Mr. Chairman,
In September 2003, at the United Nations, President Bush said: "All governments that support terror are complicit in a war against civilization. No government should ignore the threat of terror, because to look the other way gives terrorists the chance to regroup and recruit and prepare. And all nations that fight terror, as if the lives of their own people depend on it, will earn the favorable judgment of history."
One of the aspects of the War on Terrorism that gives us a particular sense of urgency is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These terrible weapons are becoming easier to acquire, build, hide, and transport. On February 11, President Bush issued a call to action to address what he considered the" greatest threat before humanity today" -- that is, the possibility of a "secret and sudden attack with chemical or biological or radiological or nuclear weapons." Indeed, the ongoing pursuit of weapons of mass destruction by a handful of states in violation of treaty commitments and international obligations poses multiple risks. Not only do these states put the safety of their neighbors in jeopardy, they also threaten the legal norms that have been painstakingly negotiated by the international community, and encourage an international black market willing and able to put the most dangerous technologies in the hands of the world's most irresponsible regimes and individuals, including terrorists. In short, indiscriminately transferring such sensitive equipment, materials, and technology puts us all at risk.
The United States worked for years to uncover one particular nefarious network - that of A.Q. Khan. Men and women of our own and other intelligence services have done superb and often very dangerous work to expose these operations to the light of day. At last the global community is aware that this network fed nuclear technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea.
Mr. Chairman,
These realities require a change in both our thinking and our tactics. President Bush called for unity among nations in promoting an international environment that actively discourages proliferation. To this end, President Bush proposed seven measures to strengthen the world's efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. To be effective, these measures require strong multilateral support. Today, I would like to outline each of these proposals.
First -- expand the work of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Through improved information sharing and enhanced operational readiness, PSI has created the practical basis for cooperation among states in disrupting the trade in Weapons of Mass Destruction, delivery systems, and related materials. President Bush called for PSI to expand its focus to law enforcement cooperation against pro1iferators, building on both PSI and on the tools already developed to fight terrorism, to prosecute illicit networks and other sources of supply. Since PSI's launch last May, it has gained the support of nearly 60 countries, many of which are represented in this Board, and that number continues to grow. We hope eventually to involve all countries that have the will and capacity to take action on proliferation. Key flag, coastal or transit states, as well as countries that are used by pro1iferators, are particularly important in this endeavor.
Second -- enact and enforce effective domestic laws and controls that support nonproliferation. Governments should crimina1ize proliferation, implement export controls conforming to the highest international standards, and ensure the security of dangerous materials within our territories. If our citizens act contrary to these laws and standards, there must be stiff penalties. President Bush proposed last fall a Security Council resolution calling for such measures. The permanent members of the Security Council are now crafting a resolution designed to meet these goals. We hope to submit a draft soon to the entire Council, and we should all work to see that it is adopted quickly. When it is passed, we stand ready to help states meet the goals of the resolution.
Third -- expand our Cooperative Threat Reduction and other assistance efforts to deal with dangerous weapons and materials. Since proliferation is a global problem, we see opportunities to extend the scope of the G-8 Global Partnership beyond Russia to other states of the former Soviet Union as well as to countries such as Iraq and Libya. The G-8 committed $20 billion over 10 years half of that sum provided by my government. Programs could be expanded for the security and disposition of fissile material, destroying chemical weapons, improving border security, controlling radiological sources, promoting cooperation against bio-terrorism, eliminating the use of highly-enriched uranium fuel in research reactors, and redirecting scientists and other specialists with weapons of mass destruction expertise into peaceful civilian employment, including commercial ventures.
The United States is beginning programs to redirect Iraqi scientists, technicians and engineers with WMD and missile experience or expertise to civilian employment in support of Iraqi reconstruction. In March, a series of workshops will be conducted by American scientific personnel to attract target Iraqi WMD personnel and to help them identify and prioritize large-scale projects in support of Iraqi reconstruction. We currently are working through legal and organizational issues to provide a stable framework for this activity that could be embraced by Iraq once it regains sovereignty.
Similarly, the United States and the United Kingdom are working together to redirect Libyan scientists, technicians and engineers to civilian employment in order to prevent the proliferation of Libyan weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery expertise. This redirection effort could attract additional donor states. We are defining program elements that could be supported by other countries, including by those with limited funds. Civilian projects at the Tajura reactor could be funded through the IAEA Technical Cooperation Program. Libya also will need assistance in meeting minimum international legal, technical, and regulatory standards for controlling high-risk radioactive sources.
