APPENDIX A Hanford Site Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program
Department of Energy Programmatic
Spent Nuclear Fuel Management
and
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
Environmental Restoration and
Waste Management Programs
Final Environmental Impact Statement
Volume 1
Appendix A
Hanford Site
Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program
April 1995
U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Environmental Management
Idaho Operations Office
Contents
1. INTRODUCTION 1-1
2. BACKGROUND 2-1
2.1 Hanford Site Overview 2-1
2.1.1 Site Description 2-1
2.1.2 History 2-3
2.1.3 Mission 2-3
2.1.4 Management 2-3
2.2 Regulatory Framework 2-4
2.2.1 Significant Federal and State Laws 2-4
2.2.2 Environmental Standards for Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facilities 2-6
2.2.3 Protection of Public Health 2-9
2.2.4 Species Protection 2-10
2.2.5 Floodplains and Wetlands 2-10
2.2.6 Cultural and Historic Preservation 2-10
2.3 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program 2-10
2.3.1 N Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel 2-13
2.3.2 Single-Pass Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel 2-15
2.3.3 Fast Flux Test Facility Spent Nuclear Fuel 2-16
2.3.4 Shippingport Core II Spent Nuclear Fuel 2-17
2.3.5 Miscellaneous Spent Nuclear Fuel 2-17
3. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES 3-1
3.1 Description of Alternatives 3-1
3.1.1 No Action Alternative 3-3
3.1.2 Decentralization Alternative 3-6
3.1.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 3-10
3.1.4 Regionalization Alternative 3-12
3.1.5 Centralization Alternative 3-18
3.2 Comparison of Alternatives 3-20
4. AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT 4-1
4.1 Overview 4-1
4.2 Land Use 4-1
4.2.1 Land Use at the Hanford Site 4-1
4.2.2 Land Use in the Vicinity of the Hanford Site 4-4
4.2.3 Potential Project Land Use 4-5
4.2.4 Native American Treaty Rights 4-5
4.3 Socioeconomics 4-6
4.3.1 Demographics 4-8
4.3.2 Economics 4-11
4.3.3 Emergency Services 4-19
4.3.4 Infrastructure 4-22
4.4 Cultural Resources 4-27
4.4.1 Prehistoric Archaeological Resources 4-28
4.4.2 Native American Cultural Resources 4-31
4.4.3 Historic Archaeological Resources 4-31
4.4.4 200 Areas 4-32
4.5 Aesthetic and Scenic Resources 4-33
4.6 Geology 4-33
4.6.1 General Geology 4-33
4.6.2 Mineral Resources 4-40
4.6.3 Seismic and Volcanic Hazards 4-40
4.7 Air Resources 4-46
4.7.1 Climate and Meteorology 4-52
4.7.2 Nonradiological Air Quality 4-56
4.7.3 Radiological Air Quality 4-62
4.8 Water Resources 4-62
4.8.1 Surface Water 4-62
4.8.2 Groundwater 4-75
4.8.3 Existing Radiological Conditions 4-80
4.8.4 Water Rights 4-82
4.9 Ecological Resources 4-82
4.9.1 Terrestrial Resources 4-83
4.9.2 Wetlands 4-89
4.9.3 Aquatic Resources 4-90
4.9.4 Threatened, Endangered, and Sensitive Species 4-91
4.9.5 Radionuclide Levels in Biological Resources 4-96
4.10 Noise 4-96
4.10.1 Hanford Site Sound Levels 4-97
4.10.2 Skagit/Hanford Data 4-97
4.10.3 Basalt Waste Isolation Project Data 4-98
4.10.4 Noise Levels of Hanford Field Activities 4-98
4.10.5 Noise Related to the Spent Nuclear Fuel Facility 4-98
4.10.6 Background Information 4-99
4.11 Traffic and Transportation 4-99
4.11.1 Regional Infrastructure 4-99
4.11.2 Hanford Site Infrastructure 4-101
4.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety 4-104
4.12.1 Occupational Health and Safety 4-104
4.12.2 Public Health and Safety 4-108
4.13 Site Services 4-112
4.13.1 Water Consumption 4-112
4.13.2 Electrical Consumption 4-112
4.13.3 Waste Water Disposal 4-114
4.14 Materials and Waste Management 4-114
4.14.1 High-Level Waste 4-117
4.14.2 Transuranic Waste 4-120
4.14.3 Mixed Low-Level Waste 4-120
4.14.4 Low-Level Waste 4-122
4.14.5 Hazardous Waste 4-124
4.14.6 Industrial Solid Waste 4-126
4.14.7 Hazardous Materials 4-127
5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES 5-1
5.1 Overview 5-1
5.1.1 No Action Alternative 5-1
5.1.2 Decentralization Alternative 5-2
5.1.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 5-3
5.1.4 Regionalization Alternative 5-3
5.1.5 Centralization Alternative 5-4
5.2 Land Use 5-4
5.2.1 No Action Alternative 5-4
5.2.2 Decentralization Alternative 5-5
5.2.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 5-5
5.2.4 Regionalization Alternative 5-6
5.2.5 Centralization Alternative 5-6
5.2.6 Effects of Alternatives on Treaty or Other Reserved Rights of
Indian Tribes and Individuals 5-7
5.3 Socioeconomics 5-7
5.3.1 No Action Alternative 5-8
5.3.2 Decentralization Alternative 5-9
5.3.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 5-11
5.3.4 Regionalization Alternative 5-11
5.3.5 Centralization Alternative 5-19
5.4 Cultural Resources 5-22
5.4.1 No Action Alternative 5-22
5.4.2 Decentralization Alternative 5-24
5.4.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 5-26
5.4.4 Regionalization Alternative 5-26
5.4.5 Centralization Alternative 5-28
5.5 Aesthetic and Scenic Resources 5-29
5.5.1 No Action Alternative 5-29
5.5.2 Decentralization Alternative 5-29
5.5.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 5-30
5.5.4 Regionalization Alternative 5-30
5.5.5 Centralization Alternative 5-30
5.6 Geologic Resources 5-31
5.7 Air Quality and Related Consequences 5-31
5.7.1 No Action Alternative 5-34
5.7.2 Decentralization Alternative 5-36
5.7.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 5-43
5.7.4 Regionalization Alternative 5-44
5.7.5 Centralization Alternative 5-45
5.8 Water Quality and Related Consequences 5-48
5.8.1 No Action Alternative 5-49
5.8.2 Decentralization Alternative 5-50
5.8.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 5-53
5.8.4 Regionalization Alternative 5-53
5.8.5 Centralization Alternative 5-53
5.9 Ecological Resources 5-53
5.9.1 No Action Alternative 5-54
5.9.2 Decentralization Alternative 5-55
5.9.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 5-59
5.9.4 Regionalization Alternative 5-59
5.9.5 Centralization Alternative 5-59
5.10 Noise 5-60
5.10.1 No Action Alternative 5-60
5.10.2 Decentralization Alternative 5-60
5.10.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 5-61
5.10.4 Regionalization Alternative 5-61
5.10.5 Centralization Alternative 5-62
5.11 Traffic and Transportation 5-62
5.11.1 No Action Alternative 5-62
5.11.2 Decentralization Alternative 5-70
5.11.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 5-73
5.11.4 Regionalization Alternative 5-73
5.11.5 Centralization Alternative 5-76
5.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety 5-77
5.12.1 No Action Alternative 5-77
5.12.2 Decentralization Alternative 5-78
5.12.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 5-79
5.12.4 Regionalization Alternative 5-79
5.12.5 Centralization Alternative 5-79
5.13 Site Services 5-80
5.13.1 No Action Alternative 5-80
5.13.2 Decentralization Alternative 5-80
5.13.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 5-82
5.13.4 Regionalization Alternative 5-82
5.13.5 Centralization Alternative 5-82
5.14 Materials and Waste Management 5-85
5.14.1 No Action Alternative 5-85
5.14.2 Decentralization Alternative 5-88
5.14.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 5-88
5.14.4 Regionalization Alternative 5-88
5.14.5 Centralization Alternative 5-89
5.15 Facility Accidents 5-89
5.15.1 Historical Accidents Involving Spent Nuclear Fuel at Hanford 5-90
5.15.2 Emergency Preparedness Planning at Hanford 5-90
5.15.3 Accident Screening and Selection for the EIS Analysis 5-90
5.15.4 Method for Accident Consequence Analysis 5-92
5.15.5 Radiological Accident Analysis 5-94
5.15.6 Secondary Impacts of Radiological Accidents 5-107
5.15.7 Nonradiological Accident Analysis 5-107
5.15.8 Construction and Occupational Accidents 5-112
5.16 Cumulative Impacts Including Pat and Reasonably Foreseeable Actions 5-112
5.16.1 No Action Alternative 5-112
5.16.2 Decentralization Alternative 5-120
5.16.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 5-123
5.16.4 Regionalization Alternative 5-123
5.16.5 Centralization Alternative 5-130
5.17 Adverse Environmental Impacts that Cannot be Avoided 5-134
5.17.1 No Action Alternative 5-134
5.17.2 Decentralization Alternative 5-134
5.17.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 5-135
5.17.4 Regionalization Alternative 5-135
5.17.5 Centralization Alternative 5-135
5.18 Relationship Between Short-Term Uses of the Environment and the
Maintenance and Enhancement of Long-Term Productivity 5-135
5.19 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Resources 5-136
5.19.1 No Action Alternative 5-136
5.19.2 Decentralization Alternative 5-137
5.19.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 5-138
5.19.4 Regionalization Alternative 5-138
5.19.5 Centralization Alternative 5-139
5.20 Potential Mitigation Measures 5-140
5.20.1 Pollution Prevention/Waste Minimization 5-141
5.20.2 Socioeconomics 5-141
5.20.3 Cultural (Archaeological, Historical, and Cultural) Resource1 5-141
5.20.4 Geology 5-142
5.20.5 Air Resources 5-142
5.20.6 Water Resources 5-142
5.20.7 Ecology 5-142
5.20.8 Noise 5-143
5.20.9 Traffic and Transportation 5-143
5.20.10 Occupational and Public Health and Safety 5-143
5.20.11 Site Utilities and Support Services 5-144
5.20.12 Accidents 5-144
6. LIST OF PREPARERS 6-1
7. REFERENCES 7-1
8. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 8-1
ATTACHMENT A - FACILITY ACCIDENTS A-1
ATTACHMENT B - EVALUATION OF OPTION FOR FOREIGN PROCESSING OF SPENT
NUCLEAR FUEL CURRENTLY LOCATED AT THE HANFORD SITE B-1
Figures
2-1 Map of Hanford Site and vicinity 2-2
4-1 Hanford Site showing proposed spent nuclear fuel facility location 4-2
4-2 Areas of Washington and Oregon where socioeconomic resources may be
affected by the proposed spent nuclear fuel facility 4-7
4-3 A generalized stratigraphic column of the major geologic units of
the Hanford Site 4-36
4-4 Map of the Columbia Basin region showing the known faults 4-41
4-5 Historical seismicity of the Columbia Plateau and surrounding areas.
All earthquakes between 1850 and 1969 with a Modified Mercalli Intensity of
IV or larger with a magnitude of 3 or greater are shown 4-43
4-6 Recent seismicity of the Columbia Plateau and surrounding areas as
measured by seismographs. All earthquakes between 1969 and 1986 with a
Modified Mercalli Intensity of IV or larger with a magnitude of 3 or greater
are shown 4-44
4-7 Computed mean and 5th to 95th percentile hazard curves for the 200-West Area
of the Hanford Site. 4-47
4-8 Computed mean and 5th to 95th percentile hazard curves for the 200-East Area
of the Hanford Site 4-48
4-9 Computed mean and 5th to 95th percentile hazard curves for the 300 Area
of the Hanford Site 4-49
4-10 Computed mean and 5th to 95th percentile hazard curves for the 400 Area
of the Hanford Site 4-50
4-11 Computed mean and 5th to 95th percentile hazard curves for the 100-K Area
of the Hanford Site 4-51
4-12 Wind rose for the Hanford Site using data collected from January 1982
to December 1989 4-54
4-13 Locations of major surface water resources and principal dams within the
Columbia Plateau 4-63
4-14 Flood area during the 1894 flood. 4-67
4-15 Flood area for the probable maximum flood. 4-68
4-16 Extent of probable maximum flood in Cold Creek area 4-71
4-17 Geologic cross section of the Hanford Site 4-76
4-18 Distribution of vegetation types on the Hanford Site 4-84
4-19 Transportation routes in the Hanford vicinity 4-100
4-20 Transportation routes on the Hanford Site 4-102
Tables
2-1 Summary of planned spent nuclear fuel management activities 2-14
3-1 Spent nuclear fuel inventory at Hanford under the various storage options
as of 2035 in MTHM 3-2
3-2 Description of existing facilities 3-5
3-3 Impact of the No Action Alternative on existing Hanford facilities 3-6
3-4 Options under the Decentralization Alternative for Hanford 3-9
3-5 Description of required facilities under the Decentralization Alternative 3-11
3-6 Description of required facilities under Regionalization Alternatives 3-16
3-7 Summarized comparisons of the alternatives 3-21
4.3-1 Regional economic and demographic indicators 4-9
4.3-2 Population figures by county in the designated region of influence 4-10
4.3-3 Population projections by county in the designated region of influence 4-10
4.3-4 County economic summary 4-12
4.3-5 Employment by industry in the region of influence, 1990 figures 4-13
4.3-6 Payroll by industry in the region of influence, 1990 figures 4-14
4.3-7 Government retirement payments in Benton and Franklin counties
in 1990 4-17
4.3-8 Income measures by county, 1990 figures 4-18
4.3-9 Hanford employee residences by county 4-19
4.3-10 Emergency services within the region of influence 4-20
4.3-11 Police personnel in the Tri-Cities in 1992 4-20
4.3-12 Fire protection in the Tri-Cities in 1992 4-21
4.3-13 Housing by county in 1990 4-23
4.3-14 Total units and occupancy rates 4-23
4.3-15 Revenue sources by county FY 1986-1987 4-25
4.3-16 Expenditures by county FY 1986-87 4-26
4.3-17 Educational services by county in 1992 4-27
4.4-1 Archaeological districts and historic properties on the Hanford Site listed
on the National Register of Historic Places 4-30
4.7-1 Maximum allowable increases for prevention of significant deterioration of
air quality 4-57
4.7-2 Washington State ambient air quality standards applicable to Hanford,
maximum background concentration, background as percent of standard,
ambient baseline (1995), ambient baseline as percent of standard, and
ambient baseline plus background as percent of standard 4-58
4.7-3 Emission rates (tons per year) for stationary emission sources within
the Hanford Site for 1992 4-60
4.8-1 Annual average concentrations of radionuclides in Columbia River water
during 1992 4-72
4.9-1 Threatened and endangered species known or possibly occurring on the
Hanford Site 4-92
4.9-2 Candidate species 4-94
4.9-3 Washington plant species of concern occurring on the Hanford Site 4-95
4.12-1 Estimated 1993 cancer incidence and cancer deaths in the United States and
the state of Washington for different forms of cancer 4-110
4.13-1 Approximate consumption of utilities and energy on the Hanford Site (1992) 4-114
4.14-1 Baseline waste quantities as of the year 2000 at Hanford 4-116
4.14-2 Radioactive waste generated on the Hanford Site from 1988-1990
in kilograms 4-118
4.14-3 Transuranic waste inventory through 1991 4-121
4.14-4 Offsite low-level waste receipts summary 4-123
4.14-5 Hazardous waste generated on the Hanford Site from 1988 through 1992 4-124
4.14-6 1973-1992: Historical annual volume of onsite buried solid sanitary waste
in cubic meters per year 4-127
5.3-1 Comparison of the socioeconomic impacts of spent nuclear fuel
Decentralization Alternative suboptions 5-10
5.3-2 Comparison of socioeconomic impacts of spent nuclear fuel
Regionalization A suboptions 5-13
5.3-3 Comparison of socioeconomic impacts of spent nuclear fuel
Regionalization B1 suboptions 5-15
5.3-4 Comparison of socioeconomic impacts of spent nuclear fuel
Regionalization B2 suboptions 5-17
5.3-5 Comparison of socioeconomic impacts of spent nuclear fuel
Centralization Alternative - maximum case suboptions 5-18
5.3-6 Comparison of socioeconomic impacts of spent nuclear fuel
Centralization Alternative - minimum case suboptions 5-20
5.4-1 Facility requirements of Decentralization suboptions and estimations
of area disturbed 5-24
5.7-1 Annual atmospheric releases for normal operation - wet storage basins
at 100-KE Area and 100-KW Area 5-35
5.7-2 Annual atmospheric releases for normal operation - fuel storage at 300 Area
308, 324, 325, and 327 buildings 5-35
5.7-3 Annual atmospheric releases for normal operation - fuel storage at 200 West
Area T Plant and 400 Area FFTF 5-36
5.7-4 Radiological consequences of airborne emissions during normal operation in
the No Action Alternative for spent nuclear fuel storage at Hanford 5-37
5.7-5 Estimated annual atmospheric releases for normal operation - new wet
storage at 200-East Area 5-38
5.7-6 Estimated annual atmospheric releases for normal operation -
shear/leach/calcine fuel process at 200-East Area 5-39
5.7-7 Estimated annual atmospheric releases for normal operation - spent
nuclear fuel solvent extraction fuel process at 200-East Area 5-40
5.7-8 Radiological consequences of airborne emissions during normal operation in
the Decentralization Alternative for spent nuclear fuel storage at Hanford 5-41
5.7-9 Estimated annual atmospheric releases for normal operation - new dry storage
at 200-East Area 5-46
5.7-10 Radiological consequences of airborne emissions during normal operation
in the Centralization Alternative for spent nuclear fuel storage at Hanford 5-47
5.11-1 Spent nuclear fuel shipment characteristics 5-64
5.11-2 Radionuclide inventories for shipments of each type of spent nuclear fuel on
the Hanford Site 5-65
5.11-3 Population densities for work areas at Hanford. 5-66
5.11-4 Impacts of incident-free transportation for the No Action Alternative. 5-68
5.11-5 Impacts of accidents during transportation for the No Action Alternative 5-69
5.11-6 Impacts of incident-free transportation for the Decentralization Alternative. 5-71
5.11-7 Impacts of accidents during transportation for the Decentralization
Alternative 5-72
5.13-1 Materials and energy required for Decentralization suboptions 5-81
5.13-2 Materials and energy required for Regionalization A suboptions 5-83
5.13-3 Materials and energy required for construction of Regionalization B
and C options 5-84
5.13-4 Materials and energy requirements for construction of Centralization options 5-85
5.14-1 Waste generation for spent nuclear fuel management alternatives 5-86
5.15-1 Radiological accidents, individual worker probability of latent cancer fatality 5-96
5.15-2 Radiological accidents, general population - 80 km latent cancer
fatalities, 95% meteorology 5-98
5.15-3 Radiological accidents, general population - 80 km latent cancer
fatalities, 50% meteorology 5-100
5.15-4 Radiological accidents, nearest public access - probability of latent
cancer fatality 5-102
5.15-5 Maximum exposed offsite individual - probability of latent cancer fatality 5-104
5.15-6 Assessment of secondary impacts of accidents for the No Action Alternative 5-109
5.15-7 Assessment of secondary impacts of accidents for the Decentralization,
1992/1993 Planning Basis, Regionalization, and Centralization Alternative 5-111
5.15-8 Nonradiological exposure to public and workers to chemicals in spent
nuclear fuel storage locations released during an accident 5-113
5.15-9 Estimated injuries, illnesses, and fatalities of workers expected during
construction and operation of facilities in each alternative (cumulative
totals through 2035) 5-118
5.19-1 Irretrievable commitment of materials in the Decentralization Alternative
suboptions 5-138
5.19-2 Irretrievable commitment of material resources in the Regionalization A
suboptions 5-139
5.19-3 Irretrievable commitment of material resources in the Regionalization B1
option 5-139
5.19-4 Irretrievable commitment of material resources in the Regionalization B2 5-140
5.19-5 Irretrievable commitment of materials in the Centralization options 5-140
1. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is currently deciding the direction of its environ-
mental restoration and waste management programs at the Idaho National Engineering Labora-
tory (INEL) for the next 10 years. Pertinent to this decision is establishing policies for the
environmentally sensitive and safe transport, storage, and management of spent nuclear fuels
(SNF). To develop these policies, it is necessary to revisit or examine the available options.
As a part of the DOE complex, the Hanford Site not only has a large portion of the
nationwide DOE-owned inventory of SNF, but also is a participant in the DOE decision for
management and ultimate disposition of SNF. Efforts in this process at Hanford include assess-
ment of several options for stabilizing, transporting, and storing all or portions of DOE-owned
SNF at the Hanford Site. Such storage and management of SNF will be in a safe and suitable
manner until a final decision is made for ultimate disposition of SNF. The Hanford Site will be
affected by the alternative chosen.
Five alternatives involving the Hanford Site are being considered for management of the
SNF inventory: 1) the No Action Alternative, 2) the Decentralization Alternative, 3) the 1992/
1993 Planning Basis Alternative, 4) the Regionalization Alternative, and 5) the Centralization
Alternative. All alternatives will be carefully designed to avoid environmental degradation and
to provide protection to human health and safety at the Hanford Site and surrounding region.
For Hanford, these alternatives are briefly summarized below:
- No Action Alternative -- The No Action Alternative would preclude any addi-
tional transportation of SNF to or from Hanford but could include activities to
maintain safe and secure materials and facilities. Hanford SNF would continue
to be managed in the current mode and upgrade of existing facilities would occur
only as required to ensure safety and security.
- Decentralization Alternative -- The Decentralization Alternative would require
that DOE-owned fuel be managed at the location where it is removed from the
reactor. Hanford SNF would be safely stored, with some limited onsite reloca-
tion of SNF. To accommodate this mission, existing facilities would be upgraded
and new storage systems would be constructed.
- 1992/1993 Plannin~ Basis -- SNF would continue to be managed in the current
mode, which includes upgrades, fuel stabilization, transport of some SNF to
either INEL or Savannah River Site for storage, and construction of an SNF stor-
age facility at Hanford.
- Regionalization Alternative -- The Regionalization Alternative contains options
that range from storing all SNF west of the Mississippi River including Naval
SNF, to shipping all Hanford SNF offsite to either INEL or the Nevada Test Site.
Existing facilities would be upgraded and new storage systems constructed, as in
the Decentralization Alternative for SNF storage at Hanford, or packaging facili-
ties would be constructed as in the Centralization (Minimum) Alternative for off-
site shipment.
- Centralization Alternative -- The Centralization Alternative has two major
options. Either all Hanford SNF would be shipped offsite to another location
where all SNF would be centralized (minimum option), or the Hanford Site
would become the centralized location (maximum option) for all DOE SNF to be
stored until ultimate disposition.
The Spent Fuel Working Group Report (DOE 1993a) identified deficiencies related to
existing SNF management at the various DOE sites. Most of these deficiencies result from deg-
radation of the fuel and the facilities that store fuel because 6f the age of these facilities and the
fuel storage conditions. Corrective actions to the identified deficiencies for each site, including
the Hanford Site, are listed in DOE (1994a). Hanford Site corrective actions important to this
EIS include the following:
1. alternative containerization of fuel stored in the 105-KE Basin to isolate a potential path-
way of fuel constituents to the environment
2. preparation of a K Basins ElS and issuance of the record of decision to provide for man-
agement of SNF in the K Basins at the Hanford Site (SNF storage siting and configura-
tion, path forward for ultirnate disposition, etc.)
3. removal of all fuel and sludge from the K Basins by December 2002 based on the K
Basins ElS record of decision
4. technical evaluation and characterization of N Reactor fuel to support development of
the K Basins EIS
5. removal of fuel from the Fast Flux Test Facility; the Plutonium and Uranium Recovery
through EXtraction (PUREX) Plant; the 308 Building; the 324, 325, and 327 buildings;
T Plant; and the 200-West Area Low-Level Burial Grounds to support prolonged safe,
economic, environmentally sound management of those fuels.
On-going corrective actions with prior National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) cover-
age, such as containerization of fuel in the 105-KE Basin, are included in the No Action Alterna-
tive. Other corrective actions are included within the scope of each of the remaining
alternatives. The impacts of continued fuel and facility degradation in the No Action
Alternative are not fully quantified, although it is generally recognized that prolonged storage in
the existing facilities for an additional 40-year period might represent unacceptable risks, as
reflected in DOE (1993a).
The Hanford Site portion of this ElS was prepared according to the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended; the Council on Environmental Quality (CEO)
regulations (40 CFR Part 1500-1308) for the implementation of the NEPA; and DOE regula-
tions (10 CFR 1021) that supplement the CEO regulations. This document discusses five alter-
natives for the management and storage of SNF, the affected environment, and potential
impacts of the alternatives.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Hanford Site Overview
2.1.1 Site Description
The U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Site lies within the semiarid Pasco Basin of the Columbia Plateau
in southeastern Washington State (Figure- 2.1). The Hanford Site occu- pies an area of about 1450 square kilometers
(560 square miles) north of the confluence of the Yakima River with the Columbia River. The Hanford Site is about
50 kilometers (30 miles) north to south and 40 kilometers (24 - miles) east to west. This land, with restricted
public access, provides a buffer for the smaller areas previously used for production of nuclear mate-
rials, and currently used for research, waste management and disposal, and environmental restora-
tion; only about 6 percent of the land area has been disturbed and is actively used. The Columbia River flows
through the northern part of the Hanford Site, and turning south, it forms part of the site's eastern boundary.
The Yakima River runs near the southern boundary and joins the Columbia River south of the city of Richland, which
bounds the Hanford Site on the southeast. Rattlesnake Mountain, the Yakima Ridge, and the Umptanum Ridge form the
southwestern and western boundary. The Saddle Mountains form the northern boundary of the Hanford Site. Two small
east-west ridges, Gable Butte and Gable Mountain, rise above the plateau of the central part of the Hanford Site.
Underneath the Hanford Site are ancient basaltic flows with basaltic outcroppings on the surface and intermixed beds
of sand and gravel from ancient periods of flooding and glacial epochs. Adjoining lands to the west, north, and east
are principally range and agricultural land. The cities of Richland, Kennewick, and Pasco (Tri-Cities) constitute the nearest
population center and are located southeast of the Hanford Site.
The Hanford Site is listed on the National Priorities List under the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. The site encompasses more than 1500 waste management
units and four groundwater contamination plumes that have been grouped into 78 operable units. Each unit
has complementary characteristics of such parameters as geography, waste characteristics, type of facility,
and relationship of contaminant plumes. This grouping into operable units allows for eco-
nomies of scale to reduce the cost and the number of characterization investigations and reme-
dial actions that will be required for the
Figure 2-1. Hanford Site and vicinity. Hanford Site to complete cleanup efforts. More information on the locations of the units is included in Section
4.1. Current maps showing the locations of the operable units can be obtained from Westinghouse Hanford Company.
2.1.2 History
The Hanford Site was acquired by the federal government in 1943. For more than 20 years, Hanford Site
facilities were dedicated primarily to the production of plutonium for national defense and to the management of
the resulting wastes. In later years, programs at the Hanford Site were diversified to include research and
development for advanced reactors, renewa-
ble energy technologies, waste disposal technologies, and cleanup of
contamination from past practices.
2.1.3 Mission
The new mission for Hanford emphasizes these components:
- Waste management of stored defense wastes and the handling, storage, and dis-
posal of radioactive,
hazardous, mixed, or sanitary wastes from current operations.
- Environmental restoration of approximately 1,500 inactive radioactive, hazardous, and mixed-waste
sites and about 100 surplus facilities.
- Research and development in energy, health, safety, environmental sciences, molecu-
lar sciences,
environmental restoration, and waste management.
- Technology development of new environmental restoration and waste management tech-
nologies, including site characterization and assessment methods; waste mini-
mization, treatment, and remediation technology; and education outreach programs.
The DOE has set a goal of cleaning up Hanford's waste sites and bringing its facilities into compliance with
local, state, and federal environmental laws by 2018.
2.1.4 Management
The Hanford Site is owned by the federal government and managed by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy, Richland Operation's Office (DOE-RL). Westinghouse Hanford Company is the site
operations and engineering contractor. Pacific Northwest Laboratory, which is operated for the DOE
by Battelle Memorial Institute, manages the research and technology laboratories. In 1994, Bechtel
Hanford Company and a team of contractors became DOE's environmental restoration contractor at the Hanford Site.
2.2 Regulatory Framework
The policy of DOE-RL is to carry out its operations in compliance with all applicable fed-
eral laws and regulations, state laws and regulations, presidential executive orders, and DOE orders.
Environmental regulatory authority over the Hanford Site is vested both in federal agen-
cies, primarily the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and in Washington State agen-
cies, primarily the Department of Ecology. Significant environmental laws and regulations rele-
vant to the management of SNF at Hanford are discussed in this section. First, major
relevant federal and Washington State statutes are listed. Next, the specific topical concerns asso-
ciated with spent nuclear fuel are discussed with appropriate citations to federal and state statutes and
regulations. U.S. Department of Energy Orders will not be cited in this discussion because DOE Orders are
not regulations. However, DOE Orders do delineate specific DOE procedures and provide detailed internal guidance
for implementation of federal environmental, safety, and health regulations. DOE Orders establish specific standards,
rules, and requirements that supplement the federal regulations for the design and construction of new facilities, and the
operation of existing facilities to ensure safe and environmentally sound operations. Finally, it should be noted
that environmental restoration and waste management activities at Hanford are governed by the Hanford Federal
Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement), which includes detailed provisions for state and
federal jurisdiction, as well as specific goals for site management and cleanup. The Fourth Amendment to the Tri-
Party Agreement (January 1994) contains specific milestones (M-34) related to the management of SNF at the Hanford
Site.
2.2.1 Significant Federal and State Laws
Significant federal and state environmental and nuclear materials management laws appli-
cable to the Hanford Site include the following (grouped by federal and state and listed alphabetically):
Federal Laws
- American Antiquities Act (16 U.S.C. 431-433)
- American Indian Religious Freedom Act (42 U.S.C. 1996)
- Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 469-469c)
- Archaeological Resources Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470aa-470ll)
- Atomic Energy Act (AEA) (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.)
- Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (16 U.S.C 668-668d)
- Clean Air Act (CAA) as amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.)
- Clean Water Act (CWA) (33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.)
- Comprehensive Conservation Study of the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River (PL 100-605)
- Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) as amended by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthori-
zation Act (SARA) (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.)
- Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C. 11001 et seq.)
- Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. 1531-1534)
- Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA) (42 USC 5801 et seq.)
- Federal Facilities Compliance Act (PL 102-386)
- Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (16 U.S.C. 661-666c)
- Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) (49 USC 1801 et seq.)
- Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16 U.S.C 703-711)
- National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.)
- National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470-470w-6)
- Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) (25 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.)
- Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) (42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq.)
- Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 13101 et seq.)
- Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) as amended by the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.)
- Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) (42 U.S.C. 300f et seq.)
- Toxic Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.)
- Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C. 1274 et seq.)
State Laws
- Washington Archaeological and Historic Preservation Code (RCW Chapter 27.34 et seq.)
- Washington Clean Air Act of 1967 (RCW Chapter 70.94 et seq.)
- Washington Hazardous Waste Management Act of 1976 (RCW Chapter 70.105 et seq.)
- Washington Model Toxics Control Act (RCW Chapter 70.105D).
- Washington Water Pollution Control Act (RCW 90.48 et seq.).
2.2.2 Environmental Standards for Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facilities
Design and performance standards for the construction and operation of SNF storage facili-
ties arise from the Atomic Energy Act, Nuclear Waste Policy Act, Clean Water Act, and Clean Air Act,
parallel state implementation statutes, and other major environmental/nuclear activi-
ties statutes. A general listing of regulations promulgated under these authorities will not be
included in this discussion of the regulatory framework; relevant regulations will be cited as appro-
priate in the topical discussions that follow.
2.2.2.1 General Environmental Requirements for Construction and Operation.
Design and construction of new facilities, modification of existing facilities, and operation of all facili-
ties would be conducted in accordance with applicable state and federal environmental regu-
lations. Special consideration with respect to operations of SNF management facilities at Hanford are
discussed in the following sections.
Columbia River water would be used to serve a wet SNF storage facility. The DOE has asserted that it has
federally reserved water withdrawal rights with respect to its Hanford operations. Nevertheless, DOE submitted an
application to the Washington State Department of Ecology on July 7, 1987, as a matter of comity for water
withdrawal rights from the Columbia River for site characterization activities related to the now defunct Basalt
Waste Isolation Project. It may be appropriate to maintain this protocol with Washington State in regard to future
withdrawals from the river.
Operation of SNF facilities may involve the generation of waste materials or unintentional releases of
waste materials to the environment. The Pollution Prevention Act requires prevention or reduction of waste
at the source whenever feasible. Reporting and cleanup of spills from an SNF facility are governed by CERCLA regulations
(40 CFR 300, "National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan"), which apply to the release of
hazardous substances into the environment, including radioactive substances.
Shipment of SNF is governed by Department of Transportation hazardous materials regulations in 49 CFR 171-
179 (under the authority of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act), which apply to the handling, packaging,
labeling, and shipment of hazardous materials offsite, including radioactive materials and wastes. Safety
standards for packaging and transporting radioactive materials are governed by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) standards established in 10 CFR Part 71, "Packaging of Radioactive Material for Transport and Trans-
portation of Radioactive Material Under Certain Conditions."
2.2.2.2 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. The status of SNF with respect to RCRA is discussed
in Volume 1. Most of the authority to administer the RCRA program, including treatment, storage and disposal
standards, and permit requirements, has been delegated by EPA to the State of Washington, except for corrective
action (cleanup). Washington State RCRA (WSHWMA) Dangerous Waste Regulations are found in WAC 173-303 (Washington
Administrative Code). Generally, RCRA does not apply to source material, special nuclear material, by-product
material, SNF, or radioactive-only wastes. Should SNF be processed into or commingled with a hazardous waste as
defined by Subtitle C of RCRA, then the generation, treatment, storage, and disposal of the hazardous waste
portion of such mixed waste would be subject to EPA regulations in 40 CFR 260-268 and 270-272.
2.2.2.3 Effluents. Regulations in 40 CFR 122 (and also in 40 CFR 125 and 129) apply to the dis-
charge of pollutants from any point source into waters of the United States. A National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit is required for such discharges, which would include any effluent discharge from an SNF storage
facility into the Columbia River. The EPA has not yet delegated to the State of Washington the authority to
issue NPDES permits at the Hanford Site. At 40 CFR 121 the regulations provide for state certification that any
activity requiring a federal CWA water permit, i.e., an NPDES permit or a discharge of dredged or fill material
permit, will not violate state water quality standards.
The EPA drinking water standards in 40 CFR 141, "National Primary Drinking Water Regulations," apply to
Columbia River water at community water supply intakes downstream of the Hanford Site. Washington Administrative
Code 173-200 sets water quality standards for groundwater, and WAC 173-201 establishes surface water quality
standards for the State of Washington.
Department of Ecology regulations in WAC 173-216 establish a state permit program, com-
monly referred to as the 216 program, for the discharge of waste materials from industrial, com-
mercial, and municipal operations into ground and surface waters of the state. Discharges cov-
ered by NPDES or WAC 173-218 (Underground Injection Control Program) permits are excluded from the 216 program.
The DOE has agreed to meet the requirements of the 216 program at the Hanford Site for discharges of liquids to the ground.
2.2.2.4 Air Quality. Hazardous emission standards in 40 CFR 61, "National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants," provide for the control of the emission of hazardous pollutants to the atmosphere, and
standards in 40 CFR 61, Subpart H, "National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon
from Department of Energy Facilities," apply specifically to the emission of radionuclides from DOE facilities.
Approval to construct a new facility or to modify an existing one may be required by these regulations. The EPA has
not yet delegated this approval authority to the State of Washington for the Hanford Site.
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 require the addition of 189 substances to the list of hazardous air
pollutants to be regulated on a schedule that extends to 1999. The hazardous air pollutant list includes
radionuclides. The amendments require the identification of source categories and the definition of required
control technology (maximum available control technology) for each of these pollutants. Hanford may fall within
the definition of a major source because total emissions from Hanford may exceed the triggering limit of 25 tons
per year for any combination of listed hazardous air pollutants (emission standards using curies as the unit of
measure for radionuclides will be promulgated in the future). This means that emission sources at Hanford may
become subject to permitting and reporting requirements and to installation requirements (including retrofit) for
control technology. A new SNF storage facility may be subject to the maximum available control technology
requirements for new sources.
Washington State Department of Health regulations in WAC 246-247, "Monitoring and Enforcement of Air
Quality and Emission Standards for Radionuclides," contain standards and permit requirements for the emission of
radionuclides to the atmosphere from DOE facilities based on Department of Ecology standards in WAC 173-480,
"Ambient Air Quality Standards and Emission Limits for Radionuclides."
The local air authority, Benton County Clean Air Authority, enforces General Regulation 80-7, which
pertains to detrimental effects, fugitive dust, incineration products, odor, opacity, asbestos, and sulfur oxide
emissions. Benton County Clean Air Authority has been delegated authority to enforce EPA asbestos regulations.
2.2.3 Protection of Public Health
Numerical standards for protection of the public from releases to the environment have been set by the EPA
and appear in the Code of Federal Regulations. The most significant of the regulations are discussed in the
following paragraphs.
Clean Air Act standards found in 40 CFR 61.92 apply to releases of radio-
nuclides to the atmosphere from DOE facilities and state as follows:
Emissions of radionuclides [other than radon-220 and radon-222] to the ambient air from Department
of Energy facilities shall not exceed those amounts that would cause any member of the public to
receive in any year an effective dose equivalent of 10 millirem/year.
Safe Drinking Water standards found in 40 CFR 141.16 apply indirectly to releases of radio-
nuclides from DOE facilities to the extent that the releases impact community water systems:
The average annual concentration of beta particle and photon radioactivity from man-made radionuclides
in drinking water shall not produce an annual dose equivalent to the body or any internal organ greater
than 4 millirem/year.
Also, maximum contaminant levels in community water systems of 5 pico- curies per liter of combined radium- 226
and radium-228, and maximum contaminant levels of 15 picocuries per liter of gross alpha particle activity,
including radium-226 but excluding radon and uranium, are specified in 40 CFR 141. The tritium concentration that
corresponds to a dose of 4 millirem per year is 20,000 picocuries per liter.
2.2.4 Species Protection
Regulations of the Endangered Species Act, the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, and the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act in 50 CFR 10-24, 222, 225-227, 402, and 450-453 apply to the Hanford Site. The Endangered Species Act
requires a biological assessment to identify any threatened or endangered species likely to be affected by the
proposed action.
2.2.5 Floodplains and Wetlands
Executive Order 11988, "Floodplain Management," Executive Order 11990, "Protection of Wetlands," and 10
CFR 1022, require an assessment of the effects of DOE actions on floodplains and wetlands. These requirements are
directed at the protection of water quality and habitat.
2.2.6 Cultural and Historic Preservation
Requirements of the National Historic Preservation Act in 36 CFR 800, the American Antiquities Act in
25 CFR 261 and 43 CFR 3, and the Archaeological Resources Protection Act and the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act in 43 CFR 7 apply to the protection of historic and cultural properties, including both existing properties and
those discovered during excavation and construction. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act and the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act also provide for certain rights of access by Native Americans to
traditional areas of worship and religious significance.
2.3 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program
This section presents a summary of current plans, as of December 1994, for the management of existing SNF on
the Hanford site. The following SNF and associated facilities are at Hanford (Bergsman 1994):
- N Reactor SNF- Zircaloy-clad metallic uranium fuel stored in water in the 105-KW and 105-KE
basins and exposed to air in the Plutonium and Uranium Recovery through Extraction (PUREX)
Plant dissolver cells A, B, and C.
- Single-pass reactor SNF - aluminum-clad metallic uranium fuel stored in water in the 105-KE
and 105-KW basins and stored in water in the PUREX basin.
- Shippingport Core II SNF - Zircaloy-clad uranium dioxide fuel stored in water in T-Plant
Canyon Pool Cell 4.
- Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) SNF - stainless steel-clad fuel stored in liquid sodium at the
FFTF, consisting mostly of plutonium and uranium oxide fuel, but also uranium and/or
plutonium metals, and carbide and nitride fuel.
- Miscellaneous commercial and experimental SNF - consisting mainly of Zircaloy-clad uranium
dioxide fuel stored in air in the 324, 325, and 327 buildings; TRIGA (training, research, and
isotope reactors built by General Atomics) fuel stored in water in the 308 Building;
miscellaneous fuel stored in air-filled shielded containers at the 200-West Area burial
grounds; and aluminum-clad, uranium-aluminum alloy fuel stored in air in the Plutonium
Finishing Plant.
Plans for management of Hanford SNF are included in the Hanford Spent Nuclear Fuel Project,
Recommended Path Forward (Fulton 1994) and the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Technical Baseline Document
Fiscal Year 1995 (WHC 1995). It should be noted, however, that the SNF management program has continued to
evolve since these documents were issued or drafted. Similarly, Hanford site-specific environmental
documentation that will be required to support the Hanford SNF management program continues to evolve.
Spent nuclear fuel EISs that are being prepared or that will be prepared include this programmatic EIS and a
Hanford site- specific K Basins EIS. The programmatic EIS will lead to a record of decision that is
scheduled to be published in June 1995. That record of decision will specify what SNF will be managed at
which DOE sites, Naval Reactor Propulsion Program sites, or other sites. The K Basins EIS is expected to
result in a record of decision that specifies where and how to relocate, stabilize, and safely store N
Reactor and single-pass reactor SNF from the K Basins to address the urgent need to remedy safety and
environmental vulnerabilities. The K Basins EIS record of decision will address management of this SNF over
a 40-year period or until ultimate disposition.
During negotiations on the Fourth Amendment to the Tri-Party Agreement (TPA), the DOE, the State of
Washington Department of Ecology, and the EPA agreed to an enforceable milestone that indirectly required
issuing that record of decision by June 1996. The record of decision on the K Basins EIS would be dependent
on the programmatic EIS record of decision. Other environmental documentation (EAs or EISs) will be
prepared for any proposed actions related to SNF that are not specifically covered in the programmatic EIS
or in the K Basins EIS.
Assuming the EISs are prepared as planned, the Hanford SNF management plan would identify and
implement management approaches that will provide safe, cost-effective storage of SNF at existing
facilities. Activities to identify, and then implement, the SNF management approach follow:
- Issuing the records of decision that are expected to result from the programmatic EIS and the
K Basin EIS.
- Achieving accord with the TPA or renegotiating activities and milestones, as necessary.
- Providing facilities for SNF management as necessary to implement the EIS records of
decision. SNF remaining onsite, as a result of the programmatic EIS record of decision could
be placed in wet or dry storage in the 200-East Area until a decision on ultimate disposition
has been made.
- Identifying and developing pathways for ultimate disposition of the SNF.
- Providing facilities and systems for preparing SNF for ultimate disposition.
N Reactor and single-pass reactor SNF would be stabilized, as necessary, to implement the K
Basins EIS record of decision. It is possible this stabilized form would be a metal or an
oxide. Suitability of other SNF for ultimate disposition in its current form is yet to be
demonstrated, but it is possible that FFTF and Shippingport SNF may not require further
stabilization.
While the SNF management approach is being defined, the following key, near-term actions at the
existing facilities are being implemented or are planned:
- Upgrading water treatment systems and retrieving sludges from the basins' floors.
- Performing necessary safety and security upgrades (e.g., water systems) to extend facility
life until SNF removal can be accomplished.
- Transferring SNF from liquid-sodium storage at the FFTF to dry storage in interim storage
casks. This activity would be integrated with FFTF deactivation.
- Transferring small quantities of SNF between existing facilities where deemed necessary to
comply with other Hanford requirements.
Discussion of the SNF inventory and plans for managing that inventory are provided in the following
sections. Planned SNF management activities are summarized in Table 2-1. Additional details on existing
storage facilities are in Chapter 3.
2.3.1 N Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel
N Reactor SNF is stored in three facilities (Bergsman 1994):
- 952 metric tons of uranium in 3815 closed canisters in the 105-KW Basin. The water in this
basin has only low levels of radionuclide contamination.
- 1144 metric tons of uranium in 3666 open canisters in the 105-KE Basin. The water in this
basin is contaminated with radionuclides, and there is a thick layer of sludge on the basin
floor.
- 0.3 metric tons of uranium in the form of intact Mark IV fuel elements and fuel element pieces
stored in air on the floor of PUREX dissolver cells A, B, and C.
Until recently, plans included 1) containerizing the fuel and sludge stored in the 105-KE Basin into
Mark II (sealed) canisters; and 2) transferring the spent fuel in PUREX to the 105-KE Basin and containerizing
it in the basin. Alternative approaches to each of these plans, including alternative containerization of fuel
and sludge at the 105-KE Basin, expedited fuel removal from the K Basins and dry storage of fuel at PUREX,
have been evaluated, and a path forward for these materials selected. PUREX SNF would be transferred to the
K Basins and subsequently managed with the existing K Basins SNF inventory pending issuance of an environmental assessment.
Expedited fuel removal from the K Basins has been selected in lieu of containerization because of benefits
to worker safety and/or the environment. The 105-K Basins SNF would be relocated to a storage facility in
the 200 Area, pending completion of the K Basins EIS. The impacts associated with implementation of this
path forward are within the envelope of impacts analyzed in this EIS.
Table 2-1. Summary of planned spent nuclear fuel management activities. In addition, work is ongoing to characterize the N Reactor and single-pass reactor fuel to provide
data relevant to assuring continued safe storage and developing plans for future actions. Recent
commitments to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board have set a date of December 1999 for completing
removal of the SNF from the 105-K Basins.
Other N Reactor SNF, which may be recovered as a result of N Basin deactivation, would also be
transferred to the 105-K Basins. A small quantity of this material (less than 0.5 MTHM) in the form of fuel
fragments and chips is suspected to be in the sludge at the bottom of N Basin.
2.3.2 Single-Pass Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel
The single-pass reactor SNF consists of residual fuel elements from the 105-KW and
105-KE reactors, plus residual elements from the clean-out of the 105-C and 105-D storage basins.
Currently, 138 elements [0.4 metric tons of uranium (MTU)] are stored in the 105-KE Basin and 47 elements
(0.1 ) are stored in the 105-KW Basin. In addition, four buckets filled with 779 single-pass reactor fuel
elements are stored in the PUREX storage basin.
It was planned that the single-pass reactor fuel stored in PUREX would be transferred to the 105-KE
Basin, containerized, and possibly transferred to the 105-KW Basin before the previously planned Hanford
SNF EIS record of decision would be issued. Activities to implement this action were initiated (Bergsman
1995). In parallel, alternative dry storage of this fuel was considered, consistent with the dry storage
evaluation for N Reactor fuel at PUREX. To enable expeditious deactivation of the PUREX plant in support of
the Hanford Site cleanup mission and because of the minimal impacts associated with relocation of this SNF
to the 105-K Basins, shipment to the 105-K Basins was selected as the preferred approach for managing this
SNF until issuance and implementation of the K Basins EIS record of decision. The SNF may be shipped
directly to the 105-KW Basin instead of the 105-KE Basin and would be stored in a manner consistent with the
requirements of the selected storage basin. The impacts associated with implementation of this path forward
are within the envelope of impacts analyzed in this EIS.
2.3.3 Fast Flux Test Facility Spent Nuclear Fuel
The SNF from FFTF is stored in the following four FFTF locations, all of which use liquid sodium for
cooling:
- the reactor core with a capacity of approximately(a) 82 fuel assemblies
- in-vessel storage with a capacity of 54 fuel assemblies
- interim decay storage with a capacity of 112 fuel assemblies and a limitation of 10 kilowatts
per assembly
- the Fuel Storage Facility with a capacity of 380 fuel assemblies(b) and a limitation of 1.4
kilowatts per assembly.
The 1993 inventory of irradiated SNF at FFTF consists of fuel from 329 assemblies; an additional 55
non-irradiated driver fuel assemblies exist. Some irradiated fuel assemblies have been disassembled, with
the fuel now placed in 40 Ident 69 containers or in the Interim Examination and Maintenance Cell. Some
irradiated fuel has been shipped offsite, but is expected to be returned to Hanford.
The DOE plans to transfer FFTF spent nuclear fuel from the liquid sodium-cooled storage facilities
into dry storage casks. These interim storage casks would hold six or seven assemblies per cask. Delivery
of an initial ten casks has been scheduled for August 1995 and an environmental assessment for this activity
has been submitted (Bergsman 1995). The majority of the casks would be sited in the 400 Area; however, a few
may be sited at the Plutonium Finishing Plant because of requirements for additional physical security. A
small fraction of the FFTF SNF is sodium bonded, and may be shipped directly offsite without emplacement in
dry storage casks if the decision in this EIS is to relocate these materials to another DOE site.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Capacity for each core-loading varies.
b. The Fuel Storage Facility actually has a capacity of 466 fuel assemblies, but is limited
to only 380 because of criticality requirements.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.3.4 Shippingport Core II Spent Nuclear Fuel
The Shippingport Core II spent nuclear fuel is stored in water in the 221-T Building (T-Plant) Canyon
Pool Cell 4. The 72 standard blanket assemblies will remain in basin storage in T-Plant until site-specific
NEPA review is completed to enable implementation of dry storage or transfer offsite. Site-specific NEPA
review will not be initiated until issuance of the record of decision for this EIS. (One un-irradiated
blanket assembly is also stored in air in the T-Plant.)
2.3.5 Miscellaneous Spent Nuclear Fuel
A variety of miscellaneous spent nuclear fuel is stored in the 300 Area, Plutonium Finishing Plant,
and low-level burial grounds (Bergsman 1994). Specific actions that have been identified (Bergsman 1995)
follow:
- The spent nuclear fuel stored in air in the 324, 325, and 327 buildings (mostly commercial,
light-water reactor fuel, i.e., Zircaloy-clad uranium dioxide) is planned for relocation
onsite; an environmental assessment for this activity will be prepared. The planned storage
facility is a dry storage cask.
- TRIGA fuel stored in water in the 308 Building is planned for relocation onsite to the 400 Area
so that the 308 Building can be deactivated; an environmental assessment has been submitted
for this activity. Alternative disposition of the TRIGA fuel may be implemented; transfer of
this fuel to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) is assumed in the INEL 1992/1993
Planning Basis Alternative.
- Miscellaneous fuel residues in the 200 Area are currently being managed as remote-handled
transuranic waste. The TRIGA SNF at the burial grounds will be relocated onsite during burial
grounds retrieval operations.
3. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES
3.1 Description of Alternatives
Five major alternatives are being evaluated for safely storing SNF until
ultimate disposition is determined. These five alternatives are 1) No Action,
2) Decentralization (with a subset of local stabilization and storage
options), 3) 1992/1993 Planning Basis, 4) Regionalization (with options A, B1,
B2, and C), and 5) Centralization (minimum and maximum options). The five
alternatives and their impacts are being evaluated concurrently by the sites
or agencies potentially affected by these alternatives, including Hanford,
Savannah River Site (SRS), Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), Oak
Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and the Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Program.
This chapter describes the spent fuel inventories, activities, and
facilities anticipated at Hanford under the various storage alternatives. The
inventory of SNF expected to be stored at Hanford under each alternative is
summarized in Table 3-1. There are eight types of fuel listed in Table 3-1 to
represent the wide variety of SNF currently held at various sites across the
United States. In addition, the United States has obligations for some SNF
held in foreign countries. The specific kinds of SNF held at Hanford that
contribute toward the total SNF inventory are shown in parentheses in column
one of Table 3-1. In terms of metric tons of heavy metal, Hanford has about
80 percent of DOE's current SNF inventory, primarily because of the large
inventory of spent fuel remaining from the shut-down N Reactor. The
Centralization Alternative minimum option is not shown in Table 3-1 because
the inventory would eventually be zero at Hanford under this option, as it is
in the Regionalization Alternative Option C. An overview of the SNF inventory
as of the year 2035, planned activities, and existing and new facilities that
may result under each of the five storage alternatives is provided below.
The No Action Alternative described in Subsection 3.1.1 forms the basis
for comparison with the remaining four storage alternatives and includes
descriptions of the expected activities, and existing storage facilities.
Decentralization (Subsection 3.1.2), the 1992/93 Planning Basis (Subsection
3.1.3), Regionalization (Subsection 3.1.4), and Centralization
(Subsection 3.1.5) are discussed in the remaining sections.
Table 3-1. Spent nuclear fuel inventory at Hanford under the various storage options as of 2035 in MTHM. ,b
Fuel type (name No Action 1992/1993 Regionali- Regionali- Regionali- Regionaliza- Centralization
of Hanford SNF and Planning zation Ac zation zation B2e tion Cf and maximum option
that is part of Decentrali- Basis B1d Centraliza-
this type) zation tion minimum
option
Naval SNF 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.23 65.23 0.00 65.23
Savannah River 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.76 8.76 0.00 213.09
and
aluminum-clad
Hanford (N 2103.17g 2103.17 2103.17 2103.17 2103.17 0.00 2103.17
Reactor
and single-
pass reactors)
Graphite 0.00 0.00 0.00 27.60 27.60 0.00 27.61
Commercial 2.30 2.30 0.00 125.18 125.18 0.00 156.51
miscellaneous
fuels
Experimental, 11.27 11.23 0.00 90.12 90.12 0.00 96.51
stainless
steel clad
(FFTF)
Experimental, 15.70 15.70 0.00 64.84 64.84 0.00 77.99
Zircaloy
clad
(Shippingport)
Experimental, 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.29 0.00 1.70
other
such as
ceramic,
liquid/salt,
etc.
TOTALS: 2132.44 2132.40 2103.17 2430.19 2485.19 0.00 2741.80
a. MTHM - Metric tons of heavy metal (thorium, uranium, and plutonium as applicable).
b. Source: Wichmann (1995). Quantities of SNF within a given category may be the result of adding
together several quantities, some large and some small, stored at different locations. Individual values
are known to within about 1%. Additional digits are shown in the table as a check on calculations, but
inventory totals are known to only two significant figures.
c. All Hanford production SNF remains at Hanford. All other SNF goes to INEL (including Hanford
commercial, experimental stainless-steel-clad, and TRIGA).
d. All SNF currently located or to be generated in the U.S. west of the Mississippi River is sent to and
stored at the Hanford Site, with the exception of Naval SNF.
e. All SNF currently located or to be generated in the U.S. west of the Mississippi River and all Naval
SNF are sent to and stored at the Hanford Site.
f. All Hanford Site SNF and all other SNF currently located or to be generated in the U.S. west of the
Mississippi River is sent to and stored at either INEL or NTS. For Hanford, this alternative is identical
to the Centralization Alternative minimum option (SNF is shipped offsite).
g. This represents the post-irradiation (end-of-life) quantity. The pre-irradiation quantity, (2116.67
MTHM) is sometimes quoted.
3.1.1 No Action Alternative
Under the No Action Alternative, only those actions that are deemed
necessary for con-
tinued safe and secure management of the SNF would be
conducted. Thus, the existing SNF would be maintained close to its current
storage locations, and there would be minimal facility upgrades. Activities
required to store SNF safely would continue at each specific site (DOE 1993b).
A description of the anticipated activities that would be necessary
under the No Action Alternative is provided in Subsection 3.1.1.1, followed by
descriptions of existing facilities (Subsection 3.1.1.2), and any new
facilities (Subsection 3.1.1.3). A comprehensive inventory and description of
the fuel at Hanford as of January 1993 is given by Bergsman (1994). That
report provides detailed information on many of the spent fuel designs and
radionuclide inventories.
3.1.1.1 Anticipated Activities. In order to carry out the No Action
Alternative, the following activities would occur at the Hanford Site:
- Characterization of the defense production reactor fuel would
proceed to establish the basis for safe storage.
- Fuel and sludge would be containerized at the 105-KE Basin or other
onsite location.
- The first 10 dry storage casks would be procured for Fast Flux Test
Facility (FFTF) fuel.
Consolidation of SNF from defense production reactors into the
105-KW Basin could occur. Other fuel may be transferred to dry cask storage
where required for safety.
3.1.1.2 Description of Existing Facilities. SNF is presently located
in 11 facilities on the Hanford Site: 105-KE and 105-KW Basins at the north
end of Hanford in the 100-K Area; T Plant, low-level waste burial grounds, and
Plutonium Finishing Plant in the 200 West Area; Plutonium and Uranium Recovery
through EXtraction (PUREX) plant in the 200 East Area; FFTF in the 400 Area;
and 308, 324, 325, and 327 buildings in the 300 Area in the southeast corner
of the site. Continued storage in these facilities is being evaluated because
the No Action Alternative includes activities required to ensure safe and
secure storage. The Plutonium
Finishing Plant and PUREX facilities are excluded from this evaluation because
SNF will not remain in those two facilities under any of the alternatives.
For the purposes of this analysis, SNF at PUREX is assumed to be relocated to
the K Basins.
Most of the facilities at the Hanford Site are decades old, some over 40
years, except for the FFTF and its associated storage buildings. A general
description, the capacity for additional storage of SNF, and the means by
which SNF can be received or removed from each facility are provided in Table
3-2. The dimensional information is for the actual storage area and not for
the entire facility in order to provide a basic idea of the storage area
required for that specific inventory of SNF. In many cases, such as the
facilities in the 300 Area, only small portions of the actual facilities are
used to store the spent fuel.
The K Basins contain the vast majority of the SNF at Hanford. The
T-Plant, 308, 325, and 327 buildings, and the Plutonium Finishing Plant
contain small amounts of stored SNF of various kinds. Four FFTF locations
contain all the FFTF spent fuel, presently stored in sodium: the Reactor
Core, In Vessel Storage, Interim Decay Storage, and Fuel Storage Facility (a
building separate from the reactor containment building). The first of 60 new
dry storage casks are expected to be available for FFTF fuel by late 1995.
The existing facilities have very little additional capacity (see Table 3-2).
While there is presently excess capacity in the K Basins, this is expected to
be consumed by the planned operations, regardless of the storage alternative
chosen.
The accessibility and limits on loading SNF are provided as key factors
in movement of any fuel from these facilities to other locations on or
offsite. Rail access is available at the facilities storing most of the fuel
(K Basins, PUREX, and T Plant); truck shipments would be used for the rest.
Acceptable casks and procedures for moving these casks may require evaluation
in many cases. Additional details on these facilities are provided by
Bergsman (1994), Bergsman (1995), and Monthey (1993).
The changes to the existing facilities that were analyzed under the No
Action Alternative of SNF storage are shown in Table 3-3.
Table 3-2. Description of existing facilities (Bergsman 1994; Bergsman 1995).
Facility Description Capacity Access
105-KE Basin Water storage pool; 38 m x 20 75% full, By rail 27
m x 6 m deep; concrete walls 100% full MT crane,
and floor; no sealant or after fairly
liner containeri restrictive
zation
105-KW Basin Water storage pool; 38 m x 20 75% fulla By rail 27
m x 6 m deep; concrete walls MT crane,
and floor; epoxy sealant; no fairly
liner restrictive
T Plant: Cell 4 Water storage pool; 4 m x 8.4 50% full By rail or
m x 5.8 m deep (water) truck
All fuel
handling
remote
PUREX Plant: East Water storage pool; 9.5 m x No Shipment by
end of 202A Bldg. 6.1 m x 5.2 m deep; Dissolver additional rail
plus Dissolver Cell sizes vary capacity 36 MT crane
Cells A, B, and C
Plutonium Dry storage in 55 gal drum No Shipment by
Finishing Plant: additional truck
2736-ZB Bldg. capacity
Fast Flux Test Liquid sodium pool storage More than By truck
Facility: Reactor (fuel storage facility is 75% full 91 MT Crane
in-vessel storage, separate from reactor
interim decay containment building, with
storage, and fuel limit of <1.4kW/assembly)
storage facility
storage locations
200 Area LL Burial Dry, retrievable storage; 13 Large By truck
Grounds: 218-W-4C lead-lined, concrete-filled additional
Trench 1 and 7; 208 liter drums, soil capacity
and 218-W-3A covered; 22 concrete casks
Trench 8 (1.66 m x 1.66 m x 1.22 m or
and S6 1.92 m high), soil covered;
39 EBR II casks (1.5 m high x
0.4 m diameter), soil
covered; 1 Zircaloy Hull
Container (152 cm long x 76
cm diameter)
308 Building Built in late 1970's water Small Truck
Annex: Neutron storage pool; 2.8 m diameter additional shipments
Radiography x 6 m deep capacity 4.5 MT crane
Facility
324 Building: B Dry storage in air; B Cell: Small Truck
and D Cells 6.7 m x 7.6 m x 9.3 m high additional shipments
(SNF uses <10% of floor capacity only
space). D Cell: 4 x 6.4 m x B Cell - 2.7
5.2 m high (small part for and 5.4 MT
fuel), thick concrete walls cranes;
and floors with steel liners Airlock - 27
MT crane
325 Building: A Dry storage in air 325A - 1.8 Small Truck
and m x 2.1 m x 4.6 m high additional shipments
B Cells in 325 (typical cell) 325B - 1.7 m x capacity only
Radiochemical 1.7 m floor area (typical 325A - 27 MT
Facility; 325 cell) crane
Shielded 325B - 2.7
Analytical MT crane
Laboratory
327 Building: A - Dry storage in air, except Small No direct
F and I Cells; for water in large basin; additional rail
Upper and Lower variety of cell sizes, but capacity Truck
SERF; Dry Storage storage only for fuel shipments
vault; EBR II research 13.5 and 18
cask; Large Basin MT cranes
a. If 105-KE Basin fuel is consolidated with 105-KW Basin fuel, 105-KE Basin
would be shut down. The storage capacity of 105-KW Basin would be increased
by replacing all the storage racks to allow multitiered stacking of fuel
storage canisters and by making minor facility modifications.
Table 3-3. Assumed changes to existing Hanford facilities in the No Action
Alternative.
Facility Facility changes
105-KE Basin Fuel and sludge to be containerized; plans to upgrade safety
and security systems
105-KW Basin Fuel is already containerized; plans to upgrade safety and
security systems
T Plant None
PUREX Plant Fuel to be moved to alternative location (assumed to be 105-
K Basins for this alternative)
Plutonium None
Finishing
Plant
Fast Flux None: Procure 10 dry storage casks by 8/95 (Bergsman 1995).
Test Facility Casks to weigh 50 T with storage cavity 3.8 m high x 0.56 m
diameter (Bergsman 1994)
200 Area LL None
Waste Burial
Grounds
308 Building None
Annex
324 Building None
325 Building None
327 Building None
3.1.1.3 Description of New Facilities. No new buildings were analyzed
for the Hanford Site under the No Action Alternative. The only activities
that were analyzed are those described for containerizing the N Reactor fuel
and procuring casks for storage of FFTF fuel. The casks would be stored
above ground on an existing concrete pad at the FFTF (Bergsman 1995). Major
changes in rail, electrical, water, or other utilities are not expected under
this alternative.
3.1.2 Decentralization Alternative
In the Decentralization Storage Alternative, as in the No Action
Alternative, the current spent fuel inventory would continue to remain close
to the point of generation or defueling. There are some existing storage
sites that may receive or ship spent fuels, such as naval spent fuel, under
one of several options under the Decentralization Alternative, but these
options do not impact Hanford (DOE 1993a). No SNF would be shipped offsite
or received from other storage locations outside of Hanford, but local
transport might take place to support safety requirements and research and
development. The Decentralization Alternative differs from the No Action
Alternative in that significant facility development and upgrades are
assumed, and spent fuel characterization, research and development, and
possibly stabilization would occur. Summaries of the anticipated activities
(Subsection 3.1.2.1) and facility require-
ments (Subsections 3.1.2.2 and
3.1.2.3) are provided below.
3.1.2.1 Anticipated Activities. The Decentralization Alternative would
include the three activities (fuel characterization, fuel and sludge
containerization, and cask procurement for FFTF fuel) mentioned above in
Subsection 3.1.1 for the No Action Alternative as well as the following
general activities:
- Characterization of defense production fuels (N Reactor and single-
pass reactor) to determine the feasibility of dry storage
- Evaluation of dry storage for other fuels (Shippingport Core II,
FFTF, miscellaneous)
- Research and development on N Reactor fuel stabilization
- Construction and utilization of wet and/or dry storage facilities
as well as a stabilization facility to support storage.
Only the defense fuels are being considered for wet storage, but dry
storage in casks or vaults could be used for all or part of Hanford's spent
fuel inventory under various options (Bergsman 1995). There are four basic
options considered for storage of the spent fuels at Hanford under the
Decentralization Alternative. Options W and X include both wet and dry
storage: wet storage for defense fuels and dry storage for all other spent
fuels in either a vault or casks. Options Y and Z involve only dry storage,
again either in a vault or casks, but these options include one of three
stabilization options for the metallic defense fuels.
The three potential processes considered for stabilizing the defense
fuels in conjunction with Options Y and Z are shear/leach/calcine (P),
shear/leach/solvent extraction (Q), and drying and passivation (D). Process
P consists of shearing the fuel into a continuous dissolver and dissolving it
in a nitric acid solution. Eventually, the processed material (without any
radionuclide removal) is calcined, pressed into a ceramic waste form, and
sealed in metal canisters.
Process Q uses solvent extraction by which metallic defense fuels are
dissolved, separating uranium and plutonium and a liquid high-level waste
stream that would most likely be vitrified for disposal in a geologic
repository. In Process Q it is assumed that the process would be carried out
on the Hanford Site. In commenting on the draft EIS, British Nuclear Fuels
Limited (BNFL) proposed such processing be carried out in their facilities
overseas. A discussion of the proposed sub-option is provided in Attachment
B. Except for the additional impacts associated with transporting SNF from
the Hanford Site to a West Coast shipping port, transoceanic shipment,
transport of the SNF overland to BNFL facilities, and return shipment of
resource materials (uranium-trioxide and plutonium-dioxide) and vitrified
high-level waste, environmental impacts would be similar to those determined
for Process Q.
Process D consists of drying and passivating the spent fuel and then
canning it for storage. The relationships between the storage and
stabilizing options are shown in Table 3-4.
Option W involves moving the N Reactor fuel from the existing basin
storage into a new basin to be built by the year 2001. Simultaneously, a
modular dry vault would be built for storage of the rest of the spent fuel at
Hanford. Option X considers the use of casks for dry storage instead of the
vault, but still requires moving the N Reactor fuel to a new basin. The
casks would be placed on concrete pads outside of any buildings and would
include two types of cask designs: concrete modules holding a storage cask,
and upright concrete casks designed specifically for the FFTF fuel. Option Y
would result in all of the non-defense spent fuel at Hanford being placed in
a large vault facility. The defense fuel would require processing in a new
facility by one of three options (P, Q, or D) prior to canning and placement
in storage. The defense fuels processed using Option P or Option D would be
stored in the vault; however, Option Q would result in several products that
would be stored or processed further as high-level waste (Bergsman 1995).
The final option, Option Z, is similar to Option Y except that casks would be
used instead of a dry storage vault for all of the nondefense spent fuels.
The defense fuels are handled as in Option Y. Additional details are
provided by Bergsman (1995).
Table 3-4. Options under the Decentralization Alternative for Hanford.
Storage Stabili- Description Facility requirements
option zation
option
W None Wet storage of New basin
defense fuels New vault
Dry storage of other
fuels
X None Wet storage of New basin
defense fuels New casks
Dry storage of other
fuels
Y P, Q, or Dry storage of all New vault; new processing facility
D fuel; stabilize [calcining (P), solvent extraction
defense fuels prior (Q), or drying and passivation (D)]
to storage
Z P, Q, or Dry storage of all New dry storage casks; new
D fuel; stabilize processing facility [calcining (P),
defense fuels prior solvent extraction (Q), or drying
to storage and passivation (D)]
3.1.2.2 Description of Existing Facilities and Impacts from the
Decentralization Alternative. The description of the existing facilities
used to store SNF at Hanford was provided in Subsection 3.1.1.2. The
Decentralization Alternative would impact the facilities beyond that already
mentioned for the No Action Alternative to the extent that fuel would be
removed from several of them: the Shippingport fuel would be removed from T
Plant to a designated interim storage location on site; FFTF fuel would
continue to be removed from the sodium-cooled storage facilities and placed
in dry storage casks; and fuel in the 200-W burial grounds might be relocated
onsite.
As shown in Table 3-2, there is very little excess capacity in any of
the facilities in which fuel is currently stored. The storage basins, in
addition to being old, were built for temporary holding, for a matter of
months only; hence, bringing them up to standards for prolonged storage would
be fraught with problems and would not be cost-effective. Except for the
burial grounds, the locations in which SNF is currently held in air were not
intended for prolonged storage either, having been built for temporary
holding for research and development or pre-
processing. The FFTF storage
facilities are all dependent on maintaining sodium in the liquid state as
coolant and storage medium, which is not cost-effective for 40 years of
storage for nonbeneficial use. Hence, the existing facilities are not
considered for use in the 40 year storage scenario.
3.1.2.3 Description of New Facilities. A minimum of two new facilities
are required, regardless of which option is chosen for storing spent fuel
under the Decentralization Alter-
na-
tive. Both Options W and X require a new
basin and either a new vault or a new cask storage facility. Descriptions of
these potential new facilities are provided in Table 3-5. A proposed site
consisting of about 260 hectares (one-quarter section) for construction of
all new facilities is located as shown in Figure 4-1. The cask facility
would cover about twice as much land area as a vault facility and would
involve modular systems placed outside on concrete pads. While the basin
requirement is dropped for Options Y and Z, a process facility is needed for
the metallic defense fuels in addition to the new dry storage facility. The
specifics of this facility vary depending on whether they involve
shear/leach/calcining (process P), shear/leach/solvent extraction
(process Q), or drying and passivation (process D). For process Q, it is
assumed that a vitrification plant and storage facilities will be available
for the processed spent fuel that would then consist of three products. The
vitrification plant and storage for high-level wastes are part of the overall
plan for Hanford.
The potential processing facilities that will result from this
alternative will require increased utilities, compared with the new dry
storage facilities that are not expected to have major utility requirements.
A rail system for receiving spent fuel at the various facilities may be
required and could be tied into the existing system. Water requirements are
expected to be insignificant. Estimates of the power requirements for
processes P, Q, and D are 10 megawatts, 18 megawatts, and 3 megawatts,
respectively. While the existing excess electrical capacity of 21 megawatts
would be sufficient for one of these facilities, other potential uses of the
existing electrical power capacity may require upgrading the existing power
system (Bergsman 1995).
3.1.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
The 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative defines those activities that
were already scheduled at the various sites for the transportation, receipt,
processing, and storage of SNF.
3.1.3.1 Description of Spent Fuel Inventory As in the previous two
alternatives, no new spent fuel would be received at Hanford under the
1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative. However, the 101 spent fuel elements
currently in the 308 Building from TRIGA reactors and the small amount of
TRIGA fuel from Oregon State University currently in the 200-W Area burial
grounds would be shipped to INEL.
Table 3-5. Description of required facilities under the Decentralization Alternative.
New Description Capacity
facility
Water Basin Building: 110 m long x 42.7 m wide x 19.8 m 2103 MTU in
(W, X) high 8000 canisters
Land use: <8094 m2 (<2 acres)
Water storage pool: rectangular, 520 m2, cast-
in-place concrete
Canisters: double barreled, each 0.23 m
diameter x 0.74 m high
Construction: 3 year duration, operation by
2001
Dry Storage Building: 39.6 m long x 48.8 m wide x 19.8 m 30 MTHM in 60
Vault high short and 25
Facility Land use: <4047 m2 (<1 acre) long canisters
(W) Modular vault: metal tubes vertically arrayed
in cast-in-place concrete structure; inert
cover gas; natural convection cooling.
Canisters: short, 0.508 m diameter x 3.96 m
(FFTF fuels); long, 0.559 m diameter x 4.57 m
(other non-defense fuels)
Construction: 3 year duration, operation by
2001
Dry Storage Building: none, concrete pads 30 MTHM, 60
Cask Land use: <8094 m2 (<2 acres) cask/
Facility Cask Systems: 1) FFTF casks, 2.29 m diameter x canisters
(X) 4.57 m high, 45.4 MT each, 2) Concrete module (FFTF design)
with fuel cask; reference storage module is and 6 storage
2.96 m wide x 5.52 m deep x 4.57 m high modules/
Canisters: 0.508 m diameter x 3.96 m (FFTF casks
cask); 1.68 m diameter x 4.88 m long, weighs
90.8 MT (storage module)
Construction: 3 year duration, operation by
2001
Shear/Leach Building: multilevel, steel-reinforced, cast 2103 MTU in 4
/ in place concrete; 110.3 m long x 55.2 m wide x years
Calcine 25.9 m high (15.8 m above grade); shielded main 2.5 MTU/day
Process or canyon is 6.1 m wide x 70.1 m long x 25.9 m
Z Facility high;
(Y) Land Use: 6070 m2 (1.5 acres)
Operation: 24 hours/day, 7 days/week for 4
years to stabilize defense fuels;
75% efficiency; 280 day/year
Construction: 3 year duration, operation by
2001
Dry Storage Building: 100.6 m long x 88.4 m wide x 18.3 m 2133 MTHM in
Vault high ~1200 defense
Facility Land use: <8094 m2 (<2 acre) canisters,
(Y) Modular vault: metal tubes vertically arrayed 60 short and
in cast-in-place concrete structure; inert 25 long non-
storage atmosphere; natural convection cooling. defense
Canisters: 0.559 m diameter x 4.11 m (defense canisters
fuels); short, 0.508 m diameter x 3.96 m (FFTF
fuels); long, 0.559 m diameter x 4.57 m (other
non-defense fuels)
Construction: 3 year duration, operation by
2001
Dry Storage Same as Dry Cask Storage Facility described for 2133 MTHM in
Cask Option X 60 cask/
Facility
(Z) Land use: 20,234 m2 (5 acres) canisters
Canisters: add storage modules/casks for (FFTF),
stabilized defense fuels; same storage 230 modules/
container dimensions as for Option X
casks
(defense), and
6 modules/
casks (other
non-defense)
Solvent Building: multilevel, steel-reinforced, cast 2103 MTU in 4
Extraction in place concrete; 26.5 m long x 77.7 m wide x years
Fuel 25.9 m high (15.8 m above grade); shielded main 2.5 MTU/day
Process canyon is 6.1 m wide x 76.2 m long x 25.9 m
Facility (Y high;
or Z) Land Use: 6070 m2 (1.5 acres)
Canisters: generates 2 kg/MTU of fuel
processed, resulting in about 30 cans of glass
for 2103 MTU of fuel
Operation: 24 hours/day, 7 days/week for 4
years to stabilize defense fuels;
75% efficiency; 280 day/year
Construction: 3 year duration, operation by
2001
Fuel Drying Building: multilevel, steel-reinforced, cast 2103 MTU in 4
and in place concrete; 115.8 m long x 64.0 m wide x years,
Passivation 25.9 m high (15.8 m above grade); shielded main 2.5 MTU/day
Facility (Y canyon is 6.1 m wide x 54.9 m long x 25.9 m
or Z) high;
Land Use: 6070 m2 (1.5 acres)
Operation: 24 hours/day, 7 days/week for 4
years to stabilize defense fuels;
75% efficiency; 280 day/year
Construction: 3 year duration, operation by
2000
a. Source: Bergsman (1995).
3.1.3.2 Anticipated Activities Most of the activities previously
discussed for the decentralization storage alternative were already planned
prior to this review. It was expected that all newly generated SNF that was
owned by the U.S. Government would be sent to either INEL or to SRS. No new
spent fuel was expected to be shipped to Hanford other than possibly limited
quantities of material for research or other scientific endeavors supporting
the nuclear industry. Upgrades and replacements of existing storage capacity
were already planned and would involve those facilities described in
Subsection 3.1.2 for the Decentralization Alternative. Thus, the activities
that would be conducted under the 1992/1993 Planning Basis are the same as for
the Decentralization Alternative under the four options listed in Table 3-4,
except for the additional activity of shipping TRIGA spent fuel to INEL.
3.1.3.3 Description of Existing Facilities and Changes Required by
Alternative The description provided in Subsection 3.1.1.2 on the existing
facilities for storing SNF at Hanford also applies to this alternative. No
additional changes to facilities are anticipated from the 1992/1993 Planning
Basis except that the 308 Building and the 200W Area burial grounds would no
longer contain TRIGA spent fuel.
3.1.3.4 Description of New Facilities. The facilities that would be
required under the 1992/1993 Planning Basis are the same as those shown
previously in Table 3-5 for the Decentralization Alternative. The impact on
existing utilities would be the same as for the Decentralization Alternative,
namely from 3 to 18 megawatts of power for stabilization facilities and
minimal other impacts.
3.1.4 Regionalization Alternative
This alternative provides for the redistribution of SNF to candidate
sites based on similarity of fuel types (Option A) or on geographic location
(Options B1, B2, and C), in order to optimize the storage of SNF owned by the
U.S. Government.
The Regionalization Alternative as it applies to the Hanford Site
consists of the following options:
- Option A (regionalized by fuel type) - Defense production SNF would
remain at Hanford; other types of SNF would be sent to INEL.
- Option B1 (geographic regionalization) - All SNF west of the
Mississippi River except Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford.
- Option B2 (geographic regionalization) - All SNF west of the
Mississippi River and Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford.
- Option C (geographic regionalization) - All Hanford SNF would be sent
to INEL or NTS.
Facilities and features of Regionalization Option A would be the same as
those described for Hanford defense production fuel in the Decentralization
Alternative. The facilities and features for all other Hanford SNF would be
very similar to those described for that SNF in the Centralization Alternative
minimum option.
Facilities and features of Regionalization Options B1 and B2 would be
incremental to those described for the Decentralization Alternative and would
include facilities and features similar to those described in the
Centralization Alternative maximum option.
Facilities and features of Regionalization Option C would be equivalent
to those described for the Centralization Alternative minimum option.
3.1.4.1 Description of Spent Fuel Inventory. The spent fuel inventory
that would be stabilized and/or stored for each of the Regionalization options
is shown in Table 3-1.
3.1.4.2 Activities Required by Each Option.
Option A, Suboption X
- wet storage of N Reactor and single-pass reactor fuel
- shipment of other Hanford Site fuel to INEL
- use of existing facilities (FFTF and T Plant) and new wet pool
facilities to load shipping casks.
For N Reactor and single-pass reactor fuel, this option is the same as
the Decentralization Alternative; for all other Hanford Site fuel, this option
is nearly the same as for the Centralization Alternative minimum option.
Option A, Suboption Y
- dry storage of all defense production fuel in a large vault facility
- transport of other Hanford Site fuel to INEL
- defense production fuel stabilized prior to storage
- use of existing facilities (FFTF and T Plant) and a stabilization
facility to load shipping casks
- leakers, if any, unloaded in a special module at a stabilization
facility.
For N Reactor and single-pass reactor fuel, this option is identical to
the Decentralization Alternative; for other Hanford Site fuel, this option is
nearly identical to the Centralization Alternative minimum option.
Option A, Suboption Z
- dry storage of all fuel in casks in a large facility
- defense production fuel stabilized prior to storage
- dry storage casks loaded at existing facilities (FFTF and T Plant)
- use of existing facilities (FFTF and T Plant) and a stabilization
facility to load shipping casks
- leakers unloaded in a special module at a stabilization facility.
For N Reactor and single-pass reactor fuel, this option is identical to
the Decentralization Alternative; for other Hanford Site fuel, this option is
nearly identical to the Centralization Alternative minimum option.
Option B1
All fuel from offsite would be stored dry in casks in a large facility,
although a very small amount might require wet storage for an interim period
prior to dry storage. SNF received from other DOE locations would arrive
stabilized and canned as necessary for storage. SNF received from
universities and SNF of U.S. origin from foreign research locations would
require canning prior to storage. The required receiving and canning would be
done in a new facility because of the extended period over which the fuel
would be received. A small amount of fuel would arrive after only limited
time since reactor discharge, which would require temporary water storage
until it aged sufficiently to be dry stored. That water storage would be
included in the receiving and canning facility. Technology development would
be conducted in a separate, nearby facility.
Option B2
The activities for this option would be the same as those for Option B1,
except that additional storage would be required for Naval fuel.
Option C
Hanford fuel would be stabilized as necessary, loaded, and shipped
offsite.
3.1.4.3 Existing Facilities. Upgrades, replacements, and additions to
the existing facilities would occur as required under the Decentralization
Alternative.
3.1.4.4 New Facilities. Research and development and pilot programs
for characterization, stabilization, and other needs to support future
decisions on the ultimate disposition of SNF would also occur. Refer to Table
3-6 for the potential facility requirements under the three storage and three
stabilization options. A description of these options is given in Section
3.1.2.1, Anticipated Activities under the Decentralization Alternative.
Options X, Y, and Z with their respective stabilization suboptions are the
same as those for the Regionalization and Decentralization Alternatives (see
Table 3-4). What is different is the specific assortment of fuel to be
managed in each of the alternatives. The stabilization facilities required
under the Regionalization Alternative are the same as those listed in Table 3-
5.
.
Table 3-6. Description of required facilities under Regionalization Alternatives.
Alternatives New Facility Description Capacity
Regionalizati Water basin Building: 109.7 m long x 42.7 m wide x 12.2 m ~2103 MTU in
on A/ high pre-cast concrete 8000
Suboption X canisters
RAX Land use: <8094 m2 (<2 acres)
Water storage pool: rectangular, 520 m2, cast-in-
place concrete
Canisters: double barreled, each 0.23 m diameter
x 0.74 m high
Construction: 3-year deviation, operation
starting in 2001
Regionalizati Shear/leach/cal See Table 3-5
on A/ cine
Suboption Y stabilization
RAY process
Regionalizati Large modular Building: 94.5 m long x 88.4 m wide x 18.3 m high ~2103 MTU in
on A/ dry storage cast-in-place concrete, pre-cast concrete 1200
Suboption RAY vault superstructure canisters
Land Use: ~8094 m2 (~2 acres)
Canisters: 0.58 m diameter x 4.11 m high
Construction: 3-year duration, operation to start
in 2001
Regionalizati Shear/leach/cal See Table 3-5
on A\ cine
Suboption RAZ stabilization
process
Regionalizati Concrete Building: 3.0 m wide x 5.5 m long x 4.6 m high 2013 MTU in
on A/ storage module Land Use: 16,187 m2 (4 acres) 230
Suboption RAZ holding NUHOMsa prefabricate
casks Casks: 1.7 m diameter x 4.9 m long d dry
storage
Construction: 3 year duration, operation to begin module casks
in 2001
Table 3-6. (contd)
Alternatives New Facility Description Capacity
Note: Facilities required for Alternatives RB1 and RB2 are in addition to those required for
Decentralization
Regionalization Incremental cask Building: 121.9 m x 365.8 m 330 MTHM
B1, RB1 storage Similar to but larger than that for
Decentralization Option X
Receiving and Building: 53.3 long x 53.3 m wide x 16.8 m high 3 188 shipping
canning facility foot thick cast-in-place concrete casks, 50
storage casks
Technology Building: 53.3 m long x 30.5 m wide x 16.8 m high
development pre-cast concrete
facility
Land use for all three RB1 facilities: 40,469 m2
(10 acres)
Construction: Receiving/canning and tech. dev.
1998-2001; for 90% of storage facility 2000-2010;
for remaining 10% storage 2010-2035; operating
period: 2000 through 2035
Regionalization Prefabricated by Building: 914.4 m x 121.9 m; similar to but 400 MTHM (for
B2, RB2 storage cask larger than Option X for Decentralization total, with
facility Decentralizat
ion, of 2500
MTHM)
Receiving and Sames as for RB1 188 shipping
canning facility casks
50 storage
casks
Technology Same as for RB1
development
facility
Land use for all
three RB2
facilities:
101,172 m2 (25
acres)
a. NUHOMs casks [Nutech Horizontal Modular Storage (from Pacific Nuclear)]
3.1.5 Centralization Alternative
Under the Centralization Alternative for SNF storage, all current and
future SNF from DOE and the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program would be sent to
one DOE site or other location. The activities at each site would depend on
whether the SNF was being received or
shipped offsite. Sites not selected would close down their storage facilities
once the fuel had been removed. The following information summarizes the
expected impact at Hanford and provides insight into the characteristics of
the SNF and facilities that would be involved in shipping these fuels to
Hanford.
3.1.5.1 Description of Spent Nuclear Fuel Inventory The SNF inventory
that would exist at Hanford under this alternative would include that which is
presently at Hanford (see Table 3-1), as well as any new fuel shipped to
Hanford. If the minimum option occurs under the Centralization Alternative,
then all of this spent fuel would be shipped offsite and there would no longer
be a spent fuel inventory at Hanford, barring any required for research. If
the maximum option occurs, the spent fuel at all of the other sites across the
United States would eventually be transported to Hanford.
The locations from which spent fuel would be sent, in addition to SRS
and INEL, include Argonne National Laboratories East and West, Babcock and
Wilcox, Brookhaven National Laboratory, General Atomics, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories,
West Valley, and Fort St. Vrain. Naval spent nuclear fuel from shipyards and
prototypes would be sent first to the equivalent of the Expended Core
Facility, which would be relocated to Hanford. There the fuel would be
examined by the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program prior to being turned over to
DOE for storage at Hanford. Foreign fuel that may be returned to the United
States following irradiation or testing offsite would also be included in this
inventory under the Centralization Alternative. Summaries of the spent fuel
at each site are shown in Volume I, Attachments B, C, and D and Volume III of
DOE (1993a). Additional information is in DOE (1992a) (Fort St. Vrain and
Peach Bottom high-temperature gas-cooled reactor spent graphite fuel).
3.1.5.2 Anticipated Activities. If Hanford is chosen as the site for
storing the entire spent fuel inventory, the upgrades, increases, and
replacements of storage capacity would occur as required for the existing
spent fuel as well as to accommodate the increased spent fuel inventory. If
the Centralization Alternative is chosen and Hanford is not selected, the
activities would include stabilization to ensure safe storage and
transportation offsite.
All fuel received from offsite would be stored dry in casks in a large
facility, although some may require wet storage for an interim period prior to
dry storage. SNF received from other DOE sites will arrive stabilized and
canned as necessary for storage. SNF received from universities and from
foreign locations would require containerization prior to storage. Naval SNF
would arrive uncontainerized, but would not require containerization. The
required receiving and containerizing would be done in a new facility because
of the large throughput involved and the extended period (40 years instead of
4) during which the fuel would be received. Some university and foreign fuel
would require temporary wet storage. That water storage is included in the
receiving and canning facility. Technology development would be conducted in
a separate, nearby facility.
3.1.5.3 Description of New Facilities. The new facilities required for
the alternative in which all U.S. DOE SNF would be stored at the Hanford Site
are of the same type as, but larger than, those required for Regionalization
Alternative Option B2:
- The Prefabricated Dry Storage Cask Facility for offsite SNF would
be approximately 120 meters x 1200 meters.
- The Receiving and Canning Facility would be approximately 110
meters x 50 meters x 20 meters high.
- The Technology Development Facility would be approximately 50
meters x 40 meters x 20 meters high.
- The land required for these three facilities together would be
approximately 14 hectares (35 acres).
3.2 Comparison of Alternatives
A summary of environmental impacts among the various alternatives is
provided in
Table 3-7. The alternatives are briefly described below to aid in
interpreting the material presented.
The No Action Alternative identifies the minimum actions deemed
necessary for con-
tinued safe and secure storage of SNF at the Hanford Site.
Upgrade of the existing facilities would not occur other than as required to
ensure safety and security.
The Decentralization Alternative includes additional facility upgrades
over those con-
sidered in the No Action Alternative, specifically, new wet
storage (for defense production fuel only) or dry storage facilities, fuel
processing via shear/leach/calcination or shear/leach/solvent extrac-
tion, with
research and development activities to support such processing.
The 1992/93 Planning Basis Alternative differs from the Decentralization
Alternative only in that TRIGA fuel currently stored at the Hanford Site would
be shipped offsite. The storage and stabilization options identified for the
Decentralization Alternative are also assumed for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis
Alternative.
The Regionalization Alternative as it applies to the Hanford Site
consists of the following options:
- Option A (fuel type) - Defense production SNF would remain at
Hanford; other types of fuel would be sent to INEL.
- Option B1 (geographic) - All SNF west of the Mississippi River,
except Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford.
- Option B2 (geographic) - All SNF west of the Mississippi River and
Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford.
- Option C (geographic) - All Hanford SNF would be sent to INEL or
NTS.
Table 3-7. Summarized comparisons of the alternativesa.
Resource or Alternatives
Consequence
No Action Decentrali- 1992/1993 Regionaliz- Regionali- Regionali- Centrali- Regionali-
zation Planning ation A zation B1 zation B2 zation at zation C and
Basis Hanford Centraliza-
tion
Elsewhere
Traffic and No change in From 1 to 6 percent From 1 to Essentially Essentiall Essential Onsite
transportatio onsite increase in onsite 5% increase same as y same as ly same traffic not
n traffic traffic depending on in onsite Decentrali- Decentrali as signif-
patterns. suboption selected. traffic zation zation Decentra- icantly
Total Total population dose depending Alternative Alternativ lization different
population would be less than 2 on e Alternati from No
dose would person-rem and no suboption ve. Action
be less than fatal cancers would be selected. Alternative.
one person- projected. Total Essentially
rem and no population no change.
fatal dose less Total
cancers than population
would be 1 person- dose would be
projected. rem and no about 4
fatal person-rem
cancers and no fatal
would be cancers would
projected. be projected.
Health &
Safety (fatal
cancers over
40 years of
normal
operations)
Occupational None (0.4) None (0.04- None (0.04- None (0.04- None (0.3- None (0.3- None None (0.08)
Public (max) None (5.2 x 0.1) 0.1) 0.1) 0.4) 0.4) (0.4) None (2.5 x
10-4) None (2.5 x None (2.5 x None (2.5 x None (2.5 x None (2.5 None (2.5 10-3)
10-3) 10-3) 10-3) 10-3) x 10-3) x 10-3)
Utilities and
energy 12,000 100-127,000 100-127,000 100-127,000 100-127,000 100- 100- 0-20,000
(megawatt- 127,000 127,000
hrs/yr)
electricalb
Materials and
waste
management
LLW, m3/y 95 41-420 41-420 61-420 43-430 43-430 110-490 140-420
TRU waste, 0 0-50 0-50 0-50 0-50 0-50 0-50 0-50
m3/y
HLW, m3/y 0 0-57 0-57 0-57 0-57 0-57 0-57 0-57
Mixed waste, 1 0.23-2.10 0.23-2.0 0.23-2.0 0.26-2.0 0.26-2.0 0.51-2.3 1.0-2.0
m3/y
Hazardous 2.3 1.1-2.8 1.1-2.8 1.1-2.8 1.2-2.9 1.2-2.9 2.3-3.9 1.4-2.8
Waste, m3/y
a. Hyphenated numbers indicate range of values depending on processing options selected.
b. Minimum value represents requirements during the period after all fuel has been placed into dry storage
or has been shipped offsite. Maximum value represents requirements during the interim period (less than 4
years) while SNF is being processed and prepared for storage or shipment offsite, assuming concurrent
operation of the process facility and the existing facilities where SNF is currently stored (as in the No
Action Alternative).
c. Spent filters and ion exchange resins are the only sources of TRU waste. Filters and resins are
charged before they become TRU waste.
