8.0 ECONOMIC IMPACTS AND ANALYSES

8.1 Analysis of Economic Impacts
8.1.1 Expected economic impacts of the pelagic longline alternatives
8.1.2 Expected economic impacts of the shark gillnet fishery alternatives
8.1.3 Expected economic impacts of the general alternatives
8.2 Regulatory Impact Review
8.2.1 Description of the management objectives
8.2.2 Description of the fishery
8.2.3 Statement of the problem
8.2.4 Description of each alternative
8.2.5 Economic analysis of expected effects of each alternative relative to the baselin
e
8.2.6 Summary
8.3 Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
8.3.1 Statement of the need for and objectives of this rulemaking

8.3.3 Description and estimate of the number of small entities to which the final rule will apply
8.3.4 Description of the projected reporting, record-keeping, and other compliance requirements of the final rule, including an estimate of the classes of small entities which will be subject to the requirement and the type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report or record
8.3.5 Description of the steps the agency has taken to minimize the significant economic impact on small entities consistent with the stated objectives of applicable statutes, including a statement of the factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting the alternative adopted in the final rule and the reason that each one of the other significant alternatives to the rule considered by the agency which affect small entities was rejected
8.3.6 Summary

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8.0 ECONOMIC IMPACTS AND ANALYSES

As described in section 3, before implementing management measures, NOAA Fisheries must consider the economic impacts of the management measures, particularly in accordance with two laws: the Regulatory Flexibility Act (Reg Flex Act) and Executive Order 12866 (E.O. 12866). This section contains an economic analysis, the Regulatory Impact Review required under E.O. 12866, and the Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) required under the Reg Flex Act. Additional economic and social considerations and information are discussed in sections 7 and 9 of this document and chapter 5 of the annual SAFE report.

8.1 Analysis of Economic Impacts

8.1.1 Expected economic impacts of the pelagic longline alternatives

Number of pelagic longline fishermen

NOAA Fisheries considers all HMS permit holders to be small entities. In October 2001, there were approximately 208 fishermen with a directed swordfish limited access permit and 112 fishermen with an incidental swordfish limited access permit. Therefore, in October 2001, there were approximately 320 fishermen who could use pelagic longline gear to fish for HMS. This is down from the 443 fishermen who were permitted to use pelagic longline gear in HMS fisheries in October 2000. The decrease in number of permit holders could be due to a number of reasons. For a description of possible reasons, please see chapter 9 of the 2002 SAFE report (NOAA Fisheries 2002).

Only a few of these fishermen actually report fishing with pelagic longline gear in logbooks (considered "active"). In 2000, 199 fishermen reported pelagic longline activity in the pelagic logbook but only 171 fishermen reported fishing for HMS with pelagic longline in both the pelagic logbook and in weigh-out slips. Table 8.1 lists the number of active pelagic longline vessels from 1990 to 2000. In general, the number of active vessels has been decreasing since 1994.

Table 8.1 The number of vessels that reported fishing with pelagic longline gear in the pelagic logbook. Source: Cramer, 2001.

Year Number of active vessels Year Number of active vessels
1990 416 1996 367
1991 333 1997 350
1992 337 1998 286
1993 434 1999 224
1994 501 2000 199
1995 489 - -


The number of vessels that fish in each area has also decreased although most vessels continue to fish in the Gulf of Mexico, Florida East Coast, or the mid-Atlantic Bight (Table 8.2).

Table 8.2 The number of vessels that reported fishing with pelagic longline gear by area. Source: Cramer and Adams, 2001; Cramer, 2001. Note: Vessels that fish in more than one area during the year are counted in both areas. CAR: Caribbean, GOM: Gulf of Mexico, FEC: Florida east coast, SAB: South Atlantic Bight, MAB: mid-Atlantic Bight, NEC: Northeast Coastal, NED: Northeast Distant, SAR: Sargasso, NCA: North Central Atlantic, TUN: tuna north, TUS: tuna south

Area 1997 1998 1999 2000
CAR 45 30 18 18
GOM 118 98 89 79
FEC 73 69 53 52
SAB 67 53 45 46
MAB 81 64 68 59
NEC 57 40 39 36
NED 22 15 10 13
SAR 11 9 4 5
NCA 24 12 9 6
TUN 21 12 9 5
TUS 21 11 8 3

Gross revenues of pelagic longline vessels

The gross revenues of pelagic longline vessels vary greatly depending on the location and species targeted. Using the weight offish landed per trip as reported in 2000 weigh-out slips and the average 2000 ex-vessel price for the fleet (Table 8.3), NOAA Fisheries calculated the average gross revenues per trip and per vessel for pelagic longline vessels. This information indicates that overall, the average pelagic longline vessel has annual gross revenues of $168,114 (range of less than $1000 to almost $800,000) and that combined the 171 vessels reporting HMS landings in both the pelagic logbook and the weigh-out slips in 2000 had total annual gross revenues of almost $29 million (Table 8.4). Most of these gross revenues were derived from swordfish and yellowfin tuna landings (Table 8.5).

Table 8.3 Average ex-vessel prices per lb dw for Atlantic HMS in 2000. Source: Dealer weigh-out slips from the Southeast Fisheries Science Center and Northeast Fisheries Science Center, and bluefin tuna dealer reports from the Northeast Regional Office. Note: Small coastal sharks are not generally caught in the North Atlantic region.

Species Average for all regions Average for N. Atlantic region only
Bigeye tuna $3.18 $4.12
Bluefin tuna $9.66 $8.93
Yellowfin tuna $2.46 $2.64
Other tunas $0.75 $0.93
Swordfish $3.51 $3.87
Large coastal sharks $0.68 $1.01
Pelagic sharks $1.09 $1.10
Small coastal sharks $0.46 -
Shark fins $10.47 $6.83


Table 8.4 Predicted gross revenues for the pelagic longline fleet based on fishing reports for 2000. Source: Logbook and weigh-out data maintained by the Southeast Fisheries Science Center.

Description Number Total value Average per vessel Minimum value per vessel Maximum value per vessel
Annual gross revenues for the fleet 171 vessels $29 million $168,114 < $1000 ~ $800,000
Per trip gross revenues for vessels fishing in NED area 47 trips $5 million $106,903 ~ $33,000 ~ $183,000
Per trip gross revenues for vessels not fishing in NED area 2,379 trips $24 million $10,182 < $100 ~ $82,000


Table 8.5 The species composition of landings in the pelagic longline fleet in 2000. Source: Logbook and weigh-out data maintained by the Southeast Fisheries Science Center.


Species % by number % by weight % by gross revenues
Swordfish 37.34 43.71 51.93
Yellowfin tuna 42.68 41.21 34.31
Bigeye tuna 7.32 7.43 8.00
Bluefin tuna 0.14 0.95 3.09
Other tunas 5.69 2.35 0.60
Pelagic sharks 1.82 2.13 1.16
Large coastal sharks 5.00 2.22 0.91


The gross revenues data change dramatically when only trips conducted in the NED area are considered. In 2000, 13 vessels took an average of 3.6 trips per vessel in the NED area. Twenty- eight of these trips occurred in the third quarter, 12 in the fourth quarter, and seven in the second quarter. No trips occurred in the first quarter. In total, these 47 trips brought in just over $5 million in gross revenues with average gross revenues per vessel per trip at $106,903 (range from $33,000 to $183,000) (Table 8.4). (1) Unlike the fleet as a whole, these gross revenues are derived almost entirely from swordfish landings (Table 8.6). It is interesting to note that the average gross revenues per trip for these vessels is almost the same as the annual gross revenues per vessel for the entire fleet (Table 8.4). Thus, of all the vessels in the fleet, vessels that fish in the NED area may be considered the most economically viable vessels.

