Name: Brent V.
ProgramYear: 2002
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Hey guys, I got a little carried away with the paper...it just seemed like I kept on going, so it's longer than required. Sorry. What Next? NASA After the Challenger Periodically, tragedies occur which change the way Americans and people around the world live. Before the morning of January 28, 1986, NASA had few setbacks in space exploration and therefore no reason to suspect an imminent, catastrophic event. Devastatingly, on that cold January morning, new fear struck the hearts of all spectators as the Challenger exploded in front of thousands of people barely a minute into its flight. An accident that stunned America, the Challenger tragedy not only set back the planned missions, but also set up for higher shuttle safety standards. Anticipated as a routine space flight, the Challenger 51-L mission resulted in one of the most transforming flights in the history of space exploration. Charlene Billings explains that the Challenger was originally scheduled for launch on Wednesday, January 22; the launch was delayed, however, to Saturday, January 25, because the shuttle Columbia returned from space later than originally planned. On the morning of January 25, a dust storm in Dakar, Senegal, delayed the Challenger liftoff once again due to NASA emergency regulations. On the third attempt, on January 26, the Challenger remained grounded due to rain showers and their possible effects on the heat tiles (47). Finally, on Monday, January 27, with ideal weather, the crew felt confident for takeoff. Adding to the troubles, though, Billings explains that, “the outside hatch handle of the orbiter could not be removed,” and therefore set back the mission for another day (48). Corinne Naden notes that on January 28, with winds down to 9 mph and the temperature down to 27°, the Challenger planned for a 9:38 a.m. liftoff (84). Billings notes that although slightly delayed by repeated ice checks, the Challenger finally lifted off at 11:38 a.m. (50). Naden also reports that Mike Smith, one of the astronauts on board the Challenger, noted that the shuttle had “a lot of wind up here today” (88). Naden goes on to explain that although all systems appeared normal throughout the first minute of flight, the Challenger experienced a dramatic turn of events that will forever last in history. Seventy-three seconds into the flight, an orange flame erupted from a joint on the right side rocket booster, and the high winds forced the flame to blossom into a tremendous fireball. Shooting away in twin arcs, the rocket boosters exploded seconds afterwards, and then the external fuel tank followed by soon disintegrating from it’s own flaming fuel (89). Naden explains that Jesse Moore, director at the Johnson Space Center, spoke at 4:30 p.m. to explain that because the velocity of the shuttle at impact at sea level was 204 mph, the searches had “not revealed any evidence that the crew of Challenger [had] survived” (91). Suffering setbacks from many evil “omens,” the Challenger finally lifted off on the morning of January 28 to what would eventually become its final flight in space. An accident that left the nation speechless, the Challenger catastrophe had many possible causes, but the failure of the O-rings prevailed as the dominating reason for the horrific explosion. These O-ring seals, or synthetic rubber rings, seal the joints in the solid rocket booster, or SRB. Michael Cole explains that, although far from ignorant of the dangers concerning the O-rings in the current setting, NASA officials, under strict time restraints, proceeded with the launch as scheduled (28). Cole states that “the boosters recovered from earlier flights showed signs that hot gases had burned partway through the O-rings”(23). Noting Ellison Onizuka’s work, Cole states that the O-ring seals posed one of the “questions about the Shuttle” (23). Roger Baisjoly, an engineer for Thiokol, the company that made the SRBs, states in a memo to his managers that delaying the resolution of the O-ring problem on the SRBs would place NASA “in jeopardy of losing a flight” as well as human life (Cole 25). Alan Stern states that Thiokol understood the limitations of their products, and some of the leading engineers from the company expressed their “concerns about the possible effects of cold weather on the launch” (49). In fact, Cole expresses the fact that while “the coldest launch so far had been 53°,” NASA made plans to launch while “it was only 32°,” and that under these conditions “the whole assembly would explode” (24). Stern notes that after a thorough investigation of the Challenger accident, the Challenger commission stated that ”the cause of the accident was a failure of the [O-ring] pressure seal” (56). Lacking foresight and proper reasoning, NASA continued with the Challenger launch, which resulted in a nation shocked and bewildered by the tragic loss of seven crewmembers. Challenger gave other countries a head start en route to advanced space exploration as well as provided the American space program with many obstacles. Ed Magnuson reports that neither the President nor Congress wanted to embark immediately on the task of deciding “just how the shuttle fits into the long-term goals of the U.S. space program” (3). T.A. Heppenheimer notes that the Americans questioned what to do after the Challenger explosion, and Europe encountered rocket problems in their own space program. Meanwhile, the Russian space program