Fourth -- prevent governments from developing nuclear weapons under false pretenses. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty sought to strike a balance between preventing proliferation and permitting maximum scope for states to pursue peaceful nuclear programs. Article IV reflects that balance by making clear that any such peaceful nuclear program must be in conformity with nonproliferation provisions of the Treaty. International nuclear commerce has settled into a reliable system that provides reactors and fuel for NPT parties, with the vast majority of states foregoing the large economic and technical challenge of constructing their own enrichment and reprocessing facilities. It is very clear that the peaceful nuclear benefits envisioned under the NPT can be fully realized without building an enrichment or reprocessing plant. Yet, in the last 15 years, a handful of states without any operational power reactors used the black market to covertly acquire enrichment and reprocessing equipment and capabilities in violation of their NPT safeguards agreement.
For this reason, President Bush proposed that the Nuclear Suppliers Group refuse to transfer enrichment or reprocessing equipment or technology to any state that does not already possess a fully functioning enrichment or reprocessing facility. Nuclear Suppliers Group states long ago pledged to provide no such assistance to non-NPT states, and that position remains firm. At the same time, the principal suppliers of nuclear fuel should ensure that states renouncing enrichment and reprocessing would have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors. This initiative is fully compatible with and would strengthen the NPT.
Fifth -- Stimulate acceptance of the Additional Protocol. While under no obligation to do so, the United States negotiated and signed an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. On May 9,2002, the President submitted that Protocol to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. The U.S. Additional Protocol is identical to that which non-nuclear weapons states are being asked to accept, with the exception that the U.S. Protocol does not obligate the United States to apply the Protocol to activities or locations of direct national security significance to the United States. By taking this step, the United States underscores its commitment to combating the potential spread of nuclear weapons, as well as demonstrates that that adherence to the Model Protocol does not place other countries at a commercial disadvantage.
President Bush recently urged the Senate to consent immediately to ratification of the Additional Protocol and, last week, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously to support Senate approval of the Protocol. We expect the full Senate to give the Protocol careful review, and we cannot predict when that review will be complete. When it is, we intend to move forward expeditiously with implementation of the Protocol in the United States.
More than 80 countries have already concluded an Additional Protocol, with about half of these in force. The United States is accelerating diplomatic efforts to encourage other states, which have not already done so, to conclude and implement Additional Protocols of their own. Weare working to make signature of the Additional Protocol a condition of nuclear supply by the end of2005.
Sixth -- strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency by enhancing its capability to ensure compliance by creating a special committee of the IAEA's Board of Governors to focus intensively on safeguards and verification. Let me provide a little background on what problems the special committee proposed by the President could address. Historically, the last such committee established by the Board of Governors, Committee 24, was created following the discovery in 1991 of Iraq's nuclear weapons program. That committee considered approaches for strengthening safeguards under existing legal authorities as well as developed new legal authorities under the Model Additional Protocol. Committee 24's work, however, remained focused on measures related to the activity of state entities.
Recent events have dramatically demonstrated that more attention needs to be paid to the activities of non-state actors. The primary objective for a new committee should be to strengthen incentives for states to comply with their international nonproliferation obligations and the IAEA's safeguards capabilities to allow it effectively to meet new proliferation threats. In so doing, the Committee should be both inward looking (at the Secretariat) and outward looking (at the behavior of member tates). The new committee could also develop initiatives to accelerate acceptance of the Additional Protocol, and review policies regarding sensitive technologies under current safeguards arrangements. The Committee would address nuclear nonproliferation activities from non-state actors, for example, by taking into account lessons learned from Iran's and Libya's covert nuclear program, and considering ways to detect clandestine procurement networks such as the one operated by A. Q. Khan.
Another area that merits reexamination is the decision by the Board of Governors in 1992 that the IAEA's authority to carry out special inspections under comprehensive safeguards agreements, with respect to undeclared locations, are only expected to occur on rare occasions. Since that time, the Board has approved the Model Protocol and more than 80 bilateral agreements with the Agency based on that Model. And, since that decision, four non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT have sought to acquire nuclear weapons. Does it make sense to limit the Agency's capability to conduct special inspections, particularly for those countries that have not brought a Protocol into force?
Finally -- countries under IAEA investigation should not be allowed to exercise the privileges of Board membership and membership on the proposed new Special Committee on Safeguards and Verification. The logic behind this proposal is a very simple one: those who are breaking the rules should not be allowed to participate in decisions regarding enforcement of those rules. This is particularly true if the Board is taking a decision on a safeguards violation by that State.