Table 8.6 The species composition of landings for pelagic longline trips conducted in the NED area in 2000. Source: Logbook and weigh-out data maintained by the Southeast Fisheries Science Center.

Species % by number % by weight % by gross revenues
Swordfish 87.79 88.54 88.14
Yellowfin tuna 0.39 0.27 0.19
Bigeye tuna 9.57 8.23 8.72
Bluefin tuna 0.12 0.99 2.27
Other tunas 1.00 0.36 0.09
Pelagic sharks 1.14 1.60 0.59
Large coastal sharks 0.00 0.00 0.00


NOAA Fisheries also looked at the gross revenues per trip for all trips outside of the NED area (2). In all, there were 2,379 pelagic longline trips reported outside of the NED area. Most of these trips were in the Gulf of Mexico and Florida East Coast areas (Table 8.7). Additionally, on average, vessels fishing in those areas conducted more trips than vessels in other areas (Table 8.7). In general, the number of trips per quarter in all areas outside the NED area were fairly constant (558 in the first quarter, 636 in the second, 687 in the third, and 498 in the fourth) with a slight increase in the third quarter and a slight decrease in the fourth quarter. In total, these 2,379 trips brought in just over $24 million in gross revenues with average gross revenues per vessel per trip at $10,182 (range from less than $100 to $82,000) (Table 8.4). (3) As expected, these gross revenues were derived from both swordfish and yellowfin tuna landings (Table 8.8).

Table 8.7 The number of trips in each area in 2000. Source: Logbook and weigh-out data maintained by the Southeast Fisheries Science Center. CAR: Caribbean, GOM: Gulf of Mexico, FEC: Florida east coast, SAB: South Atlantic Bight, MAB: mid-Atlantic Bight, NEC: Northeast Coastal, NED: Northeast Distant, SAR: Sargasso, NCA: North Central Atlantic, TUN: tuna north, TUS: tuna south

Area Number of trips Average trips per vessel
CAR 51 2.8
GOM 830 10.6
FEC 687 13.5
SAB 274 6.1
MAB 397 7.0
NEC 120 3.3
NED 47 3.6
SAR 3 1.0
NCA 8 1.6
TUN 3 1.0
TUS 6 3.0


Table 8.8 The species composition of landings for pelagic longline trips conducted outside the NED area in 2000. Source: Logbook and weigh-out data maintained by the Southeast Fisheries Science Center.

Species % by number % by weight % by gross revenues
Swordfish 31.29 36.85 45.05
Yellowfin tuna 47.76 47.48 40.68
Bigeye tuna 7.05 7.31 8.10
Bluefin tuna 0.14 0.94 3.16
Other tunas 6.25 2.65 0.69
Pelagic sharks 1.90 2.21 1.24
Large coastal sharks 5.60 2.56 1.08

Variable costs and net revenues of pelagic longline fishing

Most of the studies available to NOAA Fisheries regarding pelagic longline variable costs and net revenues analyze data from 1996 and 1997. While these data analyzed are over five years old, this information still provides interesting insights to pelagic longline fishing and provides estimates on the potential costs of pelagic longline fishing. Where noted, NOAA Fisheries has converted 1996 and 1997 dollars to 2000 dollars using the consumer price index conversion factors of 0.911 and 0.932, respectively.

Larkin et al. (2000) examined 1996 logbooks and the 1996 voluntary economic forms and found that net returns to a vessel owner varied substantially depending on the vessel size and the fishing behavior (i.e. sets per trip, fishing location, season, target species). They found that out of 3,255 pelagic longline trips reported in 1996, 642 pelagic longline trips provided the voluntary economic information. Larkin et al. (2000) suggest using median values (half of the fleet is less than this value and half is above) instead of mean values (the average of all vessels) given the high degree of skewness to the data. For example, the mean owner's share of a trip is $4,412 while the median is $2,242. Larkin et al. (2000) suggest that the median values identify the characteristics of the majority of the fleet better than the mean, which can be influenced by outliers (a few vessels that may not be similar to the rest of the fleet). The mean supply costs per trip for the vessels sampled was $5,959 and median was $3,666 (Table 8.9). This changed depending on area fished with the median ranging from $1,928 in the area between North Carolina and the east coast of Florida (FEC to MAB) and $10,100 in the Caribbean. Vessels in the NED area (Maine to Virginia region in Larkin et al. (2000)) had a median supply cost per trip of $2,831 or $3,108 in 2000 dollars. For the entire fleet, Larkin et al. (2000) found that the average net revenues per vessel per trip was $7,354 ($8,072 in 2000 dollars). Vessels fishing in the Caribbean and Maine to Virginia areas had the largest average net returns to the vessel owner per trip at $12,188 and $6,672, respectively ($13,379 and $7,324, respectively, in 2000 dollars). Generally, Larkin et al. (2000) found that vessels that were between 46 and 64 feet in length, had between 10 and 21 sets per trip, fished in the second quarter, fished in the Caribbean, or had more than 75 percent of their gross revenues from swordfish had the highest net return to the owner (ranging from $3,187 to $13,097 per trip) while vessels that were less than 45 feet in length, had between one and three sets per trip, fished in the first quarter, fished between North Carolina and Miami, FL, or had between 25 and 50 percent of their gross revenues from swordfish had the lowest net return to the owner (ranging from $642 to $1,885 per trip).

Table 8.9 The cost-earnings characteristics of 1996 pelagic longline trips. Source: Larkin et al. 2000. Note: Numbers in the table are in 1996 dollars and denote the median not the mean, unless otherwise noted.

Variable All trips Region
ME to VA NC to FL TX to FL Caribbean
Number of trips 642 86 189 319 47
Number of crew 4 3 2 4 4
Total Gross Revenues $8,916 $7,060 $4,826 $9,387 $26,227
Fuel costs $1,031 $753 $410 $1,266 $1,970
Bait costs $960 $965 $590 $1,000 $2,705
Ice costs $256 $185 $150 $330 $300
Light sticks $360 $94 $198 $597 $1,295
Miscellaneous costs $305 $171 $42 $821 $1,560
Total costs $3,666 $2,831 $1,928 $5,230 $10,100
Net return to owner $2,242 $2,671 $1,740 $2,022 $8,020
Mean net return to owner $4,412 $6,672 $3,679 $3,099 $12,188

Porter et al. (2001) conducted a survey of 147 vessels along the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico (110 surveys were completed) in 1998 regarding 1997 operations. Survey information was combined with trip tickets and logbook data. They found that on average, vessels received approximately $250,000 annual gross revenues, annual variable costs were approximately $190,000, and annual fixed costs were approximately $50,000. Thus, vessels were left with approximately $8,000 to cover depreciation on the vessel and the vessel owner lost approximately $3,500 per year. On a per trip level, gross revenues averaged $22,000 and trip expenses, including labor, were $16,000. Labor cost the owner the most (43 percent), followed by gear. Generally trip returns were divided so the vessel owner received 43 percent and the captain and crew 57%. Porter et al. (2001) noted that 1997 was probably a financially poor year due to a reduction in swordfish quota and a subsequent closure of the fishery (this fishery has not been closed since). Similar to Larkin et al. (2000), Porter et al. (2001) noted differences between region, vessel size, and target species. While all vessels had an average net return per trip of $5,556 ($6,019 in 2000 dollars), vessels that fished in the New England or Caribbean regions had much higher net returns per trip at $20,772 and $18,940, respectively ($22,505 and $20,520, respectively in 2000 dollars) (Table 8.10).