still ran forth at full throttle as the Russians put up Mir, the first space station, while the United States merely talked of such ambitions (328). Stern explains that the Challenger accident set back the United States’ plans to put the Hubble Telescope in orbit and to begin the Galileo missions to explore Jupiter and its moons (114). Stern also explains that the projected plans for the shuttle will greatly change, as NASA plans to use the shuttle primarily for “space construction, experimentation, military missions, and satellite repair” (114). Anne Simmons presents the fact that “the world will look to science and engineering” such as that of the space program to help cure environmental problems (1). Despite possible benefits, however, Stern also notes, on the more pessimistic side, that if the U.S. fails to make proper decisions on the space program’s future, the United States may find itself “trying desperately to catch up” to other nations in the race for the greatest and fastest space exploration (117). Claus Jensen explains that even though extensive alterations amounted to over $2.4 billion, the American shuttle fleet remained grounded until Discovery flew on September 29, 1988 (360). Jensen also explains that although nine flights were originally scheduled for 1989, technicians “refused to be pushed” on liftoff deadlines and small safety issues. Consequently, only five flights were actually completed during 1989 (360). Jensen further notes that after Challenger, Congress delayed giving money to NASA for a new shuttle for as long as possible because Congress felt that the money should be spent for further advancement of the Air Force. Finally, after much procrastination, Congress gave money to NASA to build a new shuttle, Endeavor. Endeavor was completed and first flown in 1992 (360). Although Challenger initially delayed some of NASA’s plans, steps were soon taken to get the space program running in the right direction again. The Challenger accident opened the eyes of many NASA officials and showed that they needed new steps and precautions to help prevent similar mishaps. Stern even notes that after the Challenger catastrophe, the “U.S. space science program [was] in shambles” (113). In an interview with Bryan O’Connor, Richard Harris explains that the NASA officials calculated the risk of another Challenger-type accident at about 1 in 78 (1). O’Connor, the NASA Shuttle Program Chief, quickly refutes Harris’s statement, however, by noting that currently, a “chance of loss is about one in 250” (2). Harris further explains that allowing only government launches, easing the pace of launches, and receiving more money from Congress have been preventive steps taken by NASA to avoid another accident such as Challenger (3). Stern also explains that the new rockets have been contracted out to companies such as Martin Marietta and McDonnell Douglas (115). Doubts still remain in the minds of many. For example, noting the NASA Advisory Commission’s work, Stern states that “the nation has allowed its space technology base to erode, leaving it with little technological capability” (119). Jose Garcia and John Pike reveal their thoughts in the same interview with Harris by claiming that NASA has had “over 280 first time anomalies” (4), and that Garcia feels confident “that we’re in a path right now to having another Challenger accident, sooner rather than later” (4). Although Diane Vaughn explains that “organizations can never create rules to cover all conditions” (420), Harris notes that the issue of shuttle safety boils down to the vague qualities of organizational attitude, and only looking back will tell who is right (5). While another accident like Challenger has not yet happened, and top officials insist that many progressive steps have been taken, much controversy remains as to whether NASA has truly realized all possibilities in preventing such an accident. Whereas the Challenger liftoff gave everyone a sense of complacent pride, its explosion brought shocking reality, including heightened shuttle safety standards. After spending billions of dollars, NASA feels the probability of another crash has reduced exponentially. If this theory holds true, maybe the Challenger accident has brought more good than bad. Given the vast efforts invested, in the end, such catastrophic events may have ultimately created for a better standard of life. Works Cited Billings, Charlene W. Christa McAuliffe: Pioneer Space Teacher. Hillside: Enslow Publishers, Inc., 1986. Cole, Michael D. Challenger: America’s Space Tragedy. Springfield: Enslow Publishers, Inc., 1995. Heppenheimer, T.A. Countdown: A History of Space Flight. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1997. Jensen, Claus. No Downlink. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1996. Magnuson, Ed. “NASA Takes a Beating: The Rogers Commission Blames the Agency for an Avoidable Accident.” Time 23 June 1986: 32+. Naden, Corinne. Ronald McNair. Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 1991. O’Connor, Bryan, Jose Garcia, and John Pike. Interview with Richard Harris. A Review of Safety in Space Since the ‘Challenger’. Natl. Public Radio. Washington. 26 Jan. 1996. Simmons, Anne. “Setting Priorities for Space Research.” 15 Nov. 2000. National Academy of Sciences. 11 Feb. 2002. . Stern, Alan. The U.S. Space Program After Challenger. New York: Impact Publishing Co., 1987. Vaughn, Diane. The Challenger Launch Decision. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996.