to
accomplish its refinancing. Under this plan, Mexico, over the coming
year, should refinance $16 billion of about $21.5 billion tesobonos
which remain outstanding.
Fees and Charges. The United States will charge Mexico interest for the
medium-term swaps and fees for the securities guarantees. The fee and
interest structure has been set to be appropriate cover for all risks
the United States will bear. Moreover, fees and interest rates rise the
more support Mexico draws upon, in order to encourage Mexico to turn
first to market sources of finance.
-- For the medium-term swaps, interest charges begin with the 91-day
U.S. Treasury bill rate to which a risk-premium of 225 to 375 basis
points or more is added.
-- The guarantees incorporate a similar fee structure, with Mexico
paying the difference between the present value of risk-free repayment
streams and streams discounted by a risk premium of 225 to 375 basis
points or more.
Economic Conditions
Economic Targets. U.S. support builds upon and adds to Mexico's
commitment to meet the rigorous monetary, fiscal, and structural policy
targets upon which it agreed with the IMF. Briefly summarized, these
targets include:
-- Pursuit of tight monetary policy with negative real money growth;
-- Reduced government spending leading to a surplus of 0.5% for 1995;
and
-- Further privatization and other structural reforms.
Monetary Policy. Moreover, Mexico has put forward an additional economic
policy memorandum which underlies these agreements. In it, Mexico
affirms the independence of its central bank and the use of monetary
policy to achieve exchange rate stability and resumption of full access
to market sources of finance.
Transparency. The Bank of Mexico and the Ministry of Finance have agreed
to make publicly available key fiscal and financial data on money and
credit aggregates, international reserves, the evolution of public-
sector debt, and other measures of economic performance. This will
provide a clearer picture of how Mexico's economy is doing and whether
economic policy targets specified in these agreements are being met.
Staged Support. The United States will make the support available in
stages, as needed, subject to our determination that Mexico is adhering
to its announced policies.
Safeguards
Notification Requirements. The Mexicans will be required to provide the
U.S. Treasury with details about how they plan to use U.S. support any
time they seek to draw on U.S. resources. For example, Mexico would have
to specify what forms of securities would be offered with a new tranche
of U.S. guarantees, as well as how the money raised with U.S. guarantees
would be used to retire existing Mexican obligations.
Veto Power. The U.S. Treasury may deny any request for a disbursement if
Treasury determines that the use is inappropriate or if it considers
that Mexico has not met the conditions set forth in the agreements.
Acceleration. The United States has the right to accelerate Mexico's
outstanding obligations to the U.S. if Mexico has failed to comply with
certain key provisions of these agreements.
Oil Backing
Proceeds From Oil Exports. In the unlikely event of default, all of
Mexico's obligations to the United States under the new arrangements
will be backed by the proceeds from Mexico's crude oil and oil products
exports.
Federal Reserve of New York. Upon implementation of these agreements,
payments for these exports will pass through an account of Bank of
Mexico at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Set Off To Meet Mexican Obligations. If Mexico fails to repay the U.S.
Treasury under these agreements, Mexico's obligations will be set off
against funds passing through the account.
Summary of Mexican Economic Policy Actions
Text of a summary released by the Department of the Treasury, February
21, 1995.
The Government and the Bank of Mexico have reaffirmed and strengthened
Mexico's economic program to contain the following actions:
-- To fulfill all commitments undertaken with the IMF in connection
with the stand-by arrangement;
-- To respond to the financial crisis with additional policy steps; and
-- To direct monetary policy to the objectives of reducing inflation,
strengthening the peso, and encouraging the restoration of spontaneous
capital inflows. To that end, the Bank of Mexico:
--Points out that under the law it is fully an independent institution;
--Reiterates that it will maintain an upper limit for net domestic
credit expansion of 10 billion Mexican pesos for all of 1995;
--Aims to restrain base money growth backed by credit operations to
below the rate of inflation;
--Points out that short-term interest rates were raised by 10
percentage points on February 20;
--Pledges to maintain tight monetary conditions to guarantee the
substantially positive real interest rates that are essential to a
successful stabilization effort; and
--Seeks the stabilization of financial conditions and return of
confidence that will permit interest rates to decline over the course of
1995.