Table 8.10 Cost-earnings characteristics of an average 1997 pelagic longline trip. Source: Porter et al. 2001. Note: Numbers in the table are in 1997 dollars and denote the mean.



Variable


All vessels
Region
New England Mid-Atlantic South Atlantic Gulf of Mexico Caribbean
Length of trip 13 36 12 8 14 28
Gross revenues $22,364 $81,569 $20,151 $11,242 $16,437 $67,440
Fuel costs $2,071 $9,209 $2,154 $717 $1,703 $5,601
Ice costs $297 $378 $252 $191 $469 $372
Bait costs $1,559 $4,779 $1,488 $882 $1,406 $3,771
Light sticks $738 $3,129 $635 $392 $490 $2,164
Food costs $897 $2,943 $817 $438 $881 $2,270
Gear costs $2,336 $6,800 $2,147 $1,381 $2,067 $5,808
Other costs $442 $1,687 $414 $206 $342 $1,293
Total variable costs (not labor) $9,634 $34,725 $8,839 $5,007 $7,867 $25,880
Total labor costs $7,173 $26,071 $6,558 $3,670 $4,727 $22,620
Net return $5,556 $20,772 $4,753 $2,565 $3,843 $18,940


In general, both Larkin et al. (2000) and Porter et al. (2001) found that the average net return to a vessel is fairly low after all variable costs including labor were accounted for. This was true even of vessels fishing in the northeast region or Caribbean (i.e., regions with relatively high gross revenues). This corresponds with the results of Ward and Hanson (1999) who found that fifty percent of the fleet earns $10,000 or less annually and that each year 20 percent of the fleet actually has a loss. Additionally, as suggested by Larkin et al. (2000) in their discussion of mean versus median values, Ward and Hanson (1999) found there were a number of vessels that earned much higher net revenues than the average vessel with 19 percent of the fleet earning $50,000 or more annually and 7 percent earning more than $100,000 annually.

Effects of the alternatives on fishermen

NOAA Fisheries considered twelve alternatives, including no action, to reduce the incidental catch and mortality of protected species, such as sea turtles, on pelagic longline gear in HMS fisheries. These alternatives include no action, a time/area closure, changes in the way pelagic longline gear is set, changes in the gear itself, changes in the bait, and changes in the reporting requirements. Of these, the alternative that proposes closing the NED area to fishing with pelagic longline gear would probably have the largest economic impact despite the fact that it actually affects only 13 (7.6%) of the 171 vessels reporting HMS landings in the pelagic logbook and weigh-out slips in 2000. The economic impact of this closure could be offset if the vessels fishing in the NED area are eligible to and decide to participate in the experimental fishery NOAA Fisheries is conducting in the NED area. Because there may be vessels that fish in the NED area that are not eligible to participate or decide not to participate in the NED area experiment, this and the following sub-section (Effects of the alternatives on fishermen and Impacts on related industries, respectively) will discuss the alternatives without considering the NED area experiment. Any economic benefits or costs of the experiment are discussed in a separate sub-section below (The experimental fishery in the northeast distant statistical reporting area).

As discussed above, based on gross revenues, it appears that vessels fishing in the NED area are some of the most economically viable operations in the pelagic longline fleet. This conclusion is supported when considering net revenues, although vessels fishing in the Caribbean appear to be as, or more, economically viable as vessels fishing in the NED area (Larkin et al., 2000; Porter et al., 2001). From 1998 to 2000, NED area vessels have landed over 40,000 swordfish or 21 percent of all swordfish landed by the Atlantic pelagic longline fishery (Cramer, 2001). If the NED area is closed, the vessels that normally fish in that area could either decide to (1) leave the fishery or (2) fish in other areas. Since 1997, an average of 15 vessels have fished each year in the NED area. Because the vessels that fish in the NED area are among the largest and most productive in the fleet, if a vessel decides to leave the fishery, it is possible that the vessel owner could sell their vessel and its permits for a "reasonable" price. However, preliminary data on the cost of HMS limited access permits do not indicate differences between permit type (directed or incidental) or vessel size. It is also likely that the experienced crew from the vessel could find positions on other pelagic longline vessels. If the vessel owner decides to have the vessel fish in other areas, unless the vessel fishes in the Caribbean, based on the gross and net revenues discussed above, it is unlikely it could generate as much revenue as it did in the NED area. Indeed, because of the vessel's large size, it is likely that with the higher maintenance costs expected, larger variable costs (e.g., fuel, ice, etc.), larger mortgage and insurance costs, and other factors such as inexperience fishing in other areas, the NED area vessels may have higher costs resulting in lower net revenues than non-NED vessels fishing in the same areas. In other words, the non-NED area vessels, even if they have similar catches as the NED area vessels, would have lower costs and therefore higher net revenues. The exception to this would be the Caribbean where vessels are also large and have similar revenues and costs as those in the NED area. However, because of their size, the NED area vessels are highly mobile and stay on longer trips than the non-NED area vessels in the fleet (except for Caribbean vessels). These factors may allow the NED area vessels to follow the migration of the fish and catch more fish per trip than is average for the other areas. This could eliminate the difference between net revenues for non-NED area vessels and net revenues for NED vessels in these open areas; although it is unlikely that the NED area vessels could have similar net revenues in other areas, except for the Caribbean, to the net revenues in the NED area.

The other alternatives considered would affect all pelagic longline fishermen but are not expected to change gross or net revenues for any portion of the fleet. Alternative 2 would prohibit fishermen from setting gangions next to floatlines. To comply with this regulation, fishermen could set fewer hooks or set hooks closer together and maintain the length of the mainline or fishermen could set the same number of hooks and maintain the same spacing while increasing the length of the mainline. If fishermen decide to set fewer hooks, the number of fish caught could decrease by an equivalent amount resulting in slightly lower gross revenues. However, the time needed to set or haul the mainline and the amount of bait needed for the hooks could also decrease resulting in slightly lower variable costs in increasing the amount of time spent fishing. If the fishermen set the same number of hooks and increase the length of the mainline to comply with the regulation, the amount of time it takes to set and haul the mainline could increase slightly but fishermen would still catch the same number of fish per set. Thus, either method of complying with this regulation should not have a large impact on overall net revenues for a trip although the ratio between costs and revenues could alter slightly.

Alternative 3 would require fishermen to have gangions longer than their floatlines. Fishermen could comply with this regulation by decreasing floatline length appropriately, increasing gangion length, or a combination of the two. Thus, this regulation could increase the amount of monofilament needed per trip in order to repair gangions and could require time in the short-term to increase the gangion length or decrease floatline length. However, this regulation should not increase costs per trip significantly and therefore should not affect net revenues.

Alternative 4 would require fishermen to possess and use non-stainless steel, corrodible hooks. Under this definition, NOAA Fisheries would not expect this alternative to have many impacts as a number of fishermen already use non-stainless steel hooks. Generally individual hooks cost less than $1.00.

Alternative 5, which would require the captain to report lethal turtle takes within 48 hours of returning to port, Alternative 6, which would require vessel operators to post handling and release guidelines, Alternative 7 which is no action, and Alternative 8, which would require fishermen to use a dehooking device, should have few, if any, economic impacts. Buying a dehooking device would be a one time cost of less than $100.

Alternative 9 would require fishermen to set hooks deeper in the water column. This could be done by placing fewer floats or placing more hooks between floats. As fishermen already do this to fish for tuna, NOAA Fisheries does not expect this alternative to have any economic impacts unless the catch composition changes dramatically. For instance, if this alternative causes more tuna to be caught than swordfish, the gross revenues per trip could decrease because swordfish are worth more than tuna (Larkin et al., 2000; Porter et al., 2001).