I would like to offer a suggestion for implementing this proposal. Article XII.C of the Statute states that the "Agency may also, in accordance with Article XIX, suspend any non-complying member from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership." So, clearly a mechanism exists to deal with a country that has been found to be in non-compliance. But, we have all witnessed that there can be an extended period, involving multiple Board meetings, where a country's actions are a matter of intense interest to the Board. For now, let me state that the phrase "under investigation", for purposes of the President's speech, refers to a State that is the subject of an IAEA Board resolution because of safeguards failings, a resolution calling upon the State to rectify those failings and upon the Director General to report back to the Board.
We believe that such a country should neither participate in decision-making with respect to itself nor with respect to other Board decisions. We do not believe that regional groups should nominate for Board membership a country that is actively being investigated by the Agency for safeguards failings nor should the General Conference elect such a state to serve on the Board. How best to achieve this result is an area where we welcome views, but we would hope that there would be general agreement to the basic logic of this proposal. The IAEA and its Board of Governors have faced very difficult noncompliance cases in recent years, and we must ensure that the IAEA has all the tools it needs to fulfill its mandate.
Mr. Chairman,
A realistic appraisal of the challenges we face is sobering. The continued spread of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies threatens the interests of every responsible government, and the future well-being of every person on this planet. But we are beginning to recognize the scope of the problem, and to outline solutions.
As Secretary of State Colin Powell recently observed, there is some good news. The overwhelming majority of states have responsibly complied with their treaty obligations. Those that have not may be having some second thoughts, and hopefully will elect to follow the good examples set by those countries which have renounced nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons programs, including South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus and, most recently, Libya. These states have recognized correctly that such weapons would ultimately make them less, not more, secure.
Resolving the problem of proliferation will not be quick or easy. Terrorists and outlaw regimes will not be dissuaded by high-minded speeches or written agreements. We can begin by fostering an environment in which outlaw behavior is met with universal condemnation and with real consequences that make the costs of proliferation unsustainable. As Under Secretary of State John R. Bolton recently stressed, "Dictators around the world must learn that weapons of mass destruction do not bring influence, prestige or security -- only isolation."
We look forward to working with like-minded states in developing these solutions. No state can win this battle alone. Whatever our individual national priorities may be in securing a higher and richer quality of life for our citizens, I believe we can all agree that our collective and national interests are best served if we combine our efforts to combat and defeat the scourge of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The United States looks forward to working with every country here today to help achieve this goal.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In September 2003, at the United Nations, President Bush said: "All governments that support terror are complicit in a war against civilization. No government should ignore the threat of terror, because to look the other way gives terrorists the chance to regroup and recruit and prepare. And all nations that fight terror, as if the lives of their own people depend on it, will earn the favorable judgment of history."
One of the aspects of the War on Terrorism that gives us a particular sense of urgency is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These terrible weapons are becoming easier to acquire, build, hide, and transport. On February 11, President Bush issued a call to action to address what he considered the" greatest threat before humanity today" -- that is, the possibility of a "secret and sudden attack with chemical or biological or radiological or nuclear weapons." Indeed, the ongoing pursuit of weapons of mass destruction by a handful of states in violation of treaty commitments and international obligations poses multiple risks. Not only do these states put the safety of their neighbors in jeopardy, they also threaten the legal norms that have been painstakingly negotiated by the international community, and encourage an international black market willing and able to put the most dangerous technologies in the hands of the world's most irresponsible regimes and individuals, including terrorists. In short, indiscriminately transferring such sensitive equipment, materials, and technology puts us all at risk.
The United States worked for years to uncover one particular nefarious network - that of A.Q. Khan. Men and women of our own and other intelligence services have done superb and often very dangerous work to expose these operations to the light of day. At last the global community is aware that this network fed nuclear technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea.
Mr. Chairman,
These realities require a change in both our thinking and our tactics. President Bush called for unity among nations in promoting an international environment that actively discourages proliferation. To this end, President Bush proposed seven measures to strengthen the world's efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. To be effective, these measures require strong multilateral support. Today, I would like to outline each of these proposals.
First -- expand the work of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Through improved information sharing and enhanced operational readiness, PSI has created the practical basis for cooperation among states in disrupting the trade in Weapons of Mass Destruction, delivery systems, and related materials. President Bush called for PSI to expand its focus to law enforcement cooperation against pro1iferators, building on both PSI and on the tools already developed to fight terrorism, to prosecute illicit networks and other sources of supply. Since PSI's launch last May, it has gained the support of nearly 60 countries, many of which are represented in this Board, and that number continues to grow. We hope eventually to involve all countries that have the will and capacity to take action on proliferation. Key flag, coastal or transit states, as well as countries that are used by pro1iferators, are particularly important in this endeavor.
