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Event Notification Report for June 15, 2007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
06/14/2007 - 06/15/2007

** EVENT NUMBERS **


43386 43400 43417 43421 43423 43424

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43386
Rep Org: KENTUCKY DEPT OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: ROGERS GROUP, INC.
Region: 1
City: HOPKINSVILLE State: KY
County: CHRISTIAN
License #: 202-312-51
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRIAN PARSLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/24/2007
Notification Time: 12:45 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2007
Event Time: 17:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
ILTAB (e-mail) ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

LOST/STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

Rogers Group Company conducted a test at mile marker 63 on Edward T. Breathitt Parkway. After the test was completed they placed the Troxler 4640-B Moisture Density gauge [S/N 1772], 9 millicuries of Cs-137 [Sealed Source Model No. A-102112], in the back of the bed of truck, did not store it or tie it down, and they drove 3.5 miles South on Edward T. Breathitt Parkway at which time they turned around and drove back to mile marker 63. When they arrived back at mile marker 63 they discovered that the gauge was missing, believe that the gauge had fallen out of the truck while it was being driven. They retraced their route that they had taken and asked several working crews if they had seen the missing gauge. The gauge was not found and the licensee believes that a motorist had stopped and picked up the gauge. The licensee notified the State Police of the missing gauge.

Reference Number: KY070002

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

* * * UPDATE RECEIVED FROM BRIAN PARSLEY TO JOE O'HARA AT 1519 ON 6/14/07 * * *

The Troxler Gauge has been found and returned to the licensee. Apparently, the gauge was recovered on 5/22/07 by a former employee of the Rogers Company, in the same general area where it was lost. The former employee took the gauge to his home in Vansans, Indiana. The individual reported the recovered gauge to the Vansans Police Department who contacted the Kentucky State Police. Both law enforcement agencies were able to confirm the identity of the gauge, and the gauge has been placed in the custody of the licensee.

Notified R1DO(Doerflein), R3DO(Phillips), and FSME(Morell)

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Hospital Event Number: 43400
Rep Org: WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Licensee: WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Region: 3
City: ST. LOUIS State: MO
County:
License #: 24-00167-11
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SUSAN LANGHORST
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 06/01/2007
Notification Time: 15:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/29/2007
Event Time: 10:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3047(a) - EMBRYO/FETUS DOSE > 50 mSv
Person (Organization):
KENNETH O'BRIEN (R3)
CYNTHIA FLANNERY (FSME)

Event Text

CANCER TREATMENT OF RADIOACTIVE IODINE RESULTS IN A DOSE TO FETUS

A patient was seen by the prescribing physician on May 22, 2007 about a cancer treatment with Iodine 131. The hospital conducted a pregnancy test on the patient. The result was negative. The individual was advised not to get pregnant prior to the treatment.

On May 29, 2007, the treatment was conducted at Barnes Jewish Hospital Radiation Oncology. The prescribed dose was for 125 millicuries of I-131. 125.5 millicuries of I-131 was the actual administered dose.

On May 30, 2007 the patient called the hospital to report that she conducted a home pregnancy test with positive results. The patient was asked to come in to the hospital on May 30, 2007 for another test. The hospital radiation safety officer received the results of the test on May 31, 2007. The results were positive. The staff at the hospital calculated a dose to the adult uterus as an approximation for the dose received by the fetus. The dose was estimated to be 25 to 34 rem.

The risk to the fetus is still being determined by the hospital. The possible effects on the fetus will be discussed with the patient at a future date.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43417
Rep Org: ALABAMA RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: BUILDING & EARTH SCIENCES OF COLUMBUS
Region: 1
City: PHENIX CITY State: AL
County:
License #: GA 1136-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID A. TURBERVILLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 06/11/2007
Notification Time: 16:57 [ET]
Event Date: 06/11/2007
Event Time: 08:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/11/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
SCOTT MOORE (FSME)

Event Text

ALABAMA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - A GEORGIA LICENSED MOISTURE DENSITY WAS DAMAGED IN ALABAMA

This event was received via facsimile from the State of Alabama


"SUBJECT: Alabama Incident 07-25 - Damage to Instrotek Model 3500 Moisture Density Gauge.