Alternatives 10 and 11 would require fishermen to change the type of bait used in the fishery. In Alternative 10, fishermen would be required to dye their bait blue. The dye used to color the bait is inexpensive ($46 per lb) and, although it may increase annual costs slightly, should have minor economic impacts. Alternative 11 would require fishermen to use mackerel instead of squid bait. Bait accounts for 16 to 26 percent of the total costs per trip (Larkin et al., 2000; Porter et al., 2001). NOAA Fisheries assumes that fishermen already use the bait that maximizes catch and minimizes costs. Thus, changing the bait type fishermen can use could either decrease gross revenues (because it does not attract as many fish) or increase total trip costs. In either case, while the exact impact is unknown because NOAA Fisheries does not collect information regarding bait type, altering the type of bait used could result in long-term changes in net revenues.

Alternative 12 would require fishermen to use a type of "stealth" gear. At this time, NOAA Fisheries has no economic information for this alternative. However, any changes to fishing gear would require at least a one-time increase in fishing costs.

Impacts on related industries

Fishermen rely on many industries including processors, dealers, wholesalers, restaurants, bait houses, equipment manufacturers and suppliers, and electronic suppliers and repairmen. Of these, only dealers are required to have Federal permits in order to buy fish from fishermen. As of October 2001, there were 522 Atlantic tuna dealers, 302 Atlantic swordfish dealers, and 249 Atlantic shark dealers. As with fishermen, the majority of these permit holders are located in Florida (20 percent), followed by Massachusetts (14 percent) and New York (10 percent).

Many of these alternatives would be unlikely to affect dealers, processors, and wholesalers unless they had an impact on the amount of fish landed. However, once again, the closure of the NED area is the alternative most likely to affect dealers, particularly dealers in the Northeast who rely on fishing vessels fishing in the NED area. Because there are so few NED area fishermen, only a few dealers rely on the NED area fishing for a substantial portion of their activities. However, because those few vessels land such a large percentage of U.S.-caught swordfish, it is likely that these dealers would be significantly affected and may be forced out of business, regardless of the course of action of the vessel. This is because if the vessel decides to continue fishing but changes areas, it is likely the vessel would change dealers in order to land the highest quality seafood and receive the highest ex-vessel price possible. Dealers that do not go out of business would likely increase dependence on other fisheries, including tunas.

Equipment manufacturers and suppliers could also experience some economic impacts if fishermen are required to change their methods of fishing. Alternatives that would affect them include Alternatives 2 and 3 because fishermen might need additional monofilament, Alternative 4 because fishermen might need different types of hooks, Alternative 8 because fishermen could be required to carry dehooking devices, and Alternative 12 because fishermen might need additional supplies than under no action. In all, these alternatives could require fishermen to buy additional supplies and thus have a positive impact on equipment manufacturers and suppliers.

The alternatives could also have implications for bait houses if fishermen are required to dye bait or switch bait. Although, it is not clear how much of an economic impact might result.

The experimental fishery in the northeast distant statistical reporting area

The information presented here is preliminary and is based on only a few of the dealer reports submitted to NOAA Fisheries regarding the vessels that participated in the experiment in 2001.

In 2001, 8 vessels participated in the experimental fishery and conducted approximately 185 sets. In 2001, the experiment examined bait type and gangion spacing. In order to participate in the experiment, each vessel had to meet a number of requirements such as holding a valid permit, carrying an observer, and complying with all other regulations. In return for participating, each vessel received $4,150 per set conducted and was allowed to sell any fish caught (4). While the experiment did not begin until mid-September, some vessels were able to conduct two trips before the end of the season.

In total, NOAA Fisheries paid participating vessels a total of $769,825 or approximately $96,228 per vessel. Vessels received additional money from selling their fish. As expected, these vessels made most of their gross revenues per trip from swordfish (Table 8.11). However, it also appears that the amount of gross revenues from bigeye tuna was larger than expected based on the information in Table 8.6. In total, it appears that the vessels that participated in the 2001 NED area experiment obtained approximately $2 million in gross revenues from both fishing and the experiment. Considering the experiment did not begin until late in the fishing season for the NED area, it appears that participating in the NED area experiment will help NED area fishing vessels economically in the short-term while fishing methods to reduce turtle bycatch are examined. In the long-term, participating in the NED area experiment will help all pelagic longline fishing vessels, particularly those in the NED area, if the experiment can document bycatch reduction methods and allow for the NED area to be re-opened to U.S. pelagic longline vessels. Depending on the impacts on catch rates, the NED area experimental fishery could also mitigate impacts on dealers in the short-term. Additionally, during the duration of the experimental fishery, dealers could experiment expanding into other fisheries in case the fishing experiment does not result in bycatch reduction methods.

NOAA Fisheries has received a number of bids for the 2002 experimental fishery. NOAA Fisheries anticipates having 10 vessels participating in the 2002 experimental fishery starting in mid-July and running through October. The bids received ranged from $4,000 to $4,500 per set.

Table 8.11 Preliminary information regarding the 2001 experimental fishery. Source: Northeast dealer weight out slips. Note: The average gross revenues per species per trip are averages from all vessels and do not add up to the total average gross revenues per trip. The information in this table does not include compensatory payments for participating in the fishery; this information denotes gross revenues from sale of fish only.

Species Average ex-vessel price Average

gross revenues per trip

Minimum

gross revenues per trip

Maximum gross revenues per trip
Swordfish $2.96 $32,501 $776 $95,731
Yellowfin tuna $3.15 $5,327 $1,064 $11,841
Bigeye tuna $4.15 $17,235 $1,153 $53,460
Albacore tuna $0.34 $557 $13 $1,949
Mako shark $1.23 $632 $94 $1,911
Total -- $84,738 $23,376 $199,123



8.1.2 Expected economic impacts of the shark gillnet fishery alternatives

Number of shark gillnet fishermen

In October 2001, there were 252 directed shark permit holders. However, the number of these permit holders that use drift gillnet gear to fish for sharks has been less than 11 vessels in recent years (Table 8.12). Each vessel has between three and six crew members, including the operator. These fishermen fish off the east coast of Florida and Georgia. Because of the gear restrictions, the short large coastal shark season, and observer coverage requirements for these vessels, it is unlikely that the number of vessels in this fishery would increase substantially.

Table 8.12 The number of operating shark gillnet vessels. Source: Trent et al., 1997; Carlson and Lee, 1999; Carlson and Baremore, 2001.

Year Number of vessels Year Number of vessels
1990 11 1996 unknown
1991 unknown 1997 unknown
1992 unknown 1998 unknown
1993 5 1999 4
1994 6 2000 6
1995 11 2001 6


Gross revenues of shark gillnet fishermen

NOAA Fisheries has few data regarding the gross revenues of shark gillnet fishermen although NOAA Fisheries hopes to collect additional economic information for all HMS fishermen in the near future. Based on landings reported in logbooks and ex-vessel price information, the gross revenues for shark gillnet fishermen during the first large coastal shark season of 1999 ranged from $3,000 to $38,000 and averaged $19,615. The average gross revenues per trip during the first large coastal shark season of 1999 ranged from $380 to $9,000 and averaged $3,700.

Using the 2000 and 2001 observer information during the non-right whale calving season, the prices listed in Table 8.3 above, and the average weight per shark (Scott et al. 1998, Carlson 2001), it appears that the total gross revenues from sharks for all observed strikenet trips (8 sets total in 2000 and 2001) was approximately $1,130 ($142 per set; the amount of time per set averaged less than one hour). Similarly, the total gross revenues from sharks for all observed driftnet trips (37 sets total in 2000 and 2001) was approximately $46,700 ($1,262 per set; the amount of time per set averaged nine hours). This information indicates that shark gillnet vessels are not as economically viable as other commercial sectors of HMS fisheries such as the pelagic longline fishermen.