-- To manage the floating exchange rate system, the Mexican financial
authorities:
--Declare that the peso has been undervalued in recent trading sessions;
--Pledge to maintain a credit and interest rate policy that will assure
that the peso appreciates from those recent levels;
--Are prepared to use the funds available to Mexico from the IMF and
other international authorities for intervention to prevent
inappropriate exchange rate fluctuations;
--Commit to adjust credit and interest rate policies quickly to regain
foreign exchange that is spent in intervention operations; and
--Aim to develop futures and forward foreign exchange markets.
-- To deal with the problems of the banking sector,
--Liquidity problems will be tackled without relaxing the credit program
established by the Bank of Mexico and with the support of the funds
available under the U.S.-Mexico Framework Agreement.
--Solvency problems will be handled in a timely and forceful manner,
using the procedures established by law.
--Depositors will be protected and fiscal measures will be adopted to
cover the resulting costs.
-- To attain a public sector surplus of 0.5% of GDP in 1995 and take
additional fiscal measures, if necessary, to strengthen Mexico's
economic program;
-- To accelerate structural reforms in the transportation,
telecommunications, and banking sectors;
-- To raise $12-14 billion from privatization and concession operations
over the next three years;
-- To improve the transparency of operations of the Government and the
Bank of Mexico by introducing new publications with timely and accurate
data-reporting operations and financial statistics, and by placing that
information on the Internet in the near future; and
-- To make use of the funds provided in the U.S.-Mexico Framework
Agreement to support a speedy return to full international capital
market access. (###)
ARTICLE 7:
U.S.-Korea Bilateral Economic Relationship
Daniel K. Tarullo, Assistant Secretary For Economic and Business Affairs
Remarks before the Korea-United States 21st Century Council, Washington,
DC, February 9, 1995
At present, the most important determinant of U.S.-Korea economic
relations is how Korea will resolve its ambivalence toward economic
liberalization and more complete integration into the world economy. If
Korea resolves this ambivalence in favor of greater openness and
participation in international institutions, our economic relationship
is likely to prosper, U.S. investment in Korea will increase, and our
trade problems will be easier to rectify.
If, on the other hand, Korea decelerates its pace of liberalization and
retains more insular economic policies, our bilateral economic
relationship is likely to be both less significant and more problematic.
U.S. investment will flow much more readily to other parts of Asia, and
trade disputes will linger and, perhaps, even multiply.
In my remarks today, I will explain our perception of Korea's
ambivalence toward economic liberalization as a prelude to discussing
the present and future of our bilateral economic relationship.
Korea: Challenge and Choices
As is now well-known, Korea's rapid economic growth began in the early
1960s, when the government abandoned its ineffective policy of import
substitution in favor of an export-led strategy. It devalued the won and
implemented a variety of policies to nurture exporters: cash subsidies,
permission to retain foreign exchange earnings, exemptions from
virtually all import controls, and favorable access to credit.
In the 1970s, the Korean Government launched its drive to develop heavy
industries such as steel, machinery, shipbuilding, and chemicals through
an explicit industrial policy whose elements included favorable credit
allocation, tax incentives, import protection, and tolerance of high
industry concentration ratios, as chaebols [large industrial/business
conglomerates] prospered under these policies.
The performance of the Korean economy since basic import substitution
policies were dropped has clearly been spectacular. In the last 30
years, annual growth has averaged nearly 9%. Korea is one of the top 15
exporters in the world, with an economy larger than two-thirds of OECD
member states.
These highly interventionist and frequently protectionist industrial
policies are usually considered to have spawned this period of rapid
growth. Whatever their relative contribution to Korea's past economic
success, the remnants of these policies now surely place limits on the
expansion and competitiveness of the Korean economy. Industrial policy
further strengthened the already powerful Korean bureaucracy, burdening
the economy with layers of formal and informal controls. The financial
system was thin and inefficient, having been used principally to
allocate credit to favored undertakings or sectors. A related problem
was the emergence of high inflation levels as credit was continuously
channeled to government-supported basic industries.
In the 1980s, Korea undertook a variety of economic reforms such as
tariff reductions, bank privatization, and a measure of financial
liberalization. Strong anti-inflationary measures were also taken.