Second -- enact and enforce effective domestic laws and controls that support nonproliferation. Governments should crimina1ize proliferation, implement export controls conforming to the highest international standards, and ensure the security of dangerous materials within our territories. If our citizens act contrary to these laws and standards, there must be stiff penalties. President Bush proposed last fall a Security Council resolution calling for such measures. The permanent members of the Security Council are now crafting a resolution designed to meet these goals. We hope to submit a draft soon to the entire Council, and we should all work to see that it is adopted quickly. When it is passed, we stand ready to help states meet the goals of the resolution.
Third -- expand our Cooperative Threat Reduction and other assistance efforts to deal with dangerous weapons and materials. Since proliferation is a global problem, we see opportunities to extend the scope of the G-8 Global Partnership beyond Russia to other states of the former Soviet Union as well as to countries such as Iraq and Libya. The G-8 committed $20 billion over 10 years half of that sum provided by my government. Programs could be expanded for the security and disposition of fissile material, destroying chemical weapons, improving border security, controlling radiological sources, promoting cooperation against bio-terrorism, eliminating the use of highly-enriched uranium fuel in research reactors, and redirecting scientists and other specialists with weapons of mass destruction expertise into peaceful civilian employment, including commercial ventures.
The United States is beginning programs to redirect Iraqi scientists, technicians and engineers with WMD and missile experience or expertise to civilian employment in support of Iraqi reconstruction. In March, a series of workshops will be conducted by American scientific personnel to attract target Iraqi WMD personnel and to help them identify and prioritize large-scale projects in support of Iraqi reconstruction. We currently are working through legal and organizational issues to provide a stable framework for this activity that could be embraced by Iraq once it regains sovereignty.
Similarly, the United States and the United Kingdom are working together to redirect Libyan scientists, technicians and engineers to civilian employment in order to prevent the proliferation of Libyan weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery expertise. This redirection effort could attract additional donor states. We are defining program elements that could be supported by other countries, including by those with limited funds. Civilian projects at the Tajura reactor could be funded through the IAEA Technical Cooperation Program. Libya also will need assistance in meeting minimum international legal, technical, and regulatory standards for controlling high-risk radioactive sources.
Fourth -- prevent governments from developing nuclear weapons under false pretenses. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty sought to strike a balance between preventing proliferation and permitting maximum scope for states to pursue peaceful nuclear programs. Article IV reflects that balance by making clear that any such peaceful nuclear program must be in conformity with nonproliferation provisions of the Treaty. International nuclear commerce has settled into a reliable system that provides reactors and fuel for NPT parties, with the vast majority of states foregoing the large economic and technical challenge of constructing their own enrichment and reprocessing facilities. It is very clear that the peaceful nuclear benefits envisioned under the NPT can be fully realized without building an enrichment or reprocessing plant. Yet, in the last 15 years, a handful of states without any operational power reactors used the black market to covertly acquire enrichment and reprocessing equipment and capabilities in violation of their NPT safeguards agreement.
For this reason, President Bush proposed that the Nuclear Suppliers Group refuse to transfer enrichment or reprocessing equipment or technology to any state that does not already possess a fully functioning enrichment or reprocessing facility. Nuclear Suppliers Group states long ago pledged to provide no such assistance to non-NPT states, and that position remains firm. At the same time, the principal suppliers of nuclear fuel should ensure that states renouncing enrichment and reprocessing would have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors. This initiative is fully compatible with and would strengthen the NPT.
Fifth -- Stimulate acceptance of the Additional Protocol. While under no obligation to do so, the United States negotiated and signed an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. On May 9,2002, the President submitted that Protocol to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. The U.S. Additional Protocol is identical to that which non-nuclear weapons states are being asked to accept, with the exception that the U.S. Protocol does not obligate the United States to apply the Protocol to activities or locations of direct national security significance to the United States. By taking this step, the United States underscores its commitment to combating the potential spread of nuclear weapons, as well as demonstrates that that adherence to the Model Protocol does not place other countries at a commercial disadvantage.
President Bush recently urged the Senate to consent immediately to ratification of the Additional Protocol and, last week, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously to support Senate approval of the Protocol. We expect the full Senate to give the Protocol careful review, and we cannot predict when that review will be complete. When it is, we intend to move forward expeditiously with implementation of the Protocol in the United States.
More than 80 countries have already concluded an Additional Protocol, with about half of these in force. The United States is accelerating diplomatic efforts to encourage other states, which have not already done so, to conclude and implement Additional Protocols of their own. Weare working to make signature of the Additional Protocol a condition of nuclear supply by the end of2005.