Variable costs of fishing with shark gillnet gear

NOAA Fisheries has limited information available regarding variable costs of shark gillnet fishing, although NOAA Fisheries hopes to collect additional economic information for all HMS fishermen in the near future. NOAA Fisheries expects that the fishing costs per trip are less than those of a pelagic longline fishing trip because the trips are usually shorter (an average of 18 hours per trip), vessels do not fish far offshore (within 30 nautical miles from port), and the gear does not need hooks, bait, or light sticks. Other costs may be incurred as the holes in the gear would need to be repaired regularly.

Shark gillnet vessels that fish in a strike-net method probably incur higher costs per trip than those vessels that fish in a drift gillnet method. This is because strikenetting usually requires the use of a small vessel (used to run the net around the school of sharks) and a spotter plane (used to spot schools of fish). While the cost per trip is higher than the traditional drift gillnet method, bycatch in this method is extremely low, catch rates of the target species is high, and vessels can complete a set in less time (one hour versus nine hours). NOAA Fisheries estimates that the smaller vessel could cost between $2,000 and $14,000 to buy. Because these second vessels have specific requirements to be sturdy enough to hold the gillnet and move quickly around the school of sharks, it is likely that vessel owners would need to re-fit any used vessel bought for this purpose. Additionally, a second vessel means additional fuel and maintenance costs. Spotter planes in other fisheries are paid based on the percentage of the proceeds from the trip, generally 10 to 25 percent of gross revenues. Thus, given the average gross revenues per trip, converting a drift gillnet vessel to a strikenet vessel could be prohibitive.

Recently some strikenet vessels have begun striking behind other vessels such as trawl vessels (e.g., shrimp vessels). This negates the need for a spotter plane and could reduce the variable costs substantially. Additionally, some of the smaller drift gillnet vessels have begun to use small nets to strike fish without a second vessel (Carlson, 2002). Their efforts are moderately successful and could reduce the costs of the fishing in a strikenet method substantially by reducing the amount of net that needs to be repaired and the amount of additional gear needed.

Effects of the alternatives on fishermen

Alternative 13 would require the vessel operator and the observer to sight whales and contact NOAA Fisheries if a listed whale is taken. This alternative is not expected to have any economic impacts. Similarly, Alternative 15, no action, would not have any economic impacts.

Alternative 14 would require shark gillnet fishermen to conduct net checks every 0.5 to two hours to check for protected species. For fishermen operating in a strikenet fashion, this alternative would not have any economic impacts since a set takes less than one hour. However, for fishermen operating in a drift gillnet fashion, this alternative would require fishermen to check the net approximately four times during a nine hour set. NOAA Fisheries believes that most gillnet fishermen fishing in a drift gillnet fashion already do this but for fishermen who do not already follow this practice, this may reduce gross revenues per set if moving the net reduces the number of fish caught. Additionally, checking the net could increase the amount of fuel needed. As fuel can be a major portion of the variable costs per trip (at least in the pelagic longline fishery), the profit per trip could be reduced. Because the profits for these vessels are already low, even a small reduction in profits could force less profitable vessels out of the fishery.

Alternative 16, prohibiting drift gillnet gear in the shark fishery, could have significant negative economic impacts on the six vessels that have fished in this fishery in recent years. While these vessels often fish in other fisheries during a large coastal shark closure, such as the mackerel fishery, NOAA Fisheries would not expect them to regain all their lost revenues by switching to other fisheries.

Alternative 17 would require shark gillnet vessels to fish in a strikenet fashion and to use spotter planes. As discussed above, a number of drift gillnet vessels are beginning to switch to a strikenet fashion of fishing but not all of them use spotter planes. Some vessels are fishing behind trawl vessels where shark schools congregate to eat the bycatch discards from those vessels. Requiring them to use spotter planes could have a substantial impact on net revenues since spotter planes typically take 10 to 25 percent of gross revenues from a trip. This alternative may have large economic costs, putting some of the vessels out of business or into other fisheries, with few ecological benefits.

Impacts on related industries

As with pelagic longline fishermen, shark gillnet fishermen rely on other industries for equipment and to sell fish. However, there are few shark gillnet fishermen, their revenues are small compared to other fishermen, and the fishery occurs in Florida where most commercial HMS fishermen are located. Therefore, it is unlikely that any related industries rely solely on shark gillnet fishermen. The only alternative that may affect other industries is Alternative 16, requiring the use of a spotter plane. This industry may notice a slight increase in revenues if shark gillnet fishermen are required to use spotter planes and all shark gillnet fishermen remain in business.

8.1.3 Expected economic impacts of the general alternatives

Number of HMS fishermen

There are approximately 23,000 fishermen who hold HMS permits. As seen in section 8.1.1, not all of these permit holders report fishing for HMS. This is especially true for the Atlantic tunas Angling and General categories where there are thousands of permit holders and but few participants are actually successful in landing bluefin or yellowfin tuna. For example, in 1997, only 1,027 vessels and, in 1998, only 965 vessels in the General and Charter/Headboat categories reported landing bluefin tuna over 73 inches curved fork length.

Table 8.13 The number of HMS permit holders. The actual number of permit holders are subject to change and can vary from year to year based on participation rates.

Permit type As of October 2000 As of October 2001
Shark, swordfish, tuna longline limited access permits 982 752
Atlantic tunas Angling category 14,908 12,685
Atlantic tunas Harpoon category 44 53
Atlantic tunas Trap category 4 1
Atlantic tunas General category 6,705 6,072
Atlantic tunas Purse Seine category, limited access 5 5
HMS Charter/headboat 2,728 (5) 3,260
Total 25,376 22,828

Gross revenues of HMS fishermen
The gross revenues of HMS fishermen changes depending on the gear type used and the species targeted. In total, HMS fishermen earned approximately $77.5 million in 2000 (on average $3,372 per permit holder) (Table 8.14). Of all HMS, yellowfin tuna brings in the highest gross revenues (~$30.6 million in 2000), followed by bluefin tuna (~$20.6 million in 2000), and swordfish (~$17.0 million in 2000). Sharks brought in the lowest gross revenues (~$5.5 million total in 2000).

Table 8.14 Estimates of the total ex-vessel value gross revenues of Atlantic HMS fisheries as presented in the 2002 SAFE report. Note: Average ex-vessel prices are the averages of averages and may have some weighting errors, except for bluefin tuna which is based on a fleet-wide average. 2000 prices are converted to 1996 dollars using a conversion factor of .911. Sources: NOAA Fisheries, 1997b; NOAA Fisheries, 2001b; Cortes, 2000; Cortes, 2001a; Cortes, 2001b; and bluefin tuna dealer reports from the Northeast Regional Office.

Species 1996 2000
Ex-vessel price

($/lb dw)

Weight

(lb dw)

Fishery Value Ex-vessel price

($/lb dw)

Weight

(lb dw)

Fishery Value
Bigeye tuna $2.40 1,212,706 $2,904,432 $2.90 1,012,352 $2,935,821
Bluefin tuna $10.58 1,652,989 $17,488,624 $8.80 2,137,580 $18,810,704
Yellowfin tuna $2.11 6,679,938 $14,116,936 $2.24 12,435,708 $27,855,986
Other tunas $0.83 368,433 $305,799 $0.68 795,243 $540,765
Total tuna -- -- $34,815,791 -- -- $50,143,276
Swordfish $3.77 7,170,619 $27,033,234 $3.20 4,832,384 $15,463,629
Large coastal sharks $0.67 5,262,314 $3,499,439 $0.62 3,762,000 $2,332,440
Pelagic sharks $1.05 695,531 $727,989 $0.99 215,005 $212,855
Small coastal sharks $0.25 460,667 $115,167 $0.42 672,245* $282,343
Shark fins

(weight = 5% of all sharks landed)

$6.01 320,926 $1,928,763 $9.54 232,462 $2,217,687
Total sharks -- -- $6,271,358 -- -- $5,045,325
Total HMS -- -- $68,120,382 -- -- $70,652,230

*1999 data used. 2000 data not available.