Significant as these changes were, they had only begun this task of
genuine economic liberalization. When rapid growth resumed later in the
decade, pressure for reform dissipated.
The year 1992 saw a significant economic downturn. As President Kim
Young San took office in 1993, many influential Koreans believed that
the structural limits of highly interventionist economic policies had
been reached. Korea had lost its low labor cost advantage as wages had
risen. Productivity gains slowed as Korean firms failed to make
efficiency gains in an over-regulated economy where oligopolistic firms
remained dominant. Therefore, despite significant investment in
technology, there were serious questions about whether many Korean
companies could be world-class competitors.
In these circumstances, President Kim initiated his program of economic
reform, including controversial measures such as real-name disclosure in
the financial sector. The Kim plan called for reduced government control
throughout the economy. It also called for further internationalization
of the Korean economy. Shortly thereafter, Presidents Kim and Clinton
agreed to the Dialogue for Economic Cooperation, which I will discuss in
a moment.
There have certainly been some reforms in the last two years, and
President Kim has recently reiterated his call for globalization. But
many suspect that the economic reform movement has slowed and perhaps
even stalled. Breaking with traditions of bureaucratic guidance is not
easy, and while globalization may seem an imperative in some respects,
it cuts against the grain of an economy in which foreigners sometimes
seem quite unwelcome.
It appears to us that there is a measure of "reform fatigue" in Seoul,
grounded in the view that the moderate reforms to date may be sufficient
to adjust Korea's economy, and that further breaks with past policies
and traditions are unnecessary. Here is where we detect ambivalence:
globalization and necessarily accompanying liberalization are both an
attractive route to growth and a threat to policies and practices that
appear to have served Korea well.
This ambivalence is captured in some contrasting statistics. On the one
hand, Korea's growth rate has rebounded to around 8%--an admirable
figure by nearly any standard. On the other hand, the Institute for
International Management Development's assessment of world
competitiveness ranks Korea 24th out of 41 countries surveyed. Perhaps
more disturbing, Korea's competitiveness among the 18 developing
countries surveyed has fallen from third in 1991 to seventh last year.
The Dialogue for Economic Cooperation
At the outset of the Kim Young San and Clinton Administrations in 1993,
Korea was known as one of the toughest places for foreigners to do
business. Through "policy loans" and restrictions on foreign exchange,
the government still directed or tightly controlled capital flows. The
financial system was underdeveloped; the foreign investment approval
process was unpredictable; and foreign companies could not own land. The
legacy of over 30 years of Korean Government promotion of manufacturing
and exports and "frugality campaigns" lingered in the public mind and in
many government regulations and practices.
Until very recently, Korea's push for globalization and economic
openness was geared almost exclusively toward export-led growth. This
approach is no longer sufficient to sustain rapid economic development.
Korea's economy is at a structural crossroads; production of basic
manufactured goods, such as shoes and textiles, are moving to other,
lower-cost Asian markets. This is a sign of Korea's progress and of its
opportunity to evolve from a newly industrialized economy to a more
advanced economy where workers' skills are rewarded with a higher
standard of living and access to the world's best products.
Greater investment from all sources will be needed to maintain Korea's
growth and economic transformation. Yet as President Kim took office,
Korea still appeared not to welcome foreign direct investment. Although
foreign investment helps disseminate capitol, technology, and know-how,
significant institutional barriers remained. Burdensome, non-transparent
regulations and local requirements added time and cost to investment
transactions. In fact, foreign direct investment has long accounted for
a smaller proportion of total national investment than in any other
high- growth Asian economy.
The Clinton Administration strongly supported the intentions of
President Kim and other senior officials to liberalize Korea's economy.
Our reasons are two-fold: First, we want Korea, an important strategic
ally, to continue as a strong and vibrant participant in the global
economy. Second, a more open Korean economy will forsake many of the
government practices that thwart U.S. businesses in Korea and produce
bilateral trade irritants.