Table 3-7. (contd)
Resource or Alternatives
Consequence
No Action Decentrali- 1992/1993 Regionali- Regionali- Regionali- Centrali- Regionali-
zation Planning zation A zation B1 zation B2 zation at zation C
Basis Hanford and
Centrali-
zation
Elsewhere
Postulated
Accidents
Facilities
Point estimate of <3.7 x 10- 4.9 x 10-4 4.9 x 10-4 4.9 x 10-4 5.7 x 10-4 5.7 x 10-4 6.5 x 10-4 4.1 x 10-4
fatal cancer risk - 3
worst conse-
quences
accident - public
Workers <1.4 x 10- 5.6 x 10-7 5.6 x 10-7 5.6 x 10-7 6.6 x 10-7 6.6 x 10-7 7.5 x 10-7 4.7 x 10-7
7
Transportation
Numbers of fatal None (5.5 1(0.7) 1(0.7) None (6.8 1(0.7) 1(0.7) 1(0.7) 1(0.7)
cancers x 10-2) x 10-2)
Land use (area No change 4 to 7 ha 4 to 7 ha 4 to 7 ha 15-17 ha 25-28 ha 35-38 ha 2 to 5 ha
converted for SNF (11-18 (11-18 (11-18 (36-43 (61-68 (86-93 (6-12
stabilization, acres) acres) acres) acres) acres) acres) acres)
packaging and/or
storage)
Socioeconomics No change 798-6374 798-6374 618-4684 1716-7592 2088-8039 2857-9019 3905-5846
(worker-years over
10 years)
Cultural Resources No change No effects No effects No effects No effects No effects No effects No effects
expected expected expected expected expected expected expected
Aesthetic and No change No effects No effects No effects No effects No effects No effects No effects
scenic expected expected expected expected expected expected expected
Geologic resources No change No effects No effects No effects No effects No effects No effects No effects
expected expected expected expected expected expected expected
Air quality and No change None None None None None None None
related
consequences (fatal
cancers over 40
years normal
operations)
Water quality and Maximum Maximum radiological and nonradiological carcinogenic risks less No effects
related radio- than 50 chances per billion expected
consequences
logical
and non-
radiologi
cal
carcinoge
nic risks
less than
one
chance
per
billion
Ecological No change 4 to 7 ha 4 to 7 ha 4 to 7 ha 15 to 17 ha 25-28 ha 35-38 ha 2 to 7 ha
resources (Habitat (11-18 (11-19 (11-18 (36-43 (61-68 (86-93 (6-12
area destroyed) acres) acres) acres) acres) acres) acres) acres)
Noise No change No effects No effects No effects No effects No effects No effects No effects
expected expected expected expected expected expected expected
Two options exist at the Hanford Site for the Centralization Alternative: 1) the minimum option, in
which all SNF on the Hanford Site would be shipped offsite, and 2) the maximum option, in which all SNF
within the DOE complex would be shipped to the Hanford Site for management and storage. In the latter case,
dry storage of all fuel sent to the Hanford Site from offsite would be assumed. A facility equivalent to
the Decentralization suboptions would be assumed for stabilization of defense production fuel prior to
storage; fuel received from offsite would have been stabilized for dry storage prior to receipt.
4. AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT
4.1 Overview
The Hanford Site is characterized by a shrub-steppe climate with large
sagebrush dominating the vegetative plant community. Jack rabbits, mice,
badgers, deer, elk, hawks, owls, and many other animals inhabit the Hanford
Site. The nearby Columbia River supports one of the last remaining spawn-
ing
areas for Chinook salmon and hosts a variety of other aquatic life. The
climate is dry with hot summers and usually mild winters. Severe weather is
rare. With construction of dams along the Columbia River, flooding is nearly
nonexistent.
The Hanford Site was a major contributor to national defense during
World War II and the Cold War era. The site was selected because it was
sparsely settled and the Columbia River provided an abundant supply of cold,
clean water to cool the reactors. As a result of wastes generated by these
national defense activities, there are presently more than 1500 waste
management units and four major groundwater contamination plumes. These have
been grouped into 78 operable units: 22 in the 100 Area (reactor area), 43 in
the 200 Area (chemical processing and refining areas), 5 in the 300 Area
(research and development area), and 4 in the 1100 Area (storage area). An
additional four units are found in the 600 Area (the rest of the Hanford
Site). Each of these operable units is following a schedule for clean-up
established by the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-
Party Agreement), which involves the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the
Washington Department of Ecology, and the EPA.
4.2 Land Use
A brief description of the existing land use on the Hanford Site and
adjacent lands and a brief discussion devoted to the existing land use on the
proposed project site area follow.
4.2.1 Land Use at the Hanford Site
The Hanford Site is used primarily by DOE. Public access is limited to
travel on the two access roads as far as the Wye Barricade, on Highway 240,
and on the Columbia River (see Figure 4-1). The site encompasses 1450 square
kilometers (560 square miles), of which most is
Figure 4-1. Hanford Site showing proposed spent nuclear fuel facility location.
open vacant land with widely scattered facilities, old reactors, and
processing plants (Figure 4-1). In the past, DOE has stated that it intends
to maintain active institutional control of the Hanford Site in perpetuity
(DOE 1989). In the future, DOE could release or declare excess portions of
the Hanford Site not required for DOE activities. Alternatively, Congress
could act to change the management or ownership of the Hanford Site. The DOE
operational areas are described below:
- The 100 Area [11 square kilometers (4.2 square miles)], which
borders the right bank (south shore) of the Columbia River, is the
site of eight retired plutonium production reactors and N Reactor,
which is in shutdown deactivation status.
- The 200-West and 200-East Areas [16 square kilometers (6.2 square
miles)] are located on a plateau about 8 and 11 kilometers (5 and 7
miles), respectively, from the Columbia River. These areas have
been dedicated for some time to fuel reprocessing and waste
processing management and disposal activities. The proposed
project would be located between these areas.
- The 300 Area [1.5 square kilometers (0.6 square miles)], located
just north of the city of Richland, is the site of nuclear research
and development.
- The 400 Area [0.6 square kilometers (0.25 square miles)] is about
8 kilometers (5 miles) north of the 300 Area and is the site of the
Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) used in the testing of breeder
reactor systems. Also included in this area is the Fuels and
Material Examination Facility.
- The 600 Area comprises the remainder of the Hanford Site and
includes the Arid Land Ecology Reserve (ALE) [310 square
kilometers (120 square miles)], which has been set aside for
ecological studies, and the following facilities and sites:
- a commercial low-level radioactive waste disposal site
[4 square kilometers (1.7 square miles)], part of which is
leased by the State of Washington.
- Washington Public Power Supply System nuclear power plants
[4.4 square kilometers (1.7 square miles)].
- a 2.6-square kilometer (1 square mile) parcel of land
transferred to Washington State as a potential site for the
disposal of nonradioactive hazardous wastes.
- a wildlife refuge of about 130 square kilometers (50 square
miles) under revocable use permit to the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service.
- an area of about 6 square kilometers (2.3 square miles) has
been provided to site a National Science Foundation Laser
Gravitational-Wave Interferometer Observatory west of the 400
Area. When completed, this facility will occupy about 0.6
square kilometers (0.2 square miles).
- a recreational game management area of about 225 square
kilometers (87 square miles) under revocable use permit to the
Washington State Department of Game.
- support facilities for the controlled access areas.
In addition, an area comprising 310 square kilometers (120 square miles)
has been designated for use as the ALE by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
for a wildlife refuge and by the Washington State Department of Wildlife for a
game management area (DOE 1986a). The entire Hanford Site has been designated
a National Environmental Research Park.
The Columbia River adjacent to the Hanford Site is a major site for
public use by boaters, water skiers, fishermen, and hunters of upland game
birds and migratory waterfowl. Some land access along the shore and on
certain islands is available for public use.
4.2.2 Land Use in the Vicinity of the Hanford Site
Land use adjacent to the Hanford Site to the southeast and generally
along the Columbia River includes residential, commercial, and industrial
development. The cities of Richland, Kennewick, and Pasco are located along
the Columbia River and are the closest major urban land uses adjacent to the
Hanford Site. These cities (known as the Tri-Cities) together support a
population of approximately 96,000.
Irrigated orchards and produce crops, dry-land farming, and grazing are
also important land uses adjacent to the Hanford Site. In 1985 wheat
represented the largest single crop in terms of area planted in Benton and
Franklin counties with 190 square kilometers (73 square miles). Corn,
alfalfa, hay, barley, and grapes are other major crops in Benton and Franklin
counties. In 1986 the Columbia Basin Project, a major irrigation project to
the north of the Tri-Cities, produced gross crop returns of $343 million,
representing 19 percent of all crops grown in Washington State. In 1986 the
average gross crop value per irrigated acre was $664.00. The largest per-
cent
age of irrigated acres produced alfalfa hay, 29.4 percent of irrigated acres;
wheat, 15.0 percent; and corn (feed grain), 9.4 percent. Other significant
crops are potatoes, apples, dried beans, asparagus, and pea seed.
4.2.3 Potential Project Land Use
The potential project site (Centralization Alternative) is located
between the 200-West and 200-East Areas. The land is currently vacant. The
proposed project would consist of constructing an SNF facility on the site.
This potential project would involve typical land uses that occur during
construction phases and a more industrial/commercial land use after reaching
the operational stage.
4.2.4 Native American Treaty Rights
In prehistoric and early historic times, the Hanford Reach of the
Columbia River was populated by Native Americans of various tribal
affiliations. The Wanapum and the Chamnapum bands of the Yakama(a) tribe lived
along the Columbia River from south of Richland upstream to Vantage (Relander
1986; Spier 1936). Some of their descendants still live nearby at Priest
Rapids Dam (the Wanapum Tribe); others have been incorporated into the Yakama
and Umatilla reservations. Palus people, who lived on the lower Snake River,
joined the Wanapum and Chamnapum to fish the Hanford Reach of the Columbia
River, and some inhabited the river's east bank (Relander 1986; Trafzer and
Scheuerman 1986). Walla Walla and Umatilla people also made periodic visits
to fish in the area. These people retain traditional secular and religious
ties to the region, and many, young and old alike, have knowledge of the
ceremonies and lifeways of their aboriginal culture. The Washane, or Seven
Drums religion, which has ancient roots and had its start on what is now the
Hanford Site, is still practiced by many people on the Yakama, Umatilla, Warm
Springs, and Nez Perce reservations. Native plant and animal foods, some of
which can be found on the Hanford Site, are used in the ceremonies performed
by sect members.
Native American Lands designated on the Hanford Site fall under the
protective rights of the Treaty of 1855 and the National Historic Preservation
Act; these will be addressed further in the Cultural Resources Section. Under
the Treaties of 1855, lands now occupied by the Hanford Site and other
southeastern Washington lands were ceded to the United States by the
confederated tribes and bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, the Confederated
Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, and the Nez Perce Tribe. Under
these treaties, the Native American tribes obtained the right to perform
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. The spelling Yakama rather than Yakima has been adopted by the
Yakama Nation.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
certain activities on those lands, including the rights to hunt, to fish at
all usual and accustomed places and to erect temporary buildings for curing
fish, to gather roots and berries, and to pasture horses and cattle on open
unclaimed lands. The Wanapum Tribe, although members never signed a treaty,
claims similar rights on ceded lands along the Columbia River.
Tribal members have expressed an interest in renewing their use of these
resources in accordance with the Treaty of 1855, and the DOE is assisting them
in this effort. Certain landmarks, especially Rattlesnake Mountain, Gable
Mountain, Gable Butte, Goose Egg Hill, and various sites along the Columbia
River, are sacred to them. The many cemeteries found along the river are also
considered to be sacred.
4.3 Socioeconomics
Activity on the Hanford Site plays a dominant role in the socioeconomics
of the Tri-Cities (Richland, Pasco, and Kennewick) and other parts of Benton
and Franklin counties. The Tri-Cities serves as a market center for a much
broader area of eastern Washington, including Adams, Columbia, Grant, Walla
Walla, and Yakima counties. The Tri-Cities also serves parts of northeastern
Oregon, including Morrow, Umatilla, and Wallowa counties. Socio-
economic
impacts of changes at Hanford are mostly confined to the immediate Tri-Cities
community and Benton and Franklin counties (Yakima County to a lesser extent).
However, because of the significance of the wider agricultural region and
surrounding communities in the Tri-Cities' economic base, this section briefly
discusses the wider region as well. Detailed analyses of the socioeconomics
are found in Scott et al. (1987) and Watson et al. (1984). Additionally, the
impact of the proposed SNF facility might be altered by changes in
socioeconomic resources in the surrounding counties of Adams, Columbia, Grant,
Walla Walla, and Yakima in Washington state; and Morrow, Umatilla, and Wallowa
counties in Oregon (these and Benton and Franklin counties comprise the
designated region of influence; see Figure 4-2). This section describes the
population, economic activity, housing, and public services and public finance
of each county within the region of influence and the Tri-Cities. Because
Benton and Franklin counties are expected to be most impacted from changes in
Hanford Site activities, the information presented in this section
concentrates on those counties, with less attention paid to the other areas
within the defined region of influence.
Figure 4-2. Areas of Washington and Oregon where socioeconomic resources may be affected by the proposed spent nuclear fuel facility (designated
region of influence).
Table 4.3-1 summarizes the regional (Benton and Franklin counties)
projections for employment, labor force, population, and Hanford Site
employment by year for the years 1995-2004. Population projections were
provided by the Washington State Office of Financial Management (1992a);
employment projections were based on projections from the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce (1992); labor force projections were based on an historical average
unemployment rate of 8.8%; and Hanford Site employment projections were
provided by DOE. It is anticipated at the time of this writing that a down-
turn in Hanford Site employment will occur. The extent of the down-turn is
unknown.
4.3.1 Demographics
This subsection briefly summarizes pertinent demographic information for
each of the counties within the region of influence. Data for Washington were
provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce (1992) and the Washington State
Office of Financial Management (1992a,b). Data for Oregon were provided by
the U.S. Department of Commerce (1992) and the Center for Population Research
and Census (1993). Table 4.3-2 summarizes the population figures from 1960 to
1992 for each of the affected counties.
During the period from 1980 to 1990, growth in the affected Washington
counties has been less than that of the state, with growth in the counties
ranging from -0.07 percent (Columbia County) to 1.22 percent (Grant County)
per year. During this same period, annual growth for the state of Washington
averaged 1.66 percent. Washington counties within the region of influence
also tended to have a younger population, with median ages ranging from 28.7
years to 39.0 years, as compared to the state median age of 33.1 years. These
counties also tended to have a larger average household size than the state
average, ranging from 2.44 to 3.03 persons, while the state average household
size was listed at 2.53 persons.
Table 4.3-3 summarizes population projections through 2005 for each of
the counties within the region of influence. All of the Washington counties
are expected to experience continued growth, although most have projected
growth rates less than that of the state. Washington is projected to have an
increase in population of 21.8 percent by 2005 (from 4,866,692 in 1990 to
5,925,888 in 2005) for an annual average increase of 1.45 percent. Growth in
the Oregon
Table 4.3-1. Regional economic and demographic indicators.
Year: 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Regional 81,000 81,780 82,570 83,360 84,170 84,900 85,320 85,740 86,170 86,590
Employment
Regional Labor 88,820 89,670 90,540 91,410 92,290 93,090 93,550 94,020 94,480 94,950
Force
Regional 162,660 164,81 166,98 169,18 171,41 173,38 175,73 178,10 180,51 182,95
Population 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Site Employment 18,700 16,200 14,700 14,700 14,700 14,700 14,700 14,700 14,700 14,700
Table 4.3-2. Population figures by county in the designated region of
influence.
County 1960 1970 1980 1990 1992 1990 1990
Median Average
Age Household
Size
Adams 9,929 12,014 13,267 13,603 14,100 30.7 2.94
Benton 62,070 67,540 109,44 112,56 118,50 32.1 2.65
4 0 0
Columbia 4,569 4,439 4,057 4,024 4,000 39.0 2.44
Franklin 23,342 25,816 35,025 37,473 39,200 28.7 3.03
Grant 46,477 41,881 48,522 54,758 58,200 31.9 2.74
Walla 42,195 42,176 47,435 48,439 50,500 33.5 2.50
Walla
Yakima 145,11 145,21 172,50 188,82 193,90 31.5 2.80
2 2 8 3 0
Morrow 4,871 4,465 7,519 7,625 8,092a -b -
Umatilla 44,352 44,923 58,861 59,249 60,150 - -
a
Wallowa 7,102 6,247 7,273 6,911 7,135a - -
a. 1991 estimate.
b. Dash indicates the information was not available.
Table 4.3-3. Population projections by county in the designated region of
influence.
1990 - 1995 - 2000 -
1995 1995 % 2000 2000 % 2005 2005 %
County Forecast Change Forecast Change Forecast Change
Adams 13,867 1.94 14,163 2.14 14,424 1.84
Benton 121,328 7.79 128,752 6.12 136,892 6.32
Columbia 4,025 0.03 4,037 0.30 4,074 0.90
Franklin 41,336 10.31 44,630 7.97 48,213 8.03
Grant 58,026 5.97 60,518 4.30 62,983 4.07
Walla Walla 49,047 1.26 49,910 1.76 50,891 1.97
Yakima 199,578 5.70 207,870 4.15 216,245 4.03
Morrow 8,095 6.16 8,596 6.19 9,157 6.53
Umatilla 62,658 5.75 66,056 5.42 69,506 5.22
Wallowa 7,065 2.23 7,253 2.66 7,496 3.35
counties within the region of influence occurred rapidly during the 1970s;
however, since 1980 population growth has tapered off. The Oregon counties
within the region of influence are also expected to experience continued
growth, although all have projected growth rates less than that of the state.
Oregon is projected to have an increase in population of 25.5 percent (from
2,842,321 in 1990 to 3,566,189 in 2005) by 2005 for an annual average increase
of 1.70 percent.
Within Benton and Franklin counties, the 1992 estimates distributed the
Tri-Cities population as follows: Richland, 33,550; Kennewick, 44,490; and
Pasco, 20,840. The combined populations of Benton City, Prosser, and West
Richland totaled 10,460 in 1992. The unincorporated population of Benton
County was 30,000. In Franklin County, incorporated areas other than Pasco
had a total population of 2,540. The unincorporated population of Franklin
County was 15,820.
4.3.2 Economics
This subsection summarizes pertinent economic activity within the region
of interest and the Tri-Cities, including information on the general economy,
employment, income, and impact of the Hanford Site. Historically, the primary
industries within the region of influence have been related to agriculture; a
multitude of crops encompassing many fruits, vegetables, and grains, are grown
each year. Nearly all of the counties in the region of influence are home to
food processing industries. Other primary industries within the region of
influence include those relating to the wood industry: lumber, wood, and
paper products. The data source for the Washington counties was the 1993
Washington State Yearbook (Office of the Secretary of State 1993), and the
data source for the Oregon counties data was the 1991-92 Oregon Blue Book
(Office of the Secretary of State 1991). Table 4.3-4 summarizes the primary
industries, total employment for 1990, and total payroll for 1990 for the
region of influence.
4.3.2.1 Employment in the Region of Interest. This subsection provides
information on the employment and payroll breakdown by sector for each county
within the region of influence. The source for the Washington counties was
Washington State Employment Security Office (1992). The source for the Oregon
counties was Department of Human Resources (1990). Tables 4.3-5 and and 4.3-6
provide information on average employment and payroll for 1990, broken down by
Table 4.3-4. County economic summary.
County Primary Industries 1990 Total 1990 Total
Employment Payroll
($ Million)
Adams Food processing, agriculture 6,142 87.2
Benton Food processing, chemicals, 50,216 1,200.0
metal products, nuclear
products
Columbia Agriculture, food processing, 1,559 22.3
wood products
Franklin Food processing, publishing, 17,958 284.6
agriculture, metal fabrication
Grant Food processing, agriculture 20,851 346.0
Walla Walla Food processing, agriculture, 20,546 366.5
wood and paper products,
manufacturing
Yakima Agriculture, food processing, 82,706 1,300.0
wood products, manufacturing
Morrow Agriculture, food processing, 2,791 53.5
utilities, lumber, livestock,
recreation
Umatilla Agriculture, food processing, 21,448 366.0
wood products, tourism,
manufacturing, recreation
Wallowa Agriculture, livestock, 2,216 37.9
lumber, recreation
industry, for each of the counties within the region of influence. For the
Washington counties, the average employment includes only persons covered by
the Employment Security Act and federal employment covered by Title 5, USC 85.
For the Oregon counties, average employment includes only employees of
businesses covered by the Employment Division Law.
4.3.2.2 Employment in the Tri-Cities. Three major sectors have been
the principal driving forces of the economy in the Tri-Cities since the early
1970s: (1) the DOE and its contractors, which operate the Hanford Site;
(2) Washington Public Power Supply System in its construction and operation of
nuclear power plants; and (3) agriculture, including a substantial
food-processing industry. With the exception of a minor amount of
agricultural commodities sold to local area consumers, the goods and services
produced by these sectors are exported from the Tri-Cities. In addition to
direct employment and payrolls, these major sectors also support a sizable
number of jobs in the local economy through their procurement of equipment,
supplies, and business services.
Table 4.3-5. Employment by industry in the region of influence, 1990 figures.
Industry Adams Benton Columbia Franklin Grant Morrow Umatilla Walla Walla Wallowa Yakima
Agriculture, 1,660 4,487 105 4,265 4,496 558 1,366 1,890 54 20,342
Forestry,
Fisheries
Mining 0 3 0 89 0 0 0 0 0 641
Construction 0 2,809 27 628 0 33 592 0 86 2,427
Manufacturing 1036 12,310 563 1,599 2,761 884 4,654 3,993 509 9,671
Transportatio 236 884 58 1,212 657 153 899 593 85 2,824
n and Public
Utilities
Wholesale 581 932 57 1,279 1,156 70 1,201 760 76 7,101
Trade
Retail Trade 720 7,865 120 2,669 3,109 195 3,845 3,639 360 12,537
Finance, 120 1,342 24 358 432 50 590 718 82 1,904
Insurance,
Real Estate
Services 564 11,741 144 2,768 2,512 142 3,416 4,207 204 14,491
Government 1,132 7,843 461 3,091 4,618 697 4,823 4,308 739 11,368
Not Elsewhere 93 0 0 0 1,110 8 63 438 23 0
Classified
Table 4.3-6. Payroll by industry in the region of influence, 1990 figures ($ million).
Industry Adams Benton Columbia Franklin Grant Walla Walla Yakima Morrow Umatill Wallowa
a
Agriculture, 14.7 39.1 1.5 39.1 47.9 18.4 173.4 9.0 18.7 0.7
Forestry,
Fisheries
Mining 0 0.1 0 2.3 0 0 0.6 0 0 0
Construction 0 79.3 1.0 12.7 0 0 47.7 0.5 11.9 2.1
Manufacturing 19.6 443.9 7.3 28.4 59.7 94.0 205.2 19.3 88.2 11.2
Transportatio 3.9 21.2 1.2 25.1 14.4 14.1 62.5 6.2 19.6 1.6
n and Public
Utilities
Wholesale 10.7 19.2 1.1 26.3 21.4 15.6 118.4 1.5 22.2 1.2
Trade
Retail Trade 7.1 89.0 1.0 31.5 30.3 36.1 143.0 1.5 41.8 3.8
Finance, 2.0 22.0 0.4 6.2 7.6 13.2 39.0 1.0 10.6 1.0
Insurance,
Real Estate
Services 6.3 286.4 1.2 42.2 28.0 66.6 226.1 1.3 48.3 2.2
Government 21.2 225.8 7.7 70.8 107.0 100.0 258.0 12.8 103.6 13.7
Not Elsewhere 1.6 0 0 0 29.7 8.6 0 0.2 1.0 0.3
Classified
1) The DOE and its Contractors (Hanford). Hanford continued to dominate the
local employment picture with almost one-quarter of the total nonagricultural
jobs in Benton and Franklin counties in 1992 (16,100 of 67,300). Hanford's
payroll has a widespread impact on the Tri-Cities economy and state economy in
addition to providing direct employment. These effects are further described
in Subsection 4.3.
2) Washington Public Power Supply System. Although activity related to
nuclear power construction ceased with the completion of the WNP-2 reactor in
1983, the Washington Public Power Supply System continues to be a major
employer in the Tri-Cities area. Headquarters personnel based in Richland
oversee the operation of one generating facility and perform a variety of
functions related to two mothballed nuclear plants and one standby generating
facility. In 1992, the Washington Public Power Supply System headquarters
employment was more than 1700 workers. Washington Public Power Supply System
activities generated a payroll of approximately $80.4 million in the
Tri-Cities during the year.
3) Agriculture. In 1990 agricultural activities in Benton and Franklin
counties were responsible for approximately 12,900 jobs, or 17 percent of the
area's total employment. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce's
Regional Economic Information System, about 2200 people were classi-
fied as farm proprietors in 1990. Farm proprietors' income from this same source was
estimated at $121 million in the same year.
Crop and livestock production in the bicounty area generated about
7600 wage and salary jobs in 1990, as represented by the employees covered by
unemployment insurance. The presence of seasonal farm workers would increase
the total number of farm workers. Apart from the diffi-
culty of obtaining reliable information on the number of seasonal workers, how-
ever, is the question of how much of these earnings are actually spent in the local area.
For this analysis, the assumption is that the impact of seasonal workers on
the local economy is sufficiently small to be safely ignored.
The area's farms and ranches generate a sizable number of jobs in
supporting activities, such as agricultural services (for example, application
of pesticides and fertilizers or irrigation system development) and sales of
farm supplies and equipment. These activities, often called agri-
business, are estimated to employ 900 people. Although formally classified as a
manufacturing activity, food processing is a natural extension of the farm
sector. More than 20 food processors in Benton and Franklin counties produce
such items as potato products, canned fruits and vegetables, wine, and animal
feed.
In addition to those three major employment sectors, three other
components are readily identified as contributors to the economic base of the
Tri-Cities economy. The first component, categorized as other major
employers, includes five employers: (1) Siemens Nuclear Power Corporation in
north Richland, (2) Sandvik Special Metals in Kennewick, (3) Boise-Cascade in
Wallula, (4) Burlington Northern Railroad in Pasco, and (5) Iowa Beef
Processors in Wallula. The second component is tourism. The Tri-Cities area
has increased its convention business substantially in recent years, in
addition to business generated by travel for recreation. The final com-
ponent in the economic base relates to the local purchasing power generated from
retired former employees. Government transfer payments in the form of pension
benefits constitute a significant proportion of total spendable income in the
local economy.
Retirees. Although the Benton and Franklin counties have a relatively young
population (approximately 56 percent under the age of 35), 15,093
people over the age of 65 resided in Benton and Franklin counties in 1990. The portion of
the total population that is 65 years and older is currently increasing at
about the same rate as that being experienced by Washington State (3.0 percent
and 3.1 percent, respectively). This segment of the population supports the
local economy on the basis of income received from government transfer
payments and pensions, private pension benefits, and prior individual savings.
Although information on private pensions and savings is not available,
data are available regarding the magnitude of government transfer payments.
The U.S. Department of Commerce's Regional Economic Information System has
estimated transfer payments by various programs at the county level. A
summary of estimated major government pension benefits received by the resi-
dents of Benton and Franklin counties in 1990 is shown in Table 4.3-7. About
two-thirds of the Social Security payments go to retired workers; the
remainder are for disability and other payments. The historical importance of
government activity in the Tri-Cities area is reflected in the relative
magnitude of the government employee pension benefits as compared to total
payments.
Table 4.3-7. Government retirement payments in Benton and Franklin counties
in 1990 ($ million).
Benton Franklin
Source County County Total
Social Security (including survivors and 101.5 31.1 132.6
disability)
Railroad retirement 2.7 3.6 6.3
Federal civilian retirement 10.5 2.8 13.3
Veterans pension and military retirement 14.7 3.1 17.8
State and local employee retirement 22.3 5.5 27.8
Total 151.7 46.1 197.8
4.3.2.3 Income Sources. Three measures of income are presented in
Table 4.3-8: total personal income, per capita income, and median household
income. Total personal income is comprised of all forms of income received by
the populace, including wages, dividends, and other revenues. Per capita
income is roughly equivalent to total personal income divided by the number of
people residing in the area. Median household income is the point at which
half of the households have an income greater than the median and half have
less. The source for total personal income and per capita income was the U.S.
Department of Commerce's Regional Economic Information System; while median
income figures for Washington State were provided in Washington State Office
of Financial Management (1992b), and by personal communication with the Bureau
of Census Housing Division for Oregon.
In 1990 the total personal income for the Washington was $92.2 billion;
of this, the counties within the region of influence comprised 8.0 percent.
Per capita income for Washington State was $18,777; all Washington counties
within the region of influence had per capita incomes less than that of the
state. All Washington counties within the region of influence, with the
exception of Benton, had median household incomes less than the state median
of $32,725.
In 1990 the total personal income for Oregon was $49.2 billion; of this,
the counties within the region of influence comprised 2.4 percent. Per capita
income for Oregon State was $17,182; two of the three affected Oregon counties
had per capita incomes greater than that of the state in 1990; however, only
one of the three counties had a median household income greater than the state
median of $27,250.
Table 4.3-8. Income measures by county, 1990 figures.
County Total Personal Per Capita Income Median Income
Income ($ Million) ($) ($)
Adams 231 16,897 25,750
Benton 1,960 17,332 33,800
Columbia 72 17,927 21,000
Franklin 553 14,734 26,300
Grant 854 15,511 23,625
Walla Walla 799 16,438 25,400
Yakima 2,920 15,374 24,525
Morrow 144 18,868 29,969
Umatilla 896 15,069 22,791
Wallowa 121 17,461 21300
4.3.2.4 Hanford Employment. In 1991 Hanford employment accounted
directly for 24 percent of total nonagricultural employment in Benton and
Franklin counties and slightly more than 0.6 percent of all statewide
nonagricultural jobs. In 1991 Hanford Site operations directly accounted for
an estimated 42 percent of the payroll dol-
lars earned in the area.
Previous studies have revealed that each Hanford job supports about 1.2-
additional jobs in the local service sector of Benton and Franklin counties
(about 2.2 total jobs) and about 1.5 additional jobs in the state's service
sector (about 2.5 total jobs) (Scott et al. 1987). Similarly, each dollar of
Hanford income supports about 2.1 dollars of total local incomes and about
2.4 dollars of total statewide incomes. Based on these multipliers, Hanford
directly or indirectly accounts for more than 40 percent of all jobs in Benton
and Franklin counties.
Based on employee residence records as of December 1993, 93 percent of
the direct employment of Hanford is comprised of residents of Benton and
Franklin counties. Approximately 81 percent of the employment is comprised of
residents who reside in one of the Tri-Cities. More than 42 percent of the
employment is comprised of Richland residents, 30 percent of Kennewick
residents, and 9 percent of Pasco residents. West Richland, Benton City,
Prosser, and other areas in Benton and Franklin counties account for 12
percent of total employment. Table 4.3-9 contains the estimated percent of
Hanford employees residing in each of the counties within the region of
influence. The information available did not include the
Table 4.3-9. Hanford employee residences by county.
County Percent of
Employees
in Residence
Adams 0.18%
Benton 84.16%
Columbia 0.01%
Franklin 9.07%
Grant 0.25%
Walla Walla 0.21%
Yakima 5.08%
Morrow 0.01%
Umatilla 0.01%
residences of DOE employees nor those of ICF Kaiser Hanford Company or the
Bechtel Hanford Company. It was assumed that the distribution of these
employees would be similar to the distribution of the other Hanford
contractors.
Hanford and contractors spent nearly $298 million, or 45.6 percent of
total procurements of $653 million, initially through Washington firms in
1993. About 18 percent of Hanford orders were filled by Tri-Cities firms.
Hanford contractors paid a total of $10.9 million in state taxes on
operations and purchases in fiscal year 1988 (the most recent year available).
Estimates show that Hanford employees paid $27.0 million in state sales tax,
use taxes, and other taxes and fees in fiscal year 1988. In addition, Hanford
paid $0.9 million to local govern-
ment in Benton, Franklin, and Yakima counties
in local taxes and fees (Scott et al. 1989).
4.3.3 Emergency Services
This subsection contains information on the law enforcement, fire
protection, and health services provided by each county within the region of
influence. These figures are presented in Table 4.3-10, with more detailed
information about the Tri-Cities area. Law enforcement figures were obtained
from each county sheriff's office in December 1993. Data on fire protection
and health care facilities were provided by the Office of the Secretary of
State (1993).
Table 4.3-10. Emergency services within the region of influence.
Commissioned Officers Number of Fire
- County Sheriff Districts -
County Unincorporated Number of Hospitals
Adams 16 + Sheriff 7 2
Benton 40 6 3
Columbia 10 + Sheriff 3 1
Franklin 18 + Sheriff 4 1
Grant 35 + Sheriff 12 1
Walla 16 + Sheriff 8 2
Walla
Yakima 63 12 3
Morrow 70 NA NA
Umatilla 12 NA NA
Wallowa 5 NA NA
Police protection in Benton and Franklin counties is provided by the
Benton and Franklin County sheriff's departments, local municipal police
departments, and the Washington State Patrol Division headquartered in
Kennewick. Table 4.3-11 shows the number of commissioned officers and patrol
cars in each department in June 1992.
Table 4.3-11. Police personnel in the Tri-Cities in 1992.
Area Commissioned Officers Patrol Cars
Kennewick Municipal 58 32
Pasco Municipal 39 11
Richland Municipal 44 35
West Richland Municipal 7 9
County Sheriff, Benton 43 50
County
County Sheriff, Franklin 23 23
County
Source: Personal communication with each department office, January 1993.
The Kennewick, Richland, and Pasco municipal departments maintain the largest
staffs of commissioned officers with 53, 44, and 38, respectively.
The Hanford Fire Department, composed of 126 firefighters, is trained to
dispose of hazardous waste and to fight chemical fires. During the 24-hour
duty period, five firefighters cover the 1100 Area, seven protect the 300
Area, seven watch the 200-East and 200-West Areas, six are responsible for the
100 Areas, and six cover the 400 Area, which includes the WPPSS area. To
perform their responsibilities, each station has access to a Hazardous
Material Response Vehicle that is equipped with chemical fire extinguishing
equipment, an attack truck that carries foam and Purple-K dry chemical, a
mobile air truck that provides air for gasmasks, and a transport tanker that
supplies water to six brush-fire trucks. The Hanford Fire Patrol owns five
ambulances and maintains contact with local hospitals.
Table 4.3-12 indicates the number of fire-fighting personnel, both paid
and unpaid, on the staffs of fire districts in the Tri-Cities area.
The Tri-Cities area is served by three hospitals: Kadlec Hospital,
Kennewick General, and Our Lady of Lourdes. In addition, the Carondelet
Psychiatric Care Center is located in Richland. Kadlec Hospital, located in
Richland, has 136 beds and functions at 39.5 percent
Table 4.3-12. Fire protection in the Tri-Cities in 1992a.
Station Fire- Volunteers Total Service Area
Fighting
Personnel
Kennewick 54 0 54 City of Kennewick
Pasco 30 0 30 City of Pasco
Richland 50 0 50 City of Richland
BCRFDb 1 6 120 126 Kennewick Area
BCRFD 2 1 31 32 Benton City
BCRFD 4 4 30 34 West Richland
a. Source: Personal communication with each department office, January
1993.
b. BCRFD = Benton County Rural Fire Department.
capacity. Their 5754 annual admissions represent more than 42 percent of the
Tri-Cities market. Non-Medicare/Medicaid patients accounted for 86 percent,
or 4982 of their annual admissions. An average stay of 3.8 days per admission
was reported for 1991.
Kennewick General Hospital maintains a 45.5 percent occupancy rate of
its 71 beds with 3619 annual admissions. Non-Medicare/Medicaid patients in
1991 represented 58 percent of its total admissions. An average stay of 3.5
days per admission was reported.
Our Lady of Lourdes Health Center, located in Pasco, reported an
occupancy rate of 36.5 percent; however, a significant amount of outpatient
care is performed there. The out patient income serves as a primary source of
income for the center. In 1990 Our Lady of Lourdes had 3328 admissions, of
which 52 percent were non-Medicare/Medicaid patients. The institution
reported an average admission stay of 5.33 days.
4.3.4 Infrastructure
4.3.4.1 Housing. This section provides information on the total number
of housing units, the number of occupied housing units, and a breakdown of
total housing units by type for each of the counties within the region of
influence. Additionally, specific information on the housing market in the
Tri-Cities is included. The data source for Washington counties was the
Washington State Office of Financial Management (1992b). The data source for
the Oregon counties was by personal communication with the Population Research
Center at Portland State University. The data source for the Tri-Cities was
by personal communication with the Washington State Office of Financial
Management. Table 4.3-13 summarizes housing information by county for 1990
for the region of influence.
In 1993 nearly 94 percent of all housing (of 40,344 total units) in the
Tri-Cities was occupied. Single-unit housing, which represents nearly 58
percent of the total units, had a 97 percent occupancy rate through-
out the Tri-Cities. Multiple-unit housing, defined as housing with two or more units,
had an occupancy rate of nearly 94 percent. Pasco had the lowest occupancy
rate, 92 percent, in all categories of housing; followed by Kennewick, 95
percent, and Richland, 96 percent. Mobile homes, which represent 9 percent of
the housing unit types, had
Table 4.3-13. Housing by county in 1990.
County Total Occupied Vacancy Single Multiple Mobile
Rate Family Family Homes
Adams 12.9%
5,263 4,586 3,324 643 1,296
Benton 5.9%
44,877 42,227 28,193 10,592 6,092
Columbia 22.7%
2,046 1,582 1,597 146 303
Franklin 10.7%
13,664 12,196 7,782 3,289 2,593
Grant 13.4%
22,809 19,745 13,692 2,661 6,456
Walla 7.4%
Walla 19,029 17,623 13,071 3,837 2,121
Yakima 6.9%
70,852 65,985 49,356 11,174 10,322
Morrow 17.8%
3,412 2,803 1,828 366 1,192
Umatilla 9.5%
24,333 22,020 15,178 4,503 4,418
Wallowa 25.5%
3,755 2,796 2,935 235 554
the lowest occupancy rate, 90 percent. In 1989 mobile homes had the highest
occupancy rate, 93 percent. Table 4.3-14 shows a detailed listing of total
units and occupancy rate by type in the Tri-Cities.
4.3.4.2 Human Services. The Tri-Cities offer a broad range of social
services. State human service offices in the Tri-Cities include the Job
Services office of the Employment Security Department; Food Stamp offices; the
Division of Developmental Disabilities; Financial and Medical Assistance; the
Child Protective Service; emergency medical service; a senior companion
program; and vocational rehabilitation.
Table 4.3-14. Total units and occupancy rates (1993 estimates)a.
City All Rate Single Rate Multiple Rate Mobile Rate
Units Units Units Homes
Richland 14,388 96 9,921 98 3,827 95 640 88
Pasco 7,846 92 3,679 96 2,982 91 1,016 86
Kennewick 18,110 95 9,824 97 5,944 96 1,942 97
Tri- 40,344 94 23,424 97 12,753 94 3,598 90
Cities
a. Source: Personal communication, Office of Financial Management, State
of Washington, Forecast Division.
The Tri-Cities are also served by a large number of private agencies and
voluntary human services organizations. The United Way, an umbrella
fund-raising organization, incorporates 25 participating agencies offering
more than 50 programs (United Way 1992).
4.3.4.3 Government. This subsection presents the county government
revenues by source (Table 4.3-15) and expenditures by function (Table 4.3-16)
for each of the counties within the region of influence. The data were taken
from U.S. Department of Commerce (1990, 1993). All county data, with the
exception of Benton and Yakima counties, are from 1986-87. Benton and Yakima
county data are from 1990-91. These years were the most recent ones
available.
4.3.4.4 Public Education. This subsection provides information on the
educational sectors of each of the counties. The source for school district
information, secondary education, and enrollment data for the Washington
counties was the Office of the Secretary of State (1993); student/teacher
ratios were provided by personal communication with the school districts.
Information on the Oregon counties was provided by personal communication with
the individual counties. Table 4.3-17 summarizes information on the number of
school districts, enrollment, and post-secondary institutions within the
region of influence.
In the Tri-Cities area, Benton County primary and secondary education is
served by six school districts with an enrollment of 24,876 students in 1992.
The student/teacher ratio in the Finley School District is 20.2; in Kennewick,
24.0; in Kiona Benton-City, 25.0; in Prosser, 22.0 for elementary and 25.0 for
secondary; and in Richland, 23.0. The Paterson School District had an
enrollment of 54 students in 1992, therefore a student/teacher ratio was not
sought. Currently, the Kennewick, Richland, and Kiona-Benton City school
districts are operating at or near capacity; Kennewick is working to alleviate
some of the overcrowded conditions by constructing one new middle school and
two new elementary schools. In addition, plans are under way for the
construction of a new high school, scheduled to open in 1997. Kiona-Benton
City is in the process of building additions at elementary and middle schools.
The county also has a post-secondary institution located in Richland, a branch
campus of Washington State University, WSU Tri-Cities. Enrollment for spring
1992 was 981 students.
Franklin County primary and secondary education is served by four school
districts with an enrollment of 8,756 students in 1992 and a student/teacher
ratio of 7.0 in Kahlotus; 17.6 in
Table 4.3-15. Revenue sources by county FY 1986-87 ($ thousand).
Intergovernmental General revenue from
revenue own sources Utility, liquor
store, and
employee
retirement
revenue
From From state
County Total Total federal government Total Taxes
government
Adams 6,690 6,690 736 2,844 3,047 2,304 -a
Bentonb 24,079 24,079 43 7,879 14,06 10,762 -
4
Columbia 2,560 2,560 78 1,388 1,040 720 -
Franklin 6,279 6,279 361 109 5,604 4,859 -
Grant 17,525 17,525 670 7,661 8,932 6,195 -
Walla Walla 11,698 11,698 426 3,763 7,008 5,658 -
Yakimab 45,310 45,289 392 14,066 28,86 20,429 21
4
Morrow 5,901 5,901 104 1,045 4,724 3,338 -
Umatilla 9,594 9,594 204 4,971 4,414 3,087 -
Wallowa 6,215 6,215 60 2,180 3,881 905 -
a. Dash indicates that the information was not available.
b. FY 1990-91.
Table 4.3-16. Expenditures by county FY 1986-87 ($ thousand).
General Expenditures
Major Functions
Natural Utility,
Capi- Police resources Sewage Inter- liquor store,
Coun- To- To- tal Educa- Wel- Hospi- Health High- protec- Correc- and parks and est on and employee
ty tal tal Out- tion fare tals ways tion tion and sanita- general retirement
lay recreation tion debt expenditure
Adams 643 643 1007 13 -a - 286 3591 475 297 138 184 22 -
1 1
Bento 220 220 890 9 - - 3626 3190 1956 4129 216 - 223 -
nb 27 27
Colum 264 264 255 - - - 230 1106 265 13 306 84 - -
bia 7 7
Frank 823 823 608 - - - 461 2883 855 811 177 - 49 -
lin 0 0
Grant 175 175 3314 - - - 1403 6617 1443 1180 704 412 22 -
89 89
Walla 118 118 432 4 - - 1068 4624 1257 610 766 143 - -
Walla 79 79
Yakim 459 459 10059 - 187 - 989 9761 4188 7382 2971 415 487 30
ab 67 37
Morro 638 638 411 216 349 1113 325 1860 270 98 237 - - -
w 2 2
Umati 107 107 188 1095 - - 2562 2337 540 561 346 - - -
lla 07 07
Wallo 613 613 362 339 794 2070 143 1181 208 111 198 67 9 -
wa 9 9
a. Dash indicates that the information was not available.
b. FY 1990-91.
Table 4.3-17. Educational services by county in 1992.
County Number of School Enrollment Post-Secondary
Districts (1992) Education
Institutions
Adams 5 3,437 0
Benton 6 24,876 1
Columbia 2 750 0
Franklin 4 8,756 1
Grant 10 13,232 1
Walla Walla 7 8,324 3
Yakima 15 42,227 3
Morrow 1 2,008a 0
Umatilla 12 12,500a 1
Wallowa 3 1,408a 0
a. 1993 enrollment
North Franklin; and 18.1 in Pasco. The Star School District had an enrollment
of 15 students in 1992; therefore, a student/teacher ratio was not sought.
Currently, Pasco School District is operating at or near capacity; however,
the district is in the process of remodeling an old high school. The county
also has a post-secondary institution of learning in Pasco, Columbia Basin
Community College. Enrollment for 1992 was 6424 students.
4.4 Cultural Resources
The Hanford Site is known to be rich in cultural resources. It contains
numerous, well-preserved archaeological sites representing both the
prehistoric and historical periods and is still thought of as a homeland by
many Native American people. A total of 248 known sites are pre-
historic, 202 are historic, and 14 sites contain both prehistoric and historic components.
Management of Hanford's cultural resources follows the Hanford Cultural
Resources Management Plan (Chatters 1989) and is conducted by the Hanford
Cultural Resources Laboratory of Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL). The Plan
contains contingency guidelines for handling the discovery of previously
unknown cultural resources encountered during construction activities.
Cultural resources are defined as any prehistoric or historic district,
site, building, structure, or object considered to be important to a culture,
subculture, or community for scientific, traditional, religious or any other
reason. These are usually divided into three major categories: prehistoric
and historic archaeological resources, architectural resources, and
traditional cultural resources. Significant cultural resources are those that
are eligible or potentially eligible to the National Register of Historic
Places (36 CFR 60.4).
Consultation is required to identify traditional cultural properties that
are important to maintaining the cultural heritage of Native American Tribes.
Under the Treaties of 1855, lands ultimately occupied by the Hanford Site were
ceded to the United States by the confederated tribes and bands of the Yakama
Indian Nation, and Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation.
Under the treaty, the Native American Tribes acquired the rights to perform
certain activities on open unclaimed lands, including the rights to hunt,
fish, gather foods and medicines, and pasture livestock on these lands. By
the time the Hanford Site was established, little open unclaimed land
remained. The Wanapum Band and the Joseph Band of the Nez Perce Tribes never
signed a treaty but have cultural ties to these lands.
The methodology for identifying, evaluating, and mitigating impacts to
cultural resources is defined by federal laws and regulations including the
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Archaeological Resource
Protection Act (ARPA), the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation
Act (NAGPRA) and the American Native American Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA).
A project affects a significant resource when it alters the property's
characteristics, including relevant features of its environment or use, that
qualify it as significant according to the National Register criteria. These
effects may include those listed in 36 CFR 800.9. Impacts to traditional
Native American properties can be determined only through consultation with
the affected Native American groups.
4.4.1 Prehistoric Archaeological Resources
People have inhabited the Middle Columbia River region since the end of the
glacial period. More than 10,000 years of prehistoric human activity in this
largely arid environment have left extensive archaeological deposits along the
river shores (Leonhardy and Rice 1970; Greengo 1982; Chatters 1989).
Well-watered areas inland from the river show evidence of concentrated human
activity (Chatters 1982, 1989; Daugherty 1952; Greene 1975; Leonhardy and Rice
1970; Rice 1980), and recent surveys indicate extensive, although dispersed,
use of arid lowlands for hunting. Graves are common in various settings, and
spirit quest monuments are still to be found on high, rocky summits of the
mountains and buttes (Rice 1968a). Throughout most of the region,
hydroelectric development, agricultural activities, and domestic and
industrial construction have destroyed or covered the majority of these
deposits. Amateur artifact collectors have had an immeasurable impact on what
remains. Within the Hanford Site, from which the public is restricted,
archaeological deposits found in the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River and
on adjacent plateaus and mountains have been spared some of the distur-
bances that have befallen other sites. The Hanford Site is thus a de facto reserve
of archaeological information of the kind and quality that has been lost
elsewhere in the region.
Currently 248 prehistoric archaeological sites are recorded in the files of
the Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory. Of 48 sites included on the
National Register of Historic Places (National Register), two are single
sites, Hanford Island Site (45BN121) and Paris Site (45GR317), and the
remainder are located in seven archaeological districts (Table -
4.4-1). In addition, a draft request for Determination of Eligibility has been prepared
for one traditional cultural property district (Gable Mountain/Gable Butte).
Three other sites, Vernita Bridge (45BN90) and Tsulim (45BN412), and 45BN163,
are considered eligible for the National Register. Archaeological sites
include remains of numerous pithouse villages, various types of open
campsites, and cemeteries along the river banks (Rice 1968a, 1980), spirit
quest monuments (rock cairns), hunting camps, game drive complexes, and
quarries in mountains and rocky bluffs (Rice 1968b), hunting/kill sites in
lowland stabilized dunes, and small temporary camps near perennial sources of
water located away from the river (Rice 1968b).
Many recorded sites were found during four archaeological reconnaissance
projects conducted between 1926 and 1968 (Krieger 1928; Drucker 1948; Rice
1968a, 1968b). Systematic archaeological surveys conducted from the middle
1980s through 1993 are responsible for the remainder (e.g., Chatters 1989;
Chatters and Cadoret 1990; Chatters and Gard 1992; Chatters et al. 1990, 1991,
1992, 1993). Little excavation has been conducted at any of the sites, and
the Mid-Columbia Archaeological Society has done most of that work. They have
conducted minor test excavations at several sites on the river banks and
islands (Rice 1980) and a larger scale test at site 45BN157 (Den Beste and Den
Beste 1976). The University of Idaho also excavated a portion of site 45BN179
(Rice 1980) and collaborated with the Mid-Columbia Archaeological Society on
its other work. Test excavations have been conducted by the Hanford Cultural
Resources Laboratory at the Wahluke (45GR306), Vernita Bridge (45BN90), and
Tsulim (45BN412) sites and at 45BN446, 45BN423, 45BN163, 45BN432, and 45BN433;
results support assessments of significance for those sites. Most of the
archaeological survey and reconnaissance activity has concentrated on islands
and on a strip of land less than 400 meters wide
Table 4.4-1. Archaeological districts and historic properties on the Hanford
Site listed on the National Register of Historic Places (with their archaeological sites).
District/Property Site(s) Included
Name
Wooded Island A.D. 45BN107 through 45BN112, 45BN168
Savage Island A.D. 45BN116 through 45BN119, 45FR257 through 45FR262
Hanford Island Site 45BN121
Hanford North A.D. 45BN124 through 45BN134, 45BN178
Locke Island A.D. 45BN137 through 45BN140, 45BN176, 45GR302 through
45GR305
Ryegrass A.D. 45BN149 through 45BN157
Paris Site 45GR317
Rattlesnake Springs 45BN170, 45BN171
A.D.
Snively Canyon A.D. 45BN172, 45BN173
100-B Reactor NAb
a. A.D. indicates archaeological district (this table).
b. Not applicable.
on either side of the river (Rice 1980), but this is changing because of a
Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory effort to inventory a 10 percent sample
of the site by 1994. During his reconnaissance of the Hanford Site in 1968,
Rice inspected portions of Gable Mountain, Gable Butte, Snively Canyon,
Rattlesnake Mountain, and Rattlesnake Springs but gave little attention to
other areas (Rice 1968b). He also inspected additional portions of Gable
Mountain and part of Gable Butte in the late 1980s (Rice 1987). Other
reconnaissance of the Basalt Waste Isolation Project Reference Repository
Location (RRL) (Rice 1984) included a proposed land exchange in T22N, R27E,
Section 33 (Rice 1981), and three narrow transportation and utility corridors
(Ertec Northwest, Inc. 1982; Morgan 1981; Smith et al. 1977). The 100 Areas
were surveyed in 1991 through 1993, revealing a large number of new
archaeological sites (Chatters et al. 1992; Wright 1993). To date only about
6 percent of the Hanford Site has been surveyed. Cultural resource reviews
are conducted when projects are proposed for areas that have not been
previously reviewed; about 100 to 120 reviews were conducted annually through
1991; this figure rose to more than 400 reviews during 1993.
4.4.2 Native American Cultural Resources
In prehistoric and early historic times, the Hanford Reach of the Columbia
River was heavily populated by Native Americans of various tribal
affiliations. The Wanapum and the Chamnapum band of the Yakama tribe dwelt
along the Columbia River from south of Richland upstream to Vantage (Relander
1956; Spier 1936). Some of their descendants still live nearby at
Priest Rapids, and others have been incorporated into the Yakama and Umatilla
reservations. Palus people, who lived on the lower Snake River, joined the
Wanapum and Chamnapum to fish the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River and some
inhabited the river's east bank (Relander 1956; Trafzer and Scheuerman 1986).
Walla Walla and Umatilla people also made periodic visits to fish in the area.
These people retain traditional secular and religious ties to the region, and
many, young and old alike, have knowledge of the ceremonies and lifeways of
their aboriginal culture. The Washane, or Seven Drums religion, which has
ancient roots and had its start on what is now the Hanford Site, is still
practiced by many people on the Yakama, Umatilla, Warm Springs, and Nez Perce
reservations. Native plant and animal foods, some of which can be found on
the Hanford Site, are used in the ceremonies performed by sect members.
4.4.3 Historic Archaeological Resources
The first Euro-Americans who came to this region were Lewis and Clark, who
traveled along the Columbia and Snake rivers during their 1803-1806
exploration of the Louisiana Territory. They were followed by fur trappers,
who also passed through on their way to more productive lands upriver and
downstream and across the Columbia Basin. It was not until the 1860s that
merchants set up stores, a freight depot, and the White Bluffs Ferry on the
Hanford Reach. Chinese miners began to work the gravel bars for gold. Cattle
ranches opened in the 1880s and farmers soon followed. Several small,
thriving towns, including Hanford, White Bluffs, and Ringold, grew up along
the riverbanks in the early 20th century. Other ferries were established at
Wahluke and Richmond. The towns and nearly all other structures were razed
after the U.S. Government acquired the land for the Hanford Nuclear
Reservation in the early 1940s (Chatters 1989; Ertec Northwest, Inc. 1981;
Rice 1980).
Historic archaeological sites totaling 202 and 11 other historic localities
have been recorded by the Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory on the Hanford
Site. Localities include the Allard Pumping Plant at Coyote Rapids, the
Hanford Irrigation Ditch, the Hanford townsite, Wahluke Ferry, the White
Bluffs townsite, the Richmond Ferry, Arrowsmith townsite, a cabin at East
White Bluffs ferry landing, the White Bluffs road, the old Hanford High
School, and the Cobblestone Warehouse at Riverland (Rice 1980). Archaeologi-
cal sites including the East White Bluffs townsite and associated ferry
landings and an assortment of trash scatters, homesteads, corrals, and dumps
have been recorded by the Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory since 1987.
Ertec Northwest, Inc. was responsible for minor test excavations at some of
the historic sites, including the Hanford townsite locality. In addition to
the recorded sites, numerous unrecorded site areas of gold mine tailings along
the river bank and the remains of homesteads, farm fields, ranches, and
abandoned Army installations are scattered over the entire Hanford Site. Of
these historic sites, one is included in the National Register as an historic
site, and 56 are listed as archeological sites.
More recent locations are the defense reactors and associated materials
processing facilities that now dominate the site. The first reactors (B, D,
and F) were constructed in 1943 as part of the Manhattan Project. Plutonium
for the first atomic explosion and the bomb that destroyed Nagasaki to end
World War II was produced in the B Reactor. Additional reactors and
processing facilities were constructed after World War II during the Cold War.
All reactor containment buildings still stand, although many ancillary
structures have been removed. The B Reactor has been listed on the National
Register of Historic Places. A historic context for Manhattan Project
facilities has been created as part of a Multiple Property Document. Until a
full evaluation of all Manhattan Project buildings and facilities has been
completed, statements about National Register status cannot be made.
4.4.4 200 Areas
An archaeological survey has been conducted of all undeveloped portions of
the 200-East Area, and a 50 percent random sample has been conducted of
undeveloped portions of the 200-West Area. The old White Bluffs freight road
(see Rice 1984) crosses diagonally through the 200-West Area. The road,
formerly a Native American trail, has been in continuous use since antiquity
and has played a role in Euro-American immigration, development, agriculture,
and Hanford Site operations. The road has been found to be eligible for
listing on the National Register of Historic Places. A 100-m easement has
been created to protect the road from uncontrolled disturbance. Historic
buildings that have not been evaluated for National Register eligibility occur
in both the 200-East and 200-West Areas.
4.5 Aesthetic and Scenic Resources
The land in the vicinity of the Hanford Site is generally flat with little
relief. Rattlesnake Mountain, rising to 1060 meters (3477 feet) above mean
sea level, forms the western boundary of the site. Gable Mountain and Gable
Butte are the highest land forms within the site. The view toward Rattlesnake
Mountain is visually pleasing, especially in the springtime when wild-
flowers are in bloom. Large rolling hills are located to the west and far north. The
Columbia River, flowing across the northern part of the site and forming the
eastern boundary, is generally considered scenic, with its contrasting blue
against a background of brown basaltic rocks and desert sagebrush. The White
Bluffs, steep whitish-brown bluffs adjacent to the Columbia River and above
the northern boundary of the river in this region, are a striking feature of
the landscape.
The potential project site (under all alternatives except No Action) is
characterized by large sagebrush, desert grasses, and shrubs. Imme-
diate views to the east include the 200-East Area facilities, views in the distant north
area of reactors. Somewhat hidden by a slight rise in the land are stacks for
facilities in 200-West Area to the west of the project site. To the south
southwest are gravel borrow pit and radio and meteorological towers. This
site is of low sensitivity in terms of aesthetic and scenic resources.
4.6 Geology
This section summarizes the geologic setting, including potential geologic
hazards, at the Hanford Site. Physiography, structure, soils, and seismicity
and volcanic hazards are briefly discussed. A more detailed discussion of
these subjects can be found in Cushing (1992).
4.6.1 General Geology
The Hanford Site lies within the Columbia Intermontane physiographic
province, bordered on the north and east by the Rocky Mountains and on the
west by the Cascade Range. The dominant geologic characteristics of the
Hanford Site have resulted from basaltic volcanism and ancient catastrophic
flooding.
Fluvial and lacustrine processes associated with the ancestral Columbia
River system, including the ancestral Snake and Yakima rivers, have been
active since the late Miocene. Deposits of these rivers and lakes are
represented by the Ringold Formation and indicate that depo-
sition was almost continuous from about 10.5 million years before present until about
3.9 million years before present (DOE 1988). At some time before
900,000 years ago, a major change in regional base level resulted in fluvial
incision of as much as 150 meters (500 feet). The post-Ringold erosional sur-
face was partially filled with locally derived alluvium and fluvial sediment
before and possibly between periods of Pleistocene flooding. However, in most
areas of the Columbia Basin subprovince, the record of Pleistocene fluvial
activity was destroyed by cataclysmic flooding. Loess (buff-colored silt)
occurs in sheets that mantle much of the upland areas of the Columbia Basin
subprovince.
Quaternary(a) volcanism has been limited to the extreme western margin of the
Columbia Basin subprovince and is associated with the Cascade Range Province.
Airfall tephra(b) from at least three Cascade volcanoes has blanketed the
central Columbia Plateau since the late Pleistocene. This tephra includes
material from several eruptions of Mount St. Helens before the May 1980
eruption. Other volcanoes have erupted less frequently; two closely spaced
eruptions from Glacier Peak about 11,200 years ago, and the eruption of -
Mount Mazama about 6,600 years ago. Generally tephra layers have not exceeded more
than a few centimeters in thickness, with the exception of the Mount Mazama
eruption when as much as 10 centimeters (3.9 inches) of tephra fell over
eastern Washington (DOE 1988).
4.6.1.1 Physiography. The Hanford Site, located within the Pasco Basin of
the Columbia Plateau, is defined generally by a thick accumulation of basaltic
lava flows that extend laterally from central Washington eastward into Idaho
and southward into Oregon (Tallman et al. 1979).
The Hanford Site overlies the structural low point of the Pasco Basin near
the confluence of the Yakima and Columbia rivers. The boundaries of the Pasco
Basin are defined by anticlinal structures of basaltic rock. These structures
are the Saddle Mountains to the north; the Umtanum Ridge, Yakima Ridge, and
Rattlesnake Hills to the west; and the Rattlesnake Hills and a series of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Quaternary- A geologic period beginning approximately two million
years ago and extending to the present.
b. Tephra- A collective term for all clastic materials ejected from a
volcano and transported through air.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
doubly plunging anticlines merging with the Horse Heaven Hills to the south.
The terrain within the Pasco Basin is relatively flat. Its surface features
were formed by catastrophic floods and have undergone little modification
since, with the exception of more recently formed sand dunes (DOE 1986a).
The elevations of the alluvial plain that covers much of the site vary from
105 meters (345 feet) above mean sea level in the southeast corner to
245 meters (803 feet) in the northwest. The 200-Area plateau in the central
part of the site varies in elevation from 190 to 245 meters (623 to 803 feet).
The major geologic units of the Hanford Site are (in ascending order):
subbasalt rocks (inferred to be sedimentary and volcanoclastic rocks), the
Columbia River Basalt Group with intercalated sediments of the Ellensburg
formation, the Ringold formation, the Plio-Pleistocene unit, and the Hanford
formation. Locally, sand and silt exist as surface material. A generalized
stratigraphic column is shown in Figure 4.3.
Knowledge of the subbasalt rocks is limited to studies of exposures along
the margin of the Columbia Plateau and to a few deep boreholes drilled in the
interior of the plateau (DOE 1988). No subbasalt rocks are exposed within the
central interior of the Columbia Plateau, including the Pasco Basin.
Interpretation of data from wells drilled in the 1980s by Shell Oil Company in
the northwestern Columbia Plateau indicates that in the central part of the
Columbia Plateau the Columbia River Basalt Group is underlain predominantly by
Tertiary continental sediments (Campbell 1989).
The Hanford formation lies on the eroded surface of the Plio-Pleistocene
unit, on the Ringold formation, or locally on the basalt bedrock. The Hanford
formation consists of catastrophic flood sediments that were deposited when
ice dams in western Montana and northern Idaho were breached and massive
volumes of water spilled abruptly across eastern and central Washington. The
floods scoured the land surface, locally eroding the Ringold formation, the
basalts, and sedimentary interbeds, leaving a network of buried channels
crossing the Pasco Basin (Tallman et al. 1979). Thick sequences of sediments
were deposited by several episodes of flooding with the last major flood
sequence dated at about 13,000 years before the present (Myers et al. 1979).
Figure 4-3. A generalized stratigraphic column of the major geologic units of the Hanford Site.
4.6.1.2 Structure. The Columbia Plateau is tectonically a part of the
North American continental plate, and is separated from the Pacific and Juan
de Fuca oceanic plates to the west by the Cascade Range, Puget-Willamette
Lowland, and Coast Range geologic provinces. It is bounded on the north by
the Okanogan Highlands, on the east by the Northern Rocky Moun-
tains and Idaho Batholith, and on the south by the High Lava plains and Snake River plain.
The tectonic history of the Columbia Plateau has included the eruption of the
continental flood basalts of the Columbia River Basalt Group during the period
of about 17 to 6 million years before present, as well as volcanic activity in
the Cascade Range to the west (DOE 1988).
Structurally, the Columbia Plateau can be divided into three informal
subprovinces: the Palouse, Blue Mountains, and Yakima Fold Belt. All but the
easternmost part of the Pasco Basin is within the Yakima Fold Belt structural
subprovince (DOE 1988). The Yakima Fold Belt contains four major structural
elements: the Yakima Folds, Cle Elum-Wallula disturbed zone, Hog Ranch-Naneum
anticline, and northwest-trending wrench faults.
The Yakima Folds are a series of continuous, narrow, asymmetric anticlines
that have wavelengths between about 5 and 30 kilometers (3 to 19 miles) and
amplitudes commonly less than 1 kilometers (less than 0.6 miles). The
anticlinal ridges are separated by broad synclines or basins. The Yakima
Folds are believed to have developed under generally north-south compres-
sion, but the origin and timing of the deformation along the fold structures are not
well known (DOE 1988). Thrust or high-angle reverse faults are often found
along both limbs of the anticlines, with the strike of the fault planes
parallel or subparallel to the axis of the anticlines. Very little direct
field evidence indicates quaternary movement along these anticlinal ridges.
One of three cases of suspected Quaternary faulting is along the central Gable
Mountain fault in the Pasco Basin. This fault is on the Hanford Site. It was
considered by the NRC to be presumed capable, but not demonstrated to be
capable for licensing purposes of the WNP plant.
The Cle Elum-Wallula disturbed zone is the central part of a larger
topographic alignment called the Olympic-Wallowa lineament that extends from
the northwestern edge of the Olympic Mountains to the northern edge of the
Wallowa Mountains in Oregon. The Cle Elum-Wallula disturbed zone is a narrow
zone about 10 kilometers (6 miles) wide that transects the Yakima Fold Belt
and has been divided informally into three structural domains: a broad zone
of deflected or anomalous fold and fault trends extending south of Cle Elum,
Washington to Rattlesnake Mountain; a narrow belt of aligned domes and doubly
plunging anticlines (called The Rattles) extending from Rattlesnake Mountain
to Wallula Gap; and the Wallula fault zone, extending from Wallula Gap to the
Blue Mountains. Evidence for quaternary deformation has been reported for 14
localities in or directly associated with the Cle Elum-Wallula disturbed zone.
However, no evidence has been reported northwest of the Finley Quarry location
(DOE 1988), about 60 kilometers (36 miles) southeast of the approximate center
of the Hanford Site.
The Hog Ranch-Naneum Ridge anticline is a broad structural arch that extends
from southwest of Wenatchee, Washington to the Yakima Ridge. This feature
defines part of the northwestern boundary of the Pasco Basin, but little is
known about the structural geology of this portion of the feature, and the
southern extent of the feature is not known.
Northwest-trending wrench (strike-slip) faults have been mapped west of
120yW longitude in the Columbia Plateau (DOE 1988). The mean strike direction
of the dextral wrench faults is 320y, but northeast-trending sinistral wrench
faults that strike 013y are less numerous. These structures are not known to
exist in the central Columbia Plateau.
Most known faults within the Hanford area are associated with anticlinal
fold axes, are thrust or reverse faults although normal faults do exist, and
were probably formed concurrently with the folding (DOE 1988). Existing known
faults within the Hanford area include wrench (strike-slip) faults as long as
3 kilometers (1.9 miles) on Gable Mountain and the Rattlesnake-Wallula
alignment, which has been interpreted as a right-lateral strike-slip fault.
The faults in Central Gable Mountain are considered NRC capable by the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission criteria (10 CFR 100) in that they have
slightly displaced the Hanford formation gravels, but their relatively short
lengths give them low seismic potential. No seismicity has been observed on
or near Gable Mountain. The Rattlesnake-Wallula alignment is interpreted as
possibly being capable, in part because of lack of any distinct evidence to
the contrary and because this structure continues along the northwest trend of
faults that appear active at Wallula Gap, some 56 kilometers (35 miles)
southeast of the central part of the Hanford Site (DOE 1988).
Strike-slip faults have not been observed crosscutting the Pasco Basin.
Anticlinal ridges that bound the Pasco Basin have been mapped in detail, and
except for some component of dextral movement on the Rattlesnake-Wallula
alignment, no strike-slip faults similar to those in the western Yakima Fold
Belt have been observed (DOE 1988). Wrench (strike-slip) faults have been
observed along the ridges at boundaries between geometrically coherent
segments of the structures, as in the Saddle Mountains, but these faults are
confined to the individual structures and formed as different geometries
developed in the fold. Similar type faults have been mapped on Gable Mountain
and studied in detail. These features are also interpreted as wrench (stike-
slip) faults that are a response to folding.
In general, for structures within the Hanford Site area, the greatest
deformation occurs in the hinge area of the anticlinal ridges and decreases
with distance from that area; that is, the greatest amount of tectonic
jointing and faulting occurs in the hinge zone and decreases toward the gently
dipping limbs. The faults usually exhibit low dips with small displacements,
may be confined to the layer in which they occur, and die out to no
recognizable displacement in short lateral distances (DOE 1988).
4.6.1.3 Soils. Hajek (1966) lists and describes 15 different soil types on
the Hanford Site. The soil types vary from sand to silty and sandy loam.
Various classifications, including land use, are also given in Hajek (1966).
The proposed SNF facility site does not contain prime or unique farmland.
Section 4.8.2.1 (Groundwater Hydrology) provides a full discussion on ranges
of thickness of the various geological units/soil types across the Hanford
Site (Figures 4-3 and 4-11). The surface Hanford Formation varies in
thickness across the Hanford Site from approximately 15 to 100 meters (49 to
328 feet) thick (Figure 4-11). The Middle Ringold Formation varies from 10 to
100 meters (32 to 328 feet) thick. The Lower Ringold and Basal Ringold
Formations only extend eastward from the western boundary of the Hanford Site
approximately 11 kilometers (6.8 miles). The former is rather uniform in
thickness at 20 meters (65 feet), while the latter demonstrates a maximum
thickness of 40 meters (131 feet) at the far western boundary of the Hanford
Site. Groundwater movement within these layers is also discussed in
Section 4.8.2.1.
There is a rather thick vadose zone on the Hanford Site. However,
conclusions drawn from studies conducted at several locations vary from no
downward percolation of precipitation on the 200 Area Plateau, where soil
texture is varied and layered with depth (all moisture penetrating the soil is
removed by evaporation) to observations of downward water movement below the
root zone in the 300 Area, where soils are coarse textured and where
precipitation was above normal (DOE 1987).
4.6.2 Mineral Resources
Sand, gravel, and cobble deposits are ubiquitous components of the soils
over the Columbia Basin in general and the Hanford Site in particular:
therefore, any possible economic impact to these resources resulting from the
siting of the proposed SNF facility or an access road would be considered
negligible. However, because gravel pits occur near the proposed SNF facility
site, from which the DOE has been extracting gravel for many uses on the
Hanford Site, these deposits could have economic value.
4.6.3 Seismic and Volcanic Hazards
The following discussion briefly summarizes seismic and volcanic hazards on
the Hanford Site. A more detailed discussion of seismic and volcanic hazards
can be found in Cushing (1992).
4.6.3.1 Seismic Hazards. The historic record of earthquakes in the Pacific
Northwest dates from about 1840. The early part of this record is based on
newspaper reports of structural damage and human perception of the shaking, as
classified by the Modified Mercalli Intensity scale, and is probably
incomplete because the region was sparsely populated. Seismograph networks
did not start providing earthquake locations and magnitudes of earthquakes in
the Pacific Northwest until about 1960. A comprehensive network of seismic
stations that provides accurate locating information for most earthquakes
larger than magnitude 2.5 was installed in eastern Washington in 1969. A
summary of the seismicity of the Pacific Northwest, a detailed review of the
seismicity in the Columbia Plateau region and the Hanford Site, and a
description of the seismic networks used to collect the data are provided in
DOE (1988).
Large earthquakes (magnitude greater than 7 on the Richter scale) in the
Pacific Northwest have occurred in the vicinity of Puget Sound, Washington,
and near the Rocky Mountains in eastern Idaho and western Montana. A large
earthquake of uncertain location occurred in north-central Washington in 1872.
This event had an estimated maximum ranging from VIII to IX and an estimated
magnitude of approximately 7. The distribution of intensities suggests a
location within a broad region between Lake Chelan, Washington and the British
Columbia border. Figure 4-4 shows the known faults occurring in the region.
Figure 4.4. Map of the Columbia Basin region showing the known faults. Seismicity of the Columbia Plateau, as determined by the rate of earthquakes
per area and the historical magnitude of these events, is relatively low when
compared to other regions of the Pacific Northwest, the Puget Sound area and
western Montana/eastern Idaho. Figure 4-5 shows the locations of all
earthquakes that occurred in the Columbia Plateau before 1969 with IV or
larger and with a magnitude of 3 or larger. Figure 4-6 shows the locations of
all earthquakes that occurred from 1969 to 1986 with magnitudes of 3 or
greater. The largest known earthquake in the Columbia Plateau occurred in
1936 around Milton-Freewater, Oregon. This earthquake had a magnitude of 5.75
and a maximum of VII, and was followed by a number of aftershocks that
indicate a northeast-trending fault plane. Other earthquakes with magnitudes
of 5 or larger and/or intensities of VI are located along the boundaries of
the Columbia Plateau in a cluster near Lake Chelan extending into the northern
Cascade Range; in northern Idaho and Washington; and along the boundary
between the western Columbia Plateau and the Cascade Range. Three VI
earthquakes have occurred within the Columbia Plateau, including one in the
Milton-Freewater region in 1921, one near Yakima, Washington in 1892, and one
near Umatilla, Oregon in 1893.
In the central portion of the Columbia Plateau, the largest earthquakes near
the Hanford Site are two that occurred in 1918 and 1973. These two
earthquakes had magnitudes of 4.4 and an intensity of V and were located north
of the Hanford Site. Earthquakes often occur in spatial and temporal clusters
in the central Columbia Plateau, and are termed earthquake swarms. The region
north and east of the Hanford Site is a region of concentrated earthquake
swarm activity, but earthquake swarms have also occurred in several locations
within the Hanford Site.
Earthquakes in a swarm tend to gradually increase and decay in frequency of
events, and usually no one outstanding large event is present within the
sequence. These earthquake swarms occur at shallow depths, with 75 percent of
the events located at depths less than 4 kilometers (2.5 miles). Each earth-
quake swarm typically lasts several weeks to months, consists of several to
100 or more earthquakes, and is clustered in an area 5 to 10 kilometers (3 to
6 miles) in lateral dimension. Often, the longest dimension of the swarm area
is elongated in an east-west direction. However, detailed locations of swarm
earthquakes indicate that the events occur on fault planes of variable
orientation, and not on a single, throughgoing fault plane.
Earthquakes in the central Columbia Plateau also occur to depths of about
30 kilometers (18 miles). These deeper earthquakes are less clustered and
occur more often as single, isolated
Figure 4-5. Historical seismicity of the Columbia Plateau and surrounding areas. All earthquakes between 1850 and 1969 with a Modified Mercalli
Intensity of IV or larger with a magnitude of 3 or greater are shown (Rohay
1989).
Figure 4-6. Recent seismicity of the Columbia Plateau and surrounding areas as measured by seismographs. All earthquakes between 1969 and 1986 with a
Modified Mercalli Intensity of IV or larger with a magnitude of 3 or greater
are shown (Rohay 1989).
events. Based on seismic refraction surveys in the region, the shallow
earthquake swarms are occurring in the Columbia River Basalts, and the deeper
earthquakes are occurring in crustal layers below the basalts.
The spatial pattern of seismicity in the central Columbia Plateau suggests
an association of the shallow swarm activity with the east-west-oriented
Saddle Mountains anticline. However, this association is complex, and the
earthquakes do not delineate a throughgoing fault plane that would be
consistent with the faulting observed on this structure.
Earthquake mechanisms in the central Columbia Plateau generally indicate
reverse faulting on east-west planes, consistent with a north-south-directed
maximum compressive stress and with the formation of the east-west-oriented
anticlinal fold of the Yakima Fold Belt (Rohay 1987). However, earthquake
focal mechanisms indicate faulting on a variety of fault plane orientations.
Earthquake focal mechanisms along the western margin of the Columbia Plateau
also indicate north-south compression, but here the minimum compressive stress
is oriented east-west, resulting in strike-slip faulting (Rohay 1987).
Geologic studies indicate an increased component of strike-slip faulting in
the western portion of the Yakima Fold Belt. Earthquake focal mechan-
isms in the Milton-Freewater region to the southeast indicate a different stress
field, one with maximum compression directed east-west instead of north-south.
Estimates for the earthquake potential of structures and zones in the
central Columbia Plateau have been developed during the licensing of nuclear
power plants at the Hanford Site. In reviewing the operating license
application for a Washington Public Power Supply System project, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC 1982) concluded that four earthquake sources should
be considered for the purpose of seismic design: the Rattlesnake-Wallula
alignment, Gable Mountain, a floating earthquake in the tectonic province, and
a swarm area.
For the Rattlesnake-Wallula alignment, which passes along the southwest
boundary of the Hanford Site, the estimated maximum magnitude is 6.5, and for
Gable Mountain, an east- west structure that passes through the northern
portion of the Hanford Site, the estimated maximum magnitude is 5.0. These
estimates were based upon the inferred sense of slip, the fault length, or the
fault area. The floating earthquake for the tectonic province was developed
from the largest event located in the Columbia Plateau, the magnitude 5.75
Milton-Freewater earthquake. The maximum swarm earthquake for the purpose of
seismic design was a magnitude 4.0 event. Figures 4-7 through 4-11 demonstrate
the ranges of frequencies versus the acceleration across the Hanford Site (Geomatrix
Consultants, Inc. 1993).
The seismic design is based upon a Safe-Shutdown Earthquake of
0.25 gravity (g; acceleration). The potential earthquake risk associated
with the Gable Mountain structure dominated the risks associated with other
potential sources that were considered. For DOE site comparison purposes,
a maximum horizontal ground surface acceleration of 0.17-0.20g at the
Hanford Site is estimated to result from an earthquake that could occur
once every 2,000 years (DOE 1994c). The seismic hazard information
presented in this EIS is for general seismic hazard comparisons across DOE
sites. Potential seismic hazards for existing and new facilities could be
evaluated on a facility specific basis consistent with DOE orders and
standards and site specific procedures.
4.6.3.2 Volcanic Hazards. Several major volcanoes are located in the
Cascade Range west of the Hanford Site. The nearest volcano, Mount Adams,
is about 165 kilometers (102 miles) from the Hanford Site, and the most
active is Mount St. Helens, approximately 220 kilometers (136 miles)
west-southwest from Hanford.
A period of renewed volcanic activity at Mount St. Helens began in March
1980 and climaxed in a major eruption on May 18, 1980. This eruption
resulted in about 1 millimeter (0.039 inches) of ash fall over a 9-hour
period at the Hanford Site, which was near the southern edge of the ash
dispersal plume. Smaller eruptions of steam and ash occurred through
October 1980, but none of these deposited measurable amounts of ash at the
site. Because of their close proximity, the volcanic mountains of the
Cascades are the principal volcanic hazard at Hanford.
The major concern is how ash fall might affect the operation of
communications equipment and electronic devices, as well as the movement of
truck and automobile traffic in and out the project site area.
4.7 Air Resources
This section addresses the general air resources at the Hanford Site and
surrounding region. Included in this section are discussions on climate
and meteorology, ambient air quality, and atmospheric dispersion.
Figure 4-7. Computed mean and 5th to 95th percentile hazard curves for the 200-West Area of the Hanford Site. Shown are results for peak horizontal
acceleration and 5 percent-damped spectral acceleration at 0.3 and 2.0
seconds (Geomatrix Consultants, Inc. 1993).
Figure 4-8. Computed mean and 5th to 95th percentile hazard curves for the 200-East Area of the Hanford Site. Shown are results for peak horizontal
acceleration and five percent-damped spectral acceleration at 0.3 and 2.0
seconds (Geomatrix Consultants, Inc. 1993).
acceleration and five percent-damped spectral acceleration at 0.3 and 2.0
seconds (Geomatrix Consultants, Inc. 1993).
Figure 4-10. Computed mean and 5th to 95th percentile hazard curves for the 400 Area of the Hanford Site. Shown are results for peak horizontal
acceleration and five percent-damped spectral acceleration at 0.3 and 2.0
seconds (Geomatrix Consultants, Inc. 1993).
Figure 4-11. Computed mean and 5th to 95th percentile hazard curves for the 100-K Area of the Hanford Site. Shown are results for peak horizontal
acceleration and five percent-damped spectral acceleration at 0.3 and 2.0
seconds (Geomatrix Consultants, Inc. 1993).
4.7.1 Climate and Meteorology
The climate of the Hanford Site, located in southcentral Washington
State, can be classified as mid-latitude semiarid or mid-latitude desert,
depending on the climatological classification scheme used. Summers are
warm and dry with abundant sunshine. Large diurnal temperature variations
result from intense solar heating during the day and radiational cooling at
night. Daytime high temperatures in June, July, and August periodically
exceed 38yC (100yF). Winters are cool with occasional precipitation.
Outbreaks of cold air associated with modified arctic air masses can reach
the area and cause temperatures to drop below -18yC (0yF). Overcast skies
and fog occur periodically (Stone et al. 1983).
Topographic features have a significant impact on the climate of the
Hanford Site. All air masses that reach the region undergo some
modification resulting from their passage over the complex topography of
the Pacific Northwest. The climate of the region is strongly influenced by
the Pacific Ocean and the Cascade Range to the west. The relatively low
annual average rainfall of 16.1 centimeters (6.3 inches) at the Hanford
Meteorological Station is caused largely by the rain shadow created by the
Cascade Range. These mountains limit much of the maritime influence of the
Pacific Ocean, resulting in a more continental-type climate than would
exist if the mountains were not present. Maritime influences are
experienced in the region during the passage of frontal systems and as a
result of movement through gaps in the Cascade Range (such as the Columbia
River Gorge).
The Rocky Mountains to the east and the north also influence the
climate of the region. These mountains play a key role in protecting the
region from the more severe winter storms and the extremely low
temperatures associated with the modified arctic air masses that move
southward through Canada. Local and regional topographical features, such
as the Yakima Ridge and the Rattlesnake Hills, also impact meteorological
conditions across the Hanford Site (Glantz and Perrault 1991). In
particular, these features have a significant impact on wind directions,
wind speeds, and precipitation levels.
Climatological data are collected for the Hanford Site at the Hanford
Meteorological Station. The station is located between the 200-West and
200-East Areas and is in close proximity to the proposed project site.
Data have been collected at this location since 1945 and are summarized in
Stone et al. (1983). Beginning in the early 1980s, data have also been
collected at a series of automated monitoring sites located throughout the
Hanford Site and the surrounding region (Glantz et al. 1990). This Hanford
Meteorological Monitoring Network is described in detail in Glantz and
Islam (1988).
4.7.1.1 Wind. Prevailing wind directions on the 200-Area plateau are
from the northwest in all months of the year. Secondary maxima occur for
southwesterly winds. Summaries of wind direction indicate that winds from
the northwest quadrant occur most often during the winter and summer.
During the spring and fall, the frequency of southwesterly winds increases
with a corresponding decrease in northwest flow. Winds blowing from other
directions (for instance, the northeast) display minimal variation from
month to month. Monthly average wind speeds are lowest during the winter
months, averaging 2.8 to 3.1 meters per second (6.2 to 6.8 miles per hour)-
, and highest during the summer, averaging 3.9 to 4.4 meters per second (8.7
to 9.9 miles per hour). Summertime drainage winds are generally
northwesterly and can frequently gust to 14 meters per second (31 miles per
hour). A wind rose for the Hanford Site is shown in Figure 4-12.
4.7.1.2 Temperature and Humidity. Eight separate temperature
measurements are made at the 122-meter (400-foot) tower at the Hanford
Meteorological Station. As of May 1987, temperatures are also meas-
ured at the 2-meter (6.6-foot) level on the twenty-two 9.1-meter (30-foot) towers
located on and around the Hanford Site. The three 61-meter (200-
foot) towers have temperature-measuring instrumentation at the 2-, 9.8-,
and 61-meter (6.6-, 32-, and 200-foot) levels. The temperature data from
the 9.1- and 61-meter (30- and 200-foot) towers are telemetered to the
Hanford Meteorological Station.
Diurnal and monthly averages and extremes of temperature, dew point, and
humidity are contained in Stone et al. (1983). Ranges of daily maximum and
minimum temperatures vary from normal maxima of 2yC (36yF) in early January
to 35yC (95yF) in late July. On the average, 55 days during the summer
months have maximum temperatures greater than or equal to 32yC (90yF), and
13 days have maxima greater than or equal to 38yC (100yF). From
mid-November through mid-March, minimum temperatures average less than or
equal to 0yC (32yF), with the minima in early January aver-
aging -6yC (21yF). During the winter, on average, four days have minimum tempera-
tures less than or equal to -18yC (0yF); however, only about one winter in two
experiences such temperatures. The record maximum temperature is 46yC
(115yF), and the record minimum temperature is -33yC (-27yF). For the
period 1912 through 1980, the average monthly temperatures ranged from a
low of -1.5yC (29yF) in January to a high of 24.7yC (77yF)
Figure 4-12. Wind rose for the Hanford Site using data collected from January 1982 to December 1989 (Glantz et al. 1990). The direction of each
of the petals of the wind rose indicates the wind direction, and the petal
length is representative of the percentage of time the wind was from that
direction. Petal thickness represents measured wind-speed category. The
velocity categories, from thinnest line (near the center of the rose) to
thickest line (near the edge of the rose), are 0.4-1.3 meters per second
(1-3 miles per hour), 1.8-3.1 meters per second (4-7 miles per hour), 3.6-
5.4 meters per second (8-12 miles per hour), 5.8-8.0 meters per second (13-
18 miles per hour), 8.5-10.7 meters per second (19-24 miles per hour),
11.2-13.9 meters per second (25-31 miles per hour), respectively.
in July. During the winter, the highest monthly average temperature at the
Hanford Meteorological Station was 7yC (45yF), and the record lowest was
-5.9yC (21yF), both occurring during February. During the summer, the
record highest monthly average temperature was 27.9yC (82yF, in July), and
the record lowest was 17.2yC (63yF, in June).
Relative humidity/dew point temperature measurements are made at the
Hanford Meteorological Station and at the three 61-meter (200-foot) tower
locations. The annual average relative humidity at the Hanford
Meteorological Station is 54 percent. It is highest during the winter
months, averaging about 75 percent, and lowest during the summer, averaging
about 35 percent. Wet bulb temperatures greater than 24yC (75yF) had not
been observed at the Hanford Meteorological Station before 1975; however,
on July 8, 9, and 10 of that year, seven hourly observations indicated wet
bulb temperatures greater than or equal to 24yC (75yF).
Fog reduces the visibility to 6 miles during an average of 42 days each
year and to less than 0.25 mile during an average of 25 days per year.
4.7.1.3 Precipitation. The average annual precipitation at the Hanford
Meteorological Station is 16.1 centimeters (6.3 inches). Most of the
precipitation occurs during the winter with nearly half of the annual
amount occurring in the months of November through February. Days with
greater then 1.3 centimeters (0.5 inches) precipitation occur less than 1
percent of the year. A rainfall intensity of at least 1.3 centimeters per
hour (0.5 inches per hour) persisting for 1 hour has only a 10 percent
probability of occurring in any given year. A rainfall intensity of at
least 2.5 centimeters per hour (1 inch per hour) has only a 0.2 percent
probability of occurring in any given year. Winter monthly average
snowfall ranges from 0.8 centimeters (0.3 inches) in March to 13.5
centimeters (5.3 inches) in January. The record snowfall of 53 centimeters
(21 inches) occurred in December 1992. During the months of December,
January, and February, snowfall accounts for about 38 percent of all
precipitation.
4.7.1.4 Severe Weather. A discussion of severe weather may include a
variety of meteorological events, including, but not limited to, severe
winds, dust and blowing dust, hail, fog, glaze, ash falls, extreme
temperatures, temperature inversions, and blowing and drifting snow. These
are described in detail in Stone et al. (1983). For many facilities,
estimates of severe winds are of particular concern. The Hanford
Meteorological Station's climatological summary and the National Severe
Storms Forecast Center's database list only 24 separate tornado occurrences
within 160 kilometers (100 miles) of the Hanford Site from 1916 to 1992
(Cushing 1992). Only one of these tornadoes was observed within the
boundaries of the Hanford Site (on its extreme western edge), and no damage
resulted. The estimated probability of a tornado striking a point at
Hanford is 9.6 x 10-6 per year (Cushing 1992). Because tornadoes are
infrequent and generally small in the Pacific Northwest (and hurricanes do
not reach this area), risks from severe winds are generally associated with
thunderstorms or the passage of strong cold fronts. The greatest peak wind
gust recorded at 15 meters (50 feet) above ground level at the Hanford
Meteorology Station was 36 meters per second (80 miles per hour).
Projections on the return periods for peak gusts exceeding a specified
speed are given in Stone et al. (1983). Extrapolations based on 35 years
of observations indicate a return period of about 200 years for a peak gust
in excess of 40 meters per second (90 miles per hour) at 15 meters (50
feet) above ground level.
4.7.1.5 Atmospheric Stability. The transport and diffusion of airborne
pollutants is dependent on the horizontal and vertical distribution of
temperature, moisture, and wind velocity in the atmosphere. Greater
amounts of turbulence or mixing in an atmospheric layer lead to greater
rates of diffusion. The highest rates of diffusion are found in thermally
unstable layers, moderate rates of diffusion are found in neutral layers,
and the lowest rates of diffusion are found in thermally stable layers.
There are a number of methods for estimating the "stability" of the
atmosphere. Using a method based on the vertical temperature gradient
(NRC 1980) and measurements made at the Hanford Meteorology Station,
thermally unstable conditions are estimated to occur an average of about
25% of the time, neutral conditions about 31% of the time, and thermally
stable conditions about 44% of the time. Detailed information on Han-
ford's atmospheric stability and associated wind conditions are presented in
Glantz et al. (1990).
4.7.2 Nonradiological Air Quality
National ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) have been set by the EPA
as mandated in the 1970 Clean Air Act. Ambient air is that portion of the
atmosphere, external to buildings, to which the general public has access.
For DOE facilities, this is interpreted to mean the site boundary or other
publicly accessible location, e.g., highways on the site. The standards
define levels of air quality that are necessary, with an adequate margin of
safety, to protect the public health (primary standards) and the public
welfare (secondary standards). Standards exist for sulfur oxides (measured
as sulfur dioxide), nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, particles with an
aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to 10 micrometers (PM10), lead, and
ozone. The standards specify the maximum pollutant concentrations and
frequencies of occurrence that are allowed for specific aver-
aging periods (that is, the concentration of carbon monoxide when averaged over 1 hour is
allowed to exceed 40 milligrams per cubic meter only once per year). The
averaging periods vary from 1 hour to 1 year, depending on the pollutant.
In addition to ambient air quality standards, the EPA has established
standards for the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) of air
quality. The PSD standards differ from the NAAQS in that the NAAQS provide
maximum allowable concentrations of pollutants, while PSDs provide maximum
allowable increases in concentrations of pollutants for areas already in
compliance with NAAQS. Prevention of Significant Deterioration standards
are expressed as allowable increments in atmospheric concentrations of
specific pollutants (nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and PM10) (40 CFR
52.21, "Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality").
Different PSD standards exist for Class I areas (where degradation of
ambient air quality is to be severely restricted), and Class II areas
(where moderate degradation of air quality is allowed) (Wark and Warner
1981). The PSD standards are presented in Table 4.7-1. The nitrogen oxide
emissions from the Plutonium and Uranium Recovery through EXtraction
(PUREX) plant and the Uranium Oxide (UO3) plant are permitted by the EPA
under the PSD program (Cushing 1992).
State and local governments have the authority to impose standards for
ambient air quality that are stricter than the national standards.
Washington State has established more stringent standards for sulfur
dioxide. In addition, Washington has established standards for volatile
organic compounds, arsenic, fluoride, total suspended particulates, and
other pollutants that are not covered by national standards. The state
standards for carbon monoxide and nitrogen dioxide are identical to the
national standards. At the local level, the Benton-Franklin Counties Clean
Air Authority has the authority to establish more stringent air standards,
but has not done so. Table 4.7-2 summarizes Washington State standards,
and background and ambient concentrations for Hanford.