Sixth -- strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency by enhancing its capability to ensure compliance by creating a special committee of the IAEA's Board of Governors to focus intensively on safeguards and verification. Let me provide a little background on what problems the special committee proposed by the President could address. Historically, the last such committee established by the Board of Governors, Committee 24, was created following the discovery in 1991 of Iraq's nuclear weapons program. That committee considered approaches for strengthening safeguards under existing legal authorities as well as developed new legal authorities under the Model Additional Protocol. Committee 24's work, however, remained focused on measures related to the activity of state entities.
Recent events have dramatically demonstrated that more attention needs to be paid to the activities of non-state actors. The primary objective for a new committee should be to strengthen incentives for states to comply with their international nonproliferation obligations and the IAEA's safeguards capabilities to allow it effectively to meet new proliferation threats. In so doing, the Committee should be both inward looking (at the Secretariat) and outward looking (at the behavior of member tates). The new committee could also develop initiatives to accelerate acceptance of the Additional Protocol, and review policies regarding sensitive technologies under current safeguards arrangements. The Committee would address nuclear nonproliferation activities from non-state actors, for example, by taking into account lessons learned from Iran's and Libya's covert nuclear program, and considering ways to detect clandestine procurement networks such as the one operated by A. Q. Khan.
Another area that merits reexamination is the decision by the Board of Governors in 1992 that the IAEA's authority to carry out special inspections under comprehensive safeguards agreements, with respect to undeclared locations, are only expected to occur on rare occasions. Since that time, the Board has approved the Model Protocol and more than 80 bilateral agreements with the Agency based on that Model. And, since that decision, four non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT have sought to acquire nuclear weapons. Does it make sense to limit the Agency's capability to conduct special inspections, particularly for those countries that have not brought a Protocol into force?
Finally -- countries under IAEA investigation should not be allowed to exercise the privileges of Board membership and membership on the proposed new Special Committee on Safeguards and Verification. The logic behind this proposal is a very simple one: those who are breaking the rules should not be allowed to participate in decisions regarding enforcement of those rules. This is particularly true if the Board is taking a decision on a safeguards violation by that State.
I would like to offer a suggestion for implementing this proposal. Article XII.C of the Statute states that the "Agency may also, in accordance with Article XIX, suspend any non-complying member from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership." So, clearly a mechanism exists to deal with a country that has been found to be in non-compliance. But, we have all witnessed that there can be an extended period, involving multiple Board meetings, where a country's actions are a matter of intense interest to the Board. For now, let me state that the phrase "under investigation", for purposes of the President's speech, refers to a State that is the subject of an IAEA Board resolution because of safeguards failings, a resolution calling upon the State to rectify those failings and upon the Director General to report back to the Board.
We believe that such a country should neither participate in decision-making with respect to itself nor with respect to other Board decisions. We do not believe that regional groups should nominate for Board membership a country that is actively being investigated by the Agency for safeguards failings nor should the General Conference elect such a state to serve on the Board. How best to achieve this result is an area where we welcome views, but we would hope that there would be general agreement to the basic logic of this proposal. The IAEA and its Board of Governors have faced very difficult noncompliance cases in recent years, and we must ensure that the IAEA has all the tools it needs to fulfill its mandate.
Mr. Chairman,
A realistic appraisal of the challenges we face is sobering. The continued spread of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies threatens the interests of every responsible government, and the future well-being of every person on this planet. But we are beginning to recognize the scope of the problem, and to outline solutions.
As Secretary of State Colin Powell recently observed, there is some good news. The overwhelming majority of states have responsibly complied with their treaty obligations. Those that have not may be having some second thoughts, and hopefully will elect to follow the good examples set by those countries which have renounced nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons programs, including South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus and, most recently, Libya. These states have recognized correctly that such weapons would ultimately make them less, not more, secure.
Resolving the problem of proliferation will not be quick or easy. Terrorists and outlaw regimes will not be dissuaded by high-minded speeches or written agreements. We can begin by fostering an environment in which outlaw behavior is met with universal condemnation and with real consequences that make the costs of proliferation unsustainable. As Under Secretary of State John R. Bolton recently stressed, "Dictators around the world must learn that weapons of mass destruction do not bring influence, prestige or security -- only isolation."
We look forward to working with like-minded states in developing these solutions. No state can win this battle alone. Whatever our individual national priorities may be in securing a higher and richer quality of life for our citizens, I believe we can all agree that our collective and national interests are best served if we combine our efforts to combat and defeat the scourge of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The United States looks forward to working with every country here today to help achieve this goal.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.