In order to support the Kim Government's liberalization effort and to
ensure that the views of U.S. business were included in this effort, we
entered into a new dialogue with Korea last year. This dialogue was, in
essence, a test to see whether a less confrontational approach could
accelerate and deepen domestic forces for liberalization. We chose Korea
as a test case because President Kim demonstrated a high-level
commitment to globalization and economic liberalization. We were
heartened by President Kim's promise to make Korea "the best place in
the world to do business." The U.S.-Korea Economic Subcabinet agreed to
launch an intensive two-way dialogue on economic issues in June 1993.
This effort, known as the Dialogue for Economic Cooperation (DEC), was
endorsed by Presidents Clinton and Kim the following month.
I do not want to overemphasize the importance of our DEC experiment. It
was not meant to replace our multilateral, regional, or bilateral trade
policy efforts. Rather, the one-year dialogue was intended to be a
temporary supplement to our more traditional market access talks.
Neither, though, should I minimize the significance of our attempt to
encourage and assist domestic forces of economic liberalization.
Although the U.S. business community was interested in the Dialogue for
Economic Cooperation, Korea's stakes were even greater. The Government
of Korea had become concerned that Korea was losing new investments to
other Pacific Rim countries with more hospitable conditions. Moreover,
some established major foreign investors withdrew from Korea to seek
better opportunities elsewhere. The Korean Government saw in the DEC an
opportunity to engage in a dialogue about economic reform as a means of
accelerating implementation of its globalization policies.
Although our dialogue was quite broad, we focused on reducing
impediments to foreign investment flows and improving the climate for
foreign investors post establishment. We resisted the effort to
concentrate on "quick fixes" and attempted to devote time and effort to
more systemic problems.
Implementation of the DEC is not complete. In fact, we have scheduled a
follow-up meeting with our Korean counterparts for late March. Thus, my
assessment is necessarily a provisional one. Still, let me highlight a
few areas covered in the DEC.
Visible impediments to investment have been only modestly reduced to
date. The investment screening process was streamlined, but the Korean
Government was unwilling to eliminate it completely. In the past, this
application process has been used by bureaucrats to delay or thwart
foreign investors. Faced with daunting bureaucratic hurdles, many
foreign companies have decided to go to other, more attractive markets
in Asia.
A few sectors formerly closed to foreign investors were opened, but many
industrial sectors of interest to U.S. firms remain effectively off
limits. For example, although Korea now allows foreigners to invest in
foreign- language schools, investment is limited to 49% of equity in one
model school per market. Although the Korean Government agreed to allow
foreign firms to provide various ground handling services in Korea, most
of these service sectors are also subject to 49% foreign equity
limitations and to certain regulatory exceptions.
Another example is cargo loading and unloading services, which are
limited to firms with no more than 49% foreign equity. The January 1,
1995 liberalization of Freight Agency and Brokerage Services excludes
air freight. And--according to what the local airport authority recently
told an American firm--approval for activities under the July 1, 1994,
opening of the Operation of Air Terminal Facilities sector is applicable
only to investments in the new Seoul airport, which is not scheduled for
completion until 2002.
Turning to practices affecting investment post establishment, the Korean
Government passed a basic law for administrative regulations which
provides for transparency in implementation of administrative law and
the opportunity for public comment on new rules. The government also
established an ombudsman-like council to hear citizen complaints against
arbitrary government actions. I understand that in several hundred cases
the council has ruled against the government. Although it will take time
to change the attitudes of the government bureaucrats, the Ministry of
Government Affairs is actively training government officials regarding
their new obligations to the public.
Under DEC auspices, the Department of Justice and the Korean Fair Trade
Commission initiated an active dialogue regarding government policies to
ensure fair competition. Korea agreed to relax restrictions on sales
promotion, thereby allowing market newcomers, including foreign firms,
innovative sales promotion tools. It also improved access to television
advertising by new entrants into the market. The U.S. agreed to train
Korean investigators in investigation of unfair trade practice
complaints in order to ensure that Korean firms do not abuse their
market power.
U.S. and Korean tax authorities negotiated a memorandum of understanding
on how to resolve tax disputes and on taxation of overseas subsidiaries.
This agreement resolves some of the uncertainty faced by Korean and U.S.
firms investing in each others' markets.
In addition to these longer term efforts, Korea agreed to certain
specific steps that will help established investors in Korea. For
example, the government eased restrictions on holding of land and access
to domestic financing.