4.7.2.1 Background Air Quality. The closest Class I areas to the
Hanford Site are Mount Rainier National Park, located approximately 160
kilometers (100 miles) west of the site; Goat Rocks Wilderness Area,
located approximately 145 kilometers (90 miles) west of the site;
Table 4.7-1. Maximum allowable increases for prevention of significant
deterioration of air qualitya.
Pollutant Averaging Time Class I Class II
Particulate matterb
(PM10)
annual 4 17
24 hours 8 30
Sulfur dioxide
annual 2 20
24 hours 5 91
3 hours 25 512
Nitrogen dioxide
annual 2.5 25
a. Source: 40 CFR 52.21.
b. Particulate matter is defined as suspended particulates with an
aerodynamic diameter less than 10 micrometers.
Table 4.7-2. Washington State ambient air quality standards applicable to Hanford,
maximum background concentration, background as percent of standard, ambient baseline
(1995), ambient baseline as percent of standard, and ambient baseline plus background
as percent of standard (standards and concentrations are in microgram per cubic
meter).
Ambient
Ambient Baseline
Washing- Maximum Background Ambient Baseline and
ton Background as Percent Baseline as percent Background
Averaging State Concentra- of (effective of as percent
Pollutant Time Standard tion Standard 1995) Standard of standard
Sulfur annual 52 0.5 1 2 4 5
dioxide
24 hour 260 6 2 19 7 10
1 hour 1,018 49 5 127 12 17
1 hour 655b 49 7 127 19 27
Particulate matter
TSPc annual 60 56 93 0 0 93
24 hour 150 356 237 6 4 241
PM annual 50d 26e 52 0 0 52
24 hour 150 596e 397 3 2 397
Carbon 8 hour 10,000 6,500 65 3 0 65
monoxide
1 hour 40,000 11,800 30 10 0 30
Ozone 1 hour 235 not not not not not
estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated
Nitrogen annual 100 36 36 3 3 39
dioxide
Lead annual 1.5 not not not not not
estimated estimated estimated estimated estimated
a. Source: Air Quality Impact Analysis in Support of the New Production Reactor
Environmental Impact Statement.
b. The standard is not to be exceeded more than twice in any seven consecutive days.
c. The TSP standards have been replaced by the PM10 standards, but the former are
serving as interim standards.
d. Arithmetic mean of the quarterly arithmetic means for the four calendar quarters
of the year.
e. Maximum concentrations were measured in 1992 at Columbia Center in Kennewick.
This value includes background concentration and site concentrations.
Mount Adams Wilderness Area, located approximately 150 kilometers (95
miles) southwest of the site; and Alpine Lakes Wilderness Area, located
approximately 175 kilometers (110 miles) northwest of the site.
Air quality in the Hanford region is well within the state and federal
standards for criteria pollutants, except that short-term particulate
concentrations occasionally exceed the 24-hour PM10 standard (Table 4.7-2).
Concentrations of toxic chemicals, as listed in 40 CFR Part 60.01, are not
available for the Hanford Site. Because the highest concentrations of
airborne particulate material are generally a result of natural events, the
area has not been designated non-attainment(a) with respect to the PM10
standard. However, the local clean air authority is currently completing
discussions with EPA and the Department of Ecology regarding plans to
conduct additional evaluations of potential sources and mitigation
measures, if any, that might be implemented to reduce the short-term
particulate loading.
Particulate concentrations can reach relatively high levels in eastern
Washington because of exceptional natural events (dust storms, volcanic
eruptions, and large brushfires) that occur in the region. Washington
ambient air quality standards do not consider rural fugitive dust from
exceptional natural events when estimating the maximum background
concentrations of particulate in the area east of the Cascade Mountain
crest. Similarly, the EPA also exempts the rural fugitive dust component
of background concentrations when considering permit applications and
enforcement of air quality standards (Cushing 1992).
4.7.2.2 Source Emissions. Emissions inventories for permitted pollution
sources in Benton, Franklin, and Walla Walla counties are routinely
compiled by the Tri-County Air Pollution Control Board. The annual
emission rates for stationary sources within the Hanford Site boundaries
were reported to the Washington State Department of Ecology by the
U.S. Department of Energy and are provided in Table 4.7-3.
The EPA's ISC/ST model was used for baseline modeling of stationary
sources projected to be in operation in 1995 (Hadley 1991). Projected
baseline conditions (presented in Table 4.7-2) are estimated to be well
below any current national or state standards (Hadley 1991).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. An attainment area is an area where measured concentrations of a
pollutant are below the primary and secondary National Ambient
Quality Standards (NAAQS).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 4.7-3. Emission rates (tons per year) for stationary emission
sources within the Hanford Site for 1992a.
Volatile
Operation Sulfur Nitrogen Organic Carbon
Source (hours per TSP PM10 Dioxide Oxides Compounds Monoxide
year)
300 Area Boiler 6384 9 8 110 22 0 2
#2
300 Area Boiler 8760 4 3 48 10 0 1
#6
200-East Boiler 8760 3 1 200 58 1 49
200-West Boiler 8760 4 1 260 75 1 62
200-East, 200- 8760 107 54 0 0 0 0
West Fugitive
Coal
300 Area 8760 9 8 120 24 0 2
Temporary Boiler
Fugitive 8760 1 0 0 0 0 0
Emissions, 200-E
a. Source: Cushing in preparation.
4.7.2.3 Nonradiological Air Quality Monitoring.
4.7.2.3.1 Onsite Monitoring-The most recent monitoring data
available were obtained in 1992.
Details of the monitoring program are
described in Woodruff and Hanf (1993). The only onsite air quality
monitoring conducted during 1991 was for nitrogen oxides. These oxides
were sampled at three locations on the Hanford Site with a bubbler assembly
operated to collect 24-hour integrated samples. The highest annual average
concentration was <0.006 parts per million by volume, well below the
applicable federal and Washington State annual ambient standard of 0.05
parts per million by volume (Cushing 1992). Monitoring of total suspended
solids was discontinued in early 1988 when the Basalt Waste Isolation
Project, for which those measurements were required, was concluded. In
1992 sampling was done at Rattlesnake Springs (near the southwestern edge
of the site) for polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and volatile organic
compounds. Levels of PCB concentrations were found to be <0.27 to <0.29
nanogram per cubic meter (Woodruff and Hanf 1993). These values are well
below the EPA limit of 1 nanogram per cubic meter. The volatile organic
compounds tested for were halogenated alkanes and alkenes, benzene, and
alkylbenzenes. All volatile organic compound concentrations were well
below the occupational maximum allowable concentrations of air
contaminants.
4.7.2.3.2 Offsite Monitoring-During the past 10 years, carbon
monoxide, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen dioxide have been monitored
periodically in communities and commercial areas southeast of Hanford.
These urban measurements are typically used to estimate the maximum
background pollutant concentrations for the Hanford Site because of a lack
of specific onsite monitoring. Because these measurements were made in the
vicinity of local sources of pollution, they will overestimate maximum
background concentrations for the Hanford Site or at the site boundaries.
The only offsite monitoring in the vicinity of the Hanford Site in
1990 was conducted by the Washington Department of Ecology for particulates
(WDOE 1991). Total suspended particulate (TSP) monitoring at Tri-Cities
locations was discontinued in early 1989. Monitoring at the remaining two
locations, Sunnyside and Wallula, continued during 1990. The annual
geometric means of measurements at Sunnyside and Wallula for 1990 were
71 micrograms per cubic meter and 80 micrograms per cubic meter,
respectively; both of these values exceeded the Washington State annual
standard of 60 micrograms per cubic meter. The Washington State 24-hour
standard, 150 micrograms per cubic meter, was exceeded six times during the
year at Sunnyside and seven times at Wallula (Cushing 1992).
Particulate matter (PM10) was also monitored at three locations: Columbia
Center in Kennewick, Walla Walla Fire Station, and Wallula. During 1992,
the 24-hour PM10 standard adopted by Washington State, 150 micrograms per
cubic meter, was exceeded two times at the Columbia Center monitoring
location. The maximum 24-hour concentration at Columbia Center was 596
micrograms per cubic meter. The maximum 24-hour concentration at the Walla
Walla Fire Station was 67 micrograms per cubic meter. The maximum 24-hour
concentration at Wallula was 124 micrograms per cubic meter. None of the
sites exceeded the annual primary standard, 50 micrograms per cubic meter
(Cushing in preparation). As noted previously, the Benton-Franklin
counties area has not been designated nonattainment with respect to PM10
standards because the particulate concentrations result from natural
events.
4.7.2.4 Summary of Nonradiological Air Quality. The Hanford Site is
currently considered an attainment area for criteria pollutants. However,
PM10 concentrations are high enough that the designation may change. There
are no Class I areas close enough to the site to be affected by emissions
at Hanford. Carbon monoxide concentrations are at 65 percent of the
allowed concentration (for an eight-hour averaging time). Current PM10
concentrations are at 52 percent of the allowed ambient standard. Nitrogen
dioxide concentrations are at 36 percent of the allowed values. All other
pollutants, for which ambient air quality standards exist, are below 25
percent of the allowed values.
4.7.3 Radiological Air Quality
Radionuclide emissions to the atmosphere from the Hanford Site have been
steadily decreasing over the last few years as site operations have changed
emphasis from the historical mission of materials production and processing
to energy and waste management research. During 1992, all operations at
the Hanford Site released less than 100 Ci of radionuclides to the
atmosphere, most of which consisted of tritium and noble gases (Woodruff
and Hanf 1993). Of that total, fission and activation products accounted
for less than 0.036 Ci, uranium isotopes accounted for less than 1 x 10-6
Ci, and transuranics contributed less than 0.005 Ci. These releases
resulted in a dose to the maximally exposed offsite resident of less than
0.005 mrem, which is several orders of magnitude less than the current EPA
standard of 10 mrem per year for DOE facilities.
Ambient air monitoring for radionuclides consisted of sampling at 42
onsite and offsite locations during 1992. Total concentrations of alpha-
and beta-emitting radionuclides at the site perimeter were
indistinguishable from those at distant locations that are unaffected by
Hanford emissions. Concentrations of two specific radionuclides (tritium
and iodine-129) were elevated relative to background; however, their
contribution to the total airborne activity was small.
4.8 Water Resources
4.8.1 Surface Water
4.8.1.1 Surface Water Hydrology. The Pasco Basin occupies about
4900 square kilometers (1900 square miles) and is located centrally within
the Columbia Basin. Elevations within the Pasco Basin are generally lower
than other parts of the plateau, and surface drainage enters it from other
basins. Within the Pasco Basin, the Columbia River is joined by three
major tributaries: the Yakima River, the Snake River, and the Walla-
Walla River.
The Hanford Site occupies approximately one-third of the land area within
the Pasco Basin. Primary surface-water features associated with the Hanford
Site are the Columbia and Yakima rivers. Several surface ponds and ditches
are present, and they are generally associated with fuel- and waste-
processing activities. Several small spring-streams occur on the Arid Land
Ecology site on the western side of the Hanford Site.
A network of dams and multipurpose water resources projects is located
along the course of the Columbia River. The principal dams are shown in
Figure 4-13. Storage behind Grand Coulee Dam, combined with storage
upstream in Canada, totals 3.1 x 1010 cubic meters (1.1 x 1012 cubic feet)
of usable storage to regulate the Columbia River for power, flood control,
and irrigation of land within the Columbia Basin project.
Figure 4-13. Locations of major surface water resources and principal dams within the Columbia Plateau.
Approximately two-thirds of the surface runoff, if there were any from
Hanford, would drain directly into the Columbia River along the Hanford
Reach, which extends from the upstream end of Lake Wallula to the Priest
Rapids Dam. One-third of the surface runoff would drain into the Yakima
River, which flows into the Columbia River below the Hanford Site. The
flow has been inventoried and described in detail by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (DOE 1986a). Flow along this reach is controlled by the Priest
Rapids Dam. Several drains and intakes are also present along this reach.
These include irrigation outfalls from the Columbia Basin Irrigation
Project and Hanford Site intakes for the onsite water export system.
Recorded flow rates of the Columbia River have ranged from 4500 to
18,000 cubic meters per second (~158,900 to 635,600 cubic feet per second)
during the runoff in spring and early summer, to 1000 to 4500 cubic meters
per second (35,300 to 158,900 cubic feet per second) during the low flow
period of late summer and winter. The average annual Columbia River flow
in the Hanford Reach, based on records from 65 years, is about 3400 cubic
meters per second (120,100 cubic feet per second) (DOE 1988). A minimum
flow of about 1020 cubic meters per second (35,000 cubic feet per second)
is maintained along the Hanford Site. Normal river elevations within the
site range from 120 meters (394 feet) above mean sea level where the river
enters the Hanford Site near Vernita to 104 meters (341 feet) where it
leaves the site near the 300-Area.
The Yakima River, near the southern portion of the Hanford Site, has a
low annual flow compared to the Columbia River. For 57 years of record,
the average annual flow of the Yakima River is about 104 cubic meters per
second (3673 cubic feet per second) with monthly maximum and minimum flows
of 490 cubic meters per second (17,305 cubic feet per second) and 4.6 cubic
meters per second (162 cubic feet per second), respectively.
Cold Creek and its tributary, Dry Creek, are ephemeral streams within the
Yakima River drainage system along the southern boundary of the Hanford
Site. Both streams drain areas to the west of the Hanford Site and cross
the southwestern part of the site toward the Yakima River.
Surface flow, when it occurs, infiltrates and disappears into the surface
sediments in the western part of the Hanford Site (refer to subsection
4.6.1.3 for a discussion of soil types and moisture percolation).
Rattlesnake Springs, located on the western part of the site, forms a small
surface stream that flows for about 3 kilometers (1.8 miles) before
disappearing into the ground. Approximately one-third of the Hanford Site
is drained by the Yakima River system.
Total estimated precipitation over the Pasco Basin is about 9 x 106 cubic
meters (318 x 106 cubic feet) annually, averaging less than 20 centimeters
per year (~8 inches per year). Mean annual runoff from the basin is
estimated to be less than 3.1 x 107 cubic meters per year (109 x 107 cubic
feet per year), or approximately 3 percent of the total precipitation. The
basin-wide runoff coefficient is zero for all practical purposes. The
remaining precipitation is assumed to be lost through evapotranspiration,
with a small component (perhaps less than 1 percent) recharging the
groundwater system (DOE 1988).
Water use in the Pasco Basin is primarily from surface diversion with
groundwater diversions accounting for less than 10 percent of the use. A
listing of surface water diversions, volumes, types of usage, and the
populations served is given in DOE (1988). Industrial and agricultural
usage represent about 32 percent and 58 percent, respectively, and
municipal use about 9 percent. The Hanford Site uses about 81 percent of
the water withdrawn for industrial purposes. However, because of the N
Reactor shutdown and considering the data in DOE (1988), these percentages
now approximate 13 percent for industrial, 75 percent for agricultural, and
12 percent for municipal use, with the Hanford Site accounting for about 41
percent of the water withdrawn for industrial use.
Approximately 50 percent of the wells in the Pasco Basin are for domestic
use and are generally shallow (less than 150 meters [500 feet]).
Agricultural wells, used for irrigation and stock supply, make up the
second-largest category of well use, about 24 percent for the Pasco Basin.
Industrial users account for only about 3 percent of the wells (DOE 1988).
Most of the water used by the Hanford Site is withdrawn from the Columbia
River. The principal users of groundwater within the Hanford Site are the
Fast Test Flux Facility, with a 1988 use of 142,000 cubic meters (5.0 x 106
cubic feet) from two wells in the unconfined aquifer, and the PNL
Observatory, with a water supply from a spring on the side of Rattlesnake
Mountain.
Regional effects of water-use activities are apparent in some areas where
the local water tables or potentiometric levels have declined because of
withdrawals from wells. In other areas, water levels in the shallow
aquifers have risen because of artificial recharge mechanisms, such as
excessive application of imported irrigation water or impoundment of
streams. Wastewater ponds on the Hanford Site have artificially recharged
the unconfined aquifer below the 200-East and 200-West Areas. The increase
in water table elevations was most rapid from 1950 to 1960, and apparently
had nearly reached equilibrium between the unconfined aquifer and the
recharge during 1970 to 1980 when only small increases in water table
elevations occurred. Wastewater discharges from the 200-West Area were
significantly reduced in 1984 (DOE 1988), with an accompanying decline in
water table elevations.
4.8.1.2 Flood Plains. Large Columbia River floods have occurred in the
past (DOE 1987), but the likelihood of recurrence of large-scale flooding
has been reduced by the construction of several flood control/water storage
dams upstream of the site. Major floods on the Columbia River are
typically the result of rapid melting of the winter snowpack over a wide
area augmented by above-normal precipitation. The maximum historical flood
on record occurred June 7, 1894, with a peak discharge at the Hanford Site
of 21,000 cubic meters per second (742,000 cubic feet per second). The
flood plain associated with the 1894 flood is shown in Figure 4-14. The
largest recent flood took place in 1948 with an observed peak discharge of
20,000 cubic meters per second (706,280 cubic feet per second) at the
Hanford Site. The probability of flooding at the magnitude of the 1894 and
1948 floods has been greatly reduced because of upstream regulation by
dams.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency has not prepared flood plain maps
for the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River because that agency prepares
maps only for developing areas (a criteria that specifically excludes the
Hanford Reach).
Evaluation of flood potential is conducted in part through the concept of
the probable maximum flood, determined from the upper limit of
precipitation falling on a drainage area and other hydrologic factors, such
as antecedent moisture conditions, snowmelt, and tributary conditions, that
could result in maximum runoff. The probable maximum flood for the
Columbia River below Priest Rapids Dam has been calculated to be
40,000 cubic meters per second (1.4 million cubic feet per second-
) and is greater than the 500-year flood. The flood plain associated with the
probable maximum flood is shown in Figure 4-15. This flood would inundate
parts of the 100-Areas located adjacent to the Columbia River, but the
central portion of the Hanford Site where the SNF facility would be located
would remain unaffected (DOE 1986a).
Figure 4-14. Flood area during the 1894 flood. Figure 4-15. Flood area for the probable maximum flood. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (1989) has derived the Standard Project
Flood with both regulated and unregulated peak discharges given for the
Columbia River below Priest Rapids Dam. Frequency curves for both natural
(unregulated) and regulated peak discharges are also given for the same
portion of the Columbia River. The regulated Standard Project Flood for
this part of the river is given as 15,200 cubic meters per second
(54,000 cubic feet per second) and the 100-year regulated flood as
12,400 cubic meters per second (440,000 cubic feet per second). No maps
for the flooded areas are provided.
Potential dam failures on the Columbia River have been evaluated (DOE
1986a; ERDA 1976). Upstream failures could arise from a number of causes,
with the magnitude of the resulting flood depending on the degree of
breaching at the dam. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers evaluated a number
of scenarios on the effects of failures of Grand Coulee Dam, assuming flow
conditions of the order of 11,000 cubic meters per second (400,000 cubic
feet per second). For purposes of emergency planning, they hypothesized
that 25 percent and 50 percent breaches, the instantaneous disappearance of
25 percent or 50 percent of the center section of the dam, would result
from the detonation of nuclear explosives in sabotage or war. The
discharge or floodwave resulting from such an instantaneous 50 percent
breach at the outfall of the Grand Coulee Dam was determined to be 600,000
cubic meters per second (21 million cubic feet per second). In addition to
the areas inundated by the probable maximum flood (see Figure 4-15), the
remainder of the 100 Areas, the 300 Area, and nearly all of Richland,
Washington, would be flooded (DOE 1986a; ERDA 1976). Deter-
minations were not made for failures of dams upstream, for associated failures downstream
of Grand Coulee, or for breaches greater than 50 percent of Grand Coulee
for two principal reasons: the 50 percent scenario was believed to
represent the largest realistically conceivable flow resulting from either
a natural or human-induced breach (DOE 1986a); that is, it was hard to
imagine that a structure as large as the Grand Coulee Dam would be 100
percent destroyed instantaneously. It was also assumed that such a
scenario as the 50 percent breach would only occur as the result of direct
explosive detonation, not because of a natural event such as an earthquake.
Even a 50 percent breach under these conditions would indicate an emergency
situation where other overriding major concerns might be present.
The possibility of a landslide resulting in river blockage and flooding
along the Columbia River has also been examined for an area bordering the
east side of the river upstream from the city of Richland (DOE 1986a). The
possible landslide area considered was the 75-meter- (250-foot-) high bluff
generally known as White Bluffs. Calculations were made for an
8 x 105 cubic meter (1 x 106 cubic yards) landslide volume with a
concurrent flood flow of 17,000 cubic meters per second (600,000 cubic feet
per second) (a 200-year flood) resulting in a flood wave crest elevation of
122 meter (400 foot) above mean sea level. Areas inundated upstream from
such a landslide event would be similar to those shown in Figure 4-15.
A flood risk analysis of Cold Creek was conducted in 1980 as part of the
characterization of a basaltic geologic repository for high-level
radioactive waste. Such design work is usually done to the criteria
Standard Project Flood or Probable Maximum Flood rather than the worst case
or 100-year flood scenario. Therefore, in lieu of 100- and 500-year
floodplain studies, a probable maximum flood evaluation was made for a
reference repository location directly west of the 200-East Area and
encompassing the 200-West Area (Skaggs and Walters 1981).
Figure 4-16 shows the extent of this evaluation.
4.8.1.3 Surface Water Quality.
4.8.1.3.1 Water Quality of the Columbia River-The Department of
Ecology classifies the Columbia River as Class A (excellent) between Grand
Coulee Dam and the mouth of the river near Astoria, Oregon (DOE 1986a).
The Hanford Reach of the Columbia River is the last free-flowing portion of
the river in the United States.
Pacific Northwest Laboratory conducts routine monitoring of the Columbia
River for both radiological and nonradiological water quality parameters.
A yearly summary of results has been published since 1973 (Woodruff and
Hanf 1993). Numerous other water quality studies have been conducted on
the Columbia River relative to the impact of the Hanford Site during the
past 37 years. Currently, eight outfalls are covered by National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits at the Hanford Site: two at
the 100-K Area, five at the 100-N Area, and one at the 300 Area. These
discharge locations are monitored for various measures of water quality,
including nonradioactive and radioactive pollutants. The dose from any
radionuclide releases is estimated for the Annual Environmental Monitoring
Report for the Hanford Site. In 1993, monitored liquid discharges resulted
in a dose of 0.012 mrem to the downstream maximally exposed individuals
(Dirkes et al. 1994). Permit applications have been
Figure 4-16. Extent of probable maximum flood in Cold Creek area. submitted to EPA Region 10 for three new facilities (outfalls) planned for
the 100 and 300 Areas. These new facilities include a treatment facility
for process wastewater (1325-N), a filter backwash/ash sluicing wastewater
disposal facility (315/384), and the 300 Area Treated Effluent Disposal
Facility.
Radiological monitoring shows low levels of radionuclides in samples of
Columbia River water. Tritium, iodine-129, and uranium are found in
somewhat higher concentrations downstream of the Hanford Site than upstream
(Woodruff and Hanf 1993), but well below concentration guidelines
established by DOE and EPA drinking-water standards (Table 4.8-1).
Cobalt-60 and iodine-131 were not consistently found in measurable
quantities during 1989 in samples of Columbia River water from
Priest Rapids Dam, the 300-Area water intake, or the Richland city
pumphouse (Woodruff and Hanf 1991). In 1989, the average annual
strontium-90 concentrations were essentially the same at Priest Rapids Dam
(upstream of the Hanford Site) and the Richland Pumphouse (Woodruff and
Hanf 1991).
Nonradiological water quality parameters measured during 1989 were
similar to those reported in previous years and were within Washington
State Water Quality Standards (Woodruff and Hanf 1991). Under Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (as amended by the Clean
Water Act of 1972) the NPDES can regulate permits issued to DOE-RL for
discharges of nonradioactive effluents made to the Columbia River.
Table 4.8-1. Annual average concentrations of radionuclides in Columbia
River water during 1992.
Water concentrations (pCi/L)
Radionuclides Upstream Downstream EDA drinking
concentration concentration water standard
(Priest Rapids (Richland
Dam) Pumphouse)
H-3 50 101 20,000
Sr-90 0.09 0.09 8.0
Uranium 0.42 0.51 NA
Tc-99 0.10 0.21 900
I-129 <2.3 x 10-5 <1.4 x 10-4 1
a. Data taken from Woodruff and Hanf (1993).
4.8.1.3.2 Water Quality of the Unconfined Aquifer-As part of the continuing environmental
monitoring program, groundwater monitoring reports have been issued since 1956 and are now published in the
Hanford Site Environmental Report, which is issued by calendar year.
The shallow, unconfined aquifer in the Pasco
Basin and on the Hanford Site contains waters of a dilute (less than or approximately 350 milligrams per liter
total dissolved solids) calcium bicarbonate chemical type. Other principal constituents include sulfate, silica,
magnesium, and nitrate. Variability in chemical composition exists within the unconfined aquifer in part because
of natural variation in the composition of the aquifer material; in part because of agricultural and irrigation
practices north, east, and west of the Hanford Site; and, on the Hanford Site, in part because of liquid waste
disposal.
Graham et al. (1981) compared analyses of unconfined aquifer water samples taken by the U.S. Geological
Survey in the Pasco Basin, but off the Hanford Site, with samples taken by PNL and the USGS on the Hanford Site for
the years 1974 through 1979. In general, Hanford Site groundwater analyses showed higher levels of chemical
constituents and temperatures than were reflected in the analyses of offsite samples.
Elevated levels of some constituents in the Hanford groundwater result from releases of various liquid
wastes from disposal facilities, primarily in the 100 Areas (formerly the site of production reactor operations)
and 200 Areas (formerly the spent fuel reprocessing and defense materials production site). Mobile contaminants,
such as tritium and nitrate, from the 200 Areas are present in a groundwater plume that extends across the
southeastern quadrant of the Hanford Site and enters the Columbia River along a broad front north of the 300 Area.
Contaminants having lower mobility are generally confined to smaller localized plumes in the vicinity of the
disposal facilities and migrate more slowly toward the Columbia River (Dirkes et al. 1994). Some longer-lived
radionuclides, such as strontium-90 and cesium-137, have reached the groundwater, primarily through liquid waste
disposal cribs. Minor quantities of longer-lived radionuclides have also reached the water table via a failed
groundwater monitoring well casing and through reverse well injection, a disposal practice that was discontinued
at Hanford in 1947 (Smith 1980).
Of the contaminants found in groundwater, several radionuclides and nonradioactive chemicals were present
in concentrations that exceeded EPA drinking water standards or DOE Derived Concentration Guides (DCG) in 1993
(Dirkes et al. 1994). These quantities are used as a relative measure of contamination, although with one
exception, groundwater beneath the site is not used for human consumption or food production. Groundwater
utilized for drinking at the FFTF visitor center contains above-background quantities of tritium and iodine-129
from the 200 Area plume; however, these levels are well below the EPA drinking water standards. There is little
opportunity for contaminated groundwater to migrate to locations where members of the public might utilize it
directly for domestic purposes or irrigation. Groundwater in the unconfined aquifer beneath the Hanford Site is
relatively isolated, and generally flows toward the north and east where it discharges to the Columbia River.
Normal hydraulic gradients within the unconfined aquifer beneath the Hanford Site prevent southward migration of
groundwater toward populated areas near Richland, and recharge to the Columbia River from aquifers in Franklin
County to the north and east prevents radionuclides in the Columbia River from migrating to groundwater across the
river from Hanford.
Groundwater monitoring at the 100 Areas detected concentrations of cobalt-60, strontium-90, antimony-125,
and uranium that were above the EPA drinking water standards. Tritium concentrations exceeded both the EPA
drinking water standard and the DOE DCG at one sample well in each of the 100-N and 100-K Areas. In 200 Area wells,
cobalt-60, technetium-99, iodine-129, cesium-137, uranium, and plutonium were occasionally found in
concentrations that exceeded the EPA drinking water standard; tritium and strontium-90 exceeded both the EPA
drinking water standard and the DOE DCG in some locations. Only uranium exceeded the EPA drinking water standard
in 300 Area wells, a result of liquid waste disposal at former fuel fabrication facilities.
Three nonradiological constituents - nitrate, chromium, and trichloroethylene - exceeded EPA drinking
water standards in both 100 and 200 Area groundwater. In addition to those constituents, some 200 Area wells
exceeded EPA drinking water standards for cyanide, fluoride, carbon tetrachloride, and chloroform. Only
trichloroethylene was found above the drinking water limits in the 300 Area.
The occurrence and consequences of leaks from waste storage tanks and of radioactive materials in soils
have been described elsewhere (ERDA 1975). These occurrences have not resulted, and are not expected to result, in
radiation exposure to the public (ERDA 1975; DOE 1987). Leakage from the 105-KE fuel storage basin results in
groundwater contamination with several radionuclides, as noted previously. The more mobile radionuclides reach
the Columbia River via springs near the 100-K Area, although radionuclides in the springs were below the EPA
drinking water standard in 1993 (Dirkes et al. 1994).
Radioactive and nonradioactive effluents are discharged to the environment from Westinghouse Hanford
Company facilities in the 200 Area (Cooney et al. 1988). These effluents, in general, are discharged to the soil
column. Cooling water represents by far the largest volume of potentially radioactive liquid effluent.
Additional treatment systems for these effluents are being designed and installed pursuant to the schedule set
forth in the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, which was jointly issued by DOE, EPA, and the
Washington Department of Ecology in May 1989. Under the provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act, remedial investigations/feasibility studies will be conducted for groundwater
operable units at Hanford.
Springs are common on basalt ridges surrounding the Pasco Basin. Geochemically, spring waters are of a
calcium or sodium bicarbonate type with low dissolved solids (approximately 200 to 400 milligrams per liter) (DOE
1986a). Compositionally these waters are similar to shallow local groundwaters (unconfined aquifer and upper
Saddle Mountains basalt). However, they are readily distinguishable from waters of the lower Saddle Mountains
(Mabton interbed) and the Wanapum and Grande Ronde basalts, which are of sodium bicarbonate to sodium chloride
bicarbonate (or sodium chloride sulfate) type. Currently, no evidence suggests these spring waters con-
tain any significant component of deeper groundwater.
4.8.1.3.3 Water Quality of the Confined Aquifer-Areal and stratigraphic changes in
groundwater chemistry characterize basalt groundwaters beneath the Hanford Site (Graham et al.
1981). The
stratigraphic position of these changes is believed to delineate flow-system boundaries and to identify chemical
evolution taking place along groundwater flow paths. Using these data, some potential mixing of groundwaters has
also been located; however, the rate of mixing is unknown. According to Woodruff and Hanf (1993), no evidence of
contamination was observed in the groundwater of the confined aquifer on Rattlesnake Ridge. Groundwater in one
well in this aquifer contained 8,800 micrograms of nitrate per liter in 1992. The well was located near an
erosional window in the confining basalt flow. In another well, tritium levels were elevated (maximum of 7,830
picocuries per liter) in 1992. In the same well, elevated levels of iodine-129 (0.15 picocuries per liter) were
observed in 1992.
4.8.2 Groundwater
4.8.2.1 Groundwater Hydrology. The regional geohydrologic setting of the Pasco Basin is based on the
stratigraphic framework consisting of numerous Miocene tholeiitic flood basalts of the Columbia River Basalt
group; relatively minor amounts of intercalated fluvial and volcanoclastic Ellensburg Formation sediments; and
fluvial, lacustrine, and glaciofluvial suprabasalt sediments. The vertical order of the geological units from the
surface downward is Hanford formation, Middle Ringold Formation, Lower Ringold Formation, Basal Ringold
Formation, and bedrock, e.g., basalt. Figure 4-3 illustrates the stratigraphic layering of the hydrogeologic
units underlying the Hanford Site, and Figure 4-17 shows the order of the geological units. The surface Hanford
formation varies in thickness across the Hanford Site from approximately 15 to 100 meters (49 to 328 feet) thick
(Figure 4-17). The Middle Ringold Formation varies from 10 to 110 meters (33 to 361 feet) thick. The Lower Ringold
and Basal Ringold Formations extend eastward from the western boundary of the site approximately 1.1 kilometers
(6.8 miles). The Lower Ringold Formation is rather uniform in thickness at 20 meters (66 feet), while the Basal
Ringold Formation demonstrates a maximum thickness of 40 meters (131 feet) at the far western boundary of the site
(interpolated from Woodruff and Hanf 1993). Lateral ground-
water movement is known to occur within a shallow,
unconfined
Figure 4-17. Geologic cross section of the Hanford Site (modified from Tallman et al. 1979). aquifer consisting of fluvial and lacustrine sediments lying on top of the basalts, and within deeper
confined-to-semiconfined aquifers consisting of basalt flow tops, flow bottom zones, and sedimentary interbeds
(DOE 1988). These deeper aquifers are intercalated with aquitards consisting of basalt flow interiors. Vertical
flow and leakage between geohydrologic units is inferred and estimated from water level or potentiometric surface
data but is not quantified, and direct measurements are not available (DOE 1988).
The multiaquifer system within the Pasco Basin has been conceptualized as consisting of four geohydrologic
units: (1) the Grande Ronde Basalt; (2) Wanapum Basalt; (3) Saddle Mountain Basalt; and (4) suprabasalt Hanford
and Ringold Formation sediments. Geohydrologic units older than the Grande Ronde Basalt are probably of minor
importance to the regional hydrologic dynamics and system.
The Grande Ronde Basalt is the most voluminous and widely spread formation within the Columbia River Basalt
group and has a thickness of at least 2745 meters (9000 feet). The Grande Ronde Basalt geohydrologic unit is
composed of the Grande Ronde Basalt and minor intercalated sediments equivalent to or part of the Ellensburg
Formation (DOE 1988). More than 50 flows of Grande Ronde Basalt underlie the Pasco Basin, but little is known of
the lower 2200 to 2500 meters of this geohydrologic unit. This unit is a confined-to-semiconfined flow system that
is recharged along the margins of the Columbia Plateau where the unit is at or close to the land sur-
face, and by
surface-water and groundwater inflow from lands adjoining the plateau. Vertical movement into and out of the unit
is known to occur. Groundwater within the unit in the eastern Pasco Basin is believed to be derived from
groundwater inflow from the east and northeast.
The Wanapum Basalt geohydrologic unit consists of basalt flows of the Wanapum Basalt intercalated with
minor and discontinuous sedimentary interbeds of the Ellensburg Formation or equivalent sediments. In the Pasco
Basin, the Wanapum Basalt consists of three members, each consisting of multiple flows. The geohydrologic unit
underlies the entire Pasco Basin and has a maximum thickness of 370 meters (1215 feet). Groundwater within the
Wanapum Basalt geohydrologic unit is confined to semiconfined. Recharge is believed to occur from precipitation
where the Wanapum Basalt is not overlain by great thicknesses of younger basalt, leakage from adjoining
formations, and surface-water and groundwater inflow from lands adjoining the plateau. Local recharge is derived
from irrigation. Within the Pasco Basin, recharge occurs along the anticlinal ridges to the north and west, with
recharge in the eastern basin being from groundwater inflow from the east and northeast (DOE 1988). Interbasin
transfer and vertical leakage are also believed to contribute to the recharge.
The Saddle Mountains Basalt geohydrologic unit is composed of the youngest formation of the Columbia River
Basalt Group and several thick sedimentary beds of the Ellensburg Formation or equivalent sediments that comprise
up to 25 percent of the unit. Within the Pasco Basin, the Saddle Mountains Basalt contains seven members, each with
one or more flows. This geohydrologic unit underlies most of the Pasco Basin, attaining a thickness of about
290 meters (950 feet), but is absent along the northwest part of the basin and along some anticlinal ridges.
Groundwater in the Saddle Mountains geohydrologic unit is confined to semiconfined, with recharge and discharge
believed to be local (DOE 1988).
The rock materials that overlie the basalts in the structural and topographic basins within the Columbia
Plateau generally consist of Miocene-Pliocene sediments, volcanics, Pleistocene sedi-
ments (including those from
catastrophic flooding), and Holocene sediments consisting mainly of alluvium and eolian deposits. The
suprabasalt geohydrologic unit (referred to as the Hanford/Ringold unit) consists principally of the
Miocene-Pliocene Ringold Formation stream, lake, and alluvial materials, and the Pleistocene catastrophic flood
deposits informally called the Hanford formation. Groundwater within the suprabasalt geohydrologic unit is
generally unconfined, with recharge and discharge usually coincident with topographic highs and lows (DOE 1988).
The Hanford/Ringold unit is essentially restricted to the Pasco Basin with principal recharge occurring along the
periphery of the basin from precipitation and ephemeral streams.
Little if any natural recharge occurs within the Hanford Site, but artificial recharge occurs from liquid
waste disposal activities (Woodruff and Hanf 1993). Recharge from irrigation occurs east and north of the
Columbia River and in the synclinal valleys west of the Hanford Site. Upward leakage from lower aqui-
fers into the unconfined aquifer is believed to occur in the northern and eastern sections of the Hanford Site.
Groundwater discharge is primarily to the Columbia River.
Groundwater under the Hanford Site occurs under unconfined and confined conditions (Figure 4-17). The
unconfined aquifer is contained within the glaciofluvial sands and gravels of the Hanford formation and within the
Ringold Formation. It is dominated by the middle member of the Ringold Formation, consisting of sands and gravels
with varying amounts of cementation. The bottom of the unconfined aquifer is the basalt surface or, in some areas,
the clay zones of the Lower Ringold. A semiconfined aquifer occurs in areas where the coarse-grained Basal Ringold
lies between the basalt and the fine-grained Lower Ringold. The confined aquifers consist of sedimentary
interbeds and/or interflow zones that occur between dense basalt flows in the Columbia River Basalt Group. The
main water-bearing portions of the interflow zones occur within a network of interconnecting vesicles and
fractures of the flow tops or flow bottoms.
4.8.2.2 Vadose Zone Hydrology. Sources of natural recharge to the unconfined aquifer are rainfall and
runoff from the higher bordering elevations, water infiltrating from small ephemeral streams, and river water
along influent reaches of the Yakima and Columbia rivers. In order to define the movement of water in the vadose
zone, the movement of precipitation through the unsaturated (vadose) zone has been studied at several locations on
the Hanford Site. Conclusions from these studies are varied depending on the location studied. Some
investigators conclude that no downward percolation of precipitation occurs on the 200-Area Plateau where soil
texture is varied and is layered with depth, and that all moisture penetrating the soil is removed by evaporation.
Others have observed downward water movement below the root zone in tests conducted near the 300 Area, where soils
are coarse textured and precipitation was above normal (DOE 1987).
From the recharge areas to the west, the groundwater flows downgradient to the discharge areas, primarily
along the Columbia River. This general west-to-east flow pattern is interrupted locally by the groundwater
mounds in the 200 Areas. From the 200 Areas, a component of groundwater also flows to the north, between Gable
Mountain and Gable Butte. These flow directions represent current conditions; the aquifer is dynamic, and
responds to changes in natural and artificial recharge.
Local recharge to the shallow basalts is believed to result from infiltration of precipi-
tation and runoff along the margins of the Pasco Basin. Regional recharge of the deep basalts is thought to result
from interbasin groundwater movement originating northeast and northwest of the Pasco Basin in areas where the Wanapum
and Grande Ronde Basalts crop out extensively (DOE 1986a). Groundwater discharge from the shallow basalt is probably to the
overlying unconfined aquifer and the Columbia River. The discharge area(s) for the deep groundwaters is presently
uncertain, but flow is believed to be generally southeastward with discharge speculated to be south of the Hanford
Site (DOE 1986a).
4.8.3 Existing Radiological Conditions
This section relates to the hydrology of the Hanford Site in general and to the hydrology of the 200 Area
specifically because it is the location of the proposed SNF facility.
4.8.3.1 Hydrology of the Hanford Site. Groundwater quality on the Hanford Site has been affected by
defense-related activities to produce nuclear materials. Due to the arid nature of the climate, natural recharge
of the groundwater on the site is normally low. Artificial recharge has occurred in the past from the disposal of
liquid waste associated with processing operations in the 100, 200, and 300 Areas that created mounds of water
underlying discharge points. While most of the site does not have contaminated groundwater, large areas
underlying the site do have elevated levels of both radiological and nonradiological constituents. The liquid
effluents discharged into the ground have carried with them certain radionuclides and chemicals that move through
the soil column at varying rates, eventually enter the groundwater, and form plumes of contamination (see Figure
5.54 in DOE 1992a).
Groundwater monitoring is conducted on an annual basis on the Hanford Site as part of the Hanford Ground-
Water Environmental Surveillance Program and other monitoring programs to study the movement of plumes,
groundwater quality, and the concentration of certain constituents as regulated by the EPA, the DOE, and
Washington State. In 1992, several groundwater samples were taken from approximately 720 wells, of which 50
percent were sampled at least quarterly or more frequently. The remainder were sampled either once or twice.
Figure 5.49 in DOE (1992a) illustrates the locations of these monitoring wells.
Results indicate that total alpha, total beta, tritium, cobalt-60, strontium-90, technetium-99,
iodine-129, cesium-137, and uranium concentrations in wells in or near operating areas exceeded Drinking Water
Standards (DWS) (see Tables C2 and C3 in Appendix C of DOE [1992a]). Concentrations of uranium in the 200-West
Area, tritium in the general 200 Area, strontium-90 in the 100-N and 200-East Areas exceeded the Derived
Concentration Guides (DCGs) [see Table C6 in Appendix C of DOE (1992b)]. Tritium continues to slowly
migrate downgradient with the groundwater flow where it enters the Columbia River; 1 curie of tritium was
discharged to the Columbia River from the 100 Areas in 1992 (Woodruff and Hanf 1993).
Nitrate concentrations also exceeded DWS at various locations in the 100, 200, and 300 Areas and at several
600 Area locations. Elevated concentrations were also detected for chromium, cyanide, carbon tetrachloride,
chloroform, and trichloroethylene in various sample wells in the 100 and 200 Areas. For further information
regarding groundwater quality on the Hanford Site, refer to DOE (1992b).
4.8.3.2 Hydrology of the 200 Areas. The unconfined aquifer beneath the Hanford Site is contained
within the Ringold Formation and the overlying Hanford formation. The unconfined aquifer is affected by
wastewater disposed to surface and subsurface disposal sites. The depth to groundwater ranges from 55 to 95 meters
(180 to 310 feet) on the 200 Area Plateau. The bottom of the unconfined aquifer is the uppermost basalt surface or,
in some areas, the clays of the Lower Ringold Member. The thickness of the unconfined aquifer in the 200 Areas
ranges from less than 15 to 61 meters (50 to 200 feet). Beneath the unconfined aquifer is a confined aquifer system
consisting of sedimentary interbeds or interflow zones that occur between dense basalt flows or flow units.
The sources of natural recharge to the unconfined aquifer are rainfall from areas of high relief to the west
of the Hanford Site and two ephemeral streams, Cold Creek and Dry Creek. From the areas of recharge, the
groundwater flows downgradient and discharges into the Columbia River. This general flow pattern is modified by
basalt outcrops and subcrops in the 200 Areas and by artificial recharge.
The unconfined aquifer beneath the 200 Areas receives artificial recharge from liquid disposal areas.
Cooling water disposed to ponds has formed groundwater mounds beneath two former and one continuing high-volume
disposal sites: U Pond in the 200-West Area, B Pond east of the 200-East Area, and Gable Mountain Pond north of the
200-East Area. The water table rose approximately 20 meters (65 feet) under U Pond and 9 meters (30 feet) under
B Pond compared with pre-Hanford conditions (Newcomb et al. 1972). However, U Pond and Gable Mountain Pond have
been eliminated and, with no further recharge from them, the water levels will decline over the coming years.
U Pond was deactivated in 1984 and Gable Mountain Pond was decommissioned and backfilled in 1987. The volume of
B Pond increased after the elimination of Gable Mountain Pond.
The dry nature (for example, climate, waste form, and depth to water) of the low-level burial ground and the
limited natural surface recharge available from precipitation minimize the probability of leachate formation and
migration from these facilities.
Additional characterization and enhanced groundwater monitoring of the 200 Areas are currently being
conducted pursuant to requirements established under the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act. When complete,
this work will supply additional information on the 200 Areas.
4.8.4 Water Rights
The Hanford Site, situated along the Columbia River and near the Yakima River, lies within a region
traditionally concerned about water rights. Typical water uses in this region include cooling a commercial
nuclear power plant, irrigation, and municipal and industrial uses. Cooling water was withdrawn from the Columbia
River to cool the defense reactors at Hanford. The DOE continues to assert a federally reserved water withdrawal
right with respect to its existing Hanford operations. Current activities use water withdrawn from the Columbia
River under the Department's federally reserved water right.
4.9 Ecological Resources
The Hanford Site is a relatively large, undisturbed area (1450 square kilometers [~560 square miles]) of
shrub-steppe that contains numerous plant and animal species adapted to the region's semiarid environment. The
site consists of mostly undeveloped land with widely spaced clusters of industrial buildings located along the
western shoreline of the Columbia River and at several locations in the interior of the site. The industrial
buildings are interconnected by roads, railroads, and electrical transmission lines. The major facilities and
activities occupy about 6 percent of the total available land area, and their impact on the surround-
ing ecosystems is minimal. Most of the Hanford Site has not experienced tillage or livestock grazing since the early 1940s. The
Columbia River flows through the Hanford Site, and although the river flow is not directly impeded by artificial
dams within the Hanford Site, the historical daily and seasonal water fluctuations have been changed by dams
upstream and downstream of the site (Rickard and Watson 1985). The Columbia River and other water bodies on the
Hanford Site provide habitat for aquatic organisms. The Columbia River is also accessible for public recreational
use and commercial navigation.
Topography of the proposed SNF facility site is level to gently sloping to the northeast. Substrate on the
subject area is primarily Burbank loamy sand intergraded with Rupert sand. The latter consists of broad,
stabilized sand dunes. Several used and unused unpaved roads cross the project area (Figure 4-18) with resulting
disturbance to the plant community. The subject area outside the disturbed area is primarily a mature stand of big
sagebrush with an understory of cheatgrass, an alien weed species, and Sandberg's bluegrass (Figure 4-18); there
are approximately 494 square kilometers (191 square miles) of this community on the Hanford site. Sagebrush-
bitterbrush/cheatgrass comprises the second largest plant community. Cover of big sagebrush increases rapidly
from 10-25 percent near Route 4 to 25-50 percent over the remainder of the site. Cover of cheatgrass and Sandberg's
bluegrass is mostly uniform across the subject area at 25-50 percent and 10-20 percent, respectively.
4.9.1 Terrestrial Resources
4.9.1.1 Vegetation. The Hanford Site, located in southeastern Washington, has been botanically char-
acterized as a shrub-steppe. Because of the site's aridity, the productivity of both plants and ani-
mals is relatively low compared with other natural communities. In the early 1800s, the domi-
nant plant in the area was big sagebrush with an understory of perennial bunchgrasses, especially Sandberg's
bluegrass and bluebunch wheatgrass. With the advent of settlement that brought livestock grazing and crop
raising, the natural vegetation mosaic was opened to a persistent invasion by alien annuals, especially cheatgrass.
Today cheatgrass is the dominant plant on fields that were cultivated 50 years ago. Cheatgrass is also well
established on rangelands at elevations less than 244 meters (800 feet) (Rickard and Rogers 1983). Wild-
fires in the area are common; the most recent extensive fire in 1984 significantly altered the shrub component of the
vegetation. The dryland areas of the Hanford Site were treeless in the years before land settlement; however,
for several decades before 1943, trees were planted and irrigated on most of the farms to provide windbreaks and shade.
When the farms were abandoned in 1943, some of the trees died but others have persisted, presumably because their
Figure 4-18. Distribution of vegetation types on the Hanford Site. roots are deep enough to contact groundwater. Today these trees serve as nest-
ing platforms for several species of
birds, including hawks, owls, ravens, magpies, and great blue herons, and as night roosts for wintering bald
eagles (Rickard and Watson 1985). The vegetation mosaic of the Hanford Site currently consists of 10 major kinds
of plant communities:
1) thyme buckwheat/Sandberg's bluegrass
2) sagebrush/bluebunch wheatgrass
3) sagebrush/cheatgrass or sagebrush/Sandberg's bluegrass
4) sagebrush-bitterbrush/cheatgrass
5) greasewood/cheatgrass-saltgrass
6) winterfat/Sandberg's bluegrass
7) cheatgrass-tumble mustard
8) willow or riparian
9) spiny hopsage/Sandberg's bluegrass
10) sand dunes.
The dominant plant community on the proposed SNF site is sagebrush/Sandberg's bluegrass, with cheatgrass-
tumble mustard occurring in the southern portion of the site. A table listing common plants on the Hanford Site can
be found in Cushing (1992).
Almost 600 species of plants have been identified on the Hanford Site (Sackschewsky et al. 1992). The
dominant plants on the 200 Area Plateau are big sagebrush, rabbitbrush, cheatgrass, and Sandberg's bluegrass, with
cheatgrass providing half of the total plant cover. More than 100 species of plants have been iden-
tified in the 200 Area Plateau. Cheatgrass and Russian thistle, annuals introduced to the United States from Eurasia in the late
1800s, invade areas where the ground surface has been disturbed. Certain desert plants have roots that grow to
depths approaching 10 meters (33 feet) (Napier 1982); however, root penetration to these depths has not been
demonstrated for plants in the 200 Areas. Rabbitbrush roots have been found at a depth of 2.4 meters (8 feet) near
the 200 Areas (Klepper et al. 1979). Mosses and lichens appear abundantly on the soil surface; lichens commonly
grow on the shrub stems. The important desert shrubs, big sagebrush and bitterbrush, are widely spaced and usually
provide less than 20 percent canopy cover. The important understory plants are grasses, especially cheat-
grass, Sandberg's bluegrass, Indian ricegrass, June grass, and needle-and-thread grass.
As compared to other semiarid regions in North America, primary productivity is relatively low and the
number of vascular plant species is also low. This situation is attributed to the low annual precipitation
(16 centimeters [~6 inches]), the low water-holding capacity of the rooting substrate (sand), and the droughty
summers and occasionally very cold winters.
Sagebrush and bitterbrush are easily killed by summer wildfires, but the grasses and other herbs are
relatively resistant and usually recover in the first growing season after burning. Fire usually opens the
community to wind erosion. The severity of erosion depends on the severity and areal extent of the fire. Hot fires
incinerate entire shrubs and damage grass crowns. Less intensive fires leave dead stems standing, and recovery of
herbs is prompt. The most recent and extensive wildfire occurred in the summer of 1984.
Bitterbrush shrubs provide browse for a resident herd of wild mule deer. Bitterbrush shrubs are slow to
recolonize burned areas because invasion is by seeds. Bitterbrush does not sprout even when fire damage is
relatively light.
Certain passerine birds (such as sage sparrow, sage thrasher, and loggerhead shrike) rely on sagebrush or
bitterbrush for nesting. These birds are not expected to nest in places devoid of shrubs. Jackrabbits also appear
to avoid burned areas without shrubs. Birds that nest on the ground in areas without shrubs included longbilled
curlews, horned larks, Western meadowlarks, and burrowing owls.
An ecological inventory of the vegetation on the proposed SNF facility site revealed two primary
vegetation types: burned and unburned sagebrush/cheatgrass. Two species predominated in the burned area: cheat-
grass and tarweed fiddleneck; the unburned vegetation comprised mainly cheatgrass and big sagebrush. During the
one-day survey, approximately 43 species were identified.
4.9.1.2 Insects. More than 300 species of terrestrial and aquatic insects have been found on the Hanford
Site. Grasshoppers and darkling beetles are among the more conspicuous groups and, together with other species,
are important in the food web of the local birds and mammals. Most species of darkling beetles occur throughout the
spring to fall period, although some species are present only during two or three months in the fall (Rogers and
Rickard 1977). Grasshoppers are evident during the late spring to fall. Both beetles and grasshoppers are subject
to wide annual variations in abundance.
4.9.1.3 Reptiles and Amphibians. Among amphibians and reptiles, 12 species are known to occur on the
Hanford Site (Fitzner and Gray 1991). The occurrence of these species is infrequent when com-
pared with similar fauna of the southwestern United States. The side-blotched lizard is the most abundant rep-
tile and can be found throughout the Hanford Site. Short-horned and sagebrush lizards are also common in selected
habitats. The most common snakes are the gopher snake, the yellow-bellied racer, and the Pacific rattlesnake, all found throughout
the Hanford Site. Striped whipsnakes and desert night snakes are rarely found, but some sightings have been
recorded for the site. Toads and frogs are found near the permanent water bodies and along the Columbia River.
Cushing (1992) contains a list of all the reptiles and amphibians occurring on the Hanford Site.
4.9.1.4 Birds. Fitzner and Gray (1991) and Landeen et al. (1992) have presented data on birds observed
on the Hanford Site. The horned lark and western meadowlark are the most abundant nesting birds in the
shrub-steppe. A list of some of the more common birds present on the Hanford Site can be found in Cushing (1992).
4.9.1.4.1 Birds Inhabiting Terrestrial Habitats-The game birds inhabiting terrestrial
habitats at Hanford are the chukar, gray partridge, and mourning dove.
The chukar and partridge are year-round
residents, but mourning doves are migrants. Although a few doves overwinter in south-eastern Washington, most
leave the area by the end of September. Mourning doves nest on the ground and in trees all across the Hanford Site.
Chukars are most numerous in the Rattlesnake Hills, Yakima Ridge, Umtanum Ridge, Saddle Mountains, and Gable
Mountain areas of the Hanford Site. A few birds also inhabit the 200-Area Plateau. Gray partridges are not as
numerous as chukars, and their numbers also vary greatly from year to year. Sage grouse populations have declined
on the Hanford Site since the 1940s, and it is probable there are no grouse nests on the site at this time. The
nearest viable population is located on the U.S. Army's Yakima Training Center, located to the north and west of
the Hanford Site.
In recent years, the number of nesting ferruginous hawks has increased, at least in part because the hawks
have accepted steel powerline towers as nesting sites. Only about 50 pairs are believed to be nesting in
Washington. Other raptors that nest on the Hanford Site are the prairie falcon, northern harrier, red-tailed
hawk, Swainson's hawk, and kestrel. Burrowing owls, great horned owls, barn owls, and long-eared owls also nest on
the site but in smaller numbers.
4.9.1.5 Mammals. Approximately 39 species of mammals have been identified on the Hanford Site (Fitzner
and Gray 1991), and a complete list can be found in Cushing (1992). The largest vertebrate predator inhabiting the
Hanford Site is the coyote, which ranges all across the site. Coyotes have been a major cause of destruction of
Canada goose nests on Columbia River islands, especially islands upstream from the abandoned Hanford townsite.
Bobcats and badgers also inhabit the Hanford Site in low numbers.
Black-tailed jackrabbits are common on the Hanford Site, mostly associated with mature stands of
sagebrush. Cottontails are also common but appear to be more closely associated with the buildings, debris piles,
and equipment laydown areas associated with the onsite laboratory and industrial facilities.
Townsend's ground squirrels occur in colonies of various sizes scattered across the Hanford Site but
marmots are scarce. The most abundant mammal inhabiting the site is the Great Basin pocket mouse. It occurs all
across the Columbia River plain and on the slopes of the surrounding ridges. Other small mammals include the deer
mouse, harvest mouse, grasshopper mouse, montane vole, vagrant shrew, and Merriam's shrew.
The Hanford Site has seven species of bats that are known to be or are potential inhabitants, arriving
mostly as fall or winter migrants. The pallid bat frequents deserted buildings and is thought to be the most
abundant of the various species. Other species include the hoary bat, silver-haired bat, California brown bat,
little brown bat, Yuma brown bat, and Pacific western big-eared bat.
A herd of Rocky Mountain elk is present on the ALE Reserve. It is believed these animals immigrated to the
reserve from the Cascade Mountains in the early 1970s. This herd had grown from approximately 6 animals in 1972 to
119 animals in the spring of 1992. Elk frequently move off the ALE Reserve to private lands located to the north
and west, particularly during late spring, summer, and early fall. However, while the elk are on the Hanford Site,
they restrict their activities to the ALE Reserve. Lack of water and the high level of human activity presumably
restrict the elk from using other areas of the Hanford Site. Despite the arid climate and their unusual habitat,
these elk appear to be very healthy; antler and body size for given age classes are among the highest recorded for
this species (McCorquodale et al. 1989). In addition, reproductive output is also among the highest recorded for
this species. Elk remain on the ALE Reserve because of the protection it provides from human disturbance.
Mule deer are found throughout the Hanford Site, although areas of highest concentrations are on the ALE
Reserve and along the Columbia River. Deer populations on the Hanford Site appear to be relatively stable. The
herd is characterized by a large proportion of very old animals (Eberhardt et al. 1982) and high fawn mortality.
Islands in the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River are used extensively as fawning sites by the deer (Eberhardt
et al. 1979) and thus are a very important habitat for this species. Hanford Site deer frequently move offsite and
are killed by hunters on adjacent public and private lands (Eberhardt et al. 1984).
The ecological survey conducted on an area adjacent to the proposed SNF facility site recorded (by presence
or sign) 12 bird, 7 mammal, and 3 reptile species.
4.9.2 Wetlands
Several habitats on the Hanford Site could be considered as wetlands. The largest wetland habi-
tat is the riparian zone bordering the Columbia River. The extent of this zone varies, but it includes extensive stands of
willows, grasses, various aquatic macrophytes, and other plants. The zone is extensively impacted by both
seasonal water level fluctuations and daily variations related to power generation at Priest Rapids Dam
immediately upstream from the site.
Other extensive areas of wetlands can be found within the Saddle Mountain National Wildlife Refuge and the
Wahluke Wildlife Refuge Area. These two areas encompass all the lands extending from the north bank of the
Columbia River northward to the site boundary and east of the Columbia River down to Ringold Springs. Wetland
habitat in these areas consists of fairly large ponds resulting from irrigation runoff. These ponds have exten-
sive stands of cattails (Typha sp.) and other emergent aquatic vegetation surrounding the open water regions.
They are extensively used as resting sites by waterfowl.
Some wetlands habitat exists in the riparian zones of some of the larger spring streams on the ALE Reserve.
These areas are not extensive and usually amount to less than a hectare in size, although the riparian zone along
Rattlesnake Springs is probably about 2 kilometers (1.2 miles) in length and consists of peachleaf willows,
cattails, and other plants. No wetlands are on or in the vicinity of the proposed project site area.
4.9.3 Aquatic Resources
There are two types of natural aquatic habitats on the Hanford Site: one is the Columbia River, which flows
along the northern and eastern edges of the Hanford Site, and the other is provided by the small spring-streams and
seeps located mainly in the Rattlesnake Hills. Several artificial water bodies, both ponds and ditches, have been
formed as a result of wastewater disposal practices associated with the operation of the reactors and separation
facilities. These bodies of water are temporary and will vanish with cessation of activities, but while present,
they form established aquatic ecosystems (except West Pond) complete with representative flora and fauna (Emery
and McShane 1980). West Pond is created by a rise in the water table in the 200 Areas and is not fed by surface flow;
thus, it is alkaline and has a greatly restricted complement of biota.
4.9.3.1 The Columbia River. The Columbia River is the dominant aquatic ecosystem on the Hanford Site
and supports a large, diverse community of plankton, benthic invertebrates, fish, and other communities. It is
the fifth largest river in North America and has a total length of about 2000 kilometers (~1240 miles) from its
origin in British Columbia to its mouth at the Pacific Ocean. The Columbia has been dammed both upstream and
downstream from the Hanford Site, and the reach flowing through the area is the last free-flowing, but regulated,
reach of the Columbia River in the United States. Plankton populations in the Hanford Reach are influ-
enced by communities that develop in the reservoirs of upstream dams, particularly Priest Rapids Reservoir, and by
manipulation of water levels below by dam operations in downstream reservoirs. Phytoplankton and zooplankton
populations at Hanford are largely transient, flowing from one reservoir to another. Generally, insufficient time
does not allow characteristic endemic groups of phytoplankton and zooplankton to develop in the Hanford Reach. No
tributaries enter the Columbia during its passage through the Hanford Site. Gray and Dauble (1977) list 43 species
of fish in the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River. Since 1977, the brown bullhead (Ictalurus nebulosus) has also
been collected, bringing the total number of fish species identified in the Hanford Reach to 44. Of these species,
the chinook salmon, sockeye salmon, coho salmon, and steelhead trout use the river as a migration route to and
from upstream spawning areas and are of the greatest economic importance. Both the fall chinook salmon and
steelhead trout also spawn in the Hanford Reach. The relative contribution of upper river bright stocks to fall
chinook salmon runs in the Columbia River increased from about 24 percent of the total in the early 1980s to 50
percent to 60 percent of the total by 1988 (Dauble and Watson 1990). The destruction of other main-
stream Columbia spawning grounds by dams has increased the relative importance of the Hanford Reach spawning
(Watson 1970, 1973). Fish migrating from the Columbia River up the Snake River would not be expected to pass through
the Hanford area because the confluence of the two rivers lies downstream from the Hanford Site.
4.9.3.2 Spring Streams. The small spring streams, such as Rattlesnake and Snively springs, contain
diverse biotic communities and are extremely productive (Cushing and Wolf 1984). Dense blooms of water-
cress occur and are not lost until one of the major flash floods occurs. The aquatic insect pro-
duction is fairly high as compared to that in mountain streams (Gaines 1987). The macrobenthic biota varies
from site to site and is related to the proximity of colonizing insects and other factors.
4.9.4 Threatened, Endangered, and Sensitive Species
Threatened and endangered plants and animals identified on the Hanford Site, as listed by the federal
government (50 CFR 17) and Washington (Washington Natural Heritage Program 1994), are shown in Table 4.9-1. No
plants or mammals on the federal list of endangered and threatened wildlife and plants (50 CFR 17.11, 17.12) are
known to occur on the Hanford Site. However, several species of both plants and animals are under consideration
for formal listing by the federal government and Washington.
4.9.4.1 Plants. Four species of plants are included in the Washington listing. Columbia
milk-vetch (Astragalus columbianus Barneby) and Hoover's desert parsley (Lomatium tuberosum) are listed as
threatened, and Columbia yellowcress (Rorippa columbiae Suksd.) and northern wormwood (Artemisia campestris ssp.
borealis var. wormskioldii) are designated as endangered. Columbia milk-vetch occurs on dry land benches along
the Columbia River in the vicinity of Priest Rapids Dam, Midway, and Vernita. It also has been found on top of
Umtanum Ridge and in Cold Creek Valley near the present vineyards. Hoover's desert parsley grows on steep talus
slopes in the vicinity of Priest Rapids Dam, Midway, and Vernita. Yellowcress occurs in the wetted zone of the
water's edge along the Columbia River. Northern wormwood is known to occur near Beverley and could inhabit the
northern shoreline of the Columbia River across from the 100 Areas.
Table 4.9-1. Threatened (T) and endangered (E) species known or possibly occurring on the Hanford Site.
Common name Scientific name Federal State
Plants
Columbia milk-vetch Astragalus columbianus T
Columbia yellowcress Rorippa columbiae E
Hoover's desert parsley Lomatium tuberosum T
Northern wormwood Artemisia campestris E
borealis var. wormskioldii
Birds
Aleutian Canada goose Branta canadensis leucopareia T E
Peregrine falcon Falco peregrinus E E
Bald eagle Haliaeetus leucocephalus T T
White pelican Pelecanus erythrorhychos E
Sandhill crane Grus canadensis E
Ferruginous hawk Buteo regalis T
Mammals
Pygmy rabbit Brachylagus idahoensis T
Insects
Oregon silverspot butterfly Speyerra zerene hippolyta T T
4.9.4.2 Animals. The federal government lists the Aleutian Canada goose (Branta canadensis
leucopareia) and the bald eagle (Haliaeetus leucocephalus) as threatened and the peregrine falcon (Falco
peregrinus) as endangered. In addition to the peregrine falcon, Aleutian Canada goose, and bald eagle, Washington
lists the white pelican (Pelecanus erythrorhynchos) and sandhill crane (Grus canadensis) as endangered and the
ferruginous hawk (Buteo regalis) as threatened. The peregrine falcon is a casual migrant to the Hanford Site and
does not nest here. The Oregon silverspot butterfly (Speyerra zerene hippolyta) has recently been classified as a
threatened species by both the state and federal governments. The bald eagle is a regular winter resident and
forages on dead salmon and waterfowl along the Columbia River; nesting attempts have been made on the Hanford Site,
but those have not been successful to date. does not nest on the Hanford Site. Increased use of power poles for
nesting sites by the ferruginous hawk on the Hanford Site has been noted. Washington State Bald Eagle Protection
Rules were issued in 1986 (WAC-232-12-292). These rules require DOE to prepare a management plan to mitigate eagle
disturbance; this has been done by Fitzner and Weiss (DOE/RL 1994). The Endangered Species Act of 1973 also
requires that Section 7 consultation be undertaken when any action is taken that may jeopardize the existence of,
destroy, or adversely modify habitat of the bald eagle or other endangered species.
Table 4.9-2 lists the designated candidate species that are under consideration for possible addition to
the threatened or endangered list. Table 4.9-3 lists the plant species that are of concern in the state of
Washington and are presently listed as sensitive or are in one of three monitor groups (Washington Natural
Heritage Program 1994).
Sagebrush habitat is considered priority habitat by Washington because of its relative scarcity in the
state and its requirement as nesting/breeding habitat by loggerhead shrikes (federal and state candidate
species), sage sparrows (state candidate), burrowing owls (state candidate), pygmy rabbits (federal candidate
and state threatened), sage thrashers (state candidate), western sage grouse (federal and state candidate), and
sagebrush voles (state monitored). Although the last five species were not discovered during the present survey
of the proposed SNF site, the habitat should be considered potentially suitable for their use. Pygmy rabbits and
western sage grouse have only rarely been seen on the Hanford Site, and then primarily in upland regions.
Loggerhead shrikes have been seen frequently on the proposed SNF facility site and are known to select tall big
sagebrush as nest sites (Poole 1992). Although this species begins migration at the beginning of August (Poole
1992), one individual was observed during the present survey of the proposed SNF site. However, no nests were
located. Ground squirrel burrows used by burrowing owls and owl pellets were observed during the present survey of
the proposed SNF site. Numerous sage sparrows were also observed on the proposed SNF site. Pygmy rabbits would not
have been observed during this survey because they are primarily crepuscular and nocturnal and may have already
begun hibernation. However, this species is not known from lowland portions of the Hanford Site. The closest
known ferruginous hawk (federal candidate and state threatened species) nest is approximately 8.9 kilometers (5.3
miles) northwest of the subject area. The subject area should be considered as comprising a portion of the
foraging range of this species. No other species listed as endangered or threatened, or candidates for such
listing by Washington or federal governments, or species listed as monitor species by Washington State, were
observed on the proposed SNF site.
Table 4.9-2. Candidate species.
Common Name Scientific Name Federal State
Mollusks
Shortfaced lanx Fisherola (=Lanx) nuttalli X
Columbia pebble snail Fluminicola (=Lithoglyphus) X X
columbiana
Birds
Common loon Gavia immer X
Swainson's hawk Buteo swainsoni X
Ferruginous hawk Buteo regalis X
Western sage grouse Centocrcus urophasianus phaios X X
Sage sparrow Amphispiza belli X
Burrowing owl Athene cunicularia X
Loggerhead shrike Lanius ludovicianus X X
Northern goshawk Accipter gentilis X
Harlequin duck Histrionicus histrionicus X
Lewis' woodpecker Melanerpes lewis X
Long-billed curlew Numenius americanus X
Sage thrasher Oreoscoptes montanus X
Flammulated owl Otus fammeolus X
Western bluebird Sialia mexicana X
Tricolored blackbird Agelaius tricolor X
Golden eagle Aquila chrysaetos X
Black tern Chlidonius niger X
Mammals
Merriam's shrew Sorex merriami X
Pacific western big-eared bat Plecotus townsendii townsendii X
Pygmy rabbit Brachylagus idahoensis X
Insects
Columbia River tiger beetle Cinindela columbica X
Plants
Columbia milk-vetch Astragalus columbianus X
Columbia yellowcress Rorippa columbiae X
Hoover's desert parsley Lomatium tuberosum X
Northern wormwood Artemisia campetis borealis X
var. wormskioldii
Table 4.9-3. Washington plant species of concern occurring on the Hanford Site.
Common Name Scientific Name Statusa
Dense sedge Carex densa S
Gray cryptantha Cryptantha leucophaea S
Bristly cyptantha Cryptantha interrupta S
Shining flatsedge Cyperus rivularis S
Piper's daisy Erigeron piperianus S
Southern mudwort Limosella acaulis S
False-pimpernel Lindernia anagallidea S
Dwarf desert primrose Oenothera pygmaea S
Desert dodder Cuscuta denticulata M1
Thompson's sandwort Arenaria franklinii M2
v. thompsonii
Robinson's onion Allium robinsonii M3
Columbia River mugwort Artemisia lindleyana M3
Stalked-pod milkvetch Astragalus sclerocarpus M3
Medick milkvetch Astragalus speirocarpus M3
Crouching milkvetch Astragalus succumbens M3
Rosy balsamroot Balsamorhiza rosea M3
Palouse thistle Cirsium brevifolium M3
Smooth cliffbrake Pellaea glabella M3
Fuzzy beardtongue penstemon Penstemon eriantherus M3
Squill onion Allium scillioides M3
The following species may inhabit the Hanford Site, but have not been recently collected, and the known
collections are questionable in terms of locations or identification.
Palouse milkvetch Astragalus arrectus S
Few-flowered blue-eyed Mary Collinsia sparsiflora S
Coyote tobacco Nicotiana attenuata S
a. Abbreviations: S, sensitive; taxa vulnerable or declining, and could become endangered or threatened
without active management or removal of threats. M1, Monitor group 1; taxa for which there are insufficient
data to support listing as threatened, endangered, or sensitive. M2, Monitor group 2; taxa with unresolved
taxonomic questions. M3, Monitor group 3; taxa that are more abundant or less threatened than previously
assumed.
4.9.5 Radionuclide Levels in Biological Resources
Samples of vegetation and wildlife are routinely collected as part of the site environ-
mental monitoring program and analyzed for various radionuclides. The following summarizes the
levels reported in Woodruff and Hanf (1993).
A single sample of vegetation collected on the Hanford Site contained 0.015 picocuries strontium-90 per
gram dry weight and 0.0059 picocuries cesium-137 per gram dry weight. These values are lower by nearly an order of
magnitude from those reported for the previous five years. Mean values of cesium-137 in upland gamebird muscle (n
= 4) in 1992 were 0.02 picocuries per gram wet weight and were about an order of magnitude higher than similar
samples collected off of the Hanford Site the previous five years (n = 42). Mean values of cesium-137 in rabbit
muscle (n = 12) were 0.09 picocuries per gram wet weight and exceed those collected on the Hanford Site the previous
five years (n = 27) by about threefold, and were an order of magnitude higher than samples collected off of the
Hanford Site. Values for strontium-90 in rabbit bone (n = 12) had a mean value of 4.08 picocuries per gram wet
weight; mean values collected on the Hanford Site for the previous five years (n = 37) were 43 picocuries per gram
wet weight, an order of magnitude higher. Mean strontium-90 concentrations in the bones of rabbits (n = 20)
collected off of the Hanford Site were 0.37 picocuries per gram wet weight. One sample of muscle collected from a
deer in the 200-Areas contained 0.006 picocuries cesium-137 per gram wet weight, nearly two orders of magnitude
less than a similar sample collected off of the Hanford Site. Fish populations are safe for human consumption.
Radionuclide levels of fish from the Hanford Reach are not significantly higher than those of fish found upstream.
Because the confluence of the Snake and Columbia Rivers is downstream from the Hanford Site, the Snake River salmon
runs do not migrate through the Hanford reach.
4.10 Noise
Noise is technically defined as sound waves perceptible to the human ear. Sound waves are characterized by
frequency, measured in Hertz (Hz), and sound pressure expressed as decibels (dB). Noise levels are often reported
as the equivalent sound level (Leq), which normally refers to the equivalent continuous sound level for an
intermittent sound, such as traffic noise. The Leq is expressed in A-weighted decibels (dBA) over a specified
period of time and is a frequency-weighted measure of sound level related to human hearing characteristics and the
concept of equal loudness.
4.10.1 Hanford Site Sound Levels
Most industrial facilities on the Hanford Site are located far enough away from the site boun-
dary that noise levels at the boundary are not measurable or are barely distinguishable from back-
ground noise levels. Modeling of environmental noises has been performed for commercial reac-
tors and State Highway 240 through the Hanford Site. These data are not concerned with background
levels of noise and are not reviewed here. Two studies of environmental noise were done at Hanford,
as described in subsections 4.10.2 and 4.10.3. One study reported environmental noise measurements taken
in 1981 during site characterization of the Skagit/Hanford Nuclear Power Plant Site (NRC 1982). The second
was a series of site characterization studies performed in 1987 that included measurement of background
environmental noise levels at five places on the Hanford Site. Additionally, such activities as well drilling
and sampling have the potential for producing noise in the field apart from major permanent facilities. Noise
can be disruptive to wildlife and studies have been done to compile noise data in remote areas.
4.10.2 Skagit/Hanford Data
Preconstruction measurements of environmental noise were taken in June 1981 on the Hanford Site (NRC
1982). Monitoring was conducted at 15 sites, showing point noise level reading ranging from 30 to 60.5 dBA. The
corresponding values for more isolated areas ranged from 30 to 38.8 dBA. Measurements taken in the vicinity of the
sites where the Washington Public Power Supply System was constructing nuclear power plants ranged from 50.6 to 64
dBA, reflecting operation of construction equipment. Measurements taken along the Columbia River near the intake
structures for WNP-2 were 47.7 and 52.1 dBA, compared to more remote river noise levels of 45.9 dBA (measured about
three miles upstream of the intake structures). Community noise levels from point measurements in North Richland
(3000 Area at Horn Rapids Road and Stevens Road [Route 240]) were 60.5 dBA, largely attributed to traffic. North
Richland is about 20 miles from the proposed site for SNF facilities.
4.10.3 Basalt Waste Isolation Project Data
Background noise levels were determined at five sites located within the Hanford Site. Noise levels are
expressed as equivalent sound levels for 24 hours (Leq-24). The average noise level for these five sites was 38.8
dBA on the dates tested. Wind was identified as the primary contributor to background noise levels with winds
exceeding 12 mph significantly affecting noise levels. This study concluded that background noise levels in
undeveloped areas at Hanford can best be described as a mean Leq-24 of 24 to 36 dBA (Cushing 1992). Periods of high
wind, which normally occur in the spring, would elevate background noise levels.
4.10.4 Noise Levels of Hanford Field Activities
In the interest of protecting Hanford workers and complying with Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) standards for noise in the workplace, the Hanford Environmental Health Foundation has
monitored noise levels resulting from several routine operations performed in the field at Hanford. These
included well drilling, pile driving, compressor operations, and water wagon operation. Occupational sources of
noise propagated in the field from outdoor activities ranged from 93.4 to 96 dBA.
4.10.5 Noise Related to the Spent Nuclear Fuel Facility
Ambient noise levels at the proposed project SNF site just west of the 200-East Area on the Hanford Site are
very low and would be expected to be less than 40 dBAs. The land is currently vacant, and no vehicular traffic
transverses the site. A lightly used road borders the eastern side of the proposed SNF site and occasional traffic
generates moderate amounts of vehicular noise, but only for those personnel near the road. Existing traffic noise
on the Hanford Site is centered primarily on the main arteries leading into the site. These are Route 4 South,
which connects with the Richland Bypass (Route 240) and eventually with Interstate 182. Another main road is Route
10, which also connects with Route 240 and leads into the 200 Areas in the site center. It is estimated that 3,300
privately owned vehicles travel to and from the site each day using these roads. The vast majority of the privately
owned vehicle movement occurs during the rush hours of 6 to 8 a.m. and 3:30 to 6 p.m. In addition, it is estimated
that 3,600 oncoming truck shipments, 445 oncoming rail shipments, and 837 intrasite truck shipments occur each day
on the Hanford Site. The movement of all this vehicular traffic generates noise along these affected road
corridors. However, little, if any, population exists along these roadways because of the geographic remoteness
of work areas on the Hanford Site. Information on noise contours generated by peak rush hour traffic in terms of
community Leqs and dBAs is not available at this time.
4.10.6 Background Information
Studies at Hanford of noise propagation have been concerned primarily with occupational noise at work sites.
Environmental noise levels have not been extensively evaluated due to the remoteness of most Hanford
activities and their isolation from receptors that are covered by federal or state statutes. The Noise Control Act
of 1972 and its subsequent amendments (Quiet Communities Act of 1978, 42 USC 4901-4918, 40 CFR 201-211) empower the
state to direct. The State of Washington has adopted RCW 70.107, which authorizes the Washington Department of
Ecology to implement rules consistent with federal noise control legislation. The Hanford Site is currently in
compliance with state and federal noise regulations.
4.11 Traffic and Transportation
4.11.1 Regional Infrastructure
This section discusses the existing transportation environment at and around the Hanford Site. Personnel
and most material shipments are transported by road. Bulk materials or large items are shipped by barge. Rail
transportation is used only to move irradiated fuel, certain high-level radioactive solid wastes, equipment, and
materials (primarily coal). High-level and low-level wastes from spent fuel stabilization are transported to
waste management facilities by pipeline.
The regional transportation network in the Hanford vicinity includes the areas in Benton and Franklin
Counties from which 93 percent of the commuter traffic associated with the site originates. Interstate highways
that serve the area are I-82, I-182, and I-90 (Figure 4-19). Interstate-82 is 8 kilometers (5 miles)
south-southwest of the site. Interstate-182, a 24-kilometer (15-mile) long urban connector route 8 kilometers (5
miles) south-southeast of the site, provides an east-west corridor linking I-82 to the Tri-Cities area.
Interstate-90 (not shown in Figure 4-19), located north of the site, is the major link to Seattle and Spokane and
extends to the east coast; SR 224 (not shown in Figure 4-19), also south of the site, serves as a 16-kilometers
Figure 4-19. Transportation routes in the Hanford vicinity. (10-mile) link between I-82 and SR 240. State Route 243 exits the northwestern boundary of the site and serves as a
primary link between Hanford and I-90. State Route 24 enters the site from the west, continues eastward across the
northernmost portion of the site, and intersects SR 17 approximately 24 kilometers (15 miles) east of the site
boundary. State Route 17 is a north-south route that links I-90 to the Tri-Cities and joins U.S. Route 395, which
continues south through the Tri-Cities. State Route 14 (not shown in Figure 4-19) connects with I-90 at Vantage,
Washington, and provides ready access to I-84 (not shown in Figure 4-19) at several locations along the Oregon and
Washington border.
General weight, width, and speed limits have been established for highways in the Hanford vicinity.
However, no unusual laws or restrictions that have been identified would significantly influence general regional
transportation.
Airline passenger and air freight service is provided at the Tri-Cities Airport owned and operated by the
Port of Pasco, at Pasco, Washington. The air terminal is located approximately 16 kilometers (10 miles) from the
Hanford Site. Delta Airlines provides domestic Boeing-737 and 727 service to Salt Lake City where multiple major
airline service is available for domestic and international travel. Two feeder airlines service the Tri-Cities:
United Express, a subsidiary of United Airlines, and Horizon Airlines, a subsidiary of Alaska Airlines, provide
service to Seattle, Portland, and several other regional cities. Federal Express serves the Tri-Cities by charter
airplane from Spokane to Pasco and Airborne Express serves the Tri-Cities with charter airplane from Seattle to
the Richland airport, Richland, Washington.
4.11.2 Hanford Site Infrastructure
Hanford's onsite road network consists of rural arterial routes (see Figure 4-20). Only 104 of the 461
kilometers (65 of the 288 miles) of paved roads at Hanford are accessible to the public. Most onsite employee
travel occurs along Route 4, with controlled access at the Yakima and Wye barricades. State Route 240 is the main
public route through the site. Public highways SR 24 and SR 243 also traverse the site.
The highway network is in excellent condition. A recently completed major highway improvement project
involved repavement and widening of the four-lane access route to the Wye Barricade. The highway network has been
used extensively for transporting large
Figure 4-20. Transportation routes on the Hanford Site. equipment items, construction materials, and radioactive materials. Resurfacing, sealing, and restoration
programs are currently planned for segments of SR 17, SR 224, SR 240, and U.S. Route 395.
In 1988 about 32 percent of the work force at Hanford worked in offices in Richland. The remaining work
force was on the site. Approximately 80 percent of the work force resides in the Tri-Cities: Richland (45
percent), Kennewick (28 percent), and Pasco (7 percent). Approximately 1600 of the employees on the site use bus
transportation.
In 1988 nearly 12 million miles were logged by DOE vehicles at Hanford. In addition, an estimated 3,300
privately owned vehicles were driven onsite each weekday and 560 were driven onsite each weekend day. Assuming a
round-trip distance of 30 miles onsite for each of these vehicles, a total of about 40 million miles were driven
annually by workers onsite.
The primary highways used by commuters are SR 24, SR 240, and I-182; 10, 90, and 10 percent of the work force
use these routes, respectively (totals to more than 100 percent because some commuters use two of the routes).
With these commuting patterns, workers annually travel about 27 million miles offsite. Trucks used for material
shipment to Hanford compose about 5 percent of the vehicular traffic on and around the site. At present there are
periods of moderate traffic congestion, some of which is expected to be alleviated by a new road to the 200 Areas.
During 1988, 169 accidents were reported onsite, with 20 involving DOE vehicles. The other accidents
involved privately owned vehicles and included seven injury accidents and one fatal accident on SR 240. Among
offsite highway segments of concern, most accidents occurred along I-82. According to available data, the 15
accidents involving trucks in 1987 in the Benton/
Franklin county study area resulted in 13 injuries and 3
fatalities.
Onsite rail transport is provided by a short-line railroad owned and operated by DOE. This line connects
just south of the Yakima River with the Union Pacific line, which in turn interchanges with the Washington Central
and Burlington Northern railroads at Kennewick. AMTRAK passenger rail service is provided in the Tri-Cities at
the Burlington Northern depot at Pasco. Approximately 145,000 rail miles were logged at Hanford in 1988,
primarily transporting coal to steam plants. Two noninjury rail accidents occurred at Hanford in 1988.
The Hanford Site infrequently uses the Port of Benton dock facilities on the Columbia River for off-loading
large shipments. Overland wheeled trailers are then used to transport those shipments to the site. No barge
accidents were reported in 1988.
4.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety
This section summarizes the Hanford Site programs designed to protect the health and safety of workers and
the public. It also describes existing radiological and nonradiological conditions and provides a historical
perspective on worker and public exposures and potential health effects.
The section is based on existing documentation and generic descriptions. Reference is made to policies,
orders, guidance documents, annual occupational exposure and environmental reports, and to other site descriptive
documents. The parameters of greatest interest are the history of radiological releases and worker radiation
doses, particularly those associated with the storage of SNF.
The DOE, the DOE-RL, and all Hanford Site contractors have established policies to help ensure a safe and
healthful workplace for all employees and visitors and to protect the environment and public health and safety.
The DOE-RL manager has the overall responsibility for safety and health at the Hanford Site. Each contractor
develops and enforces occupational and public health and safety programs that meet or exceed the requirements of
DOE orders, other federal agencies, and Washington State.
4.12.1 Occupational Health and Safety
Programs are in place at the Hanford Site to protect workers from radiological and nonradiological
hazards. Radiological protection (health physics) programs are based on requirements in regulations and DOE
orders, and on guidance in radiological control manuals. Occupational nonradiological health and safety programs
are composed of industrial hygiene programs and occupational safety programs.
4.12.1.1 Radiological Health and Safety/Health Physics Program. In order to help ensure that
workers at DOE facilities are adequately protected from ionizing radiation, the DOE promulgates radiation
protection standards for occupational workers. These standards include radiation dose limits to control worker
dose from both external radiation and internally deposited radionuclides. The current radiation dose limits were
promulgated in 10 CFR Part 835, "Occupational Radiation Protection," which was enacted in 1993. This regulation
includes limits on total effective dose equivalent to workers, dose to individual organs, and dose to members of
the public (including minors and unborn children of workers) that may be incidentally exposed while at DOE
facilities.
Hanford contractors base their radiological protection programs, procedures, and manuals primarily on 10
CFR Part 835. This regulation establishes the criteria for radiation protection for occupational workers. It
lists allowable doses, establishes a policy on keeping doses as low as reasonably achievable, and specifies
training requirements for radiation protection personnel and other workers. The DOE Radiological Control Manual,
DOE/EH-0256T, issued by DOE Headquarters, establishes practices for conducting radiological control activities at
all DOE sites. The DOE requires monitoring and reporting of radiation exposure records for individual workers and
certain visitors. Monitoring is required by 10 CFR Part 835 when the potential exists for an individual to receive
an annual effective dose equivalent above 100 millirem (1 millisievert), or an annual dose equivalent to an
individual organ greater than 10 percent of DOE occupational exposure limits. Personnel to be monitored are
assigned a thermoluminescent dosimeter that is worn at all times during radiation work on the Hanford Site. This
instrument measures the amount and type of external radiation dose the worker receives. Dosimeters for all DOE and
contractor personnel are processed by Pacific Northwest Laboratory. The centralized operational dosimetry
program reads, records, and summarizes results of dosimetry data as required. Records of occupational exposure
are maintained, and reports of radiation dose are provided annually to each worker. Summary reports are also
provided to DOE and published periodically (Smith et al. 1992)
4.12.1.2 Radiation Doses to Workers. The reported cumulative doses to all Hanford Site workers and
visitors for all activities are given as a baseline for site operations.
In 1993, about 14,500 workers were monitored at the Hanford Site. Of those monitored, 11,000 were classified
as radiation workers, with an average annual dose equivalent of 0.02 rem per individual (Lyon). This
dose is well below the 10 CFR Part 835 dose limit of 5 rem per year and the DOE Administrative Control Level of 2 rem
per year for occupational exposure.
For 1993, the estimated collective dose-equivalent was 200 person-rem for all Hanford Site radiation
workers. Based on standard dose-to-health effects conversion factors (ICRP 1991), no health effects would be
expected to result among workers so exposed.
The worker radiation dose of most interest in this document is the cumulative collective dose to SNF
workers, which is described in the following subsection. The SNF management alternatives considered in this
document are similar to those current work activities associated with maintenance and storage of SNF at the
Hanford Site.
4.12.1.3 Radiation Dose to K-Basin Workers. On the Hanford Site the bulk of the SNF is stored in the
105-KE and 105-KW Basins, which are collectively referred to as the K-Basins. The K-Basins are located within the
100-K Area of the Hanford Site. The basins are filled with recirculating water to cool the fuel and to provide
radiological shielding for personnel working in the facility. Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) operates the K
Basins for DOE. Therefore the best measure of radiation dose from SNF is the dose to WHC employees assigned to work
at the K Basins. The collective radiation dose to WHC K Basin workers over the 2-year period 1991 and 1992 averaged
22 person-rem per year, or approximately 0.4 rem per year for each worker. An average of 58 workers were assigned
to the K-Basin during 1991 and 1992, or approximately 29 workers per basin (Holloman and Motzco 1992, 1993).
The nominal collective radiation dose per year of operation of each SNF basin in the 100-K Area is estimated
to be 11 person-rem. During the plutonium production mission, each reactor at the Hanford Site had a similar
nuclear fuel storage basin associated with its operation. This resulted in an estimated total radiation dose of
2000 person-rem, assuming 179 total operating reactor years plus six years of K-Basin operation following shutdown
of the production reactors (Bergsman 1994). Therefore, operation of nuclear fuel storage basins has accounted for
approximately 2.4 percent of the total radiological dose received by all Hanford Site workers from 1945 through
1985, 86,100 rem (Gilbert et al. 1993). Based on standard dose-to-health effects conversion factors (ICRP 1991),
the dose to SNF workers since Hanford start up would statistically relate to one fatal cancer among these workers.
4.12.1.4 Worker Safety and Accidents. No incidents of overexposure to radiation have been reported to
DOE during 1990 and 1991 in association with SNF storage activities at the Hanford Site. Overexposures are defined
as any exposure over regulatory limits established by the DOE (WHC 1990; Lansing et al. 1992). In the four-year
period from 1991 through 1994, industrial-type accidents resulted in 98 lost working days at the K Basins out of a
total of approximately 70,000 days worked.
4.12.1.5 Industrial Hygiene Program. Occupational nonradiological health and safety programs at
Hanford are composed of industrial hygiene and occupational safety programs. Industrial hygiene programs address
such subjects as toxic chemicals and physical agents, carcinogens, noise, biological hazards, lasers, asbestos,
and ergonomic factors. Occupational safety programs address such subjects as machine safety, hoisting and
rigging, electrical safety, building codes, welding safety, and compressed gas cylinders.
The governing document is DOE 5480.10, "Contractor Industrial Hygiene Program," dated 6-26-85. The DOE-RL
implementing procedure for DOE 5480.10 is RLIP 5480.10 "Industrial Hygiene Program," dated 7-30-90. The procedure
establishes additional requirements and direction for implementation of an industrial hygiene program for DOE-RL
and its contractors. In addition to the program requirements of DOE 5480.10, the RL Industrial Health Program
addresses the following subject areas:
(1) Use of respiratory equipment
(2) Asbestos material
(3) Regulated carcinogen or suspect carcinogenic materials
(4) Sanitation
(5) Control of hazardous materials
(6) Filter testing
(7) Hearing conservation
(8) Indoor air quality
(9) Human factors
(10) Hazardous waste site safety/health management.
The responsibilities and authorities of the Occupational Medical Services Contractor (contracted by DOE to
Hanford Environmental Health Foundation) of the Industrial Health Program are also described in DOE 5480.10.
These are 1) to provide technical industrial health support services, that is, air and water monitoring; 2) to
evaluate, recommend, and train workers in the use of respiratory devices, as requested by DOE-RL and its
contractors; 3) to provide an industrial health analytical laboratory; 4) to conduct work environment surveys;
5) to support noise abatement and hearing conservation; and 6) to maintain permanent records of personal exposure
monitoring data. Hanford Environmental Health Foundation maintains centralized records and provides DOE-RL and
its contractors with the results of monitoring efforts.
The RL contractors are required to do the following:
- Conduct an effective program to educate employees on the potential health hazards in their work
environment, the control measures, and the protection necessary to reduce those risks to
acceptable levels.
- Inform employees of health hazards and the results from monitoring of harmful toxic or physical
agents in the work environment, and document this action.
Records are maintained in accordance with DOE 1324.2, DOE 5483.1A, and DOE 5484.1. Contractors of DOE-RL
are required to maintain records of employee toxic and physical agent exposure and potential personal exposure
data. Contractors of DOE-RL are also required to maintain Hanford Site material safety data sheets.
The DOE requires that as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) principles for radiological and
nonradiological hazardous materials be applied in the preparation of all health and safety plans, and that all
such ALARA criteria are followed during the course of the work.
Training requirements consistent with 29 CFR 1910.120 for entry into sites potentially containing toxic or
hazardous material are specified by DOE (29 CFR OSHA 1991).
The DOE-RL requires that all work (including preliminary investigation activities) be conducted in such a
manner that it conforms to applicable federal and state safety and health standards and that all operating
equipment meets all safety and operability standards and requirements.