"On the morning of June 11, 2007 at approximately 8:05 am CDT, the Alabama Office of Radiation Control received a phone call from a representative of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources advising the Agency that a moisture density gauge containing radioactive material had been run over by a dozer at a temporary job site in Phenix City, Alabama. The gauge was an Instrotek model 3500, serial number 583 containing 10 millicuries of Cs -137 and 40 millicuries of Am-241:Be. The licensee, Building and Earth Sciences of Columbus, Georgia notified the Georgia Department of Natural Resources at the time the incident occurred. Upon notification, the writer called the licensee's technician at the site to check the status of the incident. According to the licensee, the sources were in the shielded position and the area was restricted. The licensee's Radiation Safety Officer arrived at the scene and surveyed the area, the dozer and the gauge. Radiation levels around the gauge were found to be within the normal range. The gauge was placed in the transport container and returned to the licensee's facility and a leak test was performed. Leak test results are pending. Building and Earth Sciences is authorized to possess and use radioactive material under their Georgia Radioactive Material License No. GA. 1136-1.

"This is all the information that this Agency has at this time and is current as of 3:00 pm CDT, June 11, 2007."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43421
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROY GILES
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 06/14/2007
Notification Time: 14:20 [ET]
Event Date: 06/14/2007
Event Time: 08:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNABLE TO PERFORM SAFE SHUTDOWN AS A RESULT OF APPENDIX R FIRE AFFECTING HPCI

"During verification of plant procedures associated with achieving safe shutdown during and after an Appendix R fire, it was determined that there was no readily available success path to secure HPCI when required. The scenario in question involves a fire-induced spurious HPCI initiation that must be terminated within 10 minutes to prevent flooding main steam lines and disabling both available methods of hot shutdown. For this event, RCIC is one defined method of temperature and pressure control to achieve hot shutdown. The other defined method requires ADS valves to lower pressure to allow CS to provide makeup water. As written, the procedure steps provided to Operations personnel would not have been sufficient to isolate steam to the HPCI turbine. All other methods to secure HPCI that would have been reasonably available required operation of components that could have been affected by the same fire that caused the spurious initiation of HPCI.

"The procedures have been changed to provide Operations personnel adequate and effective instructions to isolate HPCI when required after a spurious initiation during an Appendix R fire.

"This is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) as a condition that could have prevented the plant from achieving safe shutdown.

"The Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 43423
Rep Org: DOW CHEMICAL
Licensee: DOW CHEMICAL
Region: 3
City: MIDLAND State: MI
County:
License #: 21-00265-06
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JIM WELDY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/14/2007
Notification Time: 16:20 [ET]
Event Date: 06/14/2007
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
GREG MORELL (FSME)

Event Text

FIXED GAUGE FOUND WITH SHUTTER OPEN WHILE IN STORAGE

The licensee was evaluating a fixed gauge in storage for possibly returning it to service when they discovered that the gauge's shutter was stuck open. Temporary lead shielding was installed and the licensee is in the process of contacting the manufacturer in order to have the device repaired and/or the source removed.

The device is an Ohmart SHRM L-200, S/N 3269, containing 35 milliCuries of Cs-137. It was removed from service and has been in storage since 1994. The gauge was positioned face down such that radiation surveys did not detect that the shutter was open. The licensee does not believe that any personnel received any significant exposure since the storage area is ground level (no basement) and has limited access (locked).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43424
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RICK ROBBINS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 06/14/2007
Notification Time: 20:21 [ET]
Event Date: 06/14/2007
Event Time: 18:19 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 98 Power Operation

Event Text

TECH SPEC. REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO 72 HOUR COMPLETION TIME NOT MET

"At 1819 hours, an orderly shutdown on Unit 1 commenced as the result of Technical Specification Action Condition (TSAC) 3.7.5.B.1 completion time of 72 hours not being met for the 1P-29 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The pump was declared inoperable on June 12, 2007, at 0131 hours as a result of high pump bearing temperatures. Repairs and testing performed to date have not satisfactorily resolved the problem.

"This non-emergency notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i). The PBNP resident inspector has been notified."

The licensee plans to conduct an extended duration test of the 1P-29 AFW pump. This test is scheduled to commence shortly and will last approximately 4 to 6 hours. The licensee will have two different hold points in the test to take pump bearing temperature data. The licensee has one emergency diesel generator (EDG) out of service (OOS), but an alternate EDG is aligned to ensure all four vital buses have vital power in the event of an loss of offsite power. No other safety related systems are OOS at this time.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.



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Friday, June 15, 2007