Let me again emphasize that I do not want to overstate what we
accomplished in the DEC. Our dialogues on administrative procedures and
competition policy have not caused a sea- change in Korean bureaucratic
or business attitudes toward foreign competitors. They have, however,
provided the Korean Government with new tools for accelerating its
globalization drive. Certainly, with President Kim Young San's
determination to push internationalization, administrative deregulation
in Korea has taken on a new vigor. Foreign investors have already seen
some improvement in Korea's investment climate. More is needed. If the
new government uses these tools aggressively, foreign investors will
detect an improvement in Korea's business climate.
As you can see by now, the DEC was not an unqualified success. Our
assessment that it has been only "modestly successful" stems partly from
our high, initial expectations caused by the Kim Administration's
ringing call for economic reform. The talks were more like a negotiation
and less like a cooperative dialogue than we, and I suspect the Korean
Government, would have liked.
The changes implemented by the Korean Government represent part of a
gradual economic evolution, not the economic policy revolution that
President Kim espoused soon after his election. Korea is still far from
"the best place in the world to do business." Indeed, the
competitiveness report, to which I alluded earlier, ranked Korea 39th
out of 41 countries for its financial sector, 38th for cost of capital,
and dead last for local capital markets and cultural openness.
In light of Korea's interest in attracting more international
investment, one must ask why we were not more successful in this joint
effort. I think there are two reasons. First, economic liberalization is
politically difficult in any country. Established forces do not want
more competition, even if it improves the efficiency of the economy as a
whole.
Moreover, Korea's DEC efforts were complicated by the distraction of the
final year of Uruguay Round negotiations. Korean officials, who
supported President Kim's economic policy vision, were fully occupied
with building a domestic consensus in favor of the Uruguay Round
agreements-- in particular, the provisions of the agricultural deal.
While Korea's agreement to the Uruguay Round provisions represents an
important milestone, it may have prevented the Korean Government from
fully capitalizing on the opportunity of our intensive DEC process.
The second reason for less than expected progress in the DEC--and this
is something of a paradox--was the recovery of Korea's economy. Soon
after President Kim came to office, there was a great deal of momentum
in favor of economic reform because Korea's economy was mired in a
slump. As the economy picked up steam in 1994, however, domestic
opponents to liberalization gained strength. Korea's cyclical recovery
gave them ammunition to argue that more drastic economic reforms were
not needed.
From the standpoint of the United States, the DEC experiment, even with
these modest gains, was a worthwhile effort. Although the DEC final
report does not match the economic reform rhetoric of the Kim
Administration, it does improve the business environment for U.S. firms
in Korea over the longer term. More importantly, the U.S. gained
experience in conducting talks about economic liberalization with a
reform-minded government.
From Korea's standpoint as well, the DEC should not be judged more than
modestly successful, because the tentative steps to open Korea's economy
have not excited foreign investors. While investment from some sources
has risen somewhat, we have seen no upsurge of investment plans by U.S.
business. Our embassy reports that doing business problems are still
widespread. Meanwhile, other countries in East and South Asia are
liberalizing at a more rapid pace. In a relative sense, Korea has fallen
further behind the competition, and American business is more likely to
look elsewhere in Asia for investment sites.
As I said in my address to this group a year ago, the investment climate
in Korea should be of much more concern to the Korean Government than it
is to us. Our investors have many other investment options, and a
hostile investment atmosphere in Korea will only drive them elsewhere.
Bilateral Trade and Investment Problems
We continue to have significant trade problems with Korea. Here, again,
I believe that a sustained economic liberalization effort will improve
matters considerably. Particularly in the case of market access
problems, we will continue to insist that our firms be given the same
opportunities in Korea that Korean firms enjoy in our markets.
Our Treasury Department and the Korean Ministry of Finance and Economy
have discussed financial sector liberalization for many years. These
discussions have produced some results. In 1993, for example, Korea
broke new ground with its comprehensive Blueprint for Financial Sector
Liberalization. Implementation of this blueprint has already reached the
final stage as Korea accelerated implementation of a number of measures.
Further, late last year, the Ministry of Finance and Economy announced
its Foreign Exchange System Reform Plan. Korean officials recently met
with Treasury representatives in Geneva for financial services
negotiations under the WTO, and there will be an official round of
financial policy talks in Washington in early March.