4.12.2 Public Health and Safety
The DOE has the responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act to establish the necessary standards to protect
members of the public from radiation exposures resulting from DOE activities. In addition, Presidential Order
12088, "Federal Compliance with Pollution Control Standards," requires all federal facilities to comply with the
legislative acts and regulations relating to the prevention, control, and abatement of environmental pollution.
The Hanford Site is also in compliance with EPA's National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for
Radionuclides, 40 CFR 61, Subpart H. The EPA offsite air emissions limiting standard is 10 millirem/year
effective dose equivalent to the public. The National Primary Drinking Water Regulations of the Safe Drinking
Water Act apply to the drinking water supplies at the Hanford Site. Several radionuclides are included in these
water standards (40 CFR 141, 142; 56 FR 33050-33127, 1991) For 1993, the Hanford Site Environmental Report (Dirkes
et al. 1994) relates that the facility is in compliance with these requirements.
4.12.2.1 Environmental Programs. DOE 5400.1, "General Environmental Protection Program,"
establishes the requirement for environmental protection programs. The Hanford Site Environmental Report is
prepared annually pursuant to DOE 5400.1 to summarize environmental data that characterize Hanford Site
environmental management performance and regulatory compliance status. The most recent report summarizes the
status in 1993 of compliance with environmental regulations, describes programs at the Hanford Site, discusses
estimates of radiation dose to the public from Hanford activities, and presents information on effluent monitoring
and environmental surveillance, including groundwater monitoring (Dirkes et al. 1994). In 1993, environmental
programs were conducted at the Hanford Site to restore environmental quality, manage waste, develop appropriate
technology for cleanup activities, and study the environment.
4.12.2.2 Environmental Monitoring/Surveillance Information. Environmental monitoring at the
Hanford Site consists of effluent monitoring and environmental surveillance, including groundwater monitoring.
Effluent monitoring is performed by the operators at the facility or at the point of release to the environment.
Environmental surveillance consists of sampling and analyzing environmental media on and off the Hanford Site to
detect and quantify potential contaminants and to assess their environmental and human health significance. The
annual Hanford Site Environmental Reports (Dirkes et al. 1994) present a summary of this information for the
Hanford Site. The Hanford Site operations contractor, Westinghouse Hanford Company, also reports summary data
annually on radioactive and nonradioactive materials released into the environment from facilities they manage
(WHC 1993a). Several federal and state laws and regulations require the reporting of radioactive and
nonradioactive releases. The Hanford Site reports pursuant to the federal Clean Air Act (Diediker et al. 1994) and
Clean Water Act.
4.12.2.3 Natural Cancer Incidence. The probability of an American contracting cancer in their
lifetime is 340 in 1000 (American Cancer Society 1993), and 20 percent of Americans will die from cancer, an
estimated 526,000 cancer deaths in 1993. Table 4.12-1 shows the estimated 1993 cancer incidence for different
types of cancer for the United States and for Washington State. For the United States the probability of
contracting cancer in 1993 is 4.9 in 1000, and 2.2 in 1000 of dying from that cancer. For Washington State the
probability of contracting cancer in 1993 is 3.2 in 1000, and 1.4 in 1000 of dying from that cancer.
The expected survival period for cancer victims has increased as detection and treatment technologies have
improved. Currently, 40 percent of the victims of all forms of cancer survive for at least 5 years.
4.12.2.4 Potential Radiation Doses. Potential radiation doses and exposures to members of the public
from releases of radionuclides to air and water at the Hanford Site are calculated and reported annually by the
Surface Environmental Surveillance Project at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory.
Table 4.12-1. Estimated 1993 cancer incidence and cancer deaths in the United States and the state of Washington
for different forms of cancer (American Cancer Society 1993).
United Statesa 1993 Washington Stateb 1993
Type of Cancer Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated
new cases deaths new cases deaths
All types & sites 1,170,000 526,000 14,825 6,350
Female breast 182,000 46,000 3,300 850
Colon & rectum 152,000 57,000 2,400 950
Lung 170,000 149,000 3,100 2,700
Oral 29,800 7,700 500 125
Uterus 44,500 10,100 600 125
Prostate 165,000 35,000 3,300 700
Skin melanoma 32,000 6,800 600 125
Pancreas 27,700 25,000 475 425
Leukemia 29,300 18,600 550 350
a. Total population 250 million.
b. Total population 5 million.
4.12.2.4.1 Maximally Exposed Individual (MEI) Dose.
The MEI is defined in the Hanford Site
Environmental Report as "an hypothetical person who lives at a location and has a lifestyle such that it is
unlikely that other members of the public would receive higher radiation doses" (Dirkes et al. 1994). The
potential radiation doses to MEI have been published in annual Hanford Site Environmental Reports since 1957. For
1993, the total potential dose (via air and water pathways) to the MEI from Hanford operations was calculated to be
0.03 mrem (Dirkes et al. 1994). Estimates of the potential cumulative Effective Dose Equivalent (EDE) to the MEI
from both air and water sources for the 28-year period 1994 through 1972 were reconstructed by the Hanford
Environmental Dose Reconstruction (HEDR) Project (TSP 1994).
The highest cumulative dose to an adult resident for the years 1944 through 1972 from pathways associated
with releases to the air was 1 rem; almost all of this dose was received during 1945. The highest cumulative dose
to an adult resident for the years 1944 through 1971 from pathways associated with releases to the water was 1.5
rem; about one-half of this was received during the period from 1954 through 1964. Thus the total cumulative dose
from both air and water releases was about 2.5 rem. For comparison, the dose received by an average resident during
this 28-year period from natural background radiation was approximately 9 rem. Radiation doses received by the
public from Hanford releases after 1972 were vanishingly small.
The maximum cumulative dose to the thyroid of a small child for the years 1944 through 1951 was estimated to
be 240 rad; the majority of this dose was received during 1945.
4.12.2.4.2 Population Dose - Estimates of the potential cumulative dose to the population
within 50 miles (80 km) of the Hanford Site for 1944 through 1972 were estimated from the releases to air and water
developed by the Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction (HEDR) project.
Pathways of exposure associated with
releases to the air dominated the population doses until after 1954 when their contribution decreased rapidly.
The cumulative population dose during 1944 through 1972 was 100,000 person-rem; essentially all of this dose was
received through air pathways in 1945. The cumulative population dose during 1944 through 1972 associated with
water pathways was estimated to be about 6,000 person-rem; most of this dose was received during the decade between
1954 and 1964.
The total potential radiation dose to the population within 50 miles (80 km) for 1993 was 0.4 person-rem
(Dirkes et al. 1994). By comparison, the total dose received in 1993 by this same population was about 110,000
person-rem.
About 50 cancer deaths would be implied by the total public radiation dose from Hanford activities since
1944 using standard dose-to-health-effects conversion factors (ICRP 91). Essentially all of these would have been
a result of radiation exposures received during 1945. For perspective, the population within 50 miles (80 km) of
the Site would have experienced about 75,000 cancer deaths in 1993 from all causes.
4.13 Site Services
4.13.1 Water Consumption
The principal source of water in the Tri-Cities and the Hanford Site is the Columbia River, from which the
water systems of Richland, Pasco, and Kennewick draw a large portion of the average 4.3 x 107 cubic meters
(11.38 billion gallons) used in 1991. Each city operates its own supply and treatment system. The Richland water
supply system derives about 67 percent of its water from the Columbia River, approximately 15 to 20 percent from a
well field in North Richland, and the remaining from groundwater wells. The city of Richland's total usage in 1991
was 2.1 x 107 cubic meters (5.65 billion gallons). This current usage represents approximately 58 percent of the
maximum supply capacity. The city of Pasco system also draws from the Columbia River for its water needs; the 1991
estimate of consumption is 1.1 x 107 cubic meters (2.81 billion gallons). The Kennewick system uses two wells and
the Columbia River for its supply. These wells serve as the sole source of water between November and March and can
provide approximately 62 percent of the total maximum supply of 2.8 x 107 cubic meters (7.3 billion gallons). Total
usage of those wells in 1991 was 1.1 x 107 cubic meters (2.92 billion gallons).
4.13.2 Electrical Consumption
Electricity is provided to the Tri-Cities by the Benton County Public Utility District, Benton Rural
Electrical Association, Franklin County Public Utility District, and City of Richland Energy Services Department.
All the power that these utilities provide in the local area is purchased from the Bonneville Power
Administration, a federal power marketing agency. The average rate for residential customers served by the three
local utilities is approximately $0.0396 per kilowatt hour. Electrical power for the Hanford Site is purchased
wholesale from the Bonneville Power Administration. Energy requirements for the site during FY 1988 exceeded
550 average megawatts.
Natural gas, provided by the Cascade Natural Gas Corporation, serves a small portion of residents, with
4800 residential customers in June 1992.
In the Pacific Northwest, hydropower, and to a lesser extent, coal and nuclear power, constitute the
region's electrical generation system. Total generating capacity is about 40,270 megawatts. Approximately 74
percent of the region's installed generating capacity is hydroelectric, which supplies approximately 65 percent
of the electricity used by the region. Coal-fired generating capacity is 6,702 megawatts in the region, 16 percent
of the region's electrical generating capacity. Two commercial nuclear power plants are in service in the Pacific
Northwest, with a 2247-megawatt capacity of 6 percent of the region's generating capacity. Oil and natural gas
account for about 3 percent of capacity.
The region's electrical power system, more than any other system in the nation, is dominated by hydropower.
On average, the region's hydropower system can produce 16,400 megawatts. Variable precipitation and limited
storage capabilities alter the system's output from 12,300 average megawatts under critical water conditions to
20,000 average megawatts in record high water years. The Pacific Northwest system's reliance on hydroelectric
power means that it is more constrained by the seasonal variations in peak demand than in meeting momentary peak
demand.
Throughout the 1980s, the Northwest had more electric power than it required and was operating with a
surplus. This surplus has been exhausted, however, and there is only approximately enough power supplied by the
existing system to meet the current electricity needs. Hydropower improvement projects currently under
construction in the Northwest include about 150 megawatts of new capacity. The cost and availability of several
other resources are currently being studied (Northwest Power Planning Council 1986). Approximate rates for
current consumption of electricity, coal, propane, natural gas, and other utilities at the Hanford Site are shown
in Table 4.13-1.
4.13.3 Waste Water Disposal
The major incorporated areas of Benton and Franklin counties are served by municipal wastewater treatment
systems, whereas the unincorporated areas are served by onsite septic systems. Richland's wastewater treatment
system is designed to treat a total capacity of 27 million cubic meters per year (a daily average flow of
8.9 million gallons per day with a peak flow of 44 million gallons per day). In 1991 the system processed an
average of 4.83 million gallons per day. The Kennewick system similarly has significant excess capacity, with a
treatment capability of 12 million cubic meters per year (8.7 million gallons per day); 1991 usage was 4.8 million
gallons per day. Pasco's waste-treatment system processes an average of 2.22 million gallons per day, while the
system could treat 4.25 million gallons per day or 16.2 liters per day.
4.14 Materials and Waste Management
This section discusses the management of materials and waste and presents both a historic overview and the
current status of the various waste types being generated and stored at the Hanford Site. Regulatory requirements
governing the management of these materials and wastes are discussed in Section 2.2.
Table 4.13-1. Approximate consumption of utilities and energy on the Hanford Site (1992).
Energy Consumption
Electricity 340,000 megawatt-hours
Coal 45,000 metric tons (50,000 tons)
Fuel Oil 83,000 cubic meters (22,000,000 gallons)
Natural Gas 680,000 cubic meters (24,000,00 cubic feet)
LPG-propane 110 cubic meters (29,000 gallons)
Gasoline 3,600 cubic meters (950,000 gallons)
Diesel 1,700 cubic meters (450,000 gallons)
Other Utilities
Water 15,000,000 cubic meters (4,000+ million gallons)
Power Demand 57 megawatts
In order for Hanford programs to meet operational and mission requirements, many hazardous materials are
or have been used onsite. Hazardous materials are not waste, but when no longer useful, may become waste. Because
of the potential for impacts to human health and the environment, hazardous materials have been included in
Subsection 4.14.7.
Wastes at the Hanford Site are generated by both facility operations and environmental restoration
activities. Facility operations include nuclear and non-nuclear research, materials testing, laboratory
analysis, high-level waste stabilization, and nuclear fuel storage, manufacturing, repair and maintenance, and
general office work. They also include operation of all waste management facilities for treatment, storage, or
disposal of Hanford wastes, as well as any waste shipped to Hanford for storage or disposal. Environmental
restoration operations include remediation (identifying and arranging for the cleanup of inactive waste sites)
and decontamination and decommissioning of surplus facilities.
Wastes and materials handled at the Hanford Site are described in subsections 4.14.1 through 4.14.7. These
wastes and materials have been classified as high-level waste (discussed in detail in subsection 4.14.1),
transuranic waste (discussed in detail in subsection 4.14.2), mixed low-level waste (discussed in detail in
subsection 4.14.3), low-level waste (discussed in detail in subsection 4.14.4), hazardous waste (discussed in
detail in subsection 4.14.5), industrial solid waste (discussed in detail in subsection 4.14.6), and hazardous
materials (discussed in detail in subsection 4.14.7). Table 4.14-1 shows expected waste disposal rates as of the
year 2000, including the expected disposition.
The total amount of waste generated and disposed of at the Hanford Site has been, and is being, reduced
through the efforts of the pollution prevention and waste minimization programs at the site. The Hanford Waste
Minimization (and Pollution Prevention) Program is an ambitious program aimed at source reduction, product
substitution, recycling, surplus chemical exchange, and waste treatment. The program is tailored to meet
Executive Order 12780, DOE orders, RCRA, and EPA guidelines. All wastes on the Hanford Site, including
radioactive, mixed, hazardous and non-hazardous regulated wastes are included in the Hanford Waste Minimization
Program.
Table 4.14-1. Baseline waste quantities as of the year 2000 at Hanforda.
Annual disposal Annual disposal Total annual
volume from volume from disposal volume
stabilization stabilization from all waste
operations of stored wastes stabilization
wastes (m3/yr) (m3/yr) (m3/yr)
Waste identification Disposition
High-level waste 0 240 240c Interim onsite
solidb storaged
Transuranic waste 0 170 170c Interim onsite
solide storagef
Low-level waste 13,000 7,000 20,000 Onsite
solidg disposal
Mixed waste 300 0 300 Interim onsite
solidg storage
Hazardous waste 100 0 100 Offsite
liquid and solid disposal
Other waste
nonhazardous
liquid 2,000,000 10,000,000 12,000,000 Liquid effluent
solid 38,000 0 38,000 Onsite disposal
sewage
liquidh 210,000 0 210,000 Liquid effluent
solidi 4 0 4 Onsite disposal
a. Baseline values are projected from 1988 data.
b. Liquid high-level waste (HLW) is held in interim storage and then processed to a solid form for disposal.
c. The baseline value is taken from 1988 data for planned future activities.
d. These wastes are targeted for disposal at a federal repository.
e. Liquids containing transuranics are processed as HLW.
f. These wastes are targeted for disposal at WIPP.
g. Solidified or absorbed-liquid-waste quantities are included in the solid waste quantity.
h. Liquid effluents from sewage treatment operations.
i. Solids from sewage treatment operations.
Reductions in the volumes of radioactive wastes generated have been achieved through methods such as
intensive surveying, waste segregation, recycling, and use of administration and engineering controls. Some
examples of waste reduction follow:
- Waste minimization efforts have reduced the volume of waste water discharged to process trenches in
the 300 Area by more than 5,600 cubic meters (>1.5 mil-
lion gallons) per day. By the end of 1992,
waste reduction efforts had reduced liquid waste by more than 22,000 cubic meters (>5.8 million
gallons) (Woodruff and Hanf 1993).
- In 1991, 440,645 kilograms (971,440 pounds) of ferrous metals, 49,323 kilograms (108,737 pounds)
of nonferrous metals, 275 cubic meters (9,076 cubic feet) of wood scrap, and 136,077 kilograms
(299,993 pounds) of scrap paper were recycled. During 1992, approximately 181,440 kilograms
(400,000 pounds) of paper were recycled (Woodruff and Hanf 1993).
On-going projects include packaging reduction, waste minimization design, and technology transfer.
Databases are used at the Hanford Site to track and manage waste management information. These databases
have been screened to ensure that the information supplied is supported by official databases, reports, or other
public documents. Although the most reliable data available have been used to quantify and characterize waste
volumes, past waste volumes are imprecise and may be subject to change as characterization of previously disposed
waste is undertaken and completed.
4.14.1 High-Level Waste
High-level radioactive waste is defined in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (PL 97-425) as "(A) the
highly radioactive material resulting from the reprocessing of SNF, including liquid waste produced directly in
reprocessing and any solid material derived from such liquid waste that contains fission products in sufficient
concentrations; and (B) other highly radioactive material that the [Nuclear Regulatory Commission], consistent
with existing law, determines by rule requires permanent isolation."
High-level waste at Hanford was generated from the reprocessing of production reactor fuel for the
recovery of plutonium, uranium, and neptunium for defense and other national programs of spent reactor fuel and
irradiated targets. Radioactive waste generated on the Hanford Site from 1988 through 1990 is shown in Table 4.14-
2.
4.14.1.1 Historic Overview. Until recently, the primary mission of the Hanford Site was production of
special nuclear material for defense purposes. Since 1943, the Hanford Site has been involved in fabrication of
reactor fuel elements, operation of production reactors,
Table 4.14-2. Radioactive waste generated on the Hanford Site from 1988-1990 in kilograms (excluding mixed
waste).
Calendar Year Low-Level Waste Transuranic Waste High-Level Waste
1988 3,800,000 21,900 0
1989 8,300,000 27,200 0
1990 3,600,000 24,500 0
Source: DOE 1991.
processing of irradiated fuel, separation and extraction of plutonium and uranium, preparation of plutonium
metal, and decontamination and decommissioning activities. Between 1943 and 1964, 149 single-shell tanks were
built to store liquid radioactive wastes. No new wastes have been added to these tanks since 1980; much of the
liquid waste originally stored in the single-shell tanks has been transferred to some of the 28 one-million gallon
double-shell tanks for safer storage (DOE 1993c).
High-level waste has been accumulating at Hanford since 1944. Most of these high-level wastes have
undergone one or more treatment steps (e.g., neutralization, precipitation, decantation, or evaporation) and will
eventually require incorporation into a stable, solid medium (e.g., glass) for final disposal (DOE 1993d, 1992b).
Between 1956 and 1990, the Plutonium and Uranium Recovery through EXtraction (PUREX) plant processed
irradiated reactor fuel to extract plutonium and uranium (DOE 1982). The wastes from the PUREX process were placed
in double-shell tanks after 1970, and are the second high-level waste stream (DOE 1993c).
Cesium and Strontium Capsules: From 1968 to 1985, most of the high-heat emitting nuclides (strontium-90
and cesium-137, plus their daughters) were extracted from the old tank waste, converted to solids (strontium
fluoride and cesium chloride), placed in double-walled metal cylinders (capsules) about 50 centimeters (20
inches) in length and 5 centimeters (2 inches) in diameter, which were stored in the Waste Encapsulation and
Storage Facility in water-filled pools (DOE 1993d).
4.14.1.2 Current Status. There are two high-level waste streams at Hanford: the single-shell tank
wastes and double-shell tank PUREX aging wastes. All wastes contained in double-shell tanks consist of mixtures
of high-level wastes, transuranic waste, and several low-level wastes, and are managed as if they contain high-
level waste. The single-shell tank wastes make up 95 percent of the Hanford Site high-level mixed waste (DOE
1993c).
There are currently 164,000 cubic meters (214,500 cubic yards) of wastes in the single-shell tanks, which
are managed as high-level waste. The waste is multi-phased: most is sludge with interstitial liquids; some is in
the form of crystalline solids, and there are some supernatant liquids present in the tanks. There are currently
92,000 cubic meters (120,000 cubic yards) of PUREX wastes in the double-shell tanks (DOE 1992e).
No known treatment is currently possible for these two waste streams, although it is planned to treat high-
level wastes in the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant, for which construction is scheduled to begin in 2002, with
an operational start date in 2009 (DOE 1993c).
No high-level wastes are expected to be generated in 1995 from SNF management activities.
Cesium and Strontium Capsules: The total number of cesium capsules produced is 1,577. As of August 19,
1993, the number of known dismantled cesium capsules is 249; these have been put to beneficial use and are not
expected to be returned. The total number of remaining capsules requiring disposal is 1,328. Of the 1,328
remaining capsules, 959 are in storage at Hanford, and 369 capsules have been leased for beneficial use. One of
these capsules developed a small leak, and others have shown signs of bulging, so current plans are to bring all
leased capsules back to the Hanford Site (DOE 1993d).
The total number of strontium capsules produced is 640. As of August 19, 1993, the number of known
dismantled strontium capsules is 35; these have been put to beneficial use and are not expected to be returned. The
total number of remaining capsules requiring disposal is 605. Of the 605, 601 are in storage at Hanford, and 4 have
been leased offsite for beneficial use.
Therefore, at present 1,328 cesium capsules (2.47 cubic meters - 3.23 cubic yards) and 605 strontium
capsules (1.08 cubic meters - 1.41 cubic yards) require storage. Nine-hundred and fifty-nine cesium capsules and
605 strontium capsules are stored in pools of water in the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility. The capsules
will be stored at Hanford until they can be transported to a proposed national repository (DOE 1992d).
4.14.2 Transuranic Waste
Transuranic waste is defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014[ee]) as "material
contaminated with elements that have an atomic number greater than 92, including neptunium, plutonium, americium,
and curium, and that are in concentrations greater than 10 nanocuries per gram, or in such other concentrations as
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission may prescribe to protect the public health and safety."
Transuranic waste is primarily generated by research and development activities, plutonium recovery,
weapons manufacturing, environmental restoration, and decontamination and decommissioning. Most transuranic
waste exists in solid form (e.g., protective clothing, paper trash, rags, glass, miscellaneous tools, and
equipment). Some transuranic waste is in
liquid form (sludges) resulting from chemical processing for recovery of plutonium or other transuranic elements.
4.14.2.1 Historic Overview. Prior to 1970 all DOE-generated transuranic waste was disposed of onsite
in shallow, unlined trenches. From 1970 to 1986, transuranic wastes were segregated from other waste types and
disposed in trenches designated for retrieval. Since 1986 all transuranic waste has been segregated and placed in
retrievable storage pending shipment and final disposal in a permanent geologic repository (DOE 1992d, 1993g).
4.14.2.2 Current Status. Currently, all transuranic wastes are stored in above-grade storage
facilities in the Hanford Central Waste Complex and Transuranic Waste Storage and Assay Facility. The plan is to
ship the stored transuranic waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad, New Mexico for final disposal.
The inventory of transuranic wastes is given in Table 4.14-3.
4.14.3 Mixed Low-Level Waste
Mixed low-level waste is defined as mixtures of low-level radioactive materials and (chemically and/or
physically) hazardous wastes. Typically, mixed low-level waste includes a
Table 4.14-3. Transuranic waste inventory through 1991a.
Disposition of TRU Waste Mass of TRU Nuclides (kilograms) Volume
(cubic meters)
Buried Waste 346 109,000b
Retrievable Storage 480 10,200
a. Source: DOE 1992d, Figures 3.3-3.6.
b. This number includes soils contaminated with TRUs.
variety of contaminated materials, including air filters, cleaning materials, engine oils and grease, paint
residues, photographic materials, soils, building materials, and decommissioned plant equipment.
4.14.3.1 Historic Overview. Between 1987 and 1991, 16,745 cubic meters (21,902 cubic yards) of mixed
low-level waste were buried at the Hanford Site (between 1944 and 1986, no differentiation was made between low-
level and low-level mixed wastes); all buried low-level wastes from that period are reported in
subsection 4.14.4). Another 4,225 cubic meters (5,526 cubic yards) of mixed waste has been accumulating in
storage in the Central Waste Complex, located in the 200-West Area (DOE 1993d).
The Hanford Site also receives defueled submarine reactor compartments, which are contaminated with PCBs
and lead. These compartments are managed as mixed waste. Several compartments are received each year and placed
in a trench in the 200-East Area (DOE 1993b).
4.14.3.2 Current Status. In 1992, 56,245 kilograms (124,000 pounds) of mixed low-level waste were
generated. The 78 mixed low-level waste streams at Hanford make up 85,000 cubic meters (111,176 cubic yards) of
waste (101,314,863 kilograms - 223,361,010 pounds). Ninety-six percent of the total is beta/gamma emitting waste
in the form of mostly aqueous liquid in the double-shell tanks. One stream (double-shell tank miscellaneous
waste) accounts for 40,000 cubic meters (52,318 cubic yards) of the mixed low-level wastes, and in combination,
the double-shell tank Double-Shell Slurry Feed, double-shell tank Complex Concentrate and double-shell tank
Double-Shell Slurry make up another 34,500 cubic meters (45,124 cubic yards). Three mixed low-level waste streams
related to the 183-H Solar Evaporation Basin cleaning made up 2,500 cubic meters (3,270 cubic yards) of wastes.
These inorganic sludge/particulate wastes have been neutralized and treated for packaging (DOE 1993c).
It is expected that of all the mixed low-level wastes at Hanford, 49 percent cannot be treated until the
technology is modified or verified. The remaining 51 percent is to be proc-
essed through the 242A-Evaporator (a
closed system in which distillates are passed through an ion-exchange system to remove cesium) (DOE 1993c).
In 1992, eight defueled submarine reactor compartment disposal packages were received and placed in Trench
94 of the 200-East Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds (Woodruff and Hanf 1993). The Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Program will prepare an EIS for their proposal to bury additional reactor compartments at Hanford. As of November
1993, there were a total of 35 submarine reactor compartments stored in Trench 94.
Mixed low-level wastes generated in 1995 from SNF management activities will total 0.4 cubic meters (0.6
cubic yards).
4.14.4 Low-Level Waste
Low-level radioactive waste is defined in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (PL 97-425) as "radioactive
material that (A) is not high-level radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, transuranic waste, or by-product
material...; and (B) the [Nuclear Regulatory Commission], consistent with existing law, classifies as low-level
radioactive waste." By-product material is defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C. 2014(e)(2)] as "(1)
any radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the
radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special nuclear material, and (2) the tailings or
wastes produced by the extraction or concentration of uranium or thorium from any ore processed primarily for its
source material content."
Commercial fuel low-level waste can be generated by fuel fabrication and reactor operations. Low-level
waste also results from commercial operations by private organizations that are licensed to use radioactive
materials. These include institutions engaged in research and various medical and industrial activities. Some
low-level waste is also generated by DOE environmental restoration activities. Other low-level wastes will be
generated in future years by routine decommissioning and decontamination operations.
4.14.4.1 Historic Overview. From 1944 to 1991, approximately 558,916 cubic meters (731,034 cubic
yards) of low-level waste was buried at Hanford (DOE 1993d). Between 1944 and 1986, no differentiation was made
between low-level and low-level mixed wastes - all data from that period are reported in this section. Another 130
cubic meters (170 cubic yards) was placed into storage.
U.S. Ecology operates a licensed commercial low-level waste burial ground at Hanford on a site that is
leased to the State of Washington. Although physically located on the Hanford Site, it is not considered part of
the Hanford facility. The site area is 40 hectares (99 acres), of which 29.5 hectares (72.9 acres) is considered
usable, with 11.9 hectares (29.4 acres) used by the end of 1991. Through 1991 338,500 cubic meters (442,741 cubic
yards) of low-level wastes had been disposed of at this site (DOE 1992d).
4.14.4.2 Current Status. Solid low-level waste currently is placed in unlined, near-surface trenches
at the 200-Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds. Onsite sources at the Hanford Site generated about 4500 square
meters of low-level waste in 1992. Table 4.14-4 lists quantities of radioactive materials received at the Hanford
Site from offsite generators over 5 years. The site continues to receive low-level waste from offsite generators
for disposal. Major sources of this waste have been the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Washington, Brook-
haven
National Laboratory in New York, and Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory in California. Other points of origin include
DOE facilities at nuclear power stations in Shippingport, Pennsylvania; Bechtel in Albany, Oregon; and Wood River
in Charleston, Rhode Island (DOE 1993d). The U.S. Ecology commercial low-level burial ground continues to
operate.
Table 4.14-4. Offsite low-level waste receipts summary (from 1987 through 1991).
Year Volume (m3) Activity (curies)
1987 7,000 68,000
1988 5,000 107,000
1989 600 1,500
1990 5,500 240,000
1991 5,300 489,000
a. Source: Draft Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Fiscal Year 1993 Site-Specific Plan for the
Richland Field Office (DOE 1993d). (Does not include waste quantities received at the U.S. Ecology low-level
burial ground.)
In 1995, 174.5 cubic meters (228.3 cubic yards) of low-level wastes will be generated from SNF management
activities. Of this amount, 167.2 cubic meters (218.7 cubic yards) are contact handled, and 7.3 cubic meters (9.6
cubic yards) are remote handled.
4.14.5 Hazardous Waste
Hazardous waste is defined in the State of Washington Dangerous Waste Regulations (WAC 173-303) as solid
waste designated by 40 CFR Part 261 and regulated as hazardous wastes by the EPA. The State of Washington
designates wastes as either "dangerous waste" or "extremely hazardous waste." Hazardous wastes are generated
during normal facility operations and environmental restoration activities at the Hanford Site (Table 4.14-5).
Mixed wastes are wastes that contain both hazardous waste (regulated under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act) and radioactive waste (regulated under the Atomic Energy Act). The following special nuclear
material production and site restoration activities have generated or may generate mixed waste:
- fabrication of reactor fuel elements
- operation of the production reactors
- processing of irradiated fuel
- separation and extraction of plutonium and uranium
- preparation of plutonium metal
- environmental restoration (i.e., soil and groundwater cleanup)
- research and development support projects
- maintenance and operations support.
Table 4.14-5. Hazardous waste generated on the Hanford Site from 1988 through 1992 (including mixed waste).
Calendar year Hazardous waste Mixed waste (t) Total (t)
(t)
1988 80,000 25,000 105,000
1989 66,000 9400 75,000
1990 780 12,000 13,000
1991 330 4600 4900
1992 620 3400 4000
Tank wastes constitute 99 percent of the mixed wastes at the Hanford Site. The Hanford Site currently has
233,689 cubic meters (305,654 cubic yards) of mixed wastes stored in these tanks: 145,952 cubic meters (190,898
cubic yards) of high-level waste, 3,935 cubic meters (5,147 cubic yards) of mixed transuranic waste, and 84,802
cubic meters (110,917 cubic yards) of mixed low-level waste. These wastes consist of 108 different waste streams
(2 high-level waste, 22 mixed transuranic waste, and 84 mixed low-level waste). Of the 108 identified waste
streams, 97 are still being generated. Additional environmental restoration waste streams are expected. Their
numbers and types remain to be determined (DOE 1993c).
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act components of mixed waste at the Hanford Site are mainly the
following listed wastes: D002B (alkaline liquids, 22 streams), D006B (cadmium, 29 streams), D007 (chromium, 34
streams), D008B (lead, 30 streams), and F003 (nonchlorinated solvents, 30 streams). Waste sources are primarily
the separations and extraction processes that were used to produce special nuclear material (DOE 1993c).
4.14.5.1 Historic Overview. In the past, hazardous waste generated at Hanford was either shipped
offsite, recycled, or treated onsite. Hazardous waste was also disposed of onsite (e.g., buried in trenches,
burial grounds, or discharged to cribs or directly to the soil). For example, from 1943 through 1945, acids from a
pipe-cleaning operation were discharged to the soil through two side-by-side cribs in an area west of the old White
Bluffs townsite. From 1955 through 1973, approximately 379-2,271 cubic meters (100,000-600,000 gallons) of
organic liquids, including carbon tetrachloride, were discharged to the soil in the 200-West Area. Drums
containing approximately 19 cubic meters (5,000 gallons) of organic solvent (primarily hexone) were buried at the
618-9 burial ground north of the 300 Area. Many of these disposal sites have been or will be closed under RCRA or
remediated under CERCLA (DOE 1993d).
4.14.5.2 Current Status. As of March 15, 1993, the Hanford Site contained 64 interim status treatment,
storage, or disposal units. Present plans are that final RCRA permits will be sought for 24 of these 64 interim
status treatment, storage, or disposal units. Thirty-four units will be closed under interim status. Six units
will be dispositioned through other regulatory options. Future circumstances may cause these numbers to change.
The treatment, storage, or disposal units within the Hanford facility include, but are not limited to, tank
systems, surface impoundments, container storage areas, waste piles, landfills, and miscellaneous units. Other
RCRA permits, such as research, development, and demonstration permits (for example, the 200-Area Liquid Effluent
Treatment Facility), are also being pursued (DOE 1993d).
The principal present waste management practice for newly generated nonradioactive hazardous waste is to
ship it offsite for treatment, recycling, recovery, and/or disposal. The Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Storage
Facility (616 Building) and the 305-B Waste Storage Facility are the only active facilities storing nonradioactive
hazardous waste (other than less than 90-day storage areas) (DOE 1992d, 1993d), other than two boxes (one
containing mixed and one containing nonradioactive waste) stored in the 222-S laboratory complex.
Hazardous wastes generated in 1995 from SNF management activities will total 2.2 cubic meters (2.9 cubic
yards).
4.14.6 Industrial Solid Waste
Solid wastes are generated in all areas of the Hanford Site. Nondangerous solid wastes include the
following nonradioactive, nonhazardous wastes:
(a) construction debris, office trash, cafeteria waste/garbage, empty containers, and packaging
materials, medical waste, inert materials, bulky items such as appliances and furniture,
solidified filter backwash and sludge from the treatment of river water, failed and broken
equipment and tools, air filters, uncontaminated used gloves and other clothing, and certain
chemical precipitates such as oxalates
(b) nonradioactive friable asbestos (regulated under the Clean Air Act)
(c) ash generated from powerhouses
(d) nonradioactive demolition debris from decommission projects.
4.14.6.1 Historic Overview. Both prior to and after establishment of the reservation, a number of
landfills have been used on the Hanford Site for solid waste disposal, including the Horn Rapids, Central,
Original Central, White Bluffs, East White Bluffs, Wahluke Slope and Hanford Townsite Landfills.
The active Hanford Site Solid Waste Landfill, located in the 200-Area, began operation in 1973.
Nondangerous wastes in category (a) above are buried in the solid waste section of the Solid Waste Landfill,
located in the 200-Area. Nonradioactive friable asbestos is buried in designated areas at the Solid Waste
Landfill. The nonradioactive dangerous waste section of the landfill was closed to chemicals in January 1985, and
closed to asbestos in May 1988. Ash generated at powerhouses in the 200-East and 200-West Areas is buried in
designated sites near those powerhouses. Demolition waste from 100-Area decommissioning projects is buried in
situ or in designated sites in the 100 Areas (Woodruff and Hanf 1993; WHC 1993b). Solid waste has also been sent to
the City of Richland landfill.
4.14.6.2 Current Status. In 1992, 22,213 cubic meters (29,054 cubic yards) of solid waste and 1,017
cubic meters (1,330 cubic yards) of asbestos were deposited in the solid waste section of the Solid Waste Landfill.
Pit 10 was opened for disposal of inert material as defined in Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-304, and a
total of 11,389 cubic meters (14,986 cubic yards) were disposed of there. A summary of the solid waste disposed of
at the Hanford Site from 1973 through 1992 is shown in Table 4.14-6. The landfill is currently scheduled for
closure in 1997 (WHC 1993b). Quantities of solid waste disposed of at the City of Richland Landfill are not readily
available.
4.14.7 Hazardous Materials
A hazardous chemical is any chemical that poses a physical or health hazard [as defined in 29 CFR
1900.1200(c)]. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act sets forth reporting requirements (Tier 1
and Tier 2) that provide the public with information on hazardous chemicals to enhance community awareness of
chemical hazards and facilitate the development of state and local emergency response plans.
Table 4.14-6. 1973-1992: Historical annual volume of onsite buried solid sanitary waste in cubic meters per year.
Waste Type Volume (m3/year)
73-81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 87 90 91 92
Construction 4,149 5,819 9,494 10,378 10,789 14,254 14,316 12,842 12,469 10,088 5,666 7,330
Debrisa
Metalsb 1,383 1,940 3,165 3,459 3,596 4,751 4,772 4,281 4,156 3,363 1,889 2,443
Paper 5,658 7,936 12,946 14,151 14,712 19,437 19,522 17,512 17,003 13,757 7,727 9,996
Miscellaneousc1,383 1,940 3,165 3,459 3,569 4,751 4,772 4,281 4,156 3,363 1,889 2,443
Total 12,573 17,635 28,770 31,447 32,694 43,193 43,382 38,916 37,785 30,571 17,170 22,213
a. Construction Debris: Volume is calculated based on disposal volume (excluding asbestos) at the onsite landfill: Construction
debris 33 percent; Metals 11 percent, Paper 45 percent, Miscellaneous Waste 11 percent.
b. Metals: See note b above. Category consists of large bulky items such as appliances and furniture.
c. Miscellaneous: Category includes garbage, packaging, empty containers, medical waste and inert materials.
4.14.7.1 Historic Overview. Hazardous chemicals are used throughout the Hanford Site in facility and
environmental restoration operations. The types of chemicals in inventory onsite tend to be static since
Hanford's mission involves mainly remediation and decontami-
nation and decommissioning (as opposed to production
or processing). The amount of chemicals actually onsite changes from day to day, and there is no requirement to
keep a real- time inventory of the quantity of chemicals onsite at any one time. Also, the percentage of hazardous
chemicals used onsite that eventually become hazardous waste cannot be determined.
4.14.7.2 Current Status. The Hazardous Materials Inventory Database currently being used to generate
Tier 2 data indicates that approximately 1484 hazardous chemicals are reported in inventory at over 783 locations
on the Hanford Site. These 1484 chemicals are contained in approximately 2926 different hazardous materials, in
weights that range from less than 0.5 kilograms (one pound) to a maximum inventory of 35,658,872 kilograms
(78,614,420 pounds).
The DOE has prepared chemical inventory reports required by the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act since 1988 (for calendar year 1987). In 1992 the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
reporting threshold was exceeded for 53 hazardous chemicals.
5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
Descriptions of analyses for various potential environmental
consequences as a result of implementing 1) No Action, 2) Decentralization, 3)
1992/1993 Planning Basis, 4) Regionalization, and 5) Centralization
Alternatives for interim storage of SNF for the Hanford Site are presented in
the following subsections. By and large these discussions are at the program-
matic level because in many cases specific alternative treatments and
locations, particularly for new facilities, have not been identified for the
Hanford Site.
5.1 Overview
An overview of the various alternatives and a brief summary of potential
environmental consequences of interest are provided in the following
subsections. For purposes of this programmatic analysis, all new facilities
were assumed to be constructed in a quarter section of land adjacent to the
200-East Area; commitment of that amount of land within the industrialized
200 Areas would be consistent with the site mission and would not represent a
conflict on land use. Up to 15 percent of that area would be disturbed during
construction of storage and support facilities where required. A survey of
the area described revealed no threatened and endangered species or cultural
resources. Routine operations under any of the alternatives would not add
significantly to current occupational or near-zero public exposure to
radiation. Although not quantified, no significant additions to current
releases of criteria pollutants or other hazardous materials would be expected
from implementing any of the alternatives. However, such implementation
requires a small increase in Hanford's electrical power consumption; the
largest increase would be less than 1.5 percent. The influx of workers would
probably increase competition for desirable housing and strain teacher/student
ratios in some local school districts, the extent of which (although small in
any case) would depend on the option chosen.
5.1.1 No Action Alternative
The No Action Alternative identifies the minimum actions deemed
necessary for continued safe and secure storage of SNF at the Hanford Site.
Upgrade of the existing facilities would not occur other than as required to
ensure safety and security. No receipt of fuels from offsite would occur. No
research and development would take place; however, characterization of fuel
would continue to establish a safety envelope for extended interim storage,
fuel would be containerized at the 105-KE Basin, and the first 10 dry storage
casks would be procured for FFTF fuel.
Results presented in the Hanford Site Environmental Report for 1992
(Woodruff and Hanf 1993) suggest that under normal conditions no significant
environmental effects would be associated with the No Action Alternative. For
example, the radiation dose to the maximally exposed individual in the Hanford
environs from all Hanford sources was calculated to have been 0.02 mrem and
the collective population dose was 0.8 person-rem during 1992. Continued
storage of SNF contributed only a small portion of those doses. No health
effects would be expected as a result of such small doses. For perspective,
the Hanford Site doses for 1992 may be compared to annual individual doses of
300 mrem and an annual collective dose of about 100,000 person-rem from
natural background radiation.
5.1.2 Decentralization Alternative
The Decentralization Alternative would consider additional facility
upgrades over those considered in the No Action Alternative, specifically, new
wet storage (for defense production fuel only) or dry storage facilities, fuel
stabilization via shear/leach/calcination or shear/leach/ solvent extraction,
with research and development activities to support SNF management.
Impacts from storage prior to implementation of new wet or dry storage
or fuels stabilization would not differ from those indicated for the No Action
Alternative. In the event new storage facilities are selected some impacts
would be associated with construction of those facilities. A proposed site
has been identified comprising one-quarter section of land adjacent to the
200-East Area where any new facilities associated with SNF storage or
stabilization that might be necessary would be assumed to be built. The area
has been surveyed both for threatened and endangered species and for the
presence of cultural resources; none were found. However, one federal
candidate species, the loggerhead shrike, and one state candidate species, the
sage sparrow, were seen. Use of this area is consistent with the Hanford
mission and would impact no threatened or endangered biota. Construc-
tion would take place on up to 15 percent of the selected site. Construction
activities would result in dust generation and various amounts of pollutants
released from diesel-fueled equipment; however, concentrations at points of
public access are expected to be well below permissible levels. Impacts
associated with SNF storage would be expected to be less than those in the
No Action Alternative.
Research and development of technologies for SNF stabilization would be
undertaken in existing hot cell facilities in the 300 Area. Although not
examined in detail for this programmatic analysis, no important environmental
consequences have resulted from work in these facilities and none would be
anticipated for development activities related to fuel processing.
5.1.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
The 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative differs from the
Decentralization Alternative only in that TRIGA fuel currently stored at the
Hanford Site would be shipped to INEL for storage. The storage and
stabilization options identified for the Decentralization Alternative are also
assumed for the 1992/93 Planning Basis Alternative and that discussion is not
repeated here. The potential impacts of transportation of TRIGA fuel to INEL
are covered in Appendix I.
5.1.4 Regionalization Alternative
The Regionalization Alternative as it applies to the Hanford Site
contains the following options:
A) All SNF, except defense production SNF, would be sent to INEL.
B1) All SNF west of the Mississippi River, except Naval SNF would be
sent to Hanford.
B2) All SNF west of the Mississippi River and Naval SNF would be sent to
Hanford.
C) All Hanford SNF would be sent to INEL or Nevada Test Site (NTS).
Facilities and features of Regionalization A would be the same as those
described for Hanford defense production fuel in the Decentralization
Alternative. The facilities and features for all other Hanford SNF would be
very similar to those described for that spent nuclear fuel in the
Centralization Minimum Alternative.
Facilities and features of Regionalization B1 and B2 options would be
incremental to those described for the Decentralization Alternative and would
be similar, but not identical, to those described in the Centralization
Maximum Alternative.
Facilities and features of Regionalization C would be equivalent to
those described for the Centralization Minimum Alternative.
5.1.5 Centralization Alternative
Two options exist at the Hanford Site for the Centralization
Alternative: 1) shipment of all fuel within the DOE complex to the Hanford
Site for management and storage, and 2) shipment of all fuel off of the
Hanford Site. In the former option, dry storage of all fuel sent to the
Hanford Site from offsite would be assumed. A facility equivalent to the
decentralization sub-options would be assumed for processing of SNF prior to
storage; fuel received from offsite would have been stabilized for dry storage
prior to receipt. The consequences of implementing this option would be
larger than those of the Decentralization Alternative. In the option of
transferring all Hanford fuel to another site, a fuel stabilization and
packaging facility would need to be constructed to prepare existing fuel for
shipment.
5.2 Land Use
Implications of implementing the alternatives for interim storage of SNF
on land use at the Hanford Site are discussed in the following subsections.
5.2.1 No Action Alternative
No new SNF facilities would be built at the Hanford Site; thus, land use
patterns would remain as described in Section 4.2 and have no impact on the
existing environment. The Hanford Site would remain a federal facility
dedicated to nuclear research and development and environmental cleanup.
Other continuing activities would include waste management, commer-
cial power production, ecological research, and wildlife management, as described in
Section 4.2.
5.2.2 Decentralization Alternative
This alternative would require the construction of an SNF facility for
fuel management and storage. Most SNF from the Hanford Site would be stored
at that facility.
Historically, the Hanford Site has been used for nuclear materials
production. The construction and operation of an SNF facility would be
consistent with this historical use. Off-site land use would not be affected
by construction and operations of an SNF facility, except to the extent that
some undeveloped lands probably would be developed for worker housing. Such
development would be subject to local land use and zoning controls, which vary
by jurisdiction. No project facilities would be located offsite.
No direct or indirect effects would occur to wildlife refuges on the
Hanford Site because SNF activities would not be close to these areas.
Similarly, no direct or indirect effects would occur to the Columbia River.
Although construction at the SNF site would disturb native vegetation (Section
5.9.1), on up to 7 hectares (18 acres) of the 65-hectare (160-acre) site, this
would involve only a small part of similar natural habitat at Hanford. The
use of Hanford as a National Environmental Research Park would not be
significantly affected.
No impacts requiring mitigation would occur to land uses a result of
construction or operation of an SNF facility at the Hanford Site.
5.2.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
The 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative differs from the
Decentralization Alternative only in that TRIGA fuel currently stored at the
Hanford Site may be shipped to INEL for storage. Thus, land use would be
essentially the same as in the Decentralization Alternative. Although
construction at the SNF site would disturb native vegetation (Sec-
tion 5.9.1), on up to 7 hectares (18 acres) of the 65-hectare (160-acre) site, this would
involve only a small part of similar natural habitat at Hanford. The use of
Hanford as a National Environmental Research Park would not be significantly
affected.
5.2.4 Regionalization Alternative
Construction of facilities in support of the Regionalization Alternative
as it applies to the Hanford Site would result in the following disturbance of
native vegetation and land use commitments:
A) From about 2 to 7 hectares (6 to 18 acres) when all SNF, except
defense production SNF would be sent to INEL.
B1) From about 14 to 17 hectares (36 to 43 acres) when all SNF west of
the Mississippi River, except Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford.
B2) From about 24 to 27 hectares (61 to 68 acres) when all SNF west of
the Mississippi River and Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford.
C) From about 2 to 5 hectares (6 to 12 acres) when all Hanford SNF
would be sent to INEL or NTS.
These areas involve only a small part of similar natural habitat at
Hanford. The use of Hanford as a National Environmental Research Park would
not be significantly affected.
5.2.5 Centralization Alternative
If Hanford is selected as the site for implementing the Centralization
Alternative, the SNF facility and its support facilities (including a new
Expended Core Facility) would be constructed. The impacts of such
construction would be essentially the same as those presented for the
Decentralization Alternative. Although construction at the SNF site would
disturb native vegetation (Section 5.9.1) on up to 37 hectares (93 acres) of
the 65-hectare (160-acre) site, this would involve only a small part of
similar natural habitat at Hanford. In addition to the above total, new
construction would also include construction of a new Expended Core Facility
for fuel from the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. The use of Hanford as a
National Environmental Research Park would not be significantly affected.
If Hanford is not selected as the site for centralization of SNF, an SNF
stabilization and packaging facility would be built to prepare the fuel for
transport offsite. This facility would have somewhat smaller construction
requirements than would be required for storage of all DOE SNF at Hanford.
The land use impacts would be similar to those described for the
Regionalization option C.
5.2.6 Effects of Alternatives on Treaty or Other Reserved Rights of Indian
Tribes and Individuals
The Yakama Indian Nation and the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla
Indian Reservation acquired certain rights and privileges in the 1855 treaty.
These rights and privileges are also claimed by the Wanapum Tribe. In Article
III, of the 1855 treaty it states that "The exclusive right of taking fish in
all streams, where running through or bordering said reservation, is further
secured to said confederated tribes and bands of Indians, as also the right of
taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common with citizens of the
Territory, and of erecting temporary buildings for curing them; together with
the privilege of hunting, gathering roots and berries, and pasturing their
horses and cattle upon open unclaimed land.(a)"
Although access to the Hanford Site has been restricted, tribal members
have expressed an interest in renewing their use of these resources in
accordance with the Treaty of 1855, and the DOE is assisting them in this
effort. In keeping with this effort, each of the alternatives would provide
for the rights and privileges identified in the treaty:
- Taking Fish - The alternatives considered in this document would not
reduce access to fishing locations on the Hanford Site.
- Hunting, Gathering Roots and Berries, and Pasturing Livestock - The
No Action Alternative would not further reduce the areas potentially
available for hunting, gathering roots and berries, or pasturing
livestock. All existing fenced areas assigned for SNF storage and a
suitable buffer zone would likely remain unavailable for these
activities. All other alternatives would require the construction
of new facilities. This would further reduce the land base
available for hunting, gathering, and pasturing. This impact could
be on the order of 18 acres.
5.3 Socioeconomics
The following section describes the socioeconomic impacts of the SNF
project at the Hanford Site. For the analysis, a ten-county region of
influence was identified. While the region of influence covers the counties
of Adams, Benton, Columbia, Franklin, Grant, Walla Walla, and Yakima in the
state of Washington; and Morrow, Umatilla, and Wallowa counties in
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a. These treaty rights and priviledges are subject to diverse interpre-
tations. None of the lands contemplated for use for SNF processing
and/or storage at Hanford were on "open unclaimed land" when the
government established the Hanford Site.
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the state of Oregon, the majority of the impacts would be confined to the
Benton-Franklin County region and the Tri-Cities (Richland, Kennewick, and
Pasco) (see Figure 4-2).
The socioeconomic impacts are classified in terms of direct and
secondary effects. Changes in Hanford employment and expenditures are
classified as direct effects, while changes that result from Hanford regional
purchases, nonpayroll expenditures, and payroll spending by Hanford employees
are classified as secondary effects. The total socioeconomic impact within
the region is the sum of the direct and secondary effects.
Estimates of total employment impacts were calculated using the Regional
Input-Output Modeling System developed for the Hanford region of influence by
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. This assessment reports the changes in
employment and earnings based on historic data, which indicate that 93 percent
of Hanford employees reside in the Benton-Franklin county area. Table 4.3-1
in Section 4.3 presents the baseline projections from which comparisons can be
made.
All employment comparisons are made relative to the regional employment
projections and not current Hanford Site employment projections. While a
down-turn in Hanford Site employment is anticipated, the extent of the down-
turn is unknown. The effect of such a down-turn on the region's employment
projection used in this analysis is expected to be minimal because the
regional projection, released in 1992, assumed a more stable rate of growth
than the actual "boom" experienced in recent years.
5.3.1 No Action Alternative
Under the No Action Alternative, only the minimum actions required for
continued safe and secure storage of SNF would occur. No new facilities would
be constructed, and only minimal facility upgrades would take place. It is
assumed that existing personnel would be utilized under this alternative, and
therefore no incremental socioeconomic consequences are anticipated.
Socioeconomic conditions would continue as described in Section 4.3.
5.3.2 Decentralization Alternative
Under the Decentralization Alternative, significant facility development
and upgrades are permitted, with various suboptions defined for processing and
storage of the SNF. The socioeconomic consequences related to implementing
the decentralization alternatives are described in this subsection. The
employment and population impacts related to construction and operation of the
Decentralization Alternative suboptions are presented in Table 5.3-1. It was
assumed that up to 300 current Hanford workers could be reassigned to
operation activities (this number excludes current workers at the Fast Flux
Test Facility because it was assumed that they would be reassigned to
activities related to the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant). Con-
struction activities were assumed to require new workers coming into the area.
Estimates of direct jobs were provided by Bergsman (1995). For construction
activity, direct jobs were reported as number of jobs in the peak year and
total person-years because it was assumed that construction activities would
"ramp-up" to the peak year, and then "ramp-down," with the total number of
jobs related to construction activity equaling the total person-years
required, as reported in Bergsman (1995). Increases in activity levels could
strain an already tight housing market and add to school-capacity concerns.
However, because construction activities are short-term relative to the total
project time frame, impacts from construction activities may be overstated.
5.3.2.1 Employment. All construction activity is assumed to peak in
1998. Construction activity for storage options W, X, Y, and Z occurs in the
years 1997-2000; construction activity for processing suboptions P and Q
occurs in the years 1998-2001. Increases in employment range from
221 (suboption X) to 1,094 (suboptions Y and P) and equate to between 0.3 and
1.3 percentage points over baseline regional employment projections (see
Table 4.3-1). All operations activity peaks in 2002, with incremental
activity tapering off. Increases in employment range from 442 (suboptions Z
and P) to 880 (suboptions Q and Small Vault) persons and equate to between 0.5
and 1.0 percentage points over baseline regional employment projections.
Beyond 2004, operations activity will taper off as processing activities
(suboptions P and Q) will occur only through 2005. Suboptions Y and Z each
require only 50 workers beyond 2005 for operations activity. Because it is
anticipated that up to 300 current workers could be reassigned, no incremental
socioeconomic impacts are anticipated after 2005. This is also true with sub-
options W and X because they are assumed to absorb between 200 and 210 current
workers for the first two years of operation (2001-2002), with employment
requirements falling to between 150 and 95
Table 5.3-1. Comparison of the socioeconomic impacts of spent nuclear fuel Decentralization Alternative
suboptions.
Decentralization Alternative 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Suboption W
Direct Jobs 0 0 216 251 216 181 0 0 0 0
Secondary Jobs 0 0 240 280 240 200 0 0 0 0
Population Change 0 0 590 680 590 490 0 0 0 0
Suboption X
Direct Jobs 0 0 200 221 200 178 0 0 0 0
Secondary Jobs 0 0 220 240 220 200 0 0 0 0
Population Change 0 0 540 600 540 490 0 0 0 0
Suboptions Y and P
Direct Jobs 0 0 318 1,094 1,033 971 715 464 464 464
Secondary Jobs 0 0 350 1,200 1,130 1,070 780 590 590 590
Population Change 0 0 870 2,980 2,810 2,650 1,950 1,370 1,370 1,370
Suboptions Q and Small Vault
Direct Jobs 0 0 62 947 934 920 872 880 880 880
Secondary Jobs 0 0 70 1,040 1,020 1,010 960 1,120 1,120 1,120
Population Change 0 0 170 2,580 2,540 2,510 2,380 2,610 2,610 2,610
Suboptions Z and P
Direct Jobs 0 0 213 935 926 920 715 442 442 442
Secondary Jobs 0 0 230 1,030 1,020 1,010 780 570 570 570
Population Change 0 0 580 2,550 2,530 2,510 1,950 1,310 1,310 1,310
Suboptions Q and Cask
Direct Jobs 0 0 45 917 917 917 872 822 822 822
Secondary Jobs 0 0 50 1,010 1,010 1,010 960 1,050 1,050 1,050
Population Change 0 0 120 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,380 2,430 2,430 2,430
workers in 2003 and 2004. For the remaining years (2005-2035), suboptions W
and X each would require only 60 workers for operation activities.
5.3.2.2 Population. For construction-related activities, the
population is expected to peak in 1998, with increases in population ranging
from 600 (suboption X) to 2,810 (suboptions Y and P) and equating to between
0.4 and 1.7 percentage points over baseline projections (see Table 4.3-1).
All operations activity peaks in 2002, with incremental activity tapering off
through 2007. Increases in population range from 1,310 (suboptions Z and P)
to 2,610 (suboptions Q and Small Vault) persons and equate to between 0.7 and
1.5 percentage points over baseline projections for 2002.
5.3.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
This alternative defines those activities that were already scheduled at
the various sites for the transportation, receipt, processing, and storage of
SNF. Under this alternative, no new spent fuel would be sent to the Hanford
Site, but the TRIGA fuel would be shipped offsite. The upgrades of existing
storage facilities, as defined in the Decentralization alternative, were
already planned, so the impacts of the 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
are essentially the same as outlined in Subsection 5.3.2. Because of the
shipment of TRIGA fuel, an additional two workers per year would be required
over 3 years of operation; however, it was assumed that current personnel
would be reassigned to fill these jobs; therefore, the incremental impacts
would be the same as those presented in Table 5.3-1.
5.3.4 Regionalization Alternative
Under this alternative, SNF would be redistributed to candidate sites
based on similarity of SNF types or region within the country. There are four
possible cases: regionalization of SNF by fuel type (Regionalization A);
regionalization in which all SNF currently stored in the western United
States, or to be generated in the western United States, except Naval SNF
would be sent to and stored at the Hanford Site (Regionalization B1);
regionalization in which all SNF currently stored in the western United
States, or to be generated in the western United States, and all Naval fuel
would be sent to and stored at the Hanford Site (Regionalization B2); and
regionalization in which all SNF currently located in the western United
States, or to be generated in the western United States, including all Hanford
SNF, would be sent to and stored at another location (Regionalization C).
5.3.4.1 Regionalization A. In this case, all SNF currently located at
Hanford, except defense production fuel, would be sent to INEL. For the
Hanford Site, the facility requirements for the N reactor and single-pass
reactor fuel would be the same as those described in the Decentralization
Alternative. Facilities for all other Hanford Site fuel would be similar to
those described within the Centralization minimum alternative. The population
and employment impacts related to Regionalization A are presented in Table
5.3-2.
5.3.4.1.1 Employment.
All construction activity is assumed to peak
in 1998. Construction activity for suboptions RAX, RAY, and RAZ occurs in the
years 1997-2000 and construction activity for suboption P occurs in the years
1998-2001. Increases in employment range from 176 (suboption RAX) to 1,065
(suboption RAY and P) and equate to between 0.2 and 1.3 percentage points over
baseline projections of regional employment (see Table 4.3-1). All operations
activity peaks in 2002, with incremental activity tapering off. Increases in
employment range from 208 (suboption RAY and P) to 230 (suboption RAZ and P)
persons and equate to between 0.2 and 0.3 percentage points over baseline
projections. Beyond 2004, operations activity will taper off as processing
activities (suboption P) will only occur through 2005. Suboptions RAY and RAZ
each require only 50 workers beyond 2005 for operations activity. Because it
is anticipated that up to 300 current workers could be reassigned, no
incremental socioeconomic impacts are anticipated after 2005. This is also
true with suboption RAX because it would require only 59 workers for operation
activities after 2005.
5.3.4.1.2 Population.
For construction-related activities, the
population is expected to peak in 1998, with increases in population ranging
from 480 (suboption RAX) to 2,900 (suboption RAY and P) and equating to
between 0.3 and 1.7 percentage points over baseline projections (see Table
4.3-1). All operations activity peaks in 2002, with incremental activity
tapering off through 2006. Increases in population range from 620 (suboption
RAX) to 680 (suboption RAY and P) persons and equate to between 0.3 and 0.4
percentage points over baseline projections for 2002.
Table 5.3-2. Comparison of socioeconomic impacts of spent nuclear fuel Regionalization A suboptions.
Regionalization A Suboptions 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Suboption RAX
Direct Jobs 0 0 90 176 176 176 0 0 0 0
Secondary Jobs 0 0 100 190 190 190 0 0 0 0
Population Change 0 0 250 480 480 480 0 0 0 0
Suboption RAY and P
Direct Jobs 0 0 150 1,065 1,065 1,065 715 208 208 208
Secondary Jobs 0 0 160 1,170 1,170 1,170 780 270 270 270
Population Change 0 0 410 2,900 2,900 2,900 1,950 620 620 620
Suboption RAZ and P
Direct Jobs 0 0 150 865 865 865 715 230 230 230
Secondary Jobs 0 0 160 950 950 950 780 290 290 290
Population Change 0 0 410 2,360 2,360 2,360 1,950 680 680 680
5.3.4.2 Regionalization B1. In this case, all SNF currently stored or
to be generated in the western United States, except Naval SNF, would be sent
to and stored at the Hanford Site. Facility requirements for this case would
be incremental to those described for the Decentralization Alternative.
Additional facilities include a storage facility for offsite fuel, a receiving
and canning facility, and a technology development facility (RB1). The
population and employment impacts related to regionalization B1 are presented
in Table 5.3-3.
5.3.4.2.1 Employment.
All construction activity is assumed to peak
in 2000. Construction activity for suboptions W, X, Y, and Z occurs in the
years 1997-2000; construction activity for suboptions P and Q occurs in the
years 1998-2001; and construction of the additional facilities (suboption RB1)
for receiving and canning and technology development occurs in the years 1998-
2001, with 90% of the storage facility being constructed during the years
2000-2010 and the remaining 10% being constructed during the years 2010-2035.
Increases in employment range from 398 (suboption X and RB1) to 1,191
(suboption Y and P and RB1) and equate to between 0.5 and 1.4 percentage
points over baseline projections of regional employment (see Table 4.3-1).
All operations activity peaks in 2002, with incremental activity tapering off.
Increases in employment range from 73 (suboption X and RB1) to 1,050
(suboption Q and Small Vault and RB1) persons and equate to between 0.1 and
1.2 percentage points over baseline projections. Beyond 2004, operations
activity will taper off as described in Section 5.3.2.2.1.
5.3.4.2.2 Population.
For construction-related activities, the
population is expected to peak in 2000, with increases in population ranging
from 1,090 (suboptions W and RB1 and X and RB1) to 3,250 (suboption Y and P
and RB1) and equating to between 0.6 and 1.9 percentage points over baseline
projections (see Table 4.3-1). All operations activity peaks in 2002, with
incremental activity tapering off through 2006. Increases in population range
from 200 (suboptions X and RB1) to 3,100 (suboptions Q, Small Vault, and RB1)
persons and equate to between 0.1 and 1.7 percentage points over baseline
projections for 2002.
5.3.4.3 Regionalization B2. In this case, all fuel currently stored or
to be generated in the western United States, including Naval fuel, would be
sent to and stored at the Hanford Site. Facility requirements for this case
would be essentially the same as those described in the Regionalization B1
case, as the only difference would be the presence of Naval fuel. The
receiving and canning facility, offsite storage facility, and technology
development facility are referred to as suboption RB2. Also required for this
case is the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Table 5.3-3. Comparison of socioeconomic impacts of spent nuclear fuel Regionalization B1 suboptions.
Regionalization B1 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Suboption
Suboptions W and RB1
Direct Jobs 0 0 216 381 352 401 215 75 72 72
Secondary Jobs 0 0 240 420 390 440 240 80 80 80
Population Change 0 0 590 1,040 960 1,090 590 210 200 200
Suboptions X and RB1
Direct Jobs 0 0 200 351 336 398 215 73 72 72
Secondary Jobs 0 0 220 390 370 440 240 80 80 80
Population Change 0 0 540 960 910 1,090 590 200 200 200
Suboptions Y, P, and RB1
Direct Jobs 0 0 318 1,224 1,169 1,191 930 637 636 636
Secondary Jobs 0 0 350 1,340 1,280 1,310 1,020 800 800 800
Population Change 0 0 870 3,340 3,180 3,250 2,530 1,870 1,870 1,870
Suboptions Z, P, and RB1
Direct Jobs 0 0 213 1,065 1,064 1,140 930 615 614 614
Secondary Jobs 0 0 230 1,170 1,170 1,250 1,020 770 770 770
Population Change 0 0 580 2,900 2,900 3,110 2,530 1,800 1,800 1,800
Suboptions Q, Small
Vault, and RB1
Direct Jobs 0 0 62 1,077 1,070 1,140 1,090 1,050 1,050 1,050
Secondary Jobs 0 0 70 1,180 1,170 1,250 1,190 1,330 1,330 1,330
Population Change 0 0 170 2,940 2,920 3,110 2,960 3,100 3,100 3,100
Suboptions Q, Cask, and
RB1
Direct Jobs 0 0 45 1,047 1,053 1,137 1,087 995 994 994
Secondary Jobs 0 0 50 1,150 1,150 1,250 1,190 1,260 1,260 1,260
Population Change 0 0 120 2,850 2,870 3,100 2,960 2,930 2,930 2,930
Program's Expended Core Facility (ECF). Discussion on the relocation of the
ECF to the Hanford Site is provided in Appendix D to the INEL Spent Nuclear
Fuel PEIS and is not included here. Population and employment impacts of the
Regionalization B2 case are presented in Table 5.3-4.
5.3.4.3.1 Employment.
All construction activity is assumed to peak
in 2000. Construction activity for suboptions W, X, Y, and Z occurs in the
years 1997-2000; construction activity for suboptions P and Q occurs in the
years 1998-2001; and construction of the additional facilities (suboption RB1)
for receiving and canning and technology development occurs in the years 1998-
2001, with 35% of the storage facility being constructed during the years
2000-2010 and the remaining 65% being constructed during the years 2010-2035.
Increases in employment range from 488 (suboptions X and RB2) to 1,281
(suboptions Y, P, and RB2) and equate to between 0.6 and 1.5 percentage points
over baseline projections of regional employment (see Table 4.3-1). All
operations activity peaks in 2002, with incremental activity tapering off.
Increases in employment range from 80 (suboptions X and RB2) to 1,085
(suboptions Q, Small Vault, and RB2) persons and equate to between 0.1 and 1.3
percentage points over baseline projections. Beyond 2004, operations activity
will taper off as described in section 5.3.2.2.1.
5.3.4.3.2 Population.
For construction-related activities, the
population is expected to peak in 2000, with increases in population ranging
from 1,330 (suboptions X and RB2) to 3,490 (suboptions Y, P and RB2) and
equating to between 0.8 and 2.0 percentage points over baseline projections
(see Table 4.3-1). All operations activity peaks in 2002, with incremental
activity tapering off through 2006. Increases in population range from 220
(suboption X and RB2) to 3,190 (suboptions Q, Small Vault, RB2) persons and
equate to between 0.1 and 1.8 percentage points over baseline projections for
2002.
5.3.4.4 Regionalization C. In this case, all fuel currently stored or
to be generated in the western United States, including all Hanford Site fuel,
would be sent to and stored at INEL or NTS. Facility requirements for the
Hanford Site in this case are identical to those described in the
Centralization Minimum Alternative. Employment and population impacts of this
case are provided in Table 5.3-5 and are discussed in Section 5.3.5.2.
Table 5.3-4. Comparison of socioeconomic impacts of spent nuclear fuel Regionalization B2 suboptions.
Regionalization 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Alternative
Suboptions W and RB2
Direct Jobs 0 0 216 451 446 491 310 107 80 80
Secondary Jobs 0 0 240 490 490 540 340 120 90 90
Population Change 0 0 590 1,230 1,220 1,340 850 300 220 220
Suboptions X and RB2
Direct Jobs 0 0 200 421 430 488 310 80 80 80
Secondary Jobs 0 0 220 460 470 540 340 90 90 90
Population Change 0 0 540 1,150 1,170 1,330 850 220 220 220
Suboptions Y, P, and RB2
Direct Jobs 0 0 318 1,294 1,263 1,281 1,025 669 669 669
Secondary Jobs 0 0 350 1,420 1,380 1,400 1,120 840 840 840
Population Change 0 0 870 3,530 3,440 3,490 2,790 1,960 1,960 1,960
Suboptions Z, P, and RB2
Direct Jobs 0 0 213 1,135 1,158 1,230 1,025 647 647 647
Secondary Jobs 0 0 230 1,240 1,270 1,350 1,120 810 810 810
Population Change 0 0 580 3,090 3,150 3,350 2,790 1,900 1,900 1,900
Suboptions Q, Small
Vault and RB2
Direct Jobs 0 0 62 1,147 1,164 1,230 1,182 1,085 1,085 1,085
Secondary Jobs 0 0 70 1,260 1,280 1,350 1,300 1,370 1,370 1,370
Population Change 0 0 170 3,130 3,170 3,350 3,220 3,190 3,190 3,190
Suboptions Q, Cask, and
RB2
Direct Jobs 0 0 45 1,117 1,147 1,227 1,182 1,027 1,027 1,027
Secondary Jobs 0 0 50 1,230 1,260 1,350 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300
Population Change 0 0 120 3,040 3,130 3,340 3,220 3,020 3,020 3,020
Table 5.3-5. Comparison of socioeconomic impacts of spent nuclear fuel Centralization Alternative -
maximum case suboptions.
Centralization 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Alternative
Suboptions W and CM
Direct Jobs 0 0 216 626 606 611 430 242 193 193
Secondary Jobs 0 0 240 690 660 670 470 280 220 220
Population Change 0 0 590 1,710 1,650 1,670 1,170 680 540 540
Suboptions X and CM
Direct Jobs 0 0 200 596 590 608 430 164 135 135
Secondary Jobs 0 0 220 650 650 670 470 180 150 150
Population Change 0 0 540 1,620 1,610 1,660 1,170 450 360 360
Suboptions, Y, P, and
CM
Direct Jobs 0 0 318 1,469 1,423 1,401 1,145 804 804 804
Secondary Jobs 0 0 350 1,610 1,560 1,540 1,260 1,000 1,000 1,000
Population Change 0 0 870 4,000 3,880 3,820 3,120 2,350 2,350 2,350
Suboptions Z, P, and CM
Direct Jobs 0 0 213 1,310 1,318 1,350 1,145 782 782 782
Secondary Jobs 0 0 230 1,440 1,440 1,480 1,260 970 970 970
Population Change 0 0 580 3,570 3,590 3,680 3,120 2,280 2,280 2,280
Suboptions Q, Small
Vault, and CM
Direct Jobs 0 0 62 1,322 1,324 1,350 1,302 1,220 1,220 1,220
Secondary Jobs 0 0 70 1,450 1,450 1,480 1,430 1,530 1,530 1,530
Population Change 0 0 170 3,600 3,610 3,680 3,550 3,580 3,580 3,580
Suboptions Q, Cask, and
CM
Direct Jobs 0 0 45 1,292 1,307 1,347 1,302 1,162 1,162 1,162
Secondary Jobs 0 0 50 1,420 1,430 1,480 1,430 1,460 1,460 1,460
Population Change 0 0 120 3,520 3,560 3,670 3,550 3,410 3,410 3,410
5.3.5 Centralization Alternative
Under this alternative, all current and future SNF would be stored at a
centralized location. There are two possible options: the maximum option in
which all fuel is stored at Hanford, and the minimum option in which all fuel
at Hanford is shipped offsite. The socioeconomic consequences related to
implementing the Centralization Alternative suboptions are described in this
subsection. The employment and population impacts related to con-
struction and operation of the maximum option are presented in Table 5.3-5.
The population and employment impacts related to construction and operation of the minimum
option are presented in Table 5.3-6. It was assumed that up to 300 current
Hanford workers could be reassigned to operation activities (this number
excludes current workers at the Fast Flux Test Facility, as it was assumed
that they would be reassigned to activities related to the Hanford Waste
Vitrification Plant). Construction activities were assumed to require new
workers coming into the area. Estimates of direct jobs were provided by
Bergsman (1995). For construction activity, direct jobs were reported as
number of jobs in the peak year and total person-years because it was assumed
that construction activities would "ramp-up" to the peak year, and then "ramp-
down," with the total number of jobs related to construction activity equaling
the total person-years required as reported in Bergsman (1995). Although the
housing market is currently uncertain and beginning to turn downward,
increases in activity levels could strain the housing market and add to
school-capacity concerns. However, because construction activities are short-
term relative to the total project time frame, impacts from construction
activities may be overstated.
5.3.5.1 Centralization - Maximum Option. Under the maximum option,
Hanford SNF would be stabilized and stored under one of the options outlined
in the decentralization alternative, with larger storage facilities. A
facility would also be built to receive SNF from other sites. Additionally,
the ECF would be relocated from the INEL site. The impacts of the ECF to
regional population and employment are presented in Appendix D of Volume 1 of
this EIS and are not discussed here. Table 5.3-5 presents the employment and
population impacts of the options under the maximum centralization option.
5.3.5.1.1 Employment.
All construction activity is assumed to peak
in 2000. Construction activity for suboptions W, X, Y, and Z occurs in the
years 1997-2000; construction activity for suboptions P and Q occurs in the
years 1998-2001; and construction activity for the
Table 5.3-6. Comparison of socioeconomic impacts of spent nuclear fuel Centralization Alternative -
minimum case suboptions.
Centralization 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Alternative
Suboption P
Direct Jobs 0 0 0 715 715 715 715 360 360 360
Secondary Jobs 0 0 0 780 780 780 780 460 460 460
Population Change 0 0 0 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,070 1,070 1,070
Suboption Q
Direct Jobs 0 0 0 872 872 872 872 786 786 786
Secondary Jobs 0 0 0 960 960 960 960 1,000 1,000 1,000
Population Change 0 0 0 2,380 2,380 2,380 2,380 2,330 2,330 2,330
Suboption D
Direct Jobs 0 0 619 620 619 619 357 357 357 357
Secondary Jobs 0 0 680 680 680 680 460 460 460 460
Population Change 0 0 1,690 1,690 1,690 1,690 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060
receiving and canning facility (suboption CM) occurs in the years 1998-2001,
with 50% of the construction activity for the modular storage facility
occurring during the years 2000-2010 and the other 50% occurring during the
years 2010-2035. Increases in employment range from 608 (sub-
options X and CM) to 1,401 (suboptions Y, P, and CM) and equate to between 0.7 and
1.7 percentage points over baseline projections of regional employment (see
Table 4.3-1). All operations activity peaks in 2002, with incremental
activity tapering off. Increases in employment range from 164 (suboptions X
and CM) to 1,220 (suboptions Q, Small Vault, and CM) persons and equate to
between 0.2 and 1.4 percentage points over baseline projections. Beyond 2004,
operations activity will taper off as processing activities (suboptions P and
Q) will occur only through 2005. Operation of the receiving and canning
facility will require 190 workers through 2011, falling to 150 workers through
2035. Suboptions Y and Z each require only 50 workers beyond 2005 for
operations activity. Because it is anticipated that up to 300 current workers
could be reassigned, no incremental socioeconomic impacts are anticipated
after 2005. This is also true with suboptions W and X because each would
require only 60 workers for operation activities.
5.3.5.1.2 Population.
For construction-related activities, the
population is expected to peak in 2000, with increases in population ranging
from 1,620 (suboptions X and CM) to 3,818 (suboptions Y, P, and CM) and
equating to between 0.9 and 2.2 percentage points over baseline projections
(see Table 4.3-1). All operations activity peaks in 2002, with incre-
mental activity tapering off through 2007. Increases in population range from 450
(suboptions X and CM) to 3,580 (suboptions Q, Small Vault, and CM) persons and
equate to between 0.3 and 2.0 percentage points over baseline projections for
2002.
5.3.5.2 Centralization. Minimum Option. Under the minimum option,
Hanford's SNF would be shipped offsite. Some stabilization of fuel would be
required prior to shipment of N Reactor and single-pass reactor fuel. Three
options were identified for the stabilization: a shear/leach/calcine facility
(suboption P); a solvent extraction facility (suboption Q); or a drying and
passivation facility (suboption D). Suboptions P and Q are the same
processing facilities that were included in the Decentralization Alternative.
Table 5.3-6 presents the employment and population impacts of the suboptions
under the Centralization minimum option.
5.3.5.2.1 Employment.
All construction activity is assumed to peak
in 1998. Construction activity for suboptions P and Q occurs in the years
1998-2001. Increases in employment range from 620 (suboption D) to 872
(suboption Q) and equate to between 0.7 and 1.0 percentage points over
baseline projections (see Table 4.3-1). All operations activity peaks in
2002, with incremental activity ending after 2006 for suboptions P and Q, and
after 2004 for suboption D. Increases in employment range from 357 (suboption
D) to 786 (suboption Q) persons and equate to between 0.4 and 0.9 percentage
points over baseline projections.
5.3.5.2.2 Population.
For construction-related activities, the
population is expected to peak in 1998, with increases in population ranging
from 1,690 (suboption D) to 2,380 (suboption Q) and equating to between 1.0
and 1.4 percentage points over baseline projections (see Table 4.3-1). All
operations activity peaks in 2002, with incremental activity ending
after 2006. Increases in population range from 1,060 (suboption D) to 2,330
(suboption Q) persons and equate to between 0.6 and 1.3 percentage points over
baseline projections for 2002.
5.4 Cultural Resources
The potential impacts of SNF management activities on cultural resources
were assessed by 1) identifying project activities that could directly or
indirectly affect significant resources; 2) identifying the known or expected
significant resources in areas of potential impact; and 3) determining whether
a project activity would have no effect, no adverse effect, or an adverse effect
on significant resources (36 CFR 800.9). Direct impacts are considered to be
those associated with ground disturbance or activities that would destroy or
]modify an architectural structure. Indirect impacts are considered to be those
resulting from improved visitor access, changes in land status, or other actions
that limit scientific investigation of the resources.
Possible measures that would be worked out in consultation with the
Washington State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO), Advisory Council for
Historic Preservation, and area tribes may include avoidance or data recovery.
5.4.1 No Action Alternative
The No Action Alternative would not involve upgrade or expansion of
existing facilities, other than those that may be required to ensure safety
and security. Specific actions considered in the No Action Alternative
include continued storage at the following facilities:
- 105-KE and 105-KW Basins
y T Plant
- FFTF
- 308 Building
- 324 Building
- 325 Building
- 327 Building
- Low-Level Burial Grounds.
With the exception of FFTF, these are existing Manhattan Project and/or
Cold War facilities currently under evaluation for National Register of
Historic Places (NRHP) eligibility.
No new facilities would be required; however, the following facility
modifications would be considered:
- Upgrade water supply and distribution system to 100-K Area.
- Upgrade seismic adequacy of K Basins.
- Upgrade fire protection systems for the K Basins.
- Safeguards and security upgrades to the K Basins.
Upgrade of the water supply and distribution system has the potential to
adversely affect prehistoric archaeological sites in the vicinity of the 100-K
Area. Several archaeological sites (45BN115, 45BN152, 45BN423, 45BN434,
45BN464, 45BN424, and H3-10) have been identified in this area (Chatters et
al. 1992). These sites are being evaluated for their National Register
eligibility. A careful review of the detailed project plans is necessary
prior to initiation of this work. If the upgrade results in ground
disturbance, as in the replacement and/or addition of new water lines, then
these actions could directly affect the archaeological sites. However, proper
design of the upgrade system could allow for avoidance of these prehistoric
sites. If avoidance is not possible, some sort of data recovery or other
measures may be developed in conjunction with affected Native American Tribes
and the SHPO. The remaining facility modifications are not likely to affect
the historical or architectural value of the Manhattan Project and/or Cold War
facilities.
Some indirect effects might result from the continued operation of SNF
storage facilities by Hanford workers in the culturally sensitive 100-K Area,
if unauthorized artifact collection would contribute to the degradation of
nearby archaeological sites. These effects could be mitigated through a
worker education program, which would use posters to inform workers of
applicable laws, briefing sessions for all persons expected to work along the
corridor, and penalties for disturbing an archaeological site. The briefing
sessions would stress the importance of cultural resources and specifics of
the laws and regulations that exist for site protection.
Direct or indirect impacts are not anticipated to any known traditional
cultural resources that are significant to members of the Yakama Indian
Nation, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, or the
Wanapum Band. This conclusion is based on the proposed locations of
facilities relative to sacred and culturally important areas identified
through ethnohistorical research and interviews with elders of bands that
formerly used the Hanford Site (Chatters 1989).
5.4.2 Decentralization Alternative
This alternative would involve additional facility upgrades beyond those
described for the No Action Alternative, including the construction of new
storage facilities and/or a processing facility. Several suboptions have been
proposed that would require construction of new facilities. Table 5.4-1 lists
the various suboptions and their facility requirements.
Table 5.4-1. Facility requirements of Decentralization suboptions and
estimations of area disturbed, [hectares (acres)].
Sub- Process New pool New New New New
options option dry dry process land
vault casks facility disturbed
W None 2.4 (6) 2.4 (6) 4.9 (12)
X None 2.4 (6) 2 (5) 4.5 (11)
Y P 4.9 (12) 2.4 (6) 7.3 (18)
Q 2.4 (6) 4.9 (12) 7.3 (18)
D 4.9 (12) 2.4 (6) 7.3 (18)
Z P 4.9 2.4 (6) 7.3 (18)
(12)
Q 2 (5) 4.9 (12) 6.9 (17)
D 4.9 2.4 (6) 7.3 (18)
(12)
All suboptions would require the temporary use of 105-KE and 105-KW
basins for packaging of fuel prior to relocation to a new wet storage
facility, or stabilization for dry storage. These are existing Manhattan
Project and/or Cold War facilities (currently under evaluation for National
Register eligibility). Modifications to these existing facilities are
considered to be comparable to those identified in the No Action Alternative.
Actions during the upgrade of the water supply and distribution system
for the 100-K Area that disturb ground have the potential to adversely affect
prehistoric archaeological sites in the vicinity of the 100-K Area (45BN115,
45BN152, 45BN423, 45BN434, 45BN464, 45BN424, and H3-10). A review of specific
upgrade actions is required to determine these effects prior to initiation of
these actions. Design of the upgrade system should incorporate
avoidance of these prehistoric sites. If avoidance is not possible, some sort
of data recovery or other measures may be developed in conjunction with
affected Native American Tribes, the SHPO, and the Advisory Council.
An indirect effect of continued operation and maintenance of these
facilities is the potential for Hanford workers to conduct unauthorized
artifact collection activities. This effect could be mitigated through a
worker education program, which would use posters to inform workers of
applicable laws, briefing sessions for all persons expected to work along the
corridor, and penalties for disturbing an archaeological site. The briefing
sessions would stress the importance of cultural resources and specifics of
the laws and regulations that exist for site protection.
All of the suboptions would require the construction of new facilities.
Wet storage pool and dry storage vault facilities would be cast-in-place
concrete structures. The dry cask storage facility would consist of modular
storage casks on a concrete pad. The stabilization facilities would be
multilevel steel-reinforced, cast-in-place concrete structures. The total land
area disturbed by the construction of these facilities is estimated to range
from 11 to 18 acres.
All new facilities would be located on a 160-acre site just west of 200-
East Area (Figure 4-1). The construction of these facilities is not expected
to directly affect any archaeological resources. The proposed project area
has been surveyed for cultural resources (HCRC 94-600-001), and no prehistoric
or historic archaeological properties were found. Consultation with the State
Historic Preservation Office and affected Native American Tribes is still in
progress. No indirect effects would be anticipated either because no
archaeological sites are known to occur within approximately 4 kilometers of
the location proposed for the SNF storage facilities. The SNF facilities
would be constructed in an industrialized area and would not alter the feeling
or association of the Manhattan Project and/or Cold War facilities located
nearby.
Text describing impacts to areas of known traditional or religious
significance to specific Native American Tribes for the No Action Alternative
in Subsection 5.4.1 also applies to the Decentralization Alternative.
5.4.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
This alternative involves continued SNF onsite transportation, receipt,
processing, and storage at the Hanford Site. However, the TRIGA fuel
currently stored at Hanford would be shipped to INEL. The impacts to cultural
resources caused by storage of this fuel at INEL are covered in Volume 1,
Appendix B (INEL Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program). The storage and
stabilization facility options for Hanford under this alternative are assumed
to be consistent with those of the Decentralization Alternative. Refer to
Subsection 5.4.2 for a discussion of the cultural resource impacts.
5.4.4 Regionalization Alternative
All new facilities would be constructed on the 65 hectare (163-acre)
site west of 200-East Area (Figure 4.1). Construction of these facilities is
not expected to have a direct effect on any significant archaeologic
resources. The proposed project area has been surveyed for cultural resources
(HCRC 94-600-017), and no prehistoric or historic archaeological properties
were found. Two isolated artifacts, one historic and one prehistoric in
origin, were recorded during the inventory. Because of their isolated status,
neither of the artifacts is considered significant. No indirect effects are
anticipated because no known archaeological sites are present within approx-
imately 4 kilometers (2 1/2 miles) of the location proposed for the SNF
storage facilities. Because the site for the new SNF facilities is in an
industrialized area, construction of these facilities would not alter the
feeling or association of the Manhattan Project and/or Cold War facilities
located nearby.
Although no cultural resource impacts are expected, the potential for
discovery during construction is proportional to the amount of land that would
be disturbed. For the various options of the Regionalization Alternative,
those areas would amount to the following amounts of land:
A) From about 2 to 7 hectares (6 to 18 acres) when all SNF, except
defense production SNF, would be sent to INEL
B1) From about 14 to 17 hectares (36 to 43 acres) when all SNF west of
the Mississippi River, with the exception of Naval SNF, would be
sent to Hanford
B2) From about 24 to 27 hectares (61 to 68 acres) when all SNF west of
the Mississippi River and Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford
C) About 2 to 5 hectares (6 to 12 acres) when all Hanford SNF would be
sent to INEL or NTS.
In any event, the maximum option would require a processing facility
(equivalent to Decentralization process options P, Q, or D) with a specialty
fuel processing area; an inspection and packaging facility; an SNF storage
complex (similar to, but larger than that for the Decentralization options
W, X, Y, or Z); and a new Expended Core Facility. The existing 105-KE and
105-KW basins would be used to package fuel for wet transport to the
processing facility. These are existing Manhattan Project and/or Cold War
facilities that are currently under evaluation for National Register
eligibility. Modifications to these facilities are considered to be similar
to those depicted for the No Action and Decentralization alternatives (refer
to Subsections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2). Ground-disturbing upgrades to the 100-K Area
water supply and distribution system are considered to have potentially
adverse effects on prehistoric archaeological sites 45BN115, 45BN152, 45BN423,
45BN434, 45BN424, H3-10, and/or 45BN464 located in this vicinity. A review of
the specific upgrade plans is required to determine the effects before
beginning these activities. Design of the upgraded water supply system should
incorporate avoidance of the prehistoric sites. If avoidance is not possible,
then some data recovery or other measures would be developed in conjunction
with the affected Native American Tribes, the SHPO, and the Advisory Council.
Text describing potential unauthorized artifact collection and possible
mitigation measures for the Decentralization Alternative in Subsection 5.4.2
also applies to the Regionalization Alternative.
Text describing impacts to areas of known traditional or religious
significance to specific Native American Tribes for the No Action Alternative
in Subsection 5.4.1 also applies to the Regionalization Alternative.
5.4.5 Centralization Alternative
This alternative consists of two scenarios: shipment of all SNF off of
the Hanford Site (minimum option), and storage of all SNF at the Hanford Site
(maximum option). For the minimum option, a new fuel stabilization and
packaging (canning) facility would be constructed.
The maximum option would require a processing facility (equivalent to
Decentralization process options P, Q, or D) with a specialty fuel processing
area; an inspection and packaging facility; an SNF storage complex (similar to
the decentralization options W, X, Y, or Z); and a new Expended Core Facility.
The existing 105-KE and 105-KW Basins would be used to package defense
production fuel for wet transport to the processing facility. These are
existing Manhattan Project and/or Cold War facilities that are currently under
evaluation for National Register eligibility. Modifications to these
facilities are considered to be similar to those depicted for the No Action
and Decentralization Alternatives (refer to Subsections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2).
Ground-disturbing upgrades to the 100-K Area water supply and distribution
system are considered to have potentially adverse effects on prehistoric
archaeological sites 45BN115, 45BN152, 45BN423, 45BN434, 45BN424, H3-10,
and/or 45BN464 located in this vicinity. A review of the specific upgrade
plans is required to determine the effects before beginning these activities.
Design of the upgraded water supply system should incorporate avoidance of the
prehistoric sites. If avoidance is not possible, then some data recovery or
other measures would be developed in conjunction with the affected Native
American Tribes, the SHPO, and the Advisory Council. Text describing
potential unauthorized artifact collection and possible mitigation measures
for the Decentralization Alternative in Subsection 5.4.2 also applies to the
Centralization Alternative.
All new facilities would be constructed on the 160-acre site west of
200-East Area (Figure 4.1). The construction of these facilities is not
expected to have a direct effect on any archaeologic resources. The proposed
project area has been surveyed for cultural resources (HCRC 94-600-001), and
no prehistoric or historic archaeological properties were found. No indirect
effects are anticipated because no known archaeological sites are present
within approximately 4 kilometers of the location proposed for the SNF storage
facilities. The site for the new SNF facilities is in an industrialized area,
thus construction of these facilities would not alter the feeling or
association of the Manhattan Project and/or Cold War facilities located
nearby.
Text describing impacts to areas of known traditional or religious
significance to specific Native American Tribes for the No Action Alternative
in Subsection 5.4.1 also applies to the Centralization Alternative.
5.5 Aesthetic and Scenic Resources
Implications of implementing the alternatives for interim storage of SNF
on aesthetic and scenic resources at the Hanford Site are discussed in the
following subsections.
5.5.1 No Action Alternative
Impacts from this alternative would have no effect on the aesthetic and
scenic resources.
5.5.2 Decentralization Alternative
This alternative would require the construction of an SNF facility at
Hanford, where most SNF from the Hanford Site would be stored.
Changes caused by construction and operation of an SNF facility would be
consistent with the existing overall visual environment of the Hanford Site.
Topographic features obstruct the SNF site from view from populated areas.
The site could be seen from the farmland bluffs that overlook the Columbia
River on the east. However, these lands are on private property not readily
accessible to the public. Landowners would likely grant access permission
only during the hunting season, if at all. No impacts requiring
mitigation would occur to the aesthetics or to the visual environ-
ment as a result of construction or operation of an SNF facility at the Hanford Site.
5.5.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
Activities in this alternative are sufficiently similar to those of the
Decentralization Alternative that they are not repeated here.
5.5.4 Regionalization Alternative
This alternative (see Section 5.1.4 for details) would require the
construction of a variety of SNF facilities depending on the option chosen.
The facilities would range from a packaging/stabilization facility if all fuel
were to be removed from Hanford (option C) to storage facilities for all SNF
west of the Mississippi River (option B2). However, changes caused by
construction and operation of these facilities would be consistent with the
existing overall visual environment of the Hanford Site. Topographic features
obstruct the SNF site from view from populated areas. The site could be seen
from the farmland bluffs to the east of the site that overlook the Columbia
River. However, these lands are on private property that is not readily
accessible to the public. Landowners would likely grant access permission
only during the hunting season, if at all.
No impacts requiring mitigation would occur to the aesthetics or to the
visual environment as a result of construction or operation of an SNF facility
at the Hanford Site.
5.5.5 Centralization Alternative
If Hanford is selected as the site for centralization of SNF, then the
SNF facility and its support facilities would be constructed here.
Changes caused by construction and operation of an SNF facility would be
substantially larger in the Centralization Maximum Alternative. However, they
would be consistent with the existing overall visual environment of the
Hanford Site. Topographic features obstruct the SNF site from view from
populated areas. The site could be seen from the farmland bluffs that
overlook the Columbia River on the east. However, these lands are on private
property not readily accessible to the public. Landowners would likely grant
access permission only during the hunting season, if at all.
No impacts requiring mitigation would occur to the aesthetics or to the
visual environment as a result of construction or operation of an SNF facility
at the Hanford Site. If Hanford is not selected as the site for
centralization of SNF, only an SNF packaging/ processing facility for shipment
of fuel would be constructed and there would be even less potential for impact
to the aesthetic and scenic resources.
5.6 Geologic Resources
No postulated impacts to the geologic resources of the Hanford Site have
been identified under any of the alternatives. Thus, geologic resources would
remain as described under Section 4.6.
5.7 Air Quality and Related Consequences
The consequences of the five alternatives on ambient air quality at the
Hanford Site are presented in this section. In the case of radiological
emissions, the consequences are compared among the alternatives and to current
Hanford Site operations. For nonradiological emissions, projected ambient
concentration at key receptor locations are compared with current concen-
trations at the Hanford Site. Development of the specific analysis for each
alternative is discussed in subsequent subsections.
The consequences of radiological emissions were evaluated using the
GENII computer code package (Napier et al. 1988). The radiological
consequences of airborne emissions during normal operation have been estimated
for the SNF storage alternatives considered in this document. Three separate
analyses were performed for each facility included in a particular alternative
using the GENII computer code. The receptors evaluated in these cases were at
the location of maximum exposure representing a potential onsite worker
outside of the SNF facility, the maximally exposed offsite resident, and the
collective population within 80 kilometers. Standard parameters for
radiological dose calculations at the Hanford Site were used for these
estimates (Schreckhise et al. 1993). The maximum impact of each alternative
on offsite receptors and workers was obtained by summing the consequences
associated with the individual facilities, although these receptors may be
physically at very different locations. The health consequences in terms of
cancer fatalities were calculated using recommendations of the International
Commission on Radiological Protection in its Publication 60 (ICRP 1991) - 4E-
04 fatal cancers/rem for workers and 5E-04 fatal cancers/rem for the general
population. Risk conversion factors were applied to both individual and
collective doses, although they are based on population averages for
individuals with varying degrees of sensitivity. The individual risk
estimates therefore represent the risk to a hypothetical individual, which
would be somewhat lower than the risk to more sensitive members of the
population.
None of the alternatives would result in a dose to the maximally exposed
offsite resident that exceeds 1 percent of the current EPA standard of
10 millirem/year. The consequences of the No Action Alternative are caused by
emissions from existing facilities where spent fuel is stored. These
facilities contribute a relatively small fraction of the total dose from
airborne emissions at all Hanford Site operations (less than half and likely
much less). The No Action Alternative represents the baseline for SNF
operations at Hanford. The consequences of the Decentralization,
Regionalization, and Centralization Alternatives vary depending on which
storage and processing options are considered. Options including processing
of defense reactor fuel result in the highest doses, which are at most an
order of magnitude greater than those in the No Action Alternative. The
consequences of options involving only containerization of defense reactor
fuel followed by wet storage, and dry storage of all other fuel, in a new
facility are approximately an order of magnitude lower than those in the
No Action Alternative.
The potential nonradiological air quality pollutants of concern for this
assessment include all pollutants for which there exist federal, state, or
local standards. This includes both the standard set of criteria pollutants
(e.g., nitrogen dioxide, oxides of sulfur, respirable particles) and toxic
pollutants.
For criteria pollutants, concentration levels are regulated by the
provisions of the Clean Air Act; Washington State standards for these criteria
pollutants are at least as stringent as the federal standards. In the State
of Washington, the Department of Ecology has the responsibility for promulgating
and enforcing air quality standards for the protection of public health.
The regulation that governs the control of toxic air pollutants (WAC
1990a,b) requires the owners of new or modified air emission sources to apply
for approval before construction. Owners of sources emitting toxic air
pollutants must demonstrate that they will employ the best available control
technology for emissions control with reasonable environmental, energy, and
economic impacts.
Construction of new facilities can also negatively impact air quality
through the emission of fugitive dusts. To model this aspect, the EPA's
Fugitive Dust Model (FDM) was selected. This model is especially designed to
compute the air quality impacts from fugitive dust emissions, such as those
associated with facility construction sites (Winges 1992). The FDM uses
steady-state Gaussian plume algorithms and a gradient-transfer deposition
algorithm to compute air quality impacts. Emissions for each source must be
apportioned into a series of particle-size classes; each of which is assigned
a representative deposition velocity. The model can operate using either
joint frequency distributions or hourly meteorological data to represent
atmospheric conditions. The model can handle up to 200 sources and 500
receptors per model run. The user may define a variety of point, line, area,
and volume sources.
The Industrial Source Complex (ISC2) models were selected to estimate
routine nonradiological air quality impacts. There are two ISC2 models: the
ISC2 short-term model (ISCST2) and the ISC2 long-term model (ISCLT2). The two
ISC2 models use steady-state Gaussian plume algorithms to estimate pollutant
concentrations from a wide variety of sources associated with industrial
complexes (EPA 1992). The models are appropriate for flat or rolling terrain,
modeling domains with a radius of less than 50 kilometers, and urban or rural
environments. The ISC2 models have been approved by the EPA for specific
regulatory applications and are designed for use on personal computers. Input
requirements for the ISC2 model include a variety of information that defines
the source configuration and pollutant emission parameters. The user may
define a variety of point, line, area, and volume sources. The ISCST2 model
uses hourly meteorological data and joint frequency distribution data to
compute straightline plume transport. Plume rise, stack-tip downwash, and
building wake can be computed. The ISC2 models compute a variety of short-
and long-term averaged products at user-specified receptor locations and
receptor rings. The ISC2 models also treat deposition processes and allow the
exponential decay of pollutants.
5.7.1 No Action Alternative
Facilities included in the No Action Alternative consist of those where
SNF is currently stored at the Hanford Site. Minimal repackaging,
stabilization, and relocation of fuel would be undertaken to ensure continued
safe storage prior to ultimate disposition. The majority of spent fuel at
Hanford is located at the 100-K Area wet storage basins. In addition, smaller
quantities of fuel are stored at other onsite facilities. These include T
Plant and a low-level waste burial ground in the 200-West Area; the Fast Flux
Test Facility in the 400 Area; and the 308, 324, 325, and 327 buildings in the
300 Area. Releases for the No Action Alternative are based on operations for
these facilities during 1992 (Bergsman 1995). These emissions were assumed to
represent operations at existing SNF storage facilities over the EIS
evaluation period, although they are subject to change with individual
facility missions and operating status. It should also be noted that some
existing facilities support a variety of other programs in energy research and
waste management in addition to laboratory and hot cell examination of fuel
materials. The historical releases from these multi-purpose facilities may
reflect other activities in addition to spent fuel storage. The past
operating emissions, therefore, represent an upper bound estimate for the fuel
storage activities. The No Action Alternative also represents the baseline of
maximum expected impacts for future spent fuel storage activities.
5.7.1.1 Radiological. Radiological air emissions for normal operation
of existing fuel storage facilities in the No Action Alternative are listed in
Tables 5.7-1 through 5.7-3 (DOE/RL 1993). The sealed fuel canisters
temporarily stored at the 200-West Area burial ground are assumed to release
negligible quantities of radionuclides in this analysis, although actual
emissions from the stored fuel have not been quantified.
The consequences of air emissions from existing facilities utilized in
the No Action Alternative are summarized in Table 5.7-4 and include a maximum
annual dose of 1E-5 rem to a potential onsite worker with a 5E-9 probability
of fatal cancer. The maximum dose to an offsite resident is estimated as 3E-6
rem/year, and the corresponding probability of fatal cancer is 1E-9. The dose
estimate for an onsite worker or an offsite individual represents the sum of
doses to separate maximally exposed individuals for each of the facilities
included in the alternative. Because these facilities are in different areas
of the Hanford Site, the respective maximally exposed workers and offsite
residents are at different locations. The actual dose to a single worker or
Table 5.7-1. Annual atmospheric releases for normal operation - wet storage
basins at 100-KE Area and 100-KW Area.
Radionuclide 100-KE Area 100-KW Area
Release (Ci/yr) Release (Ci/yr)
Cobalt-60 1.3E-06 1.4E-06
Strontium-90 1.6E-04 9.9E-07
Ruthenium-106 1.3E-05 6.2E-06
Antimony-125 1.1E-05 NAa
Cesium-137 2.3E-04 2.7E-05
Europium-154 NA 4.9E-06
Plutonium-238 1.3E-06 3.0E-08
Plutonium-241 3.9E-05 NA
Americium-241 5.1E-06 NA
Plutonium-239 8.5E-06 1.8E-07
Tritium (b) (b)
a. NA indicates not available.
b. Although tritium emissions are not routinely monitored at these
facilities, the releases from both basins were recently estimated as 1-2
Ci/year. These emissions could account for up to 25% of the total dose from
these facilities to the maximally exposed offsite resident. However, the
contribution from the 100 area tritium emissions would not change the
estimated dose from all Hanford emissions to the site's maximally exposed
offsite resident.
Table 5.7-2. Annual atmospheric releases for normal operation - fuel storage
at 300 Area 308, 324, 325, and 327 buildings.
Radionuclide 308 Building 324 Building 325 Building 327 Building
Release Release Release Release
(Ci/yr) (Ci/yr) (Ci/yr) (Ci/yr)
Tritium NAa 9.6E+00 2.5E+01 NA
Total betab 1.1E-07 6.4E-07 2.4E-06 9.3E-07
Total alphac 3.0E-08 3.9E-07 8.5E-07 1.1E-07
a. NA indicates not available.
b. Total beta emissions were assumed to be strontium-90 for modeling
purposes.
c. Total alpha emissions were assumed to be plutonium-239 for modeling
purposes.
Table 5.7-3. Annual atmospheric releases for normal operation - fuel storage
at 200 West Area T Plant and 400 Area FFTF.
Radionuclide 200-West Area T 400 Area FFTF
Plant Release
Release (Ci/yr) (Ci/yr)
Argon-41 NAa 8.5E+00b
Total beta/strontium-90 1.2E-05 6.7E-06c
Cesium-137 1.3E-05 NA
Americium-241 2.0E-06 NA
Total alpha/plutonium-239 2.2E-05 1.1E-06d
a. NA indicates not available.
b. Releases of Ar-41 occurred during reactor operation in 1992. The
reactor was subsequently shut down, and releases of short-lived activation
products are not anticipated from future fuel storage activities.
c. Total beta emissions were assumed to be strontium-90 for modeling
purposes.
d. Total alpha emissions were assumed to be plutonium-239 for modeling
purposes.
offsite resident from all facilities combined would therefore be less than
the sum of the individual facility receptor doses reported in Table 5.7-4. The
peak collective dose to the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) is 3E-2
person-rem per year, which is predicted to result in less than one fatal
cancer (6 x 10-4) over 40 years of storage.
5.7.1.2 Nonradiological Consequences. The No Action Alternative
involves no new construction so there would not be an increase in particulate
emissions. The facilities currently used in storing the SNF do not have any
nonradiological releases, so there would be no increase in concentrations of
these pollutants.
5.7.2 Decentralization Alternative
The Decentralization Alternative permits construction of new facilities
where these represent an improvement over current storage practices.
Relocation of fuel could be undertaken as part of this alternative to meet
programmatic needs; however, no fuel would be shipped to, or received from,
offsite locations. It is assumed for purposes of this analysis that new
facilities would be constructed under this alternative, and that they would be
located in a dedicated SNF management complex adjacent to the 200-East Area.
Table 5.7-4. Radiological consequences of airborne emissions during normal operation in the No-Action
Alternative for spent nuclear fuel storage at Hanford.
Onsite worker Offsite resident 80 kilometer
population
Area Facility Peak annual Probability of Peak annual Probability Peak annual Number
dose (EDE) fatal cancer dose (EDE) of fatal dose (EDE) of
(rem/yr) (rem/yr) cancer (person- fatal
rem/yr) cancers
100 KE Wet Basin 9.3E-06 2.0E-07 5.7E-03
100 KW Wet Basin 1.2E-07 3.3E-09 9.1E-05
300 308 Bldg 3.3E-09 2.1E-09 1.4E-05
300 324 Bldg 1.4E-08 2.9E-07 3.0E-03
300 325 Bldg 1.2E-07 1.9E-06 1.1E-02
300 327 Bldg 1.7E-09 2.4E-09 2.6E-05
200 W Burial 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
Ground
200 W T Plant 1.3E-07 3.3E-08 2.4E-03
400 Fast Flux 1.9E-06 1.9E-07 4.1E-03
Test
Facility
Total from All 1.2E-05 4.6E-09 2.6E-06 1.3E-09 2.7E-02 1.3E-05
Facilities
The Decentralization Alternative at Hanford includes two basic options,
each with several suboptions depending on the types of storage and processing
facilities included. The first major option includes a combination of wet
storage of defense production fuel and dry storage of all other fuel in either
a small vault facility (suboption W) or in casks (suboption X). The second
major option provides for dry storage of all fuel, which would require
processing of defense fuel prior to dry storage. If a shear/leach/calcine
process is used (suboption P), the calcine product and all other fuel would be
consolidated in a single large vault facility (suboption Y) or in casks
(suboption Z). If a solvent extraction process is chosen for the defense fuel
(suboption Q), the oxide products could be stored in either new or existing
facilities that would have lower space and shielding requirements than for the
calcine product. A high-level liquid waste stream would also be produced and
transferred to underground storage tanks. All fuel other than the processed
defense fuel would be stored in a small vault facility or in casks as in
suboptions W and X.
5.7.2.1 Radiological. Estimated radiological air emissions for normal
operations of new facilities in the Decentralization Alternative are listed in
Tables 5.7-5 through 5.7-7. The dry storage facilities are assumed to have no
radiological emissions under normal operating conditions because all fuel is
contained in sealed decontaminated canisters and storage casks. Therefore,
there is no mechanism for routine release of radionuclides from dry storage
facilities over the time period covered in this document.
The consequences of air emissions from individual facilities in the
Decentralization Alternative are summarized in Table 5.7-8 and include a
maximum annual dose of 2E-9 rem to a
Table 5.7-5. Estimated annual atmospheric releases for normal operation - new
wet storage at 200-East Area.
Radionuclide Release (Ci/yr)
Cobalt-60 1.4E-05
Strontium-90 1.1E-06
Ruthenium-106 6.2E-06
Cesium-137 2.3E-05
Europium-154 4.9E-06
Plutonium-238 1.1E-08
Plutonium-239 6.7E-08
Table 5.7-6. Estimated annual atmospheric releases for normal operation -
shear/leach/calcine fuel process at 200-East Area.
Radionuclide Release
(Ci/yr)
Tritium 7.0E+02
Carbon-14 6.5E+00
Krypton-85 2.7E+05
Strontium-90 4.8E-07
Ruthenium-106 4.3E-09
Antimony-125 1.0E-08
Tellurium-125M 2.5E-09
Iodine-129 5.0E-03
Cesium-134 1.0E-08
Cesium-137 6.0E-07
Cerium-144 2.3E-09
Promethium-147 1.6E-07
Samarium-151 7.4E-09
Europium-154 7.2E-09
Americium-242 2.4E-12
Curium-242 6.1E-12
Plutonium-238 3.2E-09
Plutonium-241 3.8E-07
Americium-241 7.8E-09
Plutonium-239/240 0.00000002
potential onsite worker (8E-13) probability of fatal cancer) for the option
including a combination of wet and dry spent fuel storage facilities. The
dose to an offsite resident at the highest exposure location is estimated as
6E-10 rem/year, and the corresponding probability of fatal cancer is 3E-13.
The peak collective dose to the population within 80 kilometers is 2E-5
person-rem per year, which is predicted to result in less than one (4 x 10-7)
fatal cancer over 40 years of storage.
Table 5.7-7. Estimated annual atmospheric releases for normal operation -
spent nuclear fuel solvent extraction fuel process at 200-East Area.
Radionuclide Release
(Ci/yr)
Tritium 7.0E+02
Carbon-14 6.5E+00
Krypton-85 2.7E+05
Strontium-90 2.4E-02
Ruthenium-106 5.1E-04
Antimony-125 4.6E-04
Tellurium-125M 2.4E-04
Iodine-129 1.9E-02
Cesium-134 5.1E-04
Cesium-137 3.0E-02
Cesium-144 1.2E-04
Promethium-147 8.1E-03
Samarium-151 7.4E-09
Europium-154 4.2E-04
Europium-155 1.7E-04
Americium-242 2.4E-12
Curium-242 6.1E-12
Plutonium-238 1.6E-03
Plutonium-241 1.9E-02
Americium-241 4.4E-03
Plutonium-239/240 0.008
Table 5.7-8. Radiological consequences of airborne emissions during normal operation in the
Decentralization Alternative for spent nuclear fuel storage at Hanford.
Onsite worker Offsite resident 80 km population
Area Facility Peak annual dose Probability Peak annual Probabilit Peak annual Number of
(EDE) (rem/yr) of fatal dose (EDE) y of fatal dose (EDE) fatal
cancer (rem/yr) cancer (person- cancers
rem/yr)
Combination Wet + Dry Storage Option
200 E New Wet Storage 2.0E-09 8.0E-13 5.7E-10 2.8E-13 2.3E-05 1.2E-08
200 E New Dry Storage 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
Dry Storage Only Option with Defense Fuel Processing
200 E New Dry Storage 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
200 E New Fuel Calcine 4.1E-06 1.7E-09 7.0E-06 3.5E-09 3.4E-01 1.7E-04
200E New Solvent 2.7E-05 1.1E-08 2.1E-05 1.1E-08 1.3E+00 6.3E-04
Extraction
For the all dry storage option, processing defense fuel is required in
the Decentralization Alternative (suboptions P and Q), and additional
emissions would result from these activities if they were conducted. The dose
to the onsite worker from air emissions would be 4E-6 rem per year for a
shear/leach/calcine process or 3E-5 rem per year for a solvent extraction
process (2E-9 or 1E-8 probability of fatal cancer, respectively) in addition to those
from the dry storage facility. The corresponding consequences for the offsite
resident would be 7E-6 rem per year (4E-9 probability of fatal cancer) for the
shear/leach/calcine facility and 2E-5 rem per year (1E-8 probability of fatal
cancer) for the solvent extraction facility. The collective dose to the
offsite population from the respective fuel processing facilities is estimated
at 0.3 to 1 person-rem per year, resulting in less than one expected fatal
cancer (<0.02) over 40 years of storage.
5.7.2.2 Nonradiological Consequences. Fugitive dust emissions from new
construction activities, toxic chemical emissions, and nitrogen oxide
emissions from fuel processing would contribute to the non-
radiological emissions in the Decentralization Alternative.
5.7.2.2.1 Fugitive Dust.
Three different construction options are
under consideration in this alternative: 1) construction of wet and dry
storage facilities, 2) construction of dry storage and the shear/leach/calcine
facility, and 3) construction of a dry storage and a solvent extraction
facility. In options 1 and 2, approximately 12 acres would be disturbed for
the construction of the storage facilities; in option 3, 6 acres would be
disturbed for the dry storage facility. An additional 6 acres would be
disturbed for the shear/leach/calcine facility or 12 acres for the solvent
extraction facility. In total up to 12 acres would be disturbed in the first
option and 18 acres in the second and third options (Bergsman 1995).
Details of the construction process are not available for the
alternatives, but a standard default value of 1.2 tons/acre/month of particles
can be assumed to be generated during new construction (EPA 1977). Most of
the particles produced by construction activities are large and settle a short
distance from the source (Seinfeld 1986). A conservative estimate is that
approximately 30 percent of the mass released would be particles small enough
to be transported away from the construction site (EPA 1988).
Experience with construction activities at Hanford indicates that
fugitive dust concentrations at the nearest point of public access and at the
site boundaries would be less than Washington State PM10 limits for both
annual and 24-hour averages. Standard control techniques (such as applying
water to the disturbed ground) could be used to limit the PM10 emissions at
the construction site and resulting airborne concentrations. Although
extensive construction activities have the potential to contribute to short-
term airborne particulate concentrations if they coincide with high wind
events, such effects would generally be obvious only in the immediate area and
could be mitigated by dust control measures over both the short and long term.
In any case, such activities would be temporary and would not adversely affect
regional air quality on a continuing basis. Construction activities would
also result in increased emissions of pollutants from diesel- and gasoline-
powered construction equipment. However, the increase in ambient levels of
pollutants would be minimal because of the relatively low levels of emission
and large distances to the nearest points of public access and the site
boundary.
5.7.2.2.2 Nitrogen Oxides.
Nitrogen oxide emissions during facility
operation are approximately the same for both the shear/leach/calcine facility
and the solvent extraction facility. It is assumed that all nitrogen oxide
emissions are in the form of nitrogen dioxide. Annual concentrations at the
nearest point of public access, 7.5 kilometers (6.4 miles) southwest of the
release site, are estimated to be 0.1 micrograms per cubic meter. This
concentration is 0.1 percent of the allowed Washington State standard and 0.4
percent of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) standard.
Nitrogen oxide concentrations were also calculated for onsite locations.
The maximum annual concentration estimated by the model is 1.2 micrograms per
cubic meter, which occurs 500 meters (0.3 miles) south of the processing
facility. The maximum ground level concentration is some distance from the
processing facility because the emissions are from an elevated stack rather
than at ground level. For example, at a distance of 100 meters (0.06 miles)
from the base of the facility, the greatest estimated nitrogen oxide annual
concentration is only 1.8 x 10-5 micrograms per cubic meter.
5.7.2.2.3 Toxic Chemical Emissions.
Information about routine
toxic chemical emissions from either the shear/leach/calcine facility or the
solvent extraction facility is unavailable. However control techniques would
be used to ensure that concentrations of toxics in the atmosphere comply with
the DOE abatement policy and local permitting requirements.
5.7.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
The 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative is assumed to be similar to the
Decentralization Alternative discussed in the previous section, including
construction of wet or dry storage facilities adjacent to the 200-East Area
and process facilities for defense production fuel if it is to be stored dry.
The only change to the Hanford Site fuel inventory would involve shipment of a
relatively small quantity of TRIGA fuel to an offsite location. This would
not substantially alter the scope of planned spent fuel storage activities,
and the 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative assumes emissions for new facili-
ties are the same as those in the Decentralization Alternative.
5.7.3.1 Radiological Consequences. The consequences for this
alternative are assumed to be the same as those for the Decentralization
Alternative. Refer to Table 5.7-8 for the list of facilities included in this
option and their consequences.
5.7.3.2 Nonradiological Consequences. The consequences for this
alternative are considered to be the same as those for the Decentralization
Alternative.
5.7.4 Regionalization Alternative
The Regionalization Alternative at Hanford includes three options,
depending on the quantity of SNF shipped to, or from, the site. Option A
provides for regional storage of SNF by type, and would entail shipping all
fuel at Hanford except defense production fuel to another location. In this
case, defense fuel would either be stored wet at a new pool facility, or it
would be processed for dry storage using suboptions similar to those described
in the Decentralization Alternative.
An additional option in the Regionalization Alternative describes
importing SNF to Hanford from other sites based on their geographic
distribution. In the first option, designated Option B1, all fuel at
locations west of the Mississippi River except Naval SNF would be stored at
Hanford. In the second option, designated Option B2, all SNF at locations
west of the Mississippi River and Naval SNF would be stored at Hanford. All
imported fuel would ultimately be placed into a new dry storage facility, the
size of which would be determined by the quantity of imported fuel to be
stored. In addition, a receiving and canning facility would be built to
repackage any fuel as needed, and to provide temporary wet storage for fuels
that could not be immediately placed into dry storage. This option would also
include a technology development facility for fuel characterization and
research related to SNF management. SNF currently at Hanford would be stored
according to the options described in the Decentralization Alternative.
Option B2 would include a separate facility to examine and characterize Naval
SNF, as described in Appendix D to Volume 1 of this EIS.
The third Regionalization option (designated Option C) would relocate
all SNF at the Hanford Site to another western U.S. location. The only new
facility that would be required for this option is a processing and packaging
facility to stabilize and repackage defense fuel and to place other fuel into
canisters as needed for shipping offsite. Prior to preparation for offsite
shipment, SNF would continue to be managed at existing facilities, as for the
No Action Alternative. All new facilities considered in the Regionalization
Alternative options would be constructed in a dedicated SNF management complex
adjacent to the 200-East Area, as for the Decentralization Alternative.
5.7.4.1 Radiological Consequences. Emissions from new facilities in
Regionalization Alternative A would be the same as those described for the
Decentralization Alternative in Table 5.7-8. Although this option does not
include the dry storage capacity for fuel other than defense production fuel,
dry storage facilities add nothing to the normal operating emissions;
therefore, the emissions and consequences from this alternative would be
quantitatively the same as those previously described for the Decentralization
Alternative.
Emissions from the new facilities in the Regionalization Alternative B
and C options are expected to be bounded by those in the Centralization
maximum and minimum options, respectively, as described in Section 5.7.5.
5.7.4.2 Nonradiological Consequences. Because of the similarity of
operations, consequences for the Regionalization Alternative are considered to
be the same as those for the Decentralization Alternative.
5.7.5 Centralization Alternative
The Centralization Alternative at Hanford includes two options: a
maximum option in which all SNF for which DOE is responsible would be stored
at Hanford, and a minimum option in which all SNF currently at Hanford would
be shipped to another site. The maximum option is similar to that described
in the Regionalization Option B2, except that the size of the receiving and
canning and dry storage facilities would be increased as necessary to
accommodate the larger quantity of imported fuel. The minimum option is
identical to that described for the Regionalization Alternative, Option C.
All new facilities considered in the Centralization Alternative options would
be constructed in a dedicated SNF management complex adjacent to the 200-East
Area.
5.7.5.1 Radiological. For the Centralization maximum option at
Hanford, emissions from the wet storage and processing facilities would be
identical to those described in the Decentralization Alternative (refer to
Tables 5.7-5 through 5.7-7). Minimal emissions from the large dry storage
facility are assumed in this case (see Table 5.7-9) because some of the
imported fuel could be stored without canning, and the assumption of zero
emissions could not be justified as in the Decentralization Alternative. The
consequences of emissions from a relocated Expended Core Facility (ECF) are
described in Appendix D to Volume 1 of this EIS and are not included here. It
should be noted that the assumptions used in Appendix D calculations for the
ECF at Hanford may differ from those used to estimate the consequences of
emissions from other Hanford facilities.
The consequences of air emissions from individual facilities in the
Centralization Alternative maximum option are summarized in Table 5.7-10 and
include a maximum annual dose of 9E-9 rem to a potential worker (4E-12
probability of fatal cancer) for a combination of wet and dry spent fuel
storage facilities. The dose to an offsite resident at the highest exposure
location is estimated as 2E-9 rem/year, and the corresponding probability of
fatal cancer is 8E-13. The peak collective dose to the population within 80
kilometers is 7E-5 person-rem per year, which is predicted to result in less
than one (4 x 10-8) fatal cancer.
Table 5.7-9. Estimated annual atmospheric releases for normal operation - new
dry storage at 200-East Area (maximum option).
Radionuclide 200-East Area
Release
(Ci/yr)
Cobalt-60 2.8E-08
Strontium-90 9.1E-07
Yttrium-90 9.1E-07
Cesium-137 1.2E-07
Plutonium- 2.8E-07
239
Table 5.7-10. Radiological consequences of airborne emissions during normal operation in the Centralization
Alternative for spent nuclear fuel storage at Hanford.
Onsite worker Offsite resident 80 km population
Area Facility Peak annual Probability Peak annual Probability Peak Annual Number of
dose (EDE) of fatal dose (EDE) of fatal Dose (EDE) Fatal
(rem/yr) cancer (rem/yr) cancer (Person- Cancers
rem/yr)
Combination Wet + Dry Storage Option
200 E New Wet Storage 2.0E-09 8.0E-13 5.7E-10 2.9E-13 2.3E-05 1.2E-08
200 E New Dry Storage 7.0E-09 3.0E-12 1.0E-09 5.0E-13 4.8E-05 2.4E-08
Dry Storage Only Option with Defense Fuel Processing
200 E New Dry Storage 7.0E-09 3.0E-12 1.0E-09 5.0E-13 4.8E-05 2.4E-08
200 E New Fuel Calcine 4.1E-06 1.7E-09 7.0E-06 3.5E-09 3.4E-01 1.7E-04
200E New Solvent 2.7E-05 1.1E-08 2.1E-05 1.1E-08 1.3E+00 6.3E-04
Extraction
Relocation of Expended Core
Facilitya
a. Data for the expended core facility (ECF) are presented in Appendix D to Volume 1 of this EIS.
Assumptions used in Appendix D calculations for the ECF at Hanford may differ from those used to estimate
the doses consequences of emission from other Hanford facilities.
Processing of defense fuel is required prior to dry storage in the
maximum option, and additional air emissions would result from those
activities if defense fuel is stored dry rather than wet. The dose to the
worker would increase by 4E-6 rem/year for a shear/ leach/ calcine process or
3E-5 rem/year for a solvent extraction process (2E-9 or 1E-8 probability of
fatal cancer, respectively). The corresponding added consequences for the
offsite resident would be 7E-6 rem/year (4E-9 probability of fatal cancer) for
the shear/leach/calcine facility and 2E-5 rem/year (1E-8 probability of fatal
cancer) for the solvent extraction facility. The collective dose to the
offsite population from the respective fuel processing facilities is estimated
at 0.3 to 1 person-rem per year, resulting in less than one (5 x 10-4 ) fatal
cancer.
In the Centralization Alternative minimum option, the consequences of
existing facilities utilized for interim fuel storage prior to shipment
offsite are the same as in the No Action Alternative. Consequences for
defense fuel processing prior to shipment are described under the
centralization maximum alternative and are equivalent to those from the
shear/leach/calcine facility. Refer to Tables 5.7-4 and 5.7-10 for the
consequences of facilities included in this option.
5.7.5.2 Nonradiological. Because of the similarity of operations
leading to nonradiological impacts on air quality, consequences for the
Centralization Alternative are considered to be the same as those for the
Decentralization Alternative with the addition of emissions from the naval
fuels Expended Core Facility. Analysis of nonradiological releases from the
Expended Core Facility can be found in Volume 1, Appendix D.
5.8 Water Quality and Related Consequences
This section evaluates the potential impacts to groundwater and surface
water resources from the construction and operation of SNF storage and
associated support facilities at the Hanford Site. Potential impacts to
groundwater and surface water, water use, and water quality from the potential
release of contaminants into, and migration through, hydrologic water-based
environments are evaluated. The potential significance of these impacts is
evaluated with respect to environmental contaminant levels from potential
releases of contaminants into the environment and the health impacts of these
contaminant levels. Contaminant waste streams include radionuclide and
chemical carcinogens and noncarcinogenic chemicals.
The Multimedia Environmental Pollutant Assessment System (MEPAS), a
computer model, was utilized to simulate the release, migration, fate,
exposure, and risk to surrounding receptors of wastes that are discharged into
the environment from the operation of SNF facilities. The MEPAS model is a
fully integrated, physics-based, PC-platform, intermedia transport- and risk computa-
tion code that is used to assess health impacts from actual and potential releas-
es of both hazardous chemicals and radioactive materials. The
MEPAS model is designed for site-specific assessments using readily available
information. It follows EPA risk-assessment guidance in evaluating 1) the
release of contaminants into the environment; 2) their movement through and
transfer between various environmental media [i.e., subsurface (vadose and
saturated zones), surface water, overland (surface soil), and atmospheric]; 3)
exposure to surrounding receptors via inhalation, ingestion, dermal contact,
and external dose; and 4) risk to carcinogens and hazard to noncarcino-
gens. The MEPAS model follows ICRP/NCRP and EPA guidelines, where the user is
allowed to choose the appropriate guidelines.
5.8.1 No Action Alternative
The only release directly to the surface water in the No Action
Alternative was associated with the 105-KE and 105-KW basins. The 105-KE and
105-KW basins were combined as one release and represented by a "single liq-
uid release point to the Columbia River" (Bergsman 1995). The annu-
al liquid discharge is assumed to be 1.4E+06 cubic meters per year (3.7E+08 gallons per
year), with a total activity of approximately 0.4 Ci: 0.26 Ci tritium,
0.066 Ci cobalt-60, 0.01 Ci cesium-137, 0.0010 Ci strontium-90, and 9.2E-06 Ci
plutonium-239 (Bergsman 1995). All of the constituents in this assessment are
radionuclides. The release is assumed to continue at this level over the
period of 18 years from 1997 through 2015. Operational liquid effluents from
the K Basins are discharged to the Columbia River via the monitored and
regulated National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitted
1908-KE outfall. Contaminant migration is from the point-source discharge
point to the Columbia River, and in the Columbia River to recep-
tors downstream. The flow discharge in the Columbia River is assumed to be under
low-flow conditions of 1,000 cubic meters per second (36,000 cubic feet per second)
(Whelan et al. 1987), which represents the most conservative case for
maximizing surface water concentrations. As a conservative assumption, the
removal of water from the Columbia River is assumed to be 100 meters (328
feet) downstream of the point of entry of the contaminant into the river. The
assessment addressed recreational activities (e.g., boating, swimming, and
fishing) in the Columbia River and use of the water as a drinking water supply
and for bathing, irrigation, etc. The risk of fatal cancer in this scenario
considering all pathways was found to be less than one chance in a billion.
For more information, refer to Whelan et al. (1994).
Intermittent leakage of water from the K Basins is monitored via onsite
groundwater sampling. Although radionuclide concentrations in some of the
100-K area monitoring wells exceed EPA drinking water standards, this
condition does not constitute a risk to the public because the groundwater is
not used directly for human consumption or food production. Analyses of water
from the K area springs, where groundwater enters the Columbia River, indicate
that radionuclide levels are below the EPA drinking water standards. Dilution
of this seepage in the river flow would further reduce the risk to the
downstream population, as indicated by the fact that radionuclide
concentrations in the Columbia River at the Richland pump house are orders of
magnitude below the drinking water standard (Dirkes et al 1994).
5.8.2 Decentralization Alternative
The Spent Nuclear Fuel Wet Transfer and Storage scenario was documented.
The source term represents the maximum potential water releases that would be
expected if a secondary containment failure and/or piping leak occurred and
went undetected for one month at a state-of-the-art wet storage fuel/transfer
facility utilizing water treatment technology now available. Releases
resulting from such a failure should not be thought of as operational or
planned releases. However, for the purposes of a nonzero release source-term,
this scenario addresses those situations where an unexpected release may
occur. The source-term information was derived from data related to the
operation of the Flourinel and Storage Facility (FAST) at INEL's Chemical
Processing Plant (ICPP 666) and is considered to be extremely conservative,
given the state-of-the-art engineering practices, monitoring, leak-detection
equipment, and surveillance procedures likely to be used at any new SNF
facility, such as FAST.
Any new facility would be built using state-of-the-art technologies,
including leak detection and water-balance monitoring equipment. This
equipment, along with the uncertainties associated with evaporation
monitoring, will have a minimum detection sensitivity. It is possible that
the new SNF facility could experience a failure that would result in a leak
that is below the sensitivity of the detection system. Based on the size of
the facility and the current monitoring programs at similar facilities, 5
gallons per day has been established as a conservative value to account for
potential undetected leakage from the facility. The nonzero release source
term would then exceed what could be expected for a new SNF wet storage or
transfer facility. Factors contributing to the conservatism in volume
estimates are the design criteria, which state that the new facility will
contain leak-detection systems (Hale 1994) and will have a lower surface area
[i.e., 2000 square meters (6600 square feet)] available for leakage as
compared to FAST [i.e., 3830 square meters (12,560 square feet)] (Hale 1994).
For the purposes of this assessment, the entire release is assumed as a point
source, which is the most conservative assumption. The concentration data
associated with the release were contained in or derived from January 6, 1986
to February 14, 1994 weekly water quality reports for FAST and are considered
to be reasonable nonzero release source terms at the 95% confidence level.
Although surveillance at the FAST facility occurs daily with radiological
surveys occurring weekly, the aqueous release assumes that the liner and/or
piping leaks and secondary containment failure go undetected for one month.
The specific radionuclide activities in the release solution are assumed
as follows: 280 pCi/L strontium-90, 3360 pCi/L cobalt-60, 160 pCi/L cobalt-
57(a), 93 pCi/L cesium-137, and 100 pCi/L antimony-125. All of the constituents
in this assessment are radionuclides. Contaminant migration is through the
vadose zone through the saturated zone to the Columbia River, and in the
Columbia River to receptors downstream. The flow discharge in the Columbia
River is assumed to be under low-flow conditions 1000 m3 per second (36,000
cubic feet per second) (Whelan et al. 1987), which represents the most
conservative case for maximizing surface water concentrations. As a
conservative assumption, the removal of water from the Columbia River is
assumed to be 100 meters (328 feet) downstream of the contaminant influent
point to the river. The assessment addresses recreational activities (e.g.,
boating, swimming and fishing) in the Columbia River and use of the water as a
drinking-water supply and for bathing, irrigation etc. The risk of fatal
cancers considering all pathways was found to be significantly less than one
chance in a trillion. For more information, refer to Whelan et al. (1994).
The Decentralization Alternative also includes an operational release
scenario to the Hanford 200 Area Treated Effluent Disposal Facility (TEDF).
Liquid effluents would be added to the TEDF, which receives liquid effluent
from many facilities in the 200 Area. The "Discharge Target" allowable
concentrations in the TEDF are presented in Bergsman (1995). Only 380 liters
(100 gallons) per day will be discharged to the TEDF basin from this opera-
tion, although other facilities unrelated to SNF storage will also be
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Cobalt-57 is substituted in the analysis for cobalt-58 because the
MEPAS database contains only cobalt-57.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
discharging to the basin. For a ponded situation, the maximum outflow from
the basin is equal to the transmission rate (i.e., saturated hydraulic
conductivity under a unit hydraulic gradient) of the soil immedi-
ately below the basin, which is 24 cubic meters per day (6260 gallons per day). To
maximize the flow velocity through the vadose zone and the mass flux of
contaminant leaving the basin (i.e., concentration x area x flow veloci-
ty), the assessment assumes that this facility leaks into the va-
dose zone over a 4-year period with the infiltration rate limited by the transmission rate of the
soil. The discharge from the pond is assumed to last for 4 years from 2002
through 2006.
Based on the movement of the second tritium plume from the Plutonium and
Uranium Recovery through Extraction cribs in the 200 Area to Well 699-24-33, a
distance of 6 kilometers (4 miles) in a 5-year period (1983 to 1988), the
average pore-water velocity (i.e., specific discharge divided by the effective
porosity) in the saturated zone was 3.3 meters per day (10.8 feet per day)
(Schramke et al. 1994). Davis et al. (1993) performed a more recent analysis
and determined the pore-water velocity as 0.02 meters per day (0.08 feet per
day) just below the TEDF site, although this is not necessarily indicative of
the velocity as the water moves toward the river. Both velocities were
initially used in assessing the migration of contamination from the basin to
determine the most conservative result with respect to risk. In the final
analysis, the highest pore-water velocity of 3.3 meters per day (10.8 feet per
day) was used because 1) it is consistent with other assessments at the instal-
lation, 2) the contaminants reached the river and receptors earlier, and
3) the resulting exposure analysis provided the more conservative estimate of
risk over the 7000-year assessment time frame.
Radionuclides, chemical carcinogens, and noncarcinogens are contained in
the waste stream. The concentrations in the TEDF were represented by the dis-
charge target allowable concentrations. Contaminant migration is from the
ponded water, through the vadose zone, through the saturated zone to the
Columbia River, and in the Columbia River to receptors downstream. The flow
discharge in the Columbia River is assumed to be under low-flow condi-
tions of 1000 cubic meters per second (36,000 cubic feet per second) (Whelan et al.
1987), which represents the most conservative case for maximizing surface
water concentrations. As a conservative assumption, the removal of water from
the Columbia River is assumed to be 100 meters (328 feet) downstream of the
point of entry of the contaminant into the river. The assessment addressed
recreational activities (e.g., boating, swimming, and fishing) in the Colum-
bia River and use of the water as a drinking-water supply and for bathing, irriga-
tion, etc.
The maximum radionuclide and chemical carcinogenic risks were found to
be less than 50 chances in a billion for all of the constituents through all
of the exposure routes. Likewise, noncarcinogenic chemical individual doses
were found to be below their respective reference doses, except chromium VI,
which had a dose about 50 percent higher than the reference dose. Chromium VI
had an assigned distribution coefficient (i.e., Kd) of zero (Serne and Wood
1990), which represents the most mobile condition in the vadose zone. For
more information, refer to Whelan et al. (1994).
5.8.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
Scenarios and consequences relating to water quality would be the same
as for the Decentralization Alternative. For more information, refer to
Whelan et al. (1994).
5.8.4 Regionalization Alternative
Scenarios and consequences relating to water quality in the
Regionalization options would be the same as for water quality aspects in the
Decentralization Alternative. For more information, refer to Whelan et al.
(1994).
5.8.5 Centralization Alternative
Scenarios and consequences relating to water quality would be the same
as for the Decentralization Alternative. For more information, refer to
Whelan et al. (1994).
5.9 Ecological Resources
Implications of implementing the alternatives for interim storage of SNF
on terrestrial resources, wetlands, aquatic ecosystems, and threatened and
endangered species at the Hanford Site are discussed in the following
subsections.
5.9.1 No Action Alternative
Implications of implementing the No Action Alternative for interim
storage of SNF on terrestrial resources, wetlands, aquatic resources, and
threatened and endangered species at the Hanford Site are discussed in the
following subsections.
5.9.1.1 Terrestrial Resources. No new SNF facilities would be
constructed at Hanford and there would be no impacts to the terrestrial
resources of the Hanford Site beyond those resulting from natural processes of
succession and the impacts of ongoing Hanford operations. They would remain
as described under Section 4.9.1.
5.9.1.2 Wetlands. No new SNF facility would be constructed; therefore,
no changes to wetlands on the Hanford Site would be expected beyond those
changes resulting from natural processes and the impacts of ongoing Hanford
operations (see Section 4.9.3).
5.9.1.3 Aquatic Resources. No new SNF facility would be constructed
and the fact that there are no surface water facilities on the SNF facility
site indicates that there would be no impacts on the aquatic resources of the
Hanford Site other than those changes resulting from natural processes and the
impacts of ongoing Hanford operations and they would remain as described in
Section 4.9.3.
5.9.1.4 Threatened and Endangered Species. No new SNF facilities would
be constructed and operated at Hanford. Thus, populations of species listed
as endangered or threatened, or candidates for such listing by the federal and
Washington State governments, or species listed as monitor species by the
Washington State government would not be impacted (either directly by
displacement or indirectly by habitat alteration) beyond effects resulting
from ongoing Hanford operations and natural processes.
5.9.1.5 Radioecology. Releases of radionuclides to the environment are
expected to be on the order of those released in the recent past by site
operations (Woodruff and Hanf 1993), and thus will not be accumulated into
terrestrial or aquatic ecosystems in concentrations that could cause
measurable impacts.
5.9.2 Decentralization Alternative
Implications of implementing the Decentralization Alternative for
interim storage of SNF on terrestrial resources, wetlands, aquatic resources,
and threatened and endan-
gered species at the Hanford Site are discussed in the
following subsections.
5.9.2.1 Terrestrial Resources. This alternative would require the
construction of an SNF facility for fuel management and storage. Most spent
fuel from the Hanford Site would be stored here.
Construction of an SNF facility at Hanford would disturb up to 9
hectares (24 acres) on the 65 hectare (160 acres) site, representing about
0.01 percent of the total area of the Hanford Site. Approximately 9 hectares
(24 acres) would be occupied by facilities, access roads, or rights-of-way and
therefore, would remain developed for the life of the project. The remaining
land would be revegetated with native grasses and shrubs upon completion of
construction.
Vegetation within construction areas would be destroyed during
land-clearing activities. Plant species that are dominant on the Hanford SNF
site, and thus would be most affected, include big sagebrush, cheatgrass, and
Sandberg's bluegrass. Total area destroyed would amount to about less than 1
percent of this community on the Hanford Site. Although the plant communities
to be disturbed are well-represented on the Hanford Site, they are relatively
uncommon regionally because of the widespread conversion of shrub-steppe
habitats to agriculture. Disturbed areas are generally recolonized by
cheatgrass, a nonnative species, at the expense of native plants. Mitigation
of these impacts could include minimizing the area of disturbance and
revegetating with native species, including shrubs, and establishing a 2:1
acreage replacement habitat in concert with a habitat enhancement plan
presently being developed for the Hanford Site in general. Adverse impacts to
vegetation on Hanford are expected to be limited to the project area and
vicinity and are not expected to affect the viability of any plant popu-
lations on the Hanford Site.
Construction of an SNF facility and support facilities would have some
adverse affect on animal populations. Less mobile animals such as
invertebrates, reptiles, and small mammals within the project area would be
destroyed during land-clearing activities. Larger mammals and birds in
construction and adjacent areas would be disturbed by construction activities
and would move to adjacent suitable habitat, and these individual animals
might not survive and reproduce. Project facilities would displace about 9
hectares (up to 24 acres) of animal habitat for the life of an SNF facility.
Revegetated areas (e.g., construction laydown areas and buried pipeline
routes) would be reinvaded by animal species from surrounding, undisturbed
habitats. The adverse impacts of construction are expected to be limited to
the project area and vicinity and should not affect the viability of any
animal populations on the Hanford Site because similar suitable habitat would
remain abundant on the site.
Very small quantities of radionuclides would be released to the
atmosphere during SNF facility operations. No organisms studied to date are
reported to be more sensitive than man to radiation (NRC-8). Therefore, as
concluded for humans, the effects of these releases on terrestrial organisms
are expected to be minor.
These impacts to the vegetation and animal communities could be
mitigated by minimizing the amount of land disturbed during construction,
employing soil erosion control measures during construction activities, and
revegetating disturbed areas with native species. These measures would limit
the amount of direct and indirect disturbance to the construction area and
surrounding habitats and would speed the recovery process for disturbed lands.
Operational impacts to terrestrial biotic resources would include
exposure of plants and animals to small amounts of radionuclides released
during operation of the SNF facility. The levels of radionuclide exposure
would be below those levels that produce adverse effects.
5.9.2.2 Wetlands. No wetlands occur on or near the SNF facility site,
so no impacts from the construction and operation of the facility to wetlands
would occur. Wetlands resources on the Hanford Site would remain as described
in Section 4.9.2. No mitigation efforts would be required because no wetlands
would be affected.
5.9.2.3 Aquatic Resources. No aquatic habitats occur on the SNF site;
thus, no impacts to aquatic resources are expected from the construction and
operation of the SNF facility. No mitigation efforts would be required
because no impacts are anticipated to aquatic resources.
5.9.2.4 Threatened and Endangered Species. Construction and operation
of the SNF facility would remove approximately 9 hectares (24 acres) of
relatively pristine big sagebrush/ cheatgrass-Sandberg's bluegrass habitat.
This sagebrush habitat is considered priority habitat by the State of
Washington because of its relative scarcity in the state and its use as nesting/
breeding habitat by loggerhead shrikes, sage sparrows, sage thrashers,
burrowing owls, pygmy rabbits, and sagebrush voles. Bald Eagles, peregrine
falcons, and Oregon silverspot butterflies do not inhabit the potential
proposed site.
Loggerhead shrikes, listed as a federal candidate (Category 2) and state
candidate species, forage on the proposed SNF site and are relatively common
on Hanford. This species is sagebrush-dependent, as it is known to select
primarily tall big sagebrush as nest sites. Construction of the SNF facility
would remove big sagebrush habitat which would preclude loggerhead shrikes
from nesting there. SNF site development would also be expected to reduce the
value of the site as foraging habitat for shrikes known to nest in adjacent
areas.
Sage sparrows and sage thrashers, both state candidate species, occur in
mature sagebrush/ bunchgrass habitat at Hanford. Sage thrashers were not
observed on the SNF site, and are extremely rare on the Hanford Site. These
species are known to nest primarily in sagebrush. Construction of the SNF
facility would preclude both of these species nesting there and reduce the
site's suitability as foraging habitat for these species.
SNF construction is not expected to substantially decrease the Hanford
population of loggerhead shrike, sage sparrow, or sage thrashers because
similar sagebrush habitat is still relatively common on the Hanford Site.
However, the cumulative effects of constructing the SNF facility, in addition
to future developments that further reduce sagebrush habitat (causing further
fragmentation of nesting habitat), could negatively affect the long-term
viability of populations of these species on the Hanford Site.
Burrowing owls, a state candidate species, are relatively common on the
Hanford Site and nest in abandoned ground squirrel burrows on the proposed SNF
site. SNF construction would remove sagebrush and disturb soil, displacing
ground squirrels and thus reducing the suitability of the area for nesting by
burrowing owls. Construction would also displace small mammals, which
constitute a portion of the prey base for this species. Construction for an
SNF facility would, however, not be expected to negatively impact the
viability of the population of burrowing owls on Hanford, as their use of
ground squirrel burrows as nests is not limited to burrows in big sagebrush
habitat.
Pygmy rabbits, a federal candidate (Category 2) and state threatened
species, are known to utilize tall clumps of big sagebrush habitat throughout
most of their range. However, this species has not recently been observed on
the Hanford Site. Construction of the SNF facility would therefore reduce the
potential for recolonization by this species by removing habitat suitable for
its use.
Sagebrush voles, a state monitor species, are common on the Hanford Site
and select burrow sites near sagebrush; however, this species is common only
at higher elevations around the Hanford Site. Construction of the SNF
facility would remove sagebrush habitat, precluding sagebrush voles from
utilizing the site. However, construction would not affect the overall
viability of sagebrush vole populations on the Hanford Site because the
majority of the population is found on the Fitzner/Eberhardt Arid Lands
Ecology Preserve.
The closest known nests of ferruginous hawks, a federal candidate
(Category 2) and state threatened species, and Swainson's hawk, a state
candidate, are 8.5 km (5 mi) and 6.2 km (3.7 mi), respectively, from the
proposed SNF site. The SNF site comprises a portion of the foraging range of
these hawks. Construction of the SNF facility is not expected to disrupt the
nesting activities of these species. However, construction would displace
small mammal populations and thus reduce the prey for these birds. The
cumulative effects of constructing the SNF facility, in addition to future
reductions in sagebrush habitat (causing further fragmentation of foraging
habitat), could negatively affect the long-term viability of populations of
these two species on Hanford.
5.9.2.5 Radioecology. Releases of radionuclides to the environment are
expected to be below those currently released by site operations (Woodruff and
Hanf 1993), and thus will not be accumulated into terrestrial or aquatic
ecosystems in concentrations that could cause measurable impacts.
5.9.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
The 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative differs from the
Decentralization Alternative only in that TRIGA fuel currently stored at the
Hanford Site would be shipped to INEL for storage. (It is possible that the
TRIGA fuel may be transferred to third parties for beneficial use prior to
the planned time of shipment to INEL.) Thus, impacts on terrestrial
resources, wetlands, aquatic resources, threatened and endangered species,
and radioecology at the Hanford Site would be essentially the same as
described for the Decentralization Alternative.
5.9.4 Regionalization Alternative
All new facilities would be constructed on the 65 hectare (163-acre)
site west of 200-East Area (Figure 4.1). Although impacts on terrestrial
resources are expected to be minimal, the impacts that would occur would be
roughly proportional to the amount of land that would be disturbed during
construction. For the various options of the Regionalization Alternative,
those areas would amount to the following amounts of land:
A) From about 2 to 7 hectares (5 to 18 acres) when all SNF except
defense production SNF would be sent to INEL.
B1) From about 15 to 17 hectares (38 to 43 acres) when all SNF west
of the Mississippi River except Naval SNF would be sent to
Hanford.
B2) From about 25 to 28 hectares (63 to 70 acres) when all SNF west
of the Mississippi River and Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford.
C) From about 2 to 5 hectares (5 to 12 acres) when all Hanford SNF
would be sent to INEL or NTS.
While the largest area cited above (28 hectares) is about three times
the size of the area to be disturbed in the Decentralization Alternative, it
is still a very small fraction of similar habitat on the Hanford Site. By
and large the discussion on flora and fauna presented in Section 5.9.2
applies to the Regionalization Alternative, bearing in mind that the area
involved would be more or less depending on the option chosen.
5.9.5 Centralization Alternative
If Hanford is selected as the site for the Centralization Alternative,
an SNF facility, as substantially described in the Decentralization
Alternative, would be constructed at Hanford. Although the facility would
store about 25 weight percent more SNF than would be stored under the
Decentralization Alternative and the number of casks would increase the
required space, the ecological impacts would be essentially the same as those
described in Section 5.9.2.
If Hanford is not selected as the site for the Centralization
Alternative, an SNF packaging facility would be built to prepare the fuel for
shipment offsite. While that facility would not be as extensive as the SNF
facility, the ecological impacts would not likely be importantly different
from those described in Section 5.9.3 for the Decentralization Alternative.
5.10 Noise
Implications of implementing the alternatives for interim storage of SNF
on noise levels at the Hanford are discussed in the following subsections.
5.10.1 No Action Alternative
Under this alternative, new SNF facilities would not be constructed, and
the noise associated with SNF facility construction and operation activities
would not occur. Because no major changes in existing noise-emitting sources
are expected at Hanford during the projected SNF facility construction period,
the ambient noise levels at Hanford would be expected to remain essentially
the same for the no-action alternative as during the baseline period.
5.10.2 Decentralization Alternative
This alternative would require the construction and operation of an SNF
facility for fuel management and storage. Most spent fuel from the Hanford
Site would be stored here. The results of a detailed analysis of the
potential noise impacts from constructing and operating a new production
reactor (project since cancelled) and its support facilities at Hanford have
been published. The analysis indicates that noise from constructing a
facility the size of a production reactor, and from operational facilities,
equipment, and machines, would not cause ambient noise levels to exceed the
limits set by the Washington State noise control regulations or EPA
guidelines. The latter are set to protect the public from the effect of
broadband environmental noise and to protect the public against hearing loss.
The results also indicate that increases in noise levels from constructing and
operating a facility the size of a production reactor and its support
facilities, including increased traffic along the major roadways, would result
in little or no increase in the annoyance level experienced by communities or
individuals.
No significant noise impacts from activities associated with SNF
facility construction and operation are expected at sensitive receptor
locations outside the Hanford boundary or at residences along the major
highways leading to the proposed SNF site at Hanford.
5.10.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
The 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative differs from the
Decentralization Alternative only in that TRIGA fuel currently stored at the
Hanford Site would be shipped to INEL for storage. (It is possible that the
TRIGA fuel may be transferred to third parties for beneficial use prior to the
planned time of shipment to INEL.) Thus, impacts would be essentially the
same as described for the Decentralization Alternative.
5.10.4 Regionalization Alternative
All new facilities would be constructed on the 65 hectare (163-acre)
site west of 200-East Area (Figure 4.1). Although noise is not expected to be
a factor in evaluating the alternatives, the amount and duration of noise
associated with construction would be roughly proportional to the amount of
land that would be disturbed during construction. For the various options of
the Regionalization Alternative, those areas would amount to the following
amounts of land:
A) From about 2 to 7 hectares (5 to 18 acres) when all SNF except
defense production SNF would be sent to INEL.
B1) From about 15 to 17 hectares (38 to 43 acres) when all SNF west of
the Mississippi River except Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford.
B2) From about 25 to 28 hectares (63 to 70 acres) when all SNF west of
the Mississippi River and Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford.
C) From About 2 to 5 hectares (5 to 13 acres) when all Hanford SNF
would be sent to INEL or NTS.
Although not likely to be heard offsite, the duration of noise that is
generated would range from about a quarter to three times that described for
the Decentralization Alternative depending on the Regionalization option
chosen.
5.10.5 Centralization Alternative
If Hanford is selected as the site for centralization of SNF, new SNF
facilities would be constructed at Hanford. Although somewhat larger than for
the Decentralization Alternative, the impacts from noise would be the same as
those described in Subsection 5.10.2.
5.11 Traffic and Transportation
The implications of implementing the alternatives for interim storage of
SNF on traffic and incident-free onsite transportation of SNF and materials
supporting SNF storage at the Hanford are discussed in the following
subsections. The impacts of offsite transportation of SNF are discussed in
Appendix I.
5.11.1 No Action Alternative
Implications of implementing the No Action Alternative for interim
storage of SNF on traffic and incident-free onsite transportation of SNF and
materials supporting SNF storage are discussed in the following subsections.
5.11.1.1 Traffic. Under the No Action Alternative, the number of
workers would stay the same as under present conditions; therefore, there
would be no change in traffic patterns. At present, there are periods of
moderate traffic congestion, some of which is expected to be alleviated by a
new road to the 200 areas.
5.11.1.2 Transportation. The RISKIND (Yuan et al. 1993) and RADTRAN 4
(Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992) computer codes were applied to calculate the
radiation doses to transport workers and the public that are estimated to
result from incident-free onsite transportation of SNF. RISKIND was also used
to calculate the consequences of bounding transportation accidents. All of
the onsite SNF shipments were assumed to emit radiation that would result in a
dose rate at the regulatory limit (i.e., 0.01 rem per hour at 2 meters (6
feet) from the external surface of the shipments). This assumption
contributes to the conservatism of the analysis because the shipment dose
rates cannot be larger than this value but frequently will be substantially
smaller. All shipments were assumed to be made by truck. A detailed
description of the approach and other important shipment-related parameters
are discussed in Volume 2, Chapter 5, and Appendix I. Hanford-specific
information and input parameters are presented in this section.
The doses per incident-free shipment of each type of SNF were calculated
using RISKIND and RADTRAN 4. The potential receptors considered are the
transportation crew of two, on-link (on the road) and off-link (persons near
the roadway) populations. Guards and/or inspectors may also be exposed to the
shipments. Guards and inspectors may be exposed when they prepare a shipment
to leave its origin facility or prepare to receive a shipment that has arrived
at a destination facility. Guards and inspectors may also be exposed while
the shipment is enroute between facilities. Guard and inspector doses at
origin and destination facilities are included in the doses calculated in
Section 5.13. Most onsite shipments originate in the 200 and 100 Areas and
will not travel through a guarded checkpoint. The guard/inspector doses for
these shipments are zero. Only the miscellaneous fuel shipments originating
in the 300 Area and the FFTF shipments originating in the 400 Area will travel
past a guarded checkpoint (see Wye Barricade in Section 4.11). Doses to the
guards at the Wye Barricade were calculated assuming they were exposed briefly
at a distance of 5 meters, (16 feet) from the shipment, as described in Volume
2, Chapter 5. The computer code RISKIND was used to calculate maximum and
individual doses; RADTRAN 4 was used to calculate collective population doses.
Five general classes of SNF were considered in this analysis. These
include N Reactor fuel, FFTF fuel, single-pass reactor (SPR) fuel, PWR Core-II
fuel, and miscellaneous fuel. A sixth type of fuel, fuel wastes in EBR-II
metal casks, was assumed to have similar shipping characteristics to
miscellaneous fuels. Some of the key shipment characteristics for these fuels
are presented in Table 5.11-1, including the SNF material forms, quantities,
shipment capacities, and numbers of shipments. Radionuclide inventories for
the various types of fuel shipments are provided in Table 5.11-2. The
radionuclide inventories were derived from the irradiated fuel inventories and
characteristics provided by Bergsman (1994, 1995) and the shipment
characteristics listed in Table 5.11-2.
The population densities of the different areas of the Hanford Site
across which shipments must travel will influence the transportation impacts.
Doses to persons along the highways (i.e., off-link doses) will be received
only by Hanford Site workers for onsite shipments.
Table 5.11-1. Spent nuclear fuel shipment characteristics.
Fuel Type Material Form Quantity, Shipment Capacity, Number of
Assemblies Assemblies/shipment Shipmentsa
N Reactor Uranium metal clad Short: 66,300 Short: 128 Short: 518
with Zircalloy-2 Long: 63,700 Long: 96 Long: 664
Total: 1,182
FFTF Mixed uranium-
plutonium oxide in 317 4 80
stainless steel
tubes
Single-pass reactor Uranium metal
enclosed in 1,100 900 2
aluminum jackets
PWR Core-II Natural uranium
oxide clad in 72 1 71
zirconium alloy
Fuel wastes in EBR- Plutonium-uranium
II metal casks compounds sealed in 24 casks 1 cask per shipment 24
stainless steel
canisters
Various uranium
Miscellaneous compounds from
research and 77 4 20
development
programs
a. This column provides the number of onsite shipments projected to occur in the Decentralization,
1992/1993 Planning Basis, Regionalization, and Centralization Alternatives. For the No-Action
Alternative, one shipment of N Reactor fuel currently at PUREX and all of the miscellaneous fuels were
assumed to be transported onsite.
Table 5.11-2. Radionuclide inventories for shipments of each type of spent
nuclear fuel on the Hanford Site (Ci/shipment). ,b
Radio- FFTF N Reactor PWR Core-II Single-pass EBR-II/
nuclide fuel reactor Misc.c
H-3 2.1E+02 3.9E+03 1.6E+02 3.9E+03 0.0E+00
Mn-54 7.0E+02 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
Fe-55 6.9E+02 1.1E+03 6.1E+03 1.1E+03 0.0E+00
Co-60 7.3E+02 7.9E+02 4.2E+03 7.9E+02 4.3E+02
Ni-63 6.0E+01 0.0E+00 2.7E+03 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
Kr-85 1.8E+03 7.5E+04 1.6E+03 7.5E+04 6.3E+02
Sr-90 1.3E+04 8.7E+05 1.8E+04 8.7E+05 3.1E+02
Y-90 1.3E+04 8.7E+05 1.8E+04 8.7E+05 3.1E+02
Ru-106 1.8E+04 7.1E+03 2.9E+02 7.1E+03 1.4E+03
Rh-106 1.8E+04 7.1E+03 2.9E+02 7.1E+03 1.4E+03
Sb-125 3.7E+03 1.6E+04 1.1E+03 1.6E+04 0.0E+00
Te-125m 9.1E+02 4.3E+03 2.6E+02 4.3E+03 0.0E+00
Cs-134 5.2E+03 1.9E+04 1.6E+03 1.9E+04 0.0E+00
Cs-137 3.6E+04 1.1E+06 3.6E+04 1.1E+06 3.5E+03
Ba-137m 3.4E+04 1.0E+06 3.4E+04 1.0E+06 3.3E+03
Ce-144 6.3E+03 4.1E+03 0.0E+00 4.1E+03 9.6E+03
Pr-144 6.3E+03 4.1E+03 0.0E+00 4.1E+03 9.6E+03
Pr-144m 7.6E+01 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
Pm-147 2.8E+04 2.9E+05 4.5E+03 2.9E+05 7.7E+03
Sm-151 1.4E+03 1.3E+04 1.9E+02 1.3E+04 0.0E+00
Eu-154 1.0E+03 1.3E+03 2.1E+03 1.3E+03 0.0E+00
Eu-155 3.2E+03 4.8E+03 7.6E+02 4.8E+03 6.4E+01
U-233 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 1.3E-01
U-234 0.0E+00 1.5E+00 0.0E+00 1.5E+00 2.1E+01
U-235 2.0E-04 6.7E-02 0.0E+00 6.7E-02 2.6E-02
U-238 2.7E-02 1.0E+00 0.0E+00 1.0E+00 3.3E-04
Np-237 4.6E-02 3.5E-02 0.0E+00 3.5E-02 0.0E+00
Pu-238 6.6E+02 0.0E+00 1.1E+03 0.0E+00 3.8E+01
Pu-239 1.4E+03 1.8E+02 2.8E+02 1.8E+02 6.9E+01
Pu-240 1.5E+03 4.5E+01 3.7E+02 4.5E+01 2.0E+02
Pu-241 6.3E+04 1.7E+03 6.8E+04 1.7E+03 1.1E+04
Pu-242 5.2E-01 3.0E-03 0.0E+00 3.0E-03 6.9E-01
Am-241 8.0E+02 3.1E+01 1.6E+03 3.1E+01 0.0E+00
Cm-243 4.6E+01 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
Cm-244 8.8E+01 0.0E+00 7.9E+02 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
a. Radionuclide inventory data were derived from information in Bergsman
(1994) and WHC (1993c).
b. For radionuclides that are indicated to have 0.0 Ci per shipment, the
quantities of fission and activation are less than 5 Ci/assembly and less
than 10 g/assembly for actinides. Radionuclides not listed on the table are
also less than these quantities.
c. Fuel inventories for EBR-II casks are assumed to be applicable to
miscellaneous fuels. The SNF in EBR-II casks and miscellaneous SNF consist
primarily of irradiated light-water reactor fuels.
The population densities for each work area on the site, used for occupational
dose calculations, are listed in Table 5.11-3. The off-link doses are
included in the occupational dose results.
For the calculation of doses to persons traveling on the highways (i.e.,
on-link doses), two-lane highways were assumed and the number of persons per
vehicle was assumed to be 2.0. No vehicle stops were included in the
calculations because the shipments are not long enough to warrant intermediate
stops for food and rest. One-way traffic densities were based on traffic
counts provided in DOE (1989). Because average traffic densities were not
available in that document and there are no administrative restrictions on
time of day when SNF transport could occur, the peak count on a given route
segment (vehicles per day) was used to calculate the traffic density for that
route. The traffic densities used for the five types of SNF and shipping
distances for the various fuel types are provided below.
- FFTF Fuel - 640 vehicles per hour; 28 kilometers one-way shipping
distance
- N Reactor Fuel - 170 vehicles per hour; 16 kilometers one-way
shipping distance
- PWR Core II Fuel - 180 vehicles per hour; 5 kilometers one-way
shipping distance
- Single-pass Reactor Fuel - 100 vehicles per hour; 16 kilometers
one-way shipping distance
- EBR-II/300 Area Miscellaneous Fuel - 640 vehicles per hour; 37
kilometers one-way shipping distance.
Table 5.11-3. Population densities for work areas at Hanford.
Work Area Worker Land Area, Worker Density, per
Population km2 km2
100 B and C 4 1.7 3
100 D and DR 4 1.5 3
100 H 4 0.7 6
100 K 124 0.9 140
100 N 360 1.0 360
200 West 1968 9.5 210
200 East 2923 9.0 330
300 2487 1.5 1700
400 638 2.1 300
600 514 1450 0.35
WPPSS 1125 4.4 260
The computer code RISKIND was used to calculate the doses to Maximally-
Exposed Individual (MEI) members of the public as discussed in Volume 2,
Chapter 5. Two exposure scenarios were modeled, including a "tailgater" and a
"bystander." The dose received by a tailgater was calculated by assuming that
an individual precedes or follows an SNF shipment for the entire duration of a
shipment. The exposure distance was assumed to be 48.8 meters (160 feet).
The dose calculated in Volume 2, Chapter 5, was based on a 37 kilo-
meters (23 miles) shipping distance, which is also the same as the longest shipping
distance anticipated for SNF shipments at Hanford (300 Area to the 200 Area).
Therefore, the public MEI dose amounts to 0.015 millirem per tailgating
incident.
The dose to a "bystander" was calculated in Volume 2, Chapter 5, to be
0.0014 millirem. This dose was calculated assuming a shipment passes by an
individual at an average speed of 56 kilometers per hour (35 miles per hour)
at a distance of 1 meter (3 feet) from the shipment. This individual was
postulated to be standing on the side of the road as an SNF shipment passes by
and was assumed to be exposed only one time.
The dose to the maximally-exposed worker from incident-free
transportation will be received by the truck crew. The dose to the truck crew
was calculated using the maximum allowable dose rate in the truck cab (2
millirem per hour) for all shipments. It was assumed that the maximum-exposed
worker will accompany all of the spent fuel shipments, even though the dose
will most likely be apportioned over a larger number of workers. The total
dose received by this individual was calculated by multiplying the maximum
dose rate by the total shipping time. The total shipping time for the various
alternatives was determined by dividing their total shipping distances by the
average speed, 56 kilometers per hour (35 miles/hour).
The results of the analysis of the No Action Alternative are presented
in Table 5.11-4. As shown, two shipment campaigns occur in this alternative;
1) shipment of N Reactor fuels at PUREX to the 105-K basins for storage and 2)
shipment of miscellaneous SNF in the 300 Area to the 200 Area to be placed in
dry storage. The total radiological impacts from incident-free transportation
in this alternative are dominated by the shipments of miscellaneous fuels from
the 300 Area to the 200 Area. This is primarily because there are
approximately 24 shipments of miscellaneous fuels, and the N Reactor fuel at
PUREX will make up only a fraction of a shipment.
Table 5.11-4. Impacts of incident-free transportation for the No Action
Alternative.
Impactsb General Occupational
Populationc
Total Dose (person-rem) 7.8E-02 1.2E-01
Cancer Fatalities 3.9E-05 4.7E-05
a. The N Reactor fuel currently at PUREX is the only N Reactor fuel
transported in this alternative. The impacts of transporting this fuel were
calculated by adjusting the impacts of transporting all N Reactor fuel
(0.3 MTHM at PUREX/2096 MTHM total N Reactor fuel).
b. Total detriment, which includes latent cancer fatalities, nonfatal
cancers, and genetic effects in subsequent generations, can be calculated by
multiplying the total dose to the general population by 7.3E-04 effects per
person-rem and the total occupational dose by 5.6E-04 effects per person-
rem.
c. Rural population density.
The doses to the maximally-exposed workers and members of the public are
summarized below:
- The dose to a tailgater was calculated to be 0.015 millirem.
- The dose to a bystander was calculated to be 0.0014 millirem.
- The dose to a truck crewman that accompanies all of the spent fuel
shipments in the No Action Alternative was calculated to be about
46 millirem.
The RISKIND computer code was used to calculate the radiological
consequences of accidental releases of radioactive material during
transportation. Consequences of severe, reasonably foreseeable accidents were
calculated to workers and the offsite population. Workers were placed at a
distance that maximizes the dose from a potential release. Hanford-specific
population density data (see Beck et al. 1991) were used to assess the
integrated doses to the offsite public, as described in Volume 2, Chapter 5.
As discussed in Appendix I, maximum radiological impacts were calculated
for a severe, reasonably foreseeable accident. For this assessment, the
consequences were assessed to populations and individuals assuming the most
severe accident scenario with a probability greater than 1E-07. The methods
and data described in Appendix I were used to calculate the accident
probabilities of the various shipments in the No Action Alternative. Hanford-
specific numbers of shipments and shipping distances were used in the
calculations. Accident rate information from Saricks and Kvitek (1991) for
urban areas in the State of Washington were used in the calculations. The
results of these calculations indicate that the probabilities of the severe
accident defined in Appendix I for the irradiated fuels transported in the
No Action Alternative are less than the 1E-07 criteria. The most likely
severe accident scenario was determined to be one involving shipments of
miscellaneous fuels from the 300 Area. The probability of such an accident
was calculated to be about 1E-09. As shown in Table 5.11-5, this is also the
highest-consequence accident scenario for the No Action Alternative.
The impacts of potential severe transportation accidents for the
No Action Alternative are shown in Table 5.11-5. The maximum exposed
individual and public collective doses are shown in Table 5.11-5 for shipments
of miscellaneous SNF in the 300 Area to dry storage in the 200 Area. This was
determined to be the most severe reasonably foreseeable onsite transportation
accident scenario for the No Action Alternative, even though its probability
is significantly smaller than 1E-07, as discussed above. As shown,
consequence estimates are presented for two atmospheric dispersion conditions;
1) neutral (Pasquill stability class D, wind speed = 4 meters per second) and
2) stable (Pasquill stability class F , wind speed = 1 meters per second).16
Table 5.11-5. Impacts of accidents during transportation for the No Action
Alternative.
Dose Consequence Cancer Fatalities Point Estimate
of Risk
Exposure Group
Stability Category Stability Category Stability
Category
D F D F D F
Offsite 1.4E+01 1.1E+02 6.8E-03 5.5E-02 6.8E-12 5.5E-11
Populationb person-rem person-rem
Maximum Exposed 5.0E-01 rem 1.7E+00 rem 2.0E-04 6.7E-04 2.0E-13 6.7E-13
Individual
a. The maximum-consequence onsite transportation accident
for the No Action Alternative is one involving a shipment of
miscellaneous fuels currently located in the 300 Area. This
is also the most likely accident scenario, but its
probability is below the 1E-07 criteria for a maximum
reasonably foreseeable accident.
b. Rural population density.
Nonradiological impacts consist of fatalities that may result from
traffic accidents as well as health effects from pollutants emitted from
vehicles involved in onsite shipments of spent nuclear fuel. These
risks are unrelated to the radioactive nature of the materials being trans-
ported. Nonradiological impacts from accidents were calculated using unit
risk factors derived by Saricks and Kvitek (1991) that convey the estimated
number of fatalities per unit distance traveled. The total nonradiological
impacts are calculated by multiplying the total shipping distance traveled
by onsite shipments by the appropriate unit risk factors.
The total nonradiological transportation impacts for the No Action
Alternative were calculated to be less than one (1.9E-05) fatality.
5.11.2 Decentralization Alternative
Implications of implementing the Decentralization Alternative for
interim storage of SNF on traffic and incident-free onsite transportation of
SNF and materials supporting SNF storage are discussed in the following
subsections.
5.11.2.1 Traffic. Under the Decentralization Alternative, the number
of construction workers would range from about 220 to 870. During operations,
the number of workers would range from about 1100 to 1300, depending on the
option selected. This would add from 1 to 6 percent to the present workforce
and to additional commuting traffic on the Hanford Site, assuming that the
proportion of workers that take the bus to work or drive their own vehicles
remains essentially constant.
5.11.2.2 Transportation. The same approaches and basic assumptions and
data described in Section 5.11.1.2 for the No Action Alternative were used to
assess the impacts of onsite transportation for the Decentralization
Alternative. The key differences between the alternatives are the numbers of
shipments and destinations. More SNF is transported in this alternative than
in the No Action Alternative. In this alternative, all N Reactor SNF in the
105-K Basins is to be transported to the 200 Area for processing and/or
storage, depending upon the particular suboption selected. The FFTF fuel is
to be transported from the 400 Area to the 200 Area for storage. The PWR
Core-II, single- pass reactor fuels, and 300 Area miscellaneous fuels are also
to be transported to a new facility in the 200 Area for storage.
Table 5.11-6 presents the incident-free transportation impacts for the
Decentralization Alternative. As shown in Table 5.11-6, the truck crews are
the largest exposure group. The total doses were found to be dominated by the
exposures received during transportation of N Reactor fuel. This is because
there are significantly more truck shipments of N Reactor fuel in this
alternative than shipments of other types of fuel.
The doses to the maximally-exposed workers and members of the public are
summarized below:
- The dose to a tailgater was calculated to be 0.015 millirem.
- The dose to a bystander was calculated to be 0.0014 millirem.
- The dose to a truck crewman that accompanies all of the spent fuel
shipments in the Decentralization Alternative was calculated to be
about 800 millirem.
The worker MEI dose is higher than that calculated for the No Action
Alternative because there are many more onsite spent fuel shipments in the
Decentralization Alternative.
Table 5.11-7 presents the impacts of potential severe transportation
accidents for the Decentralization Alternative. The maximum exposed
individual and public collective doses are shown in Table 5.11-7 for
two accident scenarios: the highest probability and highest consquence.
As explained in the table footnotes, the probabilities of both scenarios
are less than MEI 1E-07 criteria discussed in Appendix I. As shown,
consequence estimates are presented for
Table 5.11-6. Impacts of incident-free transportation for the
Decentralization Alternative.
Impactsa General Occupational
Populationb
Total Dose (person-rem) 4.3E-01 1.7E+00
Cancer Fatalities 2.2E-04 6.8E-04
a. Total detriment, which includes latent cancer fatalities, non-fatal
cancers, and genetic effects in subsequent generations, can be calculated by
multiplying the total dose to the general population by 7.3E-04 effects per
person-rem and the total occupational dose by
5.6E-04 effects per person-rem.
b. Rural population density.
Table 5.11-7. Impacts of accidents during transportation for the
Decentralization Alternative.
Dose Consequence Cancer Point Estimate
Fatalities of Risk
Accident Exposure
Scenario Group
Stability Category Stability Stability
Category Category
D F D F D F
Highest Offsite 1.7E+01 1.4E+02 8.6E-03 6.8E-02 4.3E- 3.4E-
Probabilitya Population Person- Person-rem 10 09
b rem
Maximum 7.2E-01 2.4E+00 2.9E-04 9.6E-04 1.4E- 4.8E-
Exposed Rem Rem 11 11
Individual
Highest Offsite 1.7E+02 1.3E+03 8.4E-02 6.7E-01 5.0E- 4.0E-
Consequencec Population Person- Person-rem 10 09
rem
Maximum 5.4E+00 1.8E+01 2.2E-03 7.2E-03 1.3E- 4.3E-
Exposed Rem Rem 11 11
Individual
a. The highest-probability accident is one involving a shipment of N
Reactor fuel. The probability of this accident scenario was calculated
to be approximately 5E-8 over the entire N-Reactor fuel shipping
campaign.
b. Rural population density.
c. The highest-consequence accident scenario was determined to be one
involving shipments of FFTF fuel. However, the probability of the
accident scenario analyzed here is approximately 6E-09, which is below
the 1E-07 probability criteria for a reasonably foreseeable accident.
two atmospheric dispersion conditions; 1) neutral (Pasquill stability class D,
wind speed = 4 meters per second) and 2) stable (Pasquill stability class F ,
wind speed = 1 meters per second). This table is different from Table 5.11-5
(No Action Alternative) because of the additional fuel types transported in
the Decentralization Alternative.
The total nonradiological transportation impacts for the
Decentralization Alternative were calculated to be 6.6E-04 fatalities. The
nonradiological transportation impacts of this alternative are significantly
higher than the impacts of the No Action Alternative because the numbers of
shipments, and thus total shipment mileage, is significantly higher.
5.11.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
Implications of implementing the 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
for interim storage of SNF on traffic and incident-free onsite transportation
of SNF and materials supporting SNF storage are discussed in the following
subsections.
5.11.3.1 Traffic. Because the only difference between the
Decentralization Alternative and the 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative is
the shipment of the small amount of TRIGA fuel offsite, traffic patterns would
not be significantly different from those described for the Decentralization
Alternative.
5.11.3.2 Transportation. The impacts of onsite transportation for the
1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative are substantially the same as the impacts
of the Decentralization Alternative (see Section 5.11.2). The only difference
between these two alternatives is the disposition of the TRIGA fuel in the 308
Building. The quantity and number of TRIGA fuel shipments is small relative
to the other fuel types so the disposition of the TRIGA fuels will have a
negligible impact on the results presented in Tables 5.11-3 and 5.11-4.
5.11.4 Regionalization Alternative
Implications of implementing the Regionalization Alternative for interim
storage of SNF on traffic and incident-free onsite transportation of SNF and
materials supporting SNF storage are presented in this section. The onsite
transportation requirements for the four Regionalization Alternative options
are as follows:
- Option A - Defense production fuel will be shipped from the 105-K basins
and Plutonium and Uranium Recovery through Extraction to a new facility
in the 200 Area for storage. All other fuel will be shipped offsite;
the transportation impacts of offsite shipments are addressed in
Appendix I.
- Option B1 - All SNF located or to be generated west of the Mississippi
River will be sent to Hanford for storage, except for Naval SNF.
Shipments of SNF from offsite locations are addressed in Appendix I.
The onsite SNF will be transported from its current locations to the 200
Area for storage. In terms of onsite transportation impacts, this
option is essentially the same as the Decentralization Alternative (see
Section 5.11.2).
- Option B2 - The same as Option B1 except that Naval SNF will also be
transported to Hanford. This alternative would result in the same
onsite transportation impacts as Option B1.
- Option C - All Hanford SNF will be transported offsite to a facility at
INEL or NTS. Offsite transportation impacts are addressed in Appendix
I.
5.11.4.1 Traffic. Under the Regionalization Option A, the number of
construction workers would range from about 180 to 1200, depending on the
option selected. During operations, the number of workers would range from
about 280 to 320, depending on the suboption selected. This would add from
less than 1 to about 5 percent to the present workforce and to additional
commuting traffic on the Hanford Site, assuming that the proportion of workers
that take the bus to work or drive their own vehicles remains essentially
constant. Assuming that all of the N Reactor fuel shipments travel 16
kilometers (10 miles) one way (approximate distance from the 100 Areas to the
200 Area), a total of about 40,000 vehicle-kilometers are needed for the N
Reactor fuel shipments in this option. It was stated in Section 4.11 that in
1988 DOE vehicles logged over 19,000,000 vehicle-kilometers (12,000,000
vehicle-miles) at Hanford. The increase in vehicle mileage resulting from the
Regionalization Option A, assuming that all the Hanford SNF shipments will be
made in one year, is less than 1 percent above the 1988 base DOE-vehicle
mileage.
For the Regionalization options B1 and B2, the impacts on traffic would
be essentially the same as those described for the Decentralization
Alternative (see Section 5.11.2.1).
The Regionalization Option C involves offsite shipments of Hanford fuel.
The number of Hanford workers would stay approximately the same as the
No Action Alternative. The impacts on traffic are predominantly related to
the additional vehicles on the highways that are carrying Hanford fuels to
INEL or NTS. Assuming that all of the onsite Hanford fuel shipments travel 48
kilometers (30 miles) one way (approximate distance from the 100 Areas to the
300 Area), a total of about 130,000 vehicle-miles are needed for the onsite
segments of these shipments. It was stated in Section 4.11 that in 1988 DOE
vehicles logged over 12,000,000 miles at Hanford. The increase in vehicle
mileage resulting from Regionalization Option C, assuming that all the Hanford
fuel shipments will be made in one year, is about 1 percent above the 1988
base DOE-vehicle mileage.
5.11.4.2 Transportation. In Regionalization Option A, all N Reactor
SNF in the 105-K basins and at PUREX would be transported to the 200 Area for
processing and/or storage, depending on the particular suboption selected.
The FFTF, PWR Core-II, single-pass reactor fuels, and 300 Area miscellaneous
fuels are to be transported to INEL. Offsite transportation impacts are
addressed in Appendix I. Onsite transportation impacts for this option,
therefore, would consist of the impacts of transporting N Reactor fuel from
the 105-K basins and PUREX to the 200 Area.
The transportation impacts of this option were calculated by determining
the impacts of transporting N Reactor fuel on a per-shipment basis and then
multiplying the total number of shipments. The methods and input data
described in Section 5.11.1 were used to calculate the per-shipment impacts.
The results of the transportation impact calculations for the Regional-
ization Option A are as follows:
- Incident-free transportation impacts: Public exposures - 2.4E-01
person-rem (9.6E-05 LCFs); Worker exposures - 1.4E+00 person-rem
(5.6E-04 LCFs).
- Impacts of transportation accidents: Public, Pasquill Stability
Class D - 1.7E+01 person-rem (8.6E-03 LCFs); Public - Pasquill
Stability Class F - 1.4E+02 person-rem (6.8E-02 LCFs). Maximum
exposed individual, Pasquill Stability Class D - 7.2E-01 rem
(2.9E-04 LCFs); Maximum exposed individual Pasquill Stability
Class F - 2.9E+00 rem (9.6E-04 LCFs). See the "highest
probability" accident in
Table 5.11-7.
- Nonradiological impacts: 5.6E-04 fatalities.
The incident-free doses to the maximally-exposed workers and members of
the public are summarized below:
- The dose to a tailgater was calculated to be 0.015 millirem.
- The dose to a bystander was calculated to be 0.0014 millirem.
- The dose to a truck crewman who accompanies all of the SNF
shipments in Regionalization Option A was calculated to be about
680 millirem.
The worker MEI dose is higher than that calculated for the No Action
Alternative because there are many more onsite spent fuel shipments in the
Regionalization Option A. The worker MEI dose is lower than that calculated
for the Decentralization Alternative because only N Reactor fuel is shipped
onsite in Regionalization Option A, and all fuel types are shipped onsite in
the Decentralization Alternative.
In Regionalization options B1 and B2, all Hanford SNF would be shipped
onsite from its current locations to the 200 Area. Traffic and transportation
impacts for both Regionalization options B1 and B2 would be essentially the
same as those calculated for the Decentralization Alternative.
In Regionalization Option C, all of the Hanford Site SNF would be
shipped to and stored at either INEL or NTS. Because all of the shipments of
Hanford SNF would be considered to be offsite shipments, the impacts are
addressed in Appendix I. For Hanford, this option is identical to the
Centralization Alternative, minimum option.
5.11.5 Centralization Alternative
Implications of implementing the Centralization Alternative for interim
storage of SNF on traffic and incident-free onsite transportation of SNF and
materials supporting SNF storage are discussed in the following subsections.
5.11.5.1 Traffic. Traffic patterns would be essentially the same as
for the Decentralization Alternative if Hanford were selected to receive all
DOE SNF. The patterns would last for up to twice as long because of the
additional fuel to be brought to the reprocessing/ stabilization and storage
facility (although there is only 25 weight percent more fuel to be shipped, it
would likely require smaller quantities per shipment because of its higher
heat load). If all Hanford fuel were to be shipped offsite, traffic patterns
would not be significantly different from those of the No Action Alternative.
5.11.5.2 Transportation. The Centralization Alternative results in the
same onsite transportation impacts as the Decentralization Alternative. In
the Decentralization Alternative, all Hanford Site SNF will be transported to
the 200 Areas for further processing and/or storage, depending on the specific
option. In the Centralization Alternative, all Hanford Site SNF is
transported to either a stabilization/packaging facility in the 200 Area for
preparation for offsite shipment or to the Central Storage Facility to be
located in the 200 Area. All of these cases requires onsite shipment of
Hanford SNF from their current locations to a 200 Area facility. Therefore,
the onsite transportation impacts for the Centralization Alternative are the
same as those for the Decentralization Alternative (see Section 5.11.2).
5.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety
Implications of implementing the alternatives for interim storage of SNF
on worker and public health and safety at the Hanford Site are discussed in
the following subsections. By and large this material consists of summary
material extracted from Section 5.7, "Air Quality and Related Consequences;"
5.8, "Water Quality and Related Consequences;" 5.11, "Traffic and
Transportation;" and 5.15, "Accidents."
5.12.1 No Action Alternative
Radiological and nonradiological consequences relating to occupational
and public health and safety for the No Action Alternative are presented in
the following subsections.
5.12.1.1 Radiological Consequences. The consequences of air emissions
from routine operations of existing facilities utilized in the No Action
Alternative include a maximum annual dose of 1E-5 rem to a potential onsite
worker with a 5E-9 probability of fatal cancer. The collective annual dose to
workers in spent fuel storage facilities is 24 person-rem per year (Bergsman
1995), which would require about 60 years of such operation to accumulate a
collective worker dose from which one fatal cancer might be inferred.
The dose to an offsite resident at the highest exposure location is
estimated as 3E-6 rem/year, and the corresponding probability of fatal cancer
is 1E-9.
The peak collective dose to the population within 80 kilometers (50
miles) is 3E-2 person-rem per year, which is predicted to result in less than
one fatal cancer (about 36,000 years of such operation would be required to
reach a dose from which one fatal cancer might be inferred).
5.12.2 Decentralization Alternative
Radiological and nonradiological consequences relating to occupational
and public health and safety for the Decentralization Alternative are
presented in the following subsections.
5.12.2.1 Radiological Consequences. The consequences of air emissions from individ-
ual facilities in the Decentralization Alternative are summarized in Table 5.7-8 and
include a maximum annual dose of 2E-9 rem to a potential onsite worker (8E-13
probability of fatal cancer) for any combination of wet or dry spent fuel
storage facilities. The dose to an offsite resident at the highest exposure
location is estimated as 6E-10 rem per year, and the corresponding probability
of fatal cancer is 3E-13. The peak collective dose to the population within
80 km is 2E-5 person-rem per year, which is predicted to result in less than
one fatal cancer. The collective annual dose to workers at SNF facilities for
a combination of wet and dry storage facilities is 2 person-rem per year for
maintenance and operations. Loading the new facilities would require an
additional 17-18 person-rem depending on the form of dry storage. For dry
storage only, the dose from initial loading would be 7-12 person-rem, and
there would be no dose from normal operations (Bergsman 1995).
For dry storage of defense fuel, stabilization prior to dry storage is
included in the routine operations of the Decentralization Alternative, and
additional emissions would result from these activities. The dose to the
onsite worker from air emissions would increase by 4E-6 rem/year for a
shear/leach/calcine process or 3E-5 rem/year for a solvent extraction process
(2E-9 or 1E-8 probability of fatal cancer, respectively). Collective worker
dose at fuel stabilization facilities would range from 44 person-rem per year
at a shear/ leach/ calcine facility to 78 person-rem per year at a solvent
extraction facility over the 4 years in which these facilities are expected to
operate (Bergsman 1995). The dose to an individual worker in the facility is
assumed to be limited by administrative controls to no more than 0.5 rem per
year.
The consequences from stabilization for the offsite resident would be
7E-6 rem per year (4E-9 prob- ability of fatal cancer) for the shear/leach/
calcine facility and 2E-5 rem per year (1E-8 probability of fatal
cancer) for the solvent extraction facility. The collective dose to the
offsite population from the respective fuel stabilization facilities is
estimated at 0.3 to 1 person-rem per year, resulting in less than one fatal
cancer (would require from about 1000 to 3700 years of such exposure to reach
a dose from which one fatal cancer might be inferred).
5.12.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
Because the activities are similar, radiological consequences of routine
operations for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative are considered to be
the same as those for the Decentralization Alternative.
5.12.4 Regionalization Alternative
Radiological and nonradiological consequences relating to occupational
and public health and safety for the Regionalization Alternative are presented
in the following subsections.
5.12.4.1 Radiological Consequences. Because of the similarity of
activities, the radiological consequences of routine operations for the
Regionalization Alternative Option A are considered to be the same as those
for the Decentralization Alternative. The consequences to the public of
options B and C are the same as described in the following section for the
Centralization Maximum and Minimum options, respectively. Consequences to
onsite workers would differ based on the processing and storage options for
onsite fuel as in the decentralization alternative, as well as on the quantity
of imported fuel to be received and placed into dry storage under each option.
The consequences over the 40-year storage period range from 98 to 320 person-
rem for option A, 700-920 person-rem for options B1 and B2, and 190-320
person-rem for option C. No fatal cancers would be expected as a result of
implementing any of these options.
5.12.5 Centralization Alternative
Radiological and nonradiological consequences relating to occupational
and public health and safety for the Centralization Alternative are presented
in the following subsections.
5.12.5.1. Radiological consequences of air emissions from routine
operations in the Centralization Alternative include a maximum annual dose of
9E-9 rem to a potential onsite worker (4E-12 probability of fatal cancer) for
any combination of wet or dry spent fuel storage facilities.
The collective
annual dose to SNF facility workers for a combination of wet and dry storage
facilities is 2 person-rem per year for maintenance and operations. Loading
the new facilities would require an additional 19-22 person-rem depending on
the form of dry storage. For dry storage only, the dose from initial loading
would be 9-12 person-rem, and there would be no dose from normal operations
(Bergsman 1995). Shear/leach/calcine and solvent extraction activities would
add 44 or 78 person-rem per year, respectively, and the receiving, canning,
and technology development facilities would entail an additional 20 person-rem
per year.
The dose from air emissions to an offsite resident at the highest
exposure location is estimated as 2E-9 rem per year, and the corresponding
probability of fatal cancer is 8E-13. The peak collective dose to the
population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) is 7E-5 person-rem per year, which
is predicted to result in less than one fatal cancer. These estimates do not
include relocation of the expended core facility to Hanford, which is
discussed in Appendix D to Volume 1 of this EIS. Assumptions used in the
Appendix D calculations for consequences of locating an expended core facility
at Hanford may differ from those used for other Hanford facilities.
5.13 Site Services
Implications of implementing the alternatives for interim storage of SNF
on site services at the Hanford Site are discussed in the following
subsections.
5.13.1 No Action Alternative
Implementing the No Action Alternative would require no significant
additional consumption of material or energy; however, about 12,000 megawatt-
hours per year are currently used for SNF management activities.