Variable costs of HMS fishing

NOAA Fisheries has little economic data for fishing gears other than pelagic longline. Regarding bottom longline, this gear is mainly used to target sharks and any fishing costs for this gear type should be similar to the fishing costs for pelagic longline. McHugh and Murray (1997) found that a seven day trip had an average profit (owner's share of catch minus all expenses) of $1,589. Vessels between 40 and 49 feet had an average profit of $1,975 for a seven day trip. Additional data are needed for this fishery.

Regarding purse seine, NOAA Fisheries is continuing its efforts to collect economic data on the Atlantic tunas purse seine fishery. In 2000, a voluntary survey was distributed to the owners of the five Atlantic tuna purse seine vessels. The study is still in the data collection and compilation stage, and NOAA Fisheries plans to collect additional data from the purse seine vessels in order to have preliminary results available for next year's SAFE report. The purpose of the survey is to collect up-to-date information regarding the seasonal and/or yearly costs incurred by the purse seine fleet. Accurate cost information will be particularly useful when addressing the impact of regulations on Atlantic tuna fishery participants, including purse seiners, to ensure that the agency conducts adequate analyses as required under various legal mandates.

The actual costs associated with the commercial handgear fishery is unknown although a non-random sample of 15 vessel owners in the General Category Tuna Association reported in the HMS FMP estimated the average variable cost per fishing trip in 1997 to be $516. The commercial handgear fishery targets mainly tunas, particularly bluefin tuna. For this reason, most of the economic information regarding this fishery is related to bluefin tuna. In 1999, researchers at the University of Rhode Island finalized a project that: 1) evaluated the influence of factors such as quantity supplied, time of harvest, and quality characteristics on the price of U.S. Atlantic bluefin tuna sold on the Japanese wholesale market; 2) determined the relationship between prices in Japan and ex-vessel prices received by U.S. fishermen, and 3) determined how different fishery management options influence gross revenues received by U.S. fishermen. The final report concluded that regulations should be developed and implemented that would help the fishery avoid capture seasons that are condensed into sporadic intervals. The report also recommended that consumer preferences should be considered for the efficient exploitation and trade of bluefin tuna in order to help increase revenues for the industry and to eliminate economic inefficiencies generated by public management. Specifically, the report suggests a more dispersed allocation of harvest planned in conjunction with periods of the year when fish seem to possess consumer-favored characteristics, such as high fat content. The researchers at the University of Rhode Island have continued their work, concentrating on the following research objectives: 1) to formally evaluate, using a hedonic model, the degree to which price of U.S. fresh bluefin tuna is determined by those quality attributes of each fish, rather than by just the quantity supplied; 2) to attempt to show how the quality of U.S. bluefin tuna depends on harvest practices; and 3) to combine the results from the hedonic model and production model estimates to find quota allocations that could result in the highest payoffs to the industry.

Economic information for recreational fisheries generally measures angler willingness to pay (WTP). Angler WTP depends, in part, on the species sought and on the location. Ditton et al. (1998) found that the WTP for a bluefin tuna trip in North Carolina ranged from $344 to 388 per person. Fisher and Ditton (1992a) found that anglers were willing to pay an additional $105 per trip rather than stop fishing for sharks. The most recent recreational economic information comes from a 1994 survey of anglers in New England and the mid-Atlantic (Hicks et al., 1999). The data collected were used to estimate expenditures and economic value of the various groups of recreational fisheries in this area. One category of fishing, called "Big Game" consisted primarily of HMS, including sharks, billfish, and tunas. Although this study is not an exhaustive picture of the entire HMS recreational fishery, the results provide considerable insight into the absolute and relative values of the recreational fisheries for HMS. Overall average WTP for a one-day fishing trip ranged from a low of less than a dollar in New Hampshire to a high of $42 in Virginia. Aggregate WTP (average WTP times the number of trips) ranged from $18,000 in New Hampshire to nearly $1 million in Virginia. Besides WTP, recreational anglers also have to pay for equipment and possibly travel costs. This study also found that boat fees were responsible for the greatest percentage of expenditures. Roughly 70 percent and 53 percent of total expenditures by anglers went for private/rental boats and charter/party boats, respectively. Travel expenses were the smallest portion of expenditures, although travel costs for those fishing on party/charter vessels were about twice as high as for those fishing on private/rental boats ($28 vs. $16).

Effects of the alternatives on fishermen

Alternative 18, no action, would not have any incremental economic impacts. Similarly, Alternative 19, requiring all vessels to post sea turtle handling guidelines, should not have any economic impacts since NOAA Fisheries will provide the guidelines at no cost to vessel owners.

Alternative 20, would likely have the greatest economic impact of all the alternatives considered for all gear types (excluding the NED closure area which is applicable only to pelagic longline gear). This alternative would require all fishermen to carry and use line clippers and dipnets. This equipment currently has a one-time cost of approximately $250. However, the cost could change if demand is increased as a result of any rulemaking. While $250 is not a large amount compared to other costs of fishing, it could discourage the occasional angler who would only be required to have the equipment on board for one or two HMS fishing trips a year. In total, the 23,000 fishermen permitted in HMS fisheries could spend $5.75 million buying this equipment.

Alternative 21, requiring vessels to carry and use a dehooking device, could also have minor economic impacts. Dehooking devices generally cost approximately $100 depending on the length of the handle and the strength of the material (i.e., whether it was designed for small fin fish or large fish such as sharks). As described above, this should not impact most commercial fishermen who spend much more on other fishing costs but it could discourage the occasional HMS angler. However, a number of recreational and commercial fishermen already use dehooking devices voluntarily. In total, the 23,000 fishermen permitted in HMS fisheries could spend approximately $2.3 million buying this equipment.

Alternative 22, requiring vessels to move 1 nm after any interactions with protected species, would have minor economic impacts. Interactions with protected species are a relatively rare occurrence and therefore would not affect most fishing trips. However, on the occasional fishing trip where a protected species is encountered, this alternative could increase fuel costs and could decrease target catch if the vessel is forced to move off prime fishing grounds.

Impacts on related industries

The only alternatives that would significantly affect related industries are alternatives 18 and 19. Under these alternatives, HMS fishermen could spend over $8 million buying additional equipment. This could increase profits for suppliers and encourage production for line clippers, dipnets, and dehooking devices.


8.2 Regulatory Impact Review

8.2.1 Description of the management objectives

Please see section 1 for a description of the objectives of this rulemaking.

8.2.2 Description of the fishery

Please see section 6 for a description of the fisheries that could be affected by this rulemaking.

8.2.3 Statement of the problem

Please see section 1 for a description of the problem and need for this rulemaking.

8.2.4 Description of each alternative

Please see section 2 for a summary of each alternative and section 7 for a complete description of each alternative and its expected ecological, social, and economic impacts.

8.2.5 Economic analysis of expected effects of each alternative relative to the baseline

NOAA Fisheries does not believe that the national net benefits and costs would change significantly in the long run as a result of implementation of the preferred alternatives. The benefits and costs of parts of the industry might change and the volume of certain species (such as swordfish from the NED area) might change slightly but the total volume of fish available for consumption should not change significantly. Table 8.14 indicates possible changes as a result of each alternative.