Despite all this activity and good intentions, however, Korea is fast
falling behind its Asian neighbors in financial sector liberalization.
Foreign banks and securities firms operating in Korea face exceptionally
high operating costs and day-to-day problems which limit their range of
new products. These problems are quickly fading or have been eliminated
in other Asian markets. Indeed, some financial firms claimed that Korea
has replaced Japan as the most difficult place for foreign financial
institutions to do business. This opinion has only been strengthened
since we concluded a financial review agreement with Japan in January.
This situation is regrettable for two reasons. First, continued
reluctance to open financial markets and modernize the financial sector
will inevitably hurt Korea's competitiveness. The day-to-day business
problems mentioned earlier are just examples of why Korea risks losing
its attractiveness as an investment locale compared to other Asian
economies. Development of a modern, sophisticated financial sector is
crucial in maintaining a competitive international economy.
Second, the lack of substantive progress in our financial liberalization
talks is also regrettable, because it seems to lie in stark contrast to
the intentions of senior officials at the Blue House. Clearly, the Kim
Administration has committed itself to the process of economic reform,
including liberalization of the financial sector. Korea's goal of
attaining OECD membership by 1996, for example, indicates the direction
that the Blue House wants to take and the greater role in the global
economy it has in mind for Korea. Up to this point, however, this
momentum is not being transferred effectively through the bureaucracy.
We hope, however, that the recent bureaucratic reorganization and the
merger of the Economic Planning Board with the Ministry of Finance will
help to rectify this problem.
In the trade area, we continue to be frustrated with the difficult and
grudging nature of our negotiations. While it would be fair to say that
visible trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas have been steadily
diminished over the past decade--a process to be continued by the
Uruguay Round agreements--more subtle barriers involving standards,
licensing, certification, rule making, and import processing have
increased.
Last November, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)
accepted a petition filed by the American meat industry which asserts
that Korea restricts U.S. meat imports and abrogates several bilateral
agreements. Of particular concern is the Korean Ministry of Health's
mandated shelf-life standards for various types of frozen, chilled, and
vacuum-packed meats. In spite of repeated attempts to resolve the issue,
more than a year has gone by without resolution.
Korea's costly and time-consuming regulations on testing of medical
devices do not recognize international standards and impose testing
requirements that differ by designated laboratory. Moreover, the Customs
Service insistence on physically inspecting each medical device risks
contamination. USTR estimates that potentially $200 million of U.S.
medical equipment exports are disrupted by these practices.
Automobile market access remains a matter of great concern to us. While
talks last year produced some modest progress, little has been done to
counteract the legacy of anti-import bias, which up until recently
included the likelihood that a Korean consumer who purchased a foreign
car would be subject to a tax audit.
Whither Korean Economic Liberalization
If one were to look at the individual components of our bilateral
economic dialogue--the frustrating financial discussions and endless
debates over non-tariff barriers--it would be easy to be pessimistic
about the U.S.- Korea bilateral economic relationship. On the other
hand, if one were to hear only the Korean Government's calls for
globalization and deregulation, it would be difficult to understand why
our bilateral trade and investment talks are so contentious. Our future
economic relationship depends to a great extent upon the Korean
Government's ability to sustain and implement its liberalization
policies.
I was encouraged by President Kim's 1995 New Year's address in which he
stated that "globalization is the shortcut which will lead us to
building a first-class country in the 21st century." In addition, the
new economic team that President Kim has assembled appears to be quite
capable and supportive of economic liberalization.
In light of my experience over the past year, however, I am uncertain
whether President Kim's commitment to globalization will be reflected in
the thousands of lower-level bureaucratic decisions that affect foreign
business representatives in Korea. Another problem is what appears to us
to be a lack of support for internationalization among the Korean
public. It is not clear that Koreans see President Kim's globalization
concept as something more than increasing Korea's exports.
For Korea's part, the choice is simple. It can move forward resolutely
with a globalization program that will deepen and broaden economic
linkages with its trade and investment partners. Alternatively, it could
choose to slow the pace of economic liberalization efforts. Since
foreign investors are free to choose the most promising markets in which
to invest, this course of action would leave Korea less attractive than
other East Asian economies that are dramatically reducing barriers to
capital flows. Foreign investors are already sending clear signals.