5.13.2 Decentralization Alternative
Incremental requirements for materials and energy in construction
associated with the Decentralization Alternative are shown in Table 5.13-1.
Annual consumption of energy during operations is similar to that used during
construction for the water storage options (W and X), the total would be a
small fraction of the present consumption rate. Annual consumption of energy
during operations in the options where defense production fuel is stabilized
is significantly greater; however it is still within the capacity of existing
facilities.
Table 5-13-1. Materials and energy required for Decentralization suboptions.
Item Option
W X Y Z P Q
Concrete, thousand 13 (17) 15 (20) 17 (23) 24 (32) 22 (29) 29
cubic meters/(cubic (38)
yards)
Carbon steel, 2.4 2.8 3.3 4.5 3.9 5.1
thousand tonnes (2.7) (3.1) (3.6) (5.0) (4.2) (5.6)
(tons)
Stainless steel, 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.5 0.7
thousand tonnes (0.1) (0.1) (0.6) (0.8)
(tons)
Copper, thousand 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.08
tonnes (tons) (0.07) (0.09)
Lumber, thousand 1.2 1.4 1.6 2.2 2.0 2.6
cubic meters (board (500) (570) (650) (930) (850) (1100)
feet)
Asphalt, sand, and 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.1 1.4
crushed rock, (0.8) (0.9) (1.1) (1.5) (1.4) (1.8)
thousand cubic
meters (thousand
cubic yards)
Electricity
Construction (MW- 2500 2900 3500 4800 4370 5700
hrs) 1600 1600 100 100 127,00
Operations (MW- 40,000a 0a
hrs/yr)
Diesel fuel, 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.8 1.1
thousand cubic (130) (150) (175) (240) (220) (290)
meters (thousand
gallons)
Gasoline, thousand 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.8 1.1
cubic meters (130) (150) (175) (240) (220) (290)
(thousand gallons)
Construction Cost 265 280 350 310 580 835
($ Million)
a. Assumes operation of the process facility (28,000 or 115,000 MW-hrs/yr)
concurrently with those facilities where SNF is currently stored (12,000 MW-
hrs/yr, as in the No Action Alternative) for an interim period less than 4
years.
In the Decentralization Alternative, an extension of existing utilities
to the project site area would likely be necessary. This would include water
mains, electrical power lines, sewage facilities, telephone lines, etc. All
of these utilities are available in the adjacent 200-East Area. In addition,
an existing rail line might need to be upgraded for increased traffic, and
construction of new spurs going to various proposed new facilities would
likely be required. The project would be served by an 8-inch water main
capable of delivering 7600 liters per minute (2000 gallons per minute).
Facilities would be designed to preclude discharge of water except for
sanitary waste.
5.13.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
Energy requirements in the 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative would be
essentially the same as those cited above for the Decentralization
Alternative.
5.13.4 Regionalization Alternative
Material and energy requirements in the Regionalization Option A would
be slightly less than those cited above for the Decentralization Alternative.
Material and energy requirements in the Regionalization options would be
similar to those cited above for the Decentralization Alternative, although
the construction requirements would occur over most of the interim storage
period. Incremental requirements for materials and energy in construction
associated with the Regionalization options are shown in Tables 5.13-2 and
5.13-3. For the Regionalization options that involve fuel from other
locations being stored at the Hanford Site, the requirements shown are for
fuel received from other locations and are in addition to those shown in
Table 5.13-1 for fuel already at the Hanford Site. For the Regionalization
option that has no fuel stored at the Hanford Site, the requirements shown are
the total incremental requirements.
5.13.5 Centralization Alternative
Similar to the Decentralization Alternative, annual consumption of
energy during operations is similar to that used during construction for the
water storage options (W and X), and the total would be a small fraction of
the present consumption rate. Annual consumption of energy during operations
in the options where defense production fuel is stabilized is signifi-
cantly greater; however it is still within the capacity of existing facilities.
Materials and energy requirements for construction in the Centralization
Alternatives are shown in Table 5.13-4. Similar to the Regionalization
options, the Centralization Alternative that involves fuel from other
locations being stored at the Hanford Site shows the requirements associated
with storing the fuel received from other locations and are in addition to
those shown for fuel already at the Hanford Site in Table 5.13-1. For the
Centralization option that has no fuel stored at the Hanford Site, the
requirements shown are the total incremental requirements.
In the Centralization Alternative where all SNF is brought to the
Hanford Site, an extension of existing utilities to the project site area
would be necessary. This would include water mains, electrical power lines,
sewage facilities, telephone lines, etc. All of these utilities
Table 5-13-2. Materials and energy required for Regionalization A suboptions.
Item Option
W X Y Z P Q
Concrete, thousand 9 (12) 9 (12) 16 (21) 19 (25) 22 (29) 29
cubic meters/(cubic (38)
yards)
Carbon steel, 1.7 1.7 3.0 3.6 (4) 3.9 5.1
thousand tonnes (1.9) (1.9) (3.4) (4.2) (5.6)
(tons)
Stainless steel, 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.5 0.7
thousand tonnes (0.1) (0.1) (0.6) (0.8)
(tons)
Copper, thousand 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.08
tonnes (tons) (0.07) (0.09)
Lumber, thousand 0.8 0.8 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.6
cubic meters (board (350) (350) (600) (700) (850) (1100)
feet)
Asphalt, sand, and 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.4
crushed rock, (0.6) (0.6) (1.0) (1.2) (1.4) (1.8)
thousand cubic
meters (thousand
cubic yards)
Electricity
Construction (MW- 1800 1800 3200 3800 4370 5700
hrs) 1600 1600 100 100 40,000a 127,00
Operations (MW- 0a
hrs/yr)
Diesel fuel, 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.1
thousands cubic (100) (100) (160) (190) (220) (290)
meters (thousand
gallons)
Gasoline, thousand 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.1
cubic meters (100) (100) (160) (190) (220) (290)
(thousand gallons)
Construction Cost 200 200 340 250 580 835
($ Million)
a. Assumes operation of the process facility (28,000 or 115,000 MW-Hrs/yr)
concurrently with those facilities where SNF is currently stored (12,000 MW-
Hrs/yr, as in the No Action Alternative) for an interim period less than 4
years.
Table 5-13-3. Materials and energy required for construction of
Regionalization B and C options.
Item Option
SNF Stored at SNF Stored No SNF Stored
the Hanford at the at the Hanford
Site Without Hanford Site Site
Naval SNF With Naval
SNF
Concrete, thousand cubic 54 (70) 115 (150) 18 (23)
meters/(cubic yards)
Carbon steel, thousand 8.2 (9) 19.1 (21) 3.1 (3.4)
tonnes (tons)
Stainless steel thousand 0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) 0.4 (.5)
tonnes (tons)
Copper, thousand tonnes 0 0 0.05 (0.05)
(tons)
Lumber, thousand cubic 4.8 (2000) 10 (4200) 1.6 (660)
meters (board feet)
Asphalt, sand, and crushed 2.5 (3.3) 5.4 (7.1) 0.8 (1.1)
rock, thousand cubic
meters (thousand cubic
yards)
Electricity
Construction (MW-hrs) 16,000 30,000 3400
Operations (MW-hrs/yr)a 100-127,000 100-127,000 0-20,000
Diesel fuel, thousand 1.9 (500) 4.2 (1100) 0.6 (170)
cubic meters (thousand
gallons)
Gasoline, thousand cubic 1.9 (500) 4.2 (1100) 0.6 (170)
meters (thousand gallons)
Construction Cost ($ 765 1465 560
Million)
a. Minimum value represents requirements during the period after all fuel
has been placed into dry storage, or has been shipped offsite. Maximum
value represents requirements during the interim period (less than 4 years)
while SNF is being processed and prepared for storage or shipment offsite,
assuming concurrent operation of the process facility and the existing
facilities where SNF is currently stored (as in the No Action Alternative).
are available in the adjacent 200-East Area. In addition, an existing rail
line might need to be upgraded for increased traffic and the construction of
new spurs to various proposed new facilities would likely be required.
The following section describes the material requirements for operation of
facilities in each SNF alternative and the corresponding quantities of waste
generated by these activities. Table 5.14-1 lists the breakdown by alternative
and suboption of the various types of waste generated by SNF management
facilities.
Table 5-13-4. Materials and energy requirements for construction of
Centralization options.
Item No Fuel Stored All Offsite
at the Hanford Fuel Stored at
Site the Hanford
Site
Concrete, thousand cubic meters (cubic 18 (23) 150 (200)
yards)
Carbon Steel, thousand tonnes (tons) 3.1 (3.4) 25 (27.5)
Stainless Steel, thousand tonnes (tons) 0.4 (0.5) 0.1 (0.1)
Copper, thousand tonnes (tons) 0.045 (0.05) 0
Lumber, thousand cubic meters (board feet) 1.6 (660) 13 (5600)
Asphalt, Sand, and Crushed Rock (thousand 0.8 (1.1) 7.2 (9.5)
cubic meters (thousand cubic yards)
Electricity
Construction (MW-hrs) 3400 40,000
Operations (MW-hrs/yr)a 0-20,000 100-127,000
Diesel fuel, thousand cubic meters 0.6 (170) 5.7 (1500)
(thousand gallons)
Gasoline, thousand cubic meters (thousand 0.6 (170) 5.7 (1500)
gallons)
Construction Cost ($ Million) 560 1950
a. Minimum value represents requirements during the period after all fuel
has been placed into dry storage, or has been shipped offsite. Maximum
value represents requirements during the interim period (less than 4 years)
while SNF is being processed and prepared for storage or shipment offsite,
assuming concurrent operation of the process facility and the existing
facilities where SNF is currently stored (as in the No Action Alternative).
5.14 Materials and Waste Management
5.14.1 No Action Alternative
The No Action Alternative involves only fuel storage at existing
facilities, and material requirements for the current configuration are
minimal. The exception is make-up water for the 105-K fuel storage basins,
which amounts to 2.8 million cubic meters per year.
The quantity of waste generated in the No Action Alternative is also
relatively small because the only planned modifications to existing facilities
are safety and security upgrades to the 105-K basins. About 530 cubic meters
of low-level waste would result from containerization of SNF in 105-KE Basin,
and small quantities of radioactive and mixed waste are generated at the
325 Building.
Table 5.14-1. Waste generation for spent nuclear fuel management alternatives.
Waste Type No Action Decentralization Centralization
W X Y Z P Q Offsite at Hanford a,b
Construction 0 1500 1700 1700 2800 2600 3400 2000 15000
Waste (m3,
total)
High-Level 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 14 0
Radioactive
Waste (m3/y)
Transuranic 0 0 0 0 0 28 50 0 0
Waste (m3/y)
Low-Level 95 41 50 0 0 280 420 140 68
Radioactive
Waste (m3/y)c
Mixed Waste 0.96 0.23 0.23 0 0 2.0 2.0 1.0 0.28
(Low-Level
Radioactive
and Hazardous,
(m3/y)
Non- 2.3 1.1 1.1 0 0 2.8 2.8 1.4 1.1
radioactive
Hazardous
Waste (m3/y)
a. These quantities are associated with new facilities that would be required for management of SNF shipped
to Hanford from other sites. They represent incremental increases over those for facilities that are
required to manage SNF currently at Hanford, which are discussed in the No-Action and Decentralization
Alternatives.
b. A new ECF is not included in these totals; requirements for this facility are discussed in Volume 1,
Appendix D.
c. Annual totals do not include containerization of defense production reactor SNF currently stored at the
105-K basins. This activity is expected to generate 530 cubic meters of low-level radioactive waste over a
period of approximately 2 years.
Table 5.14-1. (contd)
Waste Type Regionalization
AX AY AZ AP AQ B1a B2a,b C
Construction 900 1600 2100 2600 3400 5400 11,500 2000
Waste (m3,
total)
High-Level 0 0 0 0 57 0 0 14
Radioactive
Waste (m3/y)
Transuranic 0 0 0 28 50 0 0 0
Waste (m3/y)
Low-Level 61 0 0 280 420 1.7 1.7 140
Radioactive
Waste (m3/y)c
Mixed Waste 0.23 0 0 2.0 2.0 0.028 0.028 1.0
(Low-Level
Radioactive and
Hazardous,
(m3/y)
Non-radioactive 1.1 0 0 2.8 2.8 0.057 0.057 1.4
Hazardous Waste
(m3/y)
a. These quantities are associated with new facilities that would be required for management of SNF shipped
to Hanford from other sites. They represent incremental increases over those for facilities that are
required to manage SNF currently at Hanford, which are discussed in the No-Action and Decentralization
Alternatives.
b. A new ECF is not included in these totals; requirements for this facility are discussed in Volume 1,
Appendix D of this document.
c. Annual totals do not include containerization of defense production reactor SNF currently stored at the
105-K basins. This activity is expected to generate 530 cubic meters of low-level radioactive waste over a
period of approximately 2 years.
5.14.2 Decentralization Alternative
Material requirements for the Decentralization Alternative depend on the
suboption chosen. The suboptions involving wet storage of production reactor
fuel (suboptions W and X) require make-up water for the storage basin at
approximately 2300 cubic meters per year. Material requirements for dry
storage of fuel (suboptions Y and Z) are minimal, and consist of
decontamination chemicals in small quantities. Those suboptions including
processing of production reactor fuel (suboptions P and Q, which would be
combined with either Y or Z) require relatively large quantities of nitric
acid (2000 - 4000 cubic meters per year) and other process chemicals in
smaller quantities.
Construction waste generated for each of the suboptions depends on the
size and number of facilities required. Dry storage of all fuel, including
processing of production reactor fuel, would result in the largest quantity of
construction waste, which is assumed to be nonradioactive, nonhazardous
solids. Radioactive and hazardous waste from operations is also greater for
the dry storage suboption with processing. Wet storage of production reactor
fuel and dry storage of other onsite fuel results in the smallest quantity of
both construction and operational hazard-
ous waste.
5.14.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
This alternative would be essentially the same as the Decentralization
Alternative at Hanford.
5.14.4 Regionalization Alternative
Regionalization Alternative Option A would be essentially the same as
the Decentralization Alternative at Hanford in terms of operational material
requirements and waste generation because these originate largely from the
storage pool or process facilities, depending on the suboption selected. The
quantity of construction waste would be smaller because the dry storage
capacity for nondefense production fuel would not be needed.
The Regionalization Alternative B options would require materials in
similar quantities to the Decentralization Alternative, but would generate
construction and operational wastes in greater quantities because of
additional facilities that would be necessary to receive, package, and store
imported SNF. Note that the waste quantities reported in Table 5.14-1
represent incremental increases for SNF facilities above those listed for the
Decentralization Alternative.
The Regionalization Alternative Option C involves only stabilization of
defense production fuel and packaging of all Hanford SNF for shipment offsite.
It is identical to the Centralization Alternative minimum option as described
in Section 5.14.5.
5.14.5 Centralization Alternative
The Centralization Alternative minimum option for offsite shipment of
Hanford fuel requires construction of a stabilization and canning facility,
which would produce annual quantities of construction and operational wastes
similar to those for onsite combined wet and dry storage (suboptions W and X)
in the Decentralization Alternative. However, these wastes would only be
generated for the time required to stabilize and package fuel for offsite
shipment (approximately 4 years).
Centralization at Hanford (maximum option) would include the same
suboptions as Decentralization for SNF currently at Hanford, and the material
requirements and waste generation would be identical. For SNF imported from
other sites, additional dry storage capacity would be needed, and new
additional facilities to package and examine the fuel would be constructed.
The estimates in Table 5.14-1 for Centralization at Hanford represent
incremental increases for these additional facilities above those in the
Decentralization Alternative. They do not incorporate the additional
requirements of the Expended Core Facility, which are discussed in Volume 1,
Appendix D of this document. Operational material requirements for the
incremental dry storage capacity would be minimal, as would be the quantities
of waste generated. Construction of the new facilities would generate
nonhazardous solid waste in quantities greater than any of the other options,
but operation of the additional facilities would produce relatively small
quantities of radioactive and hazardous waste.
5.15 Facility Accidents
Implications of facility accidents associated with implementing the
alternatives for SNF storage at Hanford are discussed in the following
section. The method used to screen and select accidents for analysis is
described, as are the procedures for evaluating the consequences of selected
accidents, and the results of the analysis. Additional detail concerning
specific accidents and parameters used in the analysis is provided in
Attachment A, Facility Accidents.
5.15.1 Historical Accidents Involving SNF at Hanford
There are no known instances at Hanford where storage, handling, or
processing of SNF has resulted in an accident that involved a significant
release of radioactive or other hazardous materials to the environment or that
resulted in detrimental exposure of workers or members of the public to
hazardous materials.
5.15.2 Emergency Preparedness Planning at Hanford
Although the safety record for operations at Hanford and other DOE
facilities is generally good, DOE-RL and all Hanford Site contractors have
established Emergency Response Plans to prepare for and mitigate the
consequences of potential emergencies on the Hanford Site (DOE 1992c). These
plans were prepared in accordance with DOE Orders and other federal, state,
and local regulations. The plans describe actions that will be taken to
evaluate the severity of a potential emergency and the steps necessary to
notify and coordinate the activities of other agencies having emergency
response functions in the surrounding communities. They also specify levels
at which the hazard to workers and the public are of sufficient concern that
protective action should be taken. The Site holds regularly scheduled
exercises to ensure that individuals with responsibilities in emergency
planning are properly trained in the procedures that have been implemented to
mitigate the consequences of potential accidents and other events.
5.15.3 Accident Screening and Selection for the EIS Analysis
The alternatives for SNF storage considered in this EIS necessitate
evaluation of accidents at a variety of different types of facilities. In the
No Action Alternative, the facilities consist of those where SNF is currently
stored on the Hanford Site, or those where SNF will be stored at the time of
the record of decision. All facilities considered in the No Action
Alternative currently exist at the Hanford Site, and no construction of new
facilities is assumed. For many of these facilities, storage of SNF is inci-
dental to other activities that take place in the buildings. For the other
alternatives (Decentralization, Regionalization, 1992/1993 Planning Basis, and
Centralization), construction of new facilities dedicated solely to SNF
management is assumed.
Accidents evaluated for existing facilities at Hanford consisted of
maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents described in such previously
published analyses as safety or NEPA documentation. The source documents for
specific accidents evaluated in this section are referenced in the detailed
accident descriptions in Attachment A. In the case of new facilities,
hypothetical accidents were based on operation of similar facilities at
Hanford or other sites. Depending on the time at which the source document
was prepared, the number and types of accidents considered for each facility
would be somewhat variable. However, the screening process used in the
relatively recent analyses considers a wide scope of accident initiators and
scenarios, including industrial accidents (fires, explosions,
overpressurization, loss of containment or confinement), criticality, operator
error or injury, external hazards (surface vehicle or aircraft impact), waste
management, natural phenomena (seismic events, wind, floods, volcanic
activity), interactions with activities at adjacent facilities (construction,
maintenance, operations), and common cause events (power failure). Older
safety documents generally address these issues as well, although perhaps not
with the same rigor as newer analyses. Transportation accidents are
considered in a separate section of this appendix and are not discussed here.
Acts of terrorism are accounted for indirectly in the present analysis
because the potential consequences of terrorist activities are used to
determine security requirements for a given facility. Security measures are
implemented to mitigate the impact, or reduce the probability, of high
consequence events. Therefore, reasonably foreseeable scenarios for terrorist
activities would entail risks that are similar to those for the types of
accident initiators generally considered in the source documents that provide
the basis for this analysis.
For the purposes of this EIS, accidents are ideally grouped into three
categories based on their estimated frequencies as follows: abnormal events
(frequency >10-3 per year), design basis accidents (frequencies <10-3 to 10-6
per year), and beyond design basis accidents (frequency <10-6 to 10-7 per
year). Because the accident categories commonly used for development of
safety documents encompass different probability ranges, the estimated
frequencies (or frequency ranges) for Hanford facility accidents are reported
as indicated in the source document without regard to the accident frequency
categories established for use in the EIS. For accidents where only a range
rather than a point estimate of frequency is available, the frequency of the
accident is reported as being less than the highest frequency that defines the
range. In alternatives that consider SNF imported from other sites (such as
other DOE facilities or U.S. and foreign research reactors), frequencies for
specific accidents have been adjusted to account for increased fuel handling
at receiving, canning, and storage facilities.
Accident frequencies as reported in safety documents (Safety Analysis
Reports and related analyses) typically represent the overall probability of
the accident, including the probability of the initiating event combined with
the frequency of any contributing events required for an environmental release
to occur. The contributing events may include equipment or barrier failures,
or failures of other mitigating systems designed to prevent accidental
releases. In general, the safety documents do not evaluate the consequences
of events with expected frequencies of <10-6 per year because such accidents
are not considered reasonably foreseeable; therefore, accidents in the beyond
design basis category are generally not evaluated for this analysis.
Evaluation of aircraft traffic at the Richland and Pasco, Washington airports
determined that impacts of commercial or military aircraft were less than
1x10-7 for a facility in the Hanford 300 Area, which is at highest risk
because of its location (PNL 1992a). Therefore, aircraft accidents are not
considered further in this analysis as initiators for accidents at Hanford SNF
management facilities.
As noted previously, the safety documents for SNF facilities generally
considered a broad range of accidents; however, only the consequences of the
maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents for each facility in a given
alternative were evaluated for this document. Of the existing facilities
assessed in the No Action Alternative, most are multipurpose facilities with
diverse missions such as research or process development. These facilities
typically contain relatively small quantities of SNF relative to the
105-K basins, where the bulk of Hanford's existing SNF is stored. The
accidents evaluated in the source documents for multipurpose facilities may
therefore reflect activities other than SNF storage or handling. The risks
for such accidents are reported in this EIS for completeness, although in some
cases, neither the frequency nor the consequences associated with the accident
depend on the presence of SNF in the facility.
5.15.4 Method for Accident Consequence Analysis
In the No Action Alternative, accident consequence analyses utilized
release estimates as presented in the source document for a given existing
facility. For new facilities, release estimates were based on historical
operation of similar facilities at Hanford. These estimates were also assumed
to represent typical accidental releases in alternatives that consider storage
of fuel from offsite locations, such as other DOE facilities or U.S. and
foreign research reactors. Accidents evaluated for the research reactor fuels
indicate that releases for such specialized fuels would be comparable to those
included in this analysis (DOE 1993b; Hale and Reutzel 1993). The assumptions
used to determine radionuclide releases are included in Attachment A.
Because most source documents (other than the more recent Safety
Analysis Reports) do not evaluate hazardous materials other than
radionuclides, a different approach was used for accidents involving
nonradioactive materials. The hazardous material inventories for each
facility were used to estimate releases based on the physical state of each
compound as described in Attachment A. Specific initiators and accident
scenarios were generally not postulated for nonradioactive materials;
therefore, frequencies were not estimated for hazardous chemical accidents.
The downwind concentrations for materials released in accidents were
then calculated at receptor locations as defined for the EIS. The receptors
included a worker who is onsite but outside the facility where the accident
takes place, a member of the public who is temporarily at the nearest access
location (such as a road that crosses the site or at the site boundary), and
the maximally exposed offsite resident. Collective dose to the population
within 80 kilometers (50 miles) was also calculated for radionuclide releases.
Individual dispersion calculations were performed using 95 percent atmospheric
conditions (those resulting in air concentrations that would not be exceeded
more than 5 percent of the time). Dose to the population was calculated using
both 50 percent and 95 percent atmospheric dispersion parameters. Dispersion
calculations were performed using the GENII computer code (Napier et al. 1988)
for radionuclide releases and the EPIcode (Homann 1988) for nonradioactive
compounds.
The radiation dose to each receptor evaluated for the EIS was
recalculated for the specific conditions and release location as appropriate
to each alternative using the GENII computer code. Doses were calculated as
the effective dose equivalent using standard assumptions for the Hanford Site
as summarized in Schreckhise et al. (1993). Health effects were also
estimated as probability of fatal cancer based on recommendations of the
International Commission on Radiological Protection in its Publication 60
(ICRP 1991). The accident doses were recalculated for this analysis using a
consistent, reasonably conservative set of methods and assumptions and to
include the complete set of receptors that are to be evaluated in the EIS.
This was necessary because the methods used in the source documents were not
necessarily consistent and in some cases were outdated. For this reason, the
doses developed for this analysis may differ from those reported in the source
documents that describe the accidents; however, they should be viewed as a
screening analysis for the purposes of the EIS and are not intended to replace
or invalidate the previous results.
Individual doses were based on exposure of the receptor during the
entire release, except where the release time was sufficiently long that such
an assumption is unrealistic. For releases that were expected to last more
than a few hours, the exposure duration for onsite workers and members of the
public at accessible onsite locations was limited to 2 hours, corresponding to
the maximum time required to evacuate the Hanford Site in the event of an
accident. Offsite residents were assumed to be exposed during the entire
release, regardless of the accident duration. Exposure via inhalation and
external pathways (groundshine and submersion in the plume) were considered
for workers and the nearest public access receptors; ingestion of contaminated
food was evaluated only for offsite residents. Because protective action
guidelines specify mitigative actions to prevent consumption of contaminated
food, the ingestion dose to offsite individuals and populations is reported
separately from the other exposure routes. Reduced exposure to the plume or
to contaminated ground surface as a result of early evacuation of offsite
populations is not assumed for the purposes of this analysis, although such
actions would also be mandated if the projected dose from an accident exceeded
the protective action guidelines. Because the circumstances and consequences
postulated for workers at the scene of an accident are so speculative, they
serve no useful purpose in the decision-making process. As a consequence,
discussion of impacts on "close-in" workers are not brought forward into the
text of this Appendix. Consequences in terms of the "close-in" workers for
one scenario in each accident may be found in Attachment A.
5.15.5 Radiological Accident Analysis
5.15.5.1 No Action Alternative. The No Action Alternative consists of
fuel storage at existing Hanford facilities, including the 100-K wet storage
basins; T Plant, and a low-level burial ground in the 200-West Area; the 308,
324, 325, and 327 buildings in the 300 Area; and the Fast Flux Test Facility
(FFTF) in the 400 Area. Of these facilities, only the 100-K storage basins
and the FFTF fuel storage facility are primarily devoted to SNF storage; the
others are all multipurpose facilities that house a variety of activities in
addition to storing relatively small quantities of SNF. The consequences and
risks of accidents associated with these facilities are described in Tables
5.15-1 through 5.15-5.
The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident for multipurpose facilities
is an earthquake scenario at the 324 Building, which releases non-SNF related
radioactive material that has accumulated in a hot cell (Table 5.15-1 through
Table 5.15-5). The contributions of other activities at the facility,
including SNF storage, are estimated to be relatively minor. The maximum
reasonably foreseeable accident directly involving SNF management is a fire at
a fuel storage facility adjacent to FFTF. Several of the accident scenarios
evaluated for this alternative involve initiators that could affect more than
one facility (e.g., earthquakes); however, the combined consequences of
releases from potentially affected facilities have not been evaluated for a
common receptor.
5.15.5.2 Decentralization Alternative. The Decentralization
Alternative involves several options for construction of new facilities at
Hanford. One option includes a combination of new wet storage for defense
production reactor fuel currently stored at the 105-K basins and new dry
storage for fuel that is currently at other locations. Alternative options
are included for processing of production reactor fuel prior to dry storage.
The consequences of accidents at the new facilities are based on previously
evaluated accidents for similar installations, adapted for the conditions and
location of these facilities as assumed in this EIS.
The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident for the new facilities is a
severe cask impact followed by a fire at a dry storage facility (Tables 5.15-1
through 5.15-5). The risk from a cask drop while loading fuel at a wet
storage facility is similar for most receptors, although this scenario is
conservative for a new facility as discussed in Attachment A.
5.15.5.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative. Accidents and
consequences would be essentially the same as for the Decentralization
Alternative.
5.15.5.4 Regionalization Alternative. The consequences of the
regionalization alternatives are similar to those of other action alternatives
because they only differ in the quantity of imported fuel placed into dry
storage at the site. The types of facilities and activities involved are
generally the same as those considered for the decentralization and
centralization alternatives. Point estimates of risk for some accidents
differ from those of corresponding
Table 5.15-1. Radiological accidents, individual worker probability of latent cancer fatality.
Accident Attribute No Action Decentralization 1992/1993 Regionalization Centralization Regionalization
Description Planning Basis A, B at Hanford or Centralization
- Other Site
SNF facilities:
Wet storage fuel Consequences 1.4E-03 3.5E-04 3.5E-04 3.5E-04 3.5E-04 NAa
cask drop
Annual <1E-04 <1E-04 <1E-04 <1E-04 <1E-04 NA
Frequency
Point <1.4E-07 <3.5E-08 <3.5E-08 <3.5E-08 <3.5E-08 NA
Estimate of
Risk
FFTF liquid metal Consequences 2.4E-07 NA NA NA NA NA
fire in fuel
storage
Annual <1E-04 NA NA NA NA NA
Frequency
Point <2.9E-11 NA NA NA NA NA
Estimate of
Risk
Multi-Purpose Facilities:
324 Building Consequences (b) NA NA NA NA NA
Seismic evente
Annual 4E-04 NA NA NA NA NA
Frequency
Point (b) NA NA NA NA NA
Estimate of
Risk
325 Building Consequences 1.0E-01 NA NA NA NA NA
Seismic event
Annual 2E-04 NA NA NA NA NA
Frequency
Point 2.0E-05 NA NA NA NA NA
Estimate of
Risk
308 Building Consequences 5.2E-06 NA NA 5.2E-06 NA NA
Fuel transfer
accident
Annual <1E-02 NA NA <1E-02 NA NA
Frequency
Point <5.2E-08 NA NA <5.2E-08 NA NA
Estimate of
Risk
Table 5.15-1. (contd)
Accident Attribute No Action Decentralization 1992/1993 Regionalization Centralization Regionalization
Description Planning Basis at Hanford or Centralization
- Other Site
A B
New dry storage - Consequences NAa 9.4E-02 9.4E-02 9.4E-02 9.4E-02 9.4E-02 9.4E-02
cask impact & fire
Annual NA 6E-06 6E-06 6E-06 7E-06 8E-06 5E-06
Frequency
Point NA 5.6E-07 5.6E-07 5.6E-07 6.6E-07 7.5E-07 4.7E-07
Estimate of
Risk
New SNF process - Consequences NA 8.3E-08 8.3E-08 8.3E-08 8.3E-08 8.3E-08 8.3E-08
U metal fire
Annual NA <1.0E-04 <1.0E-04 <1.0E-04 <1.0E- <1.0E-04 <1.0E-04
Frequency 04
Point NA <8.3E-12 <8.3E-12 <8.3E-12 <8.3E- <8.3E-12 <8.3E-12
Estimate of 12
Risk
New ECF Consequences NA NA NA NA (c) (c) NA
Annual NA NA NA NA -d - NA
Frequency
Point NA NA NA NA - - NA
Estimate of
Risk
a. NA = Not applicable.
b. The dose from this scenario (1.1E + 03) rem is sufficiently high that application of a fatal cancer risk factor is
inappropriate.
c. See Appendix D for consequences of accidents at this facility.
d. Dash indicates that the information was not available.
e. The consequences associated with this accident are a result of existing contamination in the 324 Building hot cells, and
neither its likelihood nor its severity depend on the presence of spent nuclear fuel at the facility. The actual contribution
of spent nuclear fuel to releases from the accident is assumed to be negligible compared with that of other sources.
Table 5.15-2. Radiological accidents, general population - 80 km latent cancer fatalities, 95% meteorology.
Accident Attribute No Action Decentralization 1992/1993 Regionalization Centralization Regionalization
Description Planning A, B at Hanford or Centralization
Basis - Other Site
SNF
Facilities:
Wet Storage Consequences 6.9E+00 3.0E+00 3.0E+00 3.0E+00 3.0E+00 NAa
Fuel Cask
Drop
Annual <1.0E-04 <1.0E-04 <1.0E-04 <1.0E-04 <1.0E-04 NA
Frequency
Point Estimate <6.9E-04 <3.0E-04 <3.0E-04 <3.0E-04 <3.0E-04 NA
of Risk
FFTF Consequences 3.2E+01 NA NA NA NA NA
Liquid
Metal Fire
in Fuel
Storage
Annual <1.0E-04 NA NA NA NA NA
Frequency
Point Estimate <3.2E-03 NA NA NA NA NA
of Risk
Multipurpose Facilities:
324 Consequences 9.7E+02 NA NA NA NA NA
Building
Seismic
Evente
Annual 4E-04 NA NA NA NA NA
Frequency
Point Estimate 3.9E-01 NA NA NA NA NA
of Risk
325 Consequences 2.0E+00 NA NA NA NA NA
Building
Seismic
Event
Annual 2E-04 NA NA NA NA NA
Frequency
Point Estimate 4.0E-04 NA NA NA NA NA
of Risk
308 Consequences NEb NA NA NE NA NA
Building
Fuel
Transfer
Accident
Annual <1.0E-02 NA NA -c NA NA
Frequency
Point Estimate - NA NA - NA NA
of Risk
Table 5.15-2. (contd)
Accident Attribute No Action Decentralization 1992/1993 Regionalization Centralization Regionalization
Description Planning at Hanford or Centralization
Basis - Other Site
A B
New dry Consequences NA 8.1E+01 8.1E+01 8.1E+01 8.1E+01 8.1E+01 8.1E+01
storage -
cask impact
& fire
Annual NA 6E-06 6E-06 6E-06 7E-06 8E-06 5E-06
Frequency
Point Estimate NA 4.9E-04 4.9E-04 4.9E-04 5.7E-04 6.5E-04 4.1E-04
of Risk
New SNF Consequences NA 6.4E-02 6.4E-02 6.4E-02 -c 6.4E-02 6.4E-02
process -
U metal
fire
Annual NA <1.0E-04 <1.0E-04 <1.0E-04 - <1.0E-04 <1.0E-04
Frequency
Point Estimate NA <6.4E-06 <6.4E-06 <6.4E-06 - <6.4E-06 <6.4E-06
of Risk
New ECF Consequences NA NA NA NA - (d) NA
Annual NA NA NA NA - - NA
Frequency
Point Estimate NA NA NA NA - - NA
of Risk
a. NA = Not applicable.
b. NE = Collective dose not evaluated for this scenario.
c. Dash indicates that the information was not available.
d. See Appendix D for consequences.
e. The consequences associated with this accident are a result of existing contamination in the 324 Building hot
cells, and neither its likelihood nor its severity depend on the presence of SNF at the facility. The actual
contribution of SNF to releases from the accident is assumed to be negligible compared with that of other sources.
Table 5.15-3. Radiological accidents, general population - 80 km latent cancer fatalities, 50% meteorology.
Accident Attribute No Action Decentralization 199219/93 Regionalization Centralization Regionalization
Description Planning A, B at Hanford or Centralization
Basis - Other Site
SNF
Facilities:
Wet storage Consequences 4.0E-01 1.9E-01 1.9E-01 1.9E-01 1.9E-01 NAa
- fuel cask
drop
Annual <1.0E-04 <1.0E-04 <1.0E-04 <1.0E-04 <1.0E-04 NA
Frequency
Point Estimate <4.0E-05 <1.9E-05 <1.9E-05 <1.9E-05 <1.9E-05 NA
of Risk
FFTF liquid Consequences 3.8E+00 NA NA NA NA NA
metal fire
in fuel
storage
Annual <1.0E-04 NA NA NA NA NA
Frequency
Point Estimate <3.8E-04 NA NA NA NA NA
of Risk
Multipurpose Facilities:
324 Consequences 1.0E+02 NA NA NA NA NA
Building
Seismic
Evente
Annual 4E-04 NA NA NA NA NA
Frequency
Point Estimate 4.0E-02 NA NA NA NA NA
of Risk
325 Consequences 2.3E-01 NA NA NA NA NA
Building
Seismic
Event
Annual 2E-04 NA NA NA NA NA
Frequency
Point Estimate 4.6E-05 NA NA NA NA NA
of Risk
308 Consequences NEb NA NA NE NA NA
Building Annual <1.0E-02 NA NA -c NA NA
fuel Frequency - NA NA - NA NA
transfer Point Estimate
accident of Risk
Table 5.15-3. (contd)
Accident Attribute No Action Decentralization 1992/1993 Regionalization Centralization Regionalization
Description Planning at Hanford or Centralization
Basis - Other Site
A B
New dry Consequences NA 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
storage -
cask impact
& fire
Annual NA 6E-06 6E-06 6E-06 7E-06 8E-06 5E-06
Frequency
Point Estimate NA 2.4E-05 2.4E-05 2.4E-05 2.8E- 3.2E-05 2.0E-05
of Risk 05
New SNF Consequences NA 4.6E-03 4.6E-03 4.6E-03 4.6E- 4.6E-03 4.6E-03
process - 03
U metal
fire
Annual NA <1.0E-04 <1.0E-04 <1.0E-04 <1.0E- <1.0E-04 <1.0E-04
Frequency 04
Point Estimate NA <4.6E-07 <4.6E-07 <4.6E-07 <4.6E- <4.6E-07 <4.6E-07
of Risk 07
New ECF Consequences NA NA NA NA (d) (d) NA
Annual NA NA NA NA - - NA
Frequency
Point Estimate NA NA NA NA - - NA
of Risk
a. NA = Not applicable.
b. NE = Collective dose not evaluated for this scenario.
c. Dash indicates that the information was not available.
d. See Appendix D for consequences of accidents at this facility.
e. The consequences associated with this accident are a result of existing contamination in the 324 Building hot
cells, and neither its likelihood nor its severity depend on the presence of SNF at the facility. The actual
contribution of SNF to releases from the accident is assumed to be negligible compared with that of other sources.
Table 5.15-4. Radiological accidents, nearest public access - individual probability of latent cancer fatality.
Accident Attribute No Action Decentralization 1992/1993 Regionalization Centralization Regionalization
Description Planning A, B at Hanford or Centralization
Basis - Other Site
SNF
Facilities:
Wet storage Consequences 1.3E-03 3.1E-05 3.1E-05 3.1E-05 3.1E-05 NAa
fuel cask
drop
Annual <1E-04 <1E-04 <1E-04 <1E-04 <1E-04 NA
Frequency
Point <1.3E-07 <3.1E-09 <3.1E-09 <3.1E-09 <3.1E-09 NA
Estimate of
Risk
FFTF liquid Consequences 1.2E-07 NA NA NA NA NA
metal
fire in
fuel
storage
Annual <1E-04 NA NA NA NA NA
Frequency
Point <1.2E-11 NA NA NA NA NA
Estimate of
Risk
Multipurpose facilities:
324 Consequences 1.9E-01 NA NA NA NA NA
Building
Seismic
Eventd
Annual 4E-04 NA NA NA NA NA
Frequency
Point 7.6E-05 NA NA NA NA NA
Estimate of
Risk
325 Consequences 6.3E-03 NA NA NA NA NA
Building
seismic
event
Annual 2E-04 NA NA NA NA NA
Frequency
Point 1.3E-06 NA NA NA NA NA
Estimate of
Risk
308 Consequences 4.3E-07 NA NA 4.3E-07 NA NA
Building
fuel
transfer
accident
Annual <1E-02 NA NA <1E-02 NA NA
Frequency
Point <4.3E-09 NA NA <4.3E-09 NA NA
Estimate of
Risk
Table 5.15-4. (contd)
Accident Attribute No Action Decentralization 1992/1993 Regionalization Centralization Regionalization or
Description Planning at Hanford Centralization -
Basis Other Site
A B
New dry Consequences NA 3.8E-05 3.8E-05 3.8E-05 3.8E-05 3.8E-05 3.8E-05
storage -
cask impact
and fire
Annual NA 6E-06 6E-06 6E-06 7E-06 8E-06 5E-06
Frequency
Point NA 2.3E-10 2.3E-10 2.3E-10 2.7E-10 3.0E-10 1.9E-10
Estimate of
Risk
New SNF Consequences NA 2.2E-08 2.2E-08 2.2E-08 2.2E-08 2.2E-08 2.2E-08
process -
U metal fire
Annual NA <1.0E-04 <1.0E-04 <1.0E- <1.0E- <1.0E-04 <1.0E-04
Frequency 04 04
Point NA <2.2E-12 <2.2E-12 <2.2E- <2.2E- <2.2E-12 <2.2E-12
Estimate of 12 12
Risk
New ECF Consequences NA NA NA NA (c) (c) NA
Annual NA NA NA NA - - NA
Frequency
Point NA NA NA NA - - NA
Estimate of
Risk
a. NA = Not applicable.
b. See Appendix D for consequences of accidents at this facility.
c. The consequences associated with this accident are a result of existing contamination in the 324 Building hot
cells, and neither its likelihood nor its severity depend on the presence of SNF at the facility. The actual
contribution of SNF to releases from the accident is assumed to be negligible compared with that of other sources.
Table 5.15-5. Maximum exposed offsite individual - probability of latent cancer fatality.
Accident Attribute No Action Decentralization 1992/1993 Regionalization Centralization Regionalization or
Description Planning A, B at Hanford Centralization -
Basis Other Site
SNF
Facilities:
Wet storage Consequences 2.5E-04a 1.8E-04 1.8E-04 1.8E-04 1.8E-04 NAb
fuel cask
drop
Annual <1E-04 <1E-04 <1E-04 <1E-04 <1E-04 NA
Frequency
Point <2.5E-08 <1.8E-08 <1.8E-08 <1.8E-08 <1.8E-08 NA
Estimate of
Risk
FFTF liquid Consequences 2.5E-04a NA NA NA NA NA
metal Fire
in fuel
storage
Annual <1E-04 NA NA NA NA NA
Frequency
Point 2.5E-08 NA NA NA NA NA
Estimate of
Risk
Multipurpose Facilities:
324 Building Consequences 2.5E-04a NA NA NA NA NA
Seismic
Eventd
Annual 4E-04 NA NA NA NA NA
Frequency
Point 1.0E-07 NA NA NA NA NA
Estimate of
Risk
325 Building Consequences 2.5E-04a NA NA NA NA NA
Seismic
Event
Annual 2E-04 NA NA NA NA NA
Frequency
Point 5.0E-08 NA NA NA NA NA
Estimate of
Risk
308 Building Consequences 4.3E-08 NA NA 4.3E-08 NA NA
fuel
transfer
accident
Annual <1E-02 NA NA <1E-02 NA NA
Frequency
Point 4.3E-10 NA NA 4.3E-10 NA NA
Estimate of
Risk
Table 5.15-5. (contd)
Accident Attribute No Action Decentralization 1992/1993 Regionalization Centralization Regionalization or
Description Planning at Hanford Centralization -
Basis Other Site
A B
New dry Consequences NA 2.5E-04 2.5E-04 2.5E-04 2.5E-04 2.5E-04 2.5E-04
storage -
cask impact
& fire
Annual NA 6E-06 6E-06 6E-06 7E-06 8E-06 5E-06
Frequency
Point NA 1.5E-09 1.5E-09 1.5E-09 1.8E-09 2.0E-09 1.2E-09
Estimate of
Risk
New SNF Consequences NA 3.4E-06 3.4E-06 3.4E-06 3.4E-06 3.4E-06 3.4E-06
process -
U metal fire
Annual NA <1.0E-04 <1.0E-04 <1.0E- <1.0E- <1.0E-04 <1.0E-04
Frequency 04 04
Point NA <3.4E-10 <3.4E-10 <3.4E- <3.4E- <3.4E-10 <3.4E-10
Estimate of 10 10
Risk
New ECF Consequences NA NA NA NA (c) (c) NA
Annual NA NA NA NA - - NA
Frequency
Point NA NA NA NA - - NA
Estimate of
Risk
a. The offsite dose from this accident is assumed to be limited to 0.5 rem by application of protective action
guidelines. Potential dose without protective action is 1.4 rem for 105-K Basin Cask drop, 5400 rem for 324 Building
seismic event, 16 rem for 325 Building seismic event, and 5 rem for FFTF liquid metal fire.
b. NA = Not applicable.
c. See Appendix D for consequences of accidents at this facility.
d. The consequences associated with this accident are a result of existing contamination in the 324 Building hot
cells, and neither its likelihood nor its severity depend on the presence of SNF at the facility. The actual
contribution of SNF to releases from the accident is assumed to be negligible compared with that of other sources.
accidents in the other alternatives because the frequencies were adjusted to
account for the quantity of fuel handled in each option (See Tables 5.15-1
through 5.15-5). Under subalternatives A and B, the types of accidents and
their consequences would be the same as those for the decentralization
alternative. However, the frequencies (and therefore the risks), would differ
in some cases because of the volume of imported fuel that would be placed into
dry storage. For subalternative C, all fuel currently at Hanford would be
transported to another site, and the risks would be identical to those in the
centralization minimum alternative.
5.15.5.5 Centralization Alternative. The Centralization Alternative
consists of two options at Hanford: a minimum option in which all DOE spent
fuel at Hanford is transported offsite to another location for interim
storage, and a maximum option that would result in storage of all DOE spent
fuel at Hanford. Accident scenarios for the minimum option would include
those discussed under the No Action Alternative prior to shipment of the fuel
offsite. In addition, defense reactor fuel would be processed and repackaged
in a new facility prior to shipment. The risks associated with this new
facility are expected to be similar to the processing facility discussed under
the Decentralization Alternative. The cask impact accident at a dry storage
facility has been included in this option to account for handling of fuel
prior to shipment from Hanford.
The maximum option contains suboptions for wet or dry fuel storage with
processing similar to those for the Decentralization Alternative, and the
consequences are expected to be essentially the same as those described
previously. The frequency of the cask impact at a dry storage facility has
been increased to account for additional fuel that would be handled at Hanford
under this option. The only other installation that would be included in this
option is the Expended Core Facility (ECF), which would be relocated from
INEL. The consequences of accidents at this facility are discussed in Volume
1, Appendix D of this EIS, and are not described here. Note that the accident
analysis for the ECF in Appendix D incorporates different assumptions than
those used for other Hanford facilities in this section, and the two sets of
results are not directly comparable. The consequences of ECF accidents at
Hanford using assumptions consistent with those in this section would be
higher than those reported in Appendix D.
5.15.6 Secondary Impacts of Radiological Accidents
Secondary impacts of radiological accidents have been evaluated
qualitatively for this analysis. Accidents that resulted in doses to the
maximally exposed offsite resident of less than 100 millirem were considered
to have little or no secondary impact because the levels of environ-
mental contamination in these cases would be relatively small. Accidents that exceed
this level may have secondary impacts with severity depending on the expected
levels of environmental contamination. Although the levels of environmental
contamination were not assessed quantitatively for this analysis, the offsite
individual dose provides a measure of the air concentration and radionuclide
deposition at the receptor location and can be used as a semi-quantitative
estimate of the level of environmental contamination from a given accident.
The estimated secondary consequences of maximum reasonably foreseeable SNF
facility accidents are presented in Table 5.15-6.
5.15.7 Nonradiological Accident Analysis
For purposes of the EIS, a worst case accident scenario was developed for
each existing and planned facility. The details of the nonradiological
accident scenario are presented in Attachment A, and the information is
summarized in this section. The accident assumes that a chemical spill occurs
within a building and is followed by an environmental release from the normal
exhaust system. It is assumed that the building remains intact but
containment measures fail, allowing releases occur through the ventilation
system. It is assumed that all, or a portion of, the entire inventory of
toxic chemicals stored in each building is spilled. The environmental
releases are modeled, and the hypothetical concentrations at three receptor
locations are compared to toxicological limits.
Several chemical inventory and chemical emissions lists are provided by
alternative and facility (Bergsman 1995). Effects to onsite workers, the
nearest point of public access, and the public at the nearest offsite
residence were estimated using the computer model EPIcode (DOE 1993b).
Results from the EPIcode model were compared to available Emergency Response
Planning Guideline (ERPG) values, Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health
(IDLH) values, and Threshold Limit Values/Time Weighted Averages (TLV/TWA).
In the absence of these values, toxicological data for similar health
endpoints, from the Registry of Toxic Effects for Chemical Substances (RTEC)
are used.
The results of the accident scenario for each alternative are presented in
Table 5.15-8. As a general statement, in the event of an accident, the
existing 105-KE and 105-KW facilities and the proposed new wet storage
facility present the predominant risk for chemical exposure.
Under the No Action Alternative there is a potential for irreversible
health effects to occur in the 308, 324, 325 A and B buildings, while nitric
acid is a potential odor and irritation problem from both of the proposed fuel
stabilization alternatives.
5.15.7.1 No Action Alternative. A baseline of chemicals kept in spent
nuclear storage facilities was developed from chemical inventories for these
facilities compiled to comply with the Emergency Planning and Community Right-
To-Know Act (EPCRA). The existing storage facilities include 105-KE, 105-KW,
PUREX (202A), T-Plant (221T), 2736-ZB Building, 200-West low-level burial
grounds, FFTF 403 Building, 308 Building, 324 Building, 325 A&B Building, and
327 Building. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA)
lists used are from 1992.
Because most facilities have various missions, the need to have a supply
of chemicals at these facilities may not be related to the storage of SNFs.
However for purposes of the EIS, the assumption is made that the existing
inventories represents the anticipated amounts and types of chemicals which
may be needed in the future.
The results of the accident scenario under conditions of the No Action
Alternative are presented in Table 5.15-7.
5.15.7.2 Decentralization Alternative. The Decentralization Alternative
involves construction of several new facilities at Hanford, including new dry
storage for spent fuel, or a combination of new wet and dry storage. Options
are also included for several types of fuel processing prior to storage. The
consequences of new facilities are based on previously evaluated accidents for
similar installations, adapted for the conditions and locations of these facilities
as assumed in this EIS.
The baseline chemical inventory for the proposed facilities is primarily
derived from the facility costs section in the engineering design data
(Bergsman 1995). However, the wet storage facility uses the 105-KE Basin as a
surrogate for a baseline chemical inventory because the facility cost section
lists only two chemicals, sodium hydroxide and sulfuric acid.
Table 5.15-6. Assessment of secondary impacts of accidents for the No-Action Alternative.
Environmental or Social Factor
Accident Biotic Water Economic National Environmental Endangered Land Treaty Rights,
Description Resources Resources Impacts Defense Contamination Species Use Cultural
Resources,
Native Cultures
Accidents with frequencies y10-3 per year
308 Building a a a a a a a a
(fuel
handling
accident)
Accidents with frequencies <10-3 per year
324 Building Potential Potential Possible None May be None Restricti Possible
(seismic local temporary loss of antici- extensive in anticipated on on use temporary
event) effects closure of crops, pated vicinity of of restrictions on
on Hanford cost facility and adjacent access to
individ- Reach of incurred adjacent land for traditional
Columbia for offsite areas agricultu fishing sites
uals River to clean-up re, and
of some boat of
species traffic, Columbia
restrictio River
n of water islands,
use pending
locally radiologi
(Richland, cal
Pasco) survey
325 Building b b b b b b b b
(seismic
event)
FFTF fuel b b b b b b b b
storage
(liquid
metal fire)
105-K wet b b b b b b b b
storage
(cask drop)
200-W burial b b b b b b b b
ground (cask
impact &
fire)
327 Building b b b b b b b b
(hot
cell fire)
T-plant a a a a a a a a
(fuel
damage)
a. Consequences of this accident would be limited to very local onsite impact only, if any.
b. Consequences of this accident would be similar in nature to those of the 324 building or new dry
storage facility (worst case) accidents; however they would be less severe because offsite concentrations
would be lower by at least two orders of magnitude.
The results of the accident scenario under conditions of the
Decentralization Alternative are presented in Table 5.15-8.
5.15.7.3 1992/93 Planning Basis Alternative. Accidents and consequences
would be essentially the same as for the Decentralization Alternative.
5.15.7.4 Regionalization Alternative. Except for Regionalization Option
C, which would be essentially the same as the Centralization Alternative
minimum case, accidents and consequences for options A, B1, and B2 would be
essentially the same as for the Decentralization Alternative. The quantity of
nondefense fuels placed into dry storage would not affect the potential for
releases of hazardous chemicals because no such materials are present in the
dry storage facilities.
5.15.7.5 Centralization Onsite Alternative. The Centralization Onsite
Alternative consists of consolidating all spent fuel at the Hanford site.
Options are available for wet or dry fuel storage with processing similar
to those for the Decentralization Alternative. The consequences are expected to
be essentially the same as those described for the first 5 years of the
No Action Alternative, and then they are the same as those described for the
Decentralization Alternative.
The results of the accident scenario under conditions of the No Action and
Decentralization Alternatives are presented in Table 5.15-8.
5.15.7.6 Centralization Offsite Alternative. The Centralization Offsite
Alternative consists of transporting all DOE SNF at Hanford offsite to another
location for interim storage. Fuel would be stabilized prior to shipment in a
fuel drying and passivation facility. Therefore the impacts from this
alternative are the same as those for the No Action Alternative for the first
5 years, and then they are the same as those described for the fuel drying and
passivation facility.
The results of the accident scenario under conditions of the No Action
Alternative and the fuel drying and passivation facility are presented in
Table 5.15-8.
Table 5.15-7. Assessment of secondary impacts of accidents for the Decentralization, 1992/1993 Planning
Basis, Regionalization, and
Centralization Alternatives.
Environmental or Social Factor
Accident Biotic Water Economic National Environmental Endangered Land Treaty Rights/
Description Resources Resources Impacts Defense Contamination Species Use Cultural
Resources/
Native Cultures
New dry Minimal Possible Clean-up None Moderate in None Temporary Possible
storage local temporary costs antici- immediate antici- restricti temporary
(cask impact effects restrictio locally, pated environs & pated on on restriction
with fire) n of use potential offsite agricultu on access to
of loss of re traditional
Columbia crops pending fishing sites
River for radiologi
recreation cal
survey
New process a a a a a a a a
facility (U
metal fire)
New wet b b b b b b b b
storage
(cask drop)
a. Consequences of this accident would be limited to very local onsite impact only, if any.
b. Consequences of this accident would be similar in nature to those of the 324 building or new dry
storage facility (worst case) accidents; however they would be less severe because offsite concentrations
would be lower by at least two orders of magnitude.
5.15.8 Construction and Occupational Accidents
Table 5.15-9 shows the predicted number of injuries, illnesses, and
fatalities among workers from construction activities and operations
activities for each alternative. Injury, illness, and fatality counts for
construction workers are presented separately because of the relatively more
hazardous nature of construction work.
Decentralization suboptions P and Q represent the highest predicted
construction and occupational accident count of any of the alternatives. The
higher number of accidents is attributable to increased construction and fuel
processing required by these alternatives. The Centralization Onsite
Alternative has accident counts similar to those for suboptions P and Q. The
lowest accident counts are for the No Action Alternative and the
Centralization Offsite Alternative. All other alternative are similar in
their predicted accident counts.
5.16 Cumulative Impacts Including Past and Reasonably Foreseeable
Actions
Cumulative impacts associated with implementing the alternatives for
interim storage of SNF at the Hanford Site together with impacts from past and
reasonably foreseeable future actions are described in the following
subsections.
5.16.1 No Action Alternative
Cumulative impacts associated with implementation of the No Action
Alternative are described in the following subsections.
5.16.1.1 Land Use. The Hanford Site consists of about 1450 square
kilometers (360,000 acres), of which about 87 square kilometers (22,000 acres)
have been disturbed. Implementation of the No Action Alternative would not
change that land use. Construction of the Environmental Restoration Disposal
Facility will require disturbance of approximately 4.1 square kilometers
(1.020 acres) of land. However, restoration of existing disturbed sites will
compensate for this loss.
Table 5.15-8. Nonradiological exposure to public and workers to chemicals in spent nuclear fuel storage
locations released
during an accident.
Alternative/ Worker Exposure at Exposure at ERPG 1a or ERPG 2b or ERPG 3c or
Facility/ Exposure Nearest Public Nearest Public TLV/TWA 0.1 IDLH IDLH
Chemical mg/m3 Access mg/m3 Residence mg/m3 mg/m3 mg/m3 mg/m3
No Action
105-KE
chlorine 4.30 4.30 0.13 2.9d 8.7 58
PCB 23.00 23.00 0.66 0.5 0.5 5
sodium hydroxide 140.00 140.00 0.40 2 20 200
sulfuric acid 220.00 220.00 6.40 2 10 30
105-KW
chlorine 4.30 4.30 0.13 2.9 8.7 58
ethylene glycol 2.40 2.40 0.07 127 300 3000
kerosene 15.00 0.86 0.43 100 500 5000
polyacrylamide 4.20 0.24 0.12 0.03 400 4000
sodium hydroxide 140.00 140.00 0.40 2 20 200
sulfuric acid 220.00 220.00 6.40 2 10 30
PUREX (202A)
cadmium nitrate 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 10.5 105
tetrahydrate
diesel fuel 1.80 1.70 1.10 7 170 1700
mercury 7.20E-04 6.90E-04 4.30E-04 0.01 1 10
methanol 2.10E-04 2.00E-04 1.30E-04 262 3276 32760
PCB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.5 0.5 5
sodium hydroxide 0.03 0.03 0.01 2 20 200
sodium nitrite 0.04 0.04 0.03 96 960 9600
T-Plant (221T)
potassium permanganate 0.01 0.00 0.00 2 10 30
sodium 0.10 0.01 0.00 2 20 200
sodium hydroxide 0.02 0.01 0.00 2 20 200
sodium nitrite 0.05 0.00 0.00 96 960 9600
FFTF (403 Building)
sodium 67.00 24.00 0.83 2 20 200
sodium potassium alloy 5.40 2.70 0.39 2 20 200
308 Building
acetone 0.03 0.02 0.01 1780 2000 20000
ethylene glycol 70.00 57.00 37.00 127 300 3000
x-ray film (Ag) 88.00 0.77 0.36 0.01 62 620
Table 5.15-8 (contd)
Alternative/ Worker Exposure at Exposure at ERPG 1a or ERPG 2b or ERPG 3c or
Facility/ Exposure Nearest Public Nearest Public TLV/TWA 0.1 IDLH IDLH
Chemical mg/m3 Access mg/m3 Residence mg/m3 mg/m3 mg/m3 mg/m3
324 Bldg
alkyl dimethyl benzyl 29.00 1.90 0.24 10 13 130
ammonium
bis-tri-n-butyltin 38.00 2.40 0.31 0.1 20 200
oxide
poly oedmi ethylene 82.00 5.20 0.68 40 400 4000
dichloride
325 Building
mercury 3.20 0.20 0.03 0.01 1 10
poly oedmi ethylene 21.00 1.30 0.17 40 400 4000
dichloride
zinc 0.04 0.00 0.00 5 12.4 124
327 Building
poly oedmi ethylene 0.05 0.01 0.04 40 400 4000
dichloride
Decentralization
Suboption W
Wet Storage Facility
chlorine 0.75 0.10 0.04 2.9 8.7 58
PCB 3.90 0.54 0.20 0.5 0.5 5
sodium hydroxide 36.00 1.10 0.06 2 20 200
sulfuric acid 39.00 5.30 2.00 2 10 30
Vault Dry Storage
Facility
no chemicals of
concern
Decentralization
Suboption X
Wet Storage Facility
chlorine 0.75 0.10 0.04 2.9 8.7 58
PCB 3.90 0.54 0.20 0.5 0.5 5
sodium hydroxide 36.00 1.10 0.06 2 20 200
sulfuric acid 39.00 5.30 2.00 2 10 30
Casks Dry Storage
Facility
no chemicals of
concern
Decentralization
Suboption Y
Vault Dry Storage
Facility
no chemicals of
concern
Shear\Leach\Calcine
Stabilization Facility
diesel fuel 0.42 0.40 0.26 7 170 1700
nitric acid 21.00 20.00 13.00 2 25.8 258
sodium hydroxide 0.86 0.73 0.20 2 20 200
sodium nitrite 0.11 0.10 0.06 96 960 9600
sulfuric acid 0.53 0.51 0.32 2 10 30
Table 5.15-8 (contd)
Alternative/ Worker Exposure at Exposure at ERPG 1a or ERPG 2b or ERPG 3c or
Facility/ Exposure Nearest Public Nearest Public TLV/TWA 0.1 IDLH IDLH
Chemical mg/m3 Access mg/m3 Residence mg/m3 mg/m3 mg/m3 mg/m3
Decentralization
Suboption Z
Casks Dry Storage
Facility
no chemicals of
concern
Shear\Leach\Calcine
Stabilization Facility
diesel fuel 0.42 0.40 0.26 7 170 1700
nitric acid 21.00 20.00 13.00 2 25.8 258
sodium hydroxide 0.86 0.73 0.20 2 20 200
sodium nitrite 0.11 0.10 0.06 96 960 9600
sulfuric acid 0.53 0.51 0.32 2 10 30
Decentralization
Suboption P
105-KE
chlorine 4.30 4.30 0.13 2.9 8.7 58
PCB 23.00 23.00 0.66 0.5 0.5 5
sodium hydroxide 140.00 140.00 0.40 2 20 200
sulfuric acid 220.00 220.00 6.40 2 10 30
105-KW
chlorine 4.30 4.30 0.13 2.9 8.7 58
ethylene glycol 2.40 2.40 0.07 127 300 3000
kerosene 15.00 0.86 0.43 100 500 5000
polyacrylamide 4.20 0.24 0.12 0.03 400 4000
sodium hydroxide 140.00 140.00 0.40 2 20 200
sulfuric acid 220.00 220.00 6.40 2 10 30
Shear\Leach\Calcine
Stabilization Facility
diesel fuel 0.42 0.40 0.26 7 170 1700
nitric acid 21.00 20.00 13.00 2 25.8 258
sodium hydroxide 0.86 0.73 0.20 2 20 200
sodium nitrite 0.11 0.10 0.06 96 960 9600
sulfuric acid 0.53 0.51 0.32 2 10 30
Decentralization
Suboption Q
105-KE
chlorine 4.30 4.30 0.13 2.9 8.7 58
PCB 23.00 23.00 0.66 0.5 0.5 5
sodium hydroxide 140.00 140.00 0.40 2 20 200
sulfuric acid 220.00 220.00 6.40 2 10 30
Table 5.15-8 (contd)
Alternative/ Worker Exposure at Exposure at ERPG 1a or ERPG 2b or ERPG 3c or
Facility/ Exposure Nearest Public Nearest Public TLV/TWA 0.1 IDLH IDLH
Chemical mg/m3 Access mg/m3 Residence mg/m3 mg/m3 mg/m3 mg/m3
105-KW
chlorine 4.30 4.30 0.13 2.9 8.7 58
ethylene glycol 2.40 2.40 0.07 127 300 3000
kerosene 15.00 0.86 0.43 100 500 5000
polyacrylamide 4.20 0.24 0.12 0.03 400 4000
sodium hydroxide 140.00 140.00 0.40 2 20 200
sulfuric acid 220.00 220.00 6.40 2 10 30
Solvent Extraction
Fuel Stabilization
Facility
cadmium nitrate 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 10.5 105
tetrahydrate
diesel fuel 0.42 0.40 0.26 7 170 1700
hydrazine 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.13 10.5 104.8
kerosene 0.84 0.81 0.51 100 500 5000
nitric acid 21.00 20.00 13.00 5.2 25.8 258
potassium permanganate 0.00 0.00 0.00 2 10 30
sodium hydroxide 0.86 0.73 0.20 2 20 200
sodium nitrite 0.11 0.10 0.06 96 960 9600
sulfuric acid 0.53 0.51 0.32 2 10 30
1992/1993 Planning
Basis
same as
Decentralization
Regionalization
same as
Decentralization
Centralization Onsite
same as No Action for
first 5 years, then
same as
Decentralization
Centralization Offsite
same as No Action for
first 5 years, then
same as fuel drying
and passivation
facility
Fuel Drying and
Passivation Facility
diesel fuel 0.42 0.40 0.26 7 170 1700
Table 5.15-8 (contd)
Alternative/ Worker Exposure at Exposure at ERPG 1a or ERPG 2b or ERPG 3c or
Facility/ Exposure Nearest Public Nearest Public TLV/TWA 0.1 IDLH IDLH
Chemical mg/m3 Access mg/m3 Residence mg/m3 mg/m3 mg/m3 mg/m3
sodium hydroxide 0.09 0.07 0.02 2 20 200
sodium nitrite 0.11 0.10 0.06 96 960 9600
sulfuric acid 0.53 0.51 0.32 2 10 30
a. Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG) value 1 (irritation or odor), or Threshold Limit
Values/Time Weighted Averages (TLV/TWA), or value for a similar toxicological end point from toxicological
data in the Registry of Toxic Effects for Chemical Substances (RTEC).
b. ERPG 2 (irreversible health effects), or 0.1 of Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH), or
value for a similar toxicological end point from toxicological data in RTEC.
c. ERPG 3 (death), IDLH, or value for a similar toxicological end point from toxicological data in RTEC.
d. Bold italic type indicates that the toxicological limit was exceeded at one or more exposure points.
Table 5.15-9. Estimated injuries, illnesses, and fatalities of workers expected
during construction and operation of facilities in each alternative (cumulative
totals through 2035).
Construction Workersa Operations Workersa Total Workers
Alternative Injury & Fatalities Injury & Fatalities Injury & Fatalities
illness (persons) illness (persons) illness (persons)
(persons) (persons) (persons)
No Actionb 0 0 231 0 231 0
Decentralization
Suboption W 54 0 83 0 137 0
Suboption X 49 0 84 0 133 0
Suboption Yc 79 0 69 0 148 0
Suboption Zc 48 0 69 0 117 0
Suboption Pc 183 0 84 0 267 0
Suboption Qc 223 0 139 0 362 1
1992/3 Planning same as Decentralization
Basis
Regionalization
Suboption AX 38 0 82 0 120 0
Suboption AYc 74 0 69 0 143 0
Suboption AZc 37 0 69 0 106 0
Suboption B1d 99 0 109 0 208 0
Suboption B2d 211 0 136 0 347 1
Suboptions C same as Centralization offsite
Centralization 285 0 205 0 490 1
Onsited
Centralization 154 0 84 0 238 0
Offsite
a. Facility construction and operation estimates are based on DOE and DOE
contractor accident rates (See Volume 2, Part B, Table F-4-7 of this EIS).
b. Worker year estimates from Bergsman (1995).
c. Dry storage suboptions (Y or Z) would be paired with either of two processing
options
(P or Q).
d. These estimates represent incremental increases for fuel imported from offsite
locations only; estimates for storage (and stabilization where required) of onsite
fuel woule be the same as in the Decentralization Alternative.
5.16.1.2 Air Quality. Air quality limits (WAC 173-470-030,-100) at the
Hanford Site boundary are not expected to be approached as a result of
implementing the No Action Alternative or from reasonably foreseeable
additions to the Hanford Site, e.g., construction and operation of a Laser
Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory or from decommissioning of
unused facilities or site restoration activities.
5.16.1.3 Waste Management. Under the No Action Alternative, there
would be a continuing generation of about 100 cubic meters of low-level wastes
per year from incidental activities and about 530 cubic meters during
containerization of SNF and sludge in the 100-K Area basins. All presently
anticipated activities on the Hanford Site would result in approximately
20,000 cubic meters of low-level waste per year. Thus, at a maximum, the
total quantity of low-level waste from SNF activities would account for about
5 percent of the annual quantity of low-level waste generated at the Hanford
Site.
5.16.1.4 Socioeconomics. Under the No Action Alternative, the SNF
workforce would remain the same, about 60 workers. The Hanford Site workforce
is expected to drop from about 18,700 in 1995 to 14,700 in 1997 and to remain
approximately at 14,700 through 2004. The regional workforce is expected to
range from 81,000, to 86,000 in that same period.
5.16.1.5 Occupational and Public Health. The cumulative population
dose since plant startup was estimated to be about 100,000 person-rem
(estimated to one significant figure; Section 4.12.2.4.2). The number of
inferred fatal cancers since plant startup would amount to about 50
(essentially all of which would be attributed to dose received in the 1945-52
time frame). In the 50 years since plant startup, the population of interest
(assuming a constant population of 380,000 and an individual dose of about 0.3
rem/year) would have received about 5,000,000 person-rem from naturally
occurring radiation sources (natural background) which would relate to about
2,500 latent cancer fatalities. In the same 50 years about 27,000 cancer
fatalities from all causes would have been expected in that population.
If the Hanford sitewide contribution to public dose from all exposure
pathways is considered (0.8 person-rem per year from DOE facilities and 0.7
person-rem per year from Washington Public Power Supply System reactor
operation for 40 years), it is estimated that the cumulative collective dose
would be approximately 60 person-rem. No latent fatal cancers would be
expected from such a dose. Over 40 years of interim storage of SNF, the
population of interest would have received 4,000,000 person-rem from natural
background radiation. That dose would relate to 2,000 latent cancer
fatalities. In the same 40 years, about 21,000 cancer fatalities from all
causes would be expected among the population in the region of interest
(380,000 population).
Air quality limits [(40 CFR 61 Subpart H), 10 millirem per year at the
Hanford Site boundary] are not expected to be approached as a result of
implementing the No Action Alternative or from reasonably foreseeable
additions to the Hanford Site, e.g., construction and operation of a Laser
Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory or from decommissioning of
unused facilities or site restoration activities.
Cumulative spent fuel worker dose from plant startup to date was
estimated at about 2,000 person-rem (Section 4.12.1.2), from which one fatal
cancer might be inferred. In the near term the annual increments to
cumulative worker dose would be expected to be about 24 person-rem. No latent
fatal cancers would be expected from 40 years of the No Action Alternative
(960 person-rem).
The cumulative worker dose since start up of activities at the Hanford
Site is about 90,000 person-rem, to which would be added about 210 person-
rem/yr for a total cumulative worker dose of about 100,000 person-rem through
the next 40 years. Thus for 90 years of Hanford operations, about 50 latent
cancer fatalities (LCFs) might be inferred (4 LCFs inferred from 1995 onward).
In those 90 years about 4,500 LCFs would be inferred from natural background
radiation and 48,000 LCFs from all causes would be expected.
Although the worker dose assocated with all future site restoration
activities is expected to be small in comparison with cumulative worker dose
to date, it is too speculative to quantify at this time.
5.16.2 Decentralization Alternative
Cumulative impacts associated with implementation of the
Decentralization Alternative are described in the following subsections.
5.16.2.1 Land Use. The Hanford Site consists of about 1450 square
kilometers (360,000 acres), of which about 87 square kilometers (22,000 acres)
have been disturbed. Implementation of the Decentralization Alternative would
disturb an additional area of up to 0.6 square kilometers (160 acres) for a
total of about 88 square kilometers (22,000 acres). The amount of land
actually occupied by new facilities would range from about 4 ha (11 acres) to
about 7 hectares (18 acres). Construction of the Environmental Restoration
Disposal Facility will require disturbance of approximately 4.1 square
kilometers (1.020 acres) of land. However, restoration of existing disturbed
sites will compensate for this loss.
5.16.2.2 Air Quality. Air quality limits (WAC 173-470-030,-100) at the
Hanford Site boundary are not expected to be approached as a result of
implementing any of the options in the Decentralization Alternative or from
reasonably foreseeable additions to the Hanford Site, e.g., construction and
operation of a Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory or from
decommissioning of unused facilities or restoration activities.
5.16.2.3 Waste Management. In the near term under the Decentralization
Alternative, there would be about 530 cubic meters of low-level waste
generated during 2 years of repackaging and containerization of SNF and sludge
in the 100-K Basins. Thereafter low-level waste generation would range from
41 to 420 cubic meters per year for about 4 years depending on suboption
selected. All presently anticipated activities on the Hanford Site would
result in approximately 20,000 cubic meters of low-level waste per year.
Thus, at a maximum, the total low-level waste from SNF activities would
account for about 8 percent of the annual quantity of low-level waste
generated at the Hanford Site.
High-level waste that might be generated in the Decentralization
Alternative would not add significantly to the more than 250,000 cubic meters
of waste at Hanford currently handled as high-level waste.
5.16.2.4 Socioeconomics. Under the Decentralization Alternative, the
SNF workforce would increase from 80 to about 740. The Hanford Site workforce
is expected to drop from 18,700 in 1995 to 14,700 in 1997 and remain at
approximately 14,700 through 2004. The regional workforce is expected to range
from 81,000, to 86,000 in that same period. The maximum change with respect
to the regional workforce would be an increase of about 0.9 percent.
5.16.2.5 Occupational and Public Health. The cumulative population
dose since plant startup was estimated to be about 100,000 person-rem
(estimated to one significant figure; Section 4.12.2.4.2). The number of
inferred fatal cancers since plant startup would amount to about 50
(essentially all of which would be attributed to dose received in the 1945-52
time frame). In the 50 years since plant startup, the population of interest
(assuming a constant population of 380,000 and an individual dose of about 0.3
rem/year) would have received about 5,000,000 person-rem from naturally
occurring radiation sources (natural background), which would relate to 2,500
latent cancer fatalities. In the same 50 years about 27,000 cancer fatalities
from all causes would have been expected in the region of interest.
If the Hanford sitewide contribution to public dose from all exposure
pathways is considered (0.8 person-rem per year from DOE facilities and 0.7
person-rem per year from Washington Public Power Supply System reactor
operation for 40 years), it is estimated that the cumulative collective dose
would be approximately 60 person-rem. Additional collective population dose
from implementation of the Decentralization Alternative would range from 1 to
4 person-rem over 40 years (dose from 4 years of processing would dominate).
Thus, in total, the collective population dose from man-made sources would
remain approximately 60 person-rem. No latent fatal cancers would be expected
from such a dose. Over 40 years of interim storage of SNF, the population of
interest would have received 4,000,000 person-rem from naturally occurring
radiation sources (natural background). That dose would relate to 2,000
latent cancer fatalities. In the same 40 years, about 21,000 cancer
fatalities from all causes would be expected among the population in the
region of interest (380,000 population).
Air quality limits [(40 CFR 61 Subpart H), 10 millirem per year at the
Hanford Site boundary] are not expected to be approached as a result of
implementing the Decentralization Alternative or from reasonably foreseeable
additions to the Hanford Site, e.g., construction and operation of a Laser
Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory or decommissioning of unused
facilities, or site restoration activities.
Cumulative spent fuel worker dose from plant startup to date was
estimated at about 2,000 person-rem (Section 4.12.1.2), from which one latent
fatal cancer might be inferred. Collective worker dose from SNF activities
would amount to about 80 person-rem for maintenance and operations, 18 person-
rem for loading storage facilities, and 180 to 320 person-rem depending on
processing option selected. Thus, the total collective 40-year worker dose
from SNF activities would be from about 300 to 420 person-rem. Within the
accuracy of the estimates, cumulative worker dose in the Decentralization
Alternative would not add significantly to the cumulative Hanford Site worker
dose over 90 years as described for the No Action Alternative.
5.16.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
Because of the similarity of activities, cumulative impacts of the
1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative would be essentially the same as those
described for the Decentralization Alternative.
5.16.4 Regionalization Alternative (Options A, B1, B2, and C)
Cumulative impacts for implementation of the four Regionalization
Subalternatives are described in the following subsections.
5.16.4.1 Regionalization Option A . Cumulative impacts associated with
implementation of the Regionalization Option A where Hanford's defense SNF is
stored at the Hanford Site and other SNF is shipped offsite for storage are
described in the following subsections.
5.16.4.1.1 Land Use.
The Hanford Site consists of about 1450
square kilometers (360,000 acres) of which about 87 square kilometers (22,000
acres) have been disturbed. Implementation of Regionalization Option A would
disturb an additional area of up to 0.6 square kilometers (160 acres), for a
total of about 88 square kilometers (22,000 acres). The amount of land
actually occupied by new facilities would range from about 2 hectares
(6 acres) to about 7 hectares (18 acres). Construction of the Environmental
Restoration Disposal Facility will require disturbance of approximately 4.1
square kilometers (1.020 acres) of land. However, restoration of existing
disturbed sites will compensate for this loss.
5.16.4.1.2 Air Quality.
Air quality limits (WAC 173-470-030,-
100) at the Hanford Site boundary are not expected to be approached as a
result of implementing any of the options in the Regionalization A Alternative
or from reasonably foreseeable additions to the Hanford Site, e.g.,
construction and operation of a Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave
Observatory or from decommissioning of unused facilities or restoration
activities.
5.16.4.1.3 Waste Management.
In the near term under
Regionalization Option A, there would be about 530 cubic meters of low-level
waste generated during containerization of SNF and sludge in the 100-K basins.
Thereafter, low-level waste generation would range from 61 to 420 cubic meters
per year for about 4 years depending on option selected.. All presently
anticipated activities on the Hanford Site would result in approximately
20,000 cubic meters of low-level waste per year. Thus, at a maximum, the
total low-level waste from SNF activities would account for about 8 percent of
the annual Hanford generation of low-level waste.
High-level waste that might be generated in Regionalization A would not
add significantly to the more than 250,000 cubic meters of waste at Hanford
currently handled as high-level waste.
5.16.4.1.4 Socioeconomics.
Under Regionalization Option A, the
SNF workforce would increase by 60 to about 470. The Hanford Site workforce
is expected to drop from about 18,700 in 1995 to about 14,700 in 1997 and to
remain at approximately 14,700 through 2004. The regional workforce is
expected to range from 81,000, to 86,000 in that same period. The maximum
change with respect to the regional workforce would be an increase of about
0.6 percent.
5.16.4.1.5 Occupational and Public Health.
The cumulative
population dose since plant startup was estimated to be about 100,000 person-
rem (estimated to one significant figure; Section 4.12.2.4.2). The number of
inferred fatal cancers since plant startup would amount to about 50
(essentially all of which would be attributed to exposures in the 1945-52 time
frame). In the 50 years since plant startup the population of interest
(assuming a constant population of 380,000 and an individual dose of about 0.3
rem/year) would have received about 5,000,000 person-rem from naturally
occurring radiation sources (natural background), which would relate to 2,500
latent cancer fatalities. In the same 50 years about 27,000 cancer fatalities
from all causes would have been expected in the region of interest.
If the Hanford sitewide contribution to public dose from all exposure
pathways is considered (0.8 person-rem per year from DOE facilities and 0.7
person-rem per year from Washington Public Power Supply System reactor
operation for 40 years), it is estimated that the cumulative collective dose
would be approximately 60 person-rem. Additional collective population dose
from implementation of Regionalization Option A would range from 1 to 4
person-rem over 40 years (dose from 4 years of processing would dominate).
Thus, in total, the collective population dose from man-made sources would be
about 60 person-rem. No latent fatal cancers would be expected from such a
dose. Over 40 years of interim storage of SNF, the population of interest
would have received 4,000,000 person-rem from naturally occurring radiation
sources (natural background). That dose would relate to 2,000 latent cancer
fatalities. In the same 40 years, about 21,000 cancer fatalities from all
causes would be expected among the population in the region of interest
(380,000 population).
Air quality limits ([40 CFR 61 Subpart H], 10 millirem per year at the
Site boundary) are not expected to be approached as a result of implementing
the Regionalization Alternative or from reasonably foreseeable additions to
the Hanford Site, e.g., construction and operation of a Laser Interferometer
Gravitational-Wave Observatory, or decommissioning of unused facilities, or
site restoration activities.
Cumulative spent fuel worker dose from plant startup to date was
estimated at about 2,000 person-rem (Section 4.12.1.2), from which one latent
fatal cancer might be inferred. Collective worker dose from SNF activities
would amount to about 80 person-rem for maintenance and operations, 18 person-
rem for loading storage facilities, and 180 to 320 person-rem depending on
processing option selected. Thus the total collective 40-year worker dose
would be from about 300 to 420 person-rem. Within the accuracy of the
estimates, cumulative worker dose in Regionalization A would not add
significantly to the cumulative Hanford Site work dose over 90 years as
described for the No Action Alternative.
5.16.4.2 Regionalization Option B1. Cumulative impacts associated with
the implementation of Regionalization Option B1, where all SNF west of the
Mississippi River, except for Naval SNF, is transported to Hanford are
described in the following subsections.
5.16.4.2.1 Land Use.
The Hanford Site consists of about 1450
square kilometers (360,000 acres), of which about 87 square kilometers (22,000
acres) have been disturbed. Implementation of Regionalization Option B1 would
disturb an additional area of upto 0.6 square kilometers (160 acres), for a
total of about 88 square kilometers (22,000 acres). The amount of land
actually occupied by new facilities would range from about 15 hectares
(36 acres) to about 28 hectares (68 acres). Construction of the Environmental
Restoration Disposal Facility will require disturbance of approximately 4.1
square kilometers (1.020 acres) of land. However, restoration of existing
disturbed sites will compensate for this loss.
5.16.4.2.2 Air Quality.
Air quality limits (WAC 173-470-030,-
100) at the Hanford Site boundary are not expected to be approached as a
result of implementing any of the options in Regionalization Option B1 or from
reasonably foreseeable additions to the Hanford Site, e.g., construction and
operation of a Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory or from
decommissioning of unused facilities or restoration activities.
5.16.4.2.3 Waste Management.
In the near term under
Regionalization Option B1, there would be about 530 cubic meters of low-level
waste generated during repackaging and containerization of SNF and sludge in
100-K Basins. Thereafter low-level waste generation would range from 61 to
420 cubic meters per year for about 4 years depending on the suboption
selected. All presently anticipated processing activities on the Hanford Site
would result in approximately 20,000 cubic meters of low-level waste per year.
Thus, the total quantity of low-level waste from SNF activities would account
for about 8 percent of the annual quantity of low-level waste generated at the
Hanford Site.
High-level waste that might be generated in Regionalization B1 would not
add significantly to the more than 250,000 cubic meters of waste at Hanford
currently handled as high-level waste.
5.16.4.2.4 Socioeconomics.
Under Regionalization Option B1, the
SNF workforce would increase by about 170 to about 800. The Hanford Site
workforce is expected to drop from 18,700 in 1995 to 14,700 in 1997 and remain
around 14,700 through 2004. The regional workforce is expected to range from
81,000, to 86,000 in that same period. The maximum change with respect to the
regional workforce would be an increase of about 1 percent.
5.16.4.2.5 Occupational and Public Health.
The cumulative
population dose since plant startup was estimated to be about 100,000 person-
rem (estimated to one significant figure; Section 4.12.2.4.2). The number of
inferred fatal cancers since plant startup would amount to about 50
(essentially all of which would be attributed to exposures in the 1945-52 time
frame). In the 50 years since plant startup, the population of interest
(assuming a constant population of 380,000) would have received about
5,000,000 person-rem from naturally occurring radiation sources (natural
background), which would relate to 2,500 latent cancer fatalities. In the
same time, about 27,000 cancer fatalities from all causes would have been
expected in the region of interest.
If the Hanford sitewide contribution to public dose from all exposure
pathways is considered (0.8 person-rem per year from DOE facilities and 0.7
person-rem per year from Washington Public Power Supply System reactor
operation for 40 years), it is estimated that the cumulative collective dose
would be approximately 60 person-rem. Additional collective population dose
from implementation of Regionalization Option B1 would range from 1 to 4
person-rem over 40 years (dose from 4 years of processing would dominate).
Thus, in total, the collective population dose from man-made sources would
remain approximately 60 person-rem. No latent fatal cancers would be expected
from such a dose. Over 40 years of interim storage of SNF, the population of
interest would have received 4,000,000 person-rem from naturally occurring
radiation sources (natural background). That dose would relate to 2,000
latent cancer fatalities. In the same 40 years, about 21,000 cancer
fatalities from all causes would be expected among the population in the
region of interest (380,000 population).
Air quality limits [(40 CFR 61 Subpart H), 10 millirem per year at the
Hanford Site boundary] are not expected to be approached as a result of
implementing Regionalization Option B1 or from reasonably foreseeable
additions to the Hanford Site, e.g., construction and operation of a Laser
Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory or from decommissioning of
unused facilities or site restoration activities.
Cumulative spent fuel worker dose from plant startup to date was
estimated at about 2,000 person-rem (Section 4.12.1.2), from which one latent
fatal cancer might be inferred. Collective worker dose from SNF activities
would amount to about 80 person-rem for maintenance and operations, 18 person-
rem for loading storage facilities, and 180 to 320 person-rem depending on
processing option selected. Thus the total collective 40-year worker dose
would be from about 300 to 420 person-rem. Within the accuracy of the
estimates, cumulative worker dose in Regionalization B1 would not add
significantly to the cumulative Hanford Site worker dose over 90 years as
described for the No Action Alternative.
5.16.4.3 Regionalization Option B2. Cumulative impacts associated
with the implementation of Regionalization Option B2, where all SNF west of
the Mississippi River and Naval SNF, are transported to Hanford are described
in the following subsections.
5.16.4.3.1 Land Use.
The Hanford Site consists of about 1450
square kilometers (360,000 acres) of which about 87 square kilometers (22,000
acres) have been disturbed. Implementation of Regionalization Option B2 would
disturb an additional area of up to 0.6 square kilometers (160 acres), for a
total of about 88 square kilometers (22,000 acres). The amount of land
actually occupied by new facilities would range from about 21 hectares
(52 acres) to about 30 hectares (74 acres). Construction of the Environmental
Restoration Disposal Facility will require disturbance of approximately 4.1
square kilometers (1.020 acres) of land. However, restoration of existing
disturbed sites will compensate for this loss.
5.16.4.3.2 Air Quality.
Air quality limits (WAC 173-470-030,-
100) at the Hanford Site boundary are not expected to be approached as a
result of implementing any of the suboptions in Regionalization Option B1 or
from reasonably foreseeable additions to the Hanford Site, e.g., construction
and operation of a Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory, or
from decommissioning of unused facilities or restoration activities.
5.16.4.3.3 Waste Management.
In the near term under
Regionalization Option B2, there would be about 530 cubic meters of low-level
waste generated during repackaging and containerization of SNF and sludge in
the 100-K Basins. Thereafter, low-level waste generation would range from 61
to 420 cubic meters per year. All presently anticipated activities on the
Hanford Site would result in approximately 20,000 cubic meters of low-level
waste per year. Thus, at a maximum, the total quantity of low-level waste
from SNF activities would account for about 4 percent of the annual quantity
of low-level waste generated at the Hanford Site.
High-level waste that might be generated in Regionalization B2 would not
add significantly to the more than 250,000 cubic meters of waste at Hanford
currently handled as high-level waste.
5.16.4.3.4 Socioeconomics.
Under Regionalization Option B2, the
SNF workforce would increase by about 170 to about 800. The Hanford Site
workforce is expected to drop from 18,700 in 1995 to 14,700 in 1997 and remain
around 14,700 through 2004. The regional workforce is expected to range from
81,000, to 86,000 in that same period. The maximum change with respect to the
regional workforce would be an increase of about 1 percent.
5.16.4.3.5 Occupational and Public Health.
The cumulative
population dose since plant startup was estimated to be about 100,000 person-
rem (estimated to one significant figure; Section 4.12.2.4.2). The number of
inferred fatal cancers since plant startup would amount to about 100
(essentially all of which would be attributed to exposures in the 1945-52 time
frame). In the 50 years since plant startup, the population of interest
(assuming a constant population of 380,000) would have received about
5,000,000 person-rem from naturally occurring radiation sources (natural
background) which would relate to 2,500 latent cancer fatalities. In the same
time about 27,000 cancer fatalities from all causes would have been expected
in the region of interest.
If the Hanford Site contribution from all exposure pathways to public
dose is added (0.8 person-rem per year from DOE facilities and 0.7 person-rem
per year from Washington Public Power Supply System reactor operation for 40
years), it is estimated that the cumulative collective dose would be
approximately 60 person-rem. Additional collective population dose from
implementation of Regionalization Option B2 would range from 1 to 4 person-rem
over 40 years (dose from 4 years of processing would dominate). Thus, in
total, the collective population dose from man-made sources would remain
approximately 60 person-rem. No latent fatal cancers would be expected from
such a dose. Over 40 years of interim storage of SNF, the population of
interest would have received 4,000,000 person-rem from naturally occurring
radiation sources (natural background). That dose would relate to 2,000
latent cancer fatalities. In the same 40 years, about 21,000 cancer
fatalities from all causes would be expected among the population in the
region of interest (380,000 population).
Air quality limits [(40 CFR 61 Subpart H), 10 millirem per year at the
Site boundary] are not expected to be approached as a result of implementing
Regionalization Option B2 or from reasonably foreseeable additions to the
Hanford Site, e.g., construction and operation of a Laser Interferometer
Gravitational-Wave Observatory, or decommissioning of unused facilities or
site restoration activities.
Cumulative spent fuel worker dose from plant startup to date was
estimated at about 2,000 person-rem (Section 4.12.1.2), from which one latent
fatal cancer might be inferred. Collective worker dose from SNF activities
would amount to about 80 person-rem for maintenance and operations, 18 person-
rem for loading storage facilities, and 180 to 320 person-rem depending on the
processing suboption selected. Thus the total collective 40-year worker dose
would be from about 300 to 420 person-rem. Within the accuracy of the
estimates, cumulative worker dose in Regionalization B2 would not add
significantly to the cumulative Hanford Site worker dose over 90 years as
described for the No Action Alternative.
5.16.4.4 Regionalization C Option. Cumulative impacts in this option,
where all Hanford SNF is sent to INEL or NTS, would be essentially the same as
those described for the Centralization Alternative, minimum option.
5.16.5 Centralization Alternative
Cumulative impacts associated with implementation of one or the other of
two options under the Centralization Alternative are described in the
following subsections.
5.16.5.1 Centralization Alternative Maximum Option. Cumulative impacts
associated with implementation of the Centralization Alternative maximum
option, where all SNF is sent to the Hanford Site, are described in the
following subsections.
5.16.5.1.1 Land Use.
The Hanford Site consists of about 1450
square kilometers (360,000 acres), of which about 87 square kilometers (22,000
acres) have been disturbed. Implementation of the Centralization Alternative
maximum option would disturb up to an additional area of about 0.6 square
kilometers (160 acres) for a total of about 88 square kilometers (22,000
acres). The amount of land actually occupied by new facilities would range
from about 35 hectares (86 acres) to about 38 hectares (93 acres).
Construction of the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility will require
disturbance of approximately 4.1 square kilometers (1.020 acres) of land.
However, restoration of existing disturbed sites will compensate for this
loss.
5.16.5.1.2 Air Quality.
Air quality limits (WAC 173-470-030,-
100) at the Hanford Site boundary are not expected to be approached as a
result of implementing any of the suboptions in the Centralization Alternative
maximum option or from reasonably foreseeable additions to the Hanford Site,
e.g., construction and operation of a Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave
Observatory, or from decommissioning unused facilities or restoration
activities.
5.16.5.1.3 Waste Management.
In the near term under the
Centralization Alternative maximum option, there would be about 532 cubic
meters of low-level waste generated during repackaging and containerization of
SNF and sludge in the 100-K Basins. Thereafter, low-level waste generation
would amount to about 140 cubic meters per year. All presently anticipated
activities on the Hanford Site would result in approximately 20,000 cubic
meters of low-level waste per year. Thus, at a maximum, SNF activities would
account for about 1 percent of the total.
High-level waste that might be generated in the Centralization maximum
option would not add significantly to the more than 250,000 cubic meters of
waste at Hanford currently handled as high-level waste.
5.16.5.1.4 Socioeconomics.
Under the Centralization Alternative
maximum option, the SNF workforce would increase by about 290 to about 900.
The Hanford Site workforce is expected to drop from 18,700 in 1995 to 14,700
in 1997 and remain around 14,700 through 2004. The regional workforce is
expected to range from 81,000, to 86,000 in that same period. The maximum
change with respect to the regional workforce would be an increase of about
1 percent.