Table 8.14 Summary of net benefits and costs for each alternative.

Management measure Net Economic Benefits Net Economic Costs

Pelagic longline fishery requirements

Alternative 1- NED area closure

FINAL ACTION

Could reduce interactions with sea turtles leading to higher existence value. The fewer than 20 vessels that fish in the NED area land a significant amount of the U.S.-caught swordfish. This alternative would cause the vessels that fish in that area to change areas, leading to lower gross revenues, or leave fishery. If the vessels move or leave the fishery, that could impact related businesses that rely on those vessels and could effect consumers if importers increase the cost of swordfish.
Alternative 2 - Prohibit gangions next to floatlines None. Minimal.
Alternative 3 - Gangion length longer than floatline length

FINAL ACTION

Could reduce mortality of sea turtles leading to higher existence value. Minimal.
Alternative 4 - Corrodible hooks

FINAL ACTION

Could reduce post-release mortality of hooked sea turtles leading to higher existence value. Minimal.
Alternative 5 - Report lethal turtle takes within 48 hours

FINAL ACTION

None. None.
Alternative 6 - Require bottom and pelagic longline fishermen to post sea turtle handing guidelines

FINAL ACTION

None. None.
Alternative 7 - No Action None. None.
Alternative 8 - Carry and use a dehooking device Could reduce post-release mortality of hooked sea turtles leading to higher existence value. Could increase profits for suppliers. Minimal. Approximately $100 per vessel.
Alternative 9 - Fish hooks deeper in water column Could reduce interactions with sea turtles leading to higher existence value. Could reduce gross revenues by increasing the amount of tuna caught while decreasing the amount of swordfish caught. Swordfish trips generally have higher profits than tuna trips.
Alternative 10 - Use blue-dyed bait Could reduce interactions with sea turtles leading to higher existence value. Blue dye costs approximately $46 per lb. Impacts on target catch are unknown.
Alternative 11 - Use mackerel bait Could reduce interactions with sea turtles leading to higher existence value. Unknown.
Alternative 12 - Use stealth gear Could reduce interactions with sea turtles leading to higher existence value. Unknown.

Shark gillnet fishery requirements

Alternative 13 - Watch for whales; Notify NOAA Fisheries if whale taken

FINAL ACTION

Might reduce interactions with whales leading to higher existence value. None.
Alternative 14 - Net checks every 0.5 to 2 hours

FINAL ACTION

Might reduce mortality of protected species leading to higher existence value. Minimal. For fishermen who do not already do this, might increase fuel costs. Might decrease target catch if net needs to be moved during checks.
Alternative 15 - No Action None. None.
Alternative 16 - Prohibit gear Would eliminate any bycatch in the fishery leading to higher existence value of protected species. Would eliminate the six vessels in this fishery sector but would not have a large impact on the shark fishery as a whole.
Alternative 17 - Require strikenetting and spotter plane Would virtually eliminate any bycatch in the fishery leading to higher existence value of protected species. Could increase profits for spotter planes. Could eliminate the six vessels in this fishery but would not have a large impact on the shark fishery as a whole. If vessels remain in fishery, profits would decrease as much of the revenues would pay for the spotter plane.

General requirements

Alternative 18 - No Action

FINAL ACTION

No incremental effects. No incremental effects.
Alternative 19 - Post sea turtle handling guidelines None. None.
Alternative 20 - Carry and use line clippers and dipnets Might reduce post-release mortality of sea turtles leading to higher existence value. Might increase profits for suppliers. Approximately $250 per vessel or $5.75 million for all HMS fishermen.
Alternative 21 - Carry and use a dehooking device Might reduce post-release mortality of sea turtles leading to higher existence value. Might increase profits for suppliers. Approximately $100 per vessel or $2.3 million for all HMS fishermen.
Alternative 22 - Move 1 nm after interaction with protected species Might reduce post-release mortality of sea turtles leading to higher existence value. Minimal. Might increase fuel costs on rare occasions when interactions occur. Might decrease target catch on rare occasions when interactions occur.


8.2.6 Summary

Under E.O. 12866, a regulation is a "significant regulatory action" if it is likely to: 1) have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities; 2) create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency; 3) materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights, and obligation of recipients thereof; or 4) raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in the Executive Order. The final actions described in this document and in the final rule do not meet the above criteria. Therefore, under E.O. 12866, the final rule is not a significant regulatory action.

8.3 Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

8.3.1 Statement of the need for and objectives of this rulemaking

Please see section 1 of this document for a description of the need for, the legal basis, and objectives of this rulemaking.

8.3.2 A summary of the significant issues raised by the public comments in response to the initial regulatory flexibility analysis, a summary of the assessment of the agency of such issues, and a statement of any changes made in the rule as a result of such comments

NOAA Fisheries received many comments during the comment period. These and NOAA Fisheries' responses are summarized in Appendix A of this document and are included in the final rule. NOAA Fisheries received only a few comments related to economic issues and concerns; all pertained to the closure of the NED area. These comments are responded to with the other comments in Appendix A and the economic concerns are discussed here.

All of the economic comments noted the substantial economic impacts a closure of the NED area will have on the vessels that normally would fish in the area. These comments noted that NED area vessels cannot simply go fish elsewhere and remain profitable; that paychecks for crew members for NED area trips are double, and in some cases twenty times, the paychecks for crew members for non-NED area trips; and that eliminating fishing in the NED removes the incentive to continue in this fishery. Further the comments note that if the NED area is closed, NED area vessels have two options: stop fishing or attempt to survive by switching to the coastal fishery. These comments further note that other coastal fishing areas are overcrowded and that NED area vessels will experience competition with coastal longline fishermen and have gear conflicts with stationary lobster and crab gear in these coastal areas.

NOAA Fisheries is aware, and stated in the economic analyses and Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) for the proposed rule, that not all other fishing areas are likely to be as profitable as the NED area for pelagic longline vessels that typically fished in the NED area. However, data available to NOAA Fisheries indicate that other areas, such as the Caribbean area, can be as profitable as the NED area. Additionally, data available to NOAA Fisheries indicate that NED vessels already fish in other areas during winter months; thus, switching locations is not prohibitive for NED vessels. Also, in the short term, NED vessels can volunteer to participate in the NED experimental fishery. Participating in the NED experimental fishery can be profitable for these vessels in the short-term, and, in the worse case scenario, will allow these vessels time to plan their course of action if the experimental fishery does not produce results that would allow NOAA Fisheries to reopen the NED area. Additionally, while the NED area vessels could be substantially impacted due to a closure of the NED area, NOAA Fisheries must close the NED area as part of the RPA to remove jeopardy as described in the BiOp and section 1 of this document. The NED area was chosen as part of the RPA because the majority of sea turtle interactions, both as reported in fishing logbooks and as observed by fishing observers, occurs in the NED area (see section 7). Furthermore, no other area(s) would eliminate as many sea turtle interactions while impacting so few active vessels (15 vessels out of almost 200 vessels). Thus, to the extent practicable, NOAA Fisheries has minimized the economic impact of the BiOp fleet-wide.