For now, our perception of ambivalence remains. One recent manifestation
of this ambivalence is that Korea has not yet formally submitted its
application to the OECD, despite its oft-repeated desire to join by
1996. We have conflicting reports of the reasons for delay. If Korea
moves forward, enters the OECD, and conforms to the liberal trade and
financial regimes that are requisite for admission, American and other
foreign investors will take notice. We were encouraged by Korea's small
move to raise the ceiling on foreign ownership of shares in quoted
companies from 10% to 12%. But if Korea holds back, implements only
modest reforms, or treats the admission process as a contentious
negotiation, Korea's image in the international business community will
not improve.
My Korean friends and colleagues here know there is an old custom in
Korea to paste auspicious Chinese character couplets on one's door on
Ipchoon--the first day of spring. Last week, as Koreans celebrated this
holiday, many of them pasted signs that stated "Open the door, open for
ten thousand blessings; sweep the earth, sweep for gold." I am told that
this tradition has been summed up in the Korean proverb: "To close the
door to a blessing!"--which is used to refer to someone who closes his
door to a business opportunity.
At this point in our maturing bilateral relationship, Korea has the
opportunity to open new doors. If it does not, we may never know the
blessings that will be missed. (###)
ARTICLE 8:
Korea: Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
Statement by Acting Department Spokesman Christine Shelly, Washington,
DC, February 23, 1995.
The North-South "Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and
Exchanges and Cooperation" signed in December 1991, states that it is
the responsibility of the two Koreas to transform the armistice regime
into a firm state of peace. It also commits both Koreas to abide by the
present armistice agreement until a stable peace can be created.
For several years now, however, the D.P.R.K. has been attempting
unilaterally to destroy the armistice mechanism set up in the armistice
agreement, which ended the Korean War.
That mechanism consists of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and
the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). The function of the
NNSC is to oversee the cessation of the introduction of reinforcing
military personnel and equipment and to conduct investigations of
armistice violations.
The D.P.R.K. has failed to nominate a successor to Czechoslovakia as a
member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and has persuaded
the Chinese to recall their representatives from the Military Armistice
Commission.
Now, the D.P.R.K. is threatening to evict the Polish NNSC contingent. We
have forcefully told Pyongyang that such an action would be a violation
of the armistice agreement, which has maintained the peace on the Korean
Peninsula for more than 40 years now.
If Pyongyang hopes its attempts to destroy the mechanism set up by the
armistice agreement will lead us to enter into bilateral talks on a
peace treaty, it is badly mistaken.
Peace on the Korean Peninsula is a matter for Koreans, North and South,
to settle. The U.S. is willing to assist if both Koreas desire it, but
we will not negotiate a bilateral peace accord with the D.P.R.K. (###)
ARTICLE 9:
TREATY ACTIONS
Multilateral
Arbitration
Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959;
for the U.S.Dec. 29, 1970. TIAS 6997; 21 UST 2517.
Accession: Venezuela, Feb. 8, 1995.
Chemical Weapons
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production,
stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, with
annexes. Done at Paris Jan. 13, 1993 1. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-21.
Signature: Lesotho, Dec. 7, 1994.
Ratifications: Armenia, Jan. 27, 1995; Finland, Feb. 7, 1995; Lesotho,
Dec. 7, 1994; Oman, Feb. 8, 1995; Romania, Feb. 15, 1995; Turkmenistan,
Sept. 29, 1994.
Children
Convention on the rights of the child. Adopted at New York Nov. 20,
1989. Entered into force Sept. 2, 1990 2.
Signature: United States, Feb. 16, 1995.
Acceptance: Netherlands, Feb. 6, 1995.
Convention on protection of children and cooperation in respect of
intercountry adoption. Done at The Hague May 29, 1993 1.
Signature: Switzerland, Jan. 16, 1995.
Ratifications: Romania, Dec. 28, 1994; Sri Lanka, Jan. 23, 1995 3.
Copyright
Berne convention for the protection of literary and artistic works of
Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, and amended in 1979.