5.16.5.1.5 Occupational and Public Health.
The cumulative
population dose since plant startup was estimated to be about 100,000 person-
rem (estimated to one significant figure; Section 4.12.2.4.2). The number of
inferred fatal cancers since plant startup would amount to about 50
(essentially all of which would be attributed to exposures in the 1945-52 time
frame). In the 50 years since plant startup, the population of interest
(assuming a constant population of 380,000) would have received 5,000,000
person-rem from naturally occurring radiation sources (natural background),
which would relate to 2,500 latent cancer fatalities. In the same time about
27,000 cancer fatalities from all causes would have been expected in the
region of interest .
If the Hanford sitewide contribution to public dose from all exposure
pathways is considered (0.8 person-rem per year from DOE facilities and 0.7
person-rem per year from Washington Public Power Supply System reactor
operation for 40 years), it is estimated that the cumulative collective dose
would be approximately 60 person-rem. Additional collective population dose
from implementation of the Centralization Alternative maximum option would
range from 1 to 4 person-rem over 40 years (dose from 4 years of processing
would dominate). Thus, in total, the collective population dose from man-made
sources would remain approximately 60 person-rem. No latent fatal cancers
would be expected from such a dose. Over 40 years of interim storage of SNF,
the population of interest would have received 4,000,000 person-rem from
naturally occurring radiation sources (natural background). That dose would
relate to 2,000 latent cancer fatalities. In the same 40 years, about 21,000
cancer fatalities from all causes would be expected among the population in
the region of interest (380,000 population).
Air quality limits [(40 CFR 61 Subpart H), 10 millirem per year at the
Hanford Site boundary] are not expected to be approached as a result of
implementing the Centralization Alternative maximum option or from reasonably
foreseeable additions to the Hanford Site, e.g., construction and operation of
a Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory, or decommissioning of
unused facilities or site restoration activities.
Cumulative spent fuel worker dose from plant startup to date was
estimated at about 2,000 person-rem (Section 4.12.1.2), from which one latent
fatal cancer might be inferred. Collective worker dose from SNF activities in
the Centralization Alternative maximum option would amount to about 80 person-
rem for maintenance and operations, 18 person-rem for loading storage
facilities, and 180 to 320 person-rem depending on processing suboption
selected.
Within the accuracy of the estimates, cumulative worker dose in the
Centralization maximum option would not add significantly to the cumulative
Hanford Site worker dose over 90 years as described for the No Action Alternative.
5.16.5.2 Centralization Alternative Minimum Option. Cumulative impacts
associated with implementation of the Centralization Alternative minimum
option, where all SNF on the Hanford Site is shipped offsite for storage, are
described in the following subsections.
5.16.5.2.1 Land Use.
The Hanford Site consists of about 1450
square kilometers (360,000 acres) of which about 87 square kilometers (22,000
acres) have been disturbed. Implementation of the Centralization Alternative
minimum option would disturb up to an additional area of about 0.6 square
kilometers (160 acres) for a total of about 88 square kilometers (22,000
acres). The amount of land actually occupied by new facilities would range
from about 2 hectares (6 acres) to about 15 hectares (12 acres). Construction
of the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility will require disturbance of
approximately 4.1 square kilometers (1.020 acres) of land. However,
restoration of existing disturbed sites will compensate for this loss.
5.16.5.2.2 Air Quality.
Air quality limits (WAC 173-470-030,-
100) at the Hanford Site boundary are not expected to be approached as a
result of implementing the any of the suboptions in the Centralization
Alternative minimum option or from reasonably foreseeable additions to the
Hanford Site, e.g., construction and operation of a Laser Interferometer
Gravitational-Wave Observatory, or from decommissioning unused facilities or
restoration activities.
5.16.5.2.3 Waste Management.
In the near term under the
Centralization Alternative minimum option, there would be about 532 cubic
meters of low-level waste generated during repackaging and containerization of
SNF and sludge in the 100-K Basins. Thereafter, low-level waste generation
would range from 110 to 490 cubic meters per year. All presently anticipated
activities on the Hanford Site would result in approximately 21,000 cubic
meters of solid waste per year. Thus, at a maximum, SNF activities would
account for about 2 percent of the annual generation of low-level waste at the Hanford Site.
High-level waste that might be generated in the Centralization mininim
option would not add significantly to the more than 250,000 cubic meters of
waste at Hanford currently handled as high-level waste.
5.16.5.2.4 Socioeconomics.
Under the Centralization Alternative
minimum option, the SNF workforce would increase by about 390 to about 590.
The Hanford Site workforce is expected to remain at about 18,000 from 1995
through 2004. The regional workforce is expected to range from 81,000, to
86,000 in that same period. The maximum change with respect to the regional
workforce would be an increase of about 0.7 percent.
5.16.5.2.5 Occupational and Public Health.
The cumulative
population dose since plant startup was estimated to be about 200,000 person-
rem (estimated to one significant figure; Section 4.12.2.4.2). The number of
inferred fatal cancers since plant startup would amount to about 50
(essentially all of which would be attributed to exposures in the 1945-52 time
frame). In the 50 years since plant startup, the population of interest
(assuming a constant population of 380,000) would have received 5,000,000
person-rem from naturally occurring radiation sources (natural background),
which would relate to 2,500 latent cancer fatalities. In the same time about
24,000 cancer fatalities from all causes would have been expected in the
region of interest.
Cumulative spent fuel worker dose from plant startup to date was
estimated at about 2,000 person-rem (Section 4.12.1.2), from which one latent
fatal cancer might be inferred. Collective worker dose from SNF activities in
the Centralization Alternative minimum option would amount to about 80 person-
rem for maintenance and operations, 18 person-rem for loading storage
facilities, and 180 to 320 person-rem depending on processing suboption
selected. Thus the total collective 40-year worker dose would be from about
300 to 420 person-rem.
Within the accuracy of the estimates, cumulative worker dose in the
Centralization minimum option would not add significantly to the cumulative
Hanford Site worker dose over 90 years as described for the No Action
Alternative.
5.17 Adverse Environmental Impacts that Cannot be Avoided
Unavoidable adverse impacts that might arise as a result of implementing
the alternatives for interim storage of SNF at the Hanford Site are discussed
in the following subsections.
5.17.1 No Action Alternative
Adverse impacts associated with the No Action Alternative would derive
from the expense and radiation exposure associated with maintaining facilities
that are near or at the end of their design life and the possible future
degradation of fuel and facilities, thus increasing the potential for releases
of materials to the environment.
5.17.2 Decentralization Alternative
Adverse impacts associated with the Decentralization Alternative would
derive principally from construction activities needed for new facilities.
There would be displacement of some animals from the construction site and the
destruction of plant life within the site up to 9 hectares (24 acres).
Criteria pollutants, radionuclides, and hazardous chemicals would also be
released in up to permitted quantities during processing preparations.
Traffic congestion and noise are expected to increase by a few percent during
the construction of major facilities. Competition for adequate housing would
increase in the already tight market, and capacities at some of the local
school would be moderately strained with approximately 0.5 to 1.5 percent
additional students, depending on which processing and/or storage option were
chosen.
5.17.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
Adverse impacts associated with the 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
would be essentially the same as those for the Decentralization Alternative.
If transport of any amount of SNF were considered an adverse impact, that
impact would occur in this alternative if the small amount of TRIGA fuel at
Hanford were transported to INEL.
5.17.4 Regionalization Alternative
Unavoidable adverse environmental impacts for the Regionalization
Alternative range from those of the Centralization (Minimum) Alternative for
Regionalization C where all Hanford SNF is shipped offsite to essentially
those of the Centralization (Maximum) Alternative for Regionalization B2 where
all SNF west of the Mississippi River including Naval SNF is shipped to
Hanford.
5.17.5 Centralization Alternative
In the option where Hanford receives all DOE SNF, adverse impacts would
be somewhat larger than those associated with implementing the
Decentralization Alternative because about 25 weight percent more fuel than
already exists on the Hanford Site would need to be stored; however, higher
heat loads on that fuel might nearly triple the capacity needed for storage.
Transport of that 25 weight percent of SNF to the Hanford Site also likely
would be viewed as an adverse impact.
In the option where Hanford ships all of its fuel to another site,
adverse impacts would be associated with construction and operation of a fuel
packaging facility. The impacts, however, would be expected to be
substantially less than those noted for the Decentralization Alternative.
Transporting a relatively large amount of SNF offsite to another DOE facility
also likely would be considered an adverse impact.
5.18 Relationship Between Short-Term Uses of the Environment and
the Maintenance and Enhancement of Long-Term Productivity
SNF storage is contemplated for up to 40 years pending decisions on
ultimate disposition. SNF is essentially uranium-238 with varying amounts of
uranium-235 and small amounts of plutonium contaminated by small masses of
fission products (but high activity). Because of this composition, a decision
could be made at the end of the planned storage period to either continue
storage until the energy resource value of the SNF warrants processing for
power-reactor fuel or to determine that the fuel will never have any resource
value and will be disposed of. If the decision is to continue to store the
SNF, that option could be seen as the best use of land at the Hanford Site in
terms of long-term productivity. This conclusion would apply to all of the
alternatives except for the Regionalization C Alternative and the
Centralization Alternative with storage at other than Hanford.
If the decision is to dispose of the SNF or if the non-Hanford
centralization option for storage is selected, the land on the Hanford Site
would become available for other uses. Because of the potential for, or
perception of, contamination, use of the land for agriculture might not be
appropriate. Moreover, the land occupied (or that would be occupied) by SNF
facilities was of marginal utility for farming before it was obtained for the
Hanford Site, and it remains so. However, other uses, such as for wildlife
refuges, might be appropriate long-term uses of land vacated by SNF
facilities after decommissioning is completed.
5.19 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Resources
This section addresses the irretrievable commitment of resources that
would likely be used to implement the proposed project or its alternatives.
An irretrievable resource is a natural or physical resource that is
irreplaceably lost and cannot be replenished.
Implementation of the proposed project would result in the irretrievable
use of fossil fuels in construction activities and in the transport of raw
materials to the project site. In addition, there would be an irretrievable
use of electricity and fossil fuel in the SNF operations. Briefly summarized
below are discussions of irretrievable and irreversible resource impacts for
each alternative.
5.19.1 No Action Alternative
The irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources for the
No Action Alternative would include an additional increment of energy,
materials, and manpower to maintain safe and secure facilities. A new SNF
facility would not be built, and Hanford SNF would continue to be managed in
the current mode.
If the No Action Alternative were implemented, the following facilities
would likely be used at the Hanford Site to maintain continued safe and secure
storage of SNF: the 105-KE and KW Basins, FFTF, T-Plant, and the 308, 324,
325, and 327 buildings. Excluding energy and materials expended during
construction of minor facilities to maintain safety and security, the
operational staff is estimated at 215 personnel, and electrical power
consumption is estimated to be 12,000 megawatt hours per year. This
alternative represents less than a 2 percent increase in existing personnel at
the Hanford Site and a negligible increase in the total amount of electrical
energy currently used at the Hanford Site.
5.19.2 Decentralization Alternative
The irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources for the
Decentralization Alternative would include an additional increment of energy,
materials, and personnel. Existing Hanford Site SNF would be safely stored
for a 40-year period, with some limited SNF shipments. To accommodate this
mission, existing facilities would require upgrading and new storage systems
would need to be constructed. Various options have been proposed on which
facilities to build and how to upgrade existing ones, but it has not been
determined exactly which kind of facilities would need to be built. A
representative set of values is presented in Table 5.19-1, which roughly
indicates the material, personnel, and energy commitments. Depending on the
option chosen, the alternative could require less than a 1.5 percent increase
or up to a 33 percent increase (but only for 4 years) in the total amount of
electrical energy currently used at the Hanford Site.
In addition to energy increases, additional water resources would be
required for this alternative, but are not expected to be an excessive amount,
compared to the more than 15 million cubic meters (4 billion gallons) of water
used each year on the Hanford Site for all processes.
Table 5.19-1. Irretrievable commitment of materials in the Decentralization
Alternative suboptions.
Item Suboption
W X Y Z P Q
Concrete, 13 (17) 15 (20) 17 24 (32) 22 (29) 29 (38)
thousand cubic (23)
meters/(cubic
yards)
Lumber, thousand 1.2 1.4 1.6 2.2 2.0 2.6
cubic meters (500) (570) (650) (930) (850) (1100)
(board feet)
Electricity
Construction 2500 2900 3500 4800 4370 5700
(MW--hrs) 1600 1600 100 100 40,000 127,000
Operations (MW-
hrs/yr)
Diesel fuel, 500 570 660 900 830 1100
cubic meters (130) (150) (175) (240) (220) (290)
(thousand
gallons)
Gasoline, cubic 500 570 660 900 830 1100
meters (thousand (130) (150) (175) (240) (220) (290)
gallons)
a. Assumes operation of the process facility (28,000 or 115,000 MW-Hrs/yr)
concurrently with those facilities where SNF is currently stored (12,000 MW-
Hrs/yr, as in the No Action Alternative) for an interim period less than 4
years.
5.19.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
The irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources for the
1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative would be very similar to those for the
Decentralization Alternative. The materials, personnel, and energy esti-
mates are assumed to approximate those stated in the Decentralization Alternative.
5.19.4 Regionalization Alternative
The Regionalization Alternative as it applies to the Hanford Site
contains the following options:
- Option A - All SNF except defense production SNF would be sent to INEL.
- Option B1 - All SNF west of the Mississippi River except Naval SNF would
be sent to Hanford.
- Option B2 - All SNF west of the Mississippi River and Naval SNF would be
sent to Hanford.
- Option C - All Hanford SNF would be sent to INEL or NTS.
With the exception of Option C, which for Hanford is equivalent to the
Centralization Alternative minimum option, the irretrievable and irreversible
commitment of material resources are provided in Tables 5.19-2 through 5.19-4.
5.19.5 Centralization Alternative
The Centralization Alternative has two major options: either all
Hanford SNF would be shipped offsite to another DOE facility where all SNF
would be centralized (minimum option), or the Hanford Site would become the
centralized location for all DOE SNF to be temporarily
Table 5.19-2. Irretrievable commitment of material resources in the
Regionalization A suboptions.
Item Suboption
W X Y Z P Q
Concrete, 9 (12) 9 (12) 16 19 (25) 22 (29) 29 (38)
thousand cubic (21)
meters/(cubic
yards)
Lumber, thousand 0.8 0.8 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.6
cubic meters (350) (350) (600) (700) (850) (1100)
(board feet)
Electricity
Construction 1800 1800 3200 3800 4370 5700
(MW-hrs) 1600 1600 100 100 40,000a 127,000a
Operations (MW-
hrs/yr)
Diesel fuel, 380 380 610 720 830 1100
cubic meters (100) (100) (160) (190) (220) (290)
(thousand
gallons)
Gasoline, cubic 380 380 610 720 830 1100
meters (thousand (100) (100) (160) (190) (220) (290)
gallons)
a. Assumes operation of the process facility (28,000 or 115,000 MW-Hrs/yr)
concurrently with those facilities where SNF is currently stored (12,000 MW-
Hrs/yr, as in the No Action Alternative) for an interim period less than 4
years.
Table 5.19-3. Irretrievable commitment of material resources in the
Regionalization B1 option.
(In addition to those listed for the Decentralization
Alternative)
Concrete, thousand cubic meters/(cubic yards) 54 (70)
Lumber, thousand cubic meters (board feet) 5 (2,000)
Electricity, megawatt hours per year 3.000
Diesel fuel, cubic meters (thousand gallons) 1,900 (500)
Gasoline, cubic meters (thousand gallons) 1,900 (500)
Table 5.19-4. Irretrievable commitment of material resources in the
Regionalization B2 option.
(In addition to those listed for the Decentralization
Alternative)
Concrete, thousand cubic meters/(cubic yards) 120 (150)
Lumber, thousand cubic meters (board feet) 10 (4,200)
Electricity, megawatt hours per year 3,000
Diesel fuel, cubic meters (thousand gallons) 4,400 (1,200)
Gasoline, cubic meters (thousand gallons) 4,400 (1,200)
stored (maximum option). The increases in energy, materials, and personnel for
both options are shown in Table 5.19-5. If all the SNF were shipped to the
Hanford Site, then the impacts would be similar, although somewhat larger,
than those of the Regionalization B options. If all the SNF were shipped
offsite, then the impacts would be identical to the similar Regionalization B
options. If all SNF were shipped offsite, construction and operation of a
fuel packaging facility would be necessary before shipments could be made to
an offsite facility.
5.20 Potential Mitigation Measures
This section summarizes possible mitigation measures that might be
considered to avoid or reduce impacts to the environment as a result of
Hanford Site operations in support of SNF management. These measures would be
reviewed and revised as appropriate, depending on the
specific actions to be taken at a facility, the level of impact, and other
pertinent factors.
Table 5.19-5. Irretrievable commitment of materials in the Centralization
options.
Item No Fuel All Offsite Fuel
Stored at Stored at the
the Hanford Hanford Site
Site
Concrete, thousand cubic meters (cubic 18 (23) 150 (200)
yards)
Lumber, thousand cubic meters (board feet) 1.6 (660) 13 (5600)
Electricity, megawatt hours per year 0-20,000 100-127,000
Diesel fuel, cubic meters (thousand 640 (170) 5700 (1500)
gallons)
Gasoline, cubic meters (thousand gallons) 640 (170) 5700 (1500)
Possible mitigation measures are generally the same for all alternatives
and are summarized by resource category below. No impacts on land use and
aesthetic and scenic resources were identified; therefore, mitigation measures
would not be necessary.
5.20.1 Pollution Prevention/Waste Minimization
The U.S. Department of Energy is responding to Executive Order 12856 and
associated DOE orders and guidelines by reducing the use of toxic chemicals;
improving emergency planning, response, and accident notification; and
encouraging the development and use of clean technologies and the testing of
innovative pollution prevention technologies. Program components include
waste minimization, source reduction and recycling, and procurement practices
that preferentially procure products made from recycled materials. The
pollution prevention program at the Hanford Site is formalized in a Hanford
Site Waste Minimization and Pollution Prevention Awareness Program Plan.
The SNF program activities would be conducted in accordance with this
plan and implementation of the pollution prevention and waste minimization
plans would minimize the generation of waste during SNF management activities.
5.20.2 Socioeconomics
The level of predicted employment for SNF activities at the Hanford Site
is not large enough in comparison with present Hanford, local, or regional
employment to produce a boom-bust impact on the economy.
5.20.3 Cultural (Archaeological, Historical, and Cultural) Resources
To avoid loss of cultural resources during construction of SNF
facilities on the Hanford Site a cultural resources survey of the area of
interest would be conducted by PNL Cultural Resources staff. Assuming no such
resources were found, construction would proceed. If, however, during
construction (earth moving) any cultural resource is discovered, construction
activities would be halted and the PNL Cultural resources staff called upon to
evaluate and determine the appropriate disposition of the find.
To avoid loss of cultural resources during operation, such as
unauthorized artifact collection, workers could be educated through programs
and briefing sessions to inform them of applicable laws and regulations for
site protection. These educational programs would stress the importance of
preserving cultural resources and specifics of the laws and regulations for
site protection. The exact location of cultural resources are not identified
by the PNL Cultural Resources group; therefore, any such artifact collection
would be in an area discovered by the worker(s).
5.20.4 Geology
Soil loss would be controlled during construction using standard dust
suppression techniques on disturbed soil and by stockpiling with cover where
necessary. Following construction, soil loss would be controlled by
revegetation and relandscaping of disturbed areas. Any soil that might
become contaminated as a result of SNF management activities could be remediated
using methods appropriate to the type and extent of contamination.
5.20.5 Air Resources
To avoid impacts associated with emissions of fugitive dust during
construction activities, exposed soils would be treated using standard dust
suppression techniques. New facility sources of pollutant emissions to the
atmosphere would be designed using best available technology to reduce
emissions to as low as reasonably achievable.
5.20.6 Water Resources
The impacts to surface and groundwater sources could be minimized
through recycling of water, where feasible, and with clean-up of excess
process water before release to ground or surface water.
5.20.7 Ecology
To avoid impacts to endangered, candidate, or state-identified sensitive
species, pre-construction surveys would be completed to determine the presence
of these species or their habitat. Within six months of ground breaking, DOE
would again consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to determine
current species listings and perform a biological survey of the proposed SNF
site. The presently proposed site at Hanford has been surveyed and no
currently listed species were found. While not endangered, stands of Big
Sagebrush habitat are diminishing generally and Hanford would expect to
implement its habitat replacement program to provide areas on at least a 2 to
1 basis to mitigate habitat loss. In addition, areas disturbed would, as
appropriate, be seeded with native plant species.
5.20.8 Noise
Generation of construction and operations noise would be reduced, as
practicable, by using equipment that complies with EPA noise guidelines
(40 CFR Parts 201-211). Construction workers and other personnel working in
environments exceeding EPA-recommended guidelines during SNF storage
construction or operation would be provided with earmuffs or earplugs approved
by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (29 CFR Part 1910).
Because of the remote location of the Hanford SNF activities, there would be
no noise impacts with respect to the public for which mitigation would be
necessary.
5.20.9 Traffic and Transportation
At sites with increasing traffic concerns, DOE could encourage use of
high-occupancy vehicles (such as vans or buses), implementing carpooling and
ride-sharing programs, and staggering workhours to reduce peak traffic.
5.20.10 Occupational and Public Health and Safety
Although no radiological impacts on workers or the public were evident
from the evaluation of routine SNF activities at Hanford, further improvement
in controls to protect both workers and the general public is a continuing
activity. The as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) principle would be used
for controlling radiation exposure and exposure to hazardous/toxic substances.
Hanford would continue to refine its current emergency planning, emergency
preparedness, and emergency response programs in place to protect both workers
and the public.
5.20.11 Site Utilities and Support Services
No mitigation measures beyond those identified for ground disturbance
activities associated with bringing power and water to the SNF site would
appear necessary. In those cases use of standard dust suppression techniques
and revegetation of disturbed areas would mitigate ground disturbance impacts.
5.20.12 Accidents
The Hanford Site maintains an emergency response center and has
emergency action plans and equipment to respond to accidents and other
emergencies. These plans include training of workers, local emergency
response agencies (such as fire departments) and the public communication
systems and protocols, readiness drills, and mutual aid agreements. The plans
would be updated to include consideration of new SNF facilities and
activities. Design of new facilities to current seismic and other facility
protection standards would reduce the potential for accidents, and
implementation of emergency response plans would substantially mitigate the
potential for impacts in the event of an accident.
6. LIST OF PREPARERS
Rosanne L. Aaberg, dose calculations. B.S. (Chemical Engineering) University of Washington.
Seventeen years of experience in dose calculations, and EIS preparation.
John C. Abbott, affected environment and environmental impacts. BA. (Geography) Southwest
Texas State University, M.S. (Conservation of Natural Resources) University of Texas at San
Antonio. Over seventeen years of experience in the preparation of NEPA documents, ecological
risk assessment evaluations, regulatory compliance activities, and other program oversight
activities.
John M. Alvis, Jr., facility descriptions. B.S. (Nuclear Engineering) and M.S. (Nuclear
Engineering) Texas A&M University. Six years of experience in reviewing safety analyses,
licensing submittals, and contributing to the development of safety policies and guidance.
Assisted in the technical review of licensee documents for NRC.
Larry K. Berg, meteorology. B.S. (Meteorology) Pennsylvania State University. One year of
experience in analyzing air quality and air resource parameters.
Frances M. Berting, fuel inventories. BA. (Physics) Oberlin College, MA. (Physics) Smith
College, Ph.D. (Materials Science) University of Virginia. Characterization of high temperature
gas-cooled reactor spent fuel, characterization of N Reactor spent fuel, and experience with non-
destructive and destructive examination of irradiated fuel elements. Prepared NRC annual
reports on fuel performance at commercial power plants and a report on commercial spent fuel
reracking.
Charles A. Brandt, ecological characterization. B.S. (Zoology) Oregon State University, Ph.D.
(Zoology) Duke University. Over ten years of experience as a terrestrial ecologist involved in
ecological restoration, ecological risk and impact assessment, and conservation biology.
Extensive experience in preparation and analysis of NEPA-related documentation.
Mitchel E. Cunningham, spent nuclear fuel management. B.S. (Nuclear Engineering) and M.S.
(Nuclear Engineering) Oregon State University. Several years of experience in such projects as
the behavior of spent fuel during both inert and air dry storage, investigating in-reactor fission
gas release, and the development of integrated computer codes for predicting nuclear fuel rod
behavior.
Colbert E. Cushing, deputy project manager, ecological resources. B.S. (Fisheries Management)
and M.S. (Limnology) Colorado State University, Ph.D. (Limnology) University of
Saskatchewan. Thirty-four years of experience in freshwater ecological research in streams and
radioecology, and over twenty years of experience in EIS preparation. Teach university classes
in stream ecology and writing journal articles.
Phillip M. Daling, transportation impacts. B.S. (Physical Metallurgy) Washington State
University. Related experience includes performing transportation impact calculations for
various EIS and environmental assessments and in support of environmental documentation for
over ten years.
James F. Donaghue, materials and waste management. B.S. (Civil Engineering) University of
Arkansas, J.D. Golden Gate School of Law. Nine years of experience in environmental planning
compliance activities. Reviewed EISs and prepared portions of EISs and environmental
assessments for Air Force construction projects. Involved in the analysis of alternatives and
writing for the DOE Environmental Restoration Programmatic EIS.
Elizabeth A. Flores, materials and waste management. B.S. University of Connecticut, MA.
(Environmental Studies) Yale University. Twelve years of experience in environmental
protection and waste management. Assistant Director for Connecticut Department of
Environmental Protection for RCRA program.
Stephen Gajewski, regulatory framework and requirements. BA. (English) and BA.
(Psychology) Gonzaga University. J.D. University of Washington. Over fourteen years of
experience in geotechnical operations planning, land management and environmental regulatory
compliance, including quality assurance on commercial power reactors, onshore and offshore oil
and gas exploration, industrial hygiene program development and training, and environmental
strategic planning.
Clifford S. Glantz, non-radiological air quality impacts. B.S. (Physics and Atmospheric Sciences)
State University of New York at Albany, M.S. (Atmospheric Sciences) University of Washington.
Twelve years of experience in the analysis of non-radiological air quality impacts.
Richard J. Guenther, alternatives and facilities descriptions. B.S. (Engineering Physics), M.S.
(Nuclear Engineering), and Ph.D. (Nuclear Engineering) Oregon State University. Over fifteen
years of experience testing and evaluating nuclear fuels to determine their characteristics and
performance under reactor operating conditions, wet and dry interim storage, and long-term
storage in a monitored retrievable or geologic storage environment.
George V. Last, cultural resources and land use. B.S. (Geology) Washington State University.
Eighteen years of experience in geological research and cultural resources studies. Extensive
experience in preparation and review of NEPA-related documents.
John P. McDonald, water quality and related consequences. A. .S. (Computer Science) and
A.S. (Arts and Science) Columbia Basin College, B.S. (Geology) Eastern Washington University.
Four years of experience in conceptual model development of groundwater flow systems,
collection of hydraulic head data, and determination of groundwater flow rate and direction,
hydraulic testing to determine aquifer properties, testing and maintenance of the waterborne
portion of a multiple environmental media computer model, and application of numerical and
analytic computer models to environmental problems
Emmett Moore, project manager. B.S. (Chemistry) Washington State University, Ph.D. (Physical
Chemistry) University of Minnesota. Twenty years of experience in environmental regulation,
participation in and management of the preparation of environmental permits and
documentation (NEPA). University professor of physics, chemistry, and environmental sciences.
Iral C. Nelson, deputy project manager, environmental consequences. B.S. (Mathematics)
University of Oregon, MA. (Physics) University of Oregon, diplomate, American Board of
Health Physics. Thirty-eight years of experience in various aspects of health physics (radiation
protection) and twenty years of experience in conducting NEPA reviews and preparing NEPA
documentation.
Ronald C. Phillips, geology and water resources. B.S. (Biology) Wheaton College, M.S.
(Botany) Florida State University, Ph.D. (Botany) University of Washington. Wetlands
ecologist including delineation and mitigation of freshwater wetlands. Several years of
experience in the preparation and review of categorical exclusion documents, review of
environmental assessments, and preparation of biological assessments.
Kathleen Rhoads, air quality and accident analysis. B.S. (Microbiology) and M.S. (Radiological
Sciences) University of Washington. Nineteen years of experience in the analysis of risk
assessment variables, estimation of radiation does following routine or accidental release of
radionuclides to the environment, and evaluation of health effects from energy production.
Chikashi Sato, water quality and related consequences. B.S. (Chemical Engineering) Fukushima
National College of Technology, M.S. (Environmental Health Engineering) University of Kansas,
Ph.D. (Environmental Engineering) University of Iowa. Thirteen years of experience in
university teaching, application of the Multimedia Environmental Pollutant Assessment System
(MEPAS), and performance of fate and transport analysis at waste sites.
Dillard B. Shipler, Introduction and review. B.S. (Mathematics and Science) Southern Oregon
College, M.S. (Physics) University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, other studies at University of
Oregon, Oregon State University, Reed College, University of Nevada, and University of
Washington. More than thirty years of experience in the planning and management of major
programs on regulatory compliance, radiological protection, environmental impact assessment,
radiological waste management, and environmental safety and health protection.
Donna J. Stucky, socioeconomics. BA. (Economics) Pacific Lutheran University, M.S.
(Agricultural Economics) Purdue University. Two years of experience in the compilation of
economic data relating to eastern Washington State.
Betty Tegner, editor. BA. (English) University of Washington, MA. (English) California
Polytechnical State University. Previous experience in journalism and university teaching.
Five years of experience in technical editing.
Gene Whelan, water quality and related consequences. B.S. (Civil Engineering) Pennsylvania
State University, M.S. (Mechanics and Hydraulics) University of Iowa, Ph.D. (Civil and
Environmental Engineering) Utah State University. Seventeen years of experience in
multimedia contaminant environmental exposure assessments.
Mona K. Wright, cultural resources and land use. BA. (Anthropology) Eastern Oregon State
College, MA. (Anthropology) Washington State University. Fifteen years experience in cultural
resource management, Federal regulations including the National Historic Preservation Act, the
NEPA, Executive Order 11593, the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, and the
Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act, and historic and prehistoric site
identification and recording.
7. REFERENCES
American Cancer Society, 1993, Cancer Facts and Figures -- 1993, American Cancer Society, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia.
Beck, D. M., M. J. Scott, M. D. Davis, S. F. Shindle, B. A. Napier, A. G. Thurman, D. B. Pittenger, and N. C.
Batishko, 1991, Hanford Area 1990 Population and 50-Year Projections,
PNL-7803, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington.
Bergsman, K. H., 1994, Hanford Spent Fuel Inventory Baseline, WHC-SD-SNF-TI-001, Rev. 0, Westinghouse Hanford
Company, Richland, Washington.
Bergsman, K. H., 1995, Preliminary Hanford Technical Input for the Department of Energy Programmatic Spent
Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Environmental Restoration and Waste Management
Programs Environmental Impact Statement, WHC-EP-0848, Rev. 0, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland,
Washington.
Campbell, N. P., 1989, Structural and Stratigraphic Interpretation of Rocks Under the Yakima Fold Belt, Columbia
Basin, Based on Recent Surface Mapping and Well Data, Special Paper 239, Geological Society of America, Boulder,
Colorado.
Center for Population Research and Census, 1993, Provisional Projections of the Population of Oregon and its
Counties 1990 - 2010, Center for Population Research and Census, School of Urban and Public Affairs, Portland
State University, Portland, Oregon.
Chatters, J. C., 1982, "Prehistoric Settlement and Land Use in the Dry Columbia Basin," Northwest Anthropol. Res.
Notes 16:125-147.
Chatters, J. C. (ed.), 1989, Hanford Cultural Resources Management Plan, PNL-6942, Pacific Northwest Laboratory,
Richland, Washington.
Chatters, J. C., and N. A. Cadoret, 1990, Archeological Survey of the 200-East and 200-West Areas, Hanford Site,
Washington, PNL-7264, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington.
Chatters, J. C., and H. A. Gard, 1992, Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1991,
PNL-8101, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington.
Chatters, J. C., N. A. Cadoret, and P. E. Minthorn, 1990, Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory Annual Report for
Fiscal Year 1989, PNL-7362, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington.
Chatters, J. C., H. A. Gard, and P. E. Minthorn, 1991, Hanford Cultural Resources Laboratory Annual Report for
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Reactor, PNL-5275, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington.
WDOE (Washington State Department of Ecology), 1991, Washington State Air Quality Report: 1989-1990, Washington
State Department of Ecology, Olympia, Washington.
WHC (Westinghouse Hanford Company), 1987, Postirradiation Testing Laboratory (327 Building) Safety Analysis
Report, HEDL-TC-1009, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.
WHC (Westinghouse Hanford Company), 1990, Draft Revision B, Interim Safety Basis for the 308 Building, WHC-SD-FL-
ISB-001, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.
WHC (Westinghouse Hanford Company), 1993a, Environmental Releases for Calendar Year 1992, WHC-EP-0527-2,
Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.
WHC (Westinghouse Hanford Company), 1993b, letter report: Annual Report for Solid Waste Landfill Operations,
8701982B R6, January 14, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.
WHC (Westinghouse Hanford Company), 1995, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Technical Baseline Document Fiscal Year
1995, WHC-SD-SNF-SD-003, Revision 0, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.
Whelan, G., D. W. Damschen, and R. D. Brockhaus, 1987, Columbia River Statistical Update Model - Version 4.0
(COLSTAT4): Background Documentation and User's Guide, PNL-6041, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland,
Washington.
Whelan, G., J. P. McDonald, and C. Sato, 1994, Environmental Consequences to Water Resources from Alternatives of
Managing Spent Nuclear Fuel at Hanford, PNL-10053, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington.
Wichmann, T., 1995, U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho Operations Office, Idaho,
letter to distribution: "Spent Nuclear Fuel Inventory Data," OPE-EIS-95.028, February 1.
Winges, Kirk, D., 1992, User's Guide for the Fugitive Dust Model (FDM). Volume 1: User's Instructions, EPA-910/9-
88-202R (revised), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 10, Seattle, Washington.
Woodruff, R. K., and R. W. Hanf (eds.), 1991, Hanford Site Environmental Report for Calendar Year 1990, PNL-7930,
Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington.
Woodruff, R.K., and R.W. Hanf (eds.), 1992, Hanford Site Environmental Report for Calendar Year 1991, PNL-8148,
Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington.
Woodruff, R. K., and R. W. Hanf (eds.), 1993, Hanford Site Environmental Report for Calendar Year 1992, PNL-8682,
Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington.
WPPSS (Washington Public Power Supply System), 1981, Final Safety Analysis Report, Washington Nuclear Power Plant
No. 2, Amendment 18, Washington Public Power Supply System, Richland, Washington.
Wright, M. K., 1993, Fiscal Year 1992 Report on Archaeological Surveys of the 100 Areas, Hanford Site, Washington,
PNL-8819, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington.
Yuan, Y. C., S. Y. Chen, D. J. Le Poire, and R. Rothman, 1993, RISKIND- A Computer Program for Calculating
Radiological Consequences and Health Risks from Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel, ANL/EAIS-06, Rev. 0,
Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois.
8. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ALARA as low as reasonably achievable
ANL Argonne National Laboratory
ARMF advanced reactivity measurement facility
ATM approved testing materials
ATRC advanced test reactor canal
BWR boiling water reactor
CEQ Council on Environmental Quality
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CFRMF coupled fast reactivity measurement facility
DCG Derived Concentration Guides
DFA driver fuel assemblies
DOE U.S. Department of Energy
EA environmental assessment
ECF Expended Core Facility
ElS environmental impact statement
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPCRA Community Right-to-Know-Act
ERPG Emergency Response Planning Guideline
ER&WM environmental restoration and waste management
FAST Flourinel and Storage Facility at INEL
FECF fuel element cutting facility
FFTF Fast Flux Test Facility
FSF fuel storage facility
FSF Underwater Fuel Storage Facility (located at INEL)
HLW high-level waste
IDF Inspection dose factor
IDLF Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health Values
IDS interim decay storage
IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health Values
IEM interim examination and maintenance
INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
IVS in-vessel storage
ILCF latent cancer fatalities
LLW low-level waste
MEPAS Multimedia Environmental Pollutant Assessment System
MT metric tons
MTHM metric tons of heavy metal
MTR materials test reactor
MTU metric tons of uranium
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act
NPDES National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
NRF Naval Reactors Facility
NRHP National Register of Historic Places
NTS Nevada Test Site
ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PBF Canal power burst facility canal
PEIS programmatic environmental impact statement
PFP Plutonium Finishing Plant
PSD Prevention of Significant Deterioration
PUREX Plutonium and Uranium Recoverv thrnii~ PYt~~~~
PWR pressurized water reactor
RH-TRU remote-handled transuranic material
RTEC Registry of toxic effects for chemical substances
SBA standard blanket assemblies
SHPO Washington State Historic Preservation Officer
SNF spent nuclear fuel
SPR single-pass reactor
SRS Savannah River Site
SS single-shell tank
TDFA test driver fuel assemblies
TEDF Treated Effluent Disposal Facility
TFA test fuel assemblies
TLV/TWA Threshold Limit Values/Time Weighted Averages
TRIGA Training, research, and isotope reactors built by General Atomic
WAC Washington Administrative Code
WIPP Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
ATTACHMENT A
FACILITY ACCIDENTS
Methods used to evaluate facility accidents associated with implementing the alternatives
for SNF storage at Hanford are discussed in this attachment. The selection of radiological
accidents for the analysis was based on information available in previously published safety or
National Environmental Policy Act documents, as described in Section 5. 15. Analyzed releases
of nonradiological hazardous materials were based on actual or expected inventories at SNF
management facilities using conservative release assumptions. Industrial construction and
operational accidents are also evaluated based on the person-years needed to build and operate
SNF facilities.
A.1 Radiological Accidents
The GENII computer code (Napier et a!. 1988) was used to perform calculations for
each facility to estimate the consequences of radionuclide releases to the atmosphere for onsite
workers, members of the public at accessible locations on or near the site, individual residents at
the site boundary, and the population within 80 km of the release location. Dose calculations
used standard assumptions for the Hanford Site (Schreckhise et a!. 1993), and health effects
were estimated using recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological
Protection in its Publication 60 (ICRP 1991). The risks of cancer and other long-term stochastic
health effects as estimated by ICRP (1991) are based on populations exposed to relatively high
doses of radiation at high dose rates. For estimating risk to populations where the total doses
are below 20 rad, the ICRP recommended a low-dose reduction factor equal to 2. In this
analysis, where accidents would yield individual dose estimates greater than 20 rad, the ICRP
risk factors are used without the low dose correction to obtain the potential health effects.
Individual doses were estimated based on exposure of the receptor during the entire
release, except where the release was sufficiently tong that it could be divided into short-term
and long-term components. In that case, onsite workers and members of the public at accessible
onsite locations were assumed to remain in the path of the plume for the duration of the short-
term component. The exposure duration for onsite individuals was assumed to be two hours,
corresponding to the maximum time required to evacuate the Hanford Site in the event of an
accident, and no ingestion pathways were considered. Offsite individuals were assumed to be
exposed during the entire release, regardless of the accident duration. Because protective action
guidelines specify mitigative actions to prevent consumption of contaminated food, the dose to
offsite individuals and populations was estimated both with and without the food ingestion
pathways. Reduced exposure to the plume or to contaminated ground surface as a result of
early evacuation of offsite populations was not considered for the purposes of this analysis,
although such action would certainly be taken in the event of a severe accident at the site.
Individual dose calculations were performed using atmospheric dispersion parameters
that represented 95 percent conditions (i.e., the air concentrations used would not be exceeded
more than S percent of the time). In the case of collective dose, the area surrounding the
source was divided into 16 directions and 10 sectors by distance, and the dose was calculated for
only the direction resulting in maximum collective exposure. Dose to the population was
calculated using both 50 percent and 95 percent atmospheric dispersion parameters.
A.1.1 No Action Alternative
The No Action Alternative consists of fuel storage at existing Hanford facilities, including
the 100-K Area wet storage basins; T Plant and a low-level burial ground in the 200-West Area;
the 308, 324, 325, and 327 buildings in the 300 Area; and the Fast Flux Test Facility in the
400 Area. Maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents determined by Previously published
analyses were used for this evaluation, and the impacts of these accidents were reevaluated
using a consistent set of parameters for the spectrum of receptors required for this document.
A.1.1.1 105-KE and 105-KW Basin Wet Storage. Airborne releases from the fuel
storage pool are bounded by a postulated accident for the 105-ICE and l05-KW Basins. In the
accident, a cask is dropped and overturned in the fuel transfer area, with broken fuel elements
spilling out of the cask, within the pool building, but away from the pool. The scenario assumes
that the shipping cask ruptures, exposing all of the broken fuel elements in three canisters:
42 fuel elements each containing 22.5 kilograms (50 pounds) of fuel. The probability of this
accident is estimated as 10(-4) to 10(-6) per year. The analysis assumes lO-year-old fuel-grade fuel
(12 percent of plutonium content is Plutonium.240). The source term is calculated by
multiplying the inventory at risk by the release fraction. The calculation of the release fractions
assumes the fuel heats but does not melt. Also, site evacuation is assumed, giving a two-hour
time for calculation of the onsite release factor. The offsite release factor was calculated using
an eight-hour release time. The calculated release quantity was 61 grams (0.14 pounds) for
onsite exposure and 244 grams (0.54 pounds) for offsite exposure, resulting in the radionuclide
releases listed in Table A-1. Recalculation of the doses for this analysis yields the results in
Table A-2.
A cask drop involving broken fuel elements falling out of the cask would most likely be
observed by the workers, who would also be alerted by area radiation alarms and the radiation
monitor in attendance of a change in radiation intensity. The assumed 12 workers would likely
be in Special Work Permit protective clothing, but typically would not be wearing respiratory
Table A-1. Estimated radionuclide releases for a dropped fuel casket accident in the 105-K wet storage basins.
Table A-2. Consequences of 105-KE Basin cask drop accident. protection. The workers would immediately evacuate the area to reduce their exposure to direct
radiation (by increasing their distance from the source), for which their clothing provides no
protection. Once at a distance, they would move upwind of the postulated airborne release
before beginning decontamination procedures. Assuming the workers evacuate within 1 to 2
minutes, their dose would range from about 70 to 140 rem. Using risk factors cited previously,
the maximum probability of an individual contracting a fatal cancer from a dose of 140 rem
would amount to about 0.06. The collective worker dose for such a scenario would amount to
about 1800 person-rem for which one fatal cancer would be inferred. It should be noted,
however, the risk factors used are not generally intended to be applied to large acute doses and
such acute doses might produce minor near term adverse health effects.
Recent preliminary analyses, based on updated information on the ability of the lOS-K
Basins to withstand natural forces indicate that seismic-induced damage at the 105-K Basins
could, under some circumstances, result in radiation exposure to the public and workers greater
than that indicated in this EIS. The underlying concern is whether the fuel in its present
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. cute doses of this magnitude are in the lower end of the range of doses that might produce
symptoms of acute radiation syndrome in humans.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
condition could become uncovered by loss of the basin water thereby resulting in larger releases
of radionuclides to the atmosphere; in the present analysis the fuel is assumed to remain
covered. A scenario in which the fuel would remain exposed to the air and allowed to burn is
not considered a reasonably foreseeable accident for the time period covered by this EIS.
A.1.1.2 Liquid Release Scenario for 105-KE or 105-KW Basin. Accidental liquid
releases from the 105-K Basins are bounded by seismic events or other mechanical disruption of
the basin or its water supply system. The most probable scenario is a break in an 8-inch water
supply line that overfills the storage pool causing water to overflow onto the surrounding soil
(Bergsman 1995). The flow is assumed to continue for 8 hours before the supply is shut off,
resulting in release of 2300 cubic meters (600,000 gallons) of water and 60% of the radionuclide
inventory m the pool water. The inventory released from the 105-ICE Basin is assumed to be 13
Ci tritium, 0.029 Ci cobalt-60, 9.2 Ci strontium-90, 0.042 Ci cesium-134, 12 Ci cesium-
l37/barium-137m, 0.0098 Ci plutonium-238, and 0.056 Ci plutonium-239.
The corresponding radionuclide inventory m the 105-KW Basin overflow pond is as-
sumed to be as follows: 0.48 Ci tritium, 0.0013 Ci cobalt-60, 0.0031 Ci cesium-134, 0.22 Ci
cesium-137, 1.1 Ci strontium-90, 5.9E-06 Ci plutonium-238, and 3.lE-05 Ci plutonium-239. The
overflow is assumed to leach through the subsurface environment to the Columbia River.
Because the transmission rate of the soil is estimated as 570 centimeters per day [based on
DOE's Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) (Schramke 1993)], a leaching
rate of 26.3 centimeters per day (10 inches per day) will not result in a ponded situation;
therefore, the entire 2300 cubic meters (600,000 gal) of overflow will leach into the soil over an
eight-hour period. Contaminants are assumed to travel through the vadose zone, through the
saturated zone to the Columbia River and in the Columbia River to receptors downstream. The
flow discharge in the Columbia River is assumed to be under low-flow conditions of 1000 cubic
meters per second (36,000 cubic feet per second) (Whelan et al. 1987), which represents the
most conservative case for maximizing surface water concentrations. As a conservative
assumption, the removal of water from the Columbia River is assumed to be 100 meters
(328 feet) downstream of the point of entry of the contaminant into the river. The assessment
addressed recreational activities (e.g., boating, swimming, fishing) in the Columbia River and use
of the water as a drinking-water supply and for bathing, irrigation, etc. The collective risk of
fatal cancer from the spill at the 105-KW Basin was estimated as approximately 1.1 x 10.13 fatal
cancers for the maxiinum pathway and radionuclide (ingestion of plutonium-239 in fish) at 2800
years. The cumulative risk from all radionuclides and pathways amounted to approximately 6 x
10(-13) fatal cancers. The corresponding risks from a spill at the 105-KE Basin were 2 x 10(-10) fatal
cancers for the maximum nuclide and pathway (also from ingestion of plutonium-239 in fish),
and about 6 x 10.10 fatal cancers for all radionuclides and pathways (Whelan et al. 1994).
The overflow scenario described in the previous paragraph has been extrapolated to
include a larger release because of recent concerns about the effects of a seismic event severe
enough to breach joints in the basin. A crack in the basin would potentially release all of the
basin water and perhaps some of the sludge to the subsurface environment, where it would be
available for leaching to groundwater and transport to the Columbia River. Because the liquid
overflow scenario assumes release of over half of the basin water, the risk to a downstream
individual from release of all the basin water would be less that twice that estimated for the
overflow scenario. Radionuclides in the sludge would be much less mobile and would leach into
groundwater slowly, providing time for remediation and mitigation measures as necessary. Even
if significant quantities of sludge remained in the subsurface soil for an extended period prior to
clean up, the risk to the downstream individuals and population would not likely be substantially
higher than that estimated for the overflow scenario.
This accident would not likely present any hazard to workers at the basin because the
scenario is liquid to ground to groundwater and on to the Columbia River and does not involve
a source of exposure to the close-in workers.
A.1.1.3 308 Building. The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident for airborne
releases related to fuel storage at the 308 Euilding is dropping a transfer basket while moving
fuel from the reactor core to the storage pool (WHC 1990). It was conservatively estimated that
13 fuel elements would have their cladding damaged, resulting in the release of 100 percent of
the krypton-85 to the environment in S minutes. The probability of this accident is estimated as
l0(-2) to 10(-4) per year. In the Original Safety Analysis Report, the resulting dose was estimated at
0.013 rem to the worker, 8.6 x l0(-4) rem to the onsite individual, and 8.6 x lO(-5) rem at the Site
boundary. Collective dose to the population was not reported in the SAR. The individual doses
correspond to a probability of fatal cancer of 5.2E-06 per year for the worker, 4.3E-07 per year
for the onsite member of the public, and 4.3E-08 per year at the site boundary.
This information is provided in more detail in WHC (1990), which, however, does not
detail the total quantity of krypton-85 released in any of its accident scenarios. Because release
quantities for krypton-85 were not available, the consequences of this accident were not re-
evaluated for this analysis. Note that the SAR worker evaluation is for an individual in the
facility who is assumed to evacuate within S minutes. This is a somewhat different analysis from
those for the other worker consequences presented for the Hanford Site, which assume a worker
remains outside the facility at the point of maximum air concentration for a period of up to
2 hours.
A transfer basket drop that results in damage to 13 fuel elements would most likely be
observed by the workers, who would also be alerted by area radiation alarms and the radiation
monitor in attendance of a change in radiation intensity. The assumed 12 workers would likely
be in Special Work Permit protective clothing, but typically would not be wearing respiratory
protection. The workers would immediately evacuate the area to reduce their exposure to direct
radiation (by increasing their distance from the source), for which their clothing provides no
protection. Once at a distance, they would move upwind of the postulated airborne release
before beginning decontamination procedures. It was estimated (WHC 1990) that the workers
would receive a dose of 13 millirem. The collective worker dose would amount to about
0.2 person-rem, and no latent cancer fatalities would be predicted for these workers.
A.1.1.4 324 Building. The greatest potential safety concern at the 324 Building comes
from a safety assessment of the current levels of potentially highly mobile radioactive material in
B-Cell (PNL 1992a). The potential failure of the 324 Building exhaust ventilation system in a
0.1 g seismic event, along with shaking of highly mobile holdup material in the 324 Building hot
cells, could cause a total release of 610 Ci of cesium- 137 and 310 Ci of strontium-90 within
12 hours. Of this total, approximately 55 percent (340 Ci of cesium-137 and 170 Ci of
strontium-90) would be released in the first two hours. The probability of the initiating seismic
event is 4 x 10A per year, and the other events leading to the release are assumed in this
analysis to occur with certainty. The consequences of this accident are presented in Table A-3.
In comparison to this accident, other potential releases from the building are judged to be
insignificant, or they have been determined to be less probable because of radioactive material
containment or handling frequency. The consequences associated with this accident are a result
of existing contamination in the 324 Building hot cells, and neither its likelihood nor its severity
depend on the presence of spent fuel in the facility. The actual contribution of spent fuel to
releases from the accident is assumed to be negligible compared with that of other sources.
A seismic event that causes the failure of the 324 Building exhaust ventilation system and
releases significant quantities of non-spent nuclear fuel-related radioactive materials from the
building could occur at any time, whether or not there were workers in the building. An earth-
Table A-3. Consequences of a seismic event at the 324 Building. quake of sufficient intensity to cause the ventilation failure would surely be noticed by any
workers in the building. In all likelihood, area radiation alarms would also sound. The assumed
50 workers would immediately evacuate the building and move to a position upwind of the
building. Although speculative, the workers might receive as much as 25 rem before reaching a
completely safe zone. If that were the case, they would probably be restricted from further
radiation worker pending results of reading their dosimeters and completion of a medical
evaluation. The maximum probability of an individual contracting a fatal cancer from such a
dose would amount to about 0.02. The postulated collective dose would amount to about
1300 person-rem, from which one latent cancer fatality might be inferred. Based only on the
estimated initiating earthquake frequency, the chances of these consequences occurring would be
about 1 in 5,000 per year.
A.1.1.5 325 Building. A severe earthquake, without subsequent fire, is the maximum
reasonably foreseeable accident for the 325 Building (PNL 1992b). It is postulated that an
earthquake would cause windows to break but not cause general or local structural collapse.
Doors may be jammed open after building evacuation, leaving additional openings for unfiltered
releases. Building power or ventilation could be lost. Further damage would be caused to glove
boxes and the contents of shelves and cabinets. The expected effects are considered to be the
most severe that could result from a 0.135 g horizontal acceleration, corresponding to the
2 x 10(-4)per year seismic event for which protection is required by DOE design criteria for a new
structure.
Radionuclide releases associated with this accident are listed in Table A-4. It should be
noted that the environmental releases associated with the earthquake scenario are from all
sources in the 325 Building; fuel storage activities account for only a small fraction of the total.
Because these releases consist of a variety of chemical forms, the dose factors used for calcula-
tion of the consequences represented the maximum dose for all radionuclides in the total
release. The consequences of this accident are presented in Table A-5.
An earthquake that results in openings for unfiltered releases from the 325 Building
releasing significant quantities of non-spent nuclear fuel-related radioactive materials could
occur at any time, whether or not there were workers in the building. An earthquake of
sufficient intensity to cause damage to the ventilation system and possibly glove boxes and
windows would surely be noticed by any workers in the building. Whether area radiation
monitors alarmed or not, the assumed 50 workers would immediately evacuate the building and,
once outside, would move to a position upwind of the building. Although speculative, the
workers might receive as much as 3 rem before reaching a completely safe zone. The maximum
probability of latent fatal cancer for such a dose would be 0.001. The postulated collective dose
would amount to about 150 person-rem, from which no latent cancer fatalities would be inferred.
A.1.1.6 327 Building. The postulated maximum reasonably foreseeable accident for
fuel storage at the 327 Building consists of mechanical damage to fuel pins and subsequent fire
involving reactive fuel within a hot cell (WHC 1987). Because of the variety of activities that
can occur in the hot cells, specific details of the accident were not postulated. The mechanical
damage would breach the pin cladding and immediately release the gaseous fission products in
the fuel-cladding gap. The subsequent fire would cause complete reaction of reactive fuel forms.
Table A-4. Radionuclide releases for the 325 Building earthquake scenario. Table A-5. Consequences of a seismic event at the 325 Building. Fission products are released to the environment through the ventilation system, which includes
HEPA and activated charcoal filtration. The frequency of this accident is estimated as 10(-4) to
lO(-6) per year. The hot cell inventory and the fraction of the inventory released are shown in
Table A-6.
The previous analysis evaluated the most extreme case for damaged material containing
the maximum aflowable limits of fission products that had not been vented to release fission
gases. In this case, fuel materials involved are assumed to be nonreactive in water and to
contain a maximum fission product inventory of 6.5 x 106 Ci including 2500 Ci of halogens.
Radionuclide releases from the fuel into the basin water and thence into the air above the water
are based on U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.25, which addresses
accidents involving spent fuel in a storage pool. The consequences of the accident as evaluated
for this document are listed in Table A-7.
Table A-6. Assumed inventories and release fractions for a 327 Building hot cell fire. Table A-7. Consequences of 327 Building hot cell fire. This accident involves mechanical damage to fuel pins, subsequent fire within a hot cell,
and releases of radioactive material to the intact filtered ventilation system and on to the
atmosphere. There would be no added source of radiation exposure to the close-in worker at
the hot cell.
A.7.1.7 200-West Area Low-Levei Waste Btirial Grounds. The only accident
postulated to have any significant radiological releases in the Burial Ground safety analysis
report is briefly described as a vehicle impact on one or more EBR II casks followed by a fire
(Saito 1992). Two vehicle impact scenarios were discussed in the document:
1. Severe impact or collision followed by a short-duration fire caused by a vehicular
accident in the trench.
2. Extremely severe impact or collision followed by a long duration fire.
The consequences of the latter accident were evaluated for fuels containing maitmum
inventories of either fission product or transuranic radionuclides. The probability of the
accident is estimated to be 9.8 x 10-6 per year. The consequences of the less severe accident
Table A-8. Radionuclide releases for spent nuclear fuel storage at 200-West Burial Ground, accident scenario 2- extremely severe impact with long duration fire.
would be approximately an order of magnitude lower. The radionuclide releases for accident
scenario 2 are shown in Table A-8; the accident consequences as re-evaluated for this document
are presented in Table A-9. The maximum fission product inventory fuel yielded the highest
consequences for offsite receptors where the ingestion pathway was considered. The maximum
transuranic inventory was associated with higher consequences for the inhalation and external
exposure pathways.
The severe impact or collision followed by fire as postulated here might have serious-to-
fatal nonradiological consequences to drivers and passengers of the vehicles involved. It is
assumed that two drivers and two passengers are involved, These individuals would evacuate
Table A-9. Consequences of the cask impact accident and fire at 200-West Burial Ground. the area, if they were able. Because it cannot be assured that after the collision either drivers
or passengers would be able to evacuate the area to a safe distance from radiological
consequences, the worst case is assumed, that the four individuals perish in this accident
principally from trauma caused by the collision and fire. The likelihood of these consequences
occurring are estimated at 1 chance in 100,000 per year.
A.1.1.8 T Plant. The maximum scenario for fuel storage at T Plant is a dropped fuel
assembly inside the building (Jackson and Hanson 1978). The probability associated with this
accident is estimated to be 2.8 x 10(-3) per year. The release estimates assume damage to a
fraction of the wafers in the dropped fuel module containing 4-year-cooled Shippingport PWR
Core II fuel (a conservative assumption because the fuel has now been cooled for approximately
20 years). Other release assumptions include the following:
- 10% of nonvolatile radionuclides in broken fuel are released to the building floor
- 0.1% of the released particulate matenal is resuspended in the building
- All of the volatile krypton-85 is released to the building atmosphere
- Building filtration removed 98.6 percent of the particulate materials from the
effluent exiting the stack.
Release estimates for this scenario are presented in Table A-10 and the consequences of the
release are listed in Table A-11.
Because workers evacuate the canyon area when fuel assemblies are being moved to or
from the casks or pool, there would be no opportunity for impacts on workers from a dropped
fuel assembly in fuel storage at T Plant.
Table A-10. Releases for damaged assembly of Shippingport Core II fuel with 4-year decay at T Plant.
Table A-11. Consequences of fuel assembly damage at T Plant. A.1.1.9 Fast Flux Test Facillty (FFTF). The accident scenario for the handling and
storage of irradiated FFTF fuel in the Fuel Storage Facility (FSF) is a liquid metal fire (Gantt
1989). The accident scenario is a spill of 11,793 kg of liquid sodium and subsequent fire. The
spill is initiated by either an internal event or a seismic event that causes a break in the piping
between the FSF and heat exchangers. The liquid sodium is assumed to ignite spontaneously
and burn, releasing aerosols to the atmosphere. The probability of this accident is estimated to
be 10(-4) to 10(-6) per year.
The radionuclide release is from cesium that has been leached from the fuel into the
sodium. It is assumed for this accident that 0.1 percent of the elements are breached and that
the sodium contains 0.9 uCi cesium- 134 per gram of sodium and 5 uCi cesium-137 per gram of
sodium. It is assumed that 35 percent of the sodium and cesium aerosols generated in the fire
are released to the atmosphere. The total activity released is estimated as 3.7 Ci cesium- 134
and 25 Ci cesium-137. The consequences of the accident as estimated are listed in Table A-12.
Onsite individuals (workers and members of the public at onsite access locations) were assumed
to be exposed during 0.4 percent of the total release, because the spilled sodium would require
over 20 days to burn completely, and onsite individuals were assumed to be evacuated within
2 hours.
Table A-12. Consequences of liquid metal fire at the Fast Flux Test Facility. An internal event or a seismic event that causes a break in the piping between the FSF
and heat exchangers could occur whether workers were present or not. The event would surely
be noticed by any workers in the building. In all likelihood, area radiation alarms would also
sound. The assumed 50 workers would immediately evacuate the building and, once outside,
would move to a position upwind of the building. Because this is an accident that involves a
slow release of material to the atmosphere, it is speculated that dose to the close-in workers
would not exceed 0.1 rem from this accident. The postulated collective dose would amount to
about 5 person-rem, from which no latent cancer fatalities would be expected.
A.1.2 Decentralization Alternative
The Decentralization Alternative involves construction of several new facilities at
Hanford, including new dry storage for spent fuel or a combination of new wet and dry storage.
Options are also included for several types of fuel processing prior to storage. The conse-
quences of new facilities are based on previously evaluated accidents for similar installations,
adapted for the conditions and location of these facilities as assumed in this analysis.
A.1.2.1 New Wet Storage. This accident scenario is the same as that described for a
dropped fuel container at the 100-K Basins. The releases are assumed to be the same as for the
accident previously described (see Table A-1), but the evaluation was repeated for potential
location of the new facility adjacent to the 200-East Area. The accident frequency in the
No Action Alternative is also assumed for this alternative because the quantity of fuel handled
in either case would be the same. The consequences of this accident for a new facility are-
shown in Table A- 13.
A maximum reasonably foreseeable liquid release scenario has been postulated for the
new pool storage facility for wet storage of nuclear fuels. The leak is based on a 20-cm (8-inch)
water-supply pipe breaking inside of the pool building and releasing 7600 liters per minute
(2000 gallons per minute). The flow is not shut off for 8 hours, resulting in 3600 cubic meters
(960,000 gal) being added to the pool. Because the pool cannot handle this amount of liquid,
there is an overflow of 2300 cubic meters (600,000 gal) in this 8-hour period. Because the trans-
missidn rate of the soil is estimated as 570 centimeters per day (220 inches per day) [based on
DOE's Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) (Schramke 1993)], a leaching
rate of 26.3 centimeters per day (10 inches per day) will not result in ponding; therefore, the
entire volume of overflow will leach into the soil over an 8-hour period. The basin overflow
does contain 61 percent of the basin-water radionuclide inventory, which is estimated as 1.8 Ci.
The specific radionuclide inventory in the overflow pond is assumed to be as follows: 0.48 Ci
tritium, 0.0013 Ci cobalt-60,'0.031 Ci cesium-134, 0.22 Ci cesium-137, 1.1 Ci strontium-90,
5.9E-06 Ci plutonium-238, and 3.lE-05 Ci plutonium-239. All of the constituents in this
assessment are radionuclides. Contaminant migration is through the vadose zone, through the
saturated zone to the Columbia River, and in the Columbia River to receptors downstream.
The flow discharge in the Columbia River is assumed to be under low-flow conditions of
1000 cubic meters per second (36,000 cubic feet per second) (Whelan et al. 1987), which
represents the most conservative case for maximizing surface water concentrations. As a
conservative assumption, the removal of water from the Columbia River is assumed to be
100 meters (328 feet) downstream of the point of entry of the contaminant into the river. The
assessment addressed recreational activities (e.g., boating, swimming, fishing) in the Columbia
River and use of the water as a drinking-water supply and for bathing, irrigation, etc. The
overall risk of fatal cancer from this accident was found to be less than 10 chances in a billion.
(Whelan et al. 1994).
Table A-13. Consequences of cask drop accident at new wet storage facility adjacent to the 200-East Area.
A cask drop involving broken fuel elements falling out of the cask at a new wet storage
facility would be tile same as discussed in Section A. 1. 1. 1. No prompt radiation illness or latent
cancer fatalities would be~redictcd for workers in this scenario.
The accident scenario at the 105-ICE and 105-KW Basins and its results described under
the No Action Alternative would also be applicable under the Decentralization Alternative prior
to transport of fuel to a new storage facility.
A.1.2.2 New Dry Storage - Small Vault or Cask Facility. The maximum reasonably
foreseeable accident for the dry storage facility is assumed to be the same as that for a
previously evaluated accident involving transport of FFTF fuel (DOE 1986b). This accident is
used as a surrogate for a dry storage facility accident involving an impact by either an internal
or external initiator that results in a fire. The release associated with this accident is estimated
at 5.4E + 02 Ci, based on the hypothetical scenario of six FFTF fuel assemblies irradiated to
150 MWD/Kg being subjected to a severe impact followed by a fire. The fuel pins rupture on
impact or on heating in the fire, which burns for an hour before being extinguished. The
probability of such an accident resulting in b~ach of the transport cask is estimated to be
9 x 10(-7)or lower for 100 onsite shipments of FFw fuel. The estimated frequency for this
accident in tile Decentralization Alternative has been adjusted to 6 x 10(-6) per year based on the
quantity of fuel that would be handled in loading the dry storage facility. Volatiles, particulates,
and noble gases are released to the atmosphere. The estimated radionuclide releases are listed
in Table A-14, and the radiological consequences are presented in Table A-15.
Table A-14. Estimated radionuclide releases for cask impact accident and fire at new dry storage facility, based on FFTF fuel transport.
Table A-15. Consequences of cask impact accident with fire at new dry storage facility. An internal or external initiator that causes a breach followed by fire in a dry storage
facility would surely be noticed by nearby workers. In all likelihood, area radiation alarms would
also sound. The assumed 12 workers would immediately evacuate the area and, once at a safe
distance, would move to a position upwind of the building. Evacuation time to that location
would be measured in minutes. The dose to close-in workers is speculated to be about 3 rem.
The maximum probability of latent fatal cancer from such a dose would be 0.001. The
postulated collective dose would amount to about 36 person-rem, from which no latent cancer
fatalities would be expected.
A.1.2.3 New Fuel Stabilization Facility. The maximum reasonably foreseeable
radiological accident for fuel processing (either calcine or solvent extraction) is a uranium metal
fire in a storage vessel (DOE l986b; Bergsman 1995). The frequency of this accident is
estimated at 10A to l0~ per year. Releases for the accident from a new facility adjacent to the
200-East Area are listed in Table A-16. The total release assumes that fuel burns for a period
of 20 hours; therefore, doses to onsite receptors were calculated on the basis that they were
exposed for 2 hours (or 10 percent of the total release, assuming a constant release rate for the
duration of the fire). The consequences of the accident are listed in Table A-17.
This accident involves a uranium fire in a storage vessel with releases of radioactive
material to the atmosphere. There would be no added source of radiation exposure of the
close-in worker in the processing facility.
A.1.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
Accidents and consequences would be essentially the same as those for the Decentrali-
zation Alternative.
A.1.4 Regionalization Alternative
Accidents and consequences would be essentially the same as for the Decentralization
Alternative. The accident frequencies for a cask impact and fire at handling and storage
facilities were adjusted to account for the quantity of imported or exported fuel handled in each
of the suboptions at a receiving and canning facility or in loading storage facilities. For
Table A-16. Estimated airborne radionuclide release from shear/leach/ calcine stabilization facility as a result of maximum reasonably forseeable accident (uranium metal fire in storage
vessel).
Table A-17. Consequences of uranium metal fire at fuel stabilization facility.
Regionalization A (all fuel except defense fuel would be shipped offsite) the frequency was
assumed to be the same as in Decentralization (6E-06 per year). The frequency in
Regionalization B (Western fuel comes to Hanford) is slightly higher (7E-06) because of the
additional fuel that would be handled. The Regionalization Alternative is assigned a lower
frequency (5E-06) when all SNF is shipped offsite.
A.1.5 Centralization Alternative
The Centralization Alternative consists of two options at Hanford - a minimum option in
which all DOE spent fuel at Hanford is transported offsite to another location for interim
storage, and a maximum alternative that would result in storage of all DOE spent fuel at
Hanford. Accident scenarios for the minimum option would include those discussed under the
No Action Alternative prior to shipment of the fuel offsite. In addition, N reactor and SPR fuel
would be stabilized prior to shipment in a facility simflar to the shear/leach/calcine facility
discussed under the Decentralization Alternative. The uranium metal fire accident discussed
under that alternative is assumed to be the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident for a
stabilization facility in this case as well. The estimated frequency for the cask impact and fire at
storage or canning and shipping facilities has been adjusted to 5 x 10(-6) per year based on the
quantity of fuel that would be handled in the centralization minimum alternative.
The maximum option contains suboptions for wet or dry fuel storage with processing
similar to those for the Decentralization Alternative, and the consequences are expected to be
essentially the same as those described previously. The estimated frequency for the cask impact
and fire at a receiving and canning or dry storage facility has been adjusted to 8 x l0~ per year
based on the quantity of imported fuel that would be handled in the Centralization Alternative,
maximum option. The only additional installation that would be included in this option is the
Expended Core Facility (ECF), which would be relocated from the INEL. The consequences of
accidents at this facility are discussed in Volume 1, Appendix D of this document. It should be
noted that the accident evaluation for the ECF at Hanford in Appendix D uses assumptions that
are different from those used for the Hanford accidents in this attachment and therefore the
risks associated with the ECF at Hanford cannot be compared directly with those for the other
Hanford facilities presented here. The consequences of the ECF accidents using Hanford Site
assumptions would be higher than those presented in Appendix D.
A.2 Nonradiological Accidents
For purposes of the analysis, a worst-case accident scenario was developed for each
existing and planned facility. The details of the nonradiological accident scenario are presented
in this section. The scenario involves a chemical spili within a building, followed by an
environmental release from the normal exhaust system. It is assumed that the building remains
intact but containment measures fail, allowing release to occur through the ventilation system.
It is assumed that all, or a portion of, the entire inventory of toxic chemicals stored in each
building is released. The environmental releases are modeled and the hypothetical
concentrations at three receptor locations are compared to toxicological limits.
A.2.1 Chemical Lists
Chemical inventory and chemical emissions lists have been developed provided by
alternative and facility (Bergsman 1995). These chemical lists are of three basic types. The first
type is a "worst-case chemical inventory," prepared to comply with the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-To-Know Act reporting requirement. For facilities that store SNF, this lists
which ones are of particular interest. The second type, presented in the Facility Costs section, is
a general statement listing proposed process chemicals. The third type of list is an estimate of
proposed liquid effluents and airborne emissions, presented in the Facility Discharges section.
Effluent and emissions data are not presented for every option.
A.2.2 Baseline Chemical Inventory Based on Existing Facilities
A baseline inventory of chemicals kept in SNF facilities was developed from chemical
Inventories for these facilities that were compiled to comply with the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-To-Know Act. The existing storage facilities are 105-ICE Basin, 105-KW
Basin, PUREX (202A), T Plant (22 IT), 2736-ZB Building, 200W low-level burial grounds, Fast
Fuel Test Facility (FFTF) (403 Building), 308 Building, 324 Building, 325 A&B Building, and
327 Building. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act lists used are from
1992.
Because most facilities have various missions, the need for an inventory of chemicals at
these facilities may not be related to the storage of SNF. The assumption is made that the
existing inventories represent the amounts and types of chemicals that may be needed in the
future.
Table A-15 lists chemicals by facility, the regulated reportable quantity (RQ) in the event
of an environmental release, the maximum quantity stored, its physical state (gas, solid, liquid),
the reference where the chemical is listed, the hypothetical release fraction (1 for gases, 0.1 for
liquids, and 0.01 for solids), the calculated total hypothetical chemical release, and the chemical's
probable use.
In the table, a solid frame around a number indicates that a stored quantity exceeds the
reportable quantity for that chemical; a double-lined frame indicates that a conservative
hypothetical accidental release would exceed the reportable quantity. A total of seventeen
chemicals fail in the latter category and have the highest probability to be released to the air.
These seventeen chemicals are the ones that would demand the highest attention in an
emergency plan.
Because a reportable quantity has itt been defined for every chemical, the inherent
toxicity of each chemical was also considered in assessing its importance. The release fractions
used in the accidental spill scenario are conservative, higher than those reported in the literature
by as much as three orders of magnitude (Hickey et al. 1991).
A.2.3 Proposed Facilities
Table A-19 is primarily derived from the Facility Costs section of the engineering design
data (Bergsman 1995). However, the 105-KE Basin is used as a surrogate for a baseline
chemical inventory for the wet storage facility because the Facility Cost section lists only sodium
hydroxide and suffuric acid.
Table A-19 lists chemicals by facility, the regulated reportable quantity (RQ) in the event
of an environmental release, the maximum quantity stored, its physical state (gas, solid, liquid),
the reference where the chemical is listed, the hypothetical release fraction (1 for gases, 0.1 for
liquids, and 0.01 for solids), the calculated total hypothetical chemical release, and the chemical's
probable use. In the table, a solid frame around a number indicates that a stored quantity
exceeds the reportable quantity for that chemical; a double-lined frame indicates that a
conservative hypothetical accidental release would exceed the reportable quantity. A total of six
chemicals fall in the latter category and have the highest probability to be released to the air.
These six chemicals are the ones that would demand the highest attention in an emergency plan.
A.2.4 Atmospheric Modeling
Effects to onsite workers, the nearest point of pubic access, and the public at the nearest
offsite residence were estimated using the computer model EPlcode (DOE 1993b). EPicode
uses a straight line Gaussian plume model and characteristics of an individual chemical to
estimate downwind concentrations independent of direction. The 95 percent meteorological
parameters were used to determine the wind speeds and stability class used for the simulation.
In each case, stability class F was used. Wind speeds of 0.89 meters per second (2.0 miles per
hour) were used for calculating effects to an onsite worker, the nearest point of public access,
and at the nearest offsite residence. Other criteria used in the model simulations can be found
in DOE (1993a).
Table A-18. Baseline Chemical Inventory for Existing Facilities in SNF Storage Locations (Page 1)
Table A-18. Page 2 Table A-18. Page 3 Table A-18. Page 4 Table A-18. Page 5 Table A-19. Baseline Chemical Inventory for Proposed Facilities.(Page 1) Table A-19. (Page 2) Table A-19. (Page 3) A.2.5 Toxicological Limits
Results from the EPlcode model were compared to available Emergency Response
Planning Guideline (ERPG) values, Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) values,
and Threshold Limit Values/Time-Weighted Averages. In the absence of these values,
toxicological data for similar health endpoints, obtained from the Registry of Toxic Effects for
Chemical Substances (RTEC), are used.
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines are estimates of airborne concentration
thresholds above which one can reasonably anticipate observing adverse effects (DOE 1993b).
Emergency Response Planning Guideline values are specific for a substance and are divided into
three general severity levels: ERPG.l, ERPG-2, and ERPG-3. ERPG-1 values result in an
unacceptable likelihood that one would experience mild transient adverse health effects or
perception of a clearly defined objectionable odor (DOE 1993b). ERPG-2 values result in an
unacceptable likelihood that one would experience or develop irreversible or other serious
health effects or symptoms that could impair one's ability to take protective action (DOE
1993b). ERPG-3 values result in an unacceptable likelihood that one would experience life-
threatening health effects (DOE 1993b).
For many chemicals, ERPG levels are not defined. In these instances, Threshold Limit
Value/Time-Weight Average (TLV/TWA) values are substituted for ERPG-l values. Ten
percent of Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) values are substituted for ERPG-2
values, and IDLH values are substituted for ERPG-3 values (DOE 1993b).
Data from RTEC were used for eight chemicals. Acute toxicity data were utilized to
generate exposure limits to approximate the ERPG endpoints--irritation/odor, irreversible
health effects, and death.
All references for Attachment A are included
in Chapter 7 of this Appendix
ATTACHMENT B
EVALUATION OF OPTION FOR FOREIGN PROCESSING OF SPENT
NUCLEAR FUEL CURRENTLY LOCATED AT THE HANFORD SITE
B.1 Description of Foreign Processing Alternative
This option was considered in response to a public comment requesting that foreign processing of N Reactor
spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from the Hanford Site be addressed as a reasonable alternative to domestic stabilization
and storage. Under this alternative, the SNF currently stored in basins at the 100-K Area of the Hanford Site
would be packaged for shipment to an overseas facility where it would be processed. Only production reactor fuel
stored at the 100-K Basins was considered in this analysis because it represents a large quantity of relatively
homogenous material that would require stabilization in order to be suitable for 40-year storage. Small
quantities of other types of fuel currently stored at Hanford either would not require stabilization or would have
sufficiently different characteristics that they could not be stabilized efficiently by a single-process
facility.
This analysis assumes that high-level waste (HLW) arising from the process would be returned to Hanford for
interim storage, although it could potentially be stored overseas until a domestic repository was available in
which to permanently dispose of it. Similarly, uranium and plutonium resulting from the processing were presumed
to be returned to Hanford for interim storage; however, these materials could also be stored overseas until a
decision is made on their disposition by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).
The following analysis was undertaken despite substantial uncertainties concerning the feasibility of long-
distance transport of SNF in its current condition from the Hanford Site. Approximately half of the SNF is
currently stored underwater at the 100-K West Basin in sealed, vented containers, and the remaining fuel is at
100-K East Basin in containers that are open to water. Efforts to characterize the physical and chemical state of
the SNF are just getting underway, and those studies may reduce the uncertainties associated with long-distance
transport of this SNF.
The SNF shipment would be required to meet national and international regulations specifying integrity of
the cask seal in the event of internal pressure build-up, acceptable gas concentrations inside the cask, and
allowable quantities of dispersible radionuclides. Because the defense production reactor SNF suffered damage
during handling and discharge from the reactors, and because it was not designed for long-term durability in wet
storage, a substantial fraction of the fuel elements have degraded during the time since reactor operations ceased
(ranging from 7 to more than 20 years). The Hanford SNF in its present condition may not meet these requirements
because of the quantity of dispersible radionuclides in damaged and corroding SNF, or because of heat generation
and possible buildup of gases within the shipping container that might result from reactions between SNF and water
in the wet overpack.
If the Hanford fuel were not able to meet the transportation requirements, the overseas processing
alternative would necessitate additional expense and risk to stabilize the fuel or to divide the shipments into
smaller quantities than assumed for the present analysis, perhaps to the extent that it might prove to be
impractical altogether. The overland transport evaluation presented in Volume 1, Appendix I of this EIS assumed
that Hanford SNF was in a stabilized form prior to shipment, as described in this appendix. Because of the
uncertainties surrounding the feasibility of long-distance transport of Hanford SNF in its present condition, and
to be consistent with the overland transport analysis in Appendix I, the SNF for overseas shipment is also
presumed to be stabilized prior to shipment or is limited to elements that are sufficiently intact that the
requirements of the transportation regulations could be met using a wet overpack shipping system. The shipment
quantities assumed in the overseas transport analysis include the total mass of SNF estimated to be in the
K Basins, although some of the SNF is known to exist as corrosion products and sludge, which would not be suitable
for shipment without prior treatment to convert them into a less dispersible form.
B.2 Methods and Assumptions
The following sections describe the methods used to evaluate potential consequences of the overseas
processing option. The analysis focuses on the activities associated with transportation of the SNF to the United
Kingdom (U.K.) for processing and return of the waste and products to the U.S. The analysis also includes
activities at Hanford to prepare the SNF for shipment, as well as those associated with transport and processing
of the SNF within the U.K., to the extent that information was available. Information from an overseas processing
facility located in the U.K. was used as the basis for this evaluation (BNFL 1994). However, the use of those
facilities as a representative case would not preclude processing of SNF from Hanford at another suitable overseas
installation.
B.2.1 Shipping Scenarios
Potential shipping scenarios are described in this option for transporting irradiated N Reactor fuel from the
Hanford Site to the U.K., and the return of separated plutonium, uranium, and HLW to Hanford. All scenarios assume
stabilization and packaging, as necessary, of the SNF currently stored in the 100-K Area Basins on the Hanford
Site. From the 100 Area, the SNF would be loaded for onsite or offsite transport as required for each scenario.
Offsite transport would take place via either barge, truck, or rail to a port designated as a "facility of
particular hazard" in accordance with 33 CFR 126, where the shipment would be loaded onto a ship for overseas
transport. The overseas segment of the shipment was assumed to utilize purpose-built ships typical of those
employed by the representative processing facility in the U.K. for shipping SNF (BNFL 1994). Such a system would
likely be necessary if Hanford SNF were to be shipped without prior stabilization because alternative carriers
would presumably not have either the equipment or expertise required for long-distance transport of metallic SNF
in a wet overpack. If the SNF were stabilized before shipment, a variety of commercial or military shipping
options might be available (see DOE 1995 for a discussion of those options).
After processing of the SNF, the products and wastes were assumed to be returned to Hanford for interim
storage via the same U.S. seaport at which the initial shipments exited the country. The three materials
addressed in the analysis for the return shipments are plutonium, uranium, and HLW. It was assumed that the
separated plutonium and uranium would be converted to oxide forms and shipped to the U.S. aboard a purpose-built
ship similar to that used for transporting the irradiated fuel. Other transport options might also be available
for these materials, including use of military or commercial ships or aircraft. High-level waste was assumed to
be processed to a stable form (borosilicate glass encased in stainless steel canisters) before shipment. This
section provides descriptions of the shipping scenarios, transportation and packaging systems, radiological
characteristics of the shipments, transportation routes, and port facilities that were examined in this analysis.
B.2.1.1 Port Selection. Ports evaluated for the foreign processing option were chosen to minimize either
the overland or ocean segments of the shipments and to provide a reasonable range of alternative transportation
modes between the Hanford Site and the port (i.e., barge, truck, or rail). For the purposes of this evaluation,
two potential West Coast U.S. ports (Seattle/Tacoma, Washington, and Portland, Oregon) and one potential East
Coast port (Norfolk, Virginia) were evaluated for the overland transportation analysis. Population densities
along the routes to these ports are representative of those in the vicinity of many major U.S. seaports. In
addition, the port of Newark, New Jersey, was included in the port accident analysis to estimate the consequences
of an accident in a location with a very high surrounding population.
B.2.1.2 Overseas Transport. The routing for overseas transport from West Coast U.S. ports would include
transit via the Columbia River or Puget Sound to the Pacific Ocean, a southerly route through the Panama Canal or
around Cape Horn in South America, and then north to the U.K. The route around the cape is considered because it
maximizes the distance that a shipment might be required to travel, and therefore, provides an upper bound for
risks associated with the ocean transport segment. However, a route via the Panama Canal would be preferable for
West Coast shipments because it avoids potential risk associated with the added distance and adverse weather
conditions that might be encountered during transport around the cape. Transport via an East Coast U.S. port would
be directly across the Atlantic Ocean to the U.K. The total distance for ocean transport via the West Coast is
approximately 7,000 nautical miles via the Panama Canal or 17,000 nautical miles via Cape Horn; that for the East
Coast is approximately 3000 nautical miles.
B.2.1.3 Overland Transport Scenarios. Overland transport between the Hanford Site and overseas shipping
ports was evaluated for three different scenarios, as described in the following sections.
B.2.1.3.1 Barge to Portland, Transoceanic Shipment to the U.K. This scenario begins with cask
loading operations at the Hanford Site 100-K Area Basins. The shipping casks would be loaded with SNF and prepared
for truck transport to the Port of Benton barge slip near the 300 Area of the Hanford Site. After arrival at the
barge slip, the shipping casks would be transloaded onto the barge via crane and then secured to the deck of the
barge. After a full load of casks was secured, the barge would depart for the Port of Portland, Oregon, traveling
down the Columbia River through routinely navigated shipping channels. At the Port of Portland, the shipping
casks would be lifted off the barge and placed aboard a ship for the overseas segment of the journey. The shipping
casks would then be secured, and the ship would depart for the U.K. After processing of the SNF, the HLW shipments
were assumed to return via Portland, where the material would be transloaded onto a rail car and transported to
Hanford for interim storage. Shipments of uranium and plutonium oxide would be returned to Hanford by truck.
B.2.1.3.2 Truck/Rail to the Port of Seattle, Transoceanic Shipment to the U.K. The first leg of
this scenario is different from the barge-to-Portland scenario in that the shipping casks would be loaded at the
K Basins and shipped directly to the Port of Seattle, Washington, for transloading onto the ocean-going vessel.
The overland leg would consist of either truck or rail shipments. It was assumed that one shipping cask would be
transported per truck shipment or two casks per rail shipment. After arrival at the Port of Seattle, the shipping
casks would be transloaded onto the ocean-going vessel and when a shipload of casks had been loaded, the ship would
sail through Puget Sound and the Strait of Juan de Fuca to the Pacific Ocean, travel south via either the Panama
Canal or Cape Horn, and then north to the U.K. After processing, the uranium, plutonium, and vitrified HLW would
be returned to the U.S. by ship via Seattle and finally to Hanford by truck or rail.
B.2.1.3.3 Truck/Rail to the Port of Norfolk, Virginia, Transoceanic Shipment to
the U.K. This scenario would be similar to the truck/rail to Seattle scenario except the intermediate
port would be Norfolk, Virginia. Similar to the Port of Seattle scenario, the shipping casks would be loaded aboard the
ocean-going vessel and shipped to the U.K. This shipping scenario maximizes the overland transport leg and
minimizes the ocean travel distance. As with the other two shipping scenarios, the solidified HLW, plutonium
oxide, and uranium oxide materials were assumed to be returned to Hanford via Norfolk.
B.2.2 Shipping System Descriptions
This section presents descriptions of the shipping cask and truck, rail, and barge shipping systems that are
used in the three potential shipping scenarios. The information presented focuses on the param-
eters important to the impact calculations, namely the cargo capacities and radionuclide inventories.
The shipping cask assumed to be used for the SNF shipments from Hanford to the U.K. is a standard design
routinely used for commercial SNF transport (BNFL 1994). The cask could transport approximately 5 tons of intact
fuel (with a smaller capacity for damaged fuel). The loaded cask weight is about 46 tons, so it was assumed that
one cask could be transported per highway shipment and two per rail shipment. The capacities of the barge and ship
were assumed to be 24 casks each. A total of 17 transoceanic shipments would be required to accommodate the 408
caskloads that would be necessary to ship all Hanford SNF. The actual number of shipments required would depend on
the number of casks available, or on procurement of a sufficient number of new casks to provide for efficient
shipment of Hanford SNF on a reasonable schedule.
The radionuclide inventories for the SNF shipments were determined using the information on N Reactor
fuel inventories presented in Bergsman (1994). The resulting radionuclide inventories for the three types of
shipments (truck, rail, and barge/ship) are presented in Table B-1.
The return shipments of HLW and plutonium and uranium oxide were assumed to be shipped via the same routes used
for overseas shipment of Hanford SNF. For the barge to Portland option, these materials were assumed to be
returned to the U.S. by ship to the Port of Portland, where HLW shipping casks would be transloaded onto a barge
and uranium and plutonium onto trucks for transport to Hanford. Similarly for the other options, the materials
would be transported by ships to the ports of Norfolk or Seattle, transloaded onto truck or rail shipping systems,
and transported to Hanford.
The number of shipments of solidified HLW was estimated using assumed shipping cask capacities for HLW. It is
estimated that a total of 500 containers of vitrified HLW, each weighing about 500 kg, would result from
processing the N Reactor SNF (BNFL 1994). The U.K. processing facility has designed a new 110-ton shipping cask
for vitrified HLW that would be capable of carrying 21 HLW containers per shipment. Therefore, about 24 caskloads
would be required to return the HLW to the U.S. This material was assumed to be transported to a U.S. port facility
in one shipment and then transloaded onto a rail car for the overland shipment segment (the HLW cask is too large
to be transported by regular truck service). The actual number of shipments required would depend on the number of
HLW casks available or on procurement of a sufficient number of new casks to provide for efficient return shipment
of HLW on a reasonable schedule.
The radionuclide inventories for the solidified HLW shipments are presented in Table B-1. These inventories
were calculated by dividing the total quantity of each radionuclide shipped to the U.K. (exclusive of uranium and
plutonium) by the number of HLW casks (24) to be returned to the U.S.
Table B-1. Facility and transport mode radionuclide inventory developmenta
Radionuclide Curies/ Grams/ MTU Total Curies/Shipmentb Curies/Shipping Caskc
MTU Curies
in SNF
Truck Rail Barge HLWd Plutonium Uranium
Oxidee Oxidee
Shipments 408 204 17 24/1 186 236
Duration 5 years 5 years 5 years 7 months 2.3 years 2.9 years
H3 4.59E+01 9.64E+04 2.36E+02 4.73E+02 5.67E+03 4.02E+03
Fe-55 1.22E+01 2.56E+04 6.28E+01 1.26E+02 1.51E+03 1.07E+03
Co-60 8.78E+00 1.84E+04 4.52E+01 9.04E+01 1.08E+03 7.68E+02
Kr-85 8.07E+02 1.69E+06 4.15E+03 8.31E+03 9.97E+04 7.06E+04
Sr-90 9.32E+03 1.96E+07 4.80E+04 9.59E+04 1.15E+06 8.16E+05
Y-90 9.32E+03 1.96E+07 4.80E+04 9.59E+04 1.15E+06 8.16E+05
Ru-106 8.52E+01 1.79E+05 4.39E+02 8.77E+02 1.05E+04 7.46E+03
Rh-106 8.52E+01 1.79E+05 4.39E+02 8.77E+02 1.05E+04 7.46E+03
Sb-125 2.02E+02 4.24E+05 1.04E+03 2.08E+03 2.50E+04 1.77E+04
Te-125 4.94E+01 1.04E+05 2.54E+02 5.09E+02 6.10E+03 4.32E+03
Cs-134 3.01E+02 6.32E+05 1.55E+03 3.10E+03 3.72E+04 2.63E+04
Cs-137 1.20E+04 2.52E+07 6.18E+04 1.24E+05 1.48E+06 1.05E+06
Ba-137m 1.14E+04 2.39E+07 5.87E+04 1.17E+05 1.41E+06 9.98E+05
Ce-144 3.97E+01 8.34E+04 2.04E+02 4.09E+02 4.90E+03 3.47E+03
Pr-144 3.97E+01 8.34E+04 2.04E+02 4.09E+02 4.90E+03 3.47E+03
Pr-144m 4.77E-01 1.00E+03 2.46E+00 4.91E+00 5.89E+01 4.17E+01
Pm-147 2.72E+03 5.71E+06 1.40E+04 2.80E+04 3.36E+05 2.38E+05
Table B-1. (contd)
Radionuclide Curies/ Grams/ MTU Total Curies/Shipmentb Curies/Shipping Caskc
MTU Curies
in SNF
Truck Rail Barge HLWd Plutonium Uranium
Oxidee Oxidee
Shipments 408 204 17 24/1 186 236
Duration 5 years 5 years 5 years 7 months 2.3 years 2.9 years
Sm-151 1.10E+02 2.31E+05 5.66E+02 1.13E+03 1.36E+04 9.63E+03
Eu-154 2.17E+02 4.56E+05 1.12E+03 2.23E+03 2.68E+04 1.90E+04
Eu-155 5.14E+01 1.08E+05 2.65E+02 5.29E+02 6.35E+03 4.50E+03
U-234 4.34E-01 6.94E+01 9.11E+02 2.23E+00 4.47E+00 5.36E+01 3.73E+00
U-235 1.60E-02 7.39E+03 3.35E+01 8.22E-02 1.64E-01 1.97E+00 1.37E-01
U-236 7.63E-02 1.18E+03 1.60E+02 3.93E-01 7.86E-01 9.43E+00 6.57E-01
U-238 3.31E-01 9.84E+05 6.94E+02 1.70E+00 3.40E+00 4.08E+01 2.85E+00
Np-237 4.75E-02 9.98E+01 2.45E-01 4.89E-01 5.87E+00 4.16E+00
Pu-238 1.22E+02 2.56E+05 6.28E+02 1.26E+03 1.51E+04 1.33E+03
Pu-239 1.36E+02 2.20E+03 2.86E+05 7.02E+02 1.40E+03 1.68E+04 1.48E+03
Pu-240 9.94E+01 4.38E+02 2.09E+05 5.12E+02 1.02E+03 1.23E+04 1.08E+03
Pu-241 8.71E+03 8.46E+01 1.83E+07 4.49E+04 8.97E+04 1.08E+06 9.48E+04
Pu-242 6.45E-02 1.64E+01 1.35E+02 3.32E-01 6.63E-01 7.96E+00 7.01E-01
Am-241 1.84E+02 3.86E+05 9.47E+02 1.89E+03 2.27E+04 1.61E+04
Cm-244 2.62E+01 5.50E+04 1.35E+02 2.70E+02 3.24E+03 2.29E+03
a. Radionuclide inventory taken from Bergsman (1994) and represents 10-year cooled Mark 1A fuel, in which
Pu-240 constitutes 16% of total plutonium.
b. Curies/shipment inventories assume 1 cask per truck shipment, 2 truck casks per rail, and 24 truck
casks per barge shipment.
c. Curies/cask inventories are based on one cask per truck and/or rail shipment.
d. HLW - Solidified high level waste; inventory assumes 100% removal of plutonium and uranium. High-
level waste to be shipped only by barge (24 casks per barge) or rail (1 cask per rail car).
e. Plutonium and uranium oxide inventories assume 100% removal, and the number of shipments has been
adjusted to reflect conversion from metal to oxide. Plutonium and uranium oxide to be shipped by barge
and truck only.
The number of shipments of uranium and plutonium oxide were estimated using standard U.S. shipping equipment
for uranium and plutonium. The estimated quantities to be shipped include 2,360 tons of purified uranium oxide
and 6.5 tons of plutonium oxide generated from processing the K Basin SNF. For this analysis, it was assumed that
the plutonium oxide would be transported by truck in a Type B package with a capacity of 35 kg/shipment. This
results in a total of 186 caskloads of plutonium oxide. The vehicle for transport of plutonium was assumed to be a
Safe-Secure Trailer/Armored Tractor specifically designed for shipment of special nuclear materials within the
U.S. The uranium oxide was assumed to be transported by truck in shipping systems with a capacity of
10,000 kg/shipment. This would require a total of 236 caskloads of uranium oxide. One caskload per truck shipment
for overland segments was assumed. One sea shipment of uranium oxide and one of plutonium oxide were assumed to be
required.
The radionuclide inventories for the plutonium oxide and uranium oxide shipments are presented in Table B-1.
The inventories were determined by dividing the total quantities of uranium and plutonium to be shipped to the
U.K. by the respective numbers of caskloads presented above.
B.2.3 Transportation Route Information
The overland transportation routes assumed for this analysis are described in the following section. The
descriptive information includes the shipping distances and population density data. These data were developed
using the HIGHWAY (Johnson et al. 1993a) and INTERLINE (Johnson et al. 1993b) computer codes for truck and rail
shipments, respectively, and are used to calculate transportation impacts. These data are summarized below for
each transport segment described in Section B.2.2. No population data are presented for the ocean segments
because once at sea, the exposed population becomes essentially zero.
Hanford to Seattle, Washington: The truck and rail shipping distances from Hanford to Seattle were determined to
be 277 km (172 miles) and 716 km (445 miles), respectively. The large difference in shipping distance arises from
the fact that the rail route is not a direct link to Seattle, but travels from Hanford to Vancouver, Washington and
then to Seattle. For the highway route, the shipment travels through 88.1% rural areas (weighted population
density 4.5 persons/km2), 10% in suburban areas (359 persons/km2) and 1.9% in urban population zones (1870 per-
sons/km2). The rail route travels through 74.1% rural areas (9.8 persons/km2), 19% in suburban zones
(415.5 persons/km2), and 6.9% in urban areas (2226 persons/km2).
Hanford to Norfolk, Virginia: The truck and rail shipping distances from Hanford to Norfolk were determined to be
4585 km (2849 miles) and 4984 km (3097 miles), respectively. For the highway route, the shipment travels through
84.5% rural areas (7.3 persons/km2), 13.4% in suburban areas (365 persons/km2) and 2.1% in urban population zones
(2299 persons/km2). The rail route travels through 83% rural areas (7.8 persons/km2), 14.5% in suburban zones
(360.4 persons/km2), and 2.4% in urban areas (2149 persons/km2).
Hanford to Portland, Oregon: The only option evaluated for using the Port of Portland was to barge the SNF to
Portland, where it would be transloaded onto the ship. The distance and population density information for this
shipment was approximated using INTERLINE (Johnson et al. 1993b), which evaluates potential rail routes, because
the rail lines closely follow the Columbia River in which the barge would be operating. Consequently, the route
data for a barge shipment would be similar to that for a rail shipment. The rail data are thought to be more
conservative than actual barge data because the rail lines pass closer to the city centers along the river than
would a barge.
B.2.4 Description of Methods Used to Estimate Consequences
This section describes the methods used to estimate consequences of normal and accidental exposure of
individuals or populations to radioactive materials. The RADTRAN 4 (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992) and RISKIND (Yuan
et al. 1993) computer codes were used to calculate the transportation impacts, and the GENII software package
(Napier et al. 1988) was used to estimate the consequences of port accidents. The MICROSHIELD external dosimetry
software (Grove Engineering 1988) was used to determine approximate external dose rates for shipping containers
as input to the transportation consequences. Nonradiological impacts from both incident-free transport and
accidents were also evaluated.
The output from computer codes, as total effective dose equivalent (TEDE or dose) to the affected receptors,
was then used to express the consequences in terms of potential latent cancer fatalities (LCF). Recommendations
of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP 1991) for low dose, low dose rate radiological
exposures were used to convert dose as TEDE to LCF. The conversion factor applied to adult workers was 4 x 10-4
LCF/rem TEDE, and that for the general population was 5 x 10-4 LCF/rem TEDE. The general population was assumed to
have a higher rate of cancer induction for a given radiation dose than healthy adult
workers because of the presence of more sensitive individuals (e.g., children) in the general population.
The estimated LCF for potential accidents was multiplied by the expected accident frequency per year, per
shipment, or for the entire duration of the foreign processing operation, to provide a point estimate of risk
consistent with those reported in the remainder of this EIS. Incident-free transportation or normal facility
operations were assumed to occur (i.e., they have a frequency of 1.0); therefore, the cumulative risks associated
with normal operations would be identical to the predicted number of latent cancer fatalities for the duration of
the operation.
Nonradiological incident-free and accident impacts were also evaluated. Nonradiological incident-free
impacts consist of fatalities from pollutants emitted from the vehicles. Nonradiological accident impacts are
the fatalities resulting from potential vehicular accidents involving the shipments. Neither of these two
categories of impacts are related to the radiological characteristics of the cargo. Estimates of these
nonradiological impacts were derived by multiplying the unit risk factors (fatalities per mile of travel) by the
total shipping distances for all of the shipments in each shipping option. Nonradiological unit risk factors for
incident-free transport were taken from Rao et al. (1982), and for vehicular accidents were taken from Saricks and
Kvitek (1994).
B.2.4.1 RADTRAN 4 Description. The RADTRAN 4 computer code (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992) was used to
perform the analyses of the radiological impacts of routine transport, the integrated population risks of
accidents during transport of irradiated N-Reactor SNF to the U.K., and the return of vitrified HLW, plutonium
oxide, and uranium oxide from the U.K. to Hanford. RADTRAN was developed by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to
calculate the risks associated with the transportation of radioactive materials. The original code was written by
SNL in 1977 in association with the preparation of NUREG-0170, Final Environmental Statement on the
Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes (NRC 1977). The code has since been refined and
expanded and is currently maintained by SNL under contract with DOE. RADTRAN 4 is an update of the RADTRAN 3
(Madsen et al. 1986) and RADTRAN 2 (Taylor and Daniel 1982, Madsen et al. 1983) computer codes.
The RADTRAN 4 computer code is organized into the following seven models (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992):
- material model
- transportation model
- population distribution model
- health effects model
- accident severity and package release model
- meteorological dispersion model
- economic model.
The code uses the first three models to calculate the potential population dose from normal, incident-free
transportation and the first six models to calculate the risk to the population from user-defined accident
scenarios. The economic model is not used in this study.
B.2.4.1.1 Material Model. The material model defines the source as either a point source or as a line
source. For exposure distances less than twice the package dimension, the source is conservatively assumed
to be a line source. For all other cases, the source is modeled as a point source that emits radiation equally
in all directions.
The material model also contains a library of 59 isotopes each of which has 11 defining param-
eters that are used in the calculation of dose. The user can add isotopes not in the RADTRAN library
by creating a data table in the input file consisting of eleven parameters.
B.2.4.1.2 Transportation Model. The transportation model allows the user to input descrip-
tions of the transportation route. A transportation route may be divided into links or segments of
the journey with information for each link on population density, mode of travel (e.g., trailer
truck or ship), accident rate, vehicle speed, road type, vehicle density, and link length. Alternatively,
the transportation route also can be described by aggregate route data for rural, urban, and suburban areas.
For this analysis, the aggregate route method was used for each potential origin-destination combination.
The origin-destination combinations addressed in this analysis were discussed in Section B.2.1.
B.2.4.1.3 Health Effects Model. The health effects model in RADTRAN 4 is outdated and is replaced by
hand calculations. The health effects are determined by multiplying the population dose (person-rem) supplied by
RADTRAN 4 by a conversion factor.
B.2.4.1.4 Accident Severity and Package Release Model. Accident analysis in RADTRAN 4 is performed
using the accident severity and package release model. The user can define up to 20 severity categories for three
population densities (urban, suburban, and rural), each increasing in magnitude. Eight severity categories for
SNF containers that are related to fire, puncture, crush, and immersion environments are defined in NUREG-0170
(NRC 1977). Various other studies also have been performed for small packages (Clarke et al. 1976) and large
packages (Dennis et al. 1978) that also can be used to generate severity categories. The accident scenarios are
further defined by allowing the user to input release fractions and aerosol and respirable fractions for each
severity category. These fractions are also a function of the physical-chemical properties of the materials being
transported.
B.2.4.1.5 Meteorological Dispersion Model. RADTRAN 4 allows the user to choose two different
methods for modeling the atmospheric transport of radionuclides after a potential accident. The user can input
either Pasquill atmospheric-stability category data or averaged time-integrated concentrations. In this
analysis, the dispersion of radionuclides after a potential accident is modeled by the use of time-integrated
concentration values in downwind areas compiled from national averages by SNL.
B.2.4.1.6 Incident-Free Transport. The models described above are used by RADTRAN 4 to determine
dose from incident-free transportation or risk from potential accidents. The public and worker doses calculated
by RADTRAN 4 for incident-free transportation are dependent on the type of material being transported and the
transportation index (TI) of the package or packages. The TI is defined in 49 CFR 173.403(bb) as the highest
package dose rate in millirem per hour at a distance of 1 m from the external surface of the package. Dose
consequences are also dependent on the size of the package, which as indicated in the material model description,
will determine whether the package is modeled as a point source or line source for close-proximity exposures.
B.2.4.1.7 Analysis of Potential Accidents. The accident analysis performed in RADTRAN 4 calculates
population doses for each accident severity category using six exposure pathway models. The exposure pathways are
inhalation, resuspension, groundshine, cloudshine, ingestion, and direct exposure. This RADTRAN 4 analysis
assumes that any contaminated area is either mitigated or public access controlled so the dose via the ingestion
pathway equals zero. The consequences calculated for each severity category are multiplied by the appropriate
frequencies for accidents in each category and summed to give a total point estimate of risk for a radiological
accident. The parameters used to calculate the frequencies and consequences of transportation accidents are
presented in Section B.2.4.2.
B.2.4.2 RADTRAN 4 Input Parameters. RADTRAN 4 input parameters for calculating routine population
doses include route information (shipping distances, population densities, and fractions of travel in
rural, suburban, and urban areas), numbers of shipments, dose rate, and parameters that define the
population exposure characteristics. The route information and numbers of shipments were presented in
Section B.1.2 and will not be repeated here. The remaining exposure parameters are described below.
RADTRAN 4 uses the dose rate at 1 m (referred to as the TI) in calculating dose to the public and worker.
All of the SNF and HLW shipments in this analysis were assumed to be at the regulatory maximum dose rate,
which is 10 mrem per hour at a distance of 2 m from the cask surface. This would be equivalent to a TI of 13
(or a dose rate of 13 mrem/hr at 1 m from the surface). Although it is likely that many of these shipments
will have significantly smaller TI values, the use of the regulatory maximum value is bounding because it
cannot be exceeded.
Because shipments of plutonium oxide and uranium oxide would have much smaller dose rates than SNF or
HLW, preliminary shielding calculations were performed to derive more realistic values. The computer code
MICROSHIELD (Grove Engineering 1988) was used to perform these calculations. Both types of shipments were
modeled as cylindrical sources with cylindrical shields. The parameters used in these calculations are
shown below:
- Plutonium oxide: The plutonium source was assumed to be 12.7 cm in diameter and 127 cm in length.
Shielding was assumed to be provided by a 1-cm thick steel shield and an 8-cm thickness of solid
hydrogenous material. The source inventory was the same as that shown in Table B-1.
- Uranium oxide: The uranium source was modeled as a single large container although the shipment
will most likely be composed of several smaller containers. The source dimensions were assumed to
be 114 cm in diameter and 370 cm in length. The source was assumed to be surrounded by a 1-cm thick
steel cylinder and a 3-cm thick shield of solid hydrogenous material. The source inventory was
shown in Table B-1.
The dose rate at 1 m from the surface of the plutonium oxide shipment was calculated to be 0.019 mrem/hr.
Because this was increased by a factor of five to provide a bounding estimate, the TI value for these
shipments was set to 0.1 mrem/hr. The dose rate for the uranium oxide shipments was calculated to be
0.0049 mrem/hr. This was also increased by a factor of five to 0.025 mrem/hr for conservatism.
Table B-2 is a list of input parameters that are used by RADTRAN 4 in the calculation of population dose for
incident-free transportation. Many of the parameters are default values in the RADTRAN 4 code. Those that are not
default values are identified and their sources are provided in footnotes to the table.
The potential receptors include workers and the general public. Worker doses include those received by the
truck, rail, or barge crew and package handlers aboard the barge. Although RADTRAN models package handlers as
persons who handle packages during intermediate stops, the routine doses to this group were assumed to apply to
personnel who inspect the shipping containers aboard the barge. The equations used to calculate these doses
assume that a
five-person team spends approximately 0.5 hr per handling operation (or per inspection tour of the shipping
casks). Although not exact, this is believed to be a reasonable approximation.
Table B-2. Input parameters for analysis of incident-free impactsa
Parameter Rail Barge Truck
Dose rate 1 m from vehicle/package (mrem/h)b 13.1 13.1 13.1
Length of package (m) 3.0 3.0 3.0
Exclusive use No Yes Yes
Velocity in rural population zone (km/h)c 64.4 16.09 88.6
Velocity in suburban population zone (km/h)b 40.3 8.06 40.3
Velocity in urban population zone (km/h)c 24.2 3.20 24.2
Number of crewmen 5 2 2
Distance from source to crew (m) 152 45.70 10.0
Stop time per km (h/km)c 0.033 0.01 0.011
Persons exposed while stoppedc 100 50 50
Average exposure distance while stopped (m)c 20.0 50.0 20.0
Number of people per vehicle on linkc 3 0 2
Traffic count passing a specific point-rural zone,one-wayc 1.0 0 470
Traffic count passing a specific point-suburban zone,one-wayc 5.0 0 780
Traffic count passing a specific point-urban zone,one-wayc 5.0 0 2,800
a. Values shown are shipment-specific unless otherwise noted.
b. These values were used for SNF and HLW shipments. See text for the derivation of TI values for plutonium
oxide (0.1 mrem/hr) and uranium oxide shipments (0.025 mrem/hr).
c. Default values from RADTRAN (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992 and Madsen et al. 1983).
Public doses include doses to persons on the highway or railway (this category is not applicable to barge
shipments as indicated in the RADTRAN documentation), doses to persons who reside near the highway, railway, or
river, and doses at stops (for barge transport, this was assumed to include stops at navigation locks in dams).
For all three shipping modes, the doses to passengers were assumed to be 0.0 because there would be no passengers
traveling with the shipments. In addition, there were assumed to be no intermediate storage needs for the
shipments, and the doses to in-transit storage personnel were set equal to 0.0.
Information needed to characterize the potential routes between Hanford and the U.K. include the shipping
distances, population densities in rural, suburban, and urban areas along the routes, and fractions of total
shipping distance that travel through rural, suburban, and urban areas. These data were presented in
Section B.2.3.
B.2.4.3 RISKIND Description. RISKIND (Yuan et al. 1993) was used to calculate doses to the maximum
individual and the public for both rail and truck transportation accidents. RISKIND was originally developed to
model incident-free and accident conditions during transportation of SNF. The code was specifically designed to
model accidental releases based on data contained in the NRC modal study (Fischer et al. 1987). RISKIND is
designed to calculate the dose to individuals or groups of individuals for each of the severity categories
identified in the modal study and provide probability-weighted dose risk, acute fatality, latent fatality, and
genetic effect values. The probability-weighted dose risk values are calculated by multiplying and summing the
dose for each severity category times the fraction of accidents within each severity category. Health effects are
calculated by multiplying probability-weighted dose risk values by appropriate conversion factors. For this
analysis, point estimates of risk for latent cancer fatalities were estimated as described in Section B.2.4.
The code is comprised of subroutines or models used to calculate radiological exposures to individuals at
specific receptor locations. The information used to calculate these exposures can be performed using the default
values contained in RISKIND or using receptor-specific data, supplied by the user. The exposure calculations are
performed based on the receptor location, exposure conditions (i.e., inhalation and ingestion intake rates), and
meteorological conditions.
RISKIND can be used to model all environmental exposure pathways based on the duration of the exposure. That
is, for acute or short-term exposures, RISKIND can calculate exposures from initial plume passage or loss of
shipping-cask shielding. For chronic or long-term exposures, RISKIND calculates exposures from ground deposition
and ingestion from the food-chain pathways.
A radiological source inventory is contained internal to RISKIND that is based on fuel type, cooling times,
and burnup rates. An analyst can input other radiological source inventories to calculate scenario-specific
exposures. The radiological source inventory for this analysis is shown in Table B-1.
To calculate doses to the receptor, cask accident responses for both truck and rail, and release fractions
have been incorporated into RISKIND. This information is based on the NRC modal study (Fischer et al. 1987). As
discussed earlier, all shipments will be performed using Type B shipping containers; therefore, it is appropriate
to use RISKIND to calculate the dose to the maximally exposed individual for all waste forms.
B.3 Radiological Dose to Workers
The following sections describe expected radiological consequences to workers during trans-
portation and processing of N-Reactor SNF from Hanford.
B.3.1 Worker Dose from Pre-Shipment Activities at Hanford
Packaging of the K-Basin SNF for temporary wet storage was estimated to result in worker doses of approxi-
mately 140 person-rem (5.5 x 10-2 LCF) over a period of about 2 years. The activities covered by this estimate
include repacking fuel assemblies in both K-East and K-West Basins and disposing of empty canisters (DOE 1992).
The consequences of preparing the fuel for overseas shipment were assumed to be similar for the purposes of this
evaluation. If stabilization of the fuel prior to shipment were necessary, an additional 180 person-rem might be
accumulated by onsite workers over a 4-year period, resulting in 7.0 x 10-2 LCF (see Section 5.12.5 of this
appendix). Consequences of air emissions from the storage or stabilization facilities to nearby workers would be
much lower than those from direct exposure of workers in these facilities (see Section 5.7 of this appendix).
The consequences of accidents at the wet storage facility or the stabilization facility are discussed in
Section 5.15 of this appendix. Air emissions from a fuel handling accident at the 100-K Basins or a uranium fire
at the stabilization facility would result in a point estimate of risk to the nearby workers of <1.4 x 10-7 LCF or
<8.3 x 10-12 LCF per year of operation, respectively. The estimated frequency for both accidents is between 1 x 10-6
and 1 x 10-4 per year. Operations at the K Basins to package SNF for shipment would last approximately 2 years, and
the stabilization facility would require 4 years to process all of the K Basin SNF. The consequence to workers
that might be directly involved in such accidents is highly speculative, and is addressed in Attach-
ment A-Facility Accidents.
B.3.2 Worker Doses from Transportation to U.S. Ports
This section discusses the results of the worker impact calculations for truck, rail, and barge shipments to
and from the U.K. These doses were calculated using the RADTRAN 4 computer code (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992). The
RADTRAN 4 program uses a combination of meteorological, demographic, health physics, transportation, packaging,
and material factors to analyze risks associated with both normal transport (incident-free) and various user-
selected accident scenarios. The RADTRAN 4 computer code description for both routine and accident impacts was
presented in Section B.2.4.
The results of the incident-free transportation impact calculations are presented in Table B-3. The
radiological impacts are presented in terms of the population dose (person-rem) received by exposed workers and
the projected health effects calculated to occur in the exposed population. As shown, no excess fatalities were
calculated to result from any of the five transportation options considered in this study.
As shown in Table B-3, the transportation option to U.S. ports that results in the lowest worker population
doses is that involving barge shipments to the Port of Portland. This option is closely followed by the option of
shipping by rail to the Port of Seattle. The option involving truck transport to the Port of Seattle is the third
lowest option. The option of shipping by rail to the Port of Norfolk is next, followed by the option of shipping by
truck to the Port of Norfolk. This result is intuitively obvious because the shipping distances are much longer
from Hanford to Norfolk than to the other ports.
Table B-3. Results of incident-free transportation impact calculations for workers.
Option and material Radiation doses, Latent cancer fatalities
person-rem
Barge to Portland
SNF 3.0E+00 1.2E-03
HLW 1.8E-01 7.0E-05
Pu 7.7E-02 3.1E-05
U 5.3E-02 2.1E-05
TOTAL 3.3E+00 1.3E-03
Truck to Seattle
SNF 6.0E+00 2.4E-03
HLW (Rail) 3.8E-01 1.5E-04
Pu (Truck) 4.5E-02 1.8E-05
U (Truck) 3.4E-02 1.3E-05
TOTAL 6.5E+00 2.6E-03
Rail to Seattle
SNF 3.2E+00 1.3E-03
HLW (Rail) 3.8E-01 1.5E-04
Pu (Truck) 4.5E-02 1.8E-05
U (Truck) 3.4E-02 1.3E-05
TOTAL 3.7E+00 1.5E-03
Truck to Norfolk
SNF 1.0E+02 4.2E-02
HLW (Rail) 1.5E+00 5.9E-04
Pu (Truck) 7.7E-01 3.1E-04
U (Truck) 5.8E-01 2.3E-04
TOTAL 1.1E+02 4.3E-02
Rail to Norfolk
SNF 1.3E+01 5.0E-03
HLW (Rail) 1.5E+00 5.9E-04
Pu (Truck) 7.7E-01 3.1E-04
U (Truck) 5.8E-01 2.3E-04
TOTAL 1.5E+01 6.1E-03
In general, the shipments of N Reactor SNF to the U.K. would produce the highest doses of all the materials.
This is attributed primarily to the higher number of N Reactor SNF shipments than the other materials. Also, it
can be seen that rail shipments generally result in lower worker doses than truck shipments. This is because the
exposure distances between the source and crew are much longer for rail shipments than for truck shipments.
Similarly, the crew doses for rail and barge shipments are approximately comparable.
Maximum individual doses to workers from incident-free transport were calculated using the RISKIND computer
code, consistent with the approach described in Volume 1, Appendix I. The maximally exposed workers for truck
shipments were found to be the truck drivers (two-person crew), who were assumed to drive shipments for up to 2,000
hour per year. The maximally exposed worker for rail shipments was a transportation worker in a rail yard who
spent a time- and distance-weighted average of 0.16 hours inspecting, classifying, and repairing railcars and was
assumed to be present for all of the radioactive shipments.
The maximum incident-free exposure calculations for workers were performed for each shipping option. The
results are 1.46 person-rem for the barge to Portland option, 2.0 person-rem for the option of shipping to Seattle
by truck, 1.03 person-rem for the option of shipping to Seattle by rail, 35.3 person-rem for the option of shipping
to Norfolk by truck, and 17.9 person-rem for the option of shipping to Norfolk by rail.
B.3.3 Worker Dose from Port Activities
The following sections describe expected radiological consequences to workers from in-port activities for
transport of SNF to the U.K. The consequences for return of HLW, uranium, and plutonium are expected to be similar
to, or lower than, those for initial shipment of SNF to the U.K. because of the smaller number of HLW shipments
required for return to the U.S. Radiological consequences of normal transport of uranium and plutonium would be
small compared with those for SNF and HLW.
B.3.3.1 Consequences of Normal Port Activities. Consequences to workers during handling and loading
activities in ports are based on commercial experience during the last three quarters of 1994. Over this period,
workers handled two shipments consisting of 16 loaded casks, and 1 shipment consisting of 5 empty casks. The
collective dose to the 30 workers involved was 0.024 person-rem, with the maximum individual receiving 0.016 rem.
Assuming that handling of the empty casks did not contribute measurably to that total, the expected collective
dose from handling a single loaded cask is estimated to be on the order of 0.001 rem to the maximally exposed
worker and 0.0015 person-rem total to all workers. The consequences for loading and unloading of 408 casks during
shipment from the U.S. to the U.K. would therefore be approximately 1.2 person-rem to all workers over the
expected 5-year campaign. Accounting for an additional two handling activities per cask at the Hanford Site and
at the U.K. process facility would roughly double that estimate, resulting in a collective dose of 2.4 person-rem
and a potential for 9.8 x 10-4 LCF for all shipments. The maximum dose to an individual worker, assuming that
worker were involved in handling all 408 casks at one point in the shipping sequence, would be on the order of
0.4 rem over 5 years.
B.3.3.2 Consequences of Accidents During Port Activities. The consequences of accidents during port
transit were estimated based on the highest activity N Reactor SNF (Bergsman 1994). The assumed radionuclide
content of a single shipping cask is based on a loading of 5 MTU (see inventory for truck shipments in Table B-1).
Representative ports on the West and East Coasts of the U.S. (Seattle-Tacoma, Washington; Portland, Oregon;
Norfolk, Virginia; and Newark, New Jersey) were used for this analysis, based on relative population densities and
suitability for handling of SNF shipments. Newark was included in this part of the analysis because of its
relatively large surrounding population (adjacent to New York City), whereas the ports of Seattle-Tacoma,
Portland, and Norfolk are located in somewhat smaller population centers. In a previous analysis, the collective
consequences of in-port accidents were shown to be proportional to the surrounding population (DOE 1995).
The consequences (as radiation dose to individuals and populations and corresponding LCF were evaluated for a
range of accident severities leading to airborne release of radioactive material, corresponding to the accident
categories and radionuclide release fractions used for the overland transportation analysis (Volume 1, Appendix
I, Table I-28). The overall accident frequency associated with each accident category was calculated using the
conditional probability for that severity category, multiplied by the overall frequency with which a shipping
accident would occur (as estimated by DOE 1994, Table E-8). The consequences (as LCF) for each severity category
were multiplied by the corresponding frequency with which an accident in that category would occur to obtain a
point estimate of risk for each accident category. The total risk per shipment was then calculated as the sum of
risks over all accident severity categories. The frequencies for airborne release accidents evaluated using 95%
atmospheric dispersion (stable) conditions (those that would not be exceeded more than 5% of the time) were
assumed to be 10% of those evaluated using 50% (neutral) dispersion conditions, which are assumed to be the
typical or expected conditions. The risk to U.S. ports for shipping all Hanford SNF overseas is the total risk
per shipment times 17 shipments. The risk to U.K. ports is assumed to be comparable to that at U.S. ports.
The port accident analyses assume that the contents of a single cask were involved in any given accident. The
probability that multiple casks could be breached in the event of an accident is smaller than that for a single
cask, and the consequences would be proportional to the number of casks involved. Because of the construction of
the special purpose ships, with eight segregated holds each containing at most three casks, an accident that would
involve more than three casks is not considered to be reasonably foreseeable.
The consequences to an individual at a distance of 100 m, assumed to be a port worker, was estimated for
applicable exposure pathways including inhalation, external dose from submersion in the plume, and external
exposure from radionuclides deposited on the ground for a period of 2 hours. The point estimates of risk for an
accident at the Port of Portland are estimated to be 6.1 x 10-11 to 1.0 x 10-09 LCF for 1 to 17 shipments,
respectively. The corresponding point estimates of risk for Seattle/Tacoma (based on wind data from Seattle-
Tacoma airport and the population within 50 miles of the Port of Tacoma) ranged from 4.7 x 10-11 to 8.0 x 10-10 LCF.
The point estimates of risk to workers at East Coast ports were similar - ranging from 6.1 x 10-11 to 1.0 x 10-09 LCF
at Norfolk and 5.3 x 10-11 to 9.0 x 10-10 LCF at Newark.
The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident was a category 6 accident, which has a frequency of 1.3 x 10-7 per
port transit, and which was evaluated for stable atmospheric conditions resulting in a cumulative frequency of 2.2
x 10-7 for all 17 SNF shipments. The dose to the port worker was estimated to be 1.7 rem at Seattle/Tacoma, 1.9 rem
at Newark, and 2.1 rem at Portland and Norfolk. The corresponding probability of LCF ranged from 6.8 x 10-4 and
point estimates of risk, from 1.5 x 10-9 to 1.8 x 10-9 LCF.
B.3.4 Worker Dose from Ocean Transport to the United Kingdom
The following sections describe radiological consequences to workers from normal transport operations and
accidents during overseas shipments of SNF from the Hanford Site to the U.K.
B.3.4.1 Consequences of Normal Ocean Transit. The primary impact of routine (incident-free) marine
transport of SNF is potential radiological exposure to crew members of the ships used to carry the casks. Members
of the general public and marine life would not receive any measurable dose from the SNF during incident-free
marine transport of the casks. While at sea, the crew dose would be limited to those individuals who might enter
the ship's hold during transit and receive external radiation in the vicinity of the packaged SNF. At all other
times, the crew would be shielded from the casks by the decking and other structures of the vessel. The number of
entries and inspections would be a function of the transit time from the port of loading to the port of off-
loading.
External radiation from an intact shipping package must be less than specified limits that control the
exposure of the handling personnel and general public. These limits are established in 49 CFR Part 173. The limit
of interest is a 10 mrem/hr dose rate at any point 2 m from the outer surfaces of the transport cask. This limit
applies to exclusive-use shipments, i.e., a shipment in which no other cargo is loaded on the platform used for the
transportation casks, not that the ship is an exclusive-use vessel, although this would not be a limitation for
the commercial special purpose ships assumed for this analysis.
It is anticipated that the external dose rates at the outside of the transport casks would be much less than
the regulatory limits. It was estimated that the N Reactor SNF considered in this analysis would fall within the
design envelope of the internationally licensed casks routinely used by the U.K. facility for SNF transport (BNFL
1994). However, estimates of dose during normal transportation have been made assuming dose rates at the
regulatory limits, using analyses performed for transport of foreign research reactor SNF as a basis (DOE 1995).
These analyses may be used to develop an upper bound of the doses anticipated to be received by ships crews during
transport of the N Reactor SNF. Actual doses would be expected to be lower than these estimates.
B.3.4.1.1 Bounding Dose Calculations. Calculations performed to estimate bounding radiation doses
during routine cask inspections aboard ship (DOE 1995) provided information from which an inspection dose factor
(IDF) could be determined of 6 x 10-5 rem y minute-1 y cask-1 y day-1 y person-1, based on an average distance of 5.5 m.
Because the ship crews are highly trained and the ships are designed for SNF transport, it was assumed that
inspection of each of the eight holds on the ship (each containing three casks) would take no longer than
15 minutes, or an average of 5 minutes per cask for the total 24 casks. The total inspection time per day would be
2 hours. If an inspection crew were assumed to consist of two members of the ship's crew, the bounding dose per
daily inspection would be
6 x 10-5 (IDF) x 5 minutes x 24 casks = 0.007 rem y person-1 y day-1 (1)
Assuming a travel time from an eastern U.S. port of 10 days, the estimated maximum dose received by each member
of a two-person inspection crew would be 0.07 rem. This value would not exceed the 0.1 rem dose limit for a member
of the general public. The transit time for a shipment originating on the West Coast of the U.S. could be up to
five times longer, resulting in a dose per shipment of 0.35 rem. This value would exceed the 0.1 rem dose limit for
a member of the general public. However, because the ship's crews are trained and issued dosimeters, it is
presumed that they would be considered radiation workers. Although it is not clear at this time if radiation
exposure of the ship's crew would fall under the jurisdiction of the U.K. or U.S. radiation protection standards,
these standards are identical for both countries (5 rem per year, with an administrative control level of 2 rem per
year). Therefore, the maximum possible dose received by individual workers during ocean transit would be well
within the limits of the U.S. and U.K. radiation protection standards for workers.
Complete transport of the SNF to the U.K. for processing would require 17 shipments of 24 casks. The
collective dose to crew members responsible for conducting inspections on the transport ships during fuel
transport from the U.S. East Coast would be
(0.007 rem y person-1 y day-1 ) x 2 persons x (10 days y trip-1) x 17 trips = 2.4 person-rem (2)
Based on this bounding estimate of the collective dose to the ship's crew for transportation of the SNF, an
upper limit of approximately 0.001 LCF would be expected among the ship's crew from exposure to external radiation
from the SNF transport casks. If all shipments originated at a western U.S. port, the collective dose could be up
to 12 person-rem with a corresponding consequence of 0.005 LCF.
The above analysis does not consider the return of the processed SNF products and waste from the U.K. to the
U.S. It was projected that the number of shipments containing these products would be fewer than the number of SNF
shipments. However, as a bounding estimate the same number of return shipments and similar external dose rates,
at the regulatory limit, might be assumed. Under those circumstances, an upper limit of 0.01 LCF would be expected
among the ships' crews from exposure to the external radiation during all shipments.
B.3.4.1.2 Commercial Fuel Transport Experience. Information on radiation doses to ships' crews
during transport of commercial fuel, gathered from actual crew dosimeters, supports the statements above that
actual doses to the crew would be lower than the calculated bounding doses. The average individual dose during one
voyage was 0.001 rem, with a maximum individual dose of 0.022 mrem. The collective dose to the ship's crew for one
voyage was about 0.038 person-rem. On that basis, the crew's collective dose for 17 SNF shipments would be
0.65 person-rem. A comparison of bounding dose estimates and commercial transport experience is shown in
Table B-4. Based on these results, less than 0.0003 LCF would be expected among ships' crews
Table B-4. Comparison of bounding and typical ship crew's doses.
Bounding Dose Calculations Commercial Fuel Transport
Experience
Individual dose, rem 0.07 - 0.35 0.001 typical
0.022 maximum
Collective dose,
person-rem
- 17 SNF shipments 2.4 - 12 0.65
- < 17 round trips < 24 < 1.3
from radiation exposure during SNF transport, and approximately 0.0005 LCF would be expected from radiation
exposure during transport of SNF and the subsequent return of processing products and waste.
B.3.4.2 Consequences of Accidents During Ocean Transit. The consequences of accidents during ocean
transit would likely be similar to those of port workers who are near the scene of an accident (see
Section B.3.3.2). Individuals in the immediate vicinity of the impact would probably not survive
an accident severe enough to cause release of radioactive materials from a SNF shipping
cask. Effects on the ocean environment would not be expected to be discernable because of the degree of dispersion
in the event of an airborne release.
B.3.5 Worker Dose from Return of Processing Products to the United States
Return of HLW to the U.S. is assumed to result in cumulative worker doses that are bounded by those incurred in
the initial SNF shipments to the U.K. However, the distribution of dose among individual workers may differ
because of the different configuration and radionuclide content of the HLW canisters. As noted in Section
B.2.4.2, the dose rates associated with plutonium and uranium shipments are substantially below the regulatory
maximum that was assumed for the SNF and HLW shipments.
B.4 Consequences to Members of the Public
The following sections describe expected consequences to the public from various activities involved in
transporting N Reactor SNF to the U.K.
B.4.1 Public Impacts from Pre-Shipment Activities at Hanford
Activities at Hanford prior to preparation of N Reactor SNF for shipment would result in generally small
consequences to the public, as discussed in Section 5.7 of this appendix. The removal and packaging of SNF at the
basins was estimated to result in offsite consequences comparable to those observed during initial segregation of
the fuel, or approximately 2 x 10-5 to 3 x 10-4 (1 x 10-11 to 1.5 x 10-10 probability of LCF) mrem to the maximally
exposed offsite individual (DOE 1992).
The risk from accidents involving handling of N-Reactor SNF at the 100-K Basins was also presented in
Section 5.15 of this appendix. The consequences to the maximally exposed offsite individual were estimated as
2.5 x 10-4 LCF, with an associated point estimate of risk equal to <2.5 x 10-8 fatal cancers per year (assuming an
accident frequency <1 x 10-4 per year). The consequences to the population within 80 km (50 miles) were estimated
as 0.4 LCF for 50% (neutral) atmospheric dispersion conditions and 6.9 LCF for 95% (stable) atmospheric dispersion
(conditions that would not be exceeded more than 50% or 5% of the time, respectively). The corresponding point
estimates of risk amounted to <4.0 x 10-5 and <6.9 x 10-4 LCF per year, respectively.
B.4.2 Public Impacts from Transportation Activities
This section presents the analysis of the public incident-free radiological exposures, radiological accident
risks, and nonradiological impacts from transporting radioactive materials to and from the U.K. Members of the
public exposed to radiation include persons on the highway, railroad, or waterway with the shipment, persons
residing near these transport links, and persons at intermediate stops along the route (such as refueling stops
and stops at rail classification yards). The RADTRAN 4 computer code was used to perform these calculations.
A description of RADTRAN 4 was presented in Section B.2.4. The following sections present the results of the
incident-free exposure calculations, description of the accident-analysis input parameters, the results of the
accident risk impact calculations, and the evaluation of nonradiological impacts.
B.4.2.1 Results of Incident-Free Transportation Impact Calculations. The results of the public dose
calculations, developed using the RADTRAN 4 computer code and the input parameters described in Section B.2.4, are
presented in Table B-5.
Table B-5. Results of public incident-free exposure calculations.
Radiation doses, Latent Cancer Fatalities
Option and material person-rem
Barge to Portland
SNF 3.4E-01 1.7E-04
HLW 6.7E-03 3.4E-06
Pu 3.7E-02 1.9E-05
U 2.9E-02 1.4E-05
TOTAL 4.1E-01 2.1E-04
Truck to Seattle
SNF 1.5E+01 7.6E-03
HLW (rail) 1.9E-01 9.6E-05
Pu (truck) 2.5E-02 1.2E-05
U (truck) 1.9E-02 9.3E-06
TOTAL 1.5E+01 7.7E-03
Rail to Seattle
SNF 1.6E+00 8.1E-04
HLW (rail) 1.9E-01 9.6E-05
Pu (truck) 2.5E-02 1.2E-05
U (truck) 1.9E-02 9.3E-06
TOTAL 1.9E+00 9.3E-04
Truck to Norfolk
SNF 2.5E+02 1.3E-01
HLW (rail) 7.0E-01 3.5E-04
Pu (truck) 4.1E-01 2.1E-04
U (truck) 3.1E-01 1.6E-04
TOTAL 2.5E+02 1.3E-01
Rail to Norfolk
SNF 5.9E+00 3.0E-03
HLW (rail) 7.0E-01 3.5E-04
Pu (truck) 4.1E-01 2.1E-04
U (truck) 3.1E-01 1.6E-04
TOTAL 7.3E+00 3.7E-03
From a domestic transportation perspective, the lowest-impact option is one that includes rail shipments of SNF
from Hanford to the Port of Seattle. This option is followed closely by the option of moving SNF from Hanford to
the Port of Portland by barge. The third lowest domestic transportation option is that involving SNF shipments to
Seattle by truck. The highest impact options are those involving shipments from Hanford to the Port of Norfolk.
Obviously, the lowest impact domestic transportation option would be that involving the shortest shipping
distances (i.e., Hanford to Seattle or Portland). Some of the impacts of the long domestic transportation links
would be offset by subsequent reductions in the lengths of the ocean shipment segments. Consequently, the
rankings of the options presented in Table B-5 do not necessarily represent the rankings that would result if the
ocean segments of the shipments were included. However, public routine doses are not significant for ocean
voyages because the separation distance between the ship and the nearest exposed population is greater, resulting
in extremely low radiation dose rates.
The results in Table B-5 demonstrate that barge shipments of SNF (and HLW) would produce lower public routine
doses than truck or rail shipments. This is attributed primarily to the lower traffic volumes on waterways
relative to railroads and highways, generally greater separation distances between barges and the public relative
to the separation distances between highways/ railroads and the public, as well as the increased per-shipment
capacities of barges relative to truck and rail shipments (resulting in fewer shipments).
Table B-5 also demonstrates that rail shipments would produce lower public routine doses than equivalent
truck shipments. This can be seen by comparing the SNF shipment impacts for truck shipments to Seattle (15 person-
rem) and rail shipments to Seattle (1.6 person-rem). Even though the rail shipping route from Hanford to Seattle
is much longer than the truck route (277 km and 716 km), the total public routine doses are smaller. As with barge
shipments, this is attributed to lower traffic volumes, larger separation distances, and increased shipment
capacity for rail shipments.
Maximum individual doses to members of the public from incident-free transport were calculated using the
RISKIND computer code, which is consistent with the approach described in Volume 1, Appendix I. For rail
shipments, three potential exposure scenarios were evaluated by RISKIND, as described in Volume 1, Appendix I.
The maximally exposed members of the public from incident-free truck transport were also determined using three
potential exposure scenarios (see Volume 1, Appendix I).
The maximum incident-free exposure calculations for members of the public were performed for each shipping
option. The results are 0.28 person-rem for the barge to Portland option, 0.20 person-rem for the option of
shipping to Seattle by truck, 0.28 person-rem for the option of shipping to Seattle by rail, 0.20 person-rem for
the option of shipping to Norfolk by truck, and 0.28 person-rem for the option of shipping to Norfolk by rail.
B.4.2.2 Assessment of Public Impacts from Transportation Accidents. Radiological accident impacts
are presented in this section as integrated population risks (i.e., accident frequencies multiplied by
consequences integrated over the entire shipping campaign), as well as the consequences of the maximum reasonably
foreseeable accident. Population risk calculations were performed using the RADTRAN 4 computer code (Neuhauser
and Kanipe 1992). The consequences of the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident were calculated using the
RISKIND computer code (Yuan et al. 1993). Separate sections are provided for the integrated population risk
(i.e., RADTRAN 4) calculations and the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident consequence (i.e., RISKIND)
calculations.
B.4.2.2.1 Integrated Population Risk Assessment. For this analysis, risk is defined as the product
of the frequency of occurrence of an accident involving a shipment and the consequences of an accident.
Consequences are expressed in terms of the radiological dose and LCF from a release of radioactive material from
the shipping cask or the exposure of persons to radiation that could result from damaged package shielding. The
frequency of an accident that involves radioactive materials is expressed in terms of the expected number of
accidents per unit distance integrated over the total distance traveled. The response of the shipping cask to the
accident environment and the probability of release or loss of shielding, is related to the severity of the
accident.
The frequencies of occurrence of transportation accidents that would release significant quantities of
radioactive material are relatively small because the shipping casks are designed to withstand specified
transportation accident conditions (i.e., the shipping casks for all the materials shipped in this analysis were
assumed to meet the Type B packaging requirements specified in 49 CFR 174 and 10 CFR 71). Accidents on the road and
railways are difficult to totally eliminate. However, because the shipping casks are capable of withstanding
certain accident environments, including mechanical and thermal stress, only a relatively small fraction of
accidents involve conditions that are severe enough to result in a release of radioactive materials.
Should an accident involving a shipment occur, a release of radioactive material could occur only if the cask
were to fail. A failure would most likely be a small gap in a seal or small split in the containment vessel. For
the radioactive material to reach the environment, it would have to pass through the split in the cask or through
the failed seal. Materials released to the environment would be dispersed and diluted by weather action and a
fraction would be deposited on the ground (i.e., drop out of the contaminated plume) in the surrounding region.
Emergency response crews arriving on the scene would evacuate and secure the area to exclude bystanders from the
accident scene. The released material would then be cleaned up using standard decontamination techniques, such as
excavation and removal of contaminated soil. Monitoring of the area would be performed to locate contaminated
areas and to guide cleanup crews in their choice of protective clothing and equipment (e.g., fresh-air equipment
and filtered masks). Access to the area would be restricted by federal and/or state radiation control agencies
until it had been decontaminated to safe levels.
The RADTRAN 4 computer code was used to calculate the radiological risk of transportation accidents involving
radioactive material shipments. The RADTRAN 4 methodology was summarized previously. For further details, refer
to the discussions presented by RADTRAN III (Madsen et al. 1986) and RADTRAN 4: Volume 2 -- Technical Manual
(Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992).
There are five major categories of input data needed to calculate potential accident transportation risk
impacts using the RADTRAN 4 computer code. These are: 1) accident frequency, 2) release quantities,
3) atmospheric dispersion parameters, 4) population distribution parameters, and 5) human uptake and dosimetry
models. Accident frequency and release quantities are discussed below, the remaining parameters have been
discussed in previous sections.
Accident Frequency. The frequency of a severe accident is calculated by multiplying an overall accident rate
(accidents per truck-km or per rail-km) by the conditional probability that an accident would involve mechanical
and/or thermal conditions that are severe enough to result in container failure and subsequent release of
radioactive material. Overall accident rates per kilometer of truck or rail travel were taken from Saricks and
Kvitek (1994). State-specific accident rates were used in this study. For the Portland and Norfolk options, a
composite weighted-average accident rate was developed using the state-specific accident rates in Saricks and
Kvitek (1994), and travel fractions through each state that were derived from the HIGHWAY and INTERLINE results.
For this analysis, six shipment-specific severity categories were defined, with category 1 as the least
severe and the higher categories (2-6) representing increasingly severe conditions. The conditional
probabilities of encountering accident conditions in each severity category were taken from a U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) document (Fischer et al. 1987). Those conditional probabilities were developed based
on reviews of accident records and statistics compiled by various state and federal agencies. The conditional
probability for a given severity category is defined as the fraction of accidents that would fall into that
severity category if an accident were to occur. The conditional probabilities for truck and rail shipments were
determined using a binning process described in Volume 1, Appendix I of this EIS. The derivation of the accident
rates and conditional probabilities used in this analysis are discussed below. [The conditional probabilities
for barge accidents were taken directly from Pippen et al. (1995)].
As discussed above, severity category levels were defined to model the response of the various shipments to
accidents. Severity category 1 was defined as encompassing all accidents that are within the type B package
envelope that would not be severe enough to result in failure of the shipping cask (i.e., accidents with zero
release). The higher categories (2-6) were defined to include more severe accidents, and thus may lead to a
release of radioactive material. The derivation of the severity category schemes and conditional probabilities
of accidents in each severity category are discussed below for each shipping cask or container type. Table B-6
presents the conditional probabilities of the various severity categories that were used in this analysis.
Release Fractions. Release fractions (array RFRAC in RADTRAN 4) are used to determine the quantity of radio-
active material released to the environment as a result of an accident. The quantity of material released is a function
of the severity of the accident (i.e., thermal and mechanical conditions produced in the accident), the response
of the shipping container to these conditions, and the physical and chemical properties of the material being
shipped. The basis for the release fractions used in this analysis are discussed below and summarized in
Table B-7.
Release fractions for N Reactor fuel shipments were taken from Volume 1, Appendix I of this EIS. The table of
release fractions for metallic fuels was used (Table I-28). All of the released material was assumed to be in
respirable form for this assessment. Release fractions for damaged N Reactor SNF were modeled the same as for
undamaged fuel. This is because it was assumed that some form of stabilization would occur prior to shipment of
damaged SNF. Stabilization was assumed to provide a level of containment for damaged SNF, such as placement
in an overpack container, to replace the containment boundary that was provided by the failed N Reactor SNF
cladding. Stabilization was also assumed to include some form of treatment to minimize the likelihood of a
pyrophoric reaction involving the metallic uranium and to prevent the accumulation of an explosive concentration
of hydrogen gas that may be generated by the fuel elements.
Table B-6. Accident severity categories and conditional probabilities.
Conditional probability by severity category
Mode
1 2 3 4 5 6
Trucka 9.943E-01 4.03E-05 3.82E-03 1.55E-05 1.80E-03 9.84E-06
Raila 9.940E-01 2.02E-03 2.72E-03 6.14E-04 8.55E-04 1.25E-04
Bargeb 9.53E-01 2.02E-03 4.02E-02 6.41E-04 4.01E-03 1.34E-04
Shipc 6.03E-01 3.95E-01 2.0E-03 4.0E-04 4.0E-04 4.0E-04
a. Source: Fischer et al. (1987) and Volume 1, Appendix I, Figure I-2.
b. Source: Pippen et al. (1995).
c. Source: DOE (1994).
Table B-7. Release fractions used for assessment of accident impacts.
Release fraction by severity category
Material 1 2 3 4 5 6
SNFa
Gases 0.0 9.9E-03 3.3E-02 3.9E-01 3.3E-01 6.3E-01
Cesium 0.0 3.0E-08 1.0E-07 1.0E-06 1.0E-06 1.0E-05
Ruthenium 0.0 4.1E-09 1.4E-08 2.4E-07 1.4E-07 2.4E-06
Particles 0.0 3.0E-10 1.0E-09 1.0E-08 1.0E-08 1.0E-07
HLWa HLW release fractions are the same as those for SNF
Pu oxide
Particles 0.0 1.0E-06 1.0E-05 1.0E-04 1.0E-03 1.0E-02
U oxide
Particles 0.0 1.0E-06 1.0E-05 1.0E-04 1.0E-03 1.0E-02
a. These release fractions were applied to truck and rail shipments of SNF and HLW. Release fractions for
barge shipments were multiplied by 1/24, 1/12, 1/6, 1/3, and 1 for severity categories 2 through 6,
respectively, to reflect the number of shipping casks that are damaged in each category.
A different, but related, set of release fractions were used for barge shipments of N Reactor SNF. The
relationship deals with the potential involvement of multiple shipping casks in a barge carrying 24 of them.
It is overly conservative to assume that all 24 shipping casks would fail in minor barge accidents. In the
lower severity categories, the accident conditions are not severe enough to damage all 24 shipping casks.
In fact, in the lowest severity category that results in a release, only the shipping casks in the vicinity
of the collision would be affected. Consequently, the release fraction for severity category 2 was
multiplied by 1/24 to reflect the assumption that only one of the total of 24 shipping casks aboard the barge
would be damaged. Category 3 release fractions were multiplied by 1/12 to reflect the assumption that
two shipping casks out of 24 would be damaged in the accident. The release fractions for severity
categories 4, 5, and 6 were multiplied by 1/6, 1/3, and 1 to reflect the assumption that 4, 8, and all
24 casks would be damaged, respectively.
Release fractions for HLW shipments were assumed to be the same as those for SNF ship-
ments. The difference is that the strength and durability of the vitrified HLW form was taken into account by assuming
that not all of the materials released are in respirable or dispersable form. RADTRAN 4 default values for
"immobilized" radionuclides were used to model the dispersable and respirable fractions of the released
material. This means that the fraction of released material that is in dispersable form is 1.0E-06, and the
respirable fraction is 5.0E-02 (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992). The HLW release fractions for barge shipments
were adjusted similarly to those for SNF to account for the fraction of casks that were assumed to be damaged
in the six severity categories.
For plutonium and uranium oxide shipments, no data were readily available. Therefore, the release
fractions presented in Table B-7 are representative approximations. It was assumed that 10% of the material
released from the plutonium and uranium shipment accidents is in dispersable form and 5% of that is in
respirable form, based on recommendations made by Neuhauser and Kanipe (1992) for shipment of small powder
materials.
B.4.2.2.2 Consequences of Maximum Reasonably Foreseeable Accidents. The dose to the maximum
individual and the collective population dose from the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident was
calculated for each type of shipment, i.e., SNF, solidified HLW, and plutonium and uranium oxide. The
quantity and radiological constituents of each waste form are discussed in Chapter 2.0 of this appendix.
The computer code RISKIND (Yuan et al. 1993) was used to calculate the dose to the maximum individual and the
population.
RISKIND Input Parameters. This analysis evaluates the consequences of accidents involving truck or rail
shipments. A separate assessment was not performed for barge shipments to Portland because of the similarity
between the rail and barge routing data (see Section B.2.3). The radiological inventories devel-
oped in Table B-1 have been used to calculate the dose to the maximum individual and the public. For all analyses, inhalation doses
were calculated for each of the NRC modal study severity categories, assuming the maximum individual was located
100 m from the point of release and neutral weather conditions (i.e., Atmospheric Stability Class = D and 4 m/s
wind speed). To determine the maximum individual dose for each of the material types, the calculated dose for each
of the NRC modal study categories (20) were binned into the accident severity categories shown in Table B-6. The
results of the RISKIND calculations for each severity category are presented in Table B-8.
An accident frequency (accidents per year) and probable accident location by population zone (i.e., rural,
suburban, and urban) were developed for each campaign, based on the type of material, transportation mode,
transportation routing information, and state-specific transportation accident data. For this analysis a
campaign is defined as the total number of shipments required to transport all of the material from the point of
origin to the destination.
For each of the transportation modes, existing transportation model computer codes, i.e., HIGHWAY (Johnson
1993a; population data revised in 1994) and INTERLINE (Johnson 1993b; population data revised in 1994) were used
to develop the route-specific information required for the accident analyses.
The information required to calculate the accident frequencies included the total number of shipments per
campaign, the campaign duration, the total shipping distance, population zone-specific accident rates by state,
and the conditional probabilities shown in Table B-6. The population zone-specific accident frequencies are
calculated using the state-specific accident data (accidents per kilometer) for each of the population zones
contained in Saricks and Kvitek (1994) and the distance traveled in each of the population zones. The resulting
adjusted accident rates are shown in Table B-9. The values in this table were used to select the maximum reasonably
foreseeable accident scenario.
Table B-8. RISKIND calculated doses summarized by severity categorya.
Severity Truck Rail
Categoryb
Spent Nuclear Spent Nuclear Solidified HLWd
Fuel Pu Oxide U Oxide Fuel (rem)
(rem) (rem) (rem)c (rem)
1e 2.36E-05 2.36E-05 2.36E-05 2.36E-05 2.36E-05
2 8.59E-03 3.91E-04 2.36E-05 1.30E-01 1.26E-01
3 5.01E-02 1.25E-03 2.36E-05 8.53E-01 8.39E-01
4 9.39E-02 1.23E-02 2.36E-05 2.96E-01 1.26E-01
5 1.18E-01 1.23E-02 2.36E-05 9.80E-01 8.39E-01
6 2.60E-01 1.23E-01 2.36E-05 1.27E+00 8.39E-01
a. Maximum individual doses are in BOLD. (These doses were estimated in the event an accident occurs; i.e.,
they were not multiplied by the corresponding accident frequencies).
b. Severity categories are defined in Table B-6.
c. Only external doses were calculated.
d. The quantity of HLW released has been adjusted because of the immobilized form of the material. The
adjustment, 1.0E-06, was taken from RADTRAN 4 (Neuhauser and
Kanipe 1992).
e. Although, no material would be released, an external dose is calculated as a result of changes in the cask
shielding caused by an accident impact.
The calculated maximum individual doses were cross referenced with the accident frequencies in Table B-9, and
the maximum individual doses for reasonably foreseeable accidents (i.e., the accident frequency is greater than
1 x 10-7/year) have been reported.
The population dose from the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident is also provided. These analyses are
based on the same assumptions used to calculate the dose to the maximally exposed individual. The location of the
accident (or population zone) is the same as the accident location used to calculate the maximum individual doses.
The population densities for each of the impacted population zones were developed using HIGHWAY (Johnson 1993a)
and INTERLINE (Johnson 1993b).
Table B-9. Summary of route-specific accident rates.
Total Distance per zone (km) Travel fraction Population zone accident rate
distance (1.0E-07/km)
(km)
Rural Suburban Urban Rural Suburban Urban Rural Suburban Urban
Norfolk to Hanford - Truck
4311.43 3640.28 619.48 51.67 0.84 0.14 0.01 2.508 3.369 4.129
Portland to Hanford -Truck
416.82 353.25 50.21 13.36 0.85 0.12 0.03 2.279 2.802 3.675
Seattle to Hanford - Truck
276.80 243.80 27.70 5.30 0.88 0.10 0.02 2.500 2.055 1.610
Norfolk to Hanford - Rail
4984.78 4140.40 723.60 120.78 0.83 0.15 0.02 0.524 0.678 0.753
Portland to Hanford -Rail
430.50 366.32 4921 14.97 0.86 0.11 0.03 0.361 0.298 0.271
Seattle to Hanford - Rail
715.8 530.5 136.4 48.9 0.74 0.19 0.07 0.349 0.349 0.349
B.4.2.3 Results of Transportation Accident Impact Calculations. The results of the integrated
population risk assessment are presented in Table B-10. The lowest impact option is that in which SNF is shipped
from Hanford to the Port of Seattle by rail. The Port of Seattle by truck option is the next highest followed in
order by the rail option to Norfolk, truck to Norfolk, and then barge to Portland. The impacts for all of the
options are dominated by the SNF shipments to the U.K. and plutonium oxide return shipments to Hanford, primarily
because the quantities and forms of these materials are more vulnerable to accidental releases and represent
higher radiotoxicities than vitrified HLW and uranium oxide. Shipments of vitrified HLW were determined to
present the lowest impacts of all the materials because of the reasons given plus the immobilized form of the
material relative to the other materials.
Shipments by barge are shown in Table B-10 to result in relatively higher accident impacts than shipments by
rail or truck. This is because the inventories of radioactive materials transported by barge, and the resulting
potential accident releases, are at least an order of magnitude greater than for truck and rail shipments.
Because the accident rates for the three modes are comparable, this results in a higher per shipment (or per-km)
accident risk for barge than the other modes. This higher per-shipment risk more than offsets the risk reduction
attributable to fewer barge
Table B-10. Results of transportation accident risk assessmenta.
Accident impacts, Latent cancer
Option and material person-rem fatalities
Barge to Portland
SNF 1.8E-02 9.0E-06
HLW 1.5E-08 7.5E-12
Pu 9.3E-03 4.7E-06
U 2.7E-06 1.4E-09
TOTAL 2.7E-02 1.4E-05
Truck to Seattle
SNF 9.3E-05 4.7E-08
HLW (Rail) 1.6E-10 8.0E-14
Pu (Truck) 3.6E-03 1.8E-06
U (Truck) 1.1E-06 5.5E-10
TOTAL 3.7E-03 1.9E-06
Rail to Seattle
SNF 6.3E-05 3.2E-08
HLW (Rail) 1.6E-10 8.0E-14
Pu (Truck) 3.6E-03 1.8E-06
U (Truck) 1.1E-06 5.5E-10
TOTAL 3.7E-03 1.8E-06
Truck to Norfolk
SNF 2.1E-03 1.1E-06
HLW (Rail) 9.3E-10 4.7E-13
Pu (Truck) 8.3E-02 4.1E-05
U (Truck) 2.4E-05 1.2E-08
TOTAL 8.5E-02 4.2E-05
Rail to Norfolk
SNF 7.4E-04 3.7E-07
HLW (Rail) 9.3E-10 4.7E-13
Pu (Truck) 8.3E-02 4.1E-05
U (Truck) 2.4E-05 1.2E-08
TOTAL 8.3E-02 4.2E-05
a. Reported values are point estimates of risk; i.e., the accident frequency multiplied by the consequences
that would be expected if an accident occurred.
shipments so, overall, barge accident risks appear to be higher than truck or rail transport risks. However, in
comparing the magnitudes of the accident risks in Table B-8 to the public routine exposures in Table B-5, it can be
seen that the accident risks are lower than the routine public exposures. Consequently, it may be concluded that
transportation accident risk impacts are insignificant contributors to the total impacts of the transportation
options.
The results of the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident consequence assessment are provided in Tables B-11
through B-14. The results in these tables were generated using the RISKIND computer code. The following
paragraphs discuss the results of the maximally exposed individual consequence assessment for each material.
This is followed by a discussion of the results of the collective dose calculations.
N Reactor SNF. As discussed in Section 2.0, SNF will be loaded into shipping casks at the K Basins and transported
by barge, truck, or rail to ocean ports for shipment to the U.K. Two shipping modes and three transportation
routes were evaluated. The radiological source inventory used in the analysis was shown in Table B-1. The release
fractions used here were taken from Volume 1, Appendix I of this EIS (see Table B-7). The results of the
evaluation are shown in Table B-11.
As can be seen in Table B-11, for reasonably foreseeable events (i.e., the accident frequency is greater than
1.0E-07/year), the dose received by the maximally exposed individual from a rail accident ranges from 9.80E-01 to
1.27E+00 rem depending on the location of the individual and transportation route. The potential LCF range from
4.90E-04 to 6.35E-04. The accident frequency also varies based on the transportation route and accident location
from 1.27E-07 to 1.91E-06/year. Table B-11 also presents the dose received by the maximally exposed individual
from a truck accident. The dose to the maximally exposed individual ranges from 1.18E-01 to 2.60E-01 rem,
depending on the location of the individual and transportation route. The accident frequency also varies based on
the transportation route and accident location from 1.23E-07 to 1.02E-05/year. The potential LCF range from
5.90E-05 to 1.30E-04.
Collective doses to the public were also calculated for each of the transport modes and transportation route
(see Table B-11). For this analysis, it was assumed that the accident occurred in the same location as that
determined in the maximum individual dose calculations. The population dose from a rail accident ranges from
3.18E+00 to 3.27E+02 person-rem depending on the accident location, population density, and transportation route.
The doses to population from a truck accident range from 1.37E-01 to 9.44E+02 person-rem. The potential LCF range
from 1.59E-03 to 0.170 for rail and 6.85E-05 to 4.72E-1 for truck.
Table B-11. Calculated maximum individual and population radiological doses and latent cancer fatalities
based on accident location and frequency of SNF shipments.
Transportation Route Mode No. Accident Accident Maximum individual Population
of frequency location:
ship- (per populatio
mentsa year)b n zonec
TEDEd (rem) LCFe TEDEd LCFe
(person-
rem)
Hanford, Washington Truck 408 1.23E-07 Urban 2.60E-01 1.30E-04 1.01E+02 5.05E-
to 02
Portland, Oregon
Hanford, Washington 1.02E-05 Rural 1.18E-01 5.90E-05 1.37E-01 6.85E-
to 05
Seattle, Washington
Hanford, Washington 1.43-06 Urban 2.60E-01 1.30E-04 9.44E+02 4.72E-
to 01
Norfolk, Virginia
Hanford, Washington Rail 204 3.46E-07 Rural 9.80E-01 4.90E-04 3.18E+00 1.59E-
to 03
Portland, Oregon
Hanford, Washington 1.27E-07 Urban 1.27E+00 6.35E-04 3.39E+02 0.170
to
Seattle, Washington
Hanford, Washington 1.91E-06 Urban 1.27E+00 6.35E-04 3.27E+02 0.164
to
Norfolk, Virginia
a. Assumes one truck cask per truck shipment and two truck casks per rail shipment.
b. Accident frequency based on the number of shipments, campaign duration, one-way shipping distance, and
conditional probability.
c. Accident location is based on population zone where the maximum individual dose occurs.
d. TEDE - 50-year total effective dose equivalent.
e. LCF - Latent cancer fatalities. Calculated on dose (rem) to maximum individual or population, i.e.,
5.0E-04 LCF/rem
Table B-12. Calculated maximum individual and population radiological doses and latent cancer fatalities
based on accident location and frequency for plutonium oxide shipments.
Accident
No. Accident Location: Maximum Individual Population
of Frequency Population
Transportation Route Mode Ship. (per year)b Zonec
TEDEd LCFse TEDEd LCFse
(rem) (rem)
Portland, Oregon to Truck 186 1.22E-07 Urban 1.23E-01 6.15E-05 1.88E+01 9.40E-03
Hanford, Washington
Seattle, Washington 1.01E-05 Rural 1.23E-02 6.15E-06 3.46E-03 1.73E-06
to
Hanford, Washington
Norfolk, Virginia to 1.42E-06 Urban 1.23E-01 6.15E-05 1.77E+01 8.85E-03
Hanford, Washington
a. Assumes one cask per truck shipment.
b. Accident frequency based on the number of shipments, campaign duration, one-way shipping distance, and
conditional probability.
c. Accident location is based on population zone where maximum individual dose occurs.
d. TEDE - 50 year Total Effective Dose Equivalent.
e. LCFs - Latent cancer fatalities. Calculated based on dose (rem) to maximum individual or population,
i.e., 5.0E-04 LCFs/rem
Plutonium Oxide. The separated plutonium oxide was assumed to be returned to its point of origin (i.e., Hanford).
This material was assumed to be transported to a U.S. port (Seattle, Portland, or Norfolk) by ocean-going ship and
offloaded to a Safe-Secure Trailer/Armored Tractor for subsequent highway shipment to Hanford (one container per
shipment).
The results of this analysis are provided in Table B-12. The dose, to the maximally exposed individual from
the maximum reasonable foreseeable accident, ranges from 1.23E-02 to 1.23E-01 rem, depending on the location of
the individual and transportation route. The potential LCF ranges from 5.90E-06 to 5.90E-05. The accident frequency
ranges from 1.22E-07 to 1.01E-05/year depending on the transportation route and accident location.
The potential population doses from the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident have also been calculated and
are shown in Table B-12. Assuming that the accident occurs in the same location or population zone as that
determined for the maximally exposed individual, the population dose ranges from 3.46E-03 to 1.88E+01 person-rem.
The potential LCF range from 1.73E-06 to 9.40E-03.
Uranium Oxide. As with plutonium oxide, uranium oxide resulting from SNF processing was assumed to be returned to
Hanford. This material was assumed to be transported by ship to a port facility where it would be offloaded onto a
truck for subsequent highway transport to Hanford. As with the plutonium oxide, only truck accidents were
evaluated. The calculated dose received by the maximum individual from a truck accident is 2.36E-05 rem (see
Table B-13). The potential LCF are 1.18E-08. The accident frequency ranges from 1.23E-07 to 1.01E-05 per year
depending on the transportation route and accident location.
The potential collective dose ranges from 3.65E-06 to 1.98E-03 person-rem depending on the location and
transportation route. The potential LCF range from 1.83E-09 to 9.90E-07 and also depend on the accident location
and transportation route.
Solidified High-Level Waste. Following separation of all plutonium and uranium from the N Reactor fuel, the
resulting HLW was assumed to be vitrified and poured into canisters. These canisters were assumed to be shipped in
rail shipping casks by ship to a U.S. port facility and offloaded to rail cars at the port; therefore, only rail
accidents were evaluated for shipments of HLW. The radiological source inventory used in the analysis was shown
in Table B-1 and the release fractions were shown in Table B-7. Because the waste material that has been
solidified in glass logs was considered to be "immobilized" material, the fraction of released material that is
also dispersable and the fraction that is also respirable were adjusted, as discussed in Section 4.2.2.1.
Table B-13. Calculated maximum individual and population radiological doses and latent cancer fatalities
based on accident location and frequency for uranium oxide shipments.
Transportation route Mode No. Accident Accident
of frequency location: Maximum individual Population
ship- (per year)b population
mentsa zonec
TEDEd LCFe TEDEd LCFe
(rem) (person-
rem)
Portland, Oregon to Truck 236 1.23E-07 Urban 2.36E-05 1.18E-08 1.98E-03 9.90E-07
Hanford, Washington
Seattle, Washington to 1.01E-05 Rural 2.36E-05 1.18E-08 3.65E-06 1.83E-09
Hanford, Washington
Norfolk, Virginia to 1.43E-06 Urban 2.36E-05 1.18E-08 1.86E-03 9.3E-07
Hanford, Washington
a. Assumes one cask per truck shipment.
b. Accident frequency based on the number of shipments, campaign duration, one-way shipping distance, and
conditional probability.
c. Accident location is based on the population zone where maximum individual dose occurs.
d. TEDE - 50-year total effective dose equivalent.
e. LCF - Latent cancer fatalities. Calculated on dose (rem) to maximum individual or population, i.e.,
5.0E-04 LCF/rem.
The calculated dose to the maximally exposed individual and population are
shown in Table B-14. The dose to the maximally exposed individual was 8.39E-
01 rem and the potential latent cancer fatalities would be 4.20E-04. The
accident frequency varies by route and ranges from 1.25E-07 to 1.88E-06/year.
The population doses are also shown in Table B-14. The collective dose
ranges from 3.48E+00 to 1.42E+03 person-rem. The potential latent cancer
fatalities range from 1.74E-03 to 0.710.
B.4.2.4 Assessment of Nonradiological Impacts. Nonradiological accident impacts
consist of fatalities that may result from traffic accidents involving the
shipments to and from the offshore processing facility. Nonradiological
incident-free impacts are those resulting pollutants emitted from the
vehicles. These impacts are not related to the radioactive nature of the
materials being transported. In fact, the number of estimated injuries and
fatalities would be the same even if the cargo were not radioactive materials.
This section uses unit risk factors to estimate the nonradiological impacts
associated with the five shipping scenarios considered in this evaluation.
The potential for accidents involving shipments of materials to and from an
offshore processing facility is assumed to be comparable to that of general
truck, rail, and barge transport in the U.S. Nonradiological accident unit
risk factors were taken from Saricks and Kvitek (1994) to calculate
nonradiological accident impacts. These risk factors, in units of fatalities-
per-km of travel in rural and urban population zones, were multiplied by the
total distance traveled in each zone by all of the shipments and then
summed to calculate the expected number of nonradiological fatalities. The unit
risk factor for travel in suburban zones was represented by the average of the
rural and urban unit risk factors given by Saricks and Kvitek (1994).
Impacts to the public from non-radiological causes are also evaluated.
This includes fatalities resulting from pollutants emitted from the vehicles
during normal transportation. Based on the information contained in Rao et
al. (1982), the types of pollutants that are present and can impact
the public are sulfur oxides (SOx), particulates, nitrogen oxides (NOx),
carbon monoxide (CO), hydrocarbons (HC), and photochemical oxidants (Ox). Of
these pollutants, Rao et al. (1982) determined that the majority of the health
effects are from SOx and the particulates. Unit risk
Table B-14. Calculated maximum individual and population radiological doses and latent cancer fatalities
based on accident location and frequency for solidified high level waste shipments
Transportation Route Mode No. Accident Accident Maximum individual Population
of frequency location:
ship- (per year)b population
ments. zonec
a
TEDEd LCFe TEDEd LCFe
(rem) (person-
rem)
Portland, Oregon to Rail 24 3.39E-07 Rural 8.39E-01 4.20E-04 3.48E+00 1.74E-
Hanford, Washington 03
Seattle, Washington 1.25E-07 Urban 8.39E-01 4.20E-04 1.42E+03 7.1E-01
to
Hanford, Washington
Norfolk, Virginia to 1.88E-06 Urban 8.39E-01 4.20E-04 1.37E+03 6.8E-01
Hanford, Washington
a. Assumes one cask per rail shipment.
b. Accident frequency based on the number of shipments, campaign duration, one-way shipping distance, and
conditional probability.
c. Accident location is based on population zone where maximum individual dose occurs.
d. TEDE - 50-year total effective dose equivalent.
e. LCF - Latent cancer fatalities. Calculated on dose (rem) to the maximum individual or population,
i.e., 5.0E-04 LCF/rem.
factors (fatalities per kilometer) for both truck and rail
shipments were developed by Rao et al. (1982) for travel in urban
population zones (1.0E-07/km and 1.3E-07/km truck and rail
respectively). These unit risk factors were combined with the
total shipping distance in urban population zones to calculate the
nonradiological incident-free impacts to the public.
The results of the nonradiological accident and incident-free
impact calculations for the five potential shipping scenarios are
presented in Table B.15. The values reported in the table
represent the sum of the impacts from all of the shipments and
include the impacts from shipments carrying cargo as well as those
from empty return shipments.
B.4.3 Dose to the Public from Port Activities
Normal port activities during transport of N Reactor SNF are not
expected to have any consequences for members of the public other
than port workers, as discussed in Section 3.3.
The consequences of accidents during port transit were estimated
using the same assumptions described for worker consequences in
Section 3.3.2. Collective point estimates of risk to the
population within 50 miles (80 km) of each location was estimated
for an accident at the dock and on the approach to the port. The
point estimate of risk to an individual at 1600 m (1 mile) was also
estimated for applicable exposure pathways as described in
Attachment A of this appendix. Consequences for populations and
individuals are reported, both with and without the risk from
ingestion of locally grown foods because protective action
guidelines would require mitigative actions if the projected dose
exceeded specified levels. Individual consequences assume 95%
atmospheric dispersion, whereas consequences to populations are
estimated for both 50% and 95% atmospheric dispersion.
Table B.15. Nonradiological transportation impacts of offshore
processing scenarios
Accident Incident-free
Shipping scenario impacts, impacts,
fatalities fatalities
Barge to Portland 1.1E-02 2.1E-03
Seattle by Truck 8.9E-03 1.2E-03
Seattle by Rail 1.2E-02 3.4E-03
Norfolk by Truck 1.3E-01 1.6E-02
Norfolk by Rail 1.2E-01 1.5E-02
The consequences of port accidents were estimated in a manner
similar to that used for overland transportation impacts. The
contents of one shipping cask were assumed to be involved in an
accident (see Table B-1), with radionuclide releases according to
the release fractions reported in Table B-7. The dose and
resulting LCF were calculated for each of the six accident severity
categories. The point estimates of risk included the consequences
as LCF for accidents of each severity category multiplied by the
frequency with which an accident of that severity would occur. The
accident frequencies for each severity category were assumed to be
the overall accident rate per port transit (3.2 x 10-4) multiplied
by the conditional probability for accidents in each severity
category listed in Table B-6 (DOE 1994). The total accident risk
for an individual or population was then estimated as the sum of
risks for all accident severity categories. Risks for accidents
evaluated at 95% (stable) atmospheric dispersion were assumed to be
10% lower than those at 50% (neutral) dispersion.
The results for accidents at the four representative ports are
shown in Table B-16, with estimated risks for individual residents
and populations within 80 km (50 miles). Point estimates of risk
for the individual resident ranged from 6.2 x 10-13 to 1.3 x 10-
11 LCF if no locally grown food were considered; results for all
exposure pathways including ingestion were 3.5 x 10-11 to
7.8 x 10-10 LCF.
Collective point estimates of risk to the population within 50
miles of Portland, Oregon were 5.2 x 10-9 to 4.9 x 10-6 LCF assuming
50% atmospheric dispersion conditions and 1.0 x 10-8 to
8.3 x 10-6 LCF for 95% atmospheric dispersion. Corresponding
results for the population in the vicinity of Newark are 2.3 x 10-8
to 4.9 x 10-5 LCF assuming 50% atmospheric dispersion and 1.5 x 10-8
to 8.4 x 10-5 LCF for 95% atmospheric dispersion. Consequences for
the collective populations of Seattle-Tacoma and Norfolk fell
between the estimates for the other two ports.
The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident was a category 6
accident, which has a frequency of 1.3 x 10-7 per port transit, and
which was evaluated for either neutral or stable atmospheric
conditions resulting in a cumulative frequency of 2.2 x 10-6 or 2.2
x 10-7, respectively for 17 SNF shipments. Dose and risk estimates
for the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident are presented in
Table B-17. The dose to the resident member of the public ranged
from an estimated 0.02 to somewhat over 1 rem for all ports,
depending on whether locally grown food was considered as an
exposure pathway. The corresponding probability of LCF ranged from
9.0 x 10-6 to 6.5 x 10-4 and point estimates of risk, from 2.0 x 10-12
to 1.4 x 10-10 LCF. The collective
Table B-16. Point estimate of riska of latent cancer fatalities from port accidents.
Port location Portland, Oregon Seattle-Tacoma, Norfolk, Virginia Newark, New Jersey
Washington
Exposure Pathways All Inhalati All Inhalati All Inhalat All Inhalati
pathway on pathwa on pathway ion pathway on
s + ys + s + s +
external external externa external
l
Individual at 1600 m - 95% (stable) atmospheric conditions
1 Shipment 4.6E-11 7.9E-13 3.5E- 6.2E-13 4.6E-11 7.9E-13 3.9E-11 6.8E-13
17 Shipments 7.8E-10 1.3E-11 11 1.0E-11 7.8E-10 1.3E-11 6.7E-10 1.2E-11
6.0E-
10
Population within 80 km (50 miles) of dock - 50% (neutral) atmospheric conditions
1 Shipment 2.9E-07 6.6E-09 1.9E- 4.3E-09 1.2E-07 2.7E-09 1.0E-06 2.3E-08
17 Shipments 4.9E-06 1.1E-07 07 7.2E-08 2.0E-06 4.6E-08 1.7E-05 3.9E-07
3.2E-
06
Population within 80 km (50 miles) of harbor approach - 50% (neutral) atmospheric conditions
1 Shipment 2.4E-07 5.2E-09 6.0E- 1.4E-09 1.1E-07 2.5E-09 2.9E-06 6.5E-08
17 Shipments 4.0E-06 8.9E-08 08 2.3E-08 1.9E-06 4.3E-08 4.9E-05 1.1E-06
1.0E-
06
Population within 80 km (50 miles) of dock - 95% (stable) atmospheric conditions
1 Shipment 4.5E-07 1.0E-08 2.3E- 5.1E-09 3.3E-07 7.4E-09 5.0E-06 1.5E-08
17 Shipments 7.6E-06 1.8E-07 07 8.8E-08 5.6E-06 1.3E-07 8.4E-05 2.5E-07
3.9E-
06
Population within 80 km (50 Miles) of Harbor Approach - 95% (stable) Atmospheric Conditions
1 Shipment 4.9E-07 1.0E-08 1.2E- 2.8E-09 2.5E-07 5.8E-09 4.9E-06 1.1E-07
17 Shipments 8.3E-06 1.7E-07 07 4.7E-08 4.3E-06 9.8E-08 8.3E-05 1.9E-06
2.0E-
06
a. Point estimate of risk is defined as the consequences to the receptor or population (as LCF) of an
accident of a given severity category (assuming the accident occurs), multiplied by the frequency per
shipment with which an accident of that severity would occur. The risks for accidents of all severity
categories are then summed to obtain the total risk per shipment.
consequences to the populations within 80 km (50 mi) of the ports
ranged from 2.0 x 10-3 to 380 LCF assuming the accident occurs,
depending on the location of the accident (port or harbor approach)
and the exposure pathways considered. The corresponding point
estimates of risk for latent fatal cancers amounted to 4.4 x 10-9 to
8.2 x 10-5.
B.4.4 Dose to the Public from Ocean Transport to the United Kingdom
This analysis expects no dose to members of the public resulting
from incident-free ocean transport of N Reactor SNF to the U.K.
The ships carrying the fuel are owned and operated by the
commercial vendor, and its shipboard crews are assumed to be
classified as radiation workers for the purposes of this analysis.
The effects of losing a cask at sea are estimated to be
comparable to those evaluated for shipment of foreign research
reactor SNF to the U.S. (DOE 1994), based on similar shipping
inventories of long-lived radionuclides per cask. The maximum dose
to an individual for a cask lost in coastal waters was expected to
be 11 mrem/year if the cask were left in place until all its
contents dispersed. The corresponding consequences to marine biota
were 0.24 mrad/year for fish, 0.32 mrad/year for crustaceans, and
13 mrad/year for mollusks. The consequences resulting from loss of
a cask in the deep ocean would be many orders of magnitude lower
than estimates for coastal waters.
The probability of accident on the open ocean was estimated to
be 4.6 x 10-5 per shipment for an average duration voyage of about
20 days in transporting SNF from foreign research reactors to
the U.S. (DOE 1995). The frequency of accidents for overseas
shipment of SNF and process materials via special-purpose ships
would likely be within a factor of two or three of this estimate.
However, that frequency applies to commercial freight shipping
experience, and it is possible that the use of special-purpose
ships could result in a different accident rate. Using the
commercial freight accident rate given above, the probability of an
accident on the open ocean involving transport of SNF (17 ocean
shipments), HLW (1 shipment), uranium oxide (1 shipment), and
plutonium oxide (1 shipment) was calculated to be about 9.2E-04,
integrated over all the shipments.
Table B-17. Consequences and risk to the public surrounding port facilities from maximum reasonably
foreseeable accidents involving SNF shipments at or near the ports.
Port Location Portland, Oregon Tacoma, Washington Norfolk, Virginia Newark, New Jersey
All Inhalation All Inhalation All Inhalation All Inhalation
pathways + external pathways + External pathways + external pathways + external
Resident at 1600 m
Dose (rem) 1.3E+00 2.3E-02 9.9E-01 1.8E-02 1.3E+00 2.3E-02 1.1E+00 2.0E-02
LCF 6.5E-04 1.2E-05 5.0E-04 9.0E-06 6.5E-04 1.2E-05 5.5E-04 9.9E-06
LCF risk 1.4E-10 2.5E-12 1.1E-10 2.0E-12 1.4E-10 2.5E-12 1.2E-10 2.2E-12
Population within 80 km (50 mi) of dock - 50% (neutral) atmospheric dispersion
Dose 8.7E+02 1.9E+01 5.5E+02 1.2E+01 3.5E+02 7.7E+00 3.1E+03 6.8E+01
(person-rem)
LCF 4.4E-01 9.7E-03 2.8E-01 6.0E-03 1.8E-01 3.9E-03 1.6E+00 3.4E-02
LCF risk 9.5E-07 2.1E-08 6.0E-07 1.3E-08 3.8E-07 8.4E-09 3.4E-06 7.3E-08
Population within 80 km (50 mi) of harbor approach - 50% (neutral) atmospheric dispersion
Dose 6.9E+02 1.5E+01 1.8E+02 4.0E+00 3.3E+02 7.3E+00 8.5E+03 1.8E+02
(person-rem)
LCF 3.5E-01 7.5E-03 9.0E-02 2.0E-03 1.7E-01 3.7E-03 4.3E+00 9.1E-02
LCF risk 7.5E-07 1.6E-08 2.0E-07 4.4E-09 3.6E-07 7.9E-09 9.2E-06 2.0E-07
Population within 80 km (50 mi) of dock - 95% (stable) atmospheric dispersion
Dose 1.3E+04 2.9E+02 6.9E+03 1.5E+02 9.8E+03 2.1E+02 7.5E+05 1.7E+03
(person-rem)
LCF 6.5E+00 1.4E-01 3.5E+00 7.5E-02 4.9E+00 1.1E-01 3.8E+02 8.6E-01
LCF risk 1.4E-06 3.1E-08 7.5E-07 1.6E-08 1.1E-06 2.3E-08 8.2E-05 1.9E-07
Population within 80 km (50 mi) of harbor approach - 95% (stable) atmospheric dispersion
Dose 1.4E+04 3.1E+02 3.6E+03 7.8E+01 7.5E+03 1.6E+02 1.4E+05 3.2E+03
(person-rem)
LCF 7.0E+00 1.6E-01 1.8E+00 3.9E-02 3.8E+00 8.0E-02 7.0E+01 1.6E+00
LCF risk 1.5E-06 3.4E-08 3.9E-07 8.5E-09 8.2E-07 1.7E-08 1.5E-05 3.5E-07
B.5 Legal and Policy Considerations
B.5.1 Policy Considerations
For a general discussion of the policy considerations associated with DOE's management of SNF,
see Section 2 of Volume 1. Several policy consid-
erations bear on the evaluation of international
shipment and processing of SNF.
The primary consideration in international shipment of nuclear materials is concern for
unauthorized diversion of such materials to foreign weapons programs (nuclear proliferation). This
concern is mitigated, but not eliminated, because SNF is not directly useable in simple nuclear
weapons. Stringent safeguards exist for overseas transportation of nuclear materials. Highly
enriched uranium has been transported overseas for research purposes, and SNF from research
reactors has been returned to the U.S. for disposition. Although such return shipments have not
occurred routinely since 1988, DOE is considering resumption of such shipments in support of U.S.
efforts to remove highly enriched uranium SNF from international commerce. Two such shipments
were completed on an urgent relief basis in 1994, and additional shipments may resume on
completion of an evaluation by DOE (1995).
DOE (1993) has evaluated the safety and policy issues associated with overseas transport of plutonium
and concluded that such shipments could be made safely and securely within the context of current national
and international regulations for transport of radioactive materials (including special nuclear materials).
The report (DOE 1993) addresses risks to the public and the environment, emergency response requirements,
safeguards, and the regulatory framework within which such shipments could be made.
The overseas transportation of SNF and eventual return of vitrified wastes and end products
contemplated in this alternative would be managed in accordance with well defined and
demonstrated practices. However, a decision to implement the overseas transportation and
processing option will require close examination of various policy and international documents that
address plutonium stockpiling and the exchange of nuclear materials.
Other major policy considerations are the comparative risk of overseas shipment and return
versus strictly domestic transportation and management of SNF and the involvement of a foreign
population and environment in the foreign processing alternative. A decision to implement the
BNFL option would be likely to generate controversy over the perception of transferrring
environmental problems overseas. Transportation risks are addressed in Sections B.3 and B.4 of this
attachment.
The representative facility used for this analysis (British Nuclear Fuels facility operations in
Sellafield, U.K.) began in the 1940s with the same primary mission as Hanford. This commercial
facility processes large volumes of SNF from several foreign countries. Round trip shipments and
management of SNF and waste products would therefore be undertaken within a demonstrated
regulatory, technical, and physical infrastructure.
B.5.2 Applicable Laws, Regulations, and Other Requirements
B.5.2.1 General. This discussion is limited to regulatory considerations associated with the
round trip domestic and overseas transportation of SNF and other hazardous and radioactive
materials. For a discussion of general laws and regulation governing the management of SNF, see
Section 2.2 of this appendix. State and local requirements will not be discussed here because the
shipments of SNF under consideration would be in interstate or foreign commerce and federal
provisions would govern. Internal DOE Orders also are not discussed.
The significant international and federal laws and regulations that apply to the transportation of
hazardous and radioactive materials include the following laws:
- International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea of 1960 (as amended)
- Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.)
- Hazardous Transportation Materials Act (49 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.)
- Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, as amended by the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments (42 U.S.C. 26901 et seq.)
- Executive Order 12898 (Environmental Justice)
- Executive Order 12114 (Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions).
B.5.2.2 Domestic Packaging and Transportation. Transportation of hazardous and radioactive
materials, substances, and wastes are governed by the regulations of the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) (49 CFR 171-178, 383-397), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
(10 CFR 71), and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (40 CFR 262, 265).
United States DOT regulations contain requirements for identifying a material as hazardous or
radioactive. These regulations interface with NRC and EPA regulations for identifying material, but
the DOT regulations govern hazard communication via placarding, labeling, reporting, and shipping
requirements (see especially 10 CFR 71.5, in which DOT regulations are applied to shipping of
radioactive materials by NRC regulations).
Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations address packaging design and certification require-
ments. Certification is based on safety analysis report data on the packaging design for various
hypothetical accident conditions.
General overland carriage is governed by specific regulations dealing with packaging notifica-
tion, escorts, and communication. There are specific provisions for truck and for rail. For carriage
by truck, the carrier must use interstate highways or state-designated preferred routes. Department
of Transportation regulations found in 49 CFR 397.101 establish routing and driver training
requirements for highway carriers of packages containing "highway-route-controlled quantities" of
radioactive materials. Spent nuclear fuel shipments constitute such controlled shipments. For
carriage by rail car, each shipment by the railroad must comply with 49 CFR 174 Subpart K
"Detailed Requirements for Radioactive Materials."
B.5.2.3 Overseas Transportation. To the extent feasible, the NRC and DOT conform their
regulations to the model regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency. These model
international regulations are also incorporated into the International Maritime Dangerous Goods
Code, which was developed to supplement the International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea,
to which the U.S. is a signatory. Transportation risk in the global commons must be evaluated in
accordance with Executive Order 12114 (Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions).
Transportation of dangerous cargoes through the Panama Canal is governed by the International
Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG) and is addressed in 35 U.S.C. 113. General provisions for
passage through the Panama Canal are found at 35 U.S.C. 101-135. General regulations governing
navigation, including the applicability of the International Regulations for the Prevention of
Collisions at Sea (1972), are found throughout Title 33 of the CFRs.
Relevant regulations applying to transport of SNF by vessel are found in 10 CFR Parts 71 and 73
(NRC) and 49 CFR Part 176 (DOT). These regulations address prenotification to the U.S. Coast
Guard for inspection, and provide specifications for packaging, labelling, and other prepara-
tion for shipment. A Certification of Competent Authority must be obtained in compliance with
International Atomic Energy Agency requirements. Specific provisions are made for stowage,
including package surface temperature limitations, spacing, and total aggregate volume and number
of freight containers.
B.6 Environmental Justice
For analytical purposes, three modes of transportation were selected for evaluation: 1) truck or
rail to a port on Puget Sound (such as Tacoma, Washington); 2) barge to a Columbia River port in
the vicinity of Portland, Oregon; or 3) rail or truck across the country to an East Coast port. The East
Coast port of reference was assumed to be Norfolk, Virginia (Hampton Roads). These three modes
are considered to provide a reasonable range of ports and transportation options for evaluation.
The DOE draft Environmental Impact Statement on the Proposed Nuclear Weapons
Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor (FRR) Spent Nuclear Fuel (DOE/EIS-
0218D) provides information on the numbers and spatial locations of minority and low-income
populations surrounding the ports of interest identified above and the Hanford Site. Because the
FRR EIS (see Section A.2) utilized somewhat different analytical methodologies for environmental
justice purposes than those utilized in this document, some data may vary. The reasons for such
variations are explained in Section L-3.5 of Appendix L of this document. Utilizing demographic
data entirely from the FRR EIS for the purposes of this attachment, allows for comparison of the
sites of interest under consistent definitions and assumptions because the ports identified above were
not demographically evaluated in Appendix L of this EIS. The reader is referred to the draft FRR
EIS for maps locating the spatial distribution of minority and low income populations.
Table B-18 lists information on selected populations of interest for regions surrounding the
Hanford loading facility and ports. Regions surrounding each port are areas that lie at least partially
within a 16-km (10-mile) radius of the port. Eighty kilometers (50 miles) is used for Hanford.
Population characteristics shown in the table were extracted from detailed, block-group statistical
population data of the 1990 census. A block group usually includes 250 to 550 housing units.
Because the impacts as a result of transportation and facility operations are small and reasonably
foreseen accidents present no significant risk, no reasonably foreseeable adverse impacts have been
identified to the surrounding population. Therefore, no disproportionately high and adverse effects
would be expected for any particular segment of the population, including minority and low-income
populations.
Table B-18. Characterization of populations residing near candidate facilities (Hanford Site and
candidate ports of embarkationa).
Facility Total Total minority populatiHouseholds Low income households
populationwithin 16 km of facilitwithin 16 within 16 km of facility
within 16 km of
km of facility
facility
Number Number Percent Number Number Percent
Hanford, 383,934 95,042 24.8 136,496 57,667 42.2
Washingtonc
Tacoma, 511,575 85,341 16.7 198,458 83,101 41.9
Washington
Portland, Oreg356,064 54,704 15.4 146,047 66,186 45.3
Norfolk, Virgi681,864 300,179 44.0 206,464 90,723 43.9
a. Data based on draft FRR EIS (DOE/EIS-0218D).
b. Hispanic origin individuals can be of any race.
c. In the case of the Hanford loading facility, a radius of 80 km rather than 16 km was used to define
the nearby population.
B.7 Cost
The cost estimate for the foreign processing option, as provided by the representative facility,
includes the full service of transporting the SNF from the Hanford Site to the U.K. facility,
processing the material into recovered uranium and plutonium and HLW, packaging these products
appropriately for return to the U.S., storing the packaged materials pending shipment, and
transporting the materials back to the U.S. (BNFL 1994). The proposal provides only a range of total
cost ($1.3 - $2 billion), with no breakdown of those costs into the principal cost elements. Thus,
there is no detailed estimate of costs for the individual parts of the full service package. The above
estimate does not include costs incurred at Hanford to package and stabilize the fuel, if necessary,
prior to shipment, or to manage degraded fuel and sludge that may not be suitable for overseas
shipment.
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