8.3.3 Description and estimate of the number of small entities to which the final rule will apply

NOAA Fisheries considers all permit holders to be small entities. A description of the fisheries affected can be found in section 6 of this document. As of October 2001, there were approximately 208 directed swordfish permit holders and 112 incidental swordfish permit holders for a total of 320 permit holders who are authorized to use pelagic longline (only about half of all permit holders are actually active in the pelagic longline fishery) and could be affected by the pelagic longline gear requirements of the final rule. Fewer than 20 vessels would be affected by a closure of the NED area. Additionally, while there were 252 directed shark permit holders in October 2001, NOAA Fisheries knows of fewer than 11 shark fishermen who have used drift gillnet gear at some point in the past few years and who could be affected by the shark gillnet gear requirements of the final rule. The general requirements considered but not finalized in this rulemaking could have affected all HMS permit holders including HMS limited access permit holders (~ 752), tuna harpoon category permit holders (~53), tuna trap category permit holders (~1), tuna general category permit holders (~6,072), tuna purse seine category permit holders (5), tuna angling category permit holders (~12,685), and HMS charter/headboat permit holders (~3,260).

Other sectors of HMS fisheries such as dealers, processors, bait houses, and gear manufacturers might be affected by the final regulations particularly the closure of the NED area. However, the final rule does not apply directly to them, only to permit holders and fishermen. As such, economic impacts on these other sectors are discussed in other sections of this document but not here.

8.3.4 Description of the projected reporting, record-keeping, and other compliance requirements of the final rule, including an estimate of the classes of small entities which will be subject to the requirement and the type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report or record

Some of the final actions in this document result in additional reporting, record-keeping, and compliance requirements. Alternatives 5 and 13 would require fishermen to report to NOAA Fisheries turtle takes (required for fishermen using pelagic longline gear) or whale sightings (required for fishermen using shark gillnet gear) within a specified amount of time. Neither of these alternatives are expected to increase costs or to increase the needed skill levels required for HMS fisheries.

The other final actions would change the way and areas where fishermen can fish and set their gear but should not increase the skill level needed to participate in HMS fisheries. Alternatives 3 (required for fishermen using pelagic longline gear) and 14 (required for fishermen using shark gillnet gear) could have a small impact on fishing profits (e.g., 3 may require additional monofilament, 14 could reduce target catch slightly and increase fuel costs) but these alternatives would not have a significant economic impact on individual fishermen. Alternative 1 (required for fishermen using pelagic longline gear) could have a significant economic impact on fewer than 20 vessels and their communities if they do not participate in the experimental fishery and are not as successful fishing in other areas. Under the definition of non-stainless steel, Alternative 4 (required for fishermen using pelagic longline gear) is unlikely to change the profits of individual fishermen. Alternative 6 (required for fishermen using pelagic longline gear) should not have any economic impact on individual fishermen.


8.3.5 Description of the steps the agency has taken to minimize the significant economic impact on small entities consistent with the stated objectives of applicable statutes, including a statement of the factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting the alternative adopted in the final rule and the reason that each one of the other significant alternatives to the rule considered by the agency which affect small entities was rejected

During preparation of an IRFA, the Reg Flex Act (5 U.S.C. § 603 (c) (1)-(4)) lists four types of alternatives to minimize the economic impacts of a proposed rule which should be discussed. NOAA Fisheries is also including discussion of these alternatives in this FRFA. These alternatives (all of which assume the proposed action could impact small entities differently than large entities) are:
  1. Establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take into account the resources available to small entities
  2. Clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for such small entities
  3. Use of performance rather than design standards
  4. Exemptions from coverage of the rule for small entities

Under the first and fourth alternatives listed above, NOAA Fisheries considers all permit holders to be small entities, and thus, in order to meet the objectives of this rulemaking and address the management concerns at hand, NOAA Fisheries cannot exempt small entities or change the reporting requirements for small entities. The second and third alternatives are discussed below with the alternatives that were considered but not preferred.

NOAA Fisheries considered a number of alternatives for pelagic longline fishermen that could minimize the economic impact of the final actions, particularly the closure of the NED area. All of these alternatives were designed to reduce sea turtle interactions and reduce post release mortality. These alternatives included rigging the pelagic longline in a different method (Alternative 9), requiring vessels to use mackerel instead of squid bait (Alternative 11), and requiring vessels to use stealth gear (Alternative 12). At this time, NOAA Fisheries does not have adequate information on how these alternatives would affect sea turtle interactions or post-release mortality. For this reason, NOAA Fisheries is conducting an experimental fishery in the NED area to test some of these alternatives in the hopes of opening the NED area in the future and exporting the knowledge gained to other nations. In the meantime, closing the NED area (Alternative 1) allows for the greatest reduction in turtle interactions and no other alternative (performance or design) or simplification of the requirements is available that can minimize its economic impacts on the small portion of the fleet (<8 percent) that fishes in the NED area. The other final actions, would have minor economic impacts similar to those for Alternatives 9 through 12.

NOAA Fisheries is also finalizing regulations for shark gillnet fishermen. These fishermen have small profits compared to fishermen in other sectors of the HMS fleet and they often spend time fishing in other fisheries in order to make a living. The two final actions (requiring the vessel operator to sight whales and contact NOAA Fisheries and require net checks at specified times) should not have a large economic impact and should help reduce interactions and any post-release mortality if interactions do occur. However, requiring the net checks could make some trips unprofitable if the fisherman has to move the net causing him/her to miss large amount of target species and if the net checks require large amounts of fuel, thus increasing the trip costs. However, the two final actions already minimize the economic impacts compared to the two other alternatives considered (prohibiting the gear and requiring the use of a spotter plane). It is not likely that simplifying the regulations or formulating performance standards would help reduce protected species interactions or post-release mortality in this fishery.

NOAA Fisheries is not finalizing any alternative that would affect all HMS fishermen at this time. The final action maintains the status quo and will not result in any additional substantial impacts on individual small entities. The alternatives that were considered for all HMS fishermen but not selected would not result in substantial impacts on individual small entities but could have some small costs. For instance, Alternative 19 should not have any economic impact as the guidelines will be provided at no cost to the fisherman; Alternatives 20 and 21 may have some slight (~$350 in total) one time costs; and Alternative 22 might occasionally increase trip costs depending on the circumstances involved.

8.3.6 Summary

NOAA Fisheries concludes that while some of the final actions are likely to have a minor impact on small entities, most of the final actions would not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities as defined under the Reg Flex Act. However, Alternative 1, closure of the NED area, could have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities (less than 20 vessels that fish in the NED area) as defined under the Reg Flex Act. In fact, some of the small entities that participate in the NED area fishery, both fishermen and businesses related to fishing (i.e., dealers and bait houses), might be forced out of business or be forced to significantly alter their method of business. However, NOAA Fisheries is conducting an experimental fishery in the NED area that could minimize the economic impacts for fishermen who participate in the short-term, and depending on the results of the experiment, gear modifications could replace the area closure as a means to minimize the economic impacts in the long-term for the entire fishery. If NOAA Fisheries is unable to find gear modifications that reduce sea turtle takes and mortality to the extent required by the BiOp, the experimental fishery minimizes the economic impact to these few vessels to the extent practicable by allowing some fishermen to continue to fish in the NED area in the short-term while allowing time for them to explore other options for the long-term.

1. To calculate gross revenues for the NED area trips, the average ex-vessel prices from the north Atlantic region were used (Table 8.3). These ex-vessel prices may also contribute to the higher gross revenues because they are, in general, higher than the average ex-vessel prices for all regions combined. However, using these ex-vessel prices is appropriate because vessels fishing in the NED area generally land their fish in north Atlantic ports.
2. Vessels that fish for HMS are mobile and may fish in more than one area. For example, a vessel that fishes in the FEC for one trip may fish in the GOM or SAB for the next trip.
3.To calculate gross revenues for trips outside the NED area, the average ex-vessel prices from all regions were used (Table 8.3).

4. Terms of participation and amount of money offered each vessel may change in each year of the experiment.5. The charter/headboat permits used to be for Atlantic tunas only. Starting in 2001, all charter/headboats fishing for any HMS are required to obtain a permit.