Entered into force for the U.S. Mar. 1, 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-
27.
Accession: St. Kitts and Nevis, Jan. 3, 1995.
Narcotics
Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York Mar. 30,
1961. Entered into force Dec. 13, 1964; for the U.S. June 24, 1967. TIAS
6298; 18 UST 1407.
Participation: Moldova, Feb. 15, 1995.
Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at
Geneva Mar. 25, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1975. TIAS 8118; 26 UST
1439.
Accession: Mauritius, Dec. 12, 1994.
Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971.
Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 1980. TIAS 9725;
32 UST 543.
Accession: Moldova, Feb. 15, 1995.
United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances, with annex and final act. Done at Vienna Dec.
20, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1990. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-4.
Accession: Moldova, Feb. 15, 1995.
Patents
Patent cooperation treaty with regulations. Done at Washington June 19,
1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978. TIAS 8733; 28 UST 7645.
Accession: Iceland, Dec. 23, 1994.
Strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent classification.
Done at Strasbourg Mar. 24, 1971. Entered into force Oct. 7, 1975. TIAS
8140; 26 UST 1793.
Accession: Canada, Jan. 11, 1995.
Budapest treaty on the international recognition of the deposit of
microorganisms for the purposes of patent procedure, with regulations.
Done at Budapest Apr. 28, 1977 and amended on Sept. 26, 1980. Entered
into force Aug. 19, 1980. TIAS 9768; 32 UST 1241.
Accession: Iceland, Dec. 23, 1994.
Property
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization.
Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for
the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 6932; 21 UST 1749.
Accession: Nigeria, Jan. 9, 1995.
Nice agreement concerning the international classification of goods and
services for purposes of the registration of marks of June 15, 1957,
as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Entered into force Mar. 18,
1970; for the U.S. May 25, 1972. TIAS 7419; 23 UST 1353.
Accession: Iceland, Dec. 23, 1994.
Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of Mar.
20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into
force May 19, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1973. TIAS 6923, 7727; 24 UST
2140.
Accessions: Peru, Jan. 11, 1995; St. Kitts and Nevis, Jan. 3, 1995.
Bilateral
Benin
Postal money order agreement. Signed at Cotonou and Washington Dec. 15,
1994 and Jan. 10, 1995. Entered into force Apr. 1, 1995.
Indonesia
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation and exchange in the fields of
surface mining. Signed at Jakarta Dec. 2, 1994. Entered into force Dec.
2, 1994.
Memorandum of understanding concerning cooperation on standards,
metrology, and conformance. Signed at Jakarta Nov. 16, 1994. Entered
into force Nov. 16, 1994.
International Maritime Organization
Tax reimbursement agreement, with annex. Signed at London Jan. 12, 1995.
Entered into force Jan. 12, 1995.
Japan
Protocol extending the memorandum of understanding of Jan. 3 and Feb. 3,
1992, concerning cooperation in the field of hydrology, water resources,
and global climate change. Signed at Reston and Tsukuba Jan. 26 and Feb.
1, 1995; entered into force Feb. 1, 1995; effective Feb. 3, 1995.
Korea
Memorandum of understanding for technical cooperation in meteorology.
Signed at Seoul Dec. 21, 27, and 29, 1994. Entered into force Jan. 28,
1995.
Implementing agreement for cooperation in the area of energy
conservation and environmental technology. Signed at Seoul Oct. 25,
1994. Entered into force Oct. 25, 1994.
Implementing arrangement for cooperation in the area of solar energy
technology research. Signed at Seoul Oct. 25, 1994. Entered into force
Oct. 25, 1994.
Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons
Tax reimbursement agreement, with annex. Signed at The Hague Jan. 24,
1995. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1995.
Vietnam
Agreement concerning the transfer of diplomatic properties,
with appendices and amendment. Signed at Hanoi Jan. 28, 1995. Entered
into force Jan. 28, 1995.
Agreement concerning the settlement of certain property
claims. Signed at Hanoi Jan. 28, 1995. Entered into force Jan. 28, 1995.
______
1 Not in force.
2 Not in force for the U.S.
3 With declaration.
(###)
[END OF DISPATCH VOLUME 6, NUMBER